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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—Studies

Stats prove

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 7)

In this paper, we attempted a systematic investigation into the relationship between US military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the states that receive that aid. We aimed to improve on the existing literature by building and testing three explicit theoretical models (Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower and Reverse Leverage), focusing on a new measure of cooperation generated from events data rather than UN voting records, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.

We test seven hypotheses associated with three different theoretical models and find mixed results. There is little evidence in favor of the Arms for Influence model: there is an inverse relationship between absolute levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation, and there is no relationship at all between recipient state dependence on US aid and recipient state behavior. Thus, while the Lonely Superpower hypothesis was on the right track by predicting an unorthodox relationship between aid and cooperation, it did not perform as well as some of the Reverse Leverage hypotheses when it came to explaining exactly what form such unorthodoxy would take.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—Studies

Studies prove the link is significant

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 7)

In the results from equation 1, we see that, contrary to Hypothesis 1a (Arms for Influence), but consistent with Hypothesis 3b (Reverse Leverage), there is a significant, negative correlation between levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation. Economic aid, on the other hand, appears to have no effect on recipient state cooperation. The recipient country's GDP and S score are also not correlated with a state's behavior toward the United States. Recipient states that are democratic, and those that have US troops stationed on their soil, appear to be more cooperative with the United States, all else equal.

Table 3 presents results from using equation 1 to simulate the substantive impact of the statistically significant independent variables on recipient state cooperation. States that do not receive any US military aid display an average level of cooperation with the United States of +1.5 when all other variables are held constant at their means. The model predicts that states that obtain the average amount of US military aid ($20 million) will be less cooperative—scoring an average of −11 on the cooperation-conflict scale. An increase in US military aid to one standard deviation above the mean leads to an additional six-point reduction in the monthly cooperation score of the recipient state. In contrast, an increase in the number of US troops from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises recipient state cooperation almost one point. Democratic recipients are on average four points more cooperative than nondemocratic recipients.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—Interest Expansion

Security co-op opens the door to interest expansion which enables reckless driving

Priebe et al ’21 [Miranda; Dec 2021; Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University; RAND Corporation “Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the United States in Conflict?,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-3.html]

Third, once the United States makes a security commitment, it might begin to define its interests more expansively, effectively adopting the ally’s or partner’s interests as its own. Diplomatic and military interactions with the ally might cause the United States to become socialized to its concerns. Even having a seat at the table with U.S. leaders could give states opportunities to influence U.S. choices. Domestic lobbying by allies and partners might further socialize the U.S. public or policymakers to ally and partner concerns. Through lobbying, these allies and partners could create a constituency within the United States that promotes military involvement in a wider variety of issues involving those states.

Restrainers also note that there are forms of entanglement that remain short of U.S. involvement in military conflict, which we do not evaluate in this report. Edelstein and Itzkowitz Shifrinson argue that entanglement dynamics in Asia have affected U.S. force levels and the way the United States approaches its relationship with China. Posen uses the term reckless driving to refer to allies and partners that adopt riskier policies of all kinds because of an expectation of continued U.S. support. For example, Posen argues that U.S. military aid and political support have freed up resources for Israel to spend on settlement activities in the West Bank. The U.S. association with Israel’s policies on settlements and toward the Palestinians more generally, Posen argues, has harmed U.S. standing in the Arab world and has undercut its foreign policy goals with these countries, including counterterrorism.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—Strategic Blackmail

Freeriding enables strategic blackmail, which ensures entrapment

Ashford ’17 [Emma M.; Jul 6; Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; Canadian Foreign Policy Journal “Hegemonic blackmail: entrapment in civil war intervention,” https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/11926422.2017.1341843#2b85d6ca-6520-4a3d-8e4a-aa9f2ee3f33d-357c6cfb-53ba-4fa0-8e6b-e69fc2b8ce9f]

Entrapment occurs largely when no national security interest is at stake; indeed, this is the key distinction between entrapment and the classic notion of “chain-ganging” (Christensen and Snyder 1990). The mechanisms by which entrapment can occur include: (1) a state’s choice to defend its ally for reasons of credibility; (2) socialization, which encourages the adoption of an ally’s interests (so-called “self-entrapment”); (3) provocation, as alliance formation creates a security spiral; (4) an alliance emboldens a small state to attack a competitor; or (5) a state, fearful of abandonment, initiates conflict in a last-ditch attempt to preserve the alliance (Snyder 1984, Betts 2011, Findley et al. 2012). Of these, both credibility and socialization pressures are plausible drivers of involvement in civil conflict.

In effect, each can be understood as a strategic interaction between State A (the potential intervener) and State B (A’s ally) over an intervention in a third-party state (State C). In the case of credibility, State A may fear that its refusal to back B’s intervention in C’s civil war may undermine its commitments to other allies. Alternately, the process of alliance socialization, with frequent meetings and joint military exercises over time, may encourage State A to absorb B’s interests, including those it is pursuing in its intervention. In both cases, alliance dynamics push A toward support of B’s ongoing intervention. In addition to these “natural” forms of civil war entanglement – i.e., pressures that are an inevitable result of strong security ties – it is also possible for State B to increase the odds of an intervention by State A. Indeed, B sometimes has a strong incentive to do so, particularly when A has substantially higher military capacity.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—Unconditional Support

Unconditional security cooperation entangles the US in allied conflicts. Only the counterplan solves.

