2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – CP › AT: Turkey PIC › 2AC – No Solvency
Stickings, ’20 (Alexandra Stickings, Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute with a focus in military space, space warfare, counterspace capabilities and international space programmes, holds an MSc in International Security and Global Governance from Birkbeck College, University of London, a BA(Hons) in International Studies from the Open University, and a BSc(Hons) in Physics with Astronomy from the University of Nottingham. “Space as an Operational Domain: What Next for NATO?” https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/space-operational-domain-what-next-nato)
This is not to say that all NATO members will, or should, develop extensive military space programmes. Not only is this not practical or financially feasible for many but it also does not take into account the other ways that states can contribute to a secure and resilient collective space architecture. Space situational awareness (SSA), also often referred to as space domain awareness (SDA), monitoring the orbital environment, tracking satellites and pieces of debris, assessing the threat of space weather and the actions and intent of space actors – in short, acquiring as full a picture as possible about what is happening in orbit. It is an essential activity for protecting space assets, but is still an activity carried out by relatively few NATO members. States without space capabilities can be involved in this through developing their own SSA programmes or hosting ground stations as part of existing programmes, as well as participating in intelligence activities. These options would be particularly important should there be a future requirement for all member states to contribute to the NATO space enterprise.
The Alliance must also take into account potential future conflicting priorities. One such possible scenario relates to the increased attention of the US on its interests in the Pacific, while significant NATO focus remains on the threat posed by Russia, particularly in Northern and Eastern Europe. Ensuring that assets are available to monitor Russian activity in the High North or on its borders is essential. Reliance on one or a few states for these assets may not be sustainable, particularly if there is a hesitation to make them available, and it may be the case that NATO will need to acquire dedicated capabilities to carry out priority operations, either through a national programme that is managed by NATO, or one similar to that of NATO communications satellites.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – CP › AT: Process CP › 2AC – Delay Deficit
Beyza Unal 19, Former Deputy Director of International Security Programme at the Chatham House, 7/1/2019, " Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets,” https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-27-Space-Cybersecurity-2.pdf, sg
Timing is a crucial element of PNT capability. Most of the electronics used in military, civilian and commercial spheres depend on timing signals. By intercepting securely transmitted data through cyber means, an adversary may jeopardize the alliance’s missions and services. A compromised system would also diminish reliance on data received, as data confidentiality would be brought into question through possible acts of spoofing and deception.
The involvement of Russia and the US in the Syrian conflict, and the use of electronic techniques, such as signal jamming,57 and cyber means, such as hacking and spoofing, demonstrates the potential operational uses of cyberattacks. Russia’s electronic warfare capability involves not only an air defence capability but also integrates cyber operations.58
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC – CP › AT: OCO CP › 2AC – No Solvency
John J. Klein and Nickolas J. Boensch 20, John @ George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute, Nickolas is @ Bryce Space and Technology, October 2020, “Role of Space in Deterrence,” Handbook of Space Security, p. 111-126/BL
Because states derive strategic advantages from satellites and potential rivals may seek to deny a state this advantage, the concept of “space deterrence” is a relevant concept for space powers. Deterrence by punishment, compellence, deterrence by denial, and dissuasion are important ideas in the formulation of a sound space strategy. Taking the commonly accepted definition mentioned previously, space deterrence refers to persuading a potential enemy that it is in its own interests to avoid certain courses of activity in, through, or from space. Regardless of the chosen terminology or definition, what is ultimately important is that there are actions that can be taken relative to space that affect the decision-making of others.
