2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – ambiguity good
Davis '19 [Susan; 4/18/19; General Rapporteur to the NATO parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee; "NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defense, Stabilizing Deterrence," https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-04/087_STC_19_E%20-%20NATO.pdf]
60. NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages, but also poses distinct challenges.
61. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers treading lightly. A similarly vague deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War. However, ambiguity on where the threshold lies could indeed lead an opponent who is sufficiently comfortably with taking risks, to continuously exploit the ‘grey zones’, test the defender’s resolve, and conduct ever more daring cyber attacks.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc – uq – at: “cumulative”
Stefan Soesanto 21 - Senior Researcher in the Cyber Defense Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zurich. (“When Does a ‘Cyber Attack’ Demand Retaliation? NATO Broadens Its View,” Defense One, 06/30/2021, ) PJW
In the 14 years since NATO first declared that a “cyber attack” could amount to an assault requiring collective action, alliance members have never made it quite clear what would constitute such an attack. But now they appear to be broadening the still-hazy definition.
Since the Wales Summit of 2014, analysts have largely worked under the assumption that a cyberattack would have to be as destructive as a kinetic attack to reach the legal threshold that would trigger defensive actions. This view was reinforced throughout the years by NATO’s use of the grammatical singular, i.e., “a cyberattack,” and the equivalency drawn between a kinetic attack and the effects and scale of a cyberattack.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc - uniqueness
Lynch '18 [Justin; 7/10/18; Associate Editor at Fifth Domain, contributor to the New Yorker, Foreign Policy, the Atlantic; "Cyber ambiguity: NATO’s digital defense in doubt amid unstable alliances," https://www.fifthdomain.com/international/2018/07/09/cyber-ambiguity-natos-digital-defense-in-doubt-amid-unstable-alliances/]
Today, the alliance counts cybersecurity as one of its core missions. It has placed a new cyber research center in the heart of the Baltic nation.
But amid what is viewed as a sustained campaign of Russian digital warfare on the West and the trans-Atlantic alliance ― whose foundations are being questioned through a surge of populism ― the very future of NATO’s cyber strategy is left intentionally murky.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc - uniqueness
Pearson, et al 22 – James Pearson is a European Cyber Correspondent for Reuters. Jonathan Landay is a National Security Correspondent at Thomson Reuters. (“Cyberattack on NATO could trigger collective defence clause – official,” Reuters, 02/28/2022, ) PJW
LONDON/WASHINGTON, Feb 28 (Reuters) - A cyberattack on a NATO member state could trigger Article 5, its collective defence clause, a NATO official said on Monday, amid concerns that chaos in cyberspace around Russia's invasion of Ukraine could spill over into other territories. The military alliance has for years made clear that a serious cyberattack could trigger the clause, but such a scenario has so far been largely hypothetical. "Allies also recognise that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as an armed attack," the official told Reuters. "We will not speculate on how serious a cyberattack would have to be in order to trigger a collective response. Any response could include diplomatic and economic sanctions, cyber measures, or even conventional forces, depending on the nature of the attack," the official said. Whether or not a cyberattack met the threshold of an attack large enough to trigger Article 5 was a "political decision for NATO Allies to make," they added. Britain and the United States have warned of potential cyberattacks on Ukraine which could have international consequences should, for example, malicious software designed to target networks in Ukraine start to spread elsewhere. read more There has also been concern among cybersecurity experts that Russia could team up with some of the gangs and people who release malicious software, such as malware used to hold Colonial Pipeline to ransom in the United States last year. U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner said there were no clear guidelines on how NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) should respond, should such an attack take place. "These are things that have been in hypothetical discussion for a decade, but because we've not come to any universal conclusion on what those standards should be, what level of attribution is needed, we're kind of in a very grey area," he told Reuters. He posed the hypothetical case of a Russian cyberattack on Ukraine that impacts NATO member Poland, triggering power outages that result in hospital patients dying or knocking out traffic lights, causing fatal road accidents involving U.S. troops deployed there. "The West may have wanted strategic ambiguity in this area, and that may still be the right choice," he added. "But have we sufficiently made clear to the Russians the red lines on cyber or frankly to the NATO public, the American public, on red lines on cyber? I don't think we've done that."