Priebe et al ’21 [Miranda; Dec 2021; Ph.D. in political science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; M.P.A. in international relations, Princeton University; RAND Corporation “Do Alliances and Partnerships Entangle the United States in Conflict?,” https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-3.html]

Advocates of a grand strategy of restraint or offshore balancing, also known as restrainers, call for greater emphasis on diplomacy and less U.S. military engagement abroad. These strategists call for reduced forward military presence, a higher bar for the use of force, and negotiations to settle conflicts of interest with U.S. adversaries diplomatically. They argue that the United States should stop expanding its alliances, renegotiate alliances to reduce entanglement risks, or even end some of its existing alliances and partnerships.

Fear of entanglement is one of the reasons that advocates of restraint say the United States should reexamine its security relationships. This is not to say that all restrainers believe that the United States should end all existing commitments. Rather, many of these strategists argue that the United States should keep its security commitments limited to states that help protect vital U.S. interests and should take steps to mitigate entanglement risks.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—Unconditional Support

Security cooperation during peacetime emboldens allies and causes entrapment during conflict scenarios—cooperation signals a willingness to cooperate.

Blankenship and Kuo ’20 [Brian Blankenship and Raymond Kuo; Brian Blankenship is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Miami. Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, B.A. in Political Science from Indiana University, Bloomington, and Raymond Kuo holds a Ph.D. in politics, Princeton University; M.S. in international relations, London School of Economics and Political Science; B.A. in college of social studies, Wesleyan University; 3-3-2020; "Deterrence and Restraint: Do Joint Military Exercises Escalate Conflict?"; Sage Journals; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/00220027211023147#:~:text=We%20find%20that%20JMEs%20do,the%20context%20of%20an%20alliance.; Accessed 7-16-2022; AW]

Consequently, JMEs are public and costly forms of interstate security cooperation, and, as seen in Figure 1, their frequency has risen over time. They are “sharp in,” in that their inputs – national military contributions, chain of command, exercise objectives, timing, and other considerations – are clearly defined for all participants at the outset. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 350-50-3 outlines six purposes of mission command training programs, including:6 1. Warfighting exercises, where troops simulate plausible defense scenarios; 2. Command exercises, where officers prepare for integrated command with Joint Staff (across military services) and geographic commands; and 3. Mission readiness exercises, where defined units test their ability to immediately carry out specific missions. The number of troops involved depends on the mission. The smallest are typically command post exercises, where participants focus on the battle readiness of staffs to handle simulated combat situations. Actions on the “battlefield” are simulated (often via computer), and these results are fed to participating officers, who then respond and issue orders, which are again carried out via simulation. Field training 3Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. War Game in West Germany to Be Cut Back,” New York Times, December 14, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/14/world/us-war-game-in-west-germany-to-be-cut-back.html. Arms export data drawn from SIPRI. 4Data drawn from McManus (2017). 5Calculation made using ATOP dataset. (Leeds et al., 2002). 6Mission Command Training Program (2014). 4 Figure 1: Number of Joint Military Exercises by Year, 1974–2010. exercises, by contrast, are “test runs” of often large-scale operations. They can involve thousands of troops, combat vehicles, and military and civilian transportation and logistics support, all overseen by cadres of commanding officers. Regardless of size, joint military exercises are typically self-contained, tightly controlled and coordinated, and last between a few days to a few weeks. In the United States, the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish an exercise’s training objectives, force and equipment requirements, and the chain of command in coordination with all international participants. FM-25-4 recommends 13-14 months of lead time to prepare for an exercise.7 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) are signed to ensure 7Army Field Manual 25-4: How to Conduct Training Exercises (1984: Table 4). 5 all participants understand the JME’s terms, and there is a final meeting to confirm all parameters and restrictions. In addition, the exercise commander has terminal responsibility for all troops and their actions, and so is provided with extensive lists of personnel and equipment (down to the serial number). In total, JMEs are sharply delimited in their structure, purpose, and participants to ensure accountability at all levels. But while JMEs are “sharp in,” they are not “sharp out.” They produce strategic effects exceeding and not managed by their operational bounds and command structure. This can be best understood through the scholarship on “arms and alliances.” According to Morrow (1993), states have two general paths to generate security. The first is “arms,” by which we typically mean the direct acquisition of military power solely under a single state’s authority. The second is “allies,” commitments of military support from one country to another. JMEs appear to advance both paths simultaneously. Training improves warfighting performance, organizational resilience, and logistical efficacy (the “arms” pathway). Critically, this increases the likelihood of conflict escalation and war by prompting leaders to reach for military solutions to foreign policy challenges.8 Along the “allies” pathway, JMEs signal, at minimum, the willingness of the two countries’ military forces to cooperate in specific scenarios. Moreover, as McManus and Nieman (2019) elaborate, exercises are an integral means for (particularly powerful) states to demonstrate broader alignment and support for a security partner. In 1963, for example, the United States agreed to hold an exercise with and in Saudi Arabia to challenge United Arab Republic intervention in North Yemen and deter any further incursions into nearby Saudi territory (Department of State Office of the Historian, 1995: 290-291, 300). Despite not having an alliance treaty with Riyadh, the JME implied that the United States would at minimum bolster Saudi defenses through training and material support, if not direct intervention. By signaling support through both the arms and allies paths, exercises are doubly effective at deterring adversaries. But too much support, as Snyder (1997) discusses, can lead partners to escalate conflict through adverse behavior – activities that one partner does not want to encourage in another partner, because such an action has negative repercussions for the first state’s security. Chief among these potential risks is entrapment, in which a state, emboldened by and seeking to stretch a partner’s support, escalates conflict for its own individual advantage while dragging its partner into the conflict through reputational, strategic, and/or 8 See, for example, Stares (1975); Craft (1999); Kinsella and Tillema (1995); and Krause (2004). 6 audience cost mechanisms. Later authors contend that entrapment is rare because states can use ambiguity, conditionality, “backing up” from their commitment, and outright reneging to avoid being entangled in their partners’ conflicts (Kim, 2011; Benson, 2012; Beckley, 2015). However, even if states are able to avoid having to support their partners in wartime, their signals of support in peacetime may nevertheless embolden partners to act aggressively (Snyder, 1997; Cesa, 2010; Edelstein and Shifrinson, 2018).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC L—Allied Manipulation

