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2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Turkey Spoils

Turkey spoils issues even if they have NATO consensus – they’re using disputes over Sweden and Finland to air other grievances

Karadsheh and Sariyuce ‘22 - Jomana Karadsheh is an international correspondent based in the network's Istanbul Bureau; Isil Sariyuce is a journalist for CNN and Reuters (CNN, “Why is Turkey causing problems for Finland and Sweden’s plans to join NATO?”, May 19, 2022, )//RG

Just when it seemed like Finland and Sweden’s accession into NATO was imminent, Turkey has taken its allies by surprise by throwing a wrench into the works. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Thursday that Turkey planned to reject the two nations’ bids to join the alliance, after having accused them earlier of being “like guesthouses for terror organizations.” “We told relevant friends that we will say no to Sweden’s and Finland’s entry into NATO and we will continue our path like that,” he said during a conference with students in Ankara. Finland and Sweden formally applied to join NATO on Wednesday at Allied headquarters in Brussels, driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The decision represents a setback for Moscow, with the war in Ukraine triggering the kind of enlargement of the alliance that it invaded Ukraine to prevent. Accession of new states however requires consensus among existing members, and that’s where Ankara comes in. Turkey, which joined the alliance three years after it was established in 1949 and has the group’s second largest army, has said it won’t support the bids unless its demands are met. Erdogan accused the two countries of harboring members of the separatist militant Kurdistan’s Workers Party, also known as PKK. The PKK, which seeks an independent state in Turkey, has been in an armed struggle with that country for decades and has been designated a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union. He said on Wednesday that Sweden should not expect Turkey to approve its bid without returning “terrorists,” and Swedish and Finnish delegations should not come to Turkey to convince it to back their membership in the alliance. US President Joe Biden met with Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson and Finnish President Sauli Niinistö at the White House to discuss their NATO applications on Thursday, pledging them the “complete backing” of the United States. When asked on Wednesday how he will convince Turkey to support Finland and Sweden’s bids for membership, Biden told reporters, “I think we’re gonna be OK.” The crisis has brought to the fore longstanding Turkish grievances against Western nations and NATO allies, while it has given Ankara an opportunity to use its position in the alliance to extract concessions. Turkey has complained about the lack of support it has received in its fight against Kurdish militants, which Ankara perceives as its top national security threat. It has accused Sweden of harboring its adversaries and providing support to Kurdish militants in northern Syria, whom Ankara considers an extension of the PKK. Ankara also says that the two nations haven’t responded to extradition requests, according to state media. The wanted individuals are accused of having links to the PKK as well as FETO – the group led by US-based cleric Fetullah Gulen whom Turkey believes was behind the 2016 failed coup attempt (an allegation Gulen denies). Finland and Sweden voiced optimism on Tuesday that common ground can be found with Turkey over its objections. Sweden’s finance minister Mikael Damberg told public broadcaster SVT on Monday that his country is not a “friend of terrorism,” and that it takes “very seriously anything that has to do with terrorism.” “We will of course use diplomacy, we will clarify any possible uncertainties,” he said. Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde said on Saturday that her country, just like the rest of the EU, considered PKK a terrorist organization. The government has said it is ready to iron out any obstacles in talks with Turkey. Ankara has also demanded that Sweden and Finland drop an arms embargo that was slapped on Turkey in 2019 following its military offensive in northeastern Syria. Turkey launched the operation against the Kurdish-led YPG forces that were allied with the United States and other Western nations in their fight against ISIS. The offensive drew condemnation from the US and the EU, and led several European countries to impose an arms embargo on Ankara. “We would not say yes to those who impose sanctions on Turkey to join NATO,” Erdogan told reporters Monday evening. “Because then NATO would cease to be a security organization and become a place where representatives of terrorist organizations are concentrated.” The Turkish President is no stranger to fiery rhetoric, particularly around the time of elections, when a boost on the home front could help at the polls. Turkey goes to elections next year and experts believe the current state of the economy – record-high inflation and a currency that has lost nearly half its value in the past year – will cost Erdogan at the polls. Analysts say that Turkey’s veto in NATO may be used as leverage not just against future members, but current ones too. “It may not all be about Sweden and Finland,” Asli Aydintasbas, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations wrote in an article. “The president almost certainly sees this as an opportune moment to air his grievances about existing NATO members, especially with the Biden administration, which has kept the Turkish leader at arm’s length.” A key issue might be the Turkish President’s disappointment at being unable to establish a working relationship with Biden as he did with his predecessors, according to Aydintasbas. Erdogan complained to reporters last month that he and Biden didn’t have the kind of relationship he had with Presidents Trump and Obama. “Of course, there are some meetings from time to time, but they should’ve been more advanced,” he said. “My wish is that we can achieve this in the following process.” This isn’t the first time Turkey has objected to new members, Aydintasbas pointed out. “It is unlikely that Erdogan had one specific policy goal in mind, but he will no doubt expect to be cajoled, persuaded, and eventually rewarded for his cooperation, as in the past,” Aydintasbas wrote on Monday referring to previous Turkish veto threats within NATO. While Turkey has security concerns that even the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said must be addressed, the optics are far from flattering, with Turkey choosing to air its grievances and appear as a spoiler at a time when the alliance’s unity may have never been more important.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Turkey Spoils

Cohesion is impossible – plan can’t overcome Franco-Turkish divide

Antonopoulos ’20 — Paul; Doctorate researcher based in Athens. He has a special interest in international relations, with a particular focus on multipolarity and the geographic space between ancient civilizational countries stretching from Greece to India. June 30, 2020; “NATO’s Appeasement to Turkey Is Pushing France Out of the Alliance”; Global Research; ; //CYang

French President Emmanuel Macron created a stir last November when he said that NATO is experiencing a “brain death.” This single comment created a flurry of reactions as Member States attempted to justify the existence of NATO. Macron’s comments must be taken seriously when we consider that France in 1959 withdrew its Mediterranean Fleet from NATO command and in 1966 the French military left NATO’s integrated military command and demanded all foreign NATO soldiers to leave France. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk attempted to guilt the highly independent French President Charles de Gaulle for his decision to kick out foreign soldiers by asking if “the bodies of American soldiers in France’s cemeteries” who died in the two world wars also had to leave.

