2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – Security Cooperation Key
Benjamin BASKA ’19, M.A. Student at Corvinus University of Budapest , “The U.S. and the Eastern European Defence Cooperation Agreements: Impacts, Geopolitics and the Hungarian Case”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR_2019_online_final.pdf
Agreements on defence cooperation have a wider regional impact, where an adversarial power might perceive the DCA as an element of an aggressive posture by the signatory states. While DCAs could increase tensions with the power to the East of NATO’s border, at the same time, they have a more cohesive effect between the parties. Brandon J. Kinne (2019) hypothesises that when states favour ties to “partners of partners”, it results in a phenomenon that he refers to as the triadic closure. In terms of DCA networks, Kinne highlighted that this would mean that country A and B are more likely to cooperate with each other if they both sign a DCA with a common country C. Of course, this would require a high degree of trust between countries A and B in order to push for a closer defence cooperation. This is where the EDI comes into play as well. As a tool to reassure allies by the increasing US presence in these countries, it enables the US to indirectly increase military cooperation among countries, and to upgrade strategic airfields or forward basing infrastructure in these countries. It is also important to mention that the DCAs are directly connected to the geographical and geopolitical position of a country. As it was mentioned before, these countries form an imaginary line of defence that is strengthened by their NATO membership and the bilateral agreement signed with the US. Since the Trump administration is a vocal advocate of increasing the share of defencerelated contribution by allies, the DCAs could be an indirect tool to nudge them in the right direction. At the same time, it also means an increase in the US presence in Central and Eastern Europe that could be perceived as a threat to Russia. With more countries signing DCAs in the neighbourhood, the growing number of concerned states would also mean that eventually the upsetting peace and stability would increase in a region. Conclusion The aim of this analysis was to highlight the important aspects of DCAs in Central and Eastern Europe, and to introduce the uniqueness of the HungarianUS agreement. Firstly, it aimed to interpret and highlight the subtle differences between the DCAs of the selected countries while it did seek to point out why sovereignty was a focal point in each of these negotiations. Secondly, it revealed the possible implications DCAs could have on the receiving states’ sovereignty and on the geopolitics of the region. Generally, there was no single framework under which these agreements could be placed since they lacked uniformity in their scope and purpose in a global context. However, the Baltic and Eastern European DCAs were commonly grounded on a thematic setting, by the creation of a legal framework for stationing US troops in the countries’ territory and for setting the stage for more detailed agreements. The similarity of the agreements stemmed from the objective that was here to set the framework for defence- and security-related bilateral cooperations. In all the examined agreements, the focal points, around which the debates revolved, were the movement and access, the criminal jurisdiction, the ownership, or in the Hungarian case, the tax exemptions. These are the essential variables that define the purpose of the treaty from different aspects. Each variable effects the sovereignty of the receiving states and could impose limitations on the sending states. At the same time, these variables introduce measures that dismantle bureaucratic roadblocks which could hinder future cooperation among the parties. The difference in the level of details between the Baltic and the Central European DCAs is more striking. The former ones are more general with less details regarding the taxation, the environmental safety or the administrative procedures, while the latter ones put a heavy emphasis on these issues, and even specify the administrative procedures, the military exercises and permits or licenses. While these elusive differences are not easy to spot, a single adjective or phrase can inherently reflect what the receiving states prioritise on and regard important in case of foreign forces in their territory. With the conflict of right of jurisdiction on one’s own territory and the law of flag, the agreements challenge the receiving states’ sovereignty. Furthermore, these agreements are based more on the absolute than the relative gains. Both parties benefit from the cooperation separately in different ways. The US is able to enhance its military presence along the borders of Eastern Europe and to create a logistical network from the Baltic to the Black Sea, while sending a message of reassurance to its NATO allies in the region. The other parties also gain concerning their security in defence, including defence modernisation, cooperation through investments from the US, and through the increased number of trainings and exercises. The defensive posture of these countries is also strengthened. The increasing number of military exercises enable the harmonisation of European and US military standards and systems paving the way for a greater cooperation and deployment efficiency, as synchronisation and interoperability are becoming crucial factors.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – Security Cooperation Key
John M. Grondelski ’21, is deputy director of the Office of Central European Affairs, “Office of Central European Affairs”, State Magazine, January 2021, https://statemag.lab.prod.getusinfo.com/2021/01/0121office/
In the recent past a planned trip to a Central European country by a Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR) deputy assistant secretary was fairly big news within EUR’s Office of Central European Affairs (CE). However, the pace has picked up considerably in the past few years, with visits becoming more common. In the last six months alone, the United States has received the Polish president at the White House; Secretary of State Mike Pompeo traveled to Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia and has received his Romanian, Slovak, and Slovene counterparts in Washington; and three different under secretaries of state have touched down in multiple Central European capitals. These visits and events have kept the CE staff busy and active as they continue to plan and conduct bilateral relations within 10 diverse European states. CE focuses their mission on seven of Europe’s youngest democracies (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and three neutrals (Austria, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland). America’s primary geopolitical adversaries—Russia and China—continue to compete for influence in Central Europe. Russia still aspires to maintain spheres of influence in its former Soviet empire by occupying parts of neighboring Ukraine, actively instrumentalizing disinformation and malign influence in the area. Communist China has returned as well, using relationships dating back to 1949 to pursue its malign influence via opaque investment among other means. Chinese discount pricing appeals in a region that has made huge economic strides in the 30 years since the collapse of communism, but that still has a long way to go to reach Western European levels of development. Having suffered from ostensible “liberation” by the Soviet Red Army, Central European countries actively seek partnership with the United States. Positive popular attitudes there towards the United States are among the highest in Europe. Governmental attitudes generally follow with sustained U.S. engagement. “Some