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › at: ambiguity dangerous
Davis 19 – Susan Davis, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “NATO in the Cyber Age: Strengthening Security & Defence, Stabilising Deterrence,” 4/18/19, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-04/087_STC_19_E%20-%20NATO.pdf
60. NATO maintains a cyber deterrence policy of ambiguity. First, it does not draw a clear line for when a cyber attack is sufficiently harmful to cross the threshold to an armed attack. Second, it does not currently have an operational definition of what the collective response would be if that threshold were to be crossed. Such a cyber deterrence policy offers several advantages, but also poses distinct challenges.
61. A certain degree of ambiguity is beneficial because it could make opponents wary of going too far in their cyber attacks. The opponent always fears stepping over the invisible line, and thus prefers treading lightly. A similarly vague deterrence posture arguably worked well during the Cold War. However, ambiguity on where the threshold lies could indeed lead an opponent who is sufficiently comfortably with taking risks, to continuously exploit the ‘grey zones’, test the defender’s resolve, and conduct ever more daring cyber attacks.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc ov
Murauskaite et al. ’19 [Egle Murauskaite, David Quinn, Catarina P. Thomson, Devin H. Ellis, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Erik Gartzke; Senior Non-resident Fellow with the ICONS Project at the University of Maryland; 5/10/19; “Extended Deterrence Dilemmas in the Grey Zone: Trans-Atlantic Insights on Baltic Security Challenges”; ; Journal on Baltic Security, Vol. 5, Issue 2]
The first exercise was conducted in fall of 2016, in support of U.S. SOCEUR, and involved 29 expert respondents. The scenario vignette explored a series of suspicious Russia-linked incidents against Latvia: a cyberattack against the energy grid, an explosion in a Russian-language middle school, and staged protests in Riga. As Baltic, American, and Western European experts addressed these crises, several important findings emerged. The first was that both Latvia and its neighbour Lithuania delayed asking for Western assistance as long as possible – U.S. and/or NATO assistance in handling Russian interference was likely seen as the ultimate trump card to be called upon only at the darkest hour (which any individual grey zone crisis hardly qualified as, though their cumulative impact was approaching the threshold). The problem was that it significantly complicated escalation management, depriving allied decision-makers of a series of tools that could help de-escalate the conflict early and giving rise to more possibilities for the adversary to sow discord and ambiguity among the allies. The second important insight was that the EU played a significantly more important role than NATO in managing the grey zone crises – turning to NATO resources was seen as too escalatory a step. The third significant insight was that although the experts agreed at the outset on the importance for NATO and the EU to maintain a united front, during any particular crisis there was a tendency to conduct bilateral talks with Russia, trying to resolve the situation without involving the target state (i.e. Latvia) directly – which inevitably backfired.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc ov
Tertrais ’16 [Bruno; Deputy Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, member of the committees of White Papers on Defence and National Security, former Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the Ministry of Defense; April 2016; “Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: Its Origins, Meaning and Future”; ; NATO Defense College, No. 130] *Edited in brackets for reading clarity.
The Alliance has made progress in deterring and protecting against such threats. Protecting against a limited ballistic strike from the Middle East was the rationale for NATO’s ballistic missile defense program. It is today an operational capability. The cyber threat is now recognized as having the potential to be considered, under some circumstances, an “armed attack.”16 But faced with a limited attack, NATO should not expect that Article 5 will be automatically, swiftly and unanimously declared (and the history of the past 25 years highlights the relevance of these doubts). If coming from Russia, it should be expected that several member states will hesitate before taking steps that may commit them to war with Moscow. This includes not only a “Northern contingency” (in the Baltic region or in the High North), but also a scenario where Russia forcefully responds on Turkish territory to what it would, rightly or wrongly, see as provocation by Ankara.