Unconditional assistance triggers aggressive and non-cooperative allied behavior

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 7)

In this model, we anticipate a paradoxical effect of military aid in which powerful donor states become dependent on the recipients of their military aid (Mott 2002). The United States gives military aid to gain leverage and influence. But it is in a competitive market for leverage through aid; it must compete with other states to keep its influence over client states. At the same time, we can assume that the United States chooses to invest heavily in training and equipping the military forces of other countries, with all the attendant risks this entails, because it needs something from these states. Materially weak states can exploit the fact that a much stronger donor relies on them to provide some vital good—and the threat of defection to an alternative supplier—to exert influence over the donor. According to Mott (2002), during the Cold War, US security assistance recipients learned to manipulate the United States ‘‘by putting Moscow and Washington into an aid competition, by diversifying across suppliers, and converting the expected recipient dependence into a perverse sort of supplier dependence’’ (8). Although the Cold War competition with Moscow is no longer central to US foreign policy, other states and even nonstate actors have stepped in to replace the Soviet Union as alternative arms suppliers. Stokke (1995) observes that strong states have typically used foreign aid ‘‘as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor, which the recipient government would not have otherwise agreed to’’ (12). But Singer (2003) argues that the increasingly privatized military market ‘‘fundamentally alters this patron-client relationship’’ (211). Since weaker states can now purchase weapons on the open market, the patron’s ability to influence client behavior is greatly diminished. Generous US military funding runs the risk of creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more willing to ignore US interests (Mott 2002). Recipient states should be more likely to defy the United States if they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to punish them for defection (Walt 2005). US dependence on recipient states for oil, troop basing, over-flight permission, counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations, etc… makes withdrawing aid potentially more costly for the United States than for the aid recipients. It may be easier for aid recipients to find alternative suppliers than it would be for the United States to find an equally valuable place to base its troops.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 2NC UQ—Restraint Now

NATO is restrained now—Ukraine proves

Petrovics 22 (Ariel Petrovics is an Assistant Research Professor at University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy, “NATO’s restraint has made things worse for Russia in Ukraine” 3/15/22 https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/03/15/how-restraint-from-nato-has-made-things-worse-for-russia-in-ukraine/)

NATO’s decision to forgo direct intervention in Ukraine is proving to be a wise strategy for opposing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It immediately robbed Russian President Vladimir Putin of the ability to blame the United States and the West for its lack of military progress, thereby highlighting Russia’s inability to wield its own power against a much smaller neighbor. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has instead dragged into an ongoing siege against a surprisingly resilient Ukrainian defense that underscores the hollowness of Putin’s stories that he would liberate Ukraine from Western influence. Given its inability to overrun its much smaller neighbor despite a preponderance of power, Russia has proven to be its own worst enemy for its long-term plan in the region and beyond. Though the Kremlin has executed a comprehensive propaganda effort to justify and maintain support for its actions, it is increasingly clear that Russia is paying a heavy price in its international standing. As such, the international community’s — and namely Washington’s — choice to avoid direct military action might have done more to undermine Russia’s global standing and Putin’s stability at home than overt intervention might have done. While Putin might have been able to justify Russia’s slow advance and even its supposed liberation of Ukraine from Western influence if NATO and the United States had taken a more active role in the conflict, Ukraine’s irrepressible independence from its much stronger neighbor has undermined Russia’s position both as a “liberator” and even as a global superpower.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 1NC Entrapment DA

Entrapment dragoons the U.S. into nuclear escalation wormholes---multipolar transitions heighten the risk.