One of the most essential distinctions in deterrence theory is between deterrence by punishment and by denial (Snyder 1961). Deterrence by punishment concerns the threat of credible and potentially overwhelming force or other retaliatory action against any would-be adversary to discourage potential aggressors from conducting hostile actions. Deterrence by denial refers to the capability to deny the other party any gains from the behavior that is to be deterred (Snyder 1961). This concept refers similarly to deterring an adversary by presenting a credible capability to prevent it from achieving the potential gains adequate to motivate the action (Krepinevich and Martinage 2008).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – ! Russia/China Alliance
Dean, ’19 (Eric Dean, Future Readiness Officer at the Office of the Chief of Chaplains, US Army. “Can the United States Wage Existential Warfare Without Foundational Principles or Truths?” 03/25/19 https://www.cgscfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/5-Dean-Existential-Warfare.pdf)
For many Americans, the idea of waging existential warfare is the stuff of dystopian films. In the years following the Second World War, the United States emerged as one of two global superpowers whose ability to exercise its influence and will was challenged only by the Soviet Union. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, however, the U.S. has maintained global superiority—or dominance—in every domain of warfare, enjoying a unique status as the world’s only superpower. Over the past three decades, the military prowess of the United States has been largely without peer, thus the notion of existential warfare is inconceivable for many Americans. Further adding to this collective American naiveté is the fact that the last time the United States fought foreign forces on American soil was during the War of 1812, a time so far removed from the American conscience that it is difficult to imagine. Though the United States has suffered isolated attacks since then at Pearl Harbor and again on 9/11, the U.S. always has taken the fight to its enemies in their homelands, sparing our own the destruction and suffering war inevitably brings. Consequently, the possibility of waging a truly existential war is difficult at best for the average American to consider. The reality however is that if war were to break out tonight between the United States and an alliance of SinoRussian forces, the U.S. likely would lose. In simulated wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation, the U.S. continues to lose catastrophically against Russia and China as its bases, warships, and aircraft are decimated.1 RAND analyst, David Ochmanek, confirms that there is no situation under current conditions in which the United States emerges victorious in a war with Russia and China.2 With Russia touting hypersonic, precision-guided intercontinental ballistic missiles, the repercussions of consolidating personnel and equipment under Base Realignment and Closure, as well as staging large numbers of personnel and aircraft on a few large airbases and aircraft carriers translates to catastrophic loss of life and strategic assets within minutes for United States forces.3 China poses an equally devastating threat to communication networks, effectively employing a superior cyber and electronic warfare campaign against U.S. satellites, network, and communication systems.4 According to Robert Work, a former deputy secretary of defense and wargaming expert, the U.S has wargamed cyber and electronic warfare in field exercises, but “the simulated enemy forces tend to shut down United States networks so effectively that nothing works and nobody else gets any training done.”5 Assuming U.S forces somehow were able to organize and wage land warfare after these initial devastating assaults, United States ground forces would not fare much better. According to another recent RAND study, both Russian and Chinese rocket systems match or outrange current U.S. capabilities.6 Similarly, Russian field artillery outranges anything currently within the U.S. arsenal.7 Thus the reality is that should the U.S. to go to war today against a Sino-Russian force, our current forward-deployed and expeditionary-focused military forces would be destroyed or severely damaged, resulting in the Nation suddenly finding itself in it what would be an existential war conducted under large-scale combat operation conditions.8 In addition to the strategic and tactical disadvantages facing the U.S., the very nature of large-scale combat operations in a multi-domain environment where battles will be brutally fought in mega-cities creates a significant moral dilemma for American political and military leaders. The expected catastrophic loss of civilian and military lives undoubtedly will result in enormous public pressure to develop weapons and tactics to quickly end such a conflict, positing that the achieved victory will justify the means.9
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – SSA
Kestutis Paulauskas 20, Senior Strategy Officer at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, US, 3/13/20, “Space: NATO’s latest frontier,” https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/03/13/space-natos-latest-frontier/index.html
A major surprise attack by an adversary on Allied space capabilities could significantly undermine the credibility of nuclear deterrence (for example, by compromising the Alliance’s ability to detect launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). It could indeed be a precursor to major global conflict.
How to deter such attacks? Deterrence theory stipulates two ways: deterrence by denial (deny adversary the benefits it is seeking) and deterrence by punishment (ensure that the cost for its action will be prohibitive for the adversary).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – SSA
Christopher M. Martinez 20, Col., U.S. Army, senior planner for the Army G-2, 8/27/20, “It Is Time to Embrace the European Union’s Strategic Autonomy in Space,”
This article discusses why and how the United States should pivot from holding a long-standing skeptical view toward the European Union’s (EU) strategic autonomy (SA) initiatives in the space domain to embracing them. The article first highlights how the EU has advanced its research and development in space. It then discusses how the strategic environment has changed, specifically with NATO declaring space an operational domain, the US supporting greater interoperability with European allies and partners within its National Defense Strategy, Russia’s growing threat to the Baltics, and Europe’s increased appetite to leverage space for defense purposes. The article then recommends how the United States could embrace and further the EU’s space initiatives by leveraging Washington’s power within NATO—all while remaining cognizant of Europe’s waning views of the US defense industrial base. Finally, the article demonstrates how the United States, European Union, and NATO could all benefit from America’s pivot in this burgeoning domain.
