2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › AT: Perm and Theory › 2NC AT: Perm Do Both
Blankenship 20 (Brian,Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia. February 2020, The Price of Protection: Understanding Coercive Alliance Burden-Sharing http://www.bblankenship.com/uploads/6/6/2/1/66215933/blankenship_priceofprotection.pdf)
How, then, do we explain variation in the success or failure of coercive alliance burdensharing? Since the pioneering work of scholars like Olson and Zeckhauser in the 1960s, the dominant research program on burden-sharing has treated security in alliances as a public good.8 The primary claim advanced by this literature is that the larger members of an alliance will tend to over-contribute to the costs of the alliance, since its success by-and-large depends on their efforts. Smaller members, by contrast, will under-contribute, or “free-ride.” 9 This argument has generated considerable insights into the distribution of burdens in U.S. alliances – particularly in NATO – both during and after the Cold War.10 However, there is much variation that it has difficulty accounting for. It cannot explain why France withdrew from NATO’s military command in 1966, despite being among NATO’s largest members; why Germany since the end of the Cold War has been among NATO’s lowest spenders on defense as a percentage of its GDP; or why, by contrast, smaller NATO members in the 2010s – namely Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – have punched above their weight. Likewise, the economic theory of alliances cannot account for the rise in allied burden-sharing in 1970s and its subsequent fall in much of 1980s.11
In this article, I present a theory which focuses explicitly on a great power’s (or “patron’s”) ability to influence burden-sharing contributions of its junior allies (“allies,” or “protégés”). In particular, the theory explains the conditions under which a patron’s burden-sharing pressure is more or less likely to be effective. I argue that a patron’s burden-sharing leverage is greatest when its threat to abandon the alliance is both credible and salient to its partners. Specifically, a patron can most credibly threaten to abandon allies when it faces constraints on the resources it can devote to its foreign commitments, and when allies are of limited strategic value. The consequences of abandonment, in turn, are most severe for allies that are highly vulnerable to attack.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › AT: Perm and Theory › 2NC AT: Perm Do Both
Blankenship 18 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” Columbia University PhD dissertation, , Published 2018)
In a May 2017 visit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters, U.S. President Donald Trump declined to affirm his support of NATO’s Article 5, which obligates its members to come to each others’ defense.4 Indeed, this was no accident; in his speech, Trump deliberately removed a passage expressing his support for Article 5.5 U.S. allies – as well as members of Trump’s own administration – were taken aback, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel arguing that it was time for Europeans to “really take our fate into our own hands.”6 In the wake of the uproar surrounding Trump’s speech – and his treatment of allies more generally – one question that has largely been neglected is why one should even expect the United States to reassure its allies in the first place. Indeed, reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it surrenders a key source of bargaining power: the threat of abandonment. Bargaining leverage within an alliance depends on the credibility of states’ threats to abandon their partners, and thus great power patrons should limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to their allies (Snyder, 1997; Jervis, 1997: ch. 5; Crawford, 2003).7 Reassurance measures, however, are intended to have exactly the opposite effect. Why, then, would a patron deliberately weaken its bargaining position? Other stands of literature similarly suggest that reassurance can have undesirable consequences. Theories on defense burden-sharing in asymmetric alliances stress that as long as a great power’s protection is relatively assured, allies have little incentive to increase their military contributions (Olson and Zeckhauser, 1966; Oneal, 1990; Palmer, 1990a,b; Sandler, 1993). By reassuring them, the patron effectively encourages its allies to free-ride. Furthermore, reassuring allies can run the risk of moral hazard. Allies confident in their patron’s support may be prone to take risks such as confronting their adversaries because they expect that the patron will bail them out, thus increasing the probability that the patron will be entrapped or entangled in allies’ conflicts (Christensen and Snyder, 1990; Fearon, 1997; Posen, 2014). In the years leading up to World War I, for example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov cautioned against reassuring Serbia of Russia’s support too strongly, lest the Serbian government be encouraged to take a more intransigent stance vis-à-vis its territorial disputes with Austria-Hungary. He lamented that this was rendered more challenging by the attitudes of other senior Russian officials – including the ambassador to Serbia – whose support for Serbia’s pan-Slavic ambitions in the Balkans ran the risk of encouraging Serbian adventurism (Jelavich, 1991: 244-245, 250). The puzzle of reassurance is only magnified in asymmetric alliances. In his seminal book, Waltz (1979) argues that unlike in symmetric alliances between great powers, where each ally is a crucial component of the overall balance of power, in asymmetric alliances weak states are comparatively much less important, as their allegiance is less likely to influence the course of a war. Recent scholarship suggests that great powers can shape their alliance treaties and withhold support from their allies as a means of reducing the risks of moral hazard (Kim, 2011a; Benson, 2012; Mattes, 2012). Beckley (2015: 19), for one, claims that the United States “is unlikely to incur major costs to display loyalty to allies that depend on U.S. protection and patronage for their survival,” as none of its allies are inherently important for its own security. This asymmetry becomes even more pronounced in bipolar and unipolar systems, where the gap between the capabilities of the superpowers and other states is even wider and small states have even fewer patrons to choose from (Snyder, 1997; Kim, 2016). It may be understandable, then, that Walt (2005: 242) would conclude: “the credibility of U.S. commitments is not [the United States’] problem”; rather, it is “a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help.” Yet Trump’s treatment of allies has come as such a surprise because reassuring allies has, in fact, been historically common in U.S. foreign policy. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, for one, argued that “both the size and the specific elements of [American] forces are driven more by the need to reassure those that we protect under the nuclear umbrella than by U.S. requirements alone” (Murdock et al., 2009: 9). Since 1945, the United States has stationed hundreds of thousands of troops on allied soil, and U.S. officials make countless foreign visits and public statements to demonstrate interest in and support for American partners (Lebovic and Saunders, 2016). Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, for example, made such an effort to communicate U.S. commitment through numerous overseas trips that the New York Times dubbed him the “secretary of reassurance” in the summer of 2015.8Indeed, the historical record is replete with examples of weaker allies extracting support despite their patron’s reluctance. U.S. policymakers during the early years of the Cold War, for example, did not envision the U.S. troop presence in Europe as permanent, with Dwight Eisenhower arguing that “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed” (Sheetz, 1999: 32). Nevertheless, allies resisted American withdrawal, leading to what Zimmermann (2009) calls the “improbable permanence” of the U.S. troop presence. Similarly, East Germany was able to pressure a reluctant Soviet Union into building the Berlin Wall by threatening to align itself more closely with China (Harrison, 2005; Crump, 2015). However, reassurance remains understudied in the scholarly literature. Academic studies often treat great power patrons’ use of reassurance as a byproduct of deterrence, where the primary intended audiences are adversaries (Schelling, 1966; Morgan, 1983; Benson, Meirowitz, and Ramsay, 2014; McManus, 2017). To the extent that the academic literature has considered reassurance, it has largely been in the context of how states reassure their allies rather than why. Policy prescriptions, for their part, tend to either deny the importance of reassurance (e.g., Posen, 2014) or assume its importance and focus on how to reassure allies (e.g., Flournoy and Davidson, 2012).9 As a result, existing literature has not offered a theory of reassurance. 1.2 ArgumentIn this dissertation, I address the following questions: What explains variation in great powers’ use of reassurance measures toward allies? And under what conditions can patrons make their protection conditional on allied burden-sharing? Here, I define reassurance as acts made by a patron that are intended to convince an ally that its assistance will be forthcoming in the event of an attack from another state. In other words, assurances are intended to reduce allies’ fears of patron abandonment.10 The theory I present here is intended to be generalizeable; however, for reasons discussed below I focus on American alliances. Thus I use the terms “patron” and “United States” interchangeably. Although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies can credibly threaten to exit the alliance. By exit, I refer to attempts by states in an alliance to loosen themselves from the partnership by pursuing outside options. In its most extreme form, alliance exit can take the form of treaty abrogation, allying with a hostile third party, or a refusal to provide support in wartime. More commonly, patrons fear that their allies will take more incremental steps that allow them to distance themselves from the alliance by exploiting outside options. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more incentive patrons have to reassure allies. Patrons face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains and reduce free-riding, on the one hand, and reassuring allies to discourage them from pursuing outside options, on the other. This dilemma can be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances conditional on allied burden-sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. Like those of its allies, the patron’s threats are more potent to the extent that they are both credible and salient to its allies. Thus, reassurance and burden-sharing are the product of bargaining, where each side’s leverage is shaped by its threat of exit. Studying the effects of exit, however, is difficult owing to the issue of endogeneity. An ally’s desire for outside options may be a function of its patron’s behavior – including its use of reassurance (or lack thereof) – and states are also likely to anticipate the risk of exit and tailor their actions accordingly. As such, I look at factors affecting the propensity of patrons and allies to exit.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › AT: Perm and Theory › 2NC AT: Perm Do Both
[Entrapment]- It guarantees security cooperation happens even if allies don’t burden share- that signals unconditional US assistance
[Politics]- It shows congress that the US is not interested in restraining unconditional assistance abroad
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC S—AT: Domestic Politics
Schilde et al. 19, *Kaija E. Schilde is an Associate Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University. She is the author of The Political Economy of European Security (Cambridge University Press 2017). *Stephanie B. Anderson, Professor of Political Science, Ph.D. University of Cambridge (UK), M.Sc., The London School of Economics, and B.S.F.S. at Georgetown University. Her research focus is on the European Union (EU) as an International Actor, International Relations and Security Issues. *Andrew D. Garner is an Associate Professor at the University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY, USA, whose research focuses on the effect of Political, Social, and Media Environments on public opinion and voting behavior. (Kaija E. Schilde, Stephanie B. Anderson & Andrew D. Garner (2019) A more martial Europe? Public opinion, permissive consensus, and EU defence policy, European Security,28:2, 153-172, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275)
Indeed, there may be an intuitive logic to EU defence–particularly with regard to pooling and sharing defence burdens–that resonates amongst the public with little persuasion. In recent history, Europe might well have been turning inward, losing its foreign policy influence, and diminishing its role in security and defence. However, these developments cannot be understood as driven by popular opinion. A better explanation for stagnation in defence integration might be that national elites, such as defence bureaucrats and or protected national industries, benefit from the status quo.
