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2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › AT: Skills

Policy debates are an endless production of mediocre case-law journalism, which translates the outside world into intellectually complicated, but ultimately vacuous jargon---procedural constraints on deliberation are irrational conceits of our own making

Schlag 9 [Pierre, Byron R. White Professor of Law and Former Associate Dean for Research, University of Colorado Law School, “ESSAY AND RESPONSE: Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the State of the Art),” March, 2009, Georgetown Law Journal, 97 Geo. L.J. 803] **edited for ableist language

All of these three moments--the Langdellian systematizations, the realist revolt, the "law and . . ." enlightenment--were reinventions of the discipline. They failed in the sense that they failed to reproduce themselves as vital intellectual enterprises. But they did not fail in making people think. Now, we live amidst their ruins. We are in need of another re-invention. That does not seem to be happening. Instead what we have is: A. CASE-LAW JOURNALISM Case-law journalism is a legacy of Langdellianism. As an intellectual enter-prise, Langdellianism came to an end when the work of taxonomic organization was completed. Now, as mentioned above, Langdellianism did leave some [*822] academics in each field to do the useful work of entering the new cases into the old taxonomies and to make modest modifications of the latter whenever it seemed advisable. This took care of keeping six or seven legal academics in each field busy (for a lifetime). n45 As for the other what--ninety-eight percent?--they would have to do something else. The legal academy clearly did not need five hundred contracts teachers to write treatises on contracts (six would do). How then to keep the other 494 duly employed? A three-pronged answer: (1) heighten the intricacy of analysis, (2) let the academics issue lots of normative recommendations, and (3) have them argue incessantly amongst themselves. The possibility of outdoing the courts in terms of intricacy was a natural for the legal academy. Courts have dockets. Legal academics have time. Given this asymmetry, the academics could always outdo the courts in the intricacy of their analysis. For legal academics, more searching, more precise, more detailed analyses were always possible. And it was also possible along the way to chastise the courts for their analytical shallowness. Indeed, one legal-process wag in the 1950s once complained very soberly that the essential work of the Supreme Court was suffering because the Justices clearly did not have sufficient time to give proper attention to writing their opinions. n46 The second possibility--to issue lots of normative recommendations--was also a successful full-employment strategy. To the extent that legal academics could make recommendations to the courts as to what should be done, the work would never dry up. Indeed, normative prescription pretty much opened up the world of legal scholarship to the future--in fact, to all kinds of futures, ranging from the modestly improved to the wildly utopian. The third prong--to let the academics argue among themselves--was also well suited for the legal academy. Surely if Professor X had a better solution than the courts, then, of course, it should be published. And surely if Professor Y found that Professor X's proposed solution was somehow flawed, it would be useful to publish that too. And surely, further responses might also add to the storehouse of knowledge. And surely too there would be value-added for [*823] Professor Z to show that while both Professor X and Professor Y had made valuable contributions, neither of them understood the problem quite as well as Professor Z. And so on. The possibilities were endless (in a kind of mock common law sort of way). And because all the legal materials (as had been demonstrated over and over again) were fraught with contradictory values and imperatives, the game could keep going forever. These three prongs are very much a part of case-law journalism. But they are too formal to capture the ethos of the practice--for this is a practice, not a set of rules to follow, not a model, but a well-settled, fully socialized, thoroughly internalized way of thinking and writing. By way of analogy to this practice, consider the mythical reporter covering the police beat. Think 1950's film noir here. In the opening scene, the reporter waits at the police station (today, by his pager) for the suspects to trickle in. The action starts. He interviews the cops, then reads the arrest report, calls the wife or husband or girlfriend, as appropriate. Then, should zeal strike, he might visit the crime scene. In the end, he writes and files his report, which is then published in the morning paper. Case-law journalism is much the same except for three things. First, the case-law journalist is a professor of law. And she writes law review articles, not newspaper articles. Second, she does not wait by the police desk. She is by her PC looking at Lexis or Findlaw or the SCOTUS website. n47 Third, unlike the journalist who is supposed to stick to the facts, the case-law journalist inserts the cases into some sort of normative narrative. Almost invariably, the case-law journalist ends on a cheery normative prescription for betterment of law, nation, or world. (Indeed, when was the last time you saw a law review article end on the note, "Oh my god, there's nothing we can do. We're ruined."?) B. LCM The most critical aspect of case-law journalism and its variations is the submission of issues, problems, artifacts, methods, or whatever else might come over the transom to the logic of judicial discourse in a way that produces legally cognizable material ("LCM"). There is a great deal of LCM produced in the legal academy. One gets the sense here of a great machine composed of many legal academics--each one ready and able to process the materials through the logic of judicial discourse. In the early days, up until the late 1960's say, it was mainly cases that were crunched. Today, the field has opened up. We will crunch anything. No matter what comes up--O.J., thick description, postmodernism, blogs, Bush v. Gore, the anniversary of Brown v. Board, anything at all--we will turn it into LCM. [*824] When the thing really needs a lot of crunching, we will hold a symposium and get a small group to crunch the thing together. We are ready, willing, and able to crunch the stuff (any stuff) and turn it into LCM. The consumption metaphor is also apt here. Anything that comes to us, we legal academics will chew on and ultimately digest. Our job is to be there--ready to process the cases, to answer the call from CNN or NPR or 9NEWS, to provide a pithy quote for the morning paper, to argue importantly at the law review symposium, and then to go back to our offices and do it again the next day (for life). This is not nothing, of course. If you do this, it allows you to display knowledge-mastery. In turn, this will please your dean and get you lots of lines in the alumni magazine. Like this, for instance: Professor Brancroft spoke on at NPR on July 20. He published three articles on the Bankruptcy Act and Putative Spouses--and a sequel to his earlier . . . . He also presented a talk at to the State Commission on special courts and appeared on CNN to discuss . . . . And so on. Or more candidly: Professor Brancroft has not become a world-class party animal (surprise--that one) and is not visibly suffering from jungle rot. What's more, he shows evidence of working on the kinds of things that the mental giants at CNN believe is worth air time. So the upshot is that he's doing something and the rest of us at the law school are doing something. We are all doing something. The future looks bright. So give us your money please. Legal thought is a lot like that these days. Notice that if this is the job description--producing lots of LCM--it's kind of hard to have ideas. It is a lot like trying to have a truly creative idea in the middle of taking a law school exam--(which, as we all know, is seldom a good idea). C. THE PERPETUAL LAW SCHOOL EXAM And there's a thought: the state of the art really is like a perpetual law school exam. The prototype of the contemporary legal academic is someone who is constantly either preparing to take or is in fact taking a law school exam. In one sense, of course, it's not quite a law school exam because the law professor is talking about things that are actually happening: court proceedings, legislative deliberations, etc. On the other hand, it has that same sort of form--answering stock questions in terms of stock issues by deploying stock arguments. Go to the blogs: I speak truth. This is a weird job description. It is even weirder that people (besides the six who are very helpfully writing the treatises in each field) would choose to make this their job description when they could clearly choose to make their job [*825] description something else. I strongly suspect, though I cannot prove, that this has a lot to do with the kinds of people we hire. By and large, we vet people very seriously for doing really well on exam-like tasks, writing law review kinds of things, while hardly vetting them at all on anything else. Not surprisingly, when they set about writing, many of them take up the familiar spot and crunch of the perpetual law school exam. What else would they do? What else could we reasonably expect? Even much of the recent flurry of interdisciplinary activity seems to have come down to a highly academicized case of LCM production. Earlier, in the introduction, we encountered James Boyd White looking at the pile of reprints on his desk with dread and ennui. n48 I ask you now to imagine something different--namely, a stack of interdisciplinary university press monographs on your desk. The first thing to notice is their covers--beautiful colors, awesome designs. But then you imagine actually reading one of them. Do you not, gentle reader, dread the dryness of the prose, the lumbering lurch of the argument, and the deadening thuds of the footnotes? n49 For apart from the striking cover, is there not this uncanny sense that what you see before you is simply a very, very, very long law review article? Still, we should take heart. There may be something highly functional about all this. As intellectually pointless as the perpetual law school exam may be, it serves to display mastery--namely, mastery of the law by the individual legal thinker. To be really good at the perpetual law school exam is to confirm that one is really well-prepared to be a really good case-law journalist. Also it means putting out lots of LCM. The exercises also show mastery at a higher level of abstraction. They show the mastery of "the law" over current cultural trends, intellectual currents, and social events. This is an important task because it demonstrates performatively that law and its authorized agents are still dominant. n50 LCM. Moreover, case-law journalism is the way in which we confirm to each other and to outside parties (lawyers, judges, the press, tenure committees, other departments in the university) that we really are in possession of some kind of expertise. And we are. LCM does not just happen. It takes years of effort and hard work [*826] to be really good at putting out first-rate LCM. <Schlag continues> G. WHY THINGS WILL GET WORSE Two things: Personnel and Institutionalization. Personnel. Well, enough on that subject. Institutionalization. Ironically, it is at this very moment--the moment when legal scholarship seems so thoroughly compromised--that law schools have decided, seemingly en masse, to intensify the monitoring of scholarly quality and quantity as well as to enforce scholarly output maximization strategies. Law faculties and administration are all increasingly heavily invested in mentoring, career positioning, SSRN download rates, citation indices, article placement strategies, blog announcements, and glossy scholarship advertising. It's all a kind of massive "no law professor left behind" scheme. All these techniques and strategies are ways in which law professors and law schools can all watch each other with great ease and in great detail. The important part is not so much the watching, but rather that we all know we are being watched. It's as if we, who are responsible for all this (and this would seem to be nearly all of us), had read Foucault's account of the panopticon and [*831] decided it was way cool and that we should institute our own version as soon as possible. The upshot sadly is that, at the very moment (1) that some terribly unenlightening paradigms are holding sway over legal scholarship, we also have (2) a radical intensification of quantity and quality control mechanisms. For my part, I believe it would vastly improve matters if at least one of those two things were not happening. Things will get worse. On the cheery side, one can always count on (1) the contributions of exogenous forces and (2) the fact that Malthus was and still is wrong. I'm a reasonable person (as well as a law professor) so all I came back with was one really tiny insight. Not only is it tiny, but it's not even very original. And it begins like this: There is something pervasively neurotic about the structures of contemporary life. The excruciating intricacies of everyday demands, the symbolic overinvestment of meaning in the trivial, the obsessive monitoring of everything to within an inch of its life, the constant piling on of little local meta- and infra-layers of thought--all these things are, from the [*832] perspective of the