2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › CMR D---2AC
Dunlap 17 Former Major General Charles J. Dunlap, a Duke Law Professor with a focus on security and civil-military relations after retiring from the Air Force. [Let’s Temper the Rhetoric About Civil-Military Relations, Dec 15, 2017, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lets-temper-rhetoric-about-civil-military-relations]//BPS
The military is hardly as homogenous in its views as many narratives would have you believe. According to a poll from last fall, it is true that the military in general is more supportive of the commander-in-chief than the general public, but the officer corps is rather similar to the public in its opinion of the commander in chief. Furthermore, my bet is that some critics would be surprised to know that members of the military (30 percent) label white nationalists as posing a significant danger, “more than many international hot spots, like Syria (27 percent), Pakistan (25 percent), Afghanistan (22 percent) and Iraq (17 percent).” Regardless, there is nothing inherently evil or unprofessional about belonging to a political party. Personally, I’ve always been a registered independent, but I never questioned someone’s professionalism simply because in their private life chose to identify with a political party on voter rolls. In fact, one could easily argue that it is healthy for a democracy when the members of its armed forces to remain connected in a lawful way to political discourse. Of course, maintaining the appearance of non-partisanship can be complicated when, for example, a non-military spouse becomes active in partisan politics, but that is an issue not confined to the military, but to other professions in American society (see e.g., here and here). In any event, nobody should assume that simply because someone has not registered with a party or, for that matter, voted, that they have no opinion about political issues, to include partisan ones. Likewise, are we to assume that simply because someone registers a party membership they will, ipso facto, be partisan in the execution of their professional duties? That certainly is not what I’ve observed, and not just among military professionals. Judges are only one example of professional who may hold distinctly partisan views, but who nevertheless regularly set them aside (hopefully) and conduct themselves impartially in the courtroom and in their formal opinions. Military professionals in particular are routinely called upon to compartmentalize their personal views when performing their official duties so as to insulate themselves from inappropriate decision-making. For example, Roman Catholics comprise the largest faith group in the military, but they are required to operate in an environment where key tenets of their religion---such as opposition to gay marriage and abortion---cannot be allowed to compromise their official actions. Additionally, military leaders in combat especially must mentally sequester their personal feelings, such as their affection for their troops if that affection could compromise the paramount responsibility to the security of the nation as a whole. This is because the warfighting mission necessitates leaders sending them into situations where it is inevitable some will be killed or injured. When leaders find they are not able to handle the unavoidable sacrifice of their troops in order to protect the country, the best realize it’s time to leave the profession. This is precisely what happened to then Marine major Nate Fick. As he recorded his reason for leaving the Marine Corps in his magnificent memoir, One Bullet Away: The Making of a Marine Officer, Fick said: “Great Marine commanders, like all great warriors, are able to kill that which they love most---their men. It’s a fundamental law of warfare. Twice I had cheated it. I couldn’t tempt fate again.” Setting aside one’s political druthers is a vastly less demanding decision than the one Fick wrestled with, and most military professionals do so instinctively. An illustration: I deployed for Operation Desert Fox which was in the midst of Congressional efforts to impeach Bill Clinton. Despite the uncertainty of Clinton’s future, as well as his unpopularity in the military, the orders he gave to send servicemembers into harms’ way were obeyed without question (even as some say the operation was concocted to distract attention from the impeachment scandal). Claiming a “crisis” in civil-military relations as the title to Matt’s essay suggests is a perennial favorite among academics and pundits. Almost 25 years ago Dick Kohn virtually founded the “crisis” school of civil military relations with his eponymous essay Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations. The intellectual problem? The crisis never materialized. Instead, we’ve seen a military that has, despite all sorts of pressures through administrations of both parties, remained dutifully adherent to the Constitution.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Turn---Leaks---2AC
James Di Pane 19, Policy Analyst, Defense Policy, Center for National Defense, 5/02/2019, “Should Cyber Command and the NSA Have Separate Leadership? How to Decide,” , cc
The third concern is the increased potential for exposure of NSA tools and operations. Maintaining the secrecy of the NSA’s cyber tools is one of the highest priorities of the organization. Because the NSA shares its hacking tools with Cyber Command, the frequency of use for these tools has increased, leading to a correlating increased chance of release. This does not necessarily stem from the dual-hat relationship, but more from Cyber Command’s close relationship with the NSA for support.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Thumper---Ukraine---2AC
Colin Demarest 4/7, reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT, 4/07/2022, “US Cyber Command reinforces Ukraine and allies amid Russian onslaught,” , cc
WASHINGTON — U.S. Cyber Command has played a pivotal role in shielding networks and critical infrastructure stateside and abroad in the run up to and during Russia’s attack on Ukraine, its leader told Congress this week.