Attribution will be a problem in many instances; even assuming that this issue is solved, some member countries might hesitate in acknowledging the adversary’s responsibility, especially if the latter – as should be expected – embarks on massive propaganda aimed at influencing their public opinions.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 2nc ov
Roggeveen 17 – Barbara Roggeveen research assistant at the Slavic Department of the University of Amsterdam, “NATO Needs an Offensive Cybersecurity Policy,” 8/8/17, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-an-offensive-cybersecurity-policy/
Although NATO has been working toward a more comprehensive cybersecurity policy, there are two major challenges with its current strategy. The current plan places cyberattacks within the scope of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the concept of collective defense, thus, creating high thresholds for engagement. In addition, it allows for mainly defensive and reactive measures, leaving less room for preventive or offensive operations.
NATO’s approach to cybersecurity can be traced back to early steps taken at the 2014 Wales Summit, in which NATO included cyber defense in its core tasks of collective defense. At the Warsaw Summit two years later, NATO recognized cyberspace as a “domain of operations,” reaffirming its defensive mandate with regard to cyber threats.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 1nc - turn
Kulesa 19 [Lukasz; Nov 28; Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM); "The Future of Deterrence: Effectiveness and Limitations of Conventional and Nuclear Postures,” https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/future-of-deterrence-effectiveness-and-limitations-of-conventional-and-nuclear-postures-pub-80440]
NATO needs to be careful about defining and signaling its redlines. Making these boundaries too specific could embolden adversaries to intensify their actions below NATO’s declared threshold of response. Being deliberately ambiguous and raising the fear of retribution may be more useful for encouraging adversaries’ self-restraint.
At the same time, NATO should aim to deter specific types of particularly threatening unconventional activities. These include major and sophisticated cyber attacks against allies’ military forces and critical military and civilian infrastructure, proxy military and special forces operations, and state-sponsored terrorism. NATO could declare that such activities may lead it to invoke Article 5 and respond in various ways, including asymmetrically (for example, the response to a cyber attack may not involve only cyber capabilities).
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 1nc - turn
Z’hra Ghavam 16 - Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy with a B.S. from the United States Naval Academy. (“NATO’s Preparedness for Cyberwar,” September 2016, )
NATO’s publicly declared policy on cyber threats is consciously and purposefully vague.207 Why? Strategic ambiguity has its benefits. According to the Atlantic Council panel, there is no “redline” or “determined threshold” that would automatically define a cyber act as an act of war.208 Leaving the rules undefined affords NATO ample room in which to operate. For a 28-member multinational organization that operates on the principle of consensus, time and latitude for solidifying strategic-level decisions are critical. If NATO publicized a cyber redline, it would box the Alliance into a corner. This kind of policy could embolden cyber offenders and provoke massive intrusions that target NATO’s networks at just below this threshold. Having a defined redline could also invite nefarious cyber actors to cross it to test NATO’s resolve, damage its reputation as a leader in Euro-Atlantic security, and undermine the credibility of its Article 5 commitments.
Following the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO affirmed its stance on law and cyberspace while refusing to address cyber redlines:
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Strategic Ambiguity Good › 1nc - turn
Michaela Prucková 22 - Masaryk University/NATO CCDCOE Law Branch. (“Cyber attacks and Article 5 – a note on a blurry but consistent position of NATO,” CCDCOE, 2022, ) PJW
In reporting on the unfolding events in Ukraine, media and social platforms have repeatedly discussed as novel the possibility of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty being triggered by a cyber attack on one or more Member States. This article presents a brief overview of the topic and explains that the possibility a cyber attack could lead to the invocation of Article 5 has been established since 2014; hence it is not a novelty and definitely not a response to the latest events on NATO’s eastern flank.