river, pervasively neurotic. n64 Contemporary life ensnares us in all sorts of little maze-games that seem to matter tremendously and yet ultimately do not--except in the negative sense that they distract our attention from what does or at least could matter. Now, lots of people have had this sort of insight--the most famous perhaps being Heidegger (the "fallenness" thing). n65 But my insight, and it really isn't much of an insight at all, is about legal scholarship. I think the practices and institutions of contemporary legal scholarship (spam jurisprudence, case law journalism, rank anxiety, nothing happening, etc.) are extremely intense versions of this generalized neurotic structure. It's as if we were all working really hard on an imaginary bus schedule. Someone writes an article saying we need to optimize the number of buses. Another person can't resist pointing out that it might be preferable to start by optimizing the number of bus stops instead. Soon someone writes that we should reconstruct the entire schedule. Someone else will suggest that we should split the schedule along eight different parts. Someone says, the eight parts are really sixteen. Some truly original thinker says there are ten. And then, some ranker comes along and starts ranking whose law school has the best bus scheduling program going. And somebody else decides to hold a symposium on bus schedule rankings. (Remember the traveling show on Bush v. Gore?) n66 And then fifty years from now, someone will write a book: How Should the Bus Schedules of 2000-Whatever Have Been Decided? n67 Pretty soon, we've got a collective imaginary going and we're pushing buses and bus stops all across pages of the Yale Law Journal and it all feels kind of real and pretty important. And it's not hard to believe that it's important. For one thing people are getting real rewards--prestige jobs, chairs, program funding--for [*833] imaginary bus schedule breakthroughs. And adding to the increasing reality of the thing is the undeniable fact that we can't just dismiss buses or bus schedules as unreal. (If everything else fails, by the way, this is your takeaway: Buses are real.) But the thing of it is, our legal academic bus schedule remains imaginary. Even if it looks a lot like the real thing, it's still imaginary. When we put out our bus schedule, no buses run. Word. And no Rapid Transit District (RTD) that I know of is going to change its schedule just because some new bus stop entries have been introduced in the pages of the Yale Law Journal or wherever. Not going to happen. So here we are, legal academics working on our collective imaginary bus schedule. And one of the things that troubles me about this is that the imaginary bus schedule is in some important ways not at all like the RTD's bus schedule. The RTD faces real stakes. We legal academics don't. Our reality principle--to the extent we have one at all--is decidedly indeterminate: get tenure/avoid showing cause. So if we want to construct a bus schedule with stops every ten yards (all in the name of rigor or precision) then we can have at it. And realize, please, that I'm not being extreme here. It's not like this hasn't been done. Over and over again. n68 And then there's the normativity thing. I once read an article that purported to elaborate about what the Constitution should be. Now what struck me as odd was that the author really did want to free himself (and his reader) from any official pronouncements of what the Constitution is. This struck me as incredibly weird. What an odd thing to do. If the question "What should the Constitution be?" is not anchored in what the Constitution is (whatever that might be), then why not go for broke: I say let's have a constitution that guarantees universal health care, tastes a lot like Ben & Jerry's ice cream, and is laugh-out-loud funny. You leave it to me? I say: Go big. Is this flip? Well, of course, it is. But hey, I'm not the one who invented this practice of normative legal thought. I'm just pointing it out. In fact, that's what I do these days. Check that: It's what I used to do. I used to have a pretty good job as a satirist. Good working conditions. Not much competition. I'm out of business now: Legal thought satirizes itself. For me now, it's all just point and shoot. There's something gratuitous about legal scholarship. No one, of course, writes that the constitution should be like Ben & Jerry's ice cream. But just what is it that precludes anyone from suggesting that the Constitution should guarantee universal health care. (I'd be in favor--I really would.) The answer: [*834] there are constraints on what we argue. Sure there are. n69 And who generates . . . the constraints? Well, in part, we do: n70 So what we have is an imaginary legal thought shaped by imaginary collective constraints, one of which is the injunction that we should follow those constraints with great rigor. My question: Is this a neurotic structure? Yes, it is. Straight out--full-flower. It has to be because without the neurosis, [obsession], there would be nothing there. No constraints at all. Now please understand: As a matter of form, I have nothing against collective imaginaries. My only problem is this: if we law professors have to work so hard (and so painfully) on our collective imaginaries, couldn't we pick something more interesting, or important, or aesthetically enlivening, or morally salient, or politically relevant than bus schedules? I mean, couldn't we? Uh, no. Which raises perhaps my final point. It's not very nice, but someone's got to say it, and apparently it's going to be me. As mentioned earlier, our people are not cognitively challenged. They are, bell curve and all, very intelligent. It is easy then for people like you and I, when we look at the extreme intricacy of the work produced by these very intelligent people, to associate the intricacy of their work with their manifest intelligence. Indeed, we are likely to think of the relation in reciprocal terms: Because they are intelligent, their work is intricate, and because their work is intricate, it shows great intelligence. n71 But the thing I want to suggest as a possibility here is that all this intricacy of legal scholarship is less a function of intelligence than it is a manifestation of neurosis in the face of intractable conflicts. What conflicts? Consider the prototypical needs of the legal academic: A need to display great intelligence in a discourse (law) that will ultimately not bear it. A need to contribute to disciplinary knowledge in a discourse which is not really about knowledge or truth in any profound sense of those terms. A need to say something intellectually respectable within a disciplinary paradigm that we know, on some level, is intellectually compromised. [*835] A need to display control over social, political, and economic transactions that are in important senses not subject to control. A need to activate moral and political virtue in a discourse that uses both largely as window dressing. A need to make one's thought seem real and consequential in a discourse that is neither. I want to suggest then, and this is perhaps the unkindest cut of all, that within the dominant paradigm of legal scholarship, it may be that there is very little of enduring value to be said. In the main it's the rehearsal of a form, a genre--and not a self-evidently good one. n72 I have a cheery ending and a not so cheery ending The cheery ending is that it has not always been like this. And, maybe it doesn't have to be like this now. The non-cheery ending goes like this: It's going to get worse in many ways. The forces are in play--the rankings, the administrators who want to enhance the reps of their schools, the status insecurities of young (and old) faculty members, the pervasive triumph of porno (ahem, ahem, told you so) n73--all these forces will converge to produce ever more spam jurisprudence. And then something else will happen. <Schlag continues> In terms of social organization then, there may be something to be said for creating a professional corps (lawyers) whose modes of communication are widely shared and relatively standardized. Notice that if this is the objective, then the only place where that sort of standardized communication can be widely shared is somewhere close to the middle of the bell curve. Both intellectual sloth and intellectual excellence are, by definition, aberrant and thus detract from our efforts at standardization. Thus, training for mediocrity does serve a social function (within limits, of course). Mediocrity is not the only aim here. One would like this mediocrity to be the best it can be. We would like legal professionals to share a language and a mode of thought and, at the same time, for that language and mode of thought to be as perspicuous and intelligent as possible. Given the omnipresence of the bell curve, these desiderata are obviously in tension. The economists would likely talk about achieving "the optimal degree" of intelligence and mediocrity at the margin, but my sense is this will only get us so far. For law professors, the tension is bound to be somewhat frustrating. What many law professors would like--because many of them are intellectually inclined--is to bring intelligence to bear within legal discourse. This is bound to be a somewhat frustrating venture. Legal discourse is not designed to produce intelligence and, frankly, the materials and the discourse can only bear so much. Good judgment, groundedness, reasonableness--any of these virtues is often enough to snuff out real thinking. Indeed, whatever appeal good judgment, groundedness, and reasonableness may have for a judge or a lawyer (and I am prepared to say the appeal is considerable), such virtues are not particularly helpful to intellectual achievement. On the contrary, intellectual achievement requires the abandonment of received understandings. In fact, I would go so far as to say that intellectual vitality (at least in the context of a discipline like law) [*829] requires some degree of defamiliarization, some reach for the exotic. The thing is, those sorts of efforts are not going to get very far if they constantly have to answer to good judgment, groundedness, reasonableness, and the like. And at this point, I would like to flip the argument made earlier in the paper. Here, I would like us to think of appeals to good judgment, groundedness, and reasonableness in legal thought as appeals to mediocrity. Making people see things involves things far different from good judgment, groundedness, or reasonableness. It involves a kind of artistry--a reorientation of the gaze, a disruption of complacency, a sabotage of habitual forms of thought, a derailing of cognitive defaults. This is part of what a really good education is about. Constant obeisance to good judgment or groundedness or reasonableness, by contrast, will systematically frustrate such efforts. n57 This is all rather vexing. Legal academics--with aspirations to intellectual excellence--are thus destined to play out the myth of Sisyphus. The main difference, of course, is that Sisyphus had a real rock to push up a real hill. The law professors' rock and hill, by contrast are symbolic--imaginative constructions of their own making. Arguably, pushing a symbolic rock up a symbolic hill is substantially easier than doing it for real. At the very least, it is easier to fake it and to claim success. At the same time, though, the symbolic nature of the exercise perhaps makes it more transparently pointless. As between these two points, there is a certain dissonance. On the one hand, we are dealing with pushing rocks up hills--and that is surely hard work. On the other hand, the rocks and hills are of our own imagination--so it should be easy. This is very confusing. n58 My best guess (and I offer this only as a preliminary hypothesis) is that the dissonance here might yield a certain degree of neurosis. n59 Still the question pops up again: "So what?" So what--so you have maybe seven thousand-something law professors in the nation and you know, maybe ninety-six percent are engaged in a kind of vaguely neurotic scholarship. So what? Maybe it's borderline tragic. Maybe, these people could have done so much better. None of this, by the way, is clearly established. But let's just assume, it's true. Who cares? Seven thousand people--that's not a lot of people. Plus, it's hard to feel for them. I know that nearly all of them would be us (but still). It's an extraordinarily privileged life. So why care about this? Here's why. The thing about legal scholarship is that it plays--through the mediation of the professorial mind--an important role in shaping the ways, the [*830] forms, in which law students think with and about law. n60 If they are taught to think in essentially mediocre ways, they will reproduce those ways of thinking as they practice law and politics. If they are incurious, if they are lacking in political and legal imagination, if they are simply repeating the standard moves (even if with impressive virtuosity) they will, as a group, be wielding power in essentially mediocre ways. And the thing is: when mediocrity is endowed with power, it yields violence. And when mediocrity is endowed with great power, it yields massive violence. n61 All of which is to say that in making the negotiation between the imprinting of standard forms of legal thought and the imparting of an imaginative intelligence, we err too much on the side of the former. (Purely my subjective call here--but so is everybody else's.) Another way to put it is that while there is something to be said for the standardization point made earlier, generally, standardization is overdone. n62