Along with tasking teams with identifying cyber vulnerabilities and threats — operations that have since “bolstered the resilience of Ukraine” and others — the command has gleaned and shared intelligence, worked hand-in-glove with U.S. government and industry, and pursued extensive contingency planning, Gen. Paul Nakasone said April 5.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Link---Normal Means---AT: Title 10---1AR
Andru Wall 11, Senior Associate with Alston & Bird LLP; former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Centra, 12/2/2011, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” , cc
Read in concert with Title 10, Title 50 does not infringe upon the Secretary of Defense’s authorities to collect intelligence. Rather, Title 50 recognizes the authorities assigned to the Secretary of Defense under Title 10 over all DoD intelligence activities, and adds Title 50’s provisions regarding Congressional oversight to intelligence activities conducted primarily by DoD personnel in support of or in furtherance of tasking from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) (as opposed to tasking from the Secretary of Defense).
Thus, Title 10 and Title 50 are mutually-reinforcing authorities, not mutually-exclusive authorities; these statutory authorities may even be exercised simultaneously by personnel under the command and control of the Secretary of Defense. Labeling some intelligence activities “Title 50” activities while labeling similar activities “Title 10” activities creates a distinction where the law does not. Importantly, the statutes make distinctions based on direction, control, and funding—not on nomenclature.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Link---Normal Means---2AC
Robert Chesney 18, the Charles I. Francis Professor in Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of Texas School of Law and serves as the Director of UT-Austin's interdisciplinary research center the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, 4/12/2018, “Title 10 and Title 50 Issues When Computer Network Operations Impact Third Countries,”’ , cc
Does Title 10 impose a legal barrier on U.S. Cyber Command conducting operations outside of the Pentagon’s own networks?
That’s the question raised earlier this week by this story from Chris Bing at Cyberscoop (an increasingly interesting site), which builds on recent congressional testimony from Admiral Rogers. The story depicts a “quiet but constant tug of war … between the intelligence community and the military over the future of government—backed hacking,” with the central issue concerning the allocation of lead responsibility for conducting computer network operations outside the government’s own systems in order to “strike back at foreign targets.” More specifically, the story depicts something of a turf war between NSA and an increasingly independent CYBERCOM (highlighting a number of key themes, including the inherent challenge of balancing intel collection equities against the interest in having disruptive effect on some targets; on that point, read all the way to the bottom for spot-on observations from Jamil Jaffer of George Mason).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › Link---Normal Means---2AC
DSCA 21, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, carries out all security cooperation, 10/01/2021 (carbon dated), “THE SECURITY COOPERATION ENTERPRISE,” , cc
The Military Departments (MILDEPs) advise the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters for their respective departments. The MILDEPs also execute foreign sales and training as Foreign Military Sales (FMS) “Implementing Agencies” (IAs):
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation (DASA (DE&C)) provides policy oversight for international affairs functions, including FMS.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: NSA DA › UQ---Split Now---2AC
Greg Hadley 3/18, Congressional editor of Air Force Magazine, 3/18/2022, “Biden Administration Considers Splitting NSA, CYBERCOM,” , cc
President Joe Biden’s administration and the Defense Department are looking at the possibility of splitting up control of U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, reviving a long-running debate over how the two organizations are led.