Central European countries have presented themselves as ‘bridges between East and West,’” explained EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Boyse, who oversees CE. “We’ve had to remind some Allies they are not ‘bridges,’ because in 1989 they freely and eagerly chose to rejoin the West. For the most part, that message has stuck with governments, even if we still see ‘old think’ in parts of the population.” CE’s eight desk officers translate that message into action every day. Security cooperation is a top priority for most Central European countries. It takes many forms, like increased U.S. presence along NATO’s Eastern Flank and upgrading military cooperation by replacing legacy Soviet gear with state-of-the-art NATO interoperable equipment. Poland is buying 32 F-35 multirole combat aircraft, while Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania are modernizing with F-16 fighter aircraft. Military purchases also enable Allies to meet their commitments in burden sharing, undertaken at the Wales and Warsaw NATO Summits. The United States has recently signed new Defense Cooperation Agreements with Poland and Hungary and 10-year Defense Cooperation Roadmaps with Romania and Bulgaria. Military cooperation also includes Central Europe’s neutrals. Austria is a Partnership for Peace member, and many state National Guard forces are competing to become its state partner. Two U.S. companies are competing to modernize Switzerland’s air force with U.S. fighter jets.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – Security Cooperation Key
David Hutt ‘21, is a political journalist based between France and the Czech Republic, reporting on European political affairs and EU-Asian relations, “In Central Europe, Biden Can Build on Trump’s Record”, World Politics Review, 2/17/21, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29428/in-central-europe-biden-can-build-on-trump-s-record
Another potential area of cooperation is defense, mainly aimed at countering Russia’s activities. This is a field that Biden has ample experience with, having served as vice president in 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and began ramping up military activities in eastern Ukraine. Biden was one of the architects of what was then called the European Reassurance Initiative, a push to bolster the U.S. security presence in Europe in response to Russia’s aggression, including by stationing around 4,500 American troops in Poland on a rotational basis. That number is set to rise to 5,500 under a bilateral agreement that was finalized during the final months of the Trump administration. While Biden announced last week that he is reversing Trump’s decision to move 12,000 troops out of Germany—some of which were slated to redeploy elsewhere in Europe, including Poland—he is unlikely to alter the defense pacts Trump signed with Poland and with Hungary, nor is he expected to interfere with planned sales of U.S. military equipment to those countries. Ultimately, Biden’s tougher views on Moscow will endear him toward the Central European states, especially Poland. The four states are among the most passionate members of the NATO defense pact, which Biden has called “the most effective political-military alliance in modern history,” whereas Trump disparaged it as “obsolete.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L
Tamás MAGYARICS ‘19, Professor, Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University; Senior Research Fellow, American Studies Research Institute, National University of Public Service, “How to Revitalise the U.S.– Eastern European Relations”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR_2019_online_final.pdf
The single most important area where U.S. and Central European interests meet is security cooperation. Ironically, one of the challenges posed to this shared interest is coming from Western Europe, more specifically from the advocates of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), a European security policy without U.S. input. In 2000, a 60,000 strong Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was announced within the ESDP (McCray, 2014). These attempts met almost universal rejection in the U.S.; both Democratic and Republican politicians warned against any ’duplication’ of the existing structures. Then Secretary of Defence William Cohen went as far as saying that ”if the EU created a defence capability outside of NATO, the alliance would become ’a relic of the past’”. Later U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns branded the effort as ’one of the greatest t dangers to the transatlantic community’” (Carpenter, 2018). Washington, instead, lobbied for a military response force within NATO, and put pressure primarily on the new members of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe, which were – on the whole - receptive to the U.S. concerns because they strongly believed that the only country that was able to provide hard security guarantees for them was the U.S. The underlying issue is a struggle between Western European leaders, such as Emmanuel Macron, and the U.S. about the future role that America might or should play in Europe. Washington is vary of a federalised Europe with an independent defence and security capability because the present disagreements between the U.S. and the EU might degenerate into open hostilities, which – in turn – would weaken American positions in the world. NATO is the only official institution that makes the U.S. ’a European power,’ and it obviously enhances America’s opportunities to counter the Russian and Chinese influence in Europe, and even elsewhere. Moreover, the U.S. can legitimately press within NATO its allies to assume a larger share of the burdens of the Atlantic Community and thus, at least theoretically, it offers an opportunity for Washington to concentrate larger forces to combat the newly emerging military challenges elsewhere in the world, first and foremost in the Asia-Pacific region - the Obama administration’s ’pivot to Asia’ was intended to address this issue by shifting naval assets from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean - (Thompson, 2012). From a Central European point of view, a relatively strong American military, political and economic presence in Europe can be a sort of counterbalance to the centralising tendencies of the so-called core countries of Europe - which would mean, in essence, further loss of national sovereignty over a number of areas. Therefore, the countries of ’new Europe’ have tended to support the U.S. even if they had misgivings about the latter’s policies, and a similar pattern is likely to remain in place in the foreeseable future too.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L
Carpenter ’22 [Ted Galen; a senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, is the author of 12 books on international affairs; 2-28-2022; "Many predicted Nato expansion would lead to war. Those warnings were ignored"; The Guardian; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/feb/28/nato-expansion-war-russia-ukraine; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]
Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine is an act of aggression that will make already worrisome tensions between Nato and Moscow even more dangerous. The west’s new cold war with Russia has turned hot. Vladimir Putin bears primary responsibility for this latest development, but Nato’s arrogant, tone‐deaf policy toward Russia over the past quarter‐century deserves a large share as well. Analysts committed to a US foreign policy of realism and restraint have warned for more than a quarter‐century that continuing to expand the most powerful military alliance in history toward another major power would not end well. The war in Ukraine provides definitive confirmation that it did not.
