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2022 Michigan Negative

Security K Links

State discourse on AI shapes the norms for conflict – the Aff portrays AI technology as “inevitable” and a “competition.” This shapes our perceptions of other states.

Bode, 2021 - Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern Denmark [Ingvild June 25, AutoNorms “Reflecting on the Future Norms of Warfare” https://www.autonorms.eu/reflecting-on-the-future-norms-of-warfare-2/ Acc. 5/27/22 TA]

Further, in terms of other factors that may continue to shape/disrupt current norms of conflict and warfare, we should also consider the arguments that states offer. State discourse often points to the inevitability of integrating more and more AI into weapon systems. The reason for this is often two-fold: first, states map out weaponised AI as part of a steady, irresistible process that they cannot resist. Second, we have also seen an emphasis on great power competition resurfacing. From a US (and a UK) perspective, it is necessary to include ever more AI into weapon systems because China (or to a lesser extent Russia) are doing it. China and Russia, in turn, speak of the same necessity as a reaction to US (and allied states) moves. What gets lost in these dynamics is that both options represent particular, not exclusive courses of action that policymakers can or cannot engage in. In sum, tracking how norms of conflict and warfare change, especially considering emerging technologies, requires going beyond a narrow and toward a critical understanding of international law. I argue that we can expect to see norms, when defined broadly as understandings of appropriateness, emerging in practices of designing, training for, and operating (novel) weapon systems. How these norms relate to standards enshrined in international law is an active research question.

2022 Michigan Negative

Cybernetics Links

The Affirmative plan and discourse rely on humanist assumptions. The focus on human control reinforces the human/machine binary, which justifies human and team violence by condemning violence by AI. The focus on human dignity centers Value on human life, which Devalues and Marginalizes machine or cyborg life as “artificial.”

Jones, 2018 - Lecturer in Law at the University of Essex [Emily “A Posthuman-Xenofeminist Analysis of the Discourse on Autonomous Weapons Systems and Other Killing Machines” Australian Feminist Law Journal 44(1) August 1 https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2018.1465333 Acc 2/2/21 TA]