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › AT: Limits

Content-based restrictions stymie efforts to overcome militarized education - refusing limits is key to encourage improvisation and creativity

Graeber 15 [David Graeber, arguably the most important anthropologist of the 21st century, American-born, London-based anthropologist and anarchist activist, leading figure in Occupy Wall Street credited with coining the phrase “We are the 99 Percent,” assistant professor and associate professor of anthropology at Yale from 1998–2007, Reader in Social Anthropology at Goldsmiths, University of London, activism includes protests against the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec City in 2001, and the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York City, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy, Melville House printing (Brooklyn, NY): February 2015, p. 201-5]

Let me finish with another example from my own political experience. Over the last thirty or forty years, anti-authoritarians around the world have been working on creating new, and more effective, modes of direct democracy-ones that might operate without any need for a bureaucracy of violence to enforce them. I've written about these efforts extensively elsewhere. A lot of progress has been made. But those working on such projects often find themselves having to deal with exactly this sort of horror of "arbitrary" power. Part of the work of developing new forms of consensus process, for example, is to create institutional forms that encourage, rather than inhibit, improvisation and creativity. As activists sometimes put it: in most circumstances, if you bring together a crowd of people, that crowd will, as a group, behave less intelligently, and less creatively, than any single member of the crowd is likely to do if on their own. Activist decision-making process is, instead, designed to make that crowd smarter and more imaginative than any individual participant. It is indeed possible to do this, but it takes a -lot of work. And the larger the group, the more formal mechanisms have to be put in place. The single most important essay in this whole activist tradition is called "The Tyranny of Structurelessness;'110 written in the 1970s by Jo Freeman, about organizational crises that occurred in early feminist consciousness-raising circles when those groups began to attain a certain size. Freeman observed that such groups always started out with a kind of rough-and-ready anarchism, an assumption that there was no need for any formal, parliamentary rules-of-order type mechanisms at all. People would just sit down in a sisterly manner and work things out. And this was, indeed, what happened at first. However, as soon as the groups grew to over, say, twenty people, informal cliques invariably began to emerge, and small groups of friends or allies began controlling information, setting agendas, and wielding power in all sorts of subtle ways. Freeman proposed a number of different formal mechanisms that might be employed to counteract this effect, but for present purposes, the specifics don't really matter. Suffice it to say that what is now referred to as "formal consensus process" largely emerges from the crisis Freeman described, and the debate her intervention set off. What I do want to bring attention to is that almost everyone who is not emerging from an explicitly anti-authoritarian position-and no insignificant number even of those who are-completely misread Freeman's essay, and interpret it not as a plea for formal mechanisms to ensure equality, but as a plea for more transparent hierarchy. Leninists are notorious for this sort of thing, but Liberals are just as bad. I can't tell you how many arguments I've had about this. They always go exactly the same way. First, Freeman's argument about the formation of cliques and invisible power structures is taken as an argument that any group of over twenty people will always have to have cliques, power structures, and people in authority. The next step is to insist that if you want to minimize the power of such cliques, or any deleterious effects those power structures might have, the only way to do so is to institutionalize them: to take the de facto cabal and turn them into a central committee (or, since that term now has a bad history, usually they say a coordinating committee, or a steering committee, or something of that sort.) One needs to get power out of the shadows-to formalize the process, make up rules, hold elections, specify exactly what the cabal is allowed to do and what it's not. In this way, at least, word again. It comes from accountancy procedures.) It won't in any sense be arbitrary. From a practical, activist perspective, this prescription is obviously ridiculous. It is far easier to limit the degree to which informal cliques can wield effective power by granting them no formal status at all, and therefore no legitimacy; whatever "formal accountability structures" it is imagined will contain the cliques-now-turned-committees can only be far less effective in this regard, not least because they end up legitimating and hence massively increasing the differential access to information which allows some in otherwise egalitarian groups to have greater power to begin with. As I pointed out in the first essay, structures of transparency inevitably, as I've described, begin to become structures of stupidity as soon as that takes place. So say one argues this point, and the critic concedes it (which usually they have to because it's pretty much common sense). If so, the next line of defense is generally aesthetic: the critic will insist it's simply distasteful to have structures of real power that are not recognized and that can, even if they entirely lack any degree of violent enforcement, be considered arbitrary. Usually, one's interlocutor won't go so far as actually admitting their objections are aesthetic. Usually they will frame their arguments in moral terms. But occasionally, you will find some honest enough to admit that's what's going on. I well remember having an Occupy Wall Street-sponsored debate in Central Park (I'm sure it's recorded somewhere) with Norman Finkelstein-a brilliant and altogether admirable activist, who had come of age with the Civil Rights Movement and still saw groups like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as his inspiration. At this debate, Finkelstein stated the matter outright. Maybe it's true, he admitted, that the best way to keep such cliques from attaining too much power is to maintain a principle that they should not exist. But as long as such cliques are allowed to exist without being formally acknowledged and regulated, you're maintaining a system that says it's okay to be governed, even a tiny bit, from the shadows. It might not be that much of a practical problem. You might well be right that formally recognizing their existence might actually end up creating less overall freedom than leaving well enough alone. But in the final analysis, I just find the idea of being governed from the shadows, in any sense, distasteful. In such arguments, we are witnessing a direct clash between two different forms of materialized utopianism: on the one hand, an anti-authoritarianism that, in its emphasis on creative synthesis and improvisation, sees freedom basically in terms of play, and on the other, a tacit republicanism that sees freedom ultimately as the ability to reduce all forms of power to a set of clear and transparent rules. For the last two hundred years, in Europe and North America- and increasingly, elsewhere-that latter, bureaucratized notion of freedom has tended to hold sway. New institutional arrangements that operate by rules so strict and predictable they essentially disappear, so that one doesn't even know what they are (such as the physical or electronic post offices with which I began) tend to be put forward as platforms for human freedom that emerge from the very technical contingencies of running efficient structures of power. These arrangements seem to preserve the positive elements of play while somehow circumventing its more disturbing potentials. But time and again, we have seen the same results. Whether motivated by a faith in "rationality" or a fear of arbitrary power, the end result of this bureaucratized notion of freedom is to move toward the dream of a world where play has been limited entirely-or, at best, boxed away in some remote location far from any serious, consequential human endeavor-while every aspect of life is reduced to some kind of elaborate, rulebound game. It's not that such a vision lacks appeal. Who hasn't dreamed of a world where everyone knows the rules, everyone plays by the rules, and-even more-where people who play by the rules can actually still win? The problem is that this is just as much a utopian fantasy as a world of absolute free play would be. It will always remain a glimmering illusion that dissolves away as soon as we touch it. Such illusions are not always bad things. One could make a case that most of the greatest human accomplishments were the result of such quixotic pursuits. But in this particular case, and in this larger political-economic context, where bureaucracy has been the primary means by which a tiny percentage of the population extracts wealth from the rest of us, they have created a situation where the pursuit of freedom from arbitrary power simply ends up producing more arbitrary power,s and as a result, regulations choke existence, armed guards and surveillance cameras appear everywhere, science and creativity are smothered, and all of us end up finding increasing percentages of our day taken up in the filling out of forms.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › AT: SSD Good

Elite overproduction DA---society is already oversaturated with “skilled advocates”---training more leads to resentment and political instability

Economist 20 - citing Peter Turchin (Economist, , EM)

As far back as ancient Rome and imperial China, Mr Turchin shows, societies have veered from periods of political stability to instability, often at intervals of about 50 years. Consider America. Every pundit knows that Congress has become gridlocked, with Democrats and Republicans unwilling to compromise with each other. Fewer know that it was also highly polarised around 1900, before becoming more co-operative in the mid-20th century. What causes these lurches from calm to chaos? Mr Turchin views societies as large, complex systems that are subject to certain patterns, if not laws. That is an entirely different approach from much of academic history, with its preference for small-scale, microcosmic studies, argues Niall Ferguson of Stanford University. In a paper published this year Mr Turchin (with Andrey Korotayev of the Higher School of Economics in Russia) examines the prediction of instability he made in 2010. His forecast model contains many elements, but like Karl Marx, Mr Turchin seems to believe that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” Where Marx focused on the proletariat, though, Mr Turchin is more interested in the elite—and how its members struggle against each other. Who counts as the elite, and how competition manifests itself, varies from place to place; one example could be a large number of highly educated folk relative to the number of government offices (and therefore jobs). But a struggle is most likely when economic inequality is high. The rewards for being at the top are then especially lucrative, both in terms of earning power and political influence, and those who miss out feel their loss more keenly. The feeling of resentment is particularly strong among people brought up to believe that they ought to be in the elite. Worse still, societies tend to produce ever more would-be elites, in part because access to education tends to improve over time. Mr Turchin sees all this as a recipe for political chaos. Articulate, educated people rebel, producing a scramble for political and economic power. Elites stop co-operating, counter-elites emerge, and order breaks down. The argument undoubtedly papers over historical nuance. Yet focusing on dissatisfied elites is not a bad way of understanding political instability. Hugh Trevor-Roper, a historian, noted that “social crises are caused not by the clear-cut opposition of mutually exclusive interests but by the tug-of-war of opposite interests within one body.” The French Revolution was not primarily the product of misery but instead of a battle between an underemployed educated class and hereditary landowners. Historians identify “the problem of an excess of educated men” as contributing to Europe’s revolutions of 1848. Mr Turchin suggests that though slavery was the proximate cause of the American civil war, a more fundamental one was resentment from up-and-coming Northern capitalists towards stuck-in-their-ways Southerners. Elite overproduction can also help explain the malaise gripping the rich world of late. It has become extraordinarily difficult for a young person to achieve elite status, even if she works hard and goes to the best university. House prices are so high that only inheritors stand a chance of emulating the living conditions of their parents. The power of a few “superstar” firms means that there are few genuinely prestigious jobs around. Mr Turchin reckons that each year America produces some 25,000 “surplus” lawyers. Over 30% of British graduates are “overeducated” relative to their jobs. All this goes some way to explaining an apparently puzzling trend: why apparently well-off people are drawn to radicalism. Under Jeremy Corbyn Britain’s Labour Party attracted more upper-middle- and middle-class folk than it used to, even as it moved further left from the Tories; its lead among recent graduates was clear. Joe Biden’s lead over Bernie Sanders in opinion polls during the Democratic primaries was far smaller among college-educated Americans than among those who did not finish high school.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › AT: SSD Good

Sociopathy DA---switch-side teaches “moral flexibility” required to commit atrocities - by divorcing argument from passion, debate allows us to justify all manner of unspeakable acts---means we convince ourselves to do horrible things in order to forward our own interests - that’s Power and…

Spanos 4 [(William V., prof. at Binghamton, available online cross-x.com url: , Nov. 18]

Dear Joe MIller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then --and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about "objectivity" has crept into the "philosophy of debate" -- that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn't matter which position you take on an issue -- say, the United States' unilateral wars of preemption -- as long as you "score points". The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an "exceptionalist" America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its "errand in the wilderness." That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not "disinterested." It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the "democratic" institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language of "truth," far from being "disinterested" or "objective" as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of "others." This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional "objective" debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration -- judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their "disinterested" argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of "deterring democracy" (in Noam Chomsky's ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › AT: SSD Good

Militarized knowledge DA---centering debate around technocratic analysis of defense policy fuels imperial violence

Bond-Graham and Hell 3 - PhD Sociology UC Santa Barbara AND UC Fiat Pax Research Project Group (Darwin and Emily, “THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S UNIVERSITIES”, , dml)