Thinking through the Ukraine crisis – the causes
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – Link – T/L
Freire ’12 [Maria Raquel; researcher at the Centre for Social Studies and professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra, Ph.D. at the University of Kent; 2012; "Russia at the Borders of Central Europe: Changing Dynamics in Foreign Policy Relations"; SpringerLink; https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137283450_7; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]
7.3.2 Security and defence realignments: building fences or fostering cooperative approaches?
The Russian Federation’s relations with NATO have been difficult, particularly in the light of the Alliance’s open door policy (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007; Kramer 2009; Romaniuk 2010; Shea 2010). For the Russian Federation this policy is understood as an establishment of a virtual wall that reproduces the dynamics of exclusion that characterized the Cold War, but now further to the East. Despite statements about shared values, transparency and confidence-building measures, along with the establishment of institutional mechanisms for cooperation, such as the NATO–Russia Council (2002), trust between NATO and Russia has been hard to achieve.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – AT: Sanctions
Gosling et al. 5-25 [Tim; Prague-based journalist who has covered the Central European region for several years; Claudia Ciobanu; journalist for a decade, starting out at the Romanian national daily, Cotidianul, before moving to cover Central and Eastern Europe as a freelancer for various international outlets, won the first prize in the 2018 Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic excellence, finalist in the Reporting Europe and One World Media awards; Edit Inotai; Hungarian journalist, previously Berlin correspondent for Népszabadság and is now its Foreign Affairs editor; Nicholas Watson; award-winning journalist, he has worked for almost 30 years in Asia, the US and Europe, writing for publications such as the Financial Times, Politico Europe, TheStreet.com, Axios, International Herald Tribune TV and Knight-Ridder News, co-founder and managing editor of Business New Europe; 5-25-2022; "Holes Remain in a Tightening Net of Russia Sanctions"; Balkan Insight; https://balkaninsight.com/2022/05/25/central-europe-reveals-holes-in-tightening-net-of-russia-sanctions/; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL 😊] **images and captions omitted
A combination of ambivalence, lack of transparency, legislative barriers and hidden owners are undermining Central Europe’s imposition of sanctions on Russian entities and individuals. In April, Russian activist Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation published a list of over 6,000 bribe takers and warmongers who, it accuses, have enabled Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine. The EU’s sanctions list falls far short of this, identifying only 80 entities and 1,093 individuals subject to asset freezes and travel bans, though experts cast doubt on whether sanctions are being fully applied even on these fewer targets. Central Europe is illustrative of the difficulties in applying sanctions to Russian companies and individuals. Behind the lurid headlines about the seizure of mega-yachts and opulent mansions belonging to Russia’s elite, who are conservatively estimated to hold assets abroad worth over $1 trillion, there is a much more complicated picture in which a combination of ambivalence, lack of transparency, legislative barriers and hidden owners is conspiring to water down the sanctions’ effectiveness. At the state level, while all EU countries have unanimously approved the five rounds sanctions against these Russian/Belarusian entities and individuals, they have done so with varying degrees of enthusiasm. At one end of the sanctions-support spectrum you have Poland, which has been one of the strongest advocates for tough EU sanctions against Russia. In April, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki even urged the imposition of sanctions against all members of the Kremlin’s parliamentary party United Russia. Given that at the end of 2021 United Russia had more than 2.3 million registered members, such a move would go far beyond even the Navalny list. At the other end of the spectrum is Hungary, whose Russia-friendly prime minister is holding up the latest, sixth round of EU sanctions, principally over the vexed issue of banning Russian oil imports. The Budapest government’s general attitude towards the EU sanctions can be characterised as ambivalent at best. It expressed reservations when the European Commission included Moshe Kantor, president of the European Jewish Congress, and Herman Gref, CEO of Sberbank, on its sanctions list, but went along with it. But Russian Orthodox Church leader Patriarch Kirill, who is included on the sixth sanctions list for his vocal support for Putin’s war, was a step too far in Orban’s view. “We do not support the inclusion of religious leaders on the sanctions list, as this goes against freedom of religion,” the prime minister said in his weekly radio address on May 6. In between Poland and Hungary are the Czech Republic and Slovakia, both of which are run by Western-oriented, EU-sanction supporting governments, who have to deal with prominent domestic pro-Russian forces ranged against them. In Czechia, this includes President Milos Zeman and his overtly pro-Russian entourage in Prague Castle; in Slovakia, it is the two-time former prime minister Robert Fico and his SMER-SD party, around which various extremist pro-Russian parties coalesce. Present and accounted for Of course, Central European governments can only apply sanctions to that which is actually present in their country. One reason why the British sanctions on Russian companies and individuals make such attention-grabbing headlines around the world is because for so many years the UK was, in the words of Transparency International, a “global hub for money laundering”. Perhaps the most vivid example of Hungary’s contradictory stance over the sanctions is the continued presence of the Russian-based International Investment Bank – a multilateral development institution which has had its headquarters in Budapest since 2019. Considered by many to be little more than a “spy bank” beyond the remit of Hungarian regulators, Orban’s government granted it full diplomatic immunity, which allows staff to enter Hungary freely – and therefore the wider EU – potentially undermining sanctions. Yet despite the overt friendliness shown towards Russia by Orban and his governing Fidesz party, Hungary has not actually been a particularly favourite playground of Russian oligarchs, and the presence of Russian companies is – at least on paper – fairly negligible. Besides the Hungarian subsidiary of nuclear holding Rosatom – responsible for the extension of the Paks 2 nuclear power plant, a project that the Hungarian government is still insisting, somewhat optimistically, will go ahead – only a few Russian companies officially have operations in Hungary. Steelmaker Dunaferr, a renowned industrial company dating back to the communist era, is directly owned by the Cyprus-based Steelhold Ltd. Steelhold belongs to Industrial Union of Donbas, one of the biggest holdings in eastern Ukraine, but is basically controlled by Russian stakeholders. Last year, speculation grew that the company would be taken over by Russia’s Metalloinvest, owned by Alisher Usmanov, the sixth richest Russian, now also on the EU sanctions list, but the deal never materialised. As such, Steelhold is still 50 per cent owned by the Russian state development institution VEB, which is on the EU sanctions list. It is not clear how the sanctions will impact on the company’s operations; officially, it will only say it “faces some supply problems”. Dunaferr has around 3,300 employees, but a long-running feud between its Russian and Ukrainian owners has led to a management vacuum. Another interesting case is that of the rail business and industrial site Dunakeszi Jarmujavito, which is 50 per cent owned by Transmashholding, the largest manufacturer of rolling stock in Russia. The other 50 per cent of Dunakeszi, which has a major contract to modernise and produce carriages for the Hungarian state rail company, is held by the Hungarian entrepreneur Kristof Szalay-Bobrovniczky, who has just been appointed Orban’s next defence minister. Transmashholding is not on the sanctions list, but the president of the company, Andrei Bokarev, had to