4.1 Challenging the Humanist Discourse around Autonomous Weapons: A Posthuman Analysis Despite the challenges posed, calls for a ban remain strong. However, there are very large differences between the people who call for a ban. NGOs, for example, tend to take a humanitarian stance, noting the need to promote a humanist ethics and uphold the rules of IHL. Alternatively, however, there are those in this group who do not fundamentally come from a humanist background but come from the perspective of futurism.113 Whilst the position of NGOs comes from the humanist discourse of IHL and the need to protect human life over all others, aligning more with the human dignity standpoint of religious leaders, some tech experts like Elon Musk fully embrace the posthuman future while working to ensure that this future remains ethical, albeit working within the confines of capitalism.114 The will to construct the future from the now can be seen through the project OpenAI, which Musk co-founded.115 OpenAI is a project which seeks to disrupt the current corporate trend in AI research, where most of the research into AI is being done by large companies such as Google or in research centres such as MIT, with many of the findings of this research kept private in the hope of using them for profit. OpenAI is a non-profit organisation which seeks to disrupt corporate monopolies on AI research by committing to make all of its research and patents public, as well as through offering to work freely with any group or organisation.116 Noting the threat AI could pose to humanity, OpenAI aims to create a friendly General Artificial Intelligence (GAI) - a system which can do more than just one thing such as speak or play chess; one which has ‘human’ characteristics.117 OpenAI thus represents a clear, strategic effort to disrupt current trends in technology and AI development, including the will to make profit, aiming to bring a different ethical standpoint to the realm of AI research working, hopefully, to create a better future.118 All the groups who call for a preventative ban fundamentally agree that machines should not make life/death decisions. However, while NGOs seek to protect humans now within the confines of the present, with the risk of becoming out of date, futurist tech experts fundamentally believe that ‘the best way to predict the future is to invent it’.119 OpenAI represents a move towards shaping technological advancement now to prevent the existence of killer machines. Such aims are very similar to xenofeminist aims: the wish to appropriate technology for feminist aims. Whilst xenofeminism does not explicitly address the threat to life technology could pose, I argue that the wish to define and use technology for feminist aims inherently includes the wish to ensure that technology remains ‘friendly’.120 While OpenAI wishes to create a friendly AI, however, they do not explicitly define what ‘friendly’ means. Xenofeminism, on the other hand, is explicitly informed by a feminist ethos which seeks to ensure that ‘friendly’ means non-killer as a minimum. There is a need, as I will suggest, to bring these two bodies of thought together. Gender theory is required in this area due to its long history of theorising and applying a set of complex and nuanced tools which seek to promote equality and justice, these ethics forming what I argue should constitute ‘friendly’ technology. While there is a need to ensure that IHL is upheld and that robots do not kill, it is also clear that this ethical dilemma does not just apply to autonomous weapons. While the organisations mentioned above clearly have at least some form anti-militarism as a core aim,121 the temporal horizon of such NGOs remains limited. NGOs largely maintain a strict humanist stance, focusing on the realm of international law and the need to promote and protect existing legal frameworks such as IHL which situate the human at the centre of the paradigm. Whilst this has historically produced many great achievements, such a humanist stance cannot be applied given the rapid pace at which technology is now developing. AI may not only pose a threat to the lives of humans where designed, purposefully, to kill, but may also pose a threat to life in and of itself, as it exists. There is a need for all groups who are working to promote ethical technologies to consider not only what may seem attainable now, but what is feasibly attainable in the future, noting the ways in which the now can be used to construct the future. NGOs continue to situate the human as the centre of their paradigm, seeing the machine as the ‘other’ to the human. This can be seen in the way in which autonomy is discussed in relation to the human who is imagined as either in/on/out of the loop, which does not account for the ways in which humans and machines work in connection.122 Posthumanism, on the other hand, challenges the centrality of the human within Western thinking, working to re- think the human/machine binary. Feminist posthumanism notes that something else is needed; a new way of defining subjectivity which sees the complexities and interconnections between humans and others: nature, technology, animals, etc., rejecting the human as the central paradigm and noting how the human is located instead ‘in the flow of relations with multiple others’.123 The humanist discourse around autonomous weapons ignores the posthuman reality that humans and machines are already working in connection with one another. Life/death decisions are already being made by human-machine combinations, as the next section illustrates. Banning autonomous weapons is not enough: there is a need to consider the ways in which machines are already making these decisions and to create ethical frameworks for these and future technologies, rebutting the false exceptionalisation which surrounds the current discourse on autonomous weapons. 4.2 Machine-Human Life/Death Decision Making As Jasanoff notes, technology is based around a set of decisions.124 Jasanoff observes that we often do not question these decisions until there is an accident – at which point we find who made the mistake.125 However, she argues that people ‘have spent a great deal more energy thinking about how to make good laws than about how to design good technological objects’.126 Yet, she continues, ‘in democratic societies, uncontrolled delegation of power is seen as a basic threat to freedom’.127 We must ‘understand how power is delegated to technological systems’.128 The need to understand how power and decision-making are delegated to technology is ever more urgent in the realm of life/death decision-making. However, as noted, the humanist discourse on autonomous weapons fails to account for the ways in which humans and machines are already working together to make life/death decisions. The most obvious example is the use of programming and algorithms in drone warfare. While many drone strikes are conducted as ‘personality strikes’ – i.e. strikes on a particular, key, well-known person – these occur only a few times a year, with ‘signature strikes’ happening a few times a week.129 These attacks are conducted on the basis of a ‘pattern of life’ analysis. ‘Pattern of life’ analysis develops a profile of an individual or a network of individuals by drawing on all the intelligence available, which includes things like drone and other aerial surveillance intelligence, communications interceptions, as well as phone tapping information and GPS tracking information.130 What becomes clear in ‘drone warfare’, therefore, is that the drone itself is only one part of a broader system which includes big data, algorithms, intelligence collection, chains of command, and bureaucratic formations, among other technologies and practices.131 This data is then often combined with individual tracking through the use of mobile phone and GPS tracking systems in order to both watch movements as well as to target individuals.132 The gathering of this information builds up to create a file of information collected by machines which, as Chamayou has noted ‘once it becomes thick enough, will constitute a death warrant’.133 This is an example of part-machine life/death decision-making. Part of the decision-making process here is already done by machines which gather this data and predict the likelihood of an individual’s involvement with terrorist organisations. While the human is clearly involved, in that they then must note the results of the data collected, deem it enough to act upon and then operate the drone to kill the subject in question, the machine and the human are making life/death decisions together. It is also worth nothing, as Wilcox has shown, the ways in which this data is often interpreted in racialised and gendered ways.134 Such processes of human-machine life/death decision-making would not be covered under a ban of autonomous weapons. It thus seems that part of the problem with the debate around autonomous weapons is the debate around autonomy itself. By trying to define autonomy instead of working to understand automation and autonomy as in continuum, international debates on autonomous weapons other the machine from the human, creating a false paradigm. Such a limited account of autonomy works to set the standard so high for machine decision-making that, in the end, almost nothing may be covered under a ban. In the meantime, machines are already making of life/death decisions alongside humans. Machine involvement in such decision-making processes is only set to increase, as the next section will illustrate.