An additional implication emerges: it is possible that Europeans may be more supportive of the use of force at the European than the national level. Negative preferences on the use of force and interventions may be capturing low levels of support for national military interventions. Conventional wisdom assumes that individuals support national defence over collective defence, stretching negative opinion results on intervention to the logic of defence cooperation. While their states spend less on defence than the US, it appears that most Europeans are not content with the status quo, nor have they become used to spending less on the military as a matter of principle. Europeans are not so exceptional when it comes to defence preferences. Also, the idea that Europeans inherently prefer butter to guns–allowing the US to subsidise their security with no concerns–appears shaky at best.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC S—Cohesion/Alliances
Dufour, 18 [Martin Dufour, Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO, 12-10-2018, NATO Defense College, /alundy]
Cohesion, often mentioned as the Alliance’s center of gravity, lies at the heart of NATO’s success. Underwriting this cohesion is the ability of member states to share the burden of producing military capabilities to service the whole, and the burden of conducting operational missions. To do this successfully, members have to be able to undertake military actions in concert with each other in a fully coordinated, and as much as possible integrated manner. This is referred to as interoperability, defined as “the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to the use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together”.1 This definition implies that there are several layers to interoperability which need to be addressed to ensure forces are able to operate together effectively in a military context. These include technical features permitting systems to physically connect to one another and exchange information; and the alignment of procedures and processes to allow military personnel to function within the same space and achieve common goals without fratricide. It also implies that this takes place at various levels of operation, from tactical to strategic. A high level of interoperability allows allies to effectively exchange intelligence and information, cooperatively plan complex military operations, and conduct integrated missions with fully exchangeable force packages.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC S—Cohesion/Alliances
Kivimaki, 19 [Timo Kivimaki, 2-13-2019, professor of International Relations and Director of Research at University of Bath, European Security, Volume 28, ‘Power, Contribution, and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing’, /alundy]
One of the key themes of NATO Summits in recent years has been the question of burden sharing in Western defence. Are US allies paying their fair share towards common security? Some scholars feel that clarity on the fairness of contributions is necessary for the efficiency of any cooperation (Tyler ), while others claim that too much emphasis on distributional issues can hamper efficiency in the production of Western security (Cooper and Zycher , p. 7, Kreps ). These two positions are not necessarily contradictory, as clear principles on burden sharing could be a condition for effective defence and focus on common security rather than on divisive internal discussions on distribution. The focus on distribution issues may well lead to internal divisions (Techau ), but it is the lack of clarity that causes both the focus and the friction, and thus, without clarity in the alliance, politics cannot be efficient.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC S—Cohesion/Alliances
Keating 22 (Dave, American-European journalist writing for the World Politics Review, “NATO Finds a New Sense of Purpose in an Old Mission” 6/30/22 )
NATO leaders gathered this week at a summit in Madrid to adopt a New Strategic Concept, a framework that sets out the alliance’s core priorities for the next decade. But the Madrid gathering was in other ways historic, ushering in further expansion of the alliance after Turkey lifted its veto of Sweden’s and Finland’s membership bids. The U.S. also pledged to deploy more troops, warplanes and naval vessels as part of the alliance’s largest military buildup since the Cold War, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The ramifications of the summit will be most obvious on NATO’s eastern flank, with the announcement of a new, permanent headquarters in Poland and the bolstering of rotational deployments to the Baltic states. The dizzying details of NATO’s buildup in Europe mark a remarkable turnaround for an alliance that looked listless and even near collapse just a few years ago, when former U.S. President Donald Trump raised doubts about Washington’s commitment to NATO and French President Emmanuel Macron declared it “braindead.” Over the past few years, many expected the new strategic concept to pivot away from NATO’s original focus on defending Europe against Russia and instead turn the alliance’s sights on China and international terrorism. There was also considerable talk of building a European Defense Union that would give Washington’s European allies the autonomous capability to defend themselves without U.S. assistance. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 changed all that, making it clear that in practical terms, Washington’s security umbrella is the only real defense option Europe has at this time. In the span of a few months, NATO went from being considered a Cold War relic badly in need of a reboot to being an essential collective defense alliance that must double down on its original intent. The New Strategic Concept adopted yesterday by NATO leaders mentions Russia 17 times. By comparison, it mentions China 10 times and terrorism seven times, while Afghanistan is mentioned only once. The last strategic concept, signed in 2010 in the presence of then-Russian President Dimitry Medvedev, referred to Russia as a “strategic partner.” Fast forward 12 years, and the new strategic concept has reclassified Russia as a major threat to world peace. As for China, it is deemed a source of “systemic challenges” with which the alliance “remain[s] open to constructive engagement,” as some alliance members objected to labeling it a “threat.” Nevertheless, the newfound enthusiasm for NATO will not paper over difficult realities that the war in Ukraine has done nothing to ameliorate. European leaders appear to know that Biden’s Atlanticism is more likely a blip for Washington than a “return to normal,” as Trump or someone just as skeptical of U.S. security commitments like NATO could win the presidency in 2024. Former Trump aides have said he planned to withdraw the U.S. from NATO had he won reelection to a second term in office. For their part, Western European leaders were keen to stress at the Madrid summit that proposals for an autonomous European defense are not being abandoned, nor are they meant to compete with NATO. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen noted that NATO will become “more European” with the accession of Finland and Sweden into the alliance. If their bids are successful, only four EU member states will not also be members of the alliance: Ireland, Austria and Malta, all of which have longstanding positions of neutrality, and Cyprus, because of Turkey’s veto. The EU’s eastern members, however, remain wary of an autonomous European defense mechanism for fear that it will undermine NATO. They were likely reassured by this week’s summit, which gave new impetus to getting NATO back to its core mission of countering Russian aggression. For those who harbor the long-term ambition of creating an equitable alliance, rather than one that effectively functions as a U.S. protectorate, more work on European defense will be needed.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC S—Cohesion/Alliances
Tankel 17, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Stephen, “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” Lawfare, )//BB