Hersman 20, Senior Adviser, International Security Program, and Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), is a leading expert on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons policy and crisis management. (Rebecca, Summer 2020, “Wormhole Escalation in the New Nuclear Age”, https://tnsr.org/2020/07/wormhole-escalation-in-the-new-nuclear-age/)

The 1999 Kargil Crisis is representative of a crisis-escalation scenario in which smaller nuclear-armed states perceive that bigger powers will swoop in to save them from nuclear confrontation. Just one year after India and Pakistan became overt nuclear powers, the two countries approached the brink of nuclear war. Following an attempted land-grab by Pakistan in the hotly contested Kashmir region, the United States provided an off-ramp to de-escalate the conflict. At the height of the crisis, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif “insisted” on meeting with President Bill Clinton, according to Clinton’s senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council, Bruce Riedel.56 The United States stepped in after Clinton called both India’s and Pakistan’s leaders. Washington also sent its senior military commander in the region and a senior State Department official to Islamabad. Later, former deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott wrote that the world was closer to nuclear confrontation than during the Cuban Missile Crisis.57 Clearly, diplomatic interventions that can deescalate a crisis and forestall a nuclear conflict should always be pursued. However, expectations that the great powers will step in to rescue small nuclear states caught in an escalatory spiral may shift the burden of restraint and reduce accountability and responsibility for managing strategic stability among regional actors in ways that may reinforce rather than reduce risk-taking. In such a scenario, the United States may not initiate an escalation wormhole, so much as get pulled through one.

Reckless Driver Escalation

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Entrapment DA › 1NC Entrapment DA

Security Cooperation triggers allied aggression. Conditional assistance avoids these entrapment risks.

Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 7)

The United States spends more than eleven billion dollars per year on direct military assistance to foreign governments and substate groups (USAID 2009). The American government expresses a wide variety of goals motivating their use of military assistance as a foreign policy tool. Frequently, US administrations have explicitly linked military aid or arms transfers to a quid-pro-quo expectation of compliance from a government (Sislin 1994). More generally, military assistance is expected to augment US national security by increasing recipient state cooperation with US objectives. According to the State Department's 2007 Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act:

Security cooperation remains a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national security interests worldwide…. Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the United States to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the war against terrorism (1).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Econ Turn—Europe Not Key to Global

Ukraine crisis thumps--- CP is the only way to escape economic crisis anwyays.

Blanchard & Pisani-Ferry, 22 [Oliver Blanchard, C. Fred Bergsten Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and the Robert M. Solow Professor of Economics emeritus at MIT, PhD from MIT; Jean Pisani-Ferry, nonresident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Chair of the European University Institute in Florence and is a senior fellow at Bruegel, served as commissioner-general of France Stratégie, and as senior economic adviser to the minister of finance and executive chairman of the French prime minister's Council of Economic Analysis; 5-9-2022, ‘The war in Ukraine is likely to worsen Europe’s economic problems’, PIIE, /alundy]

European policymakers must devise ways to protect consumers and businesses from economic hardship resulting from the war in Ukraine. This PIIE Chart lays out short- and long-term effects of the war, difficulties including loss of exports to Russia, the fallout of sanctions, and the humanitarian crisis of dealing with millions of refugees.

More specifically, the shocks on supply chains from COVID-19 as well as the war may prompt EU adjustments in just-in-time delivery models that sacrifice efficiency. Disruptions of food supplies from  Russia and Ukraine, particularly wheat, are raising prices and causing shortages felt most acutely in developing economies, which could increase immigration to Europe from food-insecure regions. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Econ Turn—Europe Not Key to Global

It won’t even affect the US

Scranton, 14 [Steve Scranton, Chief Investment Officer and Economist for Washington Trust Bank and is a CFA charter holder with over 30 years of investment experience with equities, tax-exempt and taxable fixed income securities, 10-16-2014, ‘How will a recession or poor economic growth in Europe impact the United States?’, Washington Trust Bank, /alundy]

Much of the volatile behavior of the stock and bond markets over the past few days has been attributed to fears that Europe is heading into a recession and that this will drag down the U.S. economy. Today’s post covers the age old adage “perception versus reality” and looks at how European growth could impact U.S. growth.

First, let us walk through a quick explanation of how international trade feeds into U.S. GDP growth. One component that makes up total GDP growth is a category called net exports. This measures the change in net exports from one quarter to the next. Net exports has two components:

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Econ Turn—Link Turn

Europe can afford to spend more on defense.

Hans Binnendijk 18, senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University, 7/9/2018, “What NATO’s burden-sharing history teaches us,” , RH

NATO has dealt successfully with its burden-sharing problem before, and it can do so again. History shows that the  could have a positive impact if he does not overplay his hand at the Brussels summit.

In 1970, the relative defense expenditures of the United States and Europe were proportionally roughly what they are today. Europe spent only about 45 percent as much on defense, as did the United States. The U.S. was in the midst of the Vietnam War, which drove U.S. defense spending well above previous levels. The burden-sharing imbalance then was one of the largest in NATO’s history.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Econ Turn—Link Turn

Military spending improves economic growth.