It was the Anglo-American hegemony that de Gaulle resisted, and it can be argued that Macron is attempting to re-establish France’s independence after former French President Nicolas Sarkozy reintegrated France into NATO in 2009. A clear indicator that Macron is following in the steps of de Gaulle is when he furthered the former president’s famous phrase that Europe stretches “from Lisbon to the Urals” in Russia by saying Europe’s territory stretches all the way to Vladivostok near the Chinese and North Korean borders.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Turkey Spoils

Turkish obstacles are multi-dimensional the plan can’t overcome

Kunz 2021

Barbra, senior researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. She specializes in European security and the debates surrounding it, with a special emphasis on France and Germany. “’There is No “Europe’: Disagreements Within NATO Are Not Solely Transatlantic and Pertain to the Fundamentals of European Security”, NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (157-176), 2021.dmr

Under current circumstances, the most prominent cases of disputes among NATO members include Turkey, in an overall context of the country’s government no longer interested in being an integral part of the ‘West.’4 Tensions occur both at the bilateral level between Turkey and individual members of the Alliance—notably with Turkey’s ‘traditional’ antagonist Greece, but also the United States and France—and at the multilateral level, with Ankara blocking strategic cooperation between the NATO and the European Union or NATO and partner countries such as Armenia, Jordan, or Israel. Greece and Turkey have a longstanding conflict over Cyprus, as well as disputes over natural resources in contested waters. The United States notably ejected Turkey from the F-35 program after Turkey purchased the S-400 air defense system from Russia.5 Franco-Turkish tensions, finally, are multi-dimensional in nature and range from personal attacks between presidents Erdoğan and Macron, religious and cultural issues, to geo-strategic rivalry.6 The two countries even came close to a military clash in the Eastern Mediterranean in the summer of 2020. France’s frigate Courbet, part of NATO’s maritime security Operation Sea Guardian, was illuminated by Turkish targeting radar when approaching a cargo ship suspected of breaching the arms embargo in Libya, escorted by the Turkish navy. As France did not obtain the desired support among other NATO allies in the incident’s aftermath, it temporarily withdrew from Operation Sea Guardian.7 Paris’ positioning on Libya, where it unofficially sided with General Haftar, is widely considered to be the cause for this absence of support from other NATO members. Beyond NATO, these issues also matter in the EU context where Germany and other EU member states blocked the adoption of sanctions against Turkey.8 Western Europeans are thus not on the same page when it comes to dealing with Turkey, which is hardly surprising given their very different relations with Ankara. Moreover, the fact that the European Union—and Germany as the main actor behind the so-called EU-Turkey refugee deal9 in particular—has made itself dependent on Turkey to control flows of migration to Europe limits its room for maneuver.10 Beyond bilateral conflicts, security dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean are increasingly a cause for concern.11 These include, inter alia, conflicting territorial claims and conflicts over natural resources or countries’ positioning in the Syrian and Libyan wars—with, in all cases, Turkey as a key actor. Likewise, Turkey’s actions in the September 2020 flare-up of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been analyzed as the country’s “pursuing the goal of undermining the current status quo in the region.”12 Ankara’s military offensives in Syria against Kurdish-led forces, fighting against ISIS as US allies, also revealed deep rifts among NATO countries and further complicated the situation in the Middle East.13 All these incidents point toward the structural estrangement between the West, NATO, and Turkey rather than merely differences over policies that can be solved by compromise. They are therefore likely to have long-term implications for the Alliance’s cohesion and ability to act, including in shaping a closer relationship between NATO and the European Union as one of the key undertakings of Euro-Atlantic security.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Turkey Spoils

Erdogan won’t say yes — he’s a hard-liner — BUT even if he does, the process will still undermine solvency.

Zaman ‘5-16 —Amberin; senior correspondent reporting from the Middle East, North Africa and Europe exclusively for Al-Monitor. Zaman has been a columnist for Al-Monitor for the past five years, examining the politics of Turkey, Iraq and Syria and writing the daily Briefly Turkey newsletter. Prior to Al-Monitor, Zaman covered Turkey, the Kurds and conflicts in the region for The Washington Post, The Daily Telegraph, The Los Angeles Times and the Voice of America. May 16, 2022; "Turkey continues to play hard ball over Sweden, Finland NATO membership"; Al-Monitor: The Pulse of the Middle East; https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/05/turkey-continues-play-hard-ball-over-sweden-finland- NATO-membership; //CYang