The critics have a point. The reality is, the U.S. government has few mechanisms to reliably track how its security assistance dollars are performing in terms of return on investment for meeting strategic and policy goals. There have been a number of steps taken in the last three years to start to change that, through executive and legislative branch action. However, even the most ardent supporters of alliances and partnerships must acknowledge that the return on security assistance is often lower than it could be. More than merely wasting taxpayers’ dollars, this damages U.S. credibility and reinforces the belief that maintaining alliances and partnerships is simply not worth the costs involved. We firmly believe security assistance should remain a critical pillar of U.S. statecraft. We also believe the United States could get a better rate of return on some of these programs by changing the way it conditions assistance. Changing the way the United States conditions assistance could change that for the better. This will not solve the problem of how to optimize our relationships with other countries—there is no silver bullet for that—but it would help the United States get more bang for its buck. This is a sentiment that should appeal to the dealmaker-in-chief.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC S—Interoperability
Davies, 13 [Andrew Davies, Senior Analyst and Director of Research Australian Strategic Policy Institute, written on ADF capability and force structuring issues, post doctoral fellow in physics at Melbourne University and the ANU, twelve years in the Department of Defence in the areas of capability analysis and intelligence, 2/2013, United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, Alliance 21 Program, ‘Alliance Burden-Sharing and Force Ineroperability’, /alundy]
Australia has a long-established relationship in intelligence cooperation through the five-eyes UKUSA relationship, where interoperability is effectively seamless and information exchange is deep and routine. The result of that cooperation is a very effective burden sharing arrangement, with various of the partners taking primary responsibility for their part of the world, resulting in a global capability in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Such a cooperative arrangement also means that there is a collective surge capability in the case of major events— the response to the terrorist attacks of September 2001 being a good example. To make this happen, the intelligence relationship has a variety of mechanisms that facilitate cooperation, including regular personnel exchange, the sharing of technologies and techniques and common data and encryption standards for moving information around. This is a useful example for thinking about the benefits of interoperability in the ‘traditional’ military domains—the same basic ideas apply. For example, if partner nations have platform systems that can communicate securely to share situational awareness data, then the overall surveillance and reconnaissance capability of all of them is improved. Effectiveness is improved. In today’s resource constrained world, efficiency is also important. There are at least two aspects to that. First, having the confidence that a partner has the capability to look after a designated task (or area) while providing accurate data across a shared net allows for a division of labour, the same way that the intelligence world is ‘carved up’. Second, with the increasing cost of military platforms and their support arrangements, economies of scale become ever more important. For the larger partner, sales of equipment to allies and friends amortises costs over larger production runs. For the smaller partners, the can avoid the increasingly prohibitive R&D costs and still acquire highend equipment. The notion of burden sharing also translates across. At least since the articulation of the Nixon/Guam doctrine in 1969, the United States has made it clear that, while the United States will honour its alliance commitments, its partners and allies also have a responsibility for providing for their own defence. That means in practice that they will field defence forces that are at least locally capable, even if they lack the long range power projection capabilities the United States operates. In many cases, this gives them the ability to take responsibility for security activities in their local region.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC S—Interoperability
Ross and Dalton 20, Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Melissa Dalton, directs the Cooperative Defense Project and is a senior fellow and deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, (“A ROADMAP FOR BETTER CHOICES FROM SECURITY PARTNERS,” War on the Rocks, )
Some will object that this approach and the obligations it implies for both U.S. planners and foreign counterparts are unrealistic, and that such obligations attached to U.S. assistance could drive partners to alternative security providers. In our experience, many U.S. partners not only want to work with the United States as their security partner of choice but are also motivated by a desire to improve the effectiveness and governability of their own security sectors. Yet, it is also important to acknowledge that this approach will unquestionably require more diplomatic engagement by senior policymakers to achieve and sustain partner buy-in. That is both necessary and appropriate. Security sector assistance is a fundamentally political activity. It should be buttressed by engagement between political stakeholders on both sides to identify political objectives, requirements, and obstacles in relation to an assistance program. Indeed, the lack of this type of persistent political dialogue is a prominent cause of many security sector assistance failures. Looking Ahead Incentivizing security partners’ progress toward common outcomes and objectives will enable the United States to get more out of its security sector assistance investments. Such an approach will be vital to building strong, accountable, and interoperable partnerships globally. It may be particularly important in fragile states, where security sector assistance may otherwise inadvertently fuel predatory behavior by security actors. While political realities will inevitably disrupt routine plans, and policymakers will demand instant or tangible “deliverables,” such as lethal assistance, the only remedy to mitigate against unintended consequences is to institutionalize a smart, incentives-based planning framework with continuous opportunities for adaptation and adjustment. The United States will need to pilot this approach to experiment and fine-tune a viable framework. This in turn will require bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress for the security sector assistance enterprise to “fail forward” on a pathway to success. Several indicators suggest that Congress is ready to move in this direction. In recent years, it has passed several bills — most notably the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 — that have established important foundations for positive conditionality, including mandates for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of foreign military assistance, more flexible planning horizons for Defense Department assistance, and tighter collaboration between the Defense and State Departments in planning and implementing military aid. A new legislative initiative, the pending Department of State Authorization Act of 2019, would take several additional steps forward. Recently passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee with strong bipartisan support, the bill would create several new tools supporting positive conditionality, including strengthening assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of military assistance, authorizing “Security Assistance Compacts” similar to the bilateral compacts discussed above, and bolstering planning processes to achieve greater strategic focus and prioritization in U.S. assistance. Passage of this legislation would represent a watershed moment for U.S. security sector assistance, particularly aid provided by the Department of State. The urgency of adopting a new, more strategic approach to security assistance is growing by the day. American partnerships are under increasing pressure from declining resources, domestic isolationist trends, and strategic competition. Meanwhile, the range of global security challenges for which the United States turns to partners to contribute grows in diversity and complexity. Positive conditionality offers policymakers, diplomats, and operators a tool to shape partners’ behaviors in a manner that offers an opportunity to produce greater return on American investments, simultaneously strengthening partnerships and growing global capacity to deter, prevent, and respond to crises and conflict.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—AT: Sticking Point
Chandran, 17 [Nyshka Chandran, former writer for CNBC.com, who focused on Asia-Pacific politics, 06-07-2017, “Defense Secretary Mattis welcomes Beijing’s help on North Korea, prods on South China Sea,” CNBC, /alundy]
President Donald Trump has criticized NATO members for failing to contribute more to defense spending but Mercier said the issue wasn’t a contentious one.