Since the stand-up of CYBERCOM in 2009, its commander has functioned in a dual-hat role as the director of the NSA, an arrangement meant to help the new combatant command get off the ground. Gen. Paul M. Nakasone currently holds both titles.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › T › 2AC---Includes Info Sharing
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff is the body of the most senior uniformed leaders within the United States Department of Defense, May-23-2017, accessed on 6-16-2022, Jcs, "Security Cooperation", https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf)
Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: OCO’s Bad › AT: OCOs Bad---2AC
Limnéll 13 – Professor of Cybersecurity, Aalto University, Finland
Jarno Limnéll, “Offensive Cyber Capabilities are Needed Because of Deterrence,” The Fog of Cyber Defence, National Defence University, Department of Leadership and Military Pedagogy, Publication Series 2, Article Collection no. 10, 2013, https://cyberwar.nl/d/20130200_Offensive-Cyber-Capabilities-are-Needed-Because-of-Deterrence_Jarno-Limnell.pdf
Offensive Weaponry is Required for Credibility and Deterrence
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: OCO’s Bad › AT: OCOs Bad---2AC
Mazanec & Thayer 15 – Director in GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management team; Professor, Faculty of Political Science, University of Iceland
Brian M. Mazanec, Bradley A. Thayer, “Deterring Cyber Warfare: Bolstering Strategic Stability in Cyberspace,” Palgrave McMillan, 2015,
Deterrence-in-kind: developing offensive cyber capabilities
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: OCO’s Bad › AT: OCOs Bad---2AC
Borghard 20 – Assistant professor at the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy at West Point and a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow
Erica D. Borghard, “Operationalizing Defend Forward: How the Concept Works to Change Adversary Behavior,” Lawfare, March 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/operationalizing-defend-forward-how-concept-works-change-adversary-behavior
Here, I want to focus on the first end state: the theory of victory for how defend forward can change adversary behavior below the level of armed attack. Defend forward hypothesizes the U.S. can change adversary behavior through making attacks less effective and, cumulatively, by altering the adversary’s decision calculus regarding the perceived benefits, costs and risks of conducting malicious campaigns against the United States.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › AT: OCO’s Bad › AT: OCOs Bad---2AC
Leuprecht et al. 19 – Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada and Queen's University, and Matthew Flinders Fellow at the Flinders University of South Australia Christian Leuprecht, Joseph Szeman, David B. Skillicorn, “The Damoclean sword of offensive cyber: Policy uncertainty and collective insecurity,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 40, Issue 3, 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2019.1590960
At a more strategic level, OCOs can be used to constrain or enhance the effects of other capabilities and strategies. Whether they can be used for deterrence, and whether the concept of deterrence is even meaningful under conditions of persistent attack, is a matter of controversy. OCOs have the advantage that costs incurred or damage caused to an adversary can be controlled so that it falls short of the generally accepted level of an armed attack, and can be even reversible (Owens et al., 2009). In his book about the Trump White House, Woodward (2018) comments that military advisers to the President were reluctant to recommend offensive cyberattacks against North Korea because they thought the U.S. itself was too poorly defended to withstand retaliatory cyberattacks, a nascent example of deterrence in the cyber domain. To date, no direct use of OCO capabilities has resulted in the outbreak of traditional conflict, perhaps owing to uncertainties in the novelty of the attacks, the difficulty of attribution, and the reluctance of national cyber actors to retaliate when the path of escalation is unclear (Rid & Buchanan, 2015). Most importantly, however, the actions of armed forces in democratic countries are constrained by the rule of law, which translates into multiple authorities to ensure responsible and acceptable use, and safeguard against escalation. The fine-grained control of OCOs compared to conventional military force provides a way to manage escalation without the direct use of physical or military assets, whose effect in sparking conflict is much better known. In other words, instead of reacting to an escalating conflict by deploying physical military assets to a region, an OCO can be employed covertly to incur more controllable costs on the adversary, with the benefit of plausible deniability (Hare, 2018). Depending on the type of OCO employed, if there is a reduction in tension, the effects of the OCO can be reversed or scaled back.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › AT: A5 Thumps---2AC
Ghavam 16 – Z’hra M. Ghavam, Master of Arts in Security Studies Europe and Eurasia. National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School.