Tensions within NATO over Turkey’s demands for concessions from Finland and Sweden in exchange for backing the Nordic states’ membership of the Western alliance show no signs of abating, even as Western officials seek to play them down. Sweden confirmed today that it is sending a delegation to Ankara to discuss its decision to formally apply for NATO membership in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The move is further evidence that Turkey’s objections have not been overcome. Upping the ante, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said today they “need not bother to come” unless military sanctions imposed by the Nordic countries on Turkey were rescinded. “The crisis mode is confirmed,” a source with close knowledge of the discussions told Al-Monitor. The source said there were few signs, if any, that Turkey was ready to drop its demands that both countries cease what Ankara calls their support for “terrorists.” It is referring in particular to Kurdish groups sympathetic to imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan and Pennsylvania-based Sunni cleric Fethullah Gulen. Turkey accuses Gulen of orchestrating the failed attempt to violently overthrow the government in 2016. Turkey’s Islamic-leaning Justice and Development Party government is also demanding that both countries end their arms embargoes on Turkey over its military intervention in 2019 against the Kurds in northeast Syria. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said on Sunday that progress was being made with Finland on the issue but that Sweden was continuing to be “provocative.” He did not elaborate. US Secretary of State Tony Blinken said he had spoken to Cavusoglu after a meeting of NATO foreign ministers that was held Sunday in Berlin, and he was confident that consensus could be struck. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said he was confident that “we will be able to address the concerns that Turkey has expressed in a way that doesn’t delay the membership or accession process.” Turkey’s real beef is with Sweden, a long-time sanctuary for Turkish dissidents of all stripes since 1980 when Turkey’s generals carried out their last hard coup. In Sunday’s meeting, Cavusoglu was described by the source as being “very tough.” Cavusoglu demanded that Sweden and Finland publicly acknowledge that there are links between Ocalan’s Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Syrian Kurdish groups running the autonomous region in northeast Syria that is protected by US special operation forces. Cavusgolu singled out Sweden’s Foreign Minister Ann Linde and what he called her “so-called feminist policy.” It was an overt swipe at Linde’s overt embrace of the Syrian Kurdish leadership, which has strong female representation in keeping with Ocalan’s emphasis on gender equality. Ilham Ahmed, the executive president of the Syrian Democratic Council, one of the main arms of the Syrian Kurdish administration, has met numerous times with Linde in Stockholm. Britain’s Foreign Secretary Liz Truss pushed back “very hard” against Cavusoglu, saying the priority should be “to not send the wrong message to Russia.” “Finland Sweden’s decision to seek NATO membership is a historic step. The position of Turkey and the Erdogan regime on this is frankly bizarre and not surprising,” said Feryal Clark, the first Kurdish Turkish member of the UK parliament for Labor and a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. “It’s another example of Erdogan’s regime trying to further isolate and cut off support for Kurdish minorities,” she told Al-Monitor. In 2020, Linde angered Cavusoglu by telling him that Turkey must withdraw from northeast Syria. The Turkish Justice Ministry on Monday announced that Ankara had requested the extradition of six alleged PKK members from Finland and 11 alleged PKK members from Sweden. Ankara’s demands have struck a raw nerve in Sweden, a country that has long prided itself on putting human rights first in its foreign policy. “Ankara’s statements do raise concern in Sweden, as they come at a time when the [ruling] Social Democrats have just taken a very difficult decision to change position on the question of NATO membership,” noted Paul Levin, director of Stockholm University’s Institute for Turkish Studies. Turkey’s demands of the Swedish government “hits right at the reason many on the left have been uneasy over NATO membership — the fear that Sweden would lose its voice on matters concerning human rights and democracy.” “There is a great deal of sympathy for the Kurdish cause, especially on the left, and I think it will be difficult [for Sweden] to make any meaningful concessions,” Levin told Al-Monitor. And with elections looming in Turkey and Sweden alike, “There is a risk that a mutual inability to be seen as backing down could make for a difficult road ahead,” Levin added. “The issue is serious,” concurred Aaron Stein, director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a think tank in Philadelphia. Stein sees parallels with Turkey’s reaction to US support for the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Sweden’s “big sin,” he told Al-Monitor, is “that they adopted the same policy as the United States, which is that they view the YPG and the PKK as separate entities.” Sweden is one of the first countries to have followed in Turkey’s steps, treating the PKK as a terrorist organization since the early 1980s. “They are using a strict interpretation of the law to facilitate a policy in Syria of using the YPG to go after the Islamic State,” Stein noted, much as the United States has done, leading to a meltdown in US Turkish ties. This is hardly the first time that Erdogan is playing hardball with NATO. In 2009, Turkey withdrew its objections to the nomination of Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a former Danish prime minister, to lead the alliance only after the last-minute intervention by then-President Barack Obama. Turkey was opposed to Rasmussen because of his defense of free speech in the midst of the Danish cartoons crisis over depictions of the Prophet Mohammed that were deemed to be blasphemous. In 2019, Turkey held up defense plans for the Baltic states and Poland, insisting that NATO needed to recognize the YPG as a terrorist threat and defend Turkey against it. “It took some bureaucratic chicanery to get that one through,” recalled Stein. This included greater Turkish representation in the higher echelons of NATO. “Of course [the current crisis] probably will be worked out, but again, they made a spectacle, and in so doing, they undermined NATO solidarity at a time when two members want to join because they correctly fear Russian aggression. Turkey elevated its own security issues over those of the collective security of the alliance.”

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Turkey Spoils

Empirics prove — here’s a slew of examples.

Crowley & Erlanger ‘5-30 — Michael Crowley is a diplomatic correspondent in the Washington bureau. Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times. May 30, 2022; "For NATO, Turkey Is a Disruptive Ally"; New York Times; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/30/us/politics/turkey- NATO-russia.html; //CYang

Within an alliance that operates by consensus, the Turkish strongman has come to be seen as something of a stickup artist. In 2009, he blocked the appointment of a new NATO chief from Denmark, complaining that the country was too tolerant of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and too sympathetic to “Kurdish terrorists” based in Turkey. It took hours of cajoling by Western leaders, and a face-to-face promise from President Barack Obama that NATO would appoint a Turk to a leadership position, to satisfy Mr. Erdogan. After a rupture in relations between Turkey and Israel the next year, Mr. Erdogan prevented the alliance from working with the Jewish state for six years. A few years later, Mr. Erdogan delayed for months a NATO plan to fortify Eastern European countries against Russia, again citing Kurdish militants and demanding that the alliance declare ones operating in Syria to be terrorists. In 2020, Mr. Erdogan sent a gas-exploration ship backed by fighter jets close to Greek waters, causing France to send ships in support of Greece, also a NATO member. Now the Turkish leader is back in the role of obstructionist, and is once again invoking the Kurds, as he charges that Sweden and Finland sympathize with the Kurdish militants he has made his main enemy. “These countries have almost become guesthouses for terrorist organizations,” he said this month. “It is not possible for us to be in favor.” Mr. Erdogan’s stance is a reminder of a long-festering problem for NATO, which currently has 30 members. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may have given the alliance a new sense of mission, but NATO must still contend with an authoritarian leader willing to use his leverage to gain political points at home by blocking consensus — at least for a time.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Illiberal Spoil

NATO has no solidarity – illiberal members spoil the plan – the plan can’t overcome these structural differences

Dempsey ’18 — Judy; nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe. April 3, 2018; "NATO’s Bad Apples"; Carnegie Europe; https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75962; //CYang

Over the past few years — and in particular, over the past nine months — several members of the U.S.-led military alliance have run roughshod over NATO solidarity and the basic principles upon which the alliance was founded in April 1949. Turkey, for example, actually revealed the positions of French troops in northeast Syria. Since 2016, according to the AFP, these forces have been based in areas controlled by the YPG/PKK. The Kurdish YPG dominates the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently sharply criticized his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron, for meeting SDF leaders in Paris and for offering to mediate between the SDF and Turkey. For Erdoğan, that was tantamount to negotiating with the Syrian branch of the PKK, which Ankara insists is a terrorist organization. Yet Erdoğan went further. A Turkish news agency revealed the positions of the French forces. What sort of solidarity and discretion does that amount to, when one ally could endanger another? Closer to home, NATO has to contend with Poland and Hungary undermining the independence of the judiciary and an independent media, not to mention that way in which nongovernmental organizations in Hungary have been vilified and refugees refused shelter. Then there is the corruption in the alliance’s newest member, Montenegro, and the persistent attacks on the judiciary and anticorruption watchdogs in Romania. Altogether, these examples do much to undermine NATO as an alliance, whose members pledge “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.” Back in the last 1940s, the rule of law and democracy didn’t matter that much for NATO. The alliance’s priorities focused on the security, safety, and protection of its members (in short, the West). When Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, their membership was about bolstering the defenses of this part of Europe against the Soviet threat. Geostrategic interests and strengthening the anti-Communist bulwark took precedence over the rule of law and strong, democratic, accountable institutions. In recent years, when it’s come to countries wanting to join NATO, there has been more emphasis on values and democracy. But in its own home, NATO’s record for upholding basic principles is far from stellar. And its reluctance to criticize its allies exposes some of its intrinsic weaknesses. The first is that NATO countries are loathed to criticize each other, either publicly or even behind closed doors in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) — the forum in which alliance ambassadors meet. The NAC got its fingers badly burned during the U.S-led war against Iraq in 2002. Apart from NATO countries being so bitterly divided over the invasion, NAC sessions often ended up in shouting matches between the American and French ambassadors. NATO’s fragility was exposed for all to see. Yet, wasn’t it necessary for ambassadors to speak out? Yes, they are constrained by their own governments. But if NATO could not — and did not — speak out against torture, or renditions, or the illegality of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, or what is now happening to Turkey’s democratic institutions, then what does that say about the alliance’s principles? The second weakness is that NATO doesn’t have formal mechanisms to suspend an ally. And even if it wanted to discipline a member, that would require consensus.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 2nc Illiberal Spoil