Carter et al. 20, Heather L. Ondercin, Glenn Palmer; Assistant Professor in the Department of Government and Justice Studies at Appalachian State University; Ph.D. and M.A. in political science; Executive Director of Peace Science Society, Liberal Arts Professor of Political Science and Director of Graduate Studies at Penn State; (Jeff, January 6th, 2020; “Guns, Butter, and Growth: The Consequences of Military Spending Reconsidered”; https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1065912919890417; Political Research Quarterly)

Figure 1 presents the quarterly effect of a one-period, one-standard deviation increase in Military Spending on Social Spending (with 95% confidence intervals) over twenty quarters for each of our four scenarios.

The first thing that stands out in Figure 1 is that the relationship between increases in military spending and social spending is conditional on the contemporaneous ordering of the variables in our VAR model. Most importantly, the first quarter following an increase in military spending sees a significant increase in social spending in scenarios 1 and 2 and a significant decrease in social spending in scenarios 3 and 4. This lack of a general, short-term trade-off between military spending and social spending is consistent with most empirical research on the topic. Furthermore, the relationship between military spending and social expenditures in the short run is not random. That is, when military spending increases, we observe a guns-versus-butter trade-off in the two scenarios that mimic leaders willing to reduce social spending (scenarios 3 and 4) and a complementary relationship between military and social spending when the variable orderings reflect leaders who want to protect or expand the social welfare state (scenarios 1 and 2). Our results, therefore, are consistent with research that finds the guns-versus-butter trade-off is conditional on decision-makers’ preferences regarding the social welfare state.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Econ Turn—Link Turn

European defense spending bodies economic decline.

The Economist 22, British weekly newspaper, 4/16/2022, “What bigger military budgets mean for the economy,” , RH

In the wake of the war in Ukraine, military budgets around the world are about to get bigger. This is most notable in Europe, where the threat of Russian aggression looms largest. Germany, Italy and Norway, among others, have already decided to spend more on defence. America and China, the world’s two biggest military spenders, are also ramping up their allocations. Pressure on smaller countries to do likewise seems inevitable. What are the economic consequences of this push? When governments spend more on soldiers and arms, they have less available for other things. A common assumption, therefore, is that extra spending on armies is harmful to growth and development. But the relationship is not so straightforward. In some cases bigger defence budgets may in fact yield substantial economic benefits.

That there is a trade-off between spending on the army and on, say, roads or hospitals is a lesson that students of economics internalise early on. The classic model for illustrating the concept of opportunity costs is guns versus butter: the more you produce of one, the less you can of the other. In any given year, that simple model holds true. Governments have finite budgets, which can only be pulled in so many different directions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Populism Turn—Populism High

Populists are making a comeback in Europe after their relative decline during the pandemic

Dettmer 6-29-22, Jamie Dettmer is an Opinion Editor of POLITICO Europe, and a former VOA global affairs correspondent, “Freedom comes at a price – European voters may not want to pay it,” June 29th 2022, POLITICO, Commentary, https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-freedom-france-marine-le-pen-boyko-borissov-andrej-babis-comes-european-voters-populism-crisis/

Last autumn, centrists delightedly seized upon signs that populism was finally ebbing. But as the world moves from one crisis to the next, Europe’s cohort of populist nationalist leaders have started making their moves, ready to mine voter frustration, exploit openings and make the most of the turbulence caused by the seismic economic effects of the pandemic, now compounded by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The game is changing once again — and populism is far from out. In 2021, two populist luminaries who rode to power on waves of anti-elitism anger — Bulgaria’s Boyko Borissov and the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš — were ousted. And although its voting numbers held up in the east of Germany, the Alternative for Germany party saw a national drop in support during the country’s parliamentary ballot last September. A survey by British pollster YouGov in November similarly found support for populism had declined in 10 European countries across the previous three years, suggesting its electoral appeal may have peaked. The populist tenet that the “will of the people should be the highest principle in a country’s politics” no longer resonated as forcefully as it did, YouGov concluded. Other pollsters agreed, saying the political tide was seemingly turning against populists in Central Europe and elsewhere on the Continent, and that support for such sentiments across Europe had fallen sharply since the advent of COVID-19. Populist leaders had been unable to revive their fortunes by exploiting public frustration with pandemic restrictions or vaccine mandates as they had hoped. There was some restoration of public faith in expertise too. Tony Barber of the Financial Times populists’ “trademark scorn for expertise” helped Joe Biden defeat then United States President Donald Trump because it unsettled many voters who were “worried about their health and livelihoods.” And as incumbent governments and establishment parties strove to cushion lower-income and rural populations from the economic misery of the pandemic, they reduced recruitment opportunities for populists, whether left or right of the political spectrum. But this year, there’s a different story. The of the French parliamentary elections and far-right opposition candidate Marine Le Pen’s , the increasing strength of Giorgia Meloni’s national-conservative Brothers of Italy party, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s in April all suggest populism has hardly given up the ghost. Populists have shifted political tactics and moderated their once broader Euroskeptic aims — Meloni. They now voice more interest in focusing on changing the bloc from within than following in the footsteps of Brexit. “I think after the COVID crisis, the EU needs to reinvent itself and find a new soul,” Matteo Salvini, leader of Italy’s League party, said. Far-right populists have also been quick to learn from Orbán, tailoring their economic policies to the left-behinds and the ballooning numbers of the middle class who are now falling behind. Along these lines, while that populists didn’t have a “good pandemic” last year, political scientist Matthew Goodwin predicted they’d bounce back, seizing on the political tumult that generally lies downstream from crises. “Emerging evidence shows it looks fairly certain the Great Lockdown will actually exacerbate divides in our society that began to sharpen a few decades ago, and were then worsened by the Great Recession,” he said.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Populism Turn—Populism High