resign at the end of April after he was put on the British sanctions list, though he’s still absent from the EU list. Even so, the arrangement means that a defence minister of a NATO country is in a close business relationship with a Russian company that builds materiel for Russia’s war machine in Ukraine. When it comes to favourite places for well-to-do Russians in Europe to visit, the spa town of Heviz, some 200 kilometres west of Budapest, is high on the list. Featuring a huge thermal lake, Heviz has been a popular meeting place for the Russian intelligence services. In 2017, Austrian ex-colonel Martin Möller was reported to have handed over classified NATO documents to Russian spies in Heviz – one of several rendezvous points in Central Europe chosen by Möller, which also included Bratislava and Štrbské pleso in the High Tatras. The five-star Lotus Therme Hotel & Spa in Heviz is Russian owned, but by individuals who have been living in Hungary for decades with no obvious connections to the Putin regime. The spa town has also been a favourite destination for Russian tourists, with many owning real estate. There’s even a Russian Orthodox Church being built in Heviz, with hefty Hungarian government support. Image: EC Likewise, Poland has been of limited interest to Russians due to longstanding antipathy in the country to their presence, to the extent that the Warsaw government felt moved to unilaterally modify its national legislation to create room for its own sanction targets. This led to the announcement in April that a further 50 individuals and companies from Russia and Belarus would be subject to measures, which include a ban on entry to Poland and participation in public tenders as well as a freezing of assets. Those found guilty of breaking the sanctions are subject to fines of up to 5 billion euros. “The Polish sanctions list is a supplement to the EU list,” Interior Minister Mariusz Kaminski explained. “It applies to Russian entities and oligarchs with real interests in our country.” The list also includes companies linked to the Belarusian regime of Aleksandr Lukashenko as well as companies previously involved in the import of Russian coal into Poland. The Russian state gas company Gazprom also appears on Poland’s list, which is believed to have been the spark that led to Russia cutting of gas supplies to Poland in late April. A much bigger playground for Russian interests has been the Czech Republic. As one expert who monitors Russian-speaking organised crime once told BIRN, looking at the private school rosters shows it has been the preferred destination for the ‘second’ families of rich Russians – a mix of oligarchs and “criminal entrepreneurs” – for the past two decades. Yet following the mass expulsion of Russian diplomats in 2021 after the revelation that Russian intelligence officers were in all likelihood behind the explosion of a munitions depot in the southeast of Czechia and now the war in Ukraine, a suspiciously large number of luxury properties are finding their way on to the Czech market, priced to sell, say real estate professionals. The Czechs are “dealing with the assets of several persons and dozens of entities on the EU sanctions lists in the aggregate amount of hundreds of millions of Czech koruna,” a spokesperson for the Finance Ministry told BIRN. Asked to specify some of the assets affected, the spokesperson noted that the Finance Ministry acted in mid-April against the West End Hotel in the spa town of Marianske Lazne. The resort is owned by Dmitry Pumpyansky, whose main business is producing pipes for Russia’s oil and gas industries. The action taken against Pumpyansky means that while the hotel can continue to operate, it cannot be sold or distribute profit to Pumpyansky. A hotel of a similar name in nearby Karlovy Vary, owned by Vladimir Yevtushenko of the telecommunications and banking conglomerate Sistema, is also in the crosshairs. Other targets include a member of the Russian State Duma and the wife of another. As well as real estate, frozen assets include bank accounts and company shares. However, dealing with some assets is proving more challenging. Skoda JS, for instance, is owned by Gazprom (which is not yet on the EU sanctions list). Yet Skoda JS’s vital role maintaining and servicing Czechia’s two nuclear power plants means that the Czech state-controlled energy group CEZ has no choice but to continue cooperating with it. The Ministry of Industry and Trade admits that Russian ownership of what is a key strategic partner for Czechia’s energy security is a significant risk. “The fact that Skoda JS has Russian owners can be clearly seen as a mistake,” a spokesman told the local press. In private, officials say that a solution is being sought, which could include either a purchase by CEZ via expropriation or the imposition of an administrator. However, both routes require new legislation, a further stumbling block to the effective imposition of sanctions. The vandalized facade of one of the villas belonging to Russian state TV host Vladimir Soloviev on the shores of Lake Como, Italy, 06 April 2022. EPA-EFE/MATTEO BAZZI Law & order As one of Ukraine’s most proactive supporters, whose relations with Moscow were already in the deep freeze, it’s no surprise that the Czech Republic has enthusiastically leapt to impose sanctions. Yet current Czech legislation only allows the government to act on EU or United Nations sanctions. Prague has no option to enforce sanctions based on the US list, for instance, or even to select its own targets like Poland is doing. “The government would like to extend the current EU sanctions lists to include certain individuals and entities,” said the Finance Ministry spokesman. “This process is also underway, but requires close cooperation with intelligence services and other security services.” “Currently, there exists no real legal tool with which the Czech Republic could sanction a foreign entity on the basis of domestic demand. This is why we are preparing our own Magnitsky Act,” Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky said in late March, referring to the US legislation of 2016 that authorises its government to sanction foreign officials worldwide who are deemed to be human rights offenders, freeze their assets and ban them from entering the US. The Czech government is also working on legislation that would allow it to cut off companies from public money and tenders. Meanwhile, implementation of the sanctions can be messy and confused. The Polish Interior Ministry appeared loath to provide further details to BIRN as to the manner in which EU or Polish sanctions on Russian entities and individuals since the war have been implemented, restricting itself to stressing the country had imposed supplementary sanctions to the EU ones. However, the local media are beginning to report on a series of issues with the implementation of sanctions on the Polish list. For example, Gazeta Wyborcza reported that one company, Maga Foods, was added to the Polish list because it was owned by Mikhail Fridman, yet it is now actually in the control of a Dutch businessman after the latter purchased Fridman’s shares in March. The company, a food producer, is now struggling to survive. Paradoxically, one unintended consequence of the sanctions is that Ukrainian employees of the firm – about half of the 200-strong workforce – are suffering. “The whole situation is absurd,” Piotr Pawinski, president of the company, told Gazeta Wyborcza. “They wanted to punish Fridman, but ended up depriving our Ukrainian employees of a livelihood – and they had been sending most of their incomes to their families back home.” Experts agree that effective sanctions require greater transparency and enforcement. Yet the region falls short on both. Lack of transparency has been a feature of the region for decades and too little was done to address it. This failure is a significant complicating factor in implementing sanctions, because all too often it’s impossible to identify who owns what.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ
Tuzhanskyi ’22 [Dmytro; director of the Institute for Central European Strategy (Ukraine), Think Visegrad Fellow 2020 and IVLP alum; 1-25-2022; "Putin wants the West to repeat the tragedy of Central Europe"; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/putin-wants-west-repeat-tragedy-central-europe-opinion-1672807; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]
A string of recent high level negotiations between the West and Russia are not as fruitless as they are deemed by their participants and political commentators.