The militarization of knowledge is found in its pure form in the university. Militarized knowledge is a way of knowing the world and relationships between humans, characterized by an acceptance and promotion of violence and war. In militarized society we come to know the world and our fellow humans in terms of the hostile other. Other nations become enemies. Other peoples become dehumanized. The world becomes possess-able if we are strong enough, disposable if we so choose. Militarized knowledge adopts a worldview of force not understanding, violence not peace. Militarized society relies on knowledge to create technological solutions to our problems and conflicts. This is always at the expense of humanistic knowledge – the ways of knowing and relating to the world which find solutions in peace and organization, not violence and quantity. Because universities are at the center of knowledge creation in our society, we find our institutions of higher learning imbued with violence. The militarization of universities leads to a spiraling effect further strengthening the forces of war. Militarized universities produce: military technologies including – new weapons, warfare systems, ways of thought and organization distinct to the goals of coercion and force, and the permanent technological revolution of warfare itself. Universities in service of the warfare state also produce the human resources demanded by the militarized society. Universities churn out the politicians, technocrats, bureaucrats, and skilled workers demanded by the society which so diligently produces and executes the means of destruction. These graduates, having learned about the world, its society, and applied sciences through the lens of warfare go forth and recreate this calamity. The future politicians will lead the nation into future wars, and the future engineers will construct future combat systems, while we all obey and simply "do our jobs." The system further entrenches itself, war begets war, the institutions of knowledge produce destruction at the expense of creation. The technologies meant to banish war as unimaginabley destructive, and obsolete have only accomplished the former. New technologies meant to make war more humane, and conductable have only accomplished the latter. TechnoWar & How the University Makes War Possible The greatest effect the militarization of universities has had is by making war more conductable. Modern America, being the “civilized” and “peaceful” society it is, will not conduct a war that extols to large a cost in innocent civilian lives, and the lives of US soldiers. The technological revolution in aerial bombardment, missile capabilities, and weapon accuracy since the Vietnam war was intended to address this very issue. By making weapons more accurate and deployable from a distance, the military and its partners in science hoped to remove the US soldier from combat equation, while making state violence humane and survivable. This supposed injection of ethics into the arsenal of the United States was lauded in the Gulf War, Afghan War, and now with unprecedented emphasis in the second war against Iraq. War becomes more automated, increasingly technology withdraws the soldier from the battlefield. The arsenal becomes deployable through computer interfaces, warfighters sit behind computer screens hundreds, even thousands of miles from where they wreak havoc. Soldiers who must still encounter the enemy face to face are made into superhumans with high tech body armor, night vision, network communications, advanced sensors, all intended to make the US soldier invulnerable. Science in the service of warfare reinforces a political establishment more willing to use violence than diplomacy. US politicians become sure of their military’s capabilities to defeat the enemy, and to do so in a manner that the American public can accept. The population falls into a similar mindstate. The technological revolution to make war more effectively against the enemy leads us only to more war. Does science, technology, and knowledge emanating from our universities produce an ethical and just form of warfare? Can war be made humane through technological solutions? Absolutely not – Historically we know this. New technology leveraged in war has had the net effect of more war and more killing. Most prominent are the examples of past weapons whose inventors claimed would make war impossible. The machine gun being the most famous case was said to have made warfare so destructive and technologically advanced that nations would no longer fight. World War I immediately ensued, and millions died. The technologies meant to banish war as unimaginabley destructive, and obsolete have only accomplished the former. New technologies meant to make war more humane, and conductable have only accomplished the latter. What is at Stake? The future, and everything. The university takes its namesake from this fact. In Latin, universum - "The whole of created or existing things regarded collectively." The university is the whole of human knowledge; the knowledge we have about our existence, past present and future. The university is the attempt of the scientific system of knowledge to understand the human condition, our place in the world, and the realm of possibility. The university is more: In its most worthy incarnation, the university makes room for, even thrives from nonscientific, non-rational forms of knowledge including the arts and humanities. It is inarguably the most powerful attempt humanity has made to understand and re-make the world. With this fact in mind there are two conclusions to be drawn from the militarization of the university. First, it can be described as simply a matter of fact that knowledge creation and the university serve the military. Humans make war with one another, and that universities are involved in this effort is a truism. Humans will continue to make war, and so the inclusion of the university should be expected. This answer is of no value. It assumes a set of universal permanent truths (a nature) about the human condition with no possibility of disproving. Furthermore it offers no future for humanity other than annihilation, and it completely betrays the fundamental idealogical basis of the university which is progress through enlightenment. In contrast, it can be said that the militarization of universities is a problem directly related to the condition of a society. How much and in what ways a society’s institutions of knowledge creation serve the forces of war is a measure of that society’s worth. A nation that demands the enlistment of its knowledge base in the production of war and the perpetuation of violence is a nation not worthy of life. The only alternatives left would be the dismantling of that nation, or a radical reform of its institutions and a fight against the forces of war. This publication is dedicated to nothing less than the complete and radical reform of our society’s institutions of knowledge creation, from universities in service of the warfare state, to universities in resistance, in peace, and toward the creation of a meaningful future.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › AT: Predictability

Attempting to make the world predictable depresses vital energies

Grimm 77 ([Ruediger Hermann, art historian and Goethe scholar, Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge, ed. M. Montinari, W. Miiller-Lauter & H. Wenzel, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pg. 30-33, Gender modified]

Western logic and metaphysics have been traditionally founded upon a handful of principles which were regarded as being self-evidently true, and therefore neither requiring nor admitting of any further proof40• One of these principles we have already dealt with at some length, the notion that truth must be unchanging. Rather than further belabor the whole question of truth, we shall now turn to Nietzsche's analysis of why it is that truth should be regarded as necessarily unchanging in the first place. Nietzsche's view of reality (the will to power) is such that all that exists is an ever-changing chaos of power-quanta, continually struggling with one another for hegemony. Nothing remains the same from one instant to the next. Consequently there are no stable objects, no "identical cases," no facts, and no order. Whatever order we see in the world, we ourselves have projected into it. By itself, the world has no order : there is no intrinsically stable "world order," no "nature." Yet metaphysics, logic, and language indeed, our whole conceptual scheme is grounded in the assumption that there is such a stable order. Why? . • . die Annahme des seienden ist nothig, um denken und schliessen zu konnen : die Logik handhabt our Formeln fiir Gleichbleibendes deshalb ware diese Annahme noch ohne Beweiskraft fiir die Reali tat : ,,das Seiende" gehort zu unserer Optik48• This can perhaps be best clarified by anticipating our discussion of Nietzsche's perspectivism. Even if reality is a chaos of power-quanta, about which any statement is already an interpretation and "falsification," we nevertheless must assume some sort of order and continuity in order to function at all. But the assumption of order and continuity even if it is a necessary assumption is certainly not any sort of proof. We ourselves, as will to power, gain control over our environment by "interpreting" it, by simplifying and adapting it to our requirements. Life itself is an ongoing process of interpretation, a process of imposing a superficial order upon a chaotic reality. In Wahrheit ist Interpretation ein Mittel selbst, um Herr iiber etwas zu werden. (Der organische Prozess setzt fortwahrendes /nterpretieren voraus42• Thus we create for ourselves a world in which we can live and function and further enhance and increase our will to power. Even our perceptual apparatus is not geared to gleaning "truth" from the objects of our experience. Rather, it arranges, structures, and interprets these objects so that we can gain control over them and utilize them for our own ends. The "truth" about things is something we ourselves have projected onto them purely for the purpose of furthering our own power. Thus Nietzsche can say Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, ohne welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben konnte. Der Werth fiir das Leben entscheidet zuletzt43. Thus the "truth" about reality is simply a variety of error, a convenient fiction which is nevertheless necessary for our maintenance. In the last analysis it is not a question of "truth" at all, but rather, a matter of which "fiction," which interpretation of reality best enables me to survive and increase my power. In an absolute sense, the traditional standard of unchanging truth is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. But on the basis of Nietzsche's criterion for truth we can make a vital distinction. All statements about the truth or falsity of our experiential world are functions of the will to power, and in this sense, all equally true (or false). The difference lies in the degree to which any particular interpretation increases or decreases our power. The notion that truth is unchanging is the interpretation of a comparatively weak will to power, which demands that the world be simple, reliable, predictable, i. e. "true." Constant change, ambiguity, contradiction, paradox, etc. are much more difficult to cope with, and require a comparatively high degree of will to power to be organized (i. e. interpreted) into a manageable environment. The ambiguous and contradictory the unknown is frightening and threatening. Therefore we have constructed for ourselves a model of reality which is eminently "knowable," and consequently subject to our control. Pain and suffering have traditionally been held to stem from "ignorance" about the way the world "really" is : the more predictable and reliable the world is, the less our chances are of suffering through error, of being unpleasantly surprised. However, " darin driickt sich eine gedriickte Seele aus, voller MIBtrauen und schlimmer Erfahrung . . . 44." The demand that reality and truth be stable, reliable, predictable, and conveniently at our disposal is a symptom of weakness. The glossing over of the chaotic, contradictory, changing aspect of reality is the sign of a will to power which must reduce the conflict and competition in the world to a minimum. Yet resistance and competition are the very factors which enable any particular power-constellation to express itself and grow in power. As we saw earlier, the will to power can only express itself by meeting resistance, and any interpretation of reality which attempts to minimize these factors is profoundly anti-life (since life is will to power). Furthermore, a person embodying a strong and vigorous will to power will "interpret" the "threatening" aspect of the world the chaos, ambiguity, contradiction, danger, etc. as stimuli, which continually offer [them] a high degree of resistance which [they] must meet and overcome if [they are] to survive and grow. Rather than negate change and make the world predictable, a "strong" person would, according to Nietzsche, welcome the threat and challenge of a constantly changing world. Referring to those who require a world as changeless as possible in order to survive, Nietzsche says . . . (eine umgekehrte Art Mensch wiirde diesen Wechsel zum Reiz rechnen) Eine mit Kraft iiberladene und spielende Art W esen wiirde gerade die Aff ekte, die Unvernunft und den Wechsel in eudamonistischem Sinne gutheissen, sammt ihren Consequenzen, Gefahr, Contrast, Zu-Grunde-gehn usw-45. A large part of the intellectual energy of the West has been spent in trying to discover "facts," "laws of nature," etc., all of which are conceived to be "truths" and which, therefore, do not change. For Nietzsche, this conceptualization of our experience is tantamount to a "mummification" : when an experience is conceptualized, it is wrenched from the everchanging stream of becoming which is the world. By turning our experiences into facts, concepts, truths, statistics, etc. we "kill" them, rob them of their immediacy and vitality and embalm them, thus transforming them into the convenient bits of knowledge which furnish our comfortable, predictable, smug existences46• Der Mensch sucht ,,die Wahrheit" : eine Welt, die nicht sich widerspricht, nicht tiiuscht, nicht wechselt, eine wahre Welt, eine Welt, in der man nicht leidet : Widerspruch, Tauschung, Wechsel Ursachen des Leidens l47 For Nietzsche, this whole tendency to negate change which is so intimately connected with the presupposition that "truth" always means "unchanging, eternal truth," is a symptom of decadence, a symptom of the weakening and disruption of the will to power. This outlook says, in effect, "This far shall you go, and this much shall you learn, but no more than this . . . . " In the absence of any fixed and ultimate standard for truth, of course, this outlook is no more true or false than Nietzsche's own. Yet it is not a question here of rightness or wrongness, but a question of power. More specifically, it is a matter of vital power. "Der Werth fur das Leben entscheidet zuletzt48." Nietzsche's conclusion is that this static world interpretation has a negative, depressing effect on a person's vital energies (will to power). It constricts growth, it sets limits and hampers the self-assertion of the will to power. The strong individual, whom Nietzsche so much admires, flourishes only in an environment of change, ambiguity, contradiction, and danger. The chaotic and threatening aspect of the world is a stimulus for such individuals, demanding that they constantly grow and increase their power, or perish49• It demands that they constantly exceed their previous limits, realize their creative potential and surpass it, become more than they were. In the absence of any stability in the world, the strong individual who can flourish in such an environment is radically free from any constraint, radically free to create. It need scarcely be said that this world-interpretation is immeasurably more conducive to the growth and enhancement of the will to power than the static worldview. And the increase of will to power is Nietzsche's only criterion : Alles Geschehen, alle Bewegung, alles Werden als ein Feststellen von Gradund Kraftverhaltnissen, als ein Kampf.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › AT: Predictability