NATO’s cornerstone
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: PMCs---1NC
Soldat, a group of military experts, 1/29/18
(Soldat, “The Market is Divided PMCs, Russia Lags Far Behind”, https://soldat.pro/en/2018/01/29/5414/)
He agreed, that private military companies will be difficult to regain market share. "The world market is fully captured by the US and the UK. percent 95 PMC's market belongs to those countries. They perform a variety of functions - ranging from security and ending with accompaniment of strings... Try kerf on the market in any African country, where all captured, intercepted. We are already lagging behind many other countries. The market is divided. This business,it's not only fighting, yet, eg, protection of oil fields. Well, We have based on fierce competition incorporated. It's hard to compete with the US. If they enter into a contract of some, eg, for the protection, during the day can be aircraft of military transport aircraft to transfer several hundred cars. We have the possibility of, of course, modestly", - expert predicts, specifying, that the possibility of Russian and foreign PMCs until incomparable.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: Miscalc/Lashout---1NC
Roggeveen 17 – Barbara Roggeveen research assistant at the Slavic Department of the University of Amsterdam, “NATO Needs an Offensive Cybersecurity Policy,” 8/8/17, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-an-offensive-cybersecurity-policy/
Although NATO has been working toward a more comprehensive cybersecurity policy, there are two major challenges with its current strategy. The current plan places cyberattacks within the scope of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the concept of collective defense, thus, creating high thresholds for engagement. In addition, it allows for mainly defensive and reactive measures, leaving less room for preventive or offensive operations.
NATO’s approach to cybersecurity can be traced back to early steps taken at the 2014 Wales Summit, in which NATO included cyber defense in its core tasks of collective defense. At the Warsaw Summit two years later, NATO recognized cyberspace as a “domain of operations,” reaffirming its defensive mandate with regard to cyber threats.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: Gunboat Diplomacy---1NC
1AC author: Patrick C. R. Terry 19, dean of the faculty of law at the University of Public Administration in Kehl, Germany, “The Return of Gunboat Diplomacy: How the West has Undermined the Ban on the Use of Force,” Harvard National Security Journal Volume 10,
Although incompatible with Article 51 and not supported by sufficient state practice, a tendency is discernible whereby the United States and some of its allies, such as the U.K., Australia, and Israel are attempting to establish preventive self defense as yet another legal recourse to the use of force. The disadvantages and dangers of this strategy are manifold. The main weakness of “forcible counter-proliferation” is its ability to undermine stability in international relations and the rule of law.278 Its supporters seem to believe that it is possible to restrict the legality of such actions to cases where the United States or close allies deem them necessary—which is unrealistic and incompatible with sovereign equality.279 Once preventive self-defense is legal, there is no reason why India could not decide that it is necessary to preventively strike Pakistan, which possesses nu- clear weapons (or vice versa). Extended to other WMD, there are many more volatile situations which would seemingly justify the use of force280 and today’s ally is often tomorrow’s “rogue state,” and vice versa (Iran and Iraq being prime examples).281 Many western proponents of preventive self-defense also seem to believe that a state viewed by the United States and its allies as “rogue” is universally recognized as such, which is not the case.282 To others, the rule of law seems to be equivalent to U.S. rule, a view often confirmed when U.S. actions are claimed to have created new international law without any analysis of the practice or views of other states.283 It is, however, unlikely that other powerful states, such as China, Russia, or India will accept this U.S.-centric view. In conclusion, “preventive” selfdefense is not lawful, nor should it be. Nevertheless, many western states seek to undermine its ban.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: I-Law Internals---1NC
Ferry 18 Jean Pisani-Ferry, Economics Professor with Sciences Po of Paris and the Hertie School of Governance of Berlin, former campaign director for Emmanuel Macron and Commissioner-General of France Stratégie, the Founding Director of the think tank Bruegel. [Should we give up on global governance? Policy Contribution 17, October 2018, https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/PC-17-2018.pdf (table 1 omitted)]//BPS
