2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC – Grey Zone Escalation
Tribune Editorial Board 22 - (Editorial: Biden and Europe must use the only language Putin understands: Strength,”Chicago Tribune, 1-24-2022, ) //nt-sg
Though brutish in so many ways, Putin also is a chess player who calibrates each move and countermove. With Ukraine, he has embarked on a gambit that aims to force NATO to retreat from Eastern Europe, former Soviet lands that ring Russia’s western edge and widely known among Russians as “the near abroad.” He’s pinning his hopes on the possibility that NATO devolves into a scale of disunity that allows him to reconstitute a buffer against the West.
That’s precisely why any sign of a breakdown in the West’s resolve toward Kremlin aggression would be disastrous. The West’s cohesion is its primary strength. Whether its military and financial support for Ukraine’s democratically elected government, the buildup of defenses on Russia’s western flank, or a new regime of harsh sanctions against Russia, the U.S. and Europe cannot allow any divisiveness to germinate.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC – Grey Zone Escalation
McGee 21 - UK and European Policy and Politics Editor for CNN Digital (Luke, ANALYSIS: How the West made the most dangerous version of Putin,” CNN, 10-24-21, ) //nt-sg
"Putin is an opportunist. NATO's disunity is the greatest gift he can receive," says Riho Terras, former commander of the Estonian Defense Forces. "German reliance on Russian gas is a problem for those of us who share a border as it undermines unity. Brexit might be good for the UK, but it raises questions of a European army which would obviously be weaker than NATO."
Some believe that Putin's greatest asset has been hysteria and overstating of the threat he poses in some part of the West, combined with limited pushback from powerful nations, including the US, for his sincere hostility.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC – NATO Ineffective
Dunivan 15 – Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army and Assistant Professor at U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (Jim, “Challenges, Capability and Will: Is NATO Relevant in the Twenty-first Century?” School of Advanced Military Studies at United States Army Command and General Staff College, 5-23-15, ) //nt-sg
That being said, consensus in and of itself is one of the primary challenges to the continued relevance of the Alliance. Consensus within NATO constitutes compromise among the membership for action. While the idea of consensus has always served as a fundamental and valued principle within the Alliance, it is worth noting that compromise, by its very definition of agreement through concessions or adjustment, is rarely an optimum solution. Additionally, in their report to the Secretary General to inform the development of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, the Group of Experts put forth that:
there is an inherent tension between a multimember organization that works by consensus and a military/political Alliance operating in a fluid and fast-paced security environment...However, the need to achieve agreement...can prove arduous, sometimes leading to delays that serve no constructive purpose. In addition, the Alliance needs to prepare for situations where rapid (indeed almost instantaneous) decision-making may be required.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC – NATO Ineffective
Lindley-French 19 - is Senior Fellow, Institute of Statecraft, London; Director, Europe Analytica; Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow, National Defense University (Julian, Judy Asks: Is NATO Deterrence a Paper Tiger?” Carnegie Europe, 1-31-19, ) //nt-sg
Paper tiger? No, more cardboard elephant. Thomas Schelling said that deterrence is the power to hurt as bargaining and best held in reserve. NATO has become a collective deterrent rather than a collective defender. On the eve of a short but violent war NATO would be the last place the Americans would turn to. Rather, as NATO continued to talk deterrence, Washington would put together a high-end coalition under its command to do the fighting.
NATO is too slow of thought, decision, and foot to fight a contemporary war. The conduct of war will become far faster with new technologies appearing in a battlespace that will stretch across air, sea, land, cyber, space, information, and knowledge. The Russians understand this and have built a thirty-day “wham, bam, thank you Vlad” war machine that would exploit NATO’s slowness of force generation and military mobility. NATO assumes at least thirty days of warning. Adaptation is thus buttressing deterrent value by accelerating NATO’s speed of response and extending its power to hurt. NATO could fight a short war if it had the warning, or a long war if it was given the chance. Hmmm . . .
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC – NATO Ineffective
Ucko 10 - Adjunct fellow at the Department of War Studies at King's College London (David H., "Resetting Article 5: Toward a New Understanding of NATO's Security Guarantees," World Politics Review, 10-26-2010, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6838/resetting-article-5-toward-a-new-understanding-of-natos-security-guarantees)//nt-sg
The Estonian crisis demonstrated that today's attacks are unlikely to be the unambiguous, military and territorial attacks imagined during the Cold War, and that NATO, as a military alliance, remains ill-equipped to operate in less-traditional domains or against less-readily identifiable actors. Similar conclusions can be drawn from NATO's sole invocation of Article 5, on Sept. 12, 2001. NATO's response then centered on Operation Eagle Assist, the deployment of Airborne Early Warning aircraft (AWACS) to protect U.S. airspace, and Operation Active Endeavor, the deployment of naval forces to the eastern Mediterranean "to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity." The alliance also pledged to share intelligence on the terrorist threat, provide overflight rights and access to ports and airfields as part of any retaliatory operations, and to assist any state whose support for these measures would prove destabilizing.