Sharing the burden of defending the North Atlantic community is a defining concept of NATO, Mercier stated. “This is not new,” he said pointing to the Washington Treaty — the organization’s founding agreement — as an example.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Empirics
Glaser 17, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. His research interests include grand strategy, U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the rise of China, and the role of status and prestige motivations in international politics, (John, February 8th, 2017, “Encouraging NATO Burden Sharing: What Works?”, https://www.cato.org/blog/nato-burden-sharing?queryID=97dfb598d2a4e01f4ad80dde059b0c82)
President Donald Trump has repeatedly complained that the United States carries too much of the economic and military burden in NATO. He has even gone so far as to call the European alliance “” and to suggest that his administration might not fulfill the treaty’s Article 5 obligation that commits NATO countries to come to the defense of any member that is attacked (Note: administration officials have repeatedly sought to reassure NATO allies that we remain committed to the collective defense of Europe, and Trump has contradicted himself on this score).
Many think this provocative rhetoric is just a ploy to get our NATO allies, who habitually underspend on defense and free‐ride on America’s security guarantees, to pay more of their fair share of the burden. At the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog, Andrea Gilli argues this approach is unlikely to jolt NATO allies into spending more on defense, though. Among other reasons, most NATO allies “face financial and political constraints to increasing military expenditure” in part because U.S. security assurances “have freed up state funds in Europe for other priorities, including a robust system of social services.” And since cutting welfare benefits is typically a political non‐starter, we shouldn’t necessarily expect NATO countries to boost defense spending due to Trump’s abrasive rhetoric.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—New Metric
Raji 18, a senior fellow at the University of California, Berkeley, served as the U.S. ambassador to Sweden (2016 to 2017). She is an investor, philanthropist, and a former Wall Street banker, (Azita, February 26th, 2018, “Salvaging Trump’s Legacy in Europe: Fixing NATO Burden-Sharing”, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/salvaging-trumps-legacy-europe-fixing-nato-burden-sharing/)
When it comes to NATO defense spending, as with any strategically smart investment, the objective should be optimal allocation of resources by factoring in each ally’s comparative and competitive advantages, both domestically and internationally, and by leveraging these strengths toward overall effectiveness of NATO’s objective in achieving collective security. Using this framework, the international actions of an ally in other areas would be included toward creating a more whole, multidimensional, and ultimately more useful and accurate picture of a country’s true contribution to security, a more nuanced picture that can help identify the real laggards, as well as flaws in the model and opportunities for further improvement of metrics and results. Meanwhile, by proposing a more representatively broad metric capable of reflecting the actual ways allies contribute to security and defense, the Trump administration would, at least in this one instance, enjoy the additional benefit of digging itself out of its unforced error, namely drawing a line in the sand without having considered a response to nations who have no choice but to cross it.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Ukraine
Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, /alundy]
Hans Binnendijk explored the problem of free riding within NATO from an historical standpoint. Binnendijk reviewed the pros and cons of spending within the alliance since its inception, and he discussed how the United States had attempted to address budgetary issues with its allies in the past. He concluded that recent Russian aggression toward Ukraine could provide an opening for the United States to put more pressure on its European allies. The increased pressure could, in turn, coerce European allies to commit more to defense spending and effectively lessen the burden being placed on the U.S. Binnendijk also went through multiple policy proposals that would help initiate this pressure, and he also delved into how each facet would help to equalize burden sharing. Part of Binnendijk’s broader argument is that European NATO is changing because new geo-political considerations have become more important since the fall of the Soviet Union (Binnendijk 2016).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Public Good
Anika Binnendijk 19 — (Anika Binnendijk; senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Published: 2019; "An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense"; RAND Corporation; Accessed: 7-9-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1080712.pdf)//Pen-SY
NATO members might worry about alliance collapse or the exit of powerful allies, such as the United States, for reasons beyond homeland defense. Either could compromise NATO’s ability to conduct other operations, including humanitarian relief, counterterrorism, and enforcement of international law. For European security elites who have incorporated NATO into their core national security cultures, the existence of NATO and its associated organizations has significance beyond pure rational calculation. Although the United Kingdom might rely heavily on alliance security guarantees, behavioral and normative factors might also lead the United Kingdom to prioritize the U.S.-British “special relationship” and NATO, leading it to contribute to alliance operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere.92 Germany also values NATO for a mix of rationalist and cultural reasons.93 Therefore, while Germany chose not to participate in the NATO campaign in Libya directly, it indirectly supported the effort by sending by sending German NATO AWACS crews to Afghanistan, freeing other NATO crews for operations in Libya. The German Ministry of Defense described the move as a “political sign of our solidarity with the alliance.”94 Ultimately, states that place higher value on the “public goods” provided by the existence of the NATO alliance might be willing to bear a share of the burden during a military campaign.95
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Populist Fears
Daniel H. Nexon and Jeffrey A. Stacey 12-3-20 -- Daniel H. Nexon is a Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Jeffrey A. Stacey was a State Department official in the Obama administration. His forthcoming book is titled Rise of the East, End of the West? (“Fear of Trump’s Populism Might Save American Alliances” )