Procedural constraints preclude authentic learning

Waghid 14 [Pedagogy Out of Bounds: Untamed Variations of a Democratic Future, Yusef Waghid, Stellenbosch University, Matieland, South Africa, 2014, ebook, EDUCATIONAL FUTURES, RETHINKING THEORY AND PRACTICE, Volume 63, p. 59-63]

For Greene, authentic learning has the task of arousing students’ imagination, which ‘allows us to break with the taken for granted, to set aside familiar distinctions and definitions’ (1995, p. 3). When students are provoked to use their imagination they are ‘stirred to reach out on their own initiatives’ (Greene, 1995, p. 5). The point about authentic learning is that it is considered as releasing the imagination of students with the intention to cultivate ‘a community always in the making – the community that may someday be called a democracy’ (Greene, 1995, p. 6). In other words, the emphasis Greene places on positive freedom as a condition for authentic learning is quite obvious in the sense that students are encouraged to break the chain of causes and effects, of probabilities in which they usually find themselves entangled, and to come to be themselves. In other words, authentic learning involves students taking initiative and looking at things as if they could be otherwise, as has been mentioned previously in this book (Greene, 1995, p. 16). So, tapping into imagination as a way of enacting their positive freedom, students ‘become able to break with what is supposedly fixed and finished, objectively and independently real. It is to see beyond ... and to carve out new orders in experience ... to glimpse what might be, to form notions of what should be and what is not yet (Greene, 1995, p. 19). Consequently, authentic learning always reaches beyond itself towards a completeness that can never be attained. As aptly stated by Greene (1995, p. 28), releasing students’ imagination ‘is not to resolve, not to point the way, not to improve. It is to awaken, to disclose the ordinarily unseen, unheard, and unexpected’. This makes authentic learning a perpetual ‘narrative in the making’ (Greene, 1995, p. 5) – a democratically educative experience ‘that is always in the making’ (Greene, 1995, p. 39). It is for the latter reason that authentic (positive) learning is concomitantly linked to a democratic education in becoming, where ‘[n]o one can predict precisely the common world of possibility we will grow to [co]inhabit, nor can we absolutely justify one kind of community over another’ (Greene, 1995, p. 167) – that is, pedagogical encounters remain out of bounds. A democratic community of possibility in which individuals co-exist, says Greene, is one that embraces pluralism and does ‘not fly apart in violence and disorder’ (1995, p. 167). Such a community of possibility engages individuals to ‘speak with others as eloquently and passionately as ... [they] can about justice and caring and love and trust’ (Greene, 1995, p. 167). In a way, Greene’s call for a democratic community of possibility – a democratic community in becoming – intimates that teachers and students become more responsive to societal injustices, such as people being subjected to insecurity as a result of crime and violence; those suffering under corrupt governments and dictatorships; and others stunned by lives in refugee camps. Therefore, teachers ‘need to be attentive and vigilant if ... [they] are to open texts and spaces, [and] if ... [they] are to provoke the young [students] to be free’ (Greene, 1995, p. 121). Greene places vigilance at the centre of the concept of authentic learning and suggests some interesting distinctions that further expand the concept. Authentic learning therefore gains a new meaning that perhaps is beyond current human understandings if thought of in relation to vigilance. In the first instance, to be vigilant is ‘to awaken’ in students an awareness of the ‘ordinarily unseen, unheard, and unexpected’ (Greene, 1995, p. 28). To be vigilant is to be cautious and suspicious, yet attentive and open to something different and new. This view of vigilance is corroborated by Applebaum (2013, p. 19), who states that vigilance ‘involves listening not simply to confirm what is already known but listening to hear something new ...’. More importantly, vigilance implies being able to listen to the voices of the marginalised when they suffer injustices – that is, vigilance insists that teachers and students show their ‘outrage at injustices’ (Greene, 1995, p. 42). In this way, vigilance does not only involve listening to what is beyond recognition, but also that teachers and students remain in discomfort about the injustices and ‘identify moments where the new can emerge’ (Applebaum, 2013, p. 34) – that is, where new authentic learning can occur. Such a notion of vigilance intimates the possibility that students take an ethical and political stand. And when students act ethically and politically they listen with an openness so that there is always more to learn – they are stirred ‘to wide-awakeness, to imaginative action, and to renewed consciousness of possibility’ (Greene, 1995, p. 43). When vigilance interrupts the minds of students they become ‘conscious’ – that is, pursue a kind of thinking that always involves a risk, a venture into the unknown, and thus become open to new ways of looking at things, what Greene refers to as ‘the making of a democratic community’ (Greene, 1998, p. 126). A potent example of authentic learning in which vigilance is at play, and of the notion of a democratic community in becoming, is poignantly illustrated in the film In the land of blood and honey , directed by Angelina Jolie in 2011. Against the backdrop of the Bosnian war in the 1990s, when Serbs committed atrocious genocidal acts against Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims and Croats), Danijel, a soldier fighting for the Serbs, falls in love with Ajla, a Muslim. The romantic relationship soon garnered the dissatisfaction of Danijel’s ruthless father – a Yugoslav People’s Army general, and Danijel and Ajla were confronted with the unfamiliar, the unexplored, and the unexpected. Ajla, once used as a human shield by Serbs against resistant fighters, also witnessed the genocidal killings and sniper assassinations, and the torturous rapes of women (including herself) in prison camps. Danijel, although in many ways sympathetic towards Bosniak killings as a consequence of his love for a Muslim, could not look beyond his parochialism towards pluralism and accept that every person had a legitimate right to life, irrespective of one’s hatred for them. Only when he himself eventually killed Ajla did he realise the senselessness of the Bosnian war and surrender to the United Nations forces as a criminal of war. Now for Danijel to have acted vigilantly and with the human freedom to enact justice towards those whom he disliked would have harnessed his learning in an authentic way. It is not that he did not learn from his dogmatic blindness and prejudice towards unjust Serbian atrocities. Of course he did, otherwise he would not have acted unjustly. However, such learning is frivolous or useless, as he acted freely under coercion from his father’s external influence and the suspicion he harboured towards the Bosniaks, who made an attempt on his life by bombing a church that he attended. What Danijel failed to do, unlike Ajla, was to have ventured into the unfamiliar, the improbable, where there always was the possibility to think differently about his situation. Ajla knew that her love affair with Danijel upset the Bosniaks, yet she did not let the hatred of the Bosniaks blind her to recognise even her torturers’ (Serbs) right to existence. Unlike Danijel, Ajla was prepared to embark on a new beginning (with Danijel), in which they could have opened themselves up to the possibility of human co-existence by writing the texts of their democratic community in becoming. If a democratic community in becoming provides the space in which human action is disclosed in potentially unexpected and unpredictable ways, it makes sense to bring into the discussion Danjel’s predicament after he killed Ajla. If Danijel wanted to reverse his act of having killed Ajla – the one he loved – he would have had to consider two things: to seek the forgiveness of Ajla’s community, and to promise not to repeat his acts of violence towards other Bosniaks. Therefore he gave himself up as a war criminal. In other words, forgiving and promising are never enacted in solitude or isolation, but rather, as stated by Hannah Arendt (1998, p. 237), in the ‘public realm through the presence of others ... for no one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound by a promise made only to himself ...’. By implication, for human freedom to ensure rebeginnings it has to embark on action informed by forgiveness and making promises. Forgiveness implies the unexpected public acknowledgement of one’s act of evil (even if possible, just retribution might ensue), considering that one would be unable to undo the past, whereas promising implies committing oneself in the presence of others to put an end to something, such as heinous crimes that would go on endlessly if there were no interference. In the words of Arendt, ‘only through this constant mutual release [of forgiving and promising] from what they do can [wo]men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a power as that, to begin something new’ (Arendt, 1998, p. 240). The issue of forgiveness and making promises not to repeat unjust and undesirable human action has implications for authentic learning. Firstly, teachers and students always act in community. They are dependent on one another ‘without intimacy and without closeness’ in that they treat one another with respect, irrespective of the distance that the space of the world puts between them (Arendt, 1998, p. 243). If students were to be guilty of committing an unexpected and undesirable act – such as bullying another student, abusing drugs, or threatening a teacher – there is always the possibility that their transgressions will be subjected to the correctives of forgiveness and making promises. Condemnation and exclusion perhaps would not be possible, as forgiveness and making promises will engender possibilities to begin anew. A common example in South African schools is the rising incidence of pregnancies in teenage girls. The girls, upon informing the school of their pregnancy, often find themselves in a situation where their continuing attendance of school becomes extremely problematised by unsupportive school structures, perhaps even judgemental teachers, and they would encounter great difficulty in re-accessing the school after they have given birth. In many respects, their appeals for compassion and forgiveness either to their schools or their respective communities are met by exclusion, rather than forgiveness and acceptance. Secondly, making and keeping promises has the potential to undermine the spurious condition of sovereignty (Arendt, 1998, p. 245). In fact, making promises in the presence of others binds a person in a non-sovereign way to others and, for once, teachers’ views might not be considered as the sovereign and predicable calculations in pedagogical encounters. Making promises has some connection with the inability of individuals just to rely on themselves ‘as isolated islands of certainty’ (Arendt, 1998, p. 244). Rather, by making and keeping promises, teachers and students are connected in a non-sovereign way, so that the mastery and predictability of human action becomes self-defeating. There will always be more to learn and it would be impossible for teachers and students to remain ‘unique [sovereign] masters of what they do’ (Arendt, 1998, p. 244). Thirdly, human action that takes the risk to forgive and be forgiven should make any pedagogical encounter concerned with the possibility ‘to start anew ... in an ever-recurring cycle of becoming’ (Arendt, 1998, p. 246). This means that an authentic pedagogical encounter is always an interruption and a beginning of something new, especially in the light of human unpredictability and unreliability in a world marred by conflict, transgressions and suffering. The point about authentic learning in a positively free manner, unconstrained by the sovereignty of the other, is the fact that learning has no end and that what is to be learned will always be strange to the one who learns otherwise, learning will have reached its becoming. Authentic learning in becoming is always open to the new, the unexpected, the strange – a matter of retaining the un-bounded and strangeness of both teaching and learning. Authentic learning, therefore, includes being confronted with incidents of bullying, discrimination, teenage pregnancies, teenage suicide and homophobia – since these are all constitutive of our societal condition and cannot be wished away. Authentic learning requires of teachers to be willing to deal with the aforementioned in an open and unbiased fashion so that what emerges are forms of engagement that move towards recognition of otherness and PEDAGOGY AND DIALECTIC OF FREEDOM 63 forgiveness of transgressions. It is to a discussion of teaching as strangeness that I now turn. TEACHING AND STRANGENESS Authentic learning, as has been argued for thus far, has the best chance of being realised if teachers in pedagogical encounters are attentive and vigilant, provoking students to ethically and politically open up the texts of their lived experiences. Such pedagogical encounters would invariably remain open to the unfamiliar, the unpredictable, the unexpected – that is, the possibility of rebeginnings would be enhanced through such democratic spaces in which nothing remains certain and where there always is the possibility to begin anew. In this way, learning would be authentic and informed by positive human freedom. Such an account of authentic learning invariably depends on a particular way of teaching, which Greene suggests should be associated with strangeness (1995, p. 92). The teacher as stranger enacts her rupture as a way of finding herself in relation to others (her students) as she cultivates a pedagogical encounter. A teacher does not arrogate students, but comes to experience students through the eyes of a stranger in order ‘to see’ the unfamiliar, the unheard of (Greene, 1995, p. 92). In a way, teachers as strangers suspend both what they desire to see and try to control students’ desire. As aptly stated by Jo Anne Pagano (1998, p. 260): Most students come to the texts we teach as strangers. Greene teaches us that we must also come to those same texts as strangers, even though the syllabus is ours and filled with our questions, loaded with our desires. To teach our students to read so as to teach [positive] freedom and to choose freedom of humane action, we need to open landscapes to admit their questions, to change the landscape by honoring the identities they bring to the series of indentifications they will make.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › FW – A2: Debate isn’t political