Increased European populism is challenging the continuity of democratic institutions

Pintsch et. al 6-15-22, Anne Pintsch is an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and Management and the coordinator of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence at the University of Agder in Norway; Dennis Hammerschmidt is a data scientist with a PhD in International Relations and Quantitative Methods from the University of Mannheim; Cosima Meyer is a data scientist with a PhD in political science from the University of Mannheim, “Introduction: the declime of democracy and rise of populism in Europe and their effect on democracy promotion,” June 15th 2022, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09557571.2022.2082797

European countries, international organisations (IOs) and civil society organisations have a long history as major democracy promoters around the world (Calingaert et al. 2014; OECD-DAC 2020). Democracy promotion here refers to deliberate ‘activities engaged in by external actors to encourage the development of democracy within a given country’ (Stewart 2009, 647). However, democracy promotion is currently facing several challenges. First, democracy promoters are increasingly experiencing a pushback across the globe. Former recipient governments have passed laws or established practical hurdles that impede external support for democracy and non-governmental organisations (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Dupuy and Prakash 2020). One of the latest examples is the closing of both Russia’s oldest human rights group Memorial and a related Human Rights Centre in December 2021. They were accused, among others, of having broken the foreign agent law by not labelling all their publications with the respective label indicating foreign funding (Osborn and Antonov 2021; Osborn and Kiselyova 2021). Second, the very model of liberal democracy has also lost attractiveness for citizens (Bridoux, Hobson, and Kurki 2012; Poppe, Richter, and Wolff 2018, 2). In democracies even more than in autocracies, people doubt that their voices are heard and governments act in their interest (Rasmussen Global 2018). Finally, democracy promotion ‘is simultaneously undermined by serious problems on the side of key democracy promoters’ (Poppe, Richter, and Wolff 2018, 1). One of those is the decreasing material leverage. As one of the most important democracy promoters worldwide, the European Union (EU) has lost relative economic power (Godfrey and Youngs 2019). Between 2009 and 2020, the EU’s share of world trade in goods and services declined from 18.1 per cent1 to 16.8 per cent, while China’s share increased from 9.6 per cent to 14.7 per cent (European Commission 2021, 21). Another problem runs even deeper and concerns the ‘phenomenon of democratic contestation and erosion “at home”’ (Poppe, Richter, and Wolff 2018 2018, 2). This global phenomenon has been described as a ‘long democratic recession’, which has been ongoing for 15 years (Repucci and Slipowitz 2021, 1). The European continent is no exception. As Smolka’s (2021) analysis of democratic decline in the European Union and decreases in democratic quality shows, both old and new member states are affected by the two phenomena. 20 EU member states2 faced at least one period of democratic decline between 2004 and 2016. While Smolka does not identify a systematic third wave of democratic decline in the EU, she calls the observations ‘gloomy’ (2021, 101). In many cases, this challenge of domestic democratic contestation and erosion is directly – if not exclusively – related to the rise of populism (International IDEA 2020; Kyle and Mounk 2018). Out of 22 countries in which Luhrmann and her co-authors determine a downturn of liberal democracy € between 2008 and 2018, 14 were governed by a populist government or president (Luhrmann et al. € 2019, 906).3 Hungary and Poland – democratic forerunners after the end of the Cold War and later advocates of democracy with a unique transition experience – have become the most prominent examples of this development (Stanley 2017). However, populist parties have achieved significant electoral successes in Western Europe too, and formed part of the government in various countries such as Austria, Greece, Italy and Switzerland (Taggart 2017, 248). As Copelovitch and Pevehouse point out, ‘[t]his rising populism/nationalism has been most prevalent in the very countries that founded and have been at the core of global leadership: the United States and Western Europe’ (2019, 170). At the same time, populism’s relationship with democracy itself continues to be debated. Overall, while populism has been identified as a potential challenge to both democracy and democracy promotion, we do not know much about its actual impact. That is, while we observe a rise in populism in Western democratic states, we know very little about the impact of this rise on states’ and their organisations’ policy-making and the consequences thereof.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Populism Turn—Populism High

Influence from Trumpist radicals is spurring a spike in European populism

Collinson 4-12-22, Stephen Collinson is a reporter for CNN Politics covering the White House, and politics across the U.S. and the world, “Trump-style populism rises in US and Europe as Putin assaults world order,” April 12th 2022, CNN politics, https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/12/politics/rise-of-extremism-us-and-europe/index.html