2022 Michigan Negative

--AT EU and US cannot Cooperate

The US and the EU can overcome differences – we have more shared commonalities than difference.

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Challenges to Collaboration & Recommendations This paper argues that the US and the EU should increase their AI collaboration and partnerships to advance a world where AI is used to better peoples’ lives, grow national economies, safeguard liberal values and civil liberties, increase global security and safety, and promote peace. However, it would be naïve to assume such collaboration would be without difficulties. This section provides an overview of the obstacles—real and perceived—that experts and government officials cite as potential impediments to transatlantic cooperation. We broadly consider the challenges to full collaboration as falling into five buckets that, although distinct, interconnect with each other (see Figure 23 below). Although the list of challenges is extensive, we believe the US and the EU share more commonalities than differences. In this section, we therefore 1) provide an overview of the obstacles and explain why they are not insurmountable and 2) recommend actions that both narrow divergences and build on areas of agreement. Ultimately, the US and the EU can undertake deliberative, strategic steps towards the full realization of AI collaboration that benefits their citizens, societies, and economies.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend – Global Modelling

US / EU collaboration on AI can establish norms for autonomous weapons.

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Although the US consistently sounds the alarm bells around China’s AI aspirations and the EU urges international efforts against AI that violates fundamental rights, increasingly noting China’s actions with concern,8 little concrete international action has taken place. The United States and the European Union’s ongoing reassessment of their respective AI strategies and legislation provides a window of opportunity to align and collaborate. Transatlantic AI cooperation is at a critical juncture and the United States and the European Union should seize this opportunity to take concrete actions. The Current State The United States and the European Union are separately assessing and updating their AI strategies. However, it is a myth to assume they are not collaborating at all to advance their AI-related goals. Transatlantic cooperation on AI norms, standards, research and development, and data sharing should increase, but the United States and the European Union can build upon an existing foundation for a stronger alliance.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend – EU Solvency

The US and EU can shift the debate from defining LAWs to addressing AI more broadly.