The skills they get from engaging our aesthetic performance are key to politics in an accelerating world

Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 9-10", )//guyB

This rejection of rhetoric (and cookery) because they are based on habit and pleasure, and not on ‘true understanding’, ultimately means doing away with the tools that a community might use to deal with fast-moving sphere of politics. What is important here is the way in which the rejection of forms of practice which lack ‘real understanding’ is also frequently a rejection of modes of thought and practice which are rooted in the body. In rejecting flattery – whether cookery or rhetoric – Socrates explicitly rejects forms of practice and understanding rooted in the affects (pleasure), and in habit (embodied forms of knowledge). Indeed, Plato’s account of knowledge and morality ultimately ends up not just with a flight from the world of becoming, but very explicitly with a flight from the body, as he explains his vision of judgement in the afterlife wherein ‘the soul has been stripped of the body’ (131, 524d). Here we see the way in which Socrates’ rejection of politics is tied to his rejection of speed, and both are tied to his rejection of the body. Socrates is, in the language of Nietzsche (to which we will return in the fourth chapter), a ‘despiser of the body’ (1976: 146). His rejection of the body also means the rejection of a variety of mechanisms that the Athenian body politic uses to interrogate political and ethical questions, articulate beliefs, and manage conflicts. As Latour says of the political tools which Socrates jettisons: About what do[es Socrates] talk so irreverently? Cookery first, and then the skills of the greatest playwrights, the greatest sculptors, the greatest musicians, the greatest architects, the greatest orators, the greatest statesmen, the greatest tragedians. All of these people are dumped because they don’t know what they know in the didactic fashion that Professor Socrates wants to impose on the people of Athens. ( Latour 1999: 244) What Latour is here describing is a society that manages the conditions of politics – number, priority, urgency – by relying on a variety of arts, occurring at a variety of tempos. Whether it be tragedies in which political and moral issues are dramatized (Butler 2000) (Honig 2013), sung poems which communicated moral and political norms (Havelock 1963), public orations in which political questions are debated ( Aristotle 1991), public works of art and architecture which create a public space to manage and organize these political debates ( Arendt 1998) (Cuboniks 2018: 77), or even arts of cookery which underpin communal experiences of eating (Panagia 2009: Ch. 5). Crucially even as many of these sites rely on conscious thought and reflection, they also fold in affects, habits, memories, and corporeal qualities which prepare and shape political sensibilities for the complex and speedy encounters of the agora. As we will discuss in Chapters 2 and 3 , it is exactly the affect imbued character of thought that allows it to respond effectively to a quickly unfolding pace of events. And in both our discussions of Spinoza and Bergson, we will see accounts which, contra Socrates, seek to valorize the role of habit as a way of building both individuals and societies which can respond effectively to a ‘speedy’ pace of life and politics. Socrates’ rejection of the tools of politics is thus ultimately tied to his rejection of the body, and both are crucially tied to his fear of speed. One of the central goals of this book will be to tease out the relations between speed, politics, and the body, noting that theoretical work on the body is frequently helpful, and indeed necessary, in navigating the seeming impasses that the problem of speed introduces into the practice of politics. This focus on questions of bodily practice links us to the last theme that this book will explore.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › FW – A2: Debate isn’t political

Their description of debate as devoid of politics reveals their Socratic cowardice towards political speed

Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 1-3", )//guyB

This card is eh idk at first I was gonna cut it to be an aff “debate isn’t political” card but then I realized the bottom half of the card critiqued that idea so ig it goes neg

Isolates urgency as a generative point of Socrates hatred, very linked to acceleration

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › FW – A2: You Link Too – 2NC

We don’t link- our critique isn’t of all idealism but of their specific invocation of stability and normative dialogue in the face of a rapidly accelerating world

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics",

This quote brings out another important element of Nietzsche’s thinking. Looking at Nietzsche’s critique of idealism, we might begin to take him for a kind of vulgar realist, criticizing flights of philosophical fancy. This is to misunderstand the complexity of Nietzsche’s conception of the world of becoming. Nietzsche never takes what the “world” is for granted and, with his focus on creativity, even were “one” to know what the “world” is, the world—and “one”—would almost certainly change immediately. But that is exactly the point. Nietzsche affirms that the world is a world of change, of becoming, of uncertainty, of contingency (and therefore necessarily of suffering and disappointment). This is the world that we live in, and the world in which we must act.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › FW – A2: Ressentiment Good – 2NC

Ressentiment isn’t resentment- their impact turns aren’t responsive

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics",

Just defines ressentiment and resentment, says they’re different things

Ressentiment should not be confused with resentment. Resentment, a sense of anger over pain or injury we may have suffered (of whatever sort), is a natural response, as is the attempt to challenge or overturn the sources of these pains or injuries.12 Nietzsche (1976) does not council a kind of ascetic rejection of judgment, simply accepting everything as it comes—in which case, we would become, in his words, the ass which can only bray “Yeah-yuh” (p. 424)—nor is he arguing for a Christian “turning of the other cheek.” Being angry, resentful, unhappy, and so on are all perfectly acceptable to Nietzsche so long as—and this is crucial—they serve as a spur to action. So long as your resentment or anger becomes a vector for productive intervention in the world, then they have the potential to be good or noble. The trouble with ressentiment is that, counter to resentment, it does not act as a spur to productive action (although it does still frequently spur reactive behavior, a distinction I will shortly explain). Quite the contrary, ressentiment is resentment crystallized and spiritualized, and thus focuses not on any particular agent or actor, but rather simply on the world as a whole. Ressentiment expresses itself as a generalized resentment against a world that allows pain and suffering to occur. It frequently manifests as a rejection of the world, and the imagining of a world of perfection in opposition to this “imperfect” world. Nietzsche (1968a) makes clear how this drive to idealization is linked to ressentiment and the spirit of revenge. “To talk about ‘another’ world than this is quite pointless … we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of ‘another,’ a ‘better’ life” (p. 49). This link between idealization and revenge is displayed quite strongly, Nietzsche (1968b) says, in many of the major works of metaphysics in the Western canon: Psychology of Metaphysics—This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world;—this world is conditional; consequently there is an unconditioned world;—this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction;—this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being:—all false conclusions … It is suffering that inspires these conclusions: fundamentally they are desires that such a world should exist; in the same way, to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the ressentiment of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative. (pp. 310–311) “It is suffering that inspires these conclusions” and ressentiment is “expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer.” This is the danger of ressentiment and how it differs from resentment. Resentment is a part of living in the world for Nietzsche, a world which produces suffering and which therefore must be responded to. But ressentiment takes one out of the world. It orients one’s actions to other worlds, worlds which do not exist.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › FW – A2: Some things are calculable

Our argument isn’t that nothing is contingently knowable – it’s that we will never know everything about the world works

Glezos 20 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 10-5-2020, Routledge, "Speed and Micropolitics Bodies, Minds, and Perceptions in an Accelerating World, pp 80", )//guyB

Turning to Spinoza as a way of helping to understand and combat the rise of ressentiment against speed might appear to be a curious decision as, at first blush, it seems as if Spinoza’s metaphysics are themselves an instance of ressentiment against speed. This is because explicit in Spinoza’s monistic ontology is a complete rejection of contingency. Spinoza views all things as unfolding according to a strict conception of necessity. As he says, ‘[n]othing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way’ (I P29). Everything that happens is fully determined according to the requirements of being. Our perception of contingency is merely the result of our inability to grasp the complete web of causality that determines any action, outcome, or decision. Indeed, in Spinoza’s metaphysics, even God is not capable of contingency saying, ‘God does not act from freedom of will’ (I P32C1) but rather from the necessity of his nature. Despite this rejection of ontological contingency, Spinoza’s work is actually surprisingly useful in helping us understand how people react to contingency in an accelerating world. This is because of the way in which his epistemology works alongside his ontology. For Spinoza, humans are always constrained by our finiteness, and hence our understanding will always be premised upon inadequate knowledge. As such, the perception of contingency in life is ineradicable. It is true that, through rational thought we are able, in a certain way, to perceive things sub specie aeternitatis. But this only relates to understanding the formal logical rules which govern existence. It does not lead us to be able to actively grasp (or predict) all of the web of causal factors which lead any individual ‘thing’ to occur (II P16–17). (And all of this before Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism, with its determinations and limitations of thought, is brought into the mix.) From this perspective, our perception of infinite being will always be incomplete, and we will always see the world as full of contingency. It does not matter if metaphysically there is no freedom or indeterminacy in deus cive natura. Our lives as modal beings will always be replete with uncertainty, no matter how much we might learn about the universe.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › 2AC---Framework Bad