Introduction and Background
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – SSA
-Allies nervous about Chinese and Russian capabilities
-NATO declared space an operational domain, eager for norm building and monitoring
Aaron Bateman 20, Ph.D. candidate in the history of science and technology at Johns Hopkins University, previously U.S. Air Force intelligence officer, 4/29/20, “AMERICA NEEDS A COALITION TO WIN A SPACE WAR,” https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/america-needs-a-coalition-to-win-a-space-war/
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – SSA
Berenike Vollmer 21, President and Co-Founder at The Sciences Po Cybersecurity Association, Non-Resident Visiting Scholar affiliated to NATO CCDCOE Tallinn, Cyber Threat Analyst and ISAO Manager for Cyber Intelligence, February 2021, “NATO'S MISSION-CRITICAL SPACE CAPABILITIES UNDER THREAT: Cybersecurity Gaps in the Military Space Asset Supply Chain”, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349519572_NATO'S_MISSION-CRITICAL_SPACE_CAPABILITIES_UNDER_THREAT_Cybersecurity_Gaps_in_the_Military_Space_Asset_Supply_Chain \\SYang
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AWARENESS Initiate Intersectoral Collaboration: • Aligning differing security and ethical standards between countries; • Organizing at least one annual space asset CSCRM symposium by executives from both sides to exchange on current challenges and estimated organizational impact; • Establishing further PPPs along the SASC, for example with: o CCSDS and ISO; o Space ISAC; o US AIA; o CERTs, CSIRTs and ENISA; and/or o OSA; • Utilizing the upcoming CCDCOE Tallinn Manual 3.0 multi-stakeholder project, as well as the 2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade to address gaps. Increase NATO Strategic Level Engagement: • Creating mission-specific guidance, agreements, and security considerations; • Establishing recurrent executive-level SC leadership councils; • Timely increase of resources and staffing. Spur Exchange of Academic Expertise: • Strategically investing in space asset Research and Development (R&D) and the development of viable alternatives, such as through NATO STO’s Information Systems Technology Panel; • Realizing the establishment of a NATO Space Technology Centre under guidance of NCIA; • Considering attack vectors originating from new and upcoming technology, such as AI being increasingly implemented in space assets; • Inviting outside organisations and cybersecurity experts to provide expertise and differing perspectives on the topic, such as through cooperation between NCIA and Europol EPE. Conduct Mission-Specific Cyber SASC Risk Assessments: • Ensuring knowledge on specific procurement and SC environment around each mission, thus sourcing the materials to the level of integrity required; • Moving from detective to preventive third-party cybersecurity management capabilities; • Establishing a formal programme through manifesting policies, governance, procedures, tools, and processes on data sent to and received by any supplier; • Assessing NATO-procured ICT components, such as hardware, software, and services; • Analysing suppliers, suppliers’ sources, and the larger SC ecosystem; • Dedicating specified NATO personnel to effectively assessing and communicating supplier risks to NATO’s executive leadership. Chapter 7: Conclusion 71 Train Cyber SASC Risk Management throughout NATO Exercises: • Including cyber SASC risk management at least in every midsize to large NATO exercise to support a forward-leaning, collective defence approach; • Facilitating space asset CSCRM training for relevant stakeholder organization-wide as well as for key suppliers; • Facilitating individual end user training for each redeployment; • Engaging white hat hackers to penetration test for possible vulnerabilities throughout trainings; • Continuous phishing simulation exercises, mapping upcoming cyber SC threats and priorities, or tabletop exercises to determine key stakeholders and their responsibilities; • Sharing training and test reports to both the military and intelligence community and the commercial sector. REGULATION Streamline Security and Classification Levels: • Implementing formatting standardization for eased data integration and processing, e.g., agreeing on specific SATCOM frequencies, software, timing formatting; • Streamlining classification levels; • Streamlining strict clearances of staff and a good operational understanding of interacting with commercial representatives and users. Enhance Procurement Contract Requirements: • Creating a standardized public-private security framework for NATO-specific SASC cybersecurity: o Streamlining working language, external and internal assessments, incident reporting and communications across all partners and entities, thus creating a single-entry point for suppliers; o Adopting a standards-oriented, streamlined supplier risk approach to CSCRM processes; o Incorporating strengthened insurances, such as for data privacy, into negotiations with suppliers; o