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Defense H1 Shift the Narrative Away from Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS): The development of lethal autonomous weapons is causing tension that may prohibit substantive discussion around new areas for collaboration. The US and the EU should shift the conversation away from potential disagreement around LAWS and towards shared defense priorities such as ensuring military interoperability separate from autonomous weapons development. Related Recommendation: A2 H2 Relax Restrictions on Third-Country Funding, IP Rights: The EU should consider reviewing and changing its EDF and PESCO regulations, allowing non-EU companies to receive funds and maintain IP rights in certain collaborative research projects. The EU and member state governments should consider not replicating these restrictions in other defense-related R&D mechanisms and collaborative efforts with the US. H3 The US and the EU should Strengthen their Defense-Related AI Talent: The US and the EU should work together to pool their defense AI talent to address workforce gaps. This could include defense-related talent exchanges, talent exchanges/secondments into industry to strengthen AI literacy and skills, coordination on AI training and educational programs, and sharing of associated best practices.

2022 Michigan Negative

1NC - EU Counterplan

CP Text – The United States should increase is security cooperation with the European Union to adopt ethical principles ensuring human control in military artificial intelligence systems.

US/EU collaboration is the best solution to ethical AI – visits and dialogues prove that information sharing and joint R&D are effective.

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

2022 Michigan Negative

--AT No Enforcement

Enforcement problems should not prevent a Ban – empirical evidence, improved enforcement and moral stigmas will improve compliance

Freedberg, 2019 – Breaking Defense writer [Sydney “ Should We Ban ‘Killer Robots’? Can We? The Pentagon insists it doesn't want them. But could a global ban really rein in Russia or China? March 11, Acc 12/27/20 TA]

What about an international treaty banning lethal AI, which would have the force of law? “Such a treaty would be very difficult to monitor and enforce,” the official said. “That doesn’t mean an international treaty should be ruled out.” The Enforcement Problem “Autonomous weapons have all of the features that make arms control hard,” said Paul Scharre, a former Army Ranger, now at CNAS, who worked on the current Pentagon policy. International inspectors can’t tell by looking at an unmanned tank, plane, or warship whether it’s programmed to ask a human for permission before opening fire. Even if they get to see the actual code — a security breach few countries would allow — “there’s nothing to stop you from upgrading the software as soon as the inspectors leave,” he told me. “Having said that,” Scharre continued, “I think that the kind of arms control that Stuart Russell is advocating for is actually more feasible.” If someone’s building vast swarms of lethal mini-drones, you don’t have to see the code to know they have to be fully autonomous: There’s no practical way, Scharre told me, for humans to review and approve “a million targets.” Conversely, such mini-drones are only truly threatening in vast numbers. “A country or an individual… might be able to build a few hundred of these,” Scharre said, “but if you’re going to build millions of them, there’s no way to hide that.” So how would you find them? The best model is probably the Chemical Weapons Convention, which, unlike many other treaties — the Biological Weapons Convention, the landmine ban, and so on — has a robust enforcement mechanism. The scope of the problem is similar. Lethal chemicals like chlorine and phosgene are widely used in legitimate industry, so you can’t ban them outright any more than mini-drones; they’re relatively easy to turn into weapons, again like drones; and yet only rogue states like Syria and Iraq have used them since the end of World War I. Much of the reason militaries abandoned poison gas is that a weapon that blows with the wind is hard to control — yet another similarity with AI, since even “narrow” machine-learning algorithms modify themselves in ways beyond human understanding. But there is also a robust monitoring regime, run by the Organisation to Prevent Chemical Weapons, which has about 250 inspectors who can rapidly respond to reported violations. Such “challenge inspections” are a crucial tool, said Irakli Beridze, a Georgian-born veteran of both OPCW and the UNICRI chem, bio, radiological, & nuclear program — with service in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria — who now runs the Centre for AI & Robotics at UNICRI, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. (Beridze emphasized he was only expressing his personal opinion as an expert, not as a UN official). Mini-drone production would be easier to hide than chemical plants — for one thing, it doesn’t stink like a lot of toxic chemicals — but investigative techniques have advanced since the CWC entered into force in 1997. It might even be possible, Beridze said, to set an AI to catch an AI: use artificial intelligence to crunch big data — social media or parts orders, for example — and correlate subtle clues no human inspector could catch. Robust inspections, however, are only one part of the solution, he told me. Countries need not only to sign the treaty but use their own intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement to watch for violations. And, after initial reluctance in the private sector, “buy-in and participation of the chemical industry… was absolutely essential,” he said. “Otherwise this treaty would not work.” Once compliance became a norm in the chemical industry, in large part because of the moral stigma that attached to chemical weapons, it became much harder to produce poison gas in militarily significant amounts. Given widespread anxiety in the tech community about lethal AI, it should be possible to reach a similar consensus among drone manufacturers — eventually. Getting private industry, law enforcement, and national governments on board, even simply making them aware of the problem, would take years.