September 2016, “NATO’S PREPAREDNESS FOR CYBERWAR,” https://archive.org/details/natospreparednes1094550552
3. Clarity NATO’s publicly declared policy on cyber threats is consciously and purposefully vague.207 Why? Strategic ambiguity has its benefits. According to the Atlantic Council panel, there is no “redline” or “determined threshold” that would automatically define a cyber act as an act of war.208 Leaving the rules undefined affords NATO ample room in which to operate. For a 28-member multinational organization that operates on the principle of consensus, time and latitude for solidifying strategic-level decisions are critical. If NATO publicized a cyber redline, it would box the Alliance into a corner. This kind of policy could embolden cyber offenders and provoke massive intrusions that target NATO’s networks at just below this threshold. Having a defined redline could also invite nefarious cyber actors to cross it to test NATO’s resolve, damage its reputation as a leader in Euro-Atlantic security, and undermine the credibility of its Article 5 commitments. Following the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO affirmed its stance on law and cyberspace while refusing to address cyber redlines: Our policy also recognizes that international law, including international humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm, therefore, that cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.209
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Cohesion Adv---2AC
Liebetrau 22. Tobias Liebertrau is a Affiliated researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies; “Cyber conflict short of war: a European strategic vacuum”; February 4, 2022; Taylor and Francis; //BY
This article examined how three European NATO members – the Netherlands, France, and Norway – perceive and respond to continuous adversarial cyber operations short of war. The analysis demonstrated that the Dutch, French, and Norwegian decisions to develop offensive military cyber capabilities date 10–15 years back. In all three countries, the development of offensive cyber measures has been portrayed as a timely investment in necessary capabilities intended to deter and support military operations in armed conflict. The analysis also showed that the three countries – to different degrees and clarifications – have acknowledged that the adversarial nature of cyber operations short of war forms part of the current strategic reality. Yet, their cyber strategies and military doctrines continue to primarily centre on warfare and armed conflict.
Thus, the paper identifies a strategic vacuum as none of the three countries have formulated strategic frameworks that map onto the identified strategic reality. The recent publications of military cyber doctrines in France and the Netherlands provide initial strategic guidance for armed conflict, but it remains underspecified how the impact of continuous cyber conflict short of war affects the countries’ view on international political competition, their strategic positioning, and their military-intelligence relations. Questions concerning when, how, who and to what extent cyber countermeasures are deployed against hostile cyber operations short of war remain ambiguous and secretive. This lack of clarity, strategic guidance, and public debate puts societies at risk and undermines democratic governance.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Cohesion Adv---2AC
Smeets 19. Max Smeets is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, and author of “No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force”, published with Oxford University Press and Hurst in May 2022; “Cyber Command’s Strategy Risks Friction With Allies”; May 28, 2019; Lawfare; //BY
Much has been written about the fundamental changes in U.S. cyber strategy. U.S. Cyber Command’s vision of “” and the Department of Defense’s new strategy of “” have, in particular, led to numerous about the between the U.S. and in .
These debates are worth continuing, including about what the change in strategy means for . But commentators have so far ignored a key dimension: The strategy’s main implications may not reside in how it changes the dynamics between the U.S. and its adversaries but, instead, in how it affects broader alliance relationships, especially beyond the Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, the U.K., the U.S. and New Zealand). U.S. Cyber Command’s mission to cause friction in adversaries’ freedom of maneuver in cyberspace may end up causing significant friction in allies’ trust and confidence—and adversaries may be able to exploit that.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Yes Cyber Escalation---2AC
Healey 22. Jason Healey is a senior research scholar and adjunct professor at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. He is also a senior fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, where he was the program's founding director; “PREPARING FOR INEVITABLE CYBER SURPRISE”; January 12, 2022; War on the Rocks; //BY
Surprise in cyberspace is more important than in other domains for four reasons. The dynamics of cyber conflict lend themselves to surprising uses across all five meanings of surprise. They rely on deception and trickery; enable the unexpected and unforeseen; are sudden and fast, audacious and daring; and are especially useful early in a conflict. There are also significant first-use pressures, as they may present five ways to increase the danger of a . Because cyber capabilities are not easily observable, it is extremely difficult to assess an adversary’s order of battle or relative strength, or to detect the equivalent of tanks massing on the border. Any particular attack might have an asymmetric impact, keeping defenders on perpetual and .