C. Obsolescence of global rules and institutions Although the previous argument primarily rests on the broad pattern of international trade and finance, the adverse effects of external liberalisation can be compounded by inadequate governance. As far as trade is concerned, two cases in point are, first, inertia in the categorisation of countries, especially the fact that emerging countries, including China, still enjoy developing country status in the WTO; and, second, failures to enforce the adequate protection of intellectual property (an issue on which the EU recently joined the US and filed a complaint at the WTO against Chinese practices; see European Union, 2018). These grievances, and others concerning subsidies or investment, are not new: they were clearly spelled out by policymakers from the Obama administration (see for example, Schwab, 2011, and Wu, 2016). The underlying concern is that the systemic convergence on a market economy template that was expected from participation in the WTO has failed to materialise. The rules and institutions of global trade have brought shallow convergence but not the deeper alignment of economic systems that was hoped for. More generally, existing rules and institutions were conceived for a different world. This is very apparent in the trade field: the GATT/WTO framework dates from what Baldwin (2016) has called the “first unbundling” of production and consumption. They were not designed for the “second unbundling” of knowledge and production that gave rise to the emergence of global value chains. For decades, the implicit assumption behind the structure of trade negotiations has been that nations have well-defined sectoral trade interests: they are either exporters or importers. But in a world of global value chains, they are both importers and exporters of similar products simultaneously. Even if the principles of multilateralism remain valid, important features of the rules and institutions in which they are embedded are increasingly outdated. In the same way, opening to capital movements was supposed to result in net financial flows from savings-rich to savings-poor countries. What has happened instead is a massive increase in gross flows resulting in the interpenetration of financial systems and the coexistence of sizeable external assets and liabilities. The consequence has been the emergence of a global financial cycle (see for example Rey, 2017) and of policy dilemmas that are quite different from those arising in a simple Mundell-Fleming framework, in which interdependence takes place through net inflows and outflows of capital. Developments in the climate field further illustrate the point. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was negotiated under the assumption that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions would continue to originate in the advanced countries. But by the time the Protocol was meant to enter into force, it was clear already that the hypothesis was deeply wrong. The exemption of developing countries from emissions reductions was one of the reasons why the US did not ratify the treaty. The failed Copenhagen agreement of 2009 was an attempt to replicate Kyoto on a global scale, but there was no consensus for such an approach. Rules can be reformed and institutions can adapt. But this is a long and demanding process, especially when it requires unanimity, when participating countries have diverging interests and when changes require ratification by parliaments where there is no majority to support them. Global rules therefore exhibit a strong inertia that often prevents necessary adaptations. Trade rules, amendments to which require unanimity, are a case in point. Institutions are nimbler and can adapt to changing priorities or perspectives on interdependence. The IMF for example has succeeded in adjusting to major changes in the international economic regime and major shifts in the intellectual consensus. But even institutions face limitations to their ability to keep up with underlying transformations. This is one of the reasons why solutions to emerging problems have often been looked for outside the existing multilateral, institution-based governance framework (Table 1). D. The imbalances of global governance A further reason for popular dissatisfaction with global governance is its unbalanced nature. The deeper international integration becomes, the broader the scope of policy its management should cover, and the more acute the tension between the technical requirements of global interdependence and the domestically-rooted legitimacy of public policies. This is most apparent in the field of taxation. International tax optimisation by multinationals has become an issue of significant relevance and it is estimated that 40 percent of their profit is being artificially shifted to low-tax countries – with major consequences for national budgets (Tørsløv et al, 2018). But the fact that taxation remains at the core of sovereign prerogatives limits the scope and ambition of initiatives conducted at international level. The result, which can be regarded as an illustration of Rodrik’s trilemma, is that global coordination in tax matters falls short of what equity-conscious citizens regard as desirable and, at the same time, exceeds what sovereignty-conscious citizens consider acceptable. The imbalances of global governance are by no means limited to the taxation field. The same can be found in a series of domains, for example biodiversity and the preservation of nature. E. Increased complexity The final obstacle to multilateral solutions has to do with the sheer complexity of the challenges global governance has to tackle. In recent decades channels of international interdependence have both multiplied and diversified. They now link together countries with significantly differing levels of technical, economic or financial development. Because they have developed outside the scope of negotiated rules and established institutions, some of channels of interdependence also escape the reach of international agreements to an unprecedented degree. This is especially, but not only, the case of the internet and the multiple networks that rely on it. The world does not fit anymore the usual representation whereby individual nations trade goods, capital and technology. Even putting aside geopolitical consequences and assuming a shared commitment to openness and multilateral solutions, such complexity is bound to test the limits of existing international governance arrangements.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: I-Law Internals---1NC