Better monitoring progress and operations via customer and supplier assessments to determine CSCRM maturity; o Ensuring that contractors comply with military protection standards. • Including mandatory reports of all space asset cyber breaches, and guidance on prioritization and determination of critical components and responsibilities; • Substituting Security by Obscurity by Security by Design and Default; • Integrating or partially adopting industry standards and procedures into supplier contracts: o NAS9933; o DOD CMMC; o ISO 27001; o NIST SP 800-37; o NIST SP 800-53; o NIST SP 800-171; o NIST 800-172; and o US SPD-5. Chapter 7: Conclusion 72 By completely or partly adopting these policy recommendations, NATO would strive to fully leverage the potential of its 2019 Space Policy and its Declaration of Space as an Operational Domain. Additionally, this would allow NATO to function as a formal and informal MS consultation forum on SASC cybersecurity. This way, it would make full use of its broad collective MS portfolio, best practices and lessons learned, as suggested by NATO SG Stoltenberg. These findings are in line with the assumptions of neoliberal institutionalist theory. As has been shown, NATO and national actors seek to maximize their gain from space assets to maintain relative power and the ability to deter. This behaviour is enforced by commercial competition and innovation. Throughout this thesis, this was proven by findings which align with neoliberal institutionalist theory, thus highlighting that a) Lacking cooperation between NATO as an international organization and its MS, as well as commercial SC partners, hinders to find problem solutions and create internationally binding regulations; b) Commercial competitiveness spurred by the search for economic efficiency, competitive advantage, and cheaper labour trades off security concerns. Following neoliberal institutionalism, and aligned with above presented policy recommendations, NATO’s role should be to guide and advise MS in resolving global political and economic issues, to reduce individual cost and uncertainty. Therefore, NATO should consider a shift from regarding cyber SASC risk management from being ‘nice-to-have’ to being mandated and critical. Doing so will ease safeguarding of delivery and integrity of NATO mission-critical data, better integrate suppliers and manufacturers along the cyber SASC, and increase transparency, responsibility, and liability. Furthermore, this will ease NATO to stay competitive, deterring and up to date with innovative technology, enhancing outcomes of NATO missions and operations to the best possible extent.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – NATO Strength
Antonio Carlo 20, professor at the Sapienza University of Rome; Nikolaos Veazoglou, professor at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 3/30/2020, "ASAT Weapons: Enhancing NATO’s Operational Capabilities in the Emerging Space Dependent Era," http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43890-6_34, sg
Space-based assets function as force multipliers, providing support and crucial information during the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. According to the Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations, space capabilities provide a wide range of applications such as: global, strategic and intra-theatre satellite communications (SATCOM); positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services; terrestrial and space environmental monitoring; space situational awareness (SSA); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); NATO Shared Early Warning [6].
Satellite Communications (SATCOM): One of the most widespread functions of satellites, either civilian or military, is telecommunications. SATCOM provides support to C2 through its multiple applications, such as the establishment of communications in regions with minimal or even non existent infrastructure; transmission of intelligence; relay of messages and control of UVs.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – Laundry List
Dr. Beyza Unal 19, Former Deputy Director of the International Security Program, July 1 2019, “Cybersecurity of NATO’s Space-based Strategic Assets”, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/07/cybersecurity-natos-space-based-strategic-assets-0/2-cyber-risks-space-based-strategic **Altered for ableist language. We do not endorse any ableist language.
Considering that digital technologies are fundamental to all six of the space-dependent capabilities described above, none of them is immune to cyberattacks. Moreover, any digital system that relies upon near real-time information is vulnerable to cyberattacks. The loss of one or more of these capabilities because of human or system error or through offensive cyber operations conducted by an adversary, could have severe strategic, operational and tactical consequences. In order to understand the value of each space-dependent capability, it is important to analyse the consequences of cyberattacks on each.