2022 Michigan Negative

--AT UN Nations Oppose a Ban

A preemptive ban solves – many countries support human control.

Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The statements of governments, another element of the public conscience, illuminate that opposition to weapons that lack human control over the selection and engagement of targets extends beyond individuals to countries. More than two dozen countries have explicitly called for a preemptive ban on these weapons,[179] and consensus is emerging regarding the need for human control over the use of force. As noted above, the requirement for human control is effectively equivalent to a ban on weapons without it. Therefore, a ban would best ensure that the dictates of public conscience are met. The principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience bolster the case against fully autonomous weapons although as discussed above they are not the only matter of concern. Fully autonomous weapons are also problematic under other legal provisions and raise accountability, technological, and security risks. Collectively, these dangers to humanity more than justify the creation of new law that maintains human control over the use of force and prevents fully autonomous weapons from coming into existence.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend – Ban solves Prolif

Banning LAWs is essential to prevent proliferation of weapons.

Human Rights Watch, 2018 [August 21, News Release “Killer Robots Fail Key Moral, Legal Test Principles and Public Conscience Call for Preemptive Ban” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/21/killer-robots-fail-key-moral-legal-test# Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Basic humanity and the public conscience support a ban on fully autonomous weapons, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Countries participating in an upcoming international meeting on such “killer robots” should agree to negotiate a prohibition on the weapons systems’ development, production, and use. The 46-page report, Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots, finds that fully autonomous weapons would violate what is known as the Martens Clause. This long-standing provision of international humanitarian law requires emerging technologies to be judged by the “principles of humanity” and the “dictates of public conscience” when they are not already covered by other treaty provisions. “Permitting the development and use of killer robots would undermine established moral and legal standards,” said Bonnie Docherty, senior arms researcher at Human Rights Watch, which coordinates the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. “Countries should work together to preemptively ban these weapons systems before they proliferate around the world.”

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - - Bans Solves Instability

Regulations fail to solve accountability or technology concerns.

Human Rights Watch, 2018 [August 21, News Release “Killer Robots Fail Key Moral, Legal Test Principles and Public Conscience Call for Preemptive Ban” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/21/killer-robots-fail-key-moral-legal-test# Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The groups found that fully autonomous weapons would undermine the principles of humanity, because they would be unable to apply either compassion or nuanced legal and ethical judgment to decisions to use lethal force. Without these human qualities, the weapons would face significant obstacles in ensuring the humane treatment of others and showing respect for human life and dignity. Fully autonomous weapons would also run contrary to the dictates of public conscience. Governments, experts, and the broader public have widely condemned the loss of human control over the use of force. Partial measures, such as regulations or political declarations short of a legally binding prohibition, would fail to eliminate the many dangers posed by fully autonomous weapons. In addition to violating the Martens Clause, the weapons raise other legal, accountability, security, and technological concerns.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend – Ban Solves Dignity