Framework is equivalent to Robot Prison Guards – monitoring debaters for outward psychic rebellions that break the norm and responding with rage, psychic violence, and exclusion

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Page 129, October 2021, MG)

Quickly migrating beyond the use of robots to physically guard prisoners, this prototype project represents that moment when robots first began to evolve beyond their purely mechanical function as prison guards to the more complex task of carrying out psychiatric assessments of the behavioural patterns of prison inmates. While it could be expected that robots would first enter prisons in the traditional roles of surveillance and control, the three robots involved in the demonstration project have a very different task: namely, to mingle among a captive population as only a five-foot robot can do and, while “looking more friendly to the inmates,” conduct an active search for signs of suicidal and violent behaviour. It’s not so much, then, a demonstration concerning the feasibility of using robots in prison environments but actually an experiment with very general applications for perfecting an operating system allowing robots to conduct complex psychiatric examinations of prisoners. At this point, we move beyond cinematic images of prisons of the future with robotic guards in towers carefully monitoring prison populations to that moment when technology actively penetrates the human psyche in search of “risky behaviour.” Here, robots are no longer mechanical devices, but artificial psychiatrists equipped with 3D vision, motion detection, and programmed operating systems, all aimed at discerning visible signs of melancholy, rage, despair, desperation, fatigue, and hopelessness. While it is not evident from media reports how robots are to fulfil complex psychiatric examinations – other than the mention of the demonstration robots monitoring abrupt changes in the behaviour of individual prisoners – the intention is clear: for prison guard robots to cross the boundary between surveillance from the outside of captive bodies to internal explorations of psychic behaviour. Guided by a prescriptive doctrine concerning the parameters of “risky behaviour,” what is really being tested here is robots as avatars of the new normal, conducting frequent visual examinations of a chosen, and necessarily captive, population in order to determine which bodies fall inside and outside of the normative intelligibility determined by the artificially defined ethics of “risky behaviour.” In this case, it is the responsibility of those bodies placed under surveillance to provide no outward signs of either visible dissent (violence) or refusal of the state’s power over life (suicide).

While at first glance it might seem that guard robots are not programmed with levels of artificial intelligence and, perhaps, artificial affectivity necessary to detect otherwise invisible signs of powerful emotions internal to the psychic life of prisoners, what may be brought into political presence here is an entirely new conception concerning how power will operate in the robotic future: not so much the great referentials of power over death, or even power over life, but power over visible expressions of human affectivity – a form of robotic control that assumes the psyche is not a form of internal being but a kind of external doing; that is, the psyche is not something we have but something we do. In this scenario, what is important about the human psyche for purposes of the society of control is less the complexities of hidden intentions – the cultural acedia associated with feelings of melancholy, resentments that activate rage, total powerlessness that motivates despair – than those visible, outward manifestations of the rebellious psyche, that moment when the bodily psyche moves from the long, silent gestation of hidden intentionality to overt declarations of its intention to act, whether through violence or suicide. At that point, at least according to this prototype demonstration, robot guards will be waiting along the watchtower of the society of control, quickly targeting immanent signs of psychic rebellions against the order of normative intelligibility, relaying warnings to central command, all the while standing by for further instructions.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › 2AC---Scenario Analysis Bad

The way we discuss the future matters – analyzing hypothetical scenarios primes us for neurological modification

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 41-43, October 2021, MG)

Sound dystopian? It promises an unfolding technological future powered up by optogenetics where, with neural implant devices yet to be created, the brain will be opened up to radical psychic surgery by lightactuated technologies with the aim of disappearing lived memory, substituting in its place artificial memories – “sensory percepts” – of a past that will probably be all the more vivid, compelling, calming, soothing, and haunting precisely because it never actually happened. However, in the usual way of things technological, if optogenetics as a dystopian gateway into neural modification of the brain can sound so ready-made menacing, that is probably because it is a latecomer to the real-live games of politics in the age of neural modification by those other circulating light-actuated screens of mass media. Here, producing false memory syndrome, memories of events that are all the more real because they never actually occurred, is the normal business of contemporary media imaginaries. The skilful combination of spectacular televised spectacles, mass suggestion, and mesmerizing rhetoric provide an instant gateway into the politically effective neurological modification of cerebral cortices living under the personal and collective stress of impotent anger, unabated rage, and hysterical anxiety. For example, consider the implantation of synthetic percepts in the form of false memory syndrome so spectacularly performed on that always fabled day of moral reckoning in American political consciousness, 4 July 2020, where, with memories of other Independence Days from Sherman’s military conquest of Atlanta to the Declaration of Independence itself, President Trump took to the symbolically hallowed, and deeply colonized, ground of Mount Rushmore in the Black Hills of North Dakota to rework American political memory with silence on the pandemic, mockery of Black Lives Matter, and the declaration of a new civil war based on warring racial relationships and featuring a beleaguered and threatened population of vulnerable white Americans assaulted by menacing hordes  – Black Lives Matter and their allies in the streets as part of a resurgent “leftwing fascism” – coming to steal American history, to obliterate cultural memory itself. Everything was there: televised spectacle with the carved presidential faces on Mount Rushmore in the background, a mass crowd as a real-life stand-in for the hoped-for mass audience of American television viewers, and mesmerizing rhetoric of the war spirit based on equal mixtures of panic fear and proud belligerence that was immediately circulated everywhere through the media stream. This contemporary inversion of the Sermon on the Mount, with its emphasis this time on the war spirit not the love spirit, did not have to wait for future breakthroughs in the neuroscience but deployed light-based technologies ready at hand, the screen culture of television and social media, as its very own neural implants for communicating new memories  – true for some, false for others – from the digital world to the only psychic structure that really counts politically, the liquid, fluid brain matter of American mass society, in order to accomplish the neurological modification of the collective American cerebral cortex. That the neural implant was successful could be immediately verified by those experimental demonstrations in the streets: white jaguars being driven into crowds of protesters and shootings of anti-racism protesters by palpably anxious white men and women armed with guns locked and loaded.

In contemporary quantum culture, there are no necessary causal links, only deeply entangled relationships among fast-moving particles moving in the same web of space and time: positional, relative, and connected. This vector of twisted memories, as its moves at high velocity through the mediascape, sometimes takes the form of a futurist announcement from DARPA concerning engineering neural implants for fast communication between digital reality and the brain; at other times, it’s streamed in all its hauntingly prophetic vividness by the cinematic imaginary and, then again, makes its presence felt affectively as the basic code of contemporary political neurology. Here, neuroscience, futurist cinema, and political campaigning are themselves different twists taken in this entangled story of twisted memory: recombinant in its movements, bendable in time and space, and always travelling at high velocity. Of course, as with all important technological changes, neuroscientific research in optogenetics remains at the periphery of human attention until, once fully realized, the consequential results are moved instantly from the edges of human awareness to its very centre. Perhaps more than is realized, optogenetics promises to be the capstone of technology’s relentless movement from the exterior of the body to its deepest interiority, involving as it does the stated engineering aim of providing a gateway into the cerebral cortex, not only changing behaviour but providing for the potential implanting of new visual memories. Following the ideological formula that eases public accommodation to radical technological change, optogenetics was introduced in the language of facilitation, namely the promise of facilitating medical breakthrough. Once successfully adopted, the real implications of optogenetics as command language of the approaching age of neural modification will be imposed: neural implants for remembering a past that never existed, algorithms for mood modification, three-dimensional light-based treatments for screening away the differences. The once and future migration of neuroscience from the language of facilitation to command will itself be facilitated by the fact that we are now preparing to enter a future we have already long visually inhabited through the cinematic imaginary and which, moreover, we have already experienced at a deep affective level through the fabulations of twisted memory as the emotional alphabet of contemporary politics.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › 2AC---Improvement Bad

The will to self-improve is a smokescreen for the move to a data-driven life – that culminates in the violent transformation of subjectivity into the “thinglike”

Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 33-34, October 2021, MG)

Palpable signs that we are already living in the midst of the singularity are provided by the growing cultural appeal of what has been described as the “quantified self movement.” In this scenario, bodies strap on their mobile prosthetics, digitally tattoo themselves with an array of wearable electronic sensors, calibrate their social media lives by complex, flexible forms of digital self-tracking made possible by those new clouds of digital cumulus drifting across the global sky, and turn the previously unmeasured, untracked, and perhaps even unnoticed into vibrant streams of shareable data. Essentially, the surface of the body, as well as its previously private interiority, is transformed into GPS data in the greater games of augmented reality. Except, this time, data bodies are not so much using mobile phones to scan graphics that open onto a previously invisible world of graffiti, games, and advertising, but envelop the body in a big GIF (graphics interchange format) of its very own – a digital penumbra of numbers about eating, sleeping, loving, and working that provides an electronic shadow for tracking bodily activities. Suddenly, we find ourselves living in an age of the body and its digital shadow; this complex cloud of hyper-personalized data points is not just accumulated by mobile bodies as they track their way through life but is always spinning away from the body in fantastic reconfigurations of comparative databases that may be perfect receptacles for social sharing but are also measuring points for better individual living.

Thought of in purely astronomical terms, the quantified self movement is like a protostar  – a dense concentration of “molecular clouds where stars form.”9 Here, the newly emergent data self quickly throws off qualitative cultural debris from its past, thus committing itself to the daring gamble of seeking to quantify the unquantifiable, to literally construct a DIY body, one measurement at a time, that takes close account of lessons to be learned, data to be shared, measurements to be undertaken, numbers to be calculated, results to be reflected upon, and activities to be improved, upgraded, and overcome by its digital double – life by numbers. In any event, for a society in which complex mergers between machine intelligence and human bodies are underway, one important adaptive response on the part of an always flexible human species is to transform subjectivity in the direction of that which is required for smooth admission to the end times of technological singularity. If the language of power is data, if the language of connection is convergence, and if the privileged value is speed, then what could be better than a coherent, comprehensive, and creative plan for reproducing a form of “self” that eerily mimics the etymological meaning of data as “thinglike”? Refusing the intuitive, throwing off the ineffable, and breaking forever with the imaginary, the quantified self movement reverses the traditional order of human subjectivity by making the thing-like character of quantifiable data both the precondition and goal of individual identity in the age of nonbiological intelligence. Unlike traditional Christian monasteries that provided physical shelter in good times and bad for the idea of the sacred and its associated religious institutions, the quantified self movement promulgates, in effect, a new order of digital monasticism that puts down roots in the psychic dimension of human subjectivity itself. With being data its primal act of faith, with the meticulous, even obsessive, calculation of life’s quanta – be it empathy, happiness, sex, or cardiovascular health – as its social practice, and with meetups of members of the quantified self movement as its mode of confessional, this new monastic order heralds the eclipse of traditional expressions of human subjectivity and the triumphant emergence of the thing-like – the “data-driven life” as the form of (technological) self now taking flight at the dawn of the singularity.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › 2AC---Revenge DA