The United States that President-elect Joe Biden will inherit on January 20 faces a crisis of credibility. After four years of erratic behavior by President Donald Trump’s administration, the international community widely views the United States as an unreliable power. Even many of Washington’s closest and longest-standing allies no longer believe they can count on U.S. diplomatic or military support. Biden cannot easily undo this damage to U.S. credibility. But he can make U.S. alliances and security relationships more resilient. Paradoxically, Trump has made this task easier for the incoming president. His rise to power revealed that issues such as collective defense spending and burden sharing—long sticking points in transatlantic relations—can inflame populist sentiments and thereby threaten long-standing alliances. The Biden administration should use that threat, and the prospect of another Trump-like populist, to build more equitable security relationships. After all, countries such as France, Germany, Australia, and South Korea face a dangerous and uncertain future if U.S. security arrangements continue to deteriorate. More than 73 million Americans voted to reelect Trump. That number should serve as a powerful reminder to U.S. partners around the globe that the American system of alliances and security relationships is always just one election away from collapse. Biden must persuade these partners to contribute more to their alliance with the United States—or else risk a resurgence of American populism that would leave them vulnerable and exposed in the long run. LEMONS OUT OF LEMONADE One lesson of the Trump years is that friction over burden sharing, especially defense spending, presents a genuine threat to transatlantic relations. In 2006 and again in 2014, NATO members committed to spending two percent of their GDP on military capabilities, but less than half of them have hit that target. On the campaign trail in 2016, Trump railed against the failure of NATO allies to meet their spending obligations, even going so far as to question whether the United States would defend them in the event of a Russian attack. Once in office, he continued to harp on NATO allies’ spending shortfalls in order to pressure them to increase their military budgets and to help defray U.S. expenditures. He made similar demands of long-standing allies in Asia, supposedly in exchange for the presence of U.S. forces. This heavy-handed approach not only strained core U.S. alliances but underscored the fact that without real change on the part of U.S. allies, these relationships could become embroiled in U.S. electoral politics. According to a poll released by the Pew Research Center, by 2017 almost half of Americans thought NATO wasn’t doing enough to solve global problems. This issue is unlikely to go away anytime soon. Biden will need to convince major democratic allies such as France and Germany to make significant progress toward bringing their defense budgets in line with established commitments. Although some U.S. allies will doubtless protest or continue to drag their feet, the Biden administration has considerable leverage. Unlike, say, Pakistan, liberal democratic partners don’t want to turn to Russia or China for security guarantees. Nor are they close to being able to go it alone. Biden can make U.S. alliances and security relationships more resilient. This precarious position means that European allies should be willing to take the lead in buoying the Biden administration from day one. The long-standing pattern of partners shirking their defense-spending responsibilities—one week telling U.S. officials it would be most effective to pressure them publicly, the next week insisting that private persuasion is preferable—needs to come to an end. Berlin’s recent offer of a “new deal” on burden sharing, in which Germany would markedly increase its spending, enabling it to lead overseas military operations without the United States, along with its recent decision to crack down on Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei amounts to a strong start. But Biden needs to persuade Germany to go further: canceling the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline linking Russia and Europe and fully harmonizing Berlin’s positions on Russia and China with those in Washington would be productive next steps. Biden should also press France to increase its defense spending to meet or exceed NATO’s two percent threshold and to sharpen its condemnation of Russian aggression in Ukraine, support for reactionary populists, and efforts to subvert Western democracies. In exchange, Biden can offer European allies full support for closer U.S.-EU ties, much greater transatlantic cooperation, and U.S. backing for an independent EU military headquarters that would closely coordinate with NATO. Given that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has already called for significant increases in military spending since the U.S. election, Biden’s approach to the United Kingdom should be slightly different and calibrated to temper that country’s populist surge. Brexit has damaged the country’s economy and international standing, and its fallout presents a threat to U.S. and European interests. Biden should make clear there will be no “special relationship”—and certainly no preferential trade agreement—unless London agrees to a Brexit arrangement that preserves the Good Friday peace agreement in Northern Ireland and keeps the United Kingdom closely tied to the rest of Europe. Although democratic treaty allies in Asia generally don’t shirk their military burdens in the way European states often do, the Biden administration should still look for some early wins in the Pacific. Agreements on subsidies for U.S military bases in Japan and South Korea would be a good place to start. The Biden administration should also stress that deteriorating relations between both countries are not helpful when it comes to justifying the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia. TRUMP-PROOF These initiatives in Europe and Asia should be part of a broader Biden administration effort to “Trump-proof” its entire alliance network. That this system survived the past four years at all is a testament to the importance of institutionalized ties between ministries and departments worldwide. Even as Trump threatened to abandon U.S. allies, U.S. military and civilian officials continued to cooperate with their counterparts overseas. These professional networks made it difficult for Trump to quickly end U.S. security commitments and likely saved many other agreements as well. As part of this broader plan, the United States needs to strengthen and enhance intergovernmental relationships, especially with European allies. NATO should further develop its civilian capabilities so that the alliance can effectively hand off postconflict reconstruction and stabilization missions to the EU. In turn, the latter should finally establish its own modest yet fully deployable military force to deal with security crises closer to home. Germany and France, in particular, could spearhead this process as part of their offer to overhaul and reinvigorate the transatlantic relationship. Without rapid progress, the U.S. alliance network will remain vulnerable to another populist wave. The