Upholding the principle of dignity Demands a preemptive ban on LAWs

Docherty, 2014 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie “Shaking the Foundations The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots” Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ arms0514_ForUpload_0.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Fully autonomous weapons threaten to contravene foundational elements of human rights law. They could violate the right to life, a prerequisite for all other rights. Deficiencies in judgment, compassion, and capacity to identify with human beings could lead to arbitrary killing of civilians during law enforcement or armed conflict operations. Fully autonomous weapons could also cause harm for which individuals could not be held accountable, thus undermining the right to a remedy. Robots could not be punished, and superior officers, programmers, and manufacturers would all be likely to escape liability. Finally, as machines, fully autonomous weapons could not comprehend or respect the inherent dignity of human beings. The inability to uphold this underlying principle of human rights raises serious moral questions about the prospect of allowing a robot to take a human life. Proponents of fully autonomous weapons might argue that technology could eventually help address the problems identified in this report, and it is impossible to know where science will lead.85 In a 2013 public letter, however, more than 270 roboticists, artificial intelligence experts, and other scientists expressed their skepticism that adequate developments would be possible.86 Given this uncertainty, the potential of fully autonomous weapons to violate human rights law, combined with other ethical, legal, policy, and scientific concerns, demands a precautionary approach. The precautionary principle of international law states that “[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures.”87 When applied to fully autonomous weapons, this principle calls for preventive action to be taken now. Human Rights Watch and IHRC recommend a preemptive ban on fully autonomous weapons, which would forestall the troubling consequences described in this report and have great humanitarian benefits. It would also help prevent an arms race, block proliferation, and stop development before countries invest so heavily in this technology that they do not want to give it up.88 In determining the future of fully autonomous weapons, the international community should seriously consider their human rights implications and ensure the core components of this body of law receive protection.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend – Ban LAWs Solvency

The best solution is to ban lethal autonomous weapons. Empirically, it has worked for other weapons and has broad international support.

Garcia, 2019 – International Panel for the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons at Northeastern Univ [Denise, with Justin Haner – PhD student Global Policy, Sept 26 “The Artificial Intelligence Arms Race: Trends and World Leaders in Autonomous Weapons Development” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Ending the artificial intelligence arms race with a ban on killer robots As the AI arms race rages on, the stakes remain high yet public debate is lacking. Sixty‐one per cent of citizens polled across more than twenty countries oppose the development of lethal AWS, and yet billions of their tax dollars are being spent on their development each year (CSKR, 2019). France, Germany, and others have advocated use of the Convention on Certain Weapons (CCW) process to develop ‘Possible Guiding Principles’ as a code of conduct to encourage AWS development to stay in accordance with existing international law (Convention on Certain Weapons, 2018). Beyond that, 28 states have called for a ban on killer robots, and further the Non‐aligned Movement and a group of African states desire to negotiate a new international treaty to set limits on robotic killing. Previous weapons bans, from chemical and biological weapons to landmines and cluster munitions, have been effective policy tools which significantly curtailed the use of these problematic weapons. While the United States is not currently in a position to lead with its ill‐fated ‘America First’ policy, the EU and other forward‐thinking countries should attempt to set solid global norms and push for a ban on the use of AWS now. China announced last year that it wishes to ban the battlefield use of AWS, but not their development and production. This could serve as a basis for coalition negotiations with the rest of the world and would represent a key step forward in preventative security governance (Garcia, 2018).

2022 Michigan Negative

1NC - Ban LAWS CP

CP Text – The United Nations should adopt a mandate prohibiting Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

Banning LAWs is a de facto mandate for human control – humans are the check on autonomy

International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]

2022 Michigan Negative

Extend - Global Governance Net Benefit

CCW action on AI weapons would demonstrate the potential for global governance.

Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]

The Guiding Principles therefore are not a ceiling, but a steppingstone towards a more legally binding agreement that ensures binding human control, has meaningful positive obligations, and respects IH L and IHR L. In this regard, it is good news that the Principles’ political visibility increased after the endorsement of the Alliance for Multilateralism. Member States of the Alliance should therefore use this political momentum and lead the effort to negotiate an additional protocol to the CC W. After the November 2020 meetings of the GGE had to be cancelled due to Covid-19, attention is now on the next meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CC W and the CC W Review Conference scheduled for 2021. Tangible progress by then is sorely needed to achieve some form of arms regulation in an area of rapid technological development. Moreover, progress toward new international law would demonstrate the potential for effective global governance, called for by the Alliance for Multilateralism. The Alliance itself is still in a phase of self-definition and is a rather loose collection of states. In fact, among the countries who supported the Alliance’s Guiding Principles, there are also 20 countries that have explicitly endorsed the call for a ban on LAWS. Progress on an additional protocol with meaningful obligations for human control of LAWS would demonstrate the bridge-building capacity of the Alliance and would increase its standing as an actor for effective global governance.