Democratic backsliding ensures political divisions wrecking NATO cohesion

Flockhart 2021

Trine Flockhart is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and Public Management at the University of Southern Denmark and Co-Director of the Center for War Studies. Trine’s research focuses on international order and processes of change and transformation, the crisis in the liberal international order, resilience and NATO and transatlantic relations. “Democratic Backsliding and Contested Values Within the Alliance,” NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (177-194), 2021.dmr

The authors of the 2030 report are correct in emphasizing the importance of NATO’s commitment to shared values, but it must also be recognized that in the current political environment, agreement about those values can no longer be taken for granted—this is the case both within the Alliance, but it is also a wider problem reflecting that there is now a broadly shared consensus that the basic norms underpinning the overall liberal international order are under pressure and that global politics will be shaped by open disagreements about its basic values.8 The very same challenging international security environment that makes the commitment essential has also stirred political sentiments within the Alliance that may make it difficult—perhaps even impossible—for the Alliance to live up to the commitment. Democracy today is in crisis and NATO’s foundational values are contested in several member states such as Hungary, Turkey, and even Poland. In these member states, the possibility of democratic backsliding is today no longer unthinkable—it is already taking place.9 Even some of the oldest democracies—the United States, Britain, and France—face diminishing confidence in their democratic institutions and significant disruptions in their domestic politics. The rise of right-wing, authoritarian-style populism and an apparent mainstreaming of national(ist) politics is no longer just an abstract threat but a reality that is currently in the process of altering long established cleavage structures in party politics.11 These changes seem likely to result in new political divisions within the Alliance between liberal internationalism and illiberal nationalism. Clearly such a situation will have profound ramifications for cohesion within the Alliance and for the continued shared commitment to NATO’s foundational values. This chapter asks if the Alliance can continue to live up to its commitment to “democracy, individual liberty and rule of law” and asks how democratic backsliding may constitute an existential threat to NATO. The chapter consists of four sections. The first section outlines how NATO has historically been able to adapt to a frequently changing external strategic environment to meet a seemingly never-ending stream of crises—qualities that arguably made NATO a resilient institution. In the second section, the chapter attributes NATO’s resilience to the ability of the Alliance to balance between two different, but intertwined identities—an identity as a defense alliance and an identity as a community of values.12 The chapter demonstrates that historically, NATO’s crises, tensions, and contradictions have primarily been associated with the identity as a defense alliance, whereas the value foundation of the Alliance has been continuously reinforced and reified through deeply embedded practices associated with NATO’s identity as a community of values. In the third section, the chapter shows that today, the situation has changed fundamentally as the Alliance is doing well in areas that have historically caused the most concern such as its military capabilities, whereas NATO’s assumed bedrock of strength—its stable identity, deeply embedded practices, and shared values—is now contested from within its own ranks. In the final section, the chapter turns to contemplating NATO’s future and the prospects for NATO not only to return to long-established practices to reinforce the shared values of the Alliance, but also the prospects for the Alliance to reorient itself towards a very different and challenging strategic environment.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Spoilers/ “No” › 1nc Illiberal Spoil

Spoilers will ruin the process.

Basu ’5-18 — Zachary; national security reporter at Axios. "Strongmen spoilers in Turkey and Hungary threaten Western unity"; Axios; https://www.axios.com/2022/05/18/turkey- NATO-finland-sweden-hungary-russia; //CYang

Why it matters: Critics have accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of employing a "hostage-taking" tactic also practiced by Hungary, which for weeks has been singlehandedly blocking the European Union from imposing an embargo on Russian oil. The outsized influence of single-member states in the EU and NATO has drawn increased scrutiny in recent years, especially as both Hungary and Turkey have drifted toward authoritarianism and strengthened their ties with Russia. Their resistance to two critical Western priorities risks undermining the united front that leaders like President Biden have touted as key to effectively responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Driving the news: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who has said he is "very confident" all NATO allies will ultimately approve Sweden and Finland's applications, will meet on Wednesday with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. Çavuşoğlu said Sunday that in exchange for Turkey lifting its opposition, Sweden and Finland must end their alleged support for Kurdish groups that Turkey views as terrorists and a top national security threat. Turkey is also expected to use its leverage to seek bilateral concessions from the U.S., including speeding up the potential sale of F-16 fighter jets. Between the liens: Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, director of the German Marshall Fund's office in Ankara, told Axios that Erdoğan "saw an opportunity to extract some benefits both for Turkey and for his own political standing" ahead of a crucial election next year. Erdoğan believes he's "more or less free to do whatever he wants," Ünlühisarcıklı said. He argued it's hard to stand up to Erdogan on this issue, given the high stakes of Sweden and Finland's NATO applications, and the unique role Turkey is playing in Ukraine as both a mediator in peace talks and supplier of highly effective drones. Critics, meanwhile, say the stunt could set a precedent for other NATO leaders to essentially seek bribes in moments of crisis — with some going as far as to call Turkey a "Trojan horse" within the Western alliance. Zoom out: That label has long been used to describe Hungary's role as a spoiler within the EU. Hungary's far-right prime minister Viktor Orbán is viewed as the most pro-Russian leader in the EU, and for weeks has used his veto to prevent the bloc from banning imports of Russian oil. In the meantime, Orbán has used his leverage to pressure the EU to send Hungary a financial compensation package — effectively neutralizing Brussels' landmark decision this year to withhold pandemic recovery funds from Hungary over its democratic backsliding.