It's true that no agreement on any of the key issues has been reached during the negotiations held in Geneva, Brussels and Vienna, and 100,000 Russian soldiers are still located along the Ukrainian border. No agreement save for one may turn out to be the most important.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ
Economist ’22 [Economist; British weekly newspaper published that focuses on current affairs, international business, politics, technology, and culture; 2-5-2022, updated 2-9-2022; "As Russia menaces Ukraine, eastern European countries grow nervous"; The Economist; https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/02/05/as-russia-menaces-ukraine-eastern-european-countries-grow-nervous; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]
The municipal offices in the Estonian city of Narva are just a snowball’s throw from Russia. From her window Katri Raik, the mayor, can watch cars and lorries trickling through a border checkpoint. More than 80% of Narva’s residents are ethnic Russians, a legacy of the centuries during which Narva was part first of the Russian empire and then of the Soviet Union. Ethnic Russians, nearly a quarter of the population, have grown more integrated since Estonia became independent 30 years ago. Yet most send their children to Russian-language schools and rely on Russian media. “Yesterday someone on the city council said ‘U nikh v Estonii tak [That’s how it is over there in Estonia],’” says Ms Raik.
A former interior minister, Ms Raik was elected in December pledging to bridge the gap. A new Estonian-language school will open in September. The regional economy is now oriented towards the West. But Russia’s military build-up on the Ukrainian border is reminding Narva of where it sits. Opinion is divided along familiar lines. In several conversations, ethnic Estonians saw Russia as the aggressor, whereas ethnic Russians tended to think the risk of war exaggerated or to blame NATO. “We each know what the other thinks, so we simply don’t talk about it,” says Ms Raik.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 1NC – Central Europe Relations › 1NC – Russian Probing Scenario
Tamás MAGYARICS ‘19, Professor, Department of American Studies, Eötvös Loránd University; Senior Research Fellow, American Studies Research Institute, National University of Public Service, “How to Revitalise the U.S.– Eastern European Relations”, Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade - Budapest, Foreign Policy Review, 2019, https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FPR_2019_online_final.pdf
Despite Russian conventional threats along the eastern borders of NATO, Moscow has deployed a wide range of non-traditional weapons in its grand strategy to regain some of its influence in Central and Eastern Europe, to undermine the unity of the European Union, and to drive a wedge between the U.S. and her NATO allies in Europe. In fact, a conventional, or a nuclear, military confrontation does not seem to be likely in the foreseeable future. Therefore, NATO/U.S. had better prepare for such challenges posed by Russia as hybrid warfare and cyber warfare. Intelligence, economic, or financial penetration into the Central and Eastern European NATO members (at times with the help of front organisations), disinformation campaigns are imminent and real threats to the national security of the countries targeted, and to the cohesion of NATO alliance as well. Hybrid warfare has already been used by Moscow against Ukraine in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and the experiences gained in these conflicts are bound to be carefully studied by the Russian strategists as to their potential application in future conflicts in the neighbourhood. What is a ’clear and present danger’ for the U.S. and its allies in NATO is Russia’s cyber warfare which was used influencing the U.S. presidential elections in 2016, possibly the French and German parliamentary elections in the past few years, and definitely deployed against Estonia and Latvia in the Baltics (The Straits Times, 2017), as well as against international organisations, such as, for instance, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Brunsden, 2018). The wide range of Russian cyber warfare activity is, without question, one of the most pressing chellenges NATO, and especially its Central and Eastern European members are facing. Given the immense Russian capabilities in this area, it is stating the obvious, that the individual members of NATO cannot successfully defend themselves; it is their existential interest to work together with the other members of the Atlantic Community, first and foremost with the U.S. Moreover, cybersecurity threats to the Europeans (and the U.S.) are not only posed by Russia. The debate over the role of the Chinese Huawei in establishing the 5G mobile network in Europe, or in some countries in Europe, relates in reality to national security in a broader sense.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 1NC – Central Europe Relations › 1NC – Russian Probing Scenario
Anatol Lieven ’22, is a senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, “Russia Belongs at the Center of Europe”, Foreign Policy, 2/10/22, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/10/russia-europe-ukraine-west-security-council/
The Western attempt to expel Russia from Europe has failed. That there was such an attempt was always implicit in the strategy of seeking to admit every European country but Russia into NATO and the European Union. In this context, the NATO slogan “A Europe Whole and Free” is an explicit statement that Russia is not part of Europe.