There is also a nearly limitless realm of the possible. Cyber capabilities can bypass fielded military forces to affect a seemingly indefinite range of elements within an adversary’s society, economy, and psychology. The pace of innovation and dependence creates countless paths to attain technical surprise, as does the use of “.” Even more so than in other kinds of intelligence warning, “,” so defenders have less chance of assessing where a blow may fall.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Cyber Resilience---2AC
Creighton ’15 [Neal Creighton, October 19, 2015, “The New Cyber Resiliency: Absorption, Containment And Real-Time Offensive,” ]
Organizations today are subjected to meticulously scoped, expertly developed and targeted attacks by nation-states and criminal groups. Given how public large-scale data breaches have become, cybersecurity has become a household term. But this new normal means no one rests easy.
Emerging from the shadows of the news coverage of devastating breaches in retail, government, healthcare and finance, is the need for government agencies to think about their role and how to better withstand a breach that compromises proprietary information and could threaten critical infrastructure.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Cyber Resilience---2AC
Cushing ’14 [Seychelle; November 28; M.A. Political Science from Simon Fraser University; “Leveraging Information as Power: America’s Pursuit of Cyber Security,” ]
Adversaries study America’s cyber tool and techniques “to capitalize on [US…] ideas” for their own strategic advantage.89 On the one hand, innovating on its own code allows America to continue executing its security objectives in cyberspace. On the other hand, innovation allows the United States to speculate on how variations in its attack code may evolve to help anticipate potential attacks from its adversaries. While the United States may not be able to close all of its potential vulnerabilities,90 it can at least flag the unpatched vulnerabilities most likely exploited in a cyber strike. Red-teaming cyber games further allow the US to test both anticipated attacks and potential responses to maintain an informational advantage.91 Cyber favours offense over defence given its lax security architecture. Sophisticated cyber states that are able to innovate first will enjoy a relative advantage.92 Amassing an arsenal of undetected vulnerabilities does not necessarily produce an immediate, usable advantage. Instead, these vulnerabilities provide important information to gauge the strengths and weaknesses of America’s offensive and defensive capabilities. Finding undetected vulnerabilities, and knowing how to exploit those, positions the US to capitalize on the offense-defence innovation cycle to preserve a cyber advantage. The strike methods of nuclear or conventional weapons are largely unchanged and can be used to great effect. Cyber weapons, in comparison, only successfully work once. Innovation is required to not only manage the “constant pressure to keep up,”93 but to also tip the balance of informational advantage in your favour.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Cyber Resilience---2AC
Moens ’15 [Alexander, Seychelle Cushing, and Alan Dowd; March; professor of political science at Simon Fraser University and a Senior Fellow in Canadian-American Relations at the Fraser Institute; M.A. with Distinction from the Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University in 2014; Alan W. Dowd is a Senior Fellow and Senior Editor with the Fraser Institute; “Cybersecurity Challenges for Canada and the United States,” https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/cybersecurity-challenges-for-canada-and-the-united-states.pdf]
The absence of formal international agreements on cybersecurity does not mean there are no rules or boundaries in practice. The rule of consequences and of self-interest is in play, as is the logic of cost-benefit in escalation. For example, using cyberspace to inflict fatalities on foreign citizens or physical damage to key economic assets is not something APTs would consider lightly. Experts debate whether such extensive attacks are even possible given current capabilities (Rid, 2013; Libicki, 2009; Samaan, 2010; Clarke and Knake, 2010). To illustrate: it may be possible to interfere with the operation of a large dam via cyberspace from abroad, but destroying the concrete structure and drowning a city down river is quite another matter. To be sure, President Barack Obama is on record warning hostile players that cyberattacks are not isolated from the rest of defence policy and national security. In 2011, he used the loaded term “all necessary means” to describe the possible American reaction should the nature of the attack so warrant (U.S. White House, 2011: 14). Interestingly, Russian military officials have argued that “the use of information warfare against Russia or its armed forces will categorically not be considered a non-military phase of a conflict, whether there were casualties or not” (Hildreth, 