2022 Michigan Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › Say “No” › 1nc No US Cred

Allies say no --- Afghan withdrawal makes the US look like an uncredible partner

Cooper 21, nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council, a former assistant secretary at the Department of State, and a US Army combat veteran (R Clarek, American security cooperation needs an ‘integrity check’,” Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/american-security-cooperation-needs-an-integrity-check/)

Yet successful security cooperation—which includes arms transfers, training, security assistance, treaties, or agreements—is built around two key principles: trust and integrity of commitment, both of which are at risk today thanks to the haphazard US withdrawal from Afghanistan. In the US military, the term “integrity check” refers to a concern about an individual’s or unit’s capability or trustworthiness. Following the debacle in Kabul, the United States and its global security cooperation posture is in dire need of one. Just look at the anger expressed by stalwart NATO allies such as the United Kingdom, which in the aftermath of 9/11 unquestionably joined in to invoke the Washington Treaty’s Article 5 for collective self-defense (the first time the Alliance ever did so). That NATO launched its first operations outside the Euro-Atlantic area and began a far-reaching transformation of capabilities signaled its trust in the United States’ reliability when it came to security cooperation. Now, treaty allies and partner nations are reassessing their bilateral security relationships with the United States. It’s not just the NATO states caught off-guard by the haphazard departure from Afghanistan that will think twice before embarking upon future military campaigns with the United States. Resolute defense partners in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific—including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—likely also need overt reassurance, such as a clear national-security strategy and declared recommitments. Additionally, these partners are increasingly feeling the need to proactively raise their own defense capabilities by boosting their budgets or coordinating with allies to ensure regional security along with the United States. Besides stress-testing the integrity of American security cooperation, the Afghanistan withdrawal also highlights the necessity of staying the course on long-term investment in mutually beneficial security partnerships with countries with which the United States has shared interests—or shared threats. Well before the fall of Afghanistan, foreign partners were already questioning the reliability of the United States at a time when the debate in Washington about our global posture was becoming increasingly politicized. The case for partnering with the United States needs to be clearly articulated through the presence, performance, and processes of American security cooperation. The quality of US aerospace and defense equipment, the commitment to build capabilities, and the reassurance that comes from partnering with the US military must include further transparency, accountability, and predictability of policies. If not, American allies and partners will be hesitant to collaborate with us on future shared security requirements—or simply seek cooperation elsewhere.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Mission Objectives › 2nc Militarism

Misaligned strategies guarantee failure - three reasons

Rauen et al 18 (Brian Rauen, Terri Erisman, and Edward Ballanco are officers in the U.S. Army and graduates of the U.S. Army War College class of 2018. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense.” MORE IS NOT BETTER: FIXING SECURITY COOPERATION”, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/more-is-not-better-fixing-security-cooperation/)LR

First, each host nation has its own unique structure, interests, and strategy to address threats. Each partner military operates within a set of authorities, regulations, and other constraints or limitations that also impact the efficacy of U.S. security cooperation engagements. The relationship with the host nation can be particularly challenging as misalignment of strategies may reflect a classic principle-agent problem, a simple communication problem between well-meaning partners, or a combination of both. Security cooperation has the most potential to be effective when the strategic, operational, and tactical aspects for the United States and its partner align. Second, U.S. national, regional and partner-specific goals may not be coherent or compatible. U.S. national interests are typically broad and may be in competition with one another. For instance, one U.S. interest in a country may be prevention of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens while a potentially competing interest is the adherence to the rule of law, including due process, by the partner nation. Geographic combatant commands (GCC) develop an overarching regional campaign plan and use security cooperation engagements to support that plan, but these efforts may not align with those of the U.S. Ambassador and country team, who also develop a concept for advancing U.S. interests and engagements in their respective countries. The country team is in theory the focal point for integrating all U.S. Government programs and perspectives, including the COCOM strategies and security assistance efforts. Their regular engagement with the host nation contributes to a more detailed and in-depth understanding of the partner, the unique challenges they face, and the viability of U.S. strategies. Yet their country focus does not encourage a holistic view of regional goals to the same degree as the GCC. Assessments and feedback provided by rotational forces, visiting personnel, and analysts in Washington can be incongruent with the perspectives of the country team and lead to disagreements about how to engage effectively. Finally, the goals of U.S. military service-provided units often differ from those of the regional or country-specific teams. Service-provided units are usually not assigned to the GCC. As rotational forces, acting under their respective service component command, they typically execute security cooperation in a decentralized manner. Whereas the services are responsible for manning, training, and equipping their forces to ensure they are ready for deployment, the GCC is focused on its campaigns and strategies. While the two should be mutually supporting, some units deploy with limited knowledge or awareness of long term strategic objectives and therefore focus on their service-directed requirements. In Mali, for example, some units on small-scale deployments viewed their engagements primarily as a unit training opportunity or solely in support of a foreign military sales case, not as part of the plan to facilitate security.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Mission Objectives › 2nc Militarism

Failure to make institutional changes ensures SC fails

Gwinn 4-19 (Jeremy Gwinn, PhD inInternational Relations at Tufts University, MBA in Finance at UNC Kenan-Flagler Business School, BA in History, Middle East Studies, and Military Science at Penn State University. Teaching Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, Director, Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at DOD, active-duty Army officer and national security professional. Doctoral research focused on U.S. national security policy and unconventional warfare after 9/11. Professional experience includes leading 700+ person organizations, overseas operations in complex, multi-national environments, service in the Pentagon, and teaching and conducting research at West Point, The Fletcher School, and Harvard. “SWEETER CARROTS AND HARDER STICKS: RETHINKING U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE” https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/sweeter-carrots-and-harder-sticks-rethinking-u-s-security-assistance/)LR

The more recent U.S. experience in Iraq from 2003 until the withdrawal in 2011 contains echoes of Vietnam. David Lake’s study of that conflict suggests that provision of unconditional security assistance may still be America’s default setting. Despite massive volumes of military aid provided to the Iraqi government during this period, U.S. urging to reform the security forces and national government repeatedly failed. Nouri al-Maliki, prime minister during much of this period, resisted efforts to make the armed forces more broadly inclusive and apolitical, instead continuing to employ them as his own sectarian instrument. Again, the United States used an approach focused on training and equipping, known in the current lexicon as building partner capacity. The Iraqi government received assistance regardless of its effort, or lack thereof, to implement much-needed reform while the United States failed to use the leverage which hundreds of millions of dollars of assistance could buy. Several years later, the Iraqi military in which the United States had invested so much fell apart virtually upon first contact with the Islamic State’s irregular militia. The “building partner capacity” approach has two main flaws. First, it ignores fundamental problems, such as corruption, coup-proofing, and otherwise weak defense institutions which additional military capacity cannot overcome and may even exacerbate. Paradoxically, a focus primarily on capacity-building often fails to build meaningful, long-term capacity because it neglects underlying institutional problems. Second, it ignores principal-agent problems by assuming that once in possession of highly capable security forces, the partner will wield them in a manner aligned with U.S. interests. U.S. advisors and diplomats may recognize the pressing need for security sector reform in the partner. Unfortunately, the ingrained culture of U.S. security assistance seemingly relies on the false premise that with enough U.S. training and relationship-building, other countries’ militaries will voluntarily reform even though it is often not in their personal interests to do so. The United States is not getting the most for its security assistance dollars. Programs intended to build partner capacity tend to underperform because they fail to address underlying weakness in defense institutions or take principal-agent problems into account. To build meaningful, long-lasting capacity in partners and better align security assistance with policy goals, the United States should shift from a “building partner capacity” approach to a reform focus using conditional aid as leverage. Doing so in an environment where security assistance is yet another arena for strategic competition with Russia, China, and others will require internal reform of the U.S. security assistance apparatus. Rather than a slow-moving bureaucracy, the United States needs an agile and streamlined security assistance enterprise able to deliver aid rapidly when needed and be paused or turned off just as easily when conditions require. In short, the United States needs sweeter carrots and harder sticks.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Mission Objectives › 1nc Technicism/Militarism Focus Fails