But as French President Emmanuel Macron has reminded us, Russia is part of Europe and is simply too big, too powerful, and too invested in its immediate neighborhood to be excluded from the European security order. A continued strategy along these lines will lead to repeated Russian attempts to force its way back in. At best, this will lead to repeated and very damaging crises; at worst, to war.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › 1NC – Central Europe Relations › 1NC – Russian Probing Scenario
David Hutt ‘21, is a political journalist based between France and the Czech Republic, reporting on European political affairs and EU-Asian relations, “In Central Europe, Biden Can Build on Trump’s Record”, World Politics Review, 2/17/21, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29428/in-central-europe-biden-can-build-on-trump-s-record
Today, the United States’ relations with Central Europe are at an inflection point. Much of the recent media coverage in the region has focused on how Washington’s influence might wane if President Joe Biden picks a fight with the governments of Hungary and Poland, whose leaders had cultivated close ties with Biden’s predecessor, Donald Trump. On the campaign trail, Biden bemoaned the recent trajectory of democratic decline and the erosion of checks and balances on executive power in those countries. Meanwhile, illiberal leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orban and Poland’s Jaroslaw Kaczynski are suspicious of Biden’s pledges to make human rights and the rule of law key pillars of U.S. foreign policy, viewing such efforts as affronts to their sovereignty. As the Atlantic Council’s Petr Tuma noted in December, some observers in Central and Eastern Europe also fear that after a period of “intensified cooperation” under Trump, America could revert back to the era of President Barack Obama, “when many believed Washington (initially) sacrificed the region’s interests in the name of a reset with Moscow.” In reality, though, Biden has given no sign of any such attempt at a reset, signaling he will take a tough approach toward Russia. And even as Biden seeks to reorient U.S. foreign policy away from his predecessor’s approach, the Trump administration has actually left a solid foundation of trust and cooperation for Biden to build upon in Central Europe. Since 2017, all of the leaders from the “Visegrad Four”—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland—have visited Washington, while Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, toured each of their capitals. U.S. trade with the region is up across the board, and Washington has signed new security pacts with Poland and Hungary. And all except Budapest have backed Washington’s pressure campaign against the controversial Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. During his first weeks in office, Biden has focused more on reassuring Western European partners, holding calls with the leaders of Germany, France and the United Kingdom, as well the NATO secretary general. But having served as the main interlocutor for Central and Eastern Europe as vice president under Obama, Biden knows well the region’s strategic importance. Its natural aversion to Russian influence tends to suit U.S. interests. And China, America’s main strategic competitor, has built up its investment and influence in the region, backed by a powerful section of the Central European political elite. Improving relations with the region won’t require a great deal of heavy lifting from Biden’s administration—a rare benefit as it faces numerous intractable problems across the world. In fact, in many policy areas, Biden can largely pick up where the Trump administration left off.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Generic Relations › Top Level › 2NC – Generic Link
John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, ** is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “Introduction”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22
The premise of this book is that Russia in its current condition and configuration poses a serious threat to the stability of Europe. Russia’s authoritarian system is weak at home and yet strong enough to be a revanchist power, one able to fill power vacuums created by the USA and its allies in Africa, the Middle East and parts of Central America. Turning its back on Europe, Russia has moved closer to China, apparently ready to accept being its junior partner in the absence of allies to counter-balance Chinese influence. The focus of Russia’s leadership is on survival. It sees the restoration and upholding of Russia’s international status as essential to the process of securing its rule, prioritising it over the need to equip Russia for a new economic and political age dominated by climate change, digitalisation and other disruptive forces. The rise of Asia, the disorientation of the USA and its allies as well as the tarnishing of western values and the fractures in western societies all offer short-term gains for a Russian leadership fearful of reform at home but confident of its strength abroad. This has encouraged an ill-conceived policy of aggression towards Ukraine that could easily have triggered a wider European conflict in 2014 when it annexed Crimea and deliberately destabilised south-eastern Ukraine. In the process, Russia has needlessly made an enemy of a people with which it shares a strong cultural affinity, consolidating Ukraine as a political nation that no longer sees its future in close alliance with Russia. The ‘return’ of Crimea to Russia is meagre compensation for forcing Ukraine on to a pro-western path of development and seriously aggravating relations with the EU and NATO. Moscow’s flat-footed reaction to revolution in Belarus in the summer of 2020 pointed again to poor decision-making and limited crisis management capabilities. The Lukashenka regime had been living on borrowed time for years beforehand and danger was looming. Further misjudgements of this kind are likely to increase rather than decrease as the Russian system closes further in on itself in pursuit of greater resilience to outside threats.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Generic Relations › Top Level › 1NC – Generic Link
John Lough and Andrew Monaghan ’21,*is an associate fellow of the Russia & Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, ** is a researcher and analyst in the field of international politics. He is a Russianist in the area studies style, with a preference for old-fashioned Kremlinology. His particular interests are Russian domestic politics, strategy and biography, and he has written extensively on Russian Grand Strategy, UK-Russia Relations, and the Euro-Atlantic community’s relationship with Russia, particularly modern deterrence., “8 The outlook”, Germany's Russia problem, Published by Manchester University Press, 2021, accessed via Project Muse on 7.17.22