2001: 11). If deterrence is what kept the peace during the Cold War and the Nuclear Age, resilience may be the governing principle of the Digital Age. Deterrence, after all, works best when your adversaries have a clear idea of what you can and will do if attacked (Betts, 2013). Yet, in cyberwarfare, secrecy is paramount in maintaining a competitive edge. Defining what weapons you will retaliate with when attacked invariably reveals part of your capabilities. Having an effective deterrent in cyberspace is thus problematic. The apparent attack by the North Korean government under the name of “Guardians of Peace” against the Sony Corporation in late 2014 seems to have set off a US reaction. The wiper malware used against Sony wreaked havoc on the company and brought to a halt its imminent release of the satirical movie about Kim Jong-un called “The Interview”. A few days later, North Korea’s admittedly small Internet went dark for a period of time. Possibly, Obama made good on his threat that North Korea’s “cyber vandalism” would be met with “a proportional response” (Perlroth and Sanger, 2014, December 22). In short, the operational concept best suited for cybersecurity per se is resilience. Resilience is quite different from deterrence, since resilience presupposes weathering an attack, while the aim of deterrence is to prevent an attack through the avowal of overwhelming retaliation. Moreover, given that the nature of cyberattacks is still evolving and that attackers increasingly use third and fourth parties to channel their attacks, and thus create false leads for those trying to find the attacker (Geers, 2010), traditional notions of deterrence may not apply in cyberspace. A better defence is the ability to sustain one or more cyberattacks and to be able to counter and restore defensive capacity (Lindsay, 2013). How you recover and how you function when compromised becomes of utmost importance. This appears to be the path NATO has chosen. The alliance regularly conducts defensive war games, such as Baltic Cyber Shield and Locked Shields, in cyberspace. In 2013, NATO defence ministers agreed to establish Rapid Reaction Teams to provide better protection for NATO’s networks (NATO, 2014a). In 2014, the alliance declared cyberdefence “part of NATO’s core task of collective defence” and noted that cyberattacks could lead to invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s all-for-one collective defence commitment, which has been the foundation of Western deterrence since 1949 (NATO, 2014b: §72). Still, NATO’s 2011 policy on cybersecurity focuses on “prevention, resilience and defence of critical cyber assets to NATO and Allies” (NATO, 2011: 1).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
OCO Aff Updates › Case › Zero-Days Good---2AC
Berkowitz, 8 - research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a senior analyst at RAND. He is currently a consultant to the Defense Department and the intelligence community (Bruce, STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE: CHALLENGERS, COMPETITORS, AND THREATS TO AMERICA’S FUTURE, p. 1-4)
THIS BOOK is intended to help readers better understand the national security issues facing the United States today and offer the general outline of a strategy for dealing with them. National security policy—both making it and debating it — is harder today because the issues that are involved are more numerous and varied. The problem of the day can change at a moment's notice. Yesterday, it might have been proliferation; today, terrorism; tomorrow, hostile regional powers. Threats are also more likely to be intertwined—proliferators use the same networks as narco-traffickers, narco-traffickers support terrorists, and terrorists align themselves with regional powers. Yet, as worrisome as these immediate concerns may be, the long-term challenges are even harder to deal with, and the stakes are higher. Whereas the main Cold War threat — the Soviet Union — was brittle, most of the potential adversaries and challengers America now faces are resilient. In at least one dimension where the Soviets were weak (economic efficiency, public morale, or leadership), the new threats are strong. They are going to be with us for a long time. As a result, we need to reconsider how we think about national security. The most important task for U.S. national security today is simply to retain the strategic advantage. This term, from the world of military doctrine, refers to the overall ability of a nation to control, or at least influence, the course of events.1 When you hold the strategic advantage, situations unfold in your favor, and each round ends so that you are in an advantageous position for the next. When you do not hold the strategic advantage, they do not. As national goals go, “keeping the strategic advantage” may not have the idealistic ring of “making the world safe for democracy” and does not sound as decisively macho as “maintaining American hegemony.” But keeping the strategic advantage is critical, because it is essential for just about everything