Technicism ensures failure – internal DOD politics and the interorganizational politics prevent effective security cooperation

Young 2020

Thomas-Durell, phd, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School, “The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance” September 10, 2020, dmr

The intrinsically political nature of military organizations is no less true when it comes to armies’ efforts in the education, training, and equipping of foreign partner nations’ armed forces, known as security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA). Yet much of the American bureaucracy and legal framework for these activities treat them as fundamentally technical problems that are susceptible to improvement through better procedures. This technicism, to purloin a term from Samuel Huntington,4 is arguably at the heart of many of our failures and disappointments in building partner security forces (for example, those of Afghanistan,5 Iraq,6 and Mali7) or in reforming defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe.8 Virtually every fix proposed to partners is yet another technical or bureaucratic adjustment rather than an acknowledgment of the fundamentally political nature of these activities, both within a partner nation as well as among U.S. agencies responsible for planning and carrying out the assistance programs. The objective of this article is to argue that administration officials and Congress face two different political challenges related to improving SC and SA. Unless and until U.S. officials formulate solutions to these political problems, both branches of government will struggle to achieve more effective means of reforming partner nations’ key governmental institutions. First—and perhaps the easiest challenge to address—is that SC and SA have unintended political consequences in the government institutions of recipient countries and are not solely technical tasks. No one has expressed this point better than Mara Karlin, albeit she was speaking in reference to weak states: Past experience offers two key lessons for U.S. officials as they seek to strengthen the security sectors of weak states. First, like all state-building endeavors, these are political, not technical, exercises. Instead of focusing narrowly on training and equipment, U.S. policymakers responsible for implementing such programs must address the purpose and scope of the U.S. role and the mission, leadership, and organizational structure of the partner’s military.9 Second, SC and SA are highly politicized; both are inefficient, because of the lack of coordination between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State, and ineffective, because of lack of alignment with national security goals (and/or foreign policy objectives). This important reality needs wider appreciation by these departments, as well as by Congress, if the U.S. Government is to improve its ability to find value for money by improving partner nations’ ability to defend their sovereignty, let alone contribute to expeditionary operations. Recent reforms initiated by Congress, most notably in the fiscal year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), constitute a good first effort at addressing these longstanding problems; however, a review of the evidence shows that this legislation should be augmented to define the problem as largely political in nature, as opposed to accepting the traditional default assumption that it is solely technical, which would have enabled it to call for even deeper reforms within these bureaucracies. This article argues that, due to internal DOD politics and the interorganizational politics within the U.S. Government, suboptimal results ensue from the way the United States plans and executes SC and SA. It then suggests legislative and policy changes that might better take this reality into account. The stakes are high. If U.S. strategy is to bring troops home from the so-called endless wars overseas and let others do the fighting, then its success must be a core priority. But only by reforming the way the United States organizes itself to build allies’ and partners’ armed forces are we likely to meet with any greater success than we have in the past.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Slow/Legal Barriers › 2nc XT Delays

Contracting and supply delays plague SC

Hodges, et al, 5-11-2022, Lt-Gen (retired) Ben Hodges (@General_Ben) was Commander USARMY Europe in 2018, after he served as Commander LandCOM at NATO. He currently holds the Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Lauren Speranza is Director of Transatlantic Defense and Security at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Lauren leads the Center’s work on NATO and regional security, as well as its Defense Tech Initiative.  Krista Viksnins is a Program Assistant with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Her interests include Baltic security, cyberwarfare, the rule of law, and congressional relations. Krista received her J.D. from the University of St. Thomas School of Law and her B.A. in Political Science and Spanish from St. Olaf College. She is also a licensed attorney. (“Bolstering the Baltics: Accelerated Security Assistance,” CEPA, https://cepa.org/bolstering-the-baltics-accelerated-security-assistance/)

Fourth, the speed of delivery of security cooperation should increase for major capital equipment items (e.g., artillery, air defense, tanks, and aircraft.) As evidenced by Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, European allies need access right away to the tools and resources that will prepare them to combat potential threats from Russia tomorrow. Often major slowdowns in security assistance and cooperation programs occur in the contracting processes and production timelines.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Slow/Legal Barriers › 1nc Delays

Slow, and the US will prevent transfer of all the good stuff

Teichert 22, currently serving as assistant deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for international affairs. His previous positions have included the senior defense official and defense attaché to Iraq, the commander of Edwards Air Force Base, and the commander of Joint Base Andrews (Johm, “THE HARD POWER OF SECURITY COOPERATION,” War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-hard-power-of-security-cooperation/)

There is still much work to be done to overcome security cooperation obstacles and properly create a force that is fully ready for strategic competition and ideally postured for integrated deterrence. First, onerous security barriers hinder progress in interoperability and integration, creating operational risk to avoid minor technical risk. When making exportability rulings, decision-makers too heavily and strictly consider security risk or concerns about technological exploitation, preventing the export of U.S. weapons systems without a proper consideration for the operational necessity of offering that capability to allies and partners in order to share burdens and develop interoperability. As a result, in the name of maintaining a unilateral technological advantage, bureaucrats pass on operational risk to combatant commanders and warfighters who expect to fight shoulder-to-shoulder with fully-capable allies and partners. Second, exportability of combat-relevant systems remains an afterthought of the acquisition process. Though American policy directs that new systems be designed for exportability, waivers to this policy are liberally applied and commonplace. Finally, slow security cooperation processes often deliver certain systems late-to-need, in part because of plodding security-focused decision-making mechanisms that are a part of exportability rulings. Delayed delivery schedules create a competitive disadvantage as compared to strategic rivals while frustrating the allies and partners that the United States will rely upon in the next conflict. In the end, some Defense Department and interagency policies and processes continue to zealously guard capabilities while hindering interoperability and harming operational effectiveness. American leaders and security cooperation professionals need to systematically eliminate these remaining obstacles to properly meet integrated deterrence objectives.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Bureaucracy › 2nc Complexity – Recipient Countries