At first sight, NATO's response reflected an agile use of structures and capabilities configured for Cold War-era threats. But the first invocation of Article 5 also illustrated the limited relevance of its guarantees against less-conventional foes. Unlike the Soviet Union, al-Qaida was not deterred by the threat of collective NATO action. Nor were NATO's actions following Sept. 11 effective in punishing the transgressor or in forestalling future attacks. Indeed, it took nearly a month for NATO to confirm its invocation of Article 5 and launch Active Endeavor and Eagle Assist, as it first had to establish that the perpetrators of the attack were not domestic actors within the United States. And although the AWACS that NATO provided did free up some U.S. assets for the campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Eagle Assist was peripheral to the broader effort against al-Qaida and was terminated after a mere six months. The Mediterranean operation looked good on paper, but its relation to the al-Qaida threat was unclear, and the ships involved also operated under a limited mandate that precluded involuntary boarding of suspicious vessels.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC – Only Small Attacks Now
Rabkin and Yoo 17 - Jeremy Rabkin is Professor of Law at George Mason University and John Yoo is the Emanuel Heller Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley (Jeremy and John, Striking Power, pages 98-99, 2017) //nt-sg
There are good reasons to doubt that even these cyber operations will produce the nightmares drawn by Richard Clarke and other alarmists. The first obstacle is the scale of the technical challenge. A hostile power cannot simply aim a general-purpose cyber weapon at a target system. To take control of a network, the hackers must custom design a special program to penetrate the system. The developers of the cyber weapon must have a detailed understanding of the network, which may take years of snooping inside that system. If the target is disconnected from the Internet, as the Iranian nuclear facility was, the attacker must infiltrate a closed local network. That may prove feasible, but it requires highly specialized and sophisticated intelligence, so that attackers can infiltrate the target system by way of other computers with which it may regularly interact.
The challenge is greater still if the aim is not simply to shut down the target system but to change its operations, as with Stuxnet. The hackers must then figure out how to disguise their program to evade detection by network security teams. The Stuxnet virus is reported to have taken four or five years and billions of dollars to develop. Among other things, the developers built their own model of the Iranian nuclear facility.22 Stuxnet took over the supervisory control and data acquisition program (SCADA) of the Iranian centrifuges. As engineers have pointed out, "the complexity of SCADA systems is one of the best defenses against attack," because their complexity would prevent all but the most patient, expert, and highly informed hackers from redirecting their operations.23
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC – Only Small Attacks Now
Lonergan et al. 22 - assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University (Erica D., “Putin’s invasion of Ukraine didn’t rely on cyberwarfare. Here’s why,” WaPo, 3-7-22, ) //nt-sg
Despite these predictions, the expected “shock and awe” Russian cyber campaign in preparation of the invasion of Ukraine never emerged. Moreover, while the conflict will undoubtedly evolve, cyber operations don’t appear to be playing a decisive role on the battlefield.
Surprised? We’re not. Academic research explains why cyber operations are poor tools of coercion — whether used independently or as part of conventional warfighting.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 2NC – Only Small Attacks Now
Wolff 22 - associate professor of cybersecurity policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University (Josephine, “Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine,” Time, 3-2-2022, ) //nt-sg
But as the invasion continues with few signs of any sophisticated cyber conflict, it seems less and less likely that Russia has significant cyber capabilities in reserve, ready to deploy if needed. Instead, it begins to look like Russia’s much vaunted cyber capabilities have been neglected in recent years, in favor of developing less expensive, less effective cyber weapons that cause less widespread damage and are considerably easier to contain and defend against. For instance, many of the cyberattacks directed at Ukraine in the past month have been relatively basic distributed denial-of-service attacks, in which hackers bombard Ukrainian government websites and servers with so much online traffic that those servers cannot respond to legitimate users and are forced offline for some period of time. Denial-of-service attacks can be effective for short-term disruptions but they’re hardly a new or impressive cyber capability—in fact, they’re what Russia used to target Estonia more than a decade ago in 2007. Moreover, launching these types of attacks requires no sophisticated technical capabilities or discovery of new vulnerabilities, and they typically have fairly contained impacts on the specific, targeted computers. Similarly, recent reports that Belarusian hackers are trying to phish European officials using compromised accounts belonging to Ukrainian armed services members suggests that not only are these efforts relying on fairly basic tactics like phishing emails, they are not even being carried out by Russian military hackers directly.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › AT: Lower A5 Threshold › 1NC
Lonergan and Moller 22 - Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Sara B. Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year (Erica and Sarah, “Opinion | NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea,” Politico, 4-27-22, ) //nt-sg
This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time.