Aurel 1AC Sari 19, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter; Director, Exeter Centre for International Law; Fellow, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; Fellow, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, “The Mutual Assistance Clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties: The Challenge of Hybrid Threats,” Harvard National Security Journal, Volume 10,
The legal challenges that hybrid threats present for collective security guarantees have been recognized at the highest political level. At their Warsaw summit held in July 2016, NATO’s member states confirmed their readiness to assist each other at any stage of a hybrid campaign and to counter hybrid warfare as part of collective defense.294 They also underscored that the North Atlantic Council “could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”295 They repeated these points at their Brussels summit in July 2018.296 By drawing an express link between hybrid warfare and collective defense, NATO leaders signaled their resolve not to allow Article 5 to be hollowed out.297 Still, their declarations of intent strike a rather conservative note. Whilst they accept that NATO may assist an Ally at any stage of a “hybrid campaign,” it is only in cases of “hybrid warfare” that they foresee a potential role for Article 5. This is not an unreasonable position to take. As we saw earlier, recourse to the use of force to counter hybrid threats falling below the threshold of an armed attack is neither permissible nor necessarily appropriate. A pledge to invoke the mutual defense commitment in response to every type of hybrid threat would be a promise to use the proverbial sledgehammer to crack a nut. It would be unrealistic and therefore lack credibility in the eyes of hybrid adversaries.298 By accepting that the role of Article 5 is confined to situations of hybrid warfare, the Warsaw and Brussels Summit Declarations avoid such empty gestures. However, in the same breath they also concede that the application of Article 5 is contingent on the legal threshold between warfare and peace, and thus vulnerable to subversion along the lines discussed in the preceding sections.
It may be tempting to deal with the problem of legal thresholds by attempting to escape them altogether, but this is not a feasible strategy. Even if the contracting parties were to revise Article 5 NAT and Article 42(7) TEU to avoid references to “armed attack” and “armed aggression,”299 they would remain bound by the rules governing the use of force under the UN Charter and customary international law. Although the member states of NATO and the EU make up an influential part of the international community, it is not within their ability to adjust these general rules of international law unilaterally. In any event, lowering the threshold for the use of force in order to facilitate the application of Article 5 and Article 42(7) would come with significant costs, since it would loosen the legal restrictions for all states, including hostile powers. The applicable thresholds therefore cannot be unilaterally modified at will and without the risk of unraveling key elements of the international legal order as it currently stands.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: Hybrid War---1NC
Dr. Hal Brands 18, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Charles Edel, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney and is the author of Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic, The Disharmony of the Spheres, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/hal-brands/the-disharmony-of-the-spheres/
To see this, just work backward from the present. During the Cold War, a bipolar balance did help avert actual war between Moscow and Washington. But even in Europe—where the spheres of influence were best defined—there were continual tensions and crises as Moscow tested the Western bloc. And outside Europe, violence and proxy wars were common as the superpowers competed to extend their reach into the Third World. In the 1930s, the emergence of German and Japanese spheres of influence led to the most catastrophic war in global history. The empires of the 19th century—spheres of influence in their own right—continually jostled one another, leading to wars and near-wars over the course of decades; the Peace of Amiens between England and Napoleonic France lasted a mere 14 months. And looking back to the ancient world, there were not one, but three Punic Wars fought between Rome and Carthage as two expanding empires came into conflict. A world defined by spheres of influence is often a world characterized by tensions, wars, and competition.