Revenge DA: their framework standards scapegoat critical debate and leave the door open for authoritative figures to assert themselves- our attempts at engagement will never be enough which culminates in hateful exclusion within debate

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics",)//guyB ** edited for gendered language

Explains ressentiment as a “reactive power” which “separate[s] active force from what it can do”

This probably internal link turns their political engagement offense

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Framework › 2AC---C/I

Debate should situate itself within the paradox of acceleration, actively resisting the resentful impulse for complete stability- we accept the innate tension between humanity’s desire for security and the dynamic nature of the world

Glezos 14 (Simon Glezos, Ph. D. in political theory and international relations from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, 5-22-2014, Sagepub Journals, "Brown’s Paradox: Speed, ressentiment and global politics",

We must therefore begin to cultivate a third way, a response which does not so much try to resolve Brown’s Paradox, as re-inflect. Such an approach would seek to embrace the power and opportunities which an accelerating world provides, using them to resist the exploitation and violence inherent in the contemporary world. However, at the same time as it sought some amount of security for individuals, it would be willing to accept that a certain amount of contingency and instability in the world is ineradicable. It would ensure that this desire for stability did not manifest as a reactionary drive for the exclusion and erasure of difference, nor through a totalitarian drive for complete mastery over contingency. It would thus be a politics that attempted to express itself as, in Nietzsche’s words, an “active force,” which is to say a force which expresses itself, which builds a world to its specifications, but does so with an understanding, and even affirmation, of the limitations of life in “this world.” Such a politics therefore would rigorously have to root out the sense of ressentiment against speed, and become comfortable with living, organizing, and taking action, in an accelerating world of becoming. Learning to live within a paradox (without resorting to tactics of violence or transcendence to overcome or resolve the paradox) is no easy thing. In recent years, many thinkers have tried to develop strategies for how to live within the confines of paradoxes which they considered to be constitutive of political life. William Connolly (1991), for example, repeatedly engages with the question of what he terms “the paradox of identity,” the tension between the fact that we must simultaneously “accept the indispensability of identity and live within the medium of identity while refusing (while struggling vigorously to refuse) to live [our] own identity as intrinsic truth” (p. 46). Chantal Mouffe (2005) struggles with what she terms “the democratic paradox,” the tension between democracy as that which expresses the will of the people and that which protects and expresses the rights and agencies of the individual (pp. 2–3). Although each of these paradoxes relate to specific topics, they are fundamentally linked to the issues I raise, insofar as all are about the tension between the human desire for stability and certainty (stable identities, stable communities, stable borders), and the recognition that individual flows will always disrupt those certainties (and the further recognition that suppressing those flows entirely would require escalating, and ultimately infinite, violence). All are thus about the tension between being and becoming. We can therefore look to the way these other thinkers seek to deal with paradox. In both cases, these two thinkers advocate the importance of recognizing the ineradicability of paradox. Mouffe (2005) says that “it is vital for a pluralist democratic politics to expose and acknowledge paradoxes” (p. 16), and Connolly (1991) argues that we must learn to think “within the code of paradox” (p. 60). Note that this recognition of paradox, this attempt to live within paradox, does not involve a complete letting go or rejection of our desires of stability. To do so would be to succumb to the temptation to will away the paradox (as in the neoliberal approach). Connolly recognizes the inescapable dimension of identity, Mouffe accepts (and lauds) the importance of a sense of community, and I understand the importance of some sense of stability to the lives of individuals and communities. However, living within the paradox also means acknowledging that these certainties will always be marked by an inescapable degree of contingency. This does not mean letting go of our desire for stability, but it does mean loosening our attachment to it, recognizing the necessity (and indeed desirability) of some amount of difference, individuality, and flux in the world. This loosening of attachment is not easy, and cannot simply be the result of policy prescription. It will also mean challenging dominant narratives of identity, and working on the affective sensibilities of individuals and communities to make them more capable of coping with a certain amount of uncertainty and instability in the world. A second trajectory of future research on speed will therefore have to focus on how to draw on narrative and affective resources to inculcate a sense of comfort with uncertainty, and fight against the pull of ressentiment. 16 In an ideal world, this project of loosening people’s attachments to stability would begin to integrate with the project of making them less subject to the violence of global acceleration, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.17 As people become more secure, they become less subject to ressentiment-laden tendencies. At the same time, as they affectively fight off the ressentiment-driven desire for stability, they potentially become more willing to engage in active political tactics which might actually provide for greater security and stability. Lessened ressentiment against speed might provide the conditions of possibility for greater solidarity and alliance building across borders and differences, a greater willingness to take advantage of some of the powers which global acceleration provides. Here we might look to increasing examples of global solidarity networks (Castells, 2012; Glezos, 2012: ch. 5) and to transnational labor activism (Stillerman, 2003). Let us be clear; this possibility of a feedback loop associated with living within paradox should not be taken as a resolution of that paradox. We must remember that this paradox is fundamentally irresolvable, and thus that it will be the source of an ongoing political struggle over crucial questions (“How much stability is enough?”; “How much velocity is desirable?”). This struggle will always run the risk of falling into either ressentiment against speed or indifference to the pain that it causes. This is as it should be. As Mouffe (2005) puts it, when it comes to paradox “[N]o final resolution or equilibrium between those two conflicting logics is ever possible, and there can be only temporary, pragmatic, unstable and precarious negotiations of the tension between them” (p. 45). The best that we can do is try to ensure that we live that paradox deliberately

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › 2AC---AT: Will to Technology Good

Warming can’t be solved for centuries – impact inevitable

IPCC 21 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – Report compiled by nearly 100 scientists and authors and trusted worldwide as a leading source on climate change, “Climate Change 2021”, IPCC, 9 August 2021, , MG)

If the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere starts to go down, the Earth’s climate would respond to this 31 change (FAQ 5.3, Figure 1). Some parts of the climate system take time to react to a change in CO2 32 concentration, so a decline in atmospheric CO2 as a result of net negative emissions would not lead to 33 immediate reversal of all climate change trends. Recent studies have shown that global surface temperature 34 starts to decline within a few years following a decline in atmospheric CO2, although the decline would not 35 be detectable for decades due to natural climate variability (see FAQ 4.2). Other consequences of human36 induced climate change such as reduction in permafrost area would take decades, and yet others such as 37 warming, acidification and oxygen loss of the deep ocean would take centuries to reverse following a decline 38 in the atmospheric CO2 concentration. Sea level would continue to rise for many centuries to millennia, even 39 if large deliberate CO2 removals were successfully implemented.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › 2AC---AT: Will to Technology Good

No impact to warming

Jayaraj 21 --- Vijay Jayaraj, M.Sc., Environmental Science, University of East Anglia, England, Research Contributor for the Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation., “Why I Am a Climate Realist”, Cornwall Alliance, March 11th 2021, https://cornwallalliance.org/2021/03/why-i-am-a-climate-realist/

The answer to my question trickled in slowly over a number of years. Evidence began to emerge that scientists acknowledged a large gap between the actual observed real-world temperature datasets (from satellites) and those temperature predictions from computer climate models.

While these differences may not prove the allegations against the Climategate scientists, they do confirm one thing: the computer climate models exaggerate the future warming rate due to their high sensitivity to carbon dioxide emissions. As a result, the models continue to show an excessive and unreal warming rate for future decades.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Case › 2AC---AT: Will to Technology Good

Even if they win we affect technology - it complicates security dilemmas and makes extinction inevitable - three scenarios.

Dyer-Witheford and Matviyenko, 19 [Nick Dyer-Witheford is an author, and associate professor at the University of Western Ontario in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies. His area of study primarily focuses on the rise of technology and the internet, as well as their continuous impact on modern society and Svitlana Matviyenko is an Assistant Professor of Critical Media Analysis in the School of Communication, “Cyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism,” 2019, University of Minnesota Press]//Townes language [modified]

As we have argued, from 1945 on, the hegemonic status of the United States, as the world’s chief capitalist power, was intrinsically related to the development of computers and networks. The role of digital systems in its military–industrial complex, initially tightly coupled with nuclear weapons, spread through other aspects of its war-making system as well as through the general economy. In both aspects, it contributed to the United States’s eventual Cold War victory. In the aftermath of that victory, the United States continued to develop its digital military capacities into the ever more direct weaponization of network, creating the technological– human assemblages of what is today referred to as cyberwar. The scope of NSA global surveillance and sabotage programs and the sophistication of the Stuxnet nuclear centrifuge-destroying malware are only the most manifest instances of this process, which is today an integral part of a wider upgrade of U.S. military capacities that ties together a nuclear primacy with the militarization of space and drone warfare. Accompanying and spurring on this process is the additional dynamic of cyberwar adoption by the forces antagonistic to the global dominance of the United States and its allies. These antagonists include the defeated socialist powers, Russia and China, now paradoxically resurrected as capitalist competitors in the world market, or, in the case of North Korea, surviving in a macabre afterlife of state socialism. They also include the forces of militant Islamic jihadism, beckoned into existence by the West as an anticommunist ally, only to become its opponent in the long war on terror. All these actors converge on the militarization of digital networks. Many observers today see a moment that recapitulates the decline of previous imperial hegemons within the global capitalist system—Spain, Holland, Britain—and parallels the moments of extreme instability as old powers and new contenders confront each other.7 The rise of cyberwar is part of this tumult and quite possibly a precursor and preparation for widening and intensifying conflict. Schematically, we can envisage three potentially intertwining trajectories such a process might take:

Network degradation. Alexander Klimburg (2017) outlines the possibility of a “darkening web” characterized by persistent and gradually intensifying cyberwar between states and between states and terrorist movements conducted in a variety of registers. Security breaches, aggressive malware, and botnet attacks proliferate. Digital industrial sabotage and critical infrastructure attacks begin to multiply, as do the accidental runaway effects of cyberweapons. Networks are deeply and chronically infected with computational propaganda, fake news, and viral mis- and disinformation. In response to adversarial incursions, states intensify algorithmic surveillance, censorship, and preemptive virtual policing. Cybersecurity provisions become increasingly mandatory and elaborate. Attribution problems, falsification of evidence, and the overlap between military and intelligence forces and criminal networks create a chaotic digital twilight of hacking and trolling, botnets and viruses, malware, surveillance, and bugs, shutdowns, blocking, and filtering, in which uncertainties exacerbate suspicions and hostilities, altogether making the internet increasingly impossible to use. In short, the “darkening web” is what already exists now, only more so. One of the cofounders of Twitter, Evan Williams, offered his diagnosis, suggesting that “the Internet is broken” (Streitfeld 2017). But maybe it’s not. Maybe the internet is finally what it was always meant to be. Maybe it is perfect, but not for us, the excommunicated user-subjects. For cyberwar.