The pattern of recent years indicates that in this situation, Moscow is more likely to increase activities abroad to make its presence felt. It has playgrounds close to home – in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Moldova and Ukraine as well as further afield in Libya and Syria. Russia may also take another step closer to China at a time when tensions in US–China relations are increasing. In short, the scope for the collision of interests with western countries, including Germany, looks set to increase rather than decrease. Such an outcome is more likely because the Russian leadership appears undeterred by greater confrontation. There are four reasons for this. First, confrontation helps sustain the narrative at home that ‘the West’ is working to cut Russian down to size as part of a neocontainment policy, forcing Russia into a ‘besieged fortress’ posture. This putative external danger to Russia allows the leadership to take measures to protect itself against the real threat to its security – its own people. Second, more confrontation increases the Kremlin’s appetite for fishing in troubled waters, whether in areas vacated by the USA such as Syria, or in western countries themselves by interfering in their democratic processes to increase their societal divisions. This is part of the strategy to protect the Russian system by shaping the external environment to its benefit. Third, confrontation offers opportunities to expose the weaknesses of the EU and NATO and deepen estrangement between the USA and its European allies. Divisions within the EU on the issue of Russia offer potentially rich opportunities to Russian diplomacy. Fourth, Moscow recognises that confrontation intimidates European governments, encouraging them to find ways of talking more to Moscow rather than creating the means to deter its aggressive behaviour. Germany’s failure to invest in maintaining adequate defence forces after the end of the Cold War says much about its lack of a strategic mindset. It succumbed to a sense of a new peaceful era reinforced by the enlargement of NATO, which relieved Germans of the burden of being a frontier state as they had been for fortyfive years as a divided nation on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In this seemingly benign environment, there was less obvious need for US security guarantees and Germany’s armed forces needed to focus primarily on out-of-area crisis management to the detriment of collective defence. This had profound implications for the size, structure, equipment and training of the Bundeswehr. In 2007, a senior British officer likened the Bundeswehr’s capabilities to those of ‘an aggressive camping organisation’.5 Since 2014, a defence planning process has been in place to rebuild the armed forces’ collective defence and deterrence capabilities. This will reach not completion until 2032, leaving a significant gap during which a key vulnerability is visible. During the Cold War, the US military had the ability to deploy forces to two major theatres at the same time and had enough reserves to deal with a simultaneous minor crisis. It can now only respond to one major crisis and one smaller emergency. Should the US have to deal with a major crisis in the Asia-Pacific region, European members of NATO at present would struggle alongside a smaller US force to maintain Europe’s defences if tested. The German government’s strategic assessments after the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were clear about the need to reinvest in defence but its leaders did not want to take this message to the public because it would be unpopular. Policymakers still use coded language to make the point. In a speech in October 2020, Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer spoke compellingly of Germany needing to be a ‘strategic giver’ rather than remaining a ‘taker’. It meant becoming a ‘hard, powerpolitical factor’.6 However, there was no mention of paying for this capability. Her message instead focused on the importance of preserving the transatlantic link significantly weakened over the past two decades, and particularly under the Trump presidency. The crisis of liberal democracy symbolised by Trump’s election in 2016 and the rise of populist forces in several western countries have been grist to the Kremlin’s mill. For this reason, Russia’s leaders feel that history is on their side. Putin boldly stated in 2019 that liberalism had outlived its purpose.7 Russia’s overconfidence derives partly from the fact that it has worked out how to target western weaknesses without provoking serious retaliation. Western countries have signally failed to study Russia’s vulnerabilities in the same way and apply pressure to them as part of a strategy to defend their interests. Behind its claims that it wishes to adapt the international system to new realities, Moscow has a backward-looking agenda. It seeks refuge in the past with its nostalgia for the Yalta and Potsdam agreements.8 When it talks of a new security order, it has in mind an old one. Ahead of the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Putin even proposed a summit of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to discuss global security issues. This, of course, did not include Germany, the country with the largest population in Europe and the fourth-largest economy in the world. The Russian leadership remains obsessed with the extent of US influence in international affairs as if Russia were an equal, and despite clear signs that Washington is returning to a new form of isolationism, demonstrated by its reduced interest in the Middle East. These paranoias continue to fuel the traditional goal of weakening the transatlantic link and returning Europe to its natural state in which Russia can exert greater political influence over the continent. In this respect, Trump’s disregard for NATO, his contempt for the EU and his tendency to treat Germany as an enemy rather than an ally made him Moscow’s accomplice in weakening transatlantic relations. His assault on Germany for its low level of defence spending and the hostility of his administration to Nord Stream 2 were a deeply unnerving experience for German policymakers that look set to recede to some extent under the presidency of Joe Biden. However, even if the atmosphere improves, a return to the pre-Trump status quo in Germany’s relations with the USA looks unlikely because too much has changed in the meantime.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: SPP CP › 2AC---SPP CP
Myers 7-15 (Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. BA in Journalism @ San Francisco State University, MS in Journalism @ Northwestern University. “National Guard’s international training program needs better oversight, report finds”, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2022/07/15/national-guards-international-training-program-needs-better-oversight-report-finds/)LR
The National Guard program that pairs up states with partner countries for training needs to improve its record-keeping, according to the recommendations from a Government Accountability Office report released Wednesday. The State Partnership Program implemented a new tracking database in 2021, according to the report, but partner countries haven’t been thorough in reporting of all of the training events they’ve completed with their National Guard counterparts. During fiscal year 2021, for example, 37 of 780 activities were marked as completed, just 5%. It’s up to the National Guard Bureau to make sure that partners update their records, so that Congress can continue to appropriately fund the program, but GAO found that they haven’t been following up to make sure records are complete. “If the NGB prioritizes ensuring that partner states are recording such information in a timely manner, DoD will be positioned to have reliable information for internal decision-making purposes and for reporting to Congress as the data system continues to evolve,” the report said. The Defense Department agreed with GAO’s recommendation, but did not offer examples of how it plans to improve reporting. GAO will update its report when DoD has confirmed its next steps. The report also found some confusion at both NGB and DoD about the legal authorities that govern SPP training and travel. “While DoD has approved establishing a working group to review and clarify the use of statutory authorities for SPP activities, DoD has not ensured that the action plan describing this working group includes timelines,” the report noted.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Affirmative › Internal---Inflation
de Rugy 7/7 (Veronique de Rugy, Ph.D., is a contributing editor at Reason. She is a senior research fellow at the at George Mason University. “Democrats Are Trying To Push Through Another 'Build Back Better' Bill. It Would Only Make Inflation Worse.” Reason. July 7, 2022. Accessed July 10, 2022. , AK)
The go-to policy for dealing with nearly every modern problem is more government spending. So it was just a matter of time before Democrats tried to revive the failed "Build Back Better" (BBB) program to address today's economic troubles. Of course, if they succeed, the result will be much the same as what we've experienced over the past 18 months: more debt and rising inflation.