Recipient countries fail to understand the complexity of US bureaucracy

Arnold 20, colonel in USAF (Jason, “Add Value to Security Cooperation through Joint Unification,” FAO Journal of International Affairs, https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/add-value-to-security-cooperation?s=r)

In the Security Cooperation Enterprise, the military departments loom large as the primary implementing agencies of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) cases, and in training activities.[6] These SC programs provide our international partners with the capabilities they require both for their own security and to assist in regional security objectives that improve the overall global security situation. Most open SC cases have one of the military departments as an Implementing Agency (IA) and each service has built its own organizational structure, bureaucracy, and automated systems to support the effort.[7] Over the decades, a familiar dynamic has taken place. The military departments have developed their own implementing processes in an insular way, isolated from the other branches, and accommodating their own unique business rules, methods, and systems separate from the others. In addition to contributing to the already significant complexity of the SC Enterprise, the familiar replication of effort, divergent doctrine and practice, and inefficient use of resources is again evident. Still, the Services continue to diverge. Consider the difficulties these differing systems place on our international partners. Friendly foreign nations, committed to working toward our mutual security interests, must not only understand the various roles and processes in the general realm of SC, but also must learn the complexities of several different systems, depending on the implementing agency for a particular program. Indeed, this complexity is one of the primary complaints of the SC processes from our partners. Perhaps the complexity would be justified if it added value, but in almost all cases, the different processes add no greater benefit, but are due simply to the fact that they were developed in isolation by different organizations. Integrated processes and systems that are standardized across the implementing agencies would be a vast improvement, providing increased transparency, reduced complexity, and greater effectiveness across the board. Security Cooperation is inherently an interagency process, and requires a whole of government effort. Presidential Policy Directive 23 identified the Department of State (DoS) as the lead agency for United States Security Sector Assistance Policy, and all Security Assistance and Security Cooperation efforts require coordination and consent across agencies. The interagency process can be hampered by the diversity of processes and players that are presented by the separate Services’ SC organizations. It is not only our international partners that struggle with learning the different ways and means of the various implementing agencies, our own interagency partners can experience confusion as well in navigating the various systems, doctrine, and processes.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Bureaucracy › 2nc Complexity

Turf wars deck solvency

Bender 16 (Bryan Bender, B.A in Political Science and English @ University of Pittsburg, Adjunct ProfessorAdjunct Professor Walter Cronkite School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Senior National CorrespondentSenior National Correspondent POLITICO .“Pentagon muscles out State Dept. on foreign aid” https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/general-diplomats-tussle-over-pentagons-growing-military-aid-portfolio-221177)LR

“During the course of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in particular — and then more recently related to Iraq and Syria — there has been this steady accumulation of very specific authorities that have largely gone over to the Department of Defense,” the former Air Force officer and special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in an interview. But now that large-scale combat in Iraq and Afghanistan has diminished, “It’s a fair question to ask, ‘Do we have the balance right between State and DoD?’” For decades, the power largely rested with the State Department, which is responsible for setting and implementing foreign policy. It has traditionally played the lead role in deciding who should get U.S. security assistance and has asserted its authority to squelch military proposals it considers unwise, officials said. Last year, the department vetoed a Pentagon plan to train snipers from Belarus, which has no free elections and where political dissidents continue to disappear with no government explanation. State also recently scuttled a plan to provide lip balm and brooms to the Jordanian military — items the department deemed wasteful. The Defense Department, though, increasingly has dollars on its side. The Pentagon’s budget for such overseas military aid has more than tripled from 2008 to 2015, compared with just 23 percent growth for the State Department, according to internal administration data provided to POLITICO. “You are going to see disagreement any time DoD is proposing a change of program in a way that the State Department would perceive as diminishing the degree of coordination that is required,” said a senior administration official directly involved in the internal deliberations. Even without a change in the law, though, the State Department has found itself virtually shut out of the review process in some cases, according to interviews with current and former department officials. For example, the diplomats recently learned the Pentagon was funding counter-narcotics operations in several nations in Central Asia that the State Department had previously deemed ineligible for military assistance. State also learned from media reports that the Pentagon was training a controversial Cambodian army general. And despite efforts to better coordinate the two departments’ activities, confusion remains about who is doing what. One consequence: The Pentagon has a program underway to provide $100 million worth of new helicopters to the Kenyan military, while State has separately pursued efforts to supply it with used helicopters. The State Department isn’t concerned solely about human rights and the aid recipients’ international behavior. Its supporters also argue that the State Department is better positioned than the military to manage the programs long-term. “There is no sustainment process with DoD,” said another administration official involved in the policy debate. “Ships we have provided are rusting pierside.” A recent analysis by the Congressional Research Service also concluded that recent policy decisions “have combined to slowly muddle the clear legal separation between State and DoD roles.” A March 9 analysis by the government-funded Rand Corp. similarly called for reviewing the two departments’ “roles, interests and coordination processes.” “This trend of giving more and more authority and taking them away from State is not a great thing,” said Ilan Goldenberg, who runs the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. “It is largely a function that in Congress DoD gets a lot more attention and has a lot more leverage.”

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Bureaucracy › 2nc Complexity

Interagency conflicts have fragmented any security cooperation

McNerney and Moroney 18 (Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center; Senior International/Defense Researcher; Affiliate Faculty, Pardee RAND Graduate School; M.A. in international relations, University of Maryland; B.A. in government and German, University of Notre Dame. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Senior Political Scientist; Ph.D. in international relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, England; M.A. in European integration, University of Limerick, Ireland; B.A. in political science and history, Frostburg State University. “Reforming Security Assistance: Why the State Department Can't Lead from Behind”, )LR