2022 Michigan Negative

Extend - Modelling Solvency

The UN establishes a global model because it brings together the experience and information from many states.

International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]

SOFT LAW Best Practices: States Parties to a CCW Protocol (or any other regulatory instrument) could meet regularly with the specific purpose of sharing experiences that were already made at the domestic level regarding the design, development, acquisition, deployment, and use of weapon systems with autonomous functions (under the assumption that the use of such weapons is lawful, meaning that human control is maintained). Especially States with significant experience in this area could provide knowledge and information about regulating LAWS and could show how human control is maintained in practice. Such experiences could serve as exemplary model for other States. Best practices are also a helpful instrument to establish additional standards on the design, development, acquisition, deployment, and use of LAWS based on cooperation, transparency, trust, and confidentiality. The sharing of best practices could promote the adoption of domestic laws on LAWS, ensuring that human control is maintained as required by military, legal, and ethical considerations.

2022 Michigan Negative

Extend – Human Control Solvency

UN action through the CCW would establish the human control norm and reduce the instability and escalation from AI weapons

International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]

iPRAW recommends that the principle of human control should be internationally recognized within the CCW and possibly other documents of international law and be the basis from which requirements can be developed as part of a norm-shaping process. The elements presented below could be helpful to shape a regulation, be it legally binding or not. What is important though is to create a normative framework and operational guidance around the (development and) use of weapon systems with autonomous functions. For example, the ICRC presented one approach to such a framework by calling for a prohibition of unpredictable and anti-personnel AWS and a regulation of other AWS that considers the specific operational context. As iPRAW’s scenario-based discussions about the adequate type and level of human control illustrated, a definition of human control that adequately considers the operational context requires many details about technical capabilities and indicators for the targets. Hence, a ‘one-size-of-control-fits-all’ solution does not exist. Rather, a combination of minimum requirements and individual solutions is necessary. Individual solutions based on a case-by-case assessment will ultimately lead to different levels of granularity when it comes to formulating human control in a regulatory framework, e.g. a rather abstract declaration or treaty and more granular best practices and manuals. These could inform a regulation of LAWS and human control by creating the normative baseline and align with recommendations from other actors. As for example the ICRC discussed, it is crucial to link specific regulatory elements to the challenges raised by LAWS. Within the CCW such a regulation could cover:  military considerations: fulfilling the operational objective and translating the commanders intent to the battlefield,  legal concerns: abide by IHL principles, especially the principle of precaution by avoiding unpredictable effects, ensure human judgment to take legal decisions,  ethical concerns: retain moral agency. A CCW regulation entailing an obligation to maintain human control may also mitigate security challenges, such as conflict escalation, even though the CCW does not address them explicitly. Further important aspects, such as technology diffusion, will most likely not be addressed in a future regulation on LAWS but would have to be addressed in other fora. iPRAW’s model discussed below is not meant to read in opposition to the ICRC propositions on a prohibition and regulation of AWS but rather as an additional perspective with the same objective to keep human control in the use of force.

2022 Michigan Negative

1NC - UN CP

CP Text - The United Nations should adopt ethical principles to ensure human control in military artificial intelligence systems.