This creates a slew of practical problems if Article 5 were to be invoked for a cyberattack. From an implementation perspective, it would trigger deliberations within the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s primary decision-making body. Decisions made within the NAC require unanimity, which can be difficult to achieve for many issues but is especially burdensome for cyber ones, given all of the ambiguities outlined above. The most likely outcome of this process would be a long, drawn-out deliberation resulting in a divided alliance unable to agree on how or whether to respond. Quite simply, some allies are unlikely to want to risk World War III for a cyberattack that disrupts the financial infrastructure, for instance, of another country but doesn’t lead to loss of life or sustained damage.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: prolif slow
Tertrais ’19 [Bruno; July 29; Master’s Degree in Public Law of the University of Paris; Washington Quarterly, “Will Europe Get Its Own Bomb?,” p. 48]
But the context is now changing. If one describes the nuclear deterrence question as a matter of supply and demand, things have evolved on both ends:
– On the demand side, Russia’s new assertiveness and territorial aggression has triggered a renewed interest in Europe about the means to guarantee their existence and territorial integrity. This is true in particular not only for countries that became members of NATO at the turn of the century (such as Poland and the Baltic States) but also for EU members which are not members of NATO (Finland and Sweden) and thus do not rely on a formal U.S. guarantee, but worry about Russia. The end of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, as well as uncertainties about the future of the Iranian program, tensions in South Asia, and North Korean nuclear progress are additional reasons for Europe to reconsider deterrence.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: prolif now
Lanoszka ’18 [Alexander; 2018; International Relations Professor at the University of Waterloo; Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, “How Alliances (Mis)Manage Nuclear Proliferation,” Chapter 1]
Perhaps such pessimism is warranted amid the Teutonic shifts in international politics that attend the rise of China and the apparent decline of the United States. Yet the view that the future is unlike the past is an overstatement. American security commitments will come under stress, just as they have in the past. The difference may well be that the United States would not have the same clout over its allies as before if predictions of its relative decline are correct. If the United States had trouble suppressing the nuclear interest of industrializing allies like South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s, then future nonproliferation efforts will be much more hard-pressed to achieve success. Nevertheless, as in the past, the United States may well continue to hold sufficiently strong military and technological capabilities over adversaries.35 As such, allies’ behavior could reflect how the United States decides to allocate its strategic attention and military resources more so than deep structural trends. Nuclear proliferation among allies is not inevitable, but the choice is for the United States to make in order to prevent it from happening.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: prolif now
Tertrais ’19 [Bruno; July 29; Master’s Degree in Public Law of the University of Paris; Washington Quarterly, “Will Europe Get Its Own Bomb?” p. 56]
Still, as a study conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) indicates, there is a continued general nuclear apathy in Europe as well as an unwillingness “to face up to the renewed relevance that nuclear deterrence ought to have in their strategic thinking.”43 The time is thus not ripe for grand initiatives that would entail the creation ex abrupto of a common deterrent, especially as long as NATO mechanisms are intact. As an EU scholar put it in a recent overview of the concept of “strategic autonomy:” “[T]here appears to be no Europe-wide willingness for a ‘European nuclear deterrent’ at present. In many European countries such a level of autonomy would symbolize the end of the transatlantic relationship as we know it today, pose a strategic liability for their national security, and, for many states, violate their neutrality or constitutions.”44
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: no prolif
Axe ’18 [David; July 16; MFA from the University of South Carolina; The Daily Beast, “The Risk to the World: Massive Nuclear Proliferation,” https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-risk-to-the-world-massive-nuclear-proliferation]
More realistically, the Americans leaving NATO would force European countries that currently lack nuclear arms to toss aside the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty and rush to acquire them, all in order to deter the Russians without the Americans' help.