As a reminder, the $2 trillion proposed BBB legislation came on the tail of an oversized $2 trillion third COVID-19 relief bill and a $1 trillion infrastructure bill. It was killed when Sens. Joe Manchin (D–W.Va.) and Kyrsten Sinema (D–Ariz.) joined all Republican senators in opposition. They rightfully worried that more spending would inflate our debt and produce inflation. But now, their party is back at it again. In the midst of the largest inflation in four decades, they've been negotiating behind the scenes for weeks in hopes of passing a slimmer BBB.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Affirmative › Uniqueness---Climate
Joselow and Romm 7/7 (Maxine Joselow is a staff writer who anchors The Climate 202 at The Washington Post. Joselow came to The Post from E&E News, an environmental publication that is part of Politico. Tony Romm is the congressional economic policy reporter at The Washington Post, tracking infrastructure reform, government spending and the financial impacts of federal decision-making nationwide. Romm previously covered the tech industry for about 12 years, chronicling the myriad ways that tech companies like Apple, Facebook and Google navigate the corridors of government -- and the regulations that sometimes result. In his time at The Post, where he last served as senior technology policy reporter, he broke many of the most resonant stories on the beat, revealing once-secret information about state and federal probes into Silicon Valley’s largest firms. Romm arrived at The Post in 2018, after previously serving as a senior technology reporter for Politico and a senior editor for policy and politics at Recode, a tech business news site owned by Vox Media. Romm is also an on-air contributor to NBC News and MSNBC. “Democrats race to clinch deal on climate, energy with Manchin,” Washington Post. July 7, 2022. Accessed July 10, 2022. , AK)
The individuals cautioned that lawmakers and their staff are still discussing the idea and that no final deal on methane — or the rest of their climate agenda — has been reached. Over the past year, Democrats have repeatedly thought they were close to striking an accord with Manchin, only to see negotiations collapse at the last moment because of misunderstandings, miscommunications and lingering policy differences.
“Suggestions that a reconciliation deal is close are false,” said Sam Runyon, a spokesman for Manchin, in a statement. “Senator Manchin still has serious unresolved concerns and there is a lot of work to be done before it’s conceivable that a deal can be reached he can sign onto.”
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Affirmative › Uniqueness---Doesn’t Pass
Turner 7/6 (Trish, ABC News Coordinating Congressional Reporter. “Democrats Schumer and Manchin strike deal to cut costs for seniors,” ABC News. July 6, 2022. Accessed July 10, 2022. , AK)
Democrats involved in the matter dodged questions about timetables for passage of any final deal, cognizant of the fact that an intense focus on missed deadlines plagued the first iteration of the legislation.
But there is little doubt that the month-long August recess looms large with the focus afterward on funding the government by Oct. 1 and the crucial midterms that may very well alter the power structure in Congress. Democrats are also very wary of scaring off the mercurial Manchin with any pressure, despite knowing that a major economic package could potentially boost their political chances significantly.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Affirmative › Uniqueness---Doesn’t Pass
Everett and Levine 7/7 (John Burgess Everett is the congressional bureau chief for POLITICO, specializing in the Senate since 2013. He’s a native Mainer, a University of Maryland graduate and one of those people who goes by his middle name. Before covering the Senate, Burgess covered transportation policy for POLITICO and served on the production team. He’s also an alum of the Gazette in suburban Maryland and the Portland Press Herald in Maine. Marianne LeVine is a reporter for POLITICO, where she covers the Senate. She previously covered lobbying and co- authored POLITICO Influence. Prior to her stint on the lobbying beat, Marianne covered labor policy for POLITICO Pro, writing about regulations related to overtime pay, retirement advice and occupational health and safety. Her reporting in 2016 about domestic abuse allegations against President Donald Trump's first nominee for labor secretary, Andrew Puzder, was a key part of the debate surrounding his nomination, which he ultimately withdrew. Prior to working at POLITICO, Marianne was an intern in the Los Angeles Times' Washington, D.C. bureau. She graduated from Stanford undergrad in 2013, with degrees in International Relations and French and completed Stanford's Graduate Program in Journalism in 2014. Zack Colman contributed to the report. “Dems' climate and tax agenda to consume Congress in July,” Politico. July 7, 2022. Accessed July 10, 2022. , AK)
The Schumer-Manchin negotiations come amid a mixed backdrop for Democrats, who have a shot at keeping control of the Senate but are battling Biden’s unpopularity and public outrage over rising prices. Other pieces of Democrats’ agenda regarding child tax credits, education and senior home support are almost certain to be sidelined due to Manchin’s narrower aspirations.
Another possible casualty moving forward, according to multiple sources, are more federal subsidies for electric vehicles and new infrastructure spending to support them. Manchin has publicly panned over-reliance on electric vehicles as “stupid” when other countries control much of the supply chain for critical parts and consistently questioned more federal investment for the growing industry. Separately, car companies are asking for Washington to lift a cap on how many electric automobiles are eligible for existing tax credits.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Negative › Internal---Drug Pricing
Turner 7/6 (Trish, ABC News Coordinating Congressional Reporter. “Democrats Schumer and Manchin strike deal to cut costs for seniors,” ABC News. July 6, 2022. Accessed July 10, 2022. , AK)
Senate Democrats have reached agreement on a key portion of a revised domestic policy bill, once known as Build Back Better, which would allow Medicare to negotiate prescription drug prices, according to a source familiar with the matter.
Democrats have worked for years to give Medicare this power, always falling short in the face of GOP opposition, but this time they hope to move it forward as part of a broader, as-yet-unfinished economic package, anxious to provide relief to voters buffeted to tackle sky-high inflation and a possible recession.