Cyberattacks on military weapons systems may have operational and strategic consequences that change the way the military operates in conflict. Although electronic warfare has been in use for more than a century, sophisticated cyberattacks on the systems of NATO or its key member countries have a new and distinct impact on decision-making and on how NATO conducts its operations. Cyberattacks on military systems could also have a paralysing effect on strategic military and political decision-making and could render NATO countries vulnerable to Russian or Chinese information and deception operations.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – Debris
Jan Kallberg 12, scientist at the agency-sponsored Insider Threat Research Program and is an Assistant Professor at the United States Military Academy, 3/1/2012, "Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War," Strategic Studies Quarterly, 1(1), pp 130-132, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/256031426_Designer_Satellite_Collisions_from_Covert_Cyber_War, sg
Cyber Attacks in Space. The life span of a satellite is between five and 30 years, and even afterward it can still be orbiting with enough propellant to move through space and with functional communications which could be reactivated. Space contains thousands of satellites, both active and inactive, launched by numerous organizations and countries, hosting 5,000 space-borne transponders communicating with Earth. Every transmission is a potential inlet for a cyber attack. Older satellites share technological similarities, providing opportunities to cyber-exploit industrial systems for control and processing. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems within our municipalities, facilities, infrastructure, and factories are designed and built on older technology and hardware, sometimes designed decades ago, and the software is seldom updated. These SCADA systems are considered a strategic vulnerability and have drawn growing attention from the US cyber-defense community in recent years. Satellites may be based on hardware and technology from the 1980s for one very simple reason—they are unlikely to be upgraded after they have been launched into space.
Terrestrial cyber attacks are a single exploit on thousands, if not millions, of identical systems, and the exploit will be eliminated afterward by updates or upgrades. The difference between satellites and terrestrial cyber exploits is that a satellite is in many cases custom made, whereas the computing design is proprietary. Cyber attacks in space exploit a single system, or limited group of systems, within a larger group of satellites. These space-borne assets have a variety of operating systems, embedded software, and designs from disparate technological legacies. As more nations engage in launching satellites with a variety of technical sophistication, the risk for hijacking and manipulation through covert activity increases. A satellite’s onboard computer (OBC) can allow reconfiguration and software updates, which increase its vulnerability to cyber-attacks. A vulnerable satellite that will be orbiting for the next 10 years can be preset by a cyber perpetrator for unauthorized usage when needed.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – Ag
Robert Bell 18, businessman with over 30 years of experience as an association manager and business consultant for both nonprofit and profit-driven and organizations operating in the IT outsourcing, telecommunications, and financial services industries, 10/11/2018, “How Will Precision Agriculture Feed the World?”; , Via Satellite
By the year 2050, the world’s population is expected to hit 10 billion. Feeding that population will mean increasing global food production by 70 percent — without poisoning the world’s water supply with nitrates in the process and meeting rising demands for high food quality.
That, in a nutshell, is the reason why agriculture needs to go digital, and in a hurry. The good news is that the adoption of new agriculture technology (agtech) over the past decade has been strong in many places. According to a 2016 study from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, tractors guided by Global Positioning System (GPS) are in use on 50 percent of corn and soybean acreage in the U.S. Yield mapping — which means developing precise data on what sections of a field produce the biggest yield — is used on 40 percent of that acreage. Variable-Rate Technology (VRT) covers about 30 percent with systems that apply fertilizer based on yield maps, substantially reducing waste and excess use.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – Ag
Steven Tompkins 19, Inmarsat’s director of sector development for agriculture, 3/18/2022, “Inmarsat's Steven Tompkins cuts through the jargon to explain why satellite connectivity is the key to a global, digitalized agriculture industry,” , Inmarsat
The Agri-Tech Revolution, Agriculture 4.0, the smart and connected farm. There is no shortage of buzzwords hinting at a digitalised future, or solutions being touted as game-changing for the global agricultural industry. Commonly claimed benefits include increasing crop yields, and a reduction in input costs and the reliance on manual labour.