else America hopes to achieve — promoting freedom, protecting the homeland, defending its values, preserving peace, and so on. The Changing Threat If one needs proof of this new, dynamic environment, consider the recent record. A search of the media during the past fifteen years suggests that there were at least a dozen or so events that were considered at one time or another the most pressing national security problem facing the United States — and thus the organizing concept for U.S. national security. What is most interesting is how varied and different the issues were, and how many different sets of players they involved — and how each was replaced in turn by a different issue and a cast of characters that seemed, at least for the moment, even more pressing. They included, roughly in chronological order, • regional conflicts — like Desert Storm — involving the threat of war between conventional armies; • stabilizing “failed states” like Somalia, where government broke down in toto; • staying economically competitive with Japan; • integrating Russia into the international community after the fall of communism and controlling the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union; • dealing with “rogue states,” unruly nations like North Korea that engage in trafficking and proliferation as a matter of national policy; • combating international crime, like the scandal involving the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, or imports of illegal drugs; • strengthening international institutions for trade as countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America adopted market economies; • responding to ethnic conflicts and civil wars triggered by the reemergence of culture as a political force in the “clash of civilizations”; • providing relief to millions of people affected by natural catastrophes like earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, droughts, and the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria; • combating terrorism driven by sectarian or religious extremism; • grassroots activism on a global scale, ranging from the campaign to ban land mines to antiglobalization hoodlums and environmentalist crazies; • border security and illegal immigration; • the worldwide ripple effects of currency fluctuations and the collapse of confidence in complex financial securities; and • for at least one fleeting moment, the safety of toys imported from China. There is some overlap in this list, and one might want to group some of the events differently or add others. The important point, however, is that when you look at these problems and how they evolved during the past fifteen years, you do not see a single lesson or organizing principle on which to base U.S. strategy. Another way to see the dynamic nature of today's national security challenges is to consider the annual threat briefing the U.S. intelligence community has given Congress during the past decade. These briefings are essentially a snapshot of what U.S. officials worry most about. If one briefing is a snapshot, then several put together back to back provide a movie, showing how views have evolved.2 Figure 1 summarizes these assessments for every other year between 1996 and 2006. It shows when a particular threat first appeared, its rise and fall in the rankings, and in some cases how it fell off the chart completely. So, in 1995, when the public briefing first became a regular affair, the threat at the very top of the list was North Korea. This likely reflected the crisis that had occurred the preceding year, when Pyongyang seemed determined to develop nuclear weapons, Bill Clinton's administration seemed ready to use military action to prevent this, and the affair was defused by an agreement brokered by Jimmy Carter. Russia and China ranked high as threats in the early years, but by the end of the decade they sometimes did not even make the list. Proliferation has always been high in the listings, although the particular countries of greatest concern have varied. Terrorism made its first appearance in 1998, rose to first place after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and remains there today. The Balkans appeared and disappeared in the middle to late 1990s. A few of the entries today seem quaint and overstated. Catastrophic threats to information systems like an “electronic Pearl Harbor” and the “Y2K problem” entered the list in 1998 but disappeared after 2001. (Apparently, after people saw an airliner crash into a Manhattan skyscraper, the possible loss of their Quicken files seemed a lot less urgent.) Iraq first appeared in the briefing as a regional threat in 1997 and was still high on the list a decade later—though, of course, the Iraqi problem in the early years (suspected weapons of mass destruction) was very different from the later one (an insurgency and internationalized civil war). All this is why the United States needs agility. It not only must be able to refocus its resources repeatedly; it needs to do this faster than an adversary can focus its own resources.