The treaty's disintegration could then lead to countries all over the world pursuing their own nukes. "Trump is increasing the chances of the bomb spreading and the key treaty keeping the lid on such proliferation collapsing," says Blair.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: no prolif
Lanoszka ’18 [Alexander; 2018; Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Balsillie School of International Affairs University of Waterloo; Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, “Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation,” p. 149-157]
How do alliances curb potential or actual cases of nuclear proliferation, if at all? Many scholars argue that alliances are effective tools for bridling the nuclear ambitions of states. When allies do try to acquire nuclear weapons, their alliance relationships serve as conduits for the guarantor to coerce a nonproliferation outcome. In this book, I show that such optimism about the role military alliances play is overstated. Alliances can deter nuclear proliferation if they marry written pledges of support with compatible foreign policy and defense doctrines as well as in-theater conventional deployments. Yet alliances are prone to severe adjustments that can unsettle the ally. When guarantors make major unilateral changes to the security relationship, through undesirable doctrinal announcements or troop withdrawals, abandonment fears intensify. The affected ally becomes so doubtful of its received guarantees that it becomes more likely to engage in nuclear proliferation–related behavior. Unfortunately for the guarantor, curbing such behavior once it has started is very difficult. It requires fixing the broken security guarantee that prompted the nuclear interest in the first place. Nonmilitary tools like economic sanctions may be the best coercive instruments available, but their viability depends on the extent to which the ally relies on the guarantor. Simply put, alliances are better for deterring potential than for preventing actual nuclear proliferation.
The empirical cases support this argument. Table 2 summarizes the main findings. Fears of abandonment in West Germany intensified after July 1956 amid rumors that the Eisenhower administration would reduce the size of the US Army by a third. Shortly thereafter, West Germany joined France and Italy in a short-lived and unsuccessful effort to develop nuclear weapons. Throughout the subsequent decade, Bonn deflected calls for it to make clear nonproliferation pledges while obtaining enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Its alliance with the United States certainly constrained its decision-making, but arguments that distinct coercion episodes prompted West German leaders to renounce nuclear proliferation are overstated. Domestic politics and prestige considerations were important factors as well.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: no spillover
Axe ’18 [David; July 2018; War and politics correspondent, citing the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, the Arms Control Association, and Bruce Blair of Princeton University; The Daily Beast, “The Risk to the World: Massive Nuclear Proliferation,” ]
"The loss of U.S. reliability to deter aggression against NATO Europe would prompt France and the U.K. to expand their nuclear capabilities and Germany and other non-nuclear countries to consider building their own nuclear arsenals despite strong public opposition," Blair said.
Some European officials are already thinking in those terms. In 2017, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, chairman of Poland’s ruling Law and Justice Party, called for Europe to build up a combined nuclear arsenal as powerful as Russia's own arsenal. Conservative German parliamentarian Roderich Kiesewetter the idea.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: no spillover
Dodge 16 – Michaela Dodge, M.S in Defense and Strategic Studies, former Publius Fellow at the Claremont Institute. [A ‘No First Use’ Nuke Strategy Would be a Disaster for the US, 7-27-16, https://www.dailysignal.com/2016/07/27/if-the-obama-administration-adopts-a-no-first-use-nuclear-strategy-it-could-cripple-us-security/]
The second problem with the no first use policy is that about 30 nations around the world, close U.S. allies like Japan or NATO allies, rely on U.S. nuclear weapons for their own security. They rely on the United States to deter their nuclear-armed neighbors. North Korea habitually threatens South Korea with annihilation. North Korea’s ballistic missiles can reach Japan, another close U.S. ally. Russia is pursuing increasingly aggressive revisionist policies on the European theater. U.S. nuclear weapons have kept nuclear programs of allies at bay—and that is a very good thing as the complexity of the nuclear environment and thus the potential for miscalculation increases the more nuclear-armed countries exist. Facing dangerous neighbors and lacking U.S. assurances vis-à-vis devastating non-nuclear attacks, these countries would be undoubtedly more inclined to pursue their own nuclear weapons capabilities, complicating or thwarting U.S. nonproliferation efforts.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: no spillover
Brown 17 – J Wellington Brown, MA Thesis at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. [Indispensable Nation: US Security Guarantees and Nuclear Proliferation, June, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=813351]
Defense agreements carry great reputational costs for US credibility. Beyond an implicit notion of public goods, the United States has made an explicit commitment to come to the defense of another state. To renege on these commitments would not only damage the United States’ reputation, but in the case of collective security agreements, it would undermine the entire collective security institution. These institutions, such as NATO, serve not only as collective defense against external threats, but also promote stability and reduce the security dilemma among members of the alliance. The United States’ interest in this regional stability is the basis of its credibility in upholding collective security agreements.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › at: no spillover
Fitzsimmons 19 – Michael Fitzsimmons, research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, served previously with the US Army War College and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, PhD in international security from the University of Maryland. [Horizontal Escalation: An Asymmetric Approach to Russian Aggression?” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13.1. Spring 2019]