United States and its European allies should also make a point of holding increasingly frequent joint military exercises and air-policing patrols that involve more equipment and personnel. At the same time, they should expand the number of U.S. and allied troop rotations in central Europe and dramatically increase the number of U.S. officials seconded to NATO and EU political and military headquarters. Doing so would strengthen connections between allied policymakers and refocus U.S. attention on Europe. In the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration should push for more multilateral joint military exercises with regional allies, with an eye toward building stronger military and diplomatic relationships, akin to those that exist in Europe. On this front, Trump largely left Australia to fend for itself when it came to China. Now, Biden should push for Canberra to play an important role in Trump-proofing Asian alliances and for the governing Liberal-National Coalition to tackle its own right-populist streak. Australia, along with U.S. allies such as Japan and South Korea, will likely support greater cooperation immediately, and these efforts can provide a basis for expanding strategic engagement with India and other players currently outside the U.S. alliance system. Finally, Biden’s first overseas trip should be to Brussels for an unprecedented joint EU-NATO summit in the spring. He should follow that with a trip to Tokyo in the fall for a meeting with democratic Asian allies and a subsequent final joint summit that would include both European and Pacific partners in early 2022. In the past, the United States has preferred to maintain distance between its two sets of allies. Now, though, economic integration, global security challenges, and common membership in the U.S. security system make such an approach increasingly anachronistic. THE NEXT SHOCK Without measurable, public, and rapid progress over the next four years, the U.S. alliance network, especially in western Europe, will remain vulnerable to another populist wave. Trump-proofing these alliances and partnerships will require even more of U.S. partners than they likely realize. In an ironic twist, the fate of the U.S. security system will turn as much on how U.S. allies respond to the Biden administration as on how the Biden administration itself behaves. Early overtures to the Biden administration suggest that U.S. democratic allies, especially in Europe, understand that returning to the status quo will mean risking another populist shock—one that could finally break the system. This means that Biden will have significant leverage in negotiations to overhaul long-standing relationships. Although Trump’s “America first” approach left the world a more dangerous place, its repercussions fell disproportionately on U.S. partners, not on the United States itself. This gives the leadership of countries such as France and Germany an incentive to demonstrate that a more cooperative approach can succeed where Trump’s combative one failed. Old habits die hard, however. If democratic allies drift into complacency, the Biden administration will need to remind them that nothing less than the survival of U.S. security guarantees is at stake—not because Biden fails to see their value but because the next U.S. president might not.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Reputation
Joel R. Hillison 14, professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College and an Adjunct Professor at Gettysburg College, November 2014, “Stepping Up: Burden Sharing by NATO's Newest Members,” , RH
The collective action literature suggests that freeriding behavior is likely to increase as organizations increase their membership. Article 10 of the NATO treaty provides modalities for new members to join the Alliance.11 During the Cold War, NATO expanded from 12 original members to 16 members over a 40 plus-year period. After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO expanded from 16 members in 1998 to 28 members by 2009. While all members face incentives to free-ride, these incentives increase as the size of the organization increases. In the absence of a commonly identified threat, the rational incentives to free-ride are even more pronounced.
A salient characteristic of NATO enlargement is that all of the new members are smaller than either the United States or the Big Four European members, (Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Italy). The logic of collective action suggests that larger, more powerful states bear a greater proportion of the costs in producing a public good.12 Therefore, the new members would be expected to free-ride in relative contributions to the Alliance. However, free-riding by smaller states has not been the case. Something other than collective action theory is required to explain this phenomenon. As expected, the capability and willingness to share burdens varies from the largest European NATO members (in terms of population and geography) to the smallest. Likewise, burden sharing, as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), varies based on the level of national economic output. However, the sharing of risks, as measured by military commitments to NATO operations, less closely follows the collective action model. When national interests more closely aligned with Alliance-wide goals, NATO members were more willing to increase their contributions.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Pressure Key
WSJ 22 [The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board; oversees the Journal's editorial page, dictating the tone and direction of the newspaper's opinion section; 3/21/22; “The Rearming of Europe”; ]
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has finally motivated European leaders to say they’ll spend more on defense, but promises are the easy part. One task for President Biden at this week’s NATO summit will be pushing the Europeans to be specific about how much they’ll spend and what they’ll buy. European Union heads of state or government said in a March 11 declaration that “we must resolutely invest more and better in defence capabilities.” After a two-day meeting, the leaders vowed to “increase substantially defence expenditures” and “invest further in the capabilities necessary to conduct the full range of missions.” European NATO allies and Canada increased defense spending overall for six years through 2020, but many still don’t hit NATO’s commitment to contribute 2% of gross domestic product to defense. This target should be a floor, not a ceiling, given the Russian threat. Germany, Europe’s biggest economy and its most notorious defense free rider, has led the charge to change. Berlin hadn’t spent more than 2% of GDP on defense since the end of the Cold War, but Chancellor Olaf Scholz said last month his country will meet its commitment from now on. And it’s starting with a €100 billion down payment. Smaller countries are stepping up too. Poland, which already meets the NATO target, recently passed a law increasing defense spending to at least 3% of GDP in 2023. Frontline nations Romania, Latvia and Lithuania have publicly set clear goals or passed legislation to boost military budgets. Yet too much of Europe has only vaguely promised to do more. French President Emmanuel Macron said this month that Paris would increase spending because of Vladimir Putin’s invasion, but without precise numbers. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi said the war is “an incentive to invest more in defense than we have ever done before” but it’s unclear how far Rome will go. Spain, which barely spends above 1% of GDP on its military, has vowed to hit 2% but hasn’t said when. Countries have different political pressures and processes, and some may be quietly studying what’s feasible. But Mr. Biden can encourage his European counterparts to step up like Mr. Scholz and set the terms of debate in their own countries. Germany showed it’s possible to hit NATO’s modest spending goals immediately, and there’s no reason for others to phase in spending over long stretches. It’s also important to ensure inflation doesn’t wipe out the gains. The U.K. approved spending increases in 2020 and 2021, but with rising prices the budget in real terms could decline in 2023 and 2024. It’s also easy to spend money on items labeled “defense” that don’t really enhance a country’s security. As a defensive alliance, NATO is primarily concerned with defending Europe and perhaps some counterterrorism missions. Ukraine has offered a useful template of how to defend from a Russian attack. Every NATO country should be competent with the basic tools to resist an invasion. That means a ready arsenal of tanks, helicopters, fighter jets and other heavy equipment. As the Ukrainians have shown, antitank and short-range air-defense systems are highly effective. Drones and loitering munitions, even relatively low-tech, are critical to success on the modern battlefield. Europeans can also invest more in the sophisticated coastal- and air-defense systems and long-range precision fires that Ukraine wishes it had now. The danger is that two of Mr. Macron’s fixations—industrial policy and “strategic autonomy”—could collide to make Europe less safe. There should be an emphasis on divesting from Soviet-era equipment, such as MiG jets and air defense systems, and replacing them with European and American systems. As Ukraine is showing, a mix of U.S., European and Turkish platforms can work well together to make life difficult for Russians. But Europeans will have to avoid the temptation to invest in lesser products out of solidarity. Europe doing more for its own defense is good news, but the U.S. has more to do as well. On top of nudging the Europeans in the right direction, major increases to American defense spending are essential and would set the right example.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Pressure Key
Schnaufer 21, Tad A. Schnaufer II is a Ph.D. candidate in Security Studies at the School for Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida and is a captain in the Florida Army National Guard, “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies,” January 15th 2021, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Conflict & Security,
The Trump administration has threatened NATO allies to the point that they fear the United States may withdraw from the organization or not fulfill its obligations to Article V unless the allies meet the objective of spending two percent of their GDP on defense. have called for NATO allies to contribute more to the alliance for decades. However, they have never called into question the US commitment to Europe. Yet, this pressure has forced the European allies to start taking greater ownership of their security at the cost of warm relations with the United States as seen through .
In order to pressure allies, the United States has to send costly signals, such as withdrawing troops from Europe, to demonstrate that their security interests have diverged. This political pressure acts as a forceful method to motivate NATO allies to do more because it provides a credible threat of exclusion from the benefits of US protection. Within NATO, only the United States maintains and controls the conventional and nuclear capacity to deter and defend against existential threats to the alliance. No other ally has the expeditionary military capacity to do so. For example, Estonia is not worried about being abandoned by Romania, Portugal, or even , knowing none of them could bring a sizable military force to bear in response to a Russian invasion or fait accompli. In this case, Estonia’s chief concern revolves around the United States’ guarantee of their sovereignty through NATO. Suppose the United States can make credible claims that it is willing to abandon an ally and not fulfill its treaty obligations. In that case, the ally will experience a drastic incentive to increase its military capabilities to defend itself.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Neg › Solvency › 2NC Say Yes—Stick—Pressure Key
Kupchan 6-29-2022, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University. He is the author of Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself From the World. (Charles, “NATO’s Hard Road Ahead,” Foreign Affairs,
THE EUROPEAN PILLAR The war in Ukraine has been a geopolitical wake-up call for Europe—and NATO should capitalize on this moment. Europe has made numerous false starts over the years at acquiring more geopolitical strength and responsibility, but this time, thanks to Russia, the effort may well yield more impressive results. Russian aggression has already prompted Europeans to make new and substantial investments in military capability. Germany has allocated 100 billion euros to upgrade its dilapidated military and has agreed to meet NATO’s benchmark of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense. Other European nations have announced sizable increases in their defense budgets. Translating these investments into war-fighting capability will take time and require coordination across national boundaries and between NATO and the EU. But these investments, and Germany’s turnaround in particular, have the potential to be a game-changer, finally endowing Europe with the greater geopolitical heft that that it needs in a world in which great-power rivalry is back. The United States should keep the pressure on its allies and work with them to take full advantage of their new readiness to shoulder greater defense burdens. A more capable Europe will make for a stronger Atlantic partnership. Democrats and Republicans alike have long complained that NATO needs a sturdier European pillar. Whatever party is in power in Washington, the Atlantic link will be in better shape if Europe brings more geopolitical heft to the table. With Russia now threatening NATO’s eastern flank and tensions in the western Pacific also putting new demands on U.S. resources, Washington will appreciate having more European capability. And even though a renewed Russian threat will keep U.S. forces in Europe for the foreseeable future, Europe needs to be able to act on its own when necessary.