The UN is best to create a global norm for human control because it builds on its principles from the CCW. UN Leadership would restore the credibility of global governance

Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]

2022 Michigan Negative

--AT China not in OSCE

OSCE CBMs can promote global agreements that include China

Egel, 2021 - Nuclear Security Visiting Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy [Naomi, PhD candidate at Cornell, January, Geneva Centre for Security Policy Strategic Security Analysis” Issue 16, “Reducing Military Risks through OSCE Instruments: The Untapped Potential in the European Arms Control Framework” https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/reducing-military-risks-through-osce-instruments-the-untapped-potential-in-the-European-arms-control-framework Acc 2/27/22 TA]

Far-reaching benefits of AWS CBMs In addition to reducing the military risks posed by AWS, the process of developing AWS CBMs in the OSCE would also help to strengthen policymakers’ understanding of the role of autonomy in military operations. This would facilitate further international cooperation on AWS governance. Within the context of the CCW - at present the primary global venue considering AWS governance - debates over AWS are often stymied by diplomats’ unfamiliarity with these systems. Greater transparency and information regarding states’ AWS capabilities (including the varying elements of autonomy in these systems) and use would ameliorate this impediment to reaching an agreement. Developing AWS CBMs in the OSCE would thus help to provide a foundation for the global governance of AWS. Moreover, while OSCE CBMs would not include China (a leader in the development and use of AWS), OSCE CBMs could lay the groundwork for a global agreement that would include China. An OSCE-developed template of CBMs could also be applied outside the OSCE region, either in a global agreement or through agreements in other regional organisations.

2022 Michigan Negative

--AT OSCE Fragmented

Empirically, the OSCE CBMs have reduced the risk of war and miscalculation, even during times of political tensions

Egel, 2021 - Nuclear Security Visiting Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy [Naomi, PhD candidate at Cornell, January, Geneva Centre for Security Policy Strategic Security Analysis” Issue 16, “Reducing Military Risks through OSCE Instruments: The Untapped Potential in the European Arms Control Framework” https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/reducing-military-risks-through-osce-instruments-the-untapped-potential-in-the-European-arms-control-framework Acc 2/27/22 TA]

Conclusion CBMs for AWS would make a significant contribution to reducing the military risks posed by AWS and - equally important - are a realistic goal. Although agreement within the OSCE cannot be assured, its strong history of developing CBMs and its ability to make progress towards reducing military risk even in a climate of geopolitical tensions makes the OSCE uniquely well positioned to develop AWS CBMs. The growing proliferation of AWS and their increasing importance in military operations means that risk reduction is an urgent priority. Given the numerous challenges to arms control and cooperative security measures in other international organisations, OSCE CBMs offer one of the best opportunities for making progress in reducing the military risks of AWS. Moreover, they would provide a foundation for further governance of AWS by other international organisations. The CBMs proposed here would provide greater transparency regarding states’ capabilities and intentions regarding AWS, and in doing so, would reduce the risks of miscommunication, miscalculation and inadvertent conflict escalation that these systems pose.

2022 Michigan Negative

--AT OSCE is Voluntary

Voluntary CBMs reduce military risks by avoiding miscommunication and reducing tensions.

Egel, 2021 - Nuclear Security Visiting Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy [Naomi, PhD candidate at Cornell, January, Geneva Centre for Security Policy Strategic Security Analysis” Issue 16, “Reducing Military Risks through OSCE Instruments: The Untapped Potential in the European Arms Control Framework” https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/reducing-military-risks-through-osce-instruments-the-untapped-potential-in-the-European-arms-control-framework Acc 2/27/22 TA]

Given the difficulty of negotiating legally binding treaties governing weapons in the current geopolitical environment, informal and voluntary CBMs provide a valuable and practical way to reduce military risks arising from AWS. CBMs provide information about other states’ capabilities and intentions in order to reduce risks arising from miscalculation and miscommunication and to build trust between parties. Although CBMs are, by design, voluntary measures, OSCE CBMs have provided a valuable framework for reducing tensions and lowering risks associated with other weapons and military activities. Additionally, in 2019 the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly called on OSCE members to support international negotiations to ban lethal autonomous weapons (also referred to as fully autonomous weapons). CBMs for partially autonomous weapons would support efforts in this area while also reducing the risks posed by these kinds of weapons systems.