Many of these solutions rely on reliable internet connectivity in the field to push data from one place to another, but there are still vast swathes of agricultural land that suffer from unreliable or non-existent connectivity, either lacking cellular or broadband connectivity. If we are to take advantage of the huge possibilities available to us, overcoming our connectivity challenges will be crucial.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Add Ons › 2AC – Ag
Abhijeet Singh Baghel 19, cybersecurity researcher, recipient of a Master of Science in Cybersecurity from Utica College, December 2019, “Cyber Warfare in Outer Space,” p. 12-13
The need for cybersecurity. Cyberspace is infused throughout each warfighting domain. Outer space is no different and space operations rely heavily on cyberspace to complete missions which means this field is no stranger to cyberspace threats. An adversary could use a cyberattack to simply monitor and collect signals intelligence to use against its target indirectly or could employ cyber espionage to gain critical technical expertise to bolster military research and development (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019). In these examples, intelligence gathered in cyberspace is weaponized to ensure information superiority, which plays a vital role in military and political strategy in times of war and peace. In addition to space assets, it is important to protect classified space operations intelligence by ensuring its confidentiality, availability, and integrity to successfully maintain space dominance (Mather, 2018). When security measures are not adequate to ensure this, it opens possibilities for adversaries to hack into space combatant commands and operation centers and possibly corrupt important data or render space assets useless by seizing control (Harrison, Johnson, & Roberts, 2019). Cyberattacks are relatively cheap and do not require substantial 13 resources to complete, just an understanding of the sophisticated target. For example, China is prepared to employ cyber operations against U.S. satellite and ground stations to deescalate future conflicts by preventing the U.S.’s ability to operate during the early stages of a conflict. This is no surprise as China has already performed cyberattacks on satellites belonging to the U.S. Geological Survey, NASA, and NOAA and several others multiple times since 2007 (Gruss, 2014 and Harrison, Johnson, & Roberts, 2019).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – Solves Generic
Karl-Heinz Brunner 21, member NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the Bundestag Defence Committee and Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation, October 2021, “Space and Security – NATO’s Role,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Science and Technology Committee, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2021-04/025%20STC%2021%20E%20-%20SPACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20-%20BRUNNER_2.pdf
Space is essential to the Alliance’s deterrence and defence (NATO, 2020). NATO Allies rely heavily on space for the protection of their homelands and for military operations around the globe. Space is an “enabling domain” as it is closely interconnected with the other security domains relevant for NATO: maritime, air, land, and cyber space. Together with cyber, space will therefore play a critical role for the security of Allied nations. 37. Satellites provide precise information on movements by friend and foe through imagery or via signal interceptions. They transfer huge amounts of data from and to the battlefield: operating a single Global Hawk, for instance, requires roughly 500 megabits of satellite bandwidth per second. This is five times the total amount of satellite communications that US forces used during operations in the First Gulf War (The Economist, 2019). 38. During the 1991 Gulf War, often referred to as “the first space war”, space systems evolved from strategic assets to tactical enablers. Satellites provided near real-time information down to the tactical level throughout operation Desert Storm for the first time. Space assets, originally developed to detect strategic missile launches, were transformed into tools that worked “down to do scope reporting” in 1991 (Strout, 2021). The use of satellite-based information contributed to the quick and decisive victory of the US-led forces. 39. Today, many of NATO’s most advanced systems depend heavily on space-based assets. Examples include the Alliance’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme, the Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACs) and the Ground Surveillance System (AGS) (Moon, 2017). NATO’s Joint Air Power (JAP) is equally dependent on the national capabilities in the space domain of Allied states as they support operations in the air as well as on the ground and on the seas (Bockel, 2018). 40. The Alliance defines five core areas where it heavily depends on space-based assets (NATO, March 2020). These are (1) positioning and navigation: enabling precision strikes, force navigation or combat search and rescue (CSAR) missions; (2) integrated tactical warning and threat assessment: securing force protection, providing crucial information on missile launches and thus allowing attribution; (3) environmental monitoring: enabling meteorological forecasting and sound mission planning; (4) communications for command and control purposes and (5) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities: providing intelligence on and off the battlefield and informing targeting decisions. A key benefit of space access is that it increases the ability of the Alliance to respond, thus making it is crucially important for deterrence. Deterrence is largely based upon the adversary knowing that NATO is prepared to act, and to act the Alliance must first Observe, Orientate and Decide, as described by the military strategist John Boyd. Information gained from space can accelerate the OODA loop (OODA loop – Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) and prevent the need for conflict through careful focused action. 41. Free access to space and resilient space infrastructures are essential for operational capability and defence. As a consequence, the dependence of modern armed forces on space has become one of their greatest vulnerabilities. In the early days of space infrastructure, only the U.S. and the Soviet Union were capable of launching satellites into orbit. Space-denial technologies were either non-existent or in their infancy. After the fall of the iron curtain, the threat to Western space assets and capabilities was significantly diminished. The recent evolution of space capabilities, especially on the commercial side, and the increased number of space-faring nations has changed this situation, however.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – Say Yes – Canada
CSA 19, Canadian Space Agency, 6/14/2019, “Cybersecurity from space: the Government of Canada invests in quantum technology”, Government of Canada, https://www.canada.ca/en/space-agency/news/2019/06/cybersecurity-from-space-the-government-of-canada-invests-in-quantum-technology.html
Our digital economy depends on keeping data safe from hackers. Cybersecurity is a priority for the Government of Canada. The Canadian Space Agency's Quantum EncrYption and Science Satellite (QEYSSat) mission will test quantum technology that protects communications in space.