The reasons for this are simple. As the political scientist William Wohlforth observed, unipolar systems—such as the U.S.-dominated post–Cold War order—are anchored by a hegemonic power that can act decisively to maintain the peace. In a unipolar system, Wohlforth writes, there are few incentives for revisionist powers to incur the “focused enmity” of the leading state. Truly multipolar systems, by contrast, have often been volatile. When the major powers are more evenly matched, there is a greater temptation to aggression by those who seek to change the existing order of things. And seek to change things they undoubtedly will.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: Hybrid War---1NC
David Takacs 17, Associate Fellow at Slovak Security Policy Institute. "Ukraine‘s deterrence failure: Lessons for the Baltic States." DOI 10.1515/jobs-2017-0001
Russia and its revisionist behaviour present the Baltic States with a multitude of threats, making deterrence a top priority in the Baltic Region. Not only does Moscow wish to extend its sphere of influence to include what it describes as ‘near abroad’, it must carefully protect its own model of ‘sovereign democracy’ at home. Prior to Russian involvement, Ukraine was getting close to signing an association agreement with the European Union (EU) and it was feared that ‘democratic change in brotherly Ukraine could spread to Russia’. Transforming Ukraine to a western democracy was seen as a threat to the Russian regime and was thus stymied at its source (Snegovaya, 2014). However, the Baltic States have already been fully integrated into NATO and the (EU) and have been stable democracies for over two decades now. So what is the nature of the threat that Russia presents to the Baltic States?
Putin is using hybrid tactics as a means of achieving his objectives of a politically restructured Europe. These include massive pro-Russian propaganda and misinformation campaigns, using economic levers, intimidation, or the employment of cyber warfare elements. In Ukraine in 2014, Russia has once again demonstrated its resolve to use both military and non-military means to create and fuel conflicts in pursuit of its wider geopolitical interests. The Kremlin is busily trying to regain its sphere of influence over nations that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, and the Baltic States’ governments are continuously being reminded to stay alert. In addition, NATO frontier allies face much more significant threats due to their proximity to the potential aggressor (Grygiel and Mitchell, 2016, p. 166). Thus, what NATO needs most to deter Russia is ‘to demonstrate robust political solidarity’ within the alliance (NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report, 2015, pp. 4-6). There has been a significant increase in Russian probing activities to gauge NATO’s commitment to the Baltic States over the past two years. Grygiel and Mitchell (2016, p. 43) define Russian probing as a ‘lowmintensity and low-risk test aimed at gauging the opposing state´s power and will to maintain security and influence over a region’. In case of the Baltic States, probing is aimed at the US and the strongest European countries, their power and their will to back up their most exposed allies. As mentioned by Grygiel and Mitchell (2016, p. 122), ‘there is a strong correlation between the existence of alliances in a given region and the effectiveness of deterrence against a threatening power’. Building on the allies’ fear of abandonment and US fear of entrapment in local conflicts, Russia is aiming to hinder their relationships which could ultimately provide Moscow with more room for probing and manoeuvring in the Baltic Region.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: Hybrid War---1NC
Łukasz Kulesa 19, Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). "The Future of Deterrence: Effectiveness and Limitations of Conventional and Nuclear Postures." https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/future-of-deterrence-effectiveness-and-limitations-of-conventional-and-nuclear-postures-pub-80440
NATO needs to be careful about defining and signaling its redlines. Making these boundaries too specific could embolden adversaries to intensify their actions below NATO’s declared threshold of response. Being deliberately ambiguous and raising the fear of retribution may be more useful for encouraging adversaries’ self-restraint.
At the same time, NATO should aim to deter specific types of particularly threatening unconventional activities. These include major and sophisticated cyber attacks against allies’ military forces and critical military and civilian infrastructure, proxy military and special forces operations, and state-sponsored terrorism. NATO could declare that such activities may lead it to invoke Article 5 and respond in various ways, including asymmetrically (for example, the response to a cyber attack may not involve only cyber capabilities).
2022
Michigan
Negative
Neg – OCOs 3 – BFHR › Case › AT: Hybrid War---1NC
Fisher 15 [Max, 6/29/2015, “How World War III became possible”, Vox, ]
This poll is even worse than it looks. It assumes that Russia would launch an overt military invasion of the Baltics. What would actually happen is something far murkier, and far more likely to leverage European hesitation: the playbook from Ukraine, where Russia deployed its newly developed concepts of postmodern "hybrid war," designed to blur the distinction between war and not-war, to make it as difficult as possible to differentiate grassroots unrest or vigilante cyberattacks from Russian military aggression.
Putin may already be laying the groundwork.