A fresh tide of extreme populism -- feeding on economic strain, hostility to immigrants and cultural warfare -- is challenging key democracies from the inside the most brutal assault on In France, Hungary and elsewhere, the center seems to be dropping out of politics as moderates lose ground to radicals on the right and the left, amid widespread public discontent after a two-year pandemic that saw governments significantly curtail individual freedoms. Only 17 months ago, a US campaign won by a veteran establishment politician -- President Joe Biden -- who had campaigned as a moderate against a wannabe authoritarian -- Donald Trump -- appeared to herald the end of the road for the former commander in chief's populist crusade. Yet Republicans, still in thrall to Trump -- many of whom have signed on to his corrosive lies about election fraud to win the favor of his supporters -- appear on course to capture the House, and perhaps the Senate, in midterm elections in the fall. They are capitalizing on deep frustrations around the country over rising prices and high gasoline costs that Biden has been unable to stem. Many are also staking out fiery messages on racial, gender and LGBTQ issues and immigration, implying that traditional American culture is at risk of being destroyed. That theme dominated the Supreme Court confirmation hearings for Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. In France, President Emmanuel Macron -- the epitome of technocratic elitism -- now faces a tough two-week fight to beat back the momentum of the anti-immigrant, anti-Islam and pro-Putin far-right candidate The pro-Trump wing of European politics racked up one victory that would have pleased Russian President Vladimir Putin after -- a scourge of press freedom, EU leaders and democratic values -- kept his job in a landslide election win earlier this month. Orban, a favorite of the "Make America Great Again" movement and conservative TV pundits, profited from his own gerrymandering of electoral districts and friendly propagandists in the press to defy predictions that his appeal was fading. Trump's continued hold on Republican politics, Orban's victory and Macron's tight reelection race underscore how the established structures of democracy in Western nations remain vulnerable -- not just from hostile outside forces like Putin's election meddling but also from a perception that traditional politicians are unable to solve people's problems.

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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Turn—Burden Sharing Inevitable

Burden sharing is inevitable- moving away from 2% is key

McInnis ’22 (Kathleen McInnis, a senior fellow in the International Security Program, “2 Percent Defense Spending Is a Bad Target for NATO”, ) //sethlee

It’s like clockwork: As NATO’s late June summit in Madrid , the debate over whether allies grows louder. NATO defense ministers in 2006 to spend at least 2 percent of their nation’s gross domestic product on their defense annually. Today that’s become a totemic object for the alliance—especially for Americans who insist that others are spending too little. There is a certain truth in that, but there are much more pressing concerns for NATO than tracking this figure. Leaders should be asking harder questions about how the money is being spent and how the security burden can be shared, not obsessing about who’s giving their fair share. The pledge was reaffirmed in 2014 at NATO’s Wales summit by alliance leaders, because NATO states were collectively failing to meet the 2006 commitment, thanks to decades of chronic underinvestment by European states on their militaries, which, unsurprisingly, led to significant capability gaps in their ability to conduct military operations. This, in turn, meant that the United States, which spends more than 3 percent annually, was absorbing the lion’s share of the costs associated with securing Europe. As the argument went in 2014, the United States would be much more to continuing its investment in trans-Atlantic security if NATO nations would just spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Getting all NATO heads of state to agree to the 2 percent minimum target was a laudable achievement—and one that might not have happened if Russia hadn’t invaded Ukraine earlier that year. But the 2 percent target has proved to be both operationally insufficient and strategically counterproductive. Ultimately, without some serious adjustments to the strategic debates, a focus on the 2 percent minimum target only severely hurts NATO’s relevance—and public support for the alliance. The 2 percent minimum target was largely intended as a political mechanism—for example, to help defense ministries fend off budget cuts imposed by finance ministers. But 2 percent is an input rather than an output metric. In other words, how that 2 percent is spent is considerably more important than whether countries are spending enough. Although there’s a hearty debate about how much of Russia’s ham-handed approach to its war against Ukraine is due to technological weakness versus Russian strategic incompetence, there is no question that some defense investments need to be rethought, including those needed for stronger territorial defense—including maritime and airspace defense—of a soon-to-expanded northeastern NATO border. With further Russian aggression likely and Afghanistan in the rearview mirror, there’s going to be a new emphasis on territorial defense and deterrence. That’s more people-heavy than expeditionary operations, and as any comptroller will tell you, people are surprisingly expensive. Yes, a number of European countries——have decided to increase their defense spending in the wake of Ukraine, but how will those monies be used? At the strategic level, the 2 percent minimum target has become even more problematic. Alliances are frameworks for communication and cooperation among states that extend much more deeply and broadly than just security and defense; NATO’s benefits for the United States go a long way military cooperation. Unfortunately, the 2 percent minimum target reframes the conversation about security burden-sharing into one about transactional cost-sharing. But the value of alliances cannot be measured in terms of dollars and euros. The danger of overemphasizing a minimum figure that European partners may not be comfortable with meeting is that it contributes to the impression the United States is somehow being cheated. Is it any wonder that after years of hammering Europe about the 2 percent minimum target that the previous U.S. president decided that his country was getting an unfair deal—and reportedly almost pulled the United States out of NATO? Support for NATO may be strong among the traditional foreign-policy establishment, but in a time of rapidly shifting U.S. domestic politics, it’s also potentially fragile. Nor does the 2 percent minimum account for the nonmilitary dimensions of contemporary security needs. Economic and political dynamics are critically important to a nation’s security—and from the perspective of the public in NATO states are perhaps even more important than military capabilities. European states have been at the forefront of coping with challenges such as disinformation and cyberwarfare—capacities and experience that are vital but not fully reflected in military budgets. This is, arguably, why NATO’s Article 2 exists: to underscore that economic and political policies must reinforce military alliance commitments. As the Chinese tech giant in NATO countries demonstrate, failure to consider the security dimensions of commercial investments can have an adverse impact on the alliance. The conversation on burden-sharing must better account for the broader trade-offs and risks associated with choosing alliance security over commercial profitability. Those costs of NATO commitment in Europe are rarely visible in Washington discussions. When NATO governments meet in Madrid, they will endorse an updated “Strategic Concept,” a vision document for how the alliance views—and should prepare for—the current and emerging strategic environment. Yet in order to turn that concept into a meaningful and sustainable political reality, the alliance must then have a tough but necessary conversation on how to recalibrate burden-sharing—and embed that new understanding in any implementing guidance it develops for the Strategic Concept.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Neg › Internal Net Benefit › 2NC INB—AT: Non-Numeric Metric Bad