The goal is to make the world safer and advance U.S. security interests. But is it working? For the most part, we don't know. Studies by the RAND Corporation have found evidence of potentially powerful returns on investment but also significant risks. Skeptics can point to many horror stories about American military equipment rotting in storage depots or being misused and U.S.-trained officers becoming dictators, coup plotters and human rights abusers. The State Department has oversight for all foreign assistance, including security assistance. Since 9/11, however, Congress has given the Pentagon significant increases in funding and authorities to cooperate with security forces around the world. If Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and members of Congress don't take steps toward reform, State may find it increasingly difficult to maintain this important leadership role. State's first challenge is the tangle of legislative authorities and stove-piped appropriations that drive U.S. security assistance. The U.S. spent roughly $42 billion in 2017 on foreign assistance, including $17 billion in security assistance. America's flagship security assistance program is Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which provided almost $6 billion in military equipment and services to foreign partners last year. But State oversees many other security assistance accounts to support military education, peacekeeping, counterterrorism and other efforts. Several of the laws that authorize these programs are outdated, disjointed and inhibit agility and long-term planning. A review of security assistance authorities could go a long way toward clarifying congressional priorities and expectations in an international security environment that grows increasingly complex. For example, rather than reform the 42-year-old law that prohibits security assistance to foreign law enforcement, Congress simply provides a steady stream of waivers and exemptions, to the tune of about $2 billion annually. To what extent does Congress want the State Department to strengthen foreign police forces, border security officers, counterterrorism units and counter-narcotics investigators? What priorities and restrictions do they desire on this assistance? It's hard to say. RAND's 2016 report, From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation, identified similar problems for the Department of Defense (DoD), analyzing a convoluted patchwork of over 100 DoD authorities, many of which had been created or strengthened in the wake of 9/11. In 2017, Congress consolidated and reformed many of these authorities and created new reporting requirements to improve DoD's assessments of what's really required, monitoring of progress and evaluation of outcomes. Defense has greater authority now to re-prioritize resources from one country to another or one activity to another as it deems appropriate. In exchange for that flexibility, DoD has the responsibility to report more clearly on what's working and what's not. The State Department's second challenge involves planning. For example, FMF funding is allocated to individual partner nations, who tell the U.S. what equipment and services they would like, and U.S. officials decide whether to approve the request. Parallel discussions take place among different officials about peacekeeping, counter-narcotics, counterterrorism and other programs, each with its own planning processes and congressional reporting requirements. While there is certainly coordination along the way, there is often a transactional, disjointed feel to the process.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Bureaucracy › 2nc Complexity

Security Cooperation fails (not with agenda DA)

Tankel and Rand 15, Rand is the former deputy director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Tankel is an assistant professor at the School of International Service at American University (“Security assistance isn’t the quick fix the US thinks it is,” The Hill, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/250348-security-assistance-isnt-the-quick-fix-the-us-thinks-it-is/amp/)

As we argue in a report recently released by the Center for a New American Security, Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment, part of the problem is that BPC has become a catchall for wide array of security assistance and cooperation programs, only some of which actually pertain to enhancing the capabilities and capacity of a partner’s military and civilian institutions. There are myriad challenges to deploying assistance and cooperation effectively. Recent events in Syria only scratch the surface. Security assistance and cooperation has been a critical pillar of U.S. statecraft for decades. The post-9/11 interest in using assistance and cooperation to incentivize and enable local partners contributed to the creation of a slew of new authorities and programs. Yet, despite its strategic centrality and large price tag, our report argues that many security assistance and cooperation programs fail to achieve U.S. objectives because of strategic and structural deficiencies. Strategically, U.S. policymakers are often not clear about the specific outcomes they intend to achieve with security assistance and cooperation. Even when objectives are clear, there may be too many of them for a single program, which results in conflicting objectives. This is especially troublesome when pressing, short-term objectives subvert long-term U.S. goals. Also, there is currently no system in place to adequately assess outcomes. This not only risks wasting taxpayers’ dollars. Failure to assess progress and adjust programs accordingly can actually reduce U.S. influence with recipient states, which may believe they can free-ride or begin to view assistance as an entitlement. The practice of using security assistance to build relationships sometimes contributes to this problem. So does the fact that policymakers too often look to security assistance as a quick fix or way to address demands to “do something.” Yet, security assistance and cooperation remains vitally important and is appealing, especially when options like large-scale U.S. military operations do not make strategic sense. This helps to explain the numerous new authorities that consecutive administrations have requested and Congress has created. The increase in new authorities has contributed to confusion about the purposes of different programs. Moreover, programs are sometimes chosen based on which authorities are available or most flexible rather than on the authority best suited to the task at hand. Finally, most of the new programs are housed at the Pentagon and not the State Department. As a result, programs are deployed to meet Defense requirements as opposed to implemented in a way that furthers broader foreign policy objectives. The bottom line is that more is not necessarily better. That goes for the number of authorities and the level of assistance or cooperation provided to U.S. partners. The spate of new authorities has exacerbated both imbalances between the Pentagon and the State Department and conflicts among the objectives that assistance and cooperation are used to achieve.

2022 Michigan Negative
Security Cooperation Fails › Bureaucracy › 1nc Complexity

SC is dysfunctional – bureaucratic system dooms solvency

Bergmann and Schmitt 2021

Max Bergmann, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs; Alexandra Schmitt senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center; “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, March 9, 2021, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/dmr

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. While it continues to control funding for its many Title 22 programs, they are largely executed via DSCA and the MILDEPs. Although Congress has recognized that it has, in effect, created the basis for confusion via the two departments’ dual congressionally mandated authorities and authorizations, a political decision to create a clear lead agent for these activities remains missing. One will return to the U.S. Government’s well-used practice of “fudging” when it comes to identifying who’s in charge.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › turn

Women have supported wars in the past – empirically proven and not questioning their role subjects them to being more controlled by the men around them

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pg 84/// MF)

Both kinds of political motherhood are at work in the fact that women have historically supported wars (both imperialist wars and wars of national liberation) and fought in them, often in the name of maternalism. Sending sons and daughters to war can be seen as a patri-otic motherly duty, and fi ghting in wars can be seen as a form of motherly protection of the homeland or mothering in a new nation (Elshtain 1987). At the same time, many women have become soldiers out of economic necessity or sought gender equality in soldiering as a ticket to full citizenship and a path to public power for women. Thus, the idea that women are either naturally or socially geared for peace has been put in question and can be an impediment, particularly in cases of state-led political motherhood, to women seeking gen-der equality because it bars them from or marginalizes them in militaries that control signif-icant resources and are particularly valorized in the stories of nations and the fabric of national life. This produces a “gendered nationalism” in which only men who forged a nation in blood get to defi ne what that nation is, regardless of whether women spilled blood for it or on its altar as (fewer) combatants or (many) non-combatants, and regardless of the many other contributions that women make to (re)producing and sustaining the life of a nation (Enloe 1989: 63). When women are seen only as the symbols and the reproducers of the nation, not as agents in its narratives, then they become subject to an array of controls over their bodies and their beings by men of the nation (Kaufman and Williams 2007: 16–18; Yuval-Davis 1997).