The Canadian Space Agency (CSA) is awarding a contract worth $30 million to Honeywell for the design and implementation phases of the QEYSSat mission.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – Say Yes – Europe
Laurens Cerulus 5/10, leads POLITICO Europe's team of reporters covering cybersecurity, privacy and data protection issues as Cybersecurity Editor, 5/10/2022, “EU, UK blame Russia for Ukraine satellite hack”, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-countries-blame-ukraine-satellite-hack-on-russia/
The EU and the U.K. on Tuesday slammed the Russian government for an "unacceptable" cyberattack on satellite communications provider Viasat in February that brought down Ukrainian networks.
The attack happened just an hour before Moscow started its invasion of Ukraine, the EU said in a statement, adding it was "yet another example of Russia’s continued pattern of irresponsible behaviour in cyberspace, which also formed an integral part of its illegal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine."
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – Say Yes – Turkey
Kieran Hatton 20, Design Research Intern Duo Security Leveraging User Insight Data to Improve Passwordless Experiences on 36 Million Devices, 4/27/2020, “Turkey’s New Cyber Security Center is Necessary, but is It Enough?”, Medium, https://medium.com/meddah-a-u-s-turkey-storytelling-project/turkeys-new-cyber-security-center-is-necessary-but-is-it-enough-89b7ef8cd347
However, USOM’s defenses are unlikely to dissuade stronger foreign state actors, like those involved in the United Arab Emirates remote hacking of former Turkish deputy prime minister Mehmet Şimşek, from seeking ways to disrupt Turkish cyber protections. States like Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia maintain competitive relations with Turkey. These nations are therefore incentivized to deploy malware to harm critical Turkish infrastructure.
Turkey should implement a cybersecurity framework. Attacks from foreign states as well as non-state actors are often effective given the Turkish government’s lack of familiarity with cybersecurity measures. Turkish government officials have been reported using unencrypted, traditional email or other unsecured accounts to transmit sensitive information. A cybersecurity framework streamlines digital defense measures and greatly reduces the risk of cyber threats by providing a blueprint for systems which meet rigorous cybersecurity standards. These can be in various forms: multinational, like the European Union’s Cybersecurity Certification Framework; organizational, like the International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) 2700 and National Institute for Standards and Technology’s (NIST) framework; and, even indigenous, like the Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority Cybersecurity Framework.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – Say Yes – General
David Jones 3/18, reporter for Cybersecurity Dive. He has been a reporter and editor for more than 25 years, 3/18/2022, Cybersecurity Dive, “Cyberthreats grow as US, NATO countries press Russia sanctions”, https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/cyberthreats-russia-war/620640/
The FBI and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency on Thursday said they are aware of possible threats to satellite communications networks in the U.S. and abroad. The agencies are urging organizations to check for insecure remote access tools and urging companies report any suspicious network activity.
Dive Insight:
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
2AC Case › 2AC – Solvency › 2AC – No Lasers
Theresa Hitchens 5/19, Space and Air Force reporter at Breaking Defense. The former Defense News editor was a senior research associate at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), 5/19/2022, “Don’t be dazzled by Russia’s laser weapons claims: Experts”, Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/dont-be-dazzled-by-russias-laser-weapons-claims-experts/
The ability to dazzle a satellite at that range isn’t a particularly amazing capability, especially given that most modern optical imaging satellites carry cameras that included lenses that function like human eyelids, and simply close when they detect any potentially blinding light source (natural or otherwise).
“Laser systems that can damage tougher and more distant targets such as ICBMs or orbiting satellites are quite some years away. Satellite sensors definitely can be vulnerable to being dazzled or blinded if they are not protected, but certainly much less so if they are well-designed,” Grego said.