Current burden-sharing strategies are based in too many skewed factors--- new burden sharing is necessary for fairness and recognition among allies.

Mattelaer, 16 [Alexander Mattelaer, 3-1-2016, Assistant Director of the Institute for European Studies (IES) in Brussels, Belgium. PhD in Political Science from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, ‘Revisiting the Principles of NATO Burden-Sharing’, /alundy]

A thousand different ways exist for evaluating Alliance burden sharing. This has not only to do with methodology, but also with the tendency in all nations to discount the value of the efforts undertaken by others. Engaging in this debate, therefore, requires careful consideration of the available approaches and the broader purpose these serve. This section reviews the metrics currently in use and contrasts these with frequent criticisms and alternatives. It goes on to discuss their historical inspirations, which helps to transform a debate that tends to focus on defense accounting into one on military strategy. Commonly agreed principles of Alliance strategy are of greater importance than numeric details divorced from their historical and geographical context. At present, NATO defense planners evaluate burden-sharing on the basis of eleven metrics that measure financial inputs as well as military outputs. The best known of these are the investment parameters, namely the percentage of GDP spent on defense expenditure and the percentage of overall defense expenditure spent on major equipment and Research & Development, currently set at 2 percent and 20 percent. With respect to military capabilities, NATO planners track the percentages of any ally’s armed forces that are deployable and sustainable on expeditionary US Leadership and NATO Mattelaer 27 operations. They also evaluate the extent to which every ally implements the national capability targets assigned under the NATO defense plan- ning process.5 An additional guideline in this regard is that no ally can be asked to provide more than 50 percent of any individual capabil- ity set during the apportionment of national targets. The underlying idea here is to wean the Alliance off its near-exclusive reliance on a single ally—read the United States—for certain capabilities. A third set of metrics concerns actual contributions: the percentages of deploy- able land forces, airframes, and vessels that are effectively deployed on operations, the extent to which an ally fills assigned staff positions in the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure headquarters, and the contribution made to filling the requirements of the NATO Response Force. Depending on what measurement parameters one prefers to look at, a different picture emerges. The share of GDP spent on defense often makes media headlines, but this metric draws frequent criticism on methodological grounds.6 Most importantly, it does not differentiate between defense spending for national and for Alliance purposes. It is no secret the United States—which scores the highest on this scale— also has significant national responsibilities that lie far beyond the remit of the Alliance, such as its security guarantees to South Korea and Japan. In some European capitals, it is a rhetorical question to ask whether the United States would spend a dollar less on its military if its allies were to spend more. In addition, alternative metrics are occasionally put forward. These would typically skew the balance in a particular direction. Measuring defense spending per square kilometer of national territory would constitute an extreme example of this kind. Last, but not least, there is the discussion on common funding. While small in size relative to overall defense spending, NATO’s common budgets arguably constitute the purest expression of how the bills of the Alliance are split. The cost-sharing arrangement for the civil budget, the military budget, and the NATO security investment program follows an agreed formula based on Gross National Income.7 One important exception to this formula is the United States, which assumes a 22.14 percent share of the total, whereas its economic weight within the Alliance accounts for more than 40 percent of the NATO total. Taking this discount into consideration, the largest proportional share of NATO common funding is thus borne by Germany (14.65 percent), the ally otherwise most notorious for not meeting investment targets. It is easy to get lost in the jungle of data that these metrics generate. They also bear little direct relationship to the changing security environ- ment the Alliance faces and the precise mix of military capabilities that is required for meeting future challenges. In other words, a focus on any particular parameter is akin to putting the cart before the horse. It is therefore well worth remembering that during the first decades of the Alliance’s existence, successive strategic concepts articulated a list of general principles deemed fundamental to the organization of a common defense. As coined by the 1949 Strategic Concept, the list ran as follows (emphasis added)