Also, deterrence and escalation outcomes in a regional crisis with Russia are critically important to the US beyond the direct local consequences of any conflict, grave as they may be. The US commitment to NATO’s collective defense is the lynchpin of American alliance commitments globally. Hence, even otherwise minor crises are likely to have long-term effects for US power and global security, in terms of demonstrating strengths, weaknesses, and levels of resolve in American defense of its stated commitments abroad.11
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – assurance link
Piret Pernik 14 {Piret Pernik is a Researcher of Strategy Branch of the NATO CCDCOE. Her main research areas are cyber security strategies and policies, horizon scanning and analysis of cyber threats, and the development of military cyber organizations. September 2014. “Improving Cyber Security: NATO and the EU.” https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Piret_Pernik_-_Improving_Cyber_Security.pdf}//JM
Development of the approaches of NATO and the EU The principal focus of NATO’s cyber defence approach has always been the protection of its own headquarters, agencies, and operations. The Alliance has been improving its cyber defence capabilities since 1990s. The first well-known cyber incident against NATO took place in 1999 during NATO’s operation “Allied Force” in Kosovo when hacker groups from Russia and Serbia disrupted NATO’s internal systems.14 Few years later, at the Prague Summit in 2002, cyber security appeared for the first time on NATO’s political agenda with NATO declaring to “strengthen our capabilities to defend against cyber attacks.”15 In the same year, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved a Cyber Defence Programme and as part of this, the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) - NATO’s emergency team to prevent, detect and respond to cyber incidents - was created.16 The cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 that disabled its governmental, media and financial websites and the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 that included military offence against Georgian military forces and cyber attacks against Georgian webpages17 helped NATO to realize how it was behind in cyber space. Subsequently, the Alliance’s focus broadened from the security of its own networks to that of its member states.18 In January 2008 NATO approved its first Policy on Cyber Defence stressing “the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems […]; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack.”19 In the same year, it established the Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) to coordinate cyber defence, review capabilities and conduct appropriate security risk management across the Alliance. It also accredited the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre for Excellence (CCD COE) with the main objectives to improve the interoperability of NATO and enhance cyber awareness, education, and training efforts. In 2009 cyber defence was rendered an integral part of NATO exercises. In 2010 the Lisbon Summit addressed cyber defence capabilities gaps including improvements to the NCIRC, and in the same year the Emerging Security Challenges Division was created within NATO International Staff with a mandate to analyse among other asymmetrical threats cyber threats. The Defence Policy and Planning Committee/Cyber Defence (from 2014 titled the Cyber Defence Committee) was also established to provide political-level guidance and oversight. In 2011 the Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB, supplanted CDMA), which consists of NATO cyber experts at the political, military, operational, and technical levels was set up. Its purpose is to coordinate cyber defence activities throughout NATO and associated agencies, and to facilitate implementation of NATO’s cyber defence policies and capabilities.20 In June 2011 a revised Cyber Defence Policy was approved, confirming the resolve to protect NATO’s networks and assist member states in the event of cyber attack. It also commanded the establishment of two cyber Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) by the end of 2012 with a core of six professionals that can be deployed within 24 hours to a member state.21 Any NATO nation under cyber attack could request the team’s assistance through the CDMB22, the deployment must be approved by the North Atlantic Council (which may be politically challenging). The policy also defined minimum requirements to national networks critical to NATO’s core tasks and assistance to the Allies to achieve the minimum levels of security. Additionally, the Defence Policy and Planning Committee in Reinforced format (DPPC(R)) was set up to oversee the work of CDMB and manage the overall planning process, including cyber capabilities.23 In 2012 the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) was established.24
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Assurance › 2nc – assurance link
Schneider & Herr 18 – Jacquelyn Schneider, Cyber Conflict Studies Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. Trey Herr, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution. [Sharing is Caring: The United States’ New Cyber Commitment for NATO, 10-10-20, https://www.cfr.org/blog/sharing-caring-united-states-new-cyber-commitment-nato]
Given the recent blockbuster headlines about alleged Chinese snooping on server hardware sold to major technology companies and the latest joint-denunciation of Russian cyber operations, you could be forgiven for having missed an important NATO-related development. The Associated Press reports that the U.S. Defense Department will announce a new commitment to use offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities on behalf of NATO allies.
The new commitment is notable given how cybersecurity has long been treated as an exceptional domain of operations, and cyber capabilities reserved as strategic national assets to be shared with only the closest of allies. With this announcement, the Pentagon is suggesting that cyber capabilities might be used alongside conventional weapons with allies and indeed, equal weight appears to be given to offensive and defensive operations. Perhaps most significantly, the announcement moves NATO partners closer to what has been a tight coterie of U.S.-favored signals intelligence partners such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada.