2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › 2AC---No China Transition
Beckley 17 [Beckley, Michael, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion”, ]//AA
China’s neighbors can check Chinese maritime expansion and will remain ca¬pable of doing so for the foreseeable future. Given this regional balance of power, the United States should adopt an “active denial” strategy to preserve the territorial status quo in East Asia. The strategy would aim to raise the costs of military aggression for China, without backing it into a corner, and would have three main elements. First, the United States would bolster the A2/AD capabilities of China’s neighbors by providing them with loans, arms, training, and intelligence. The goal would be to turn China’s neighbors into prickly “porcupines,” capable of denying territory to China but not of taking and holding terri¬tory themselves.168 Second, the United States would create buffers between U.S. and Chinese forces by stationing most U.S. forces in hardened bases scattered around the East Asian periphery, where they could be called upon in the event of war but otherwise kept beyond the reach of most of China’s forces.169 Decreasing the number of U.S. forces near China’s borders would reduce the likelihood of air and naval clashes, help reassure China that the United States does not intend to launch massive strikes on the Chinese mainland at the outset of a crisis, and increase the resilience of U.S. forces in the region by reducing their exposure to Chinese preemptive attacks. Third, the United States would backstop the local balance of power in war-time, but would plan to do so gradually. In minor conflicts, the United States would try to convince China to back down by using nonmilitary forms of coer-cion.170 The United States is uniquely empowered to impose financial sanc¬tions and embargoes on hostile countries (and to deny enemies the ability to respond in kind) because of its central role in global banking, plentiful energy resources, and unparalleled ability to disrupt international shipping and communications networks.171 In the initial stages of a conflict, therefore, the United States could use financial sanctions, embargoes, or cyber operations to try to achieve “victory without violence,” as it did in compelling Iran to ne¬gotiate curbs on its nuclear program and in deterring Russia from annexing eastern Ukraine.172 If the conflict escalated to war, the United States could initially “lead from behind,” supporting local forces with logistics, intelligence, and, if absolutely necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese forces operating in the combat theater rather than those stationed on the Chinese mainland. These strikes could be conducted from submarines, stealth aircraft, or road-mobile shore-based missile batteries strung along the first island chain—all of which are far less vulnerable to Chinese A2/AD forces than surface ships and non-stealth aircraft. If the United States needed to ratchet up the pain, it could es-calate horizontally before doing so vertically—that is, by opening new geographic fronts (e.g., by blockading the Strait of Malacca) rather than pour-ing U.S. forces into the main combat theater. This strategy obviously sacrifices military effectiveness for the sake of en-hancing crisis stability. The U.S. military could gain a major advantage over the PLA if it simply unloaded on China’s bases, missile batteries, satellites, and radar installations at the outset of a conflict. The U.S. military generally favors this type of knock-out-punch strategy and for good reason: pinprick strikes and gradual escalation invite a grinding war of attrition. Why give the enemy a chance to fight back? Offensive doctrines make sense against weak states that do not have nuclear weapons. Against China, however, a military posture primed for rapid escala¬tion could be a recipe for disaster. For starters, an offensive posture risks turning minor disputes into major wars. China might be tempted to shoot first during a crisis, in a desperate at-tempt to stun the United States before the U.S. military wipes out the PLA’s offensive forces.173 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and China’s interven-tion in the Korean War are just two examples of this “use it or lose it” logic in action. In the years ahead, many events can, and almost surely will, spark crises between the United States and China; the two countries have long¬standing disputes over freedom of navigation, North Korea, Taiwan, and human rights, among other issues. A sensible U.S. security policy, therefore, must balance the need to deter China with the need to prevent disputes from escalating. Second, an offensive U.S. posture vis-à-vis China risks turning conventional wars into nuclear wars.174 Some of the systems that support China’s conven¬tional military forces—missile batteries, radars, satellites, submarines—also support its nuclear arsenal, so Chinese leaders might mistake U.S. strikes on these systems as a preemptive attack on China’s nuclear deterrent. Moreover, some PLA officials have suggested that China would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against a conventional attack on its homeland. Perhaps these declara- tions are bluffs, but is it really so hard to imagine that, in the heat of battle and when facing the potential loss of its offensive forces, China might fire off a nu¬clear weapon in the hopes of shocking the United States into a cease-fire? If China were poised to overrun East Asia, then it might make sense for the United States to risk nuclear war to check Chinese expansion. Better to address the problem than repeat the mistakes of the interwar period and appease ag¬gressors. China, however, is incapable of going on an Imperial Japan–style rampage across East Asia, so the stakes for the United States in a war between China and its neighbors would be moderate, and the main danger would be in doing too much rather than too little.175 Instead of rushing into a war with China, therefore, the United States should pick its battles selectively, escalate gradually, and let local actors do most of the heavy lifting. Some scholars argue that the United States should simply pull U.S. forces out of East Asia and hand over all responsibility for balancing China to local actors.176 Retrenchment, however, not only would reduce U.S. influence in the region, but also degrade crisis stability by undermining deterrence. China might be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and ramp up coer¬cive pressure on its demoralized neighbors. As Thomas Christensen has shown, successful security policy requires a balance of reassurance and deter-rence.177 Retrenchment is skewed too heavily toward the former. An active denial strategy, therefore, remains the United States’ best defense policy toward China. The strategy maintains deterrence, by reducing China’s ability to achieve a quick military victory, while enhancing crisis stability, by reassuring China that it will not be cold-cocked on the first day of a war. Compared to slaying the forces of fascism and communism, stabilizing East Asia is an admittedly underwhelming call to greatness. It is not a mission that Americans are any more eager to undertake than the great geopolitical cam¬paigns of the twentieth century. But it is just as virtuous and just as vital.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › 2AC---No China War---Interdependence
Joseph S. Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21,
Dimensions of US-China Interdependence There are many strands of interdependence in the US-China relationship, and the symmetry of vulnerability varies with each one. Former Australia Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently summarized six different dimensions.9 Trade Over the past decade, the United States received 19 percent of China’s exports, while China represented only 8 percent of US total exports. China’s leadership knows that the United States can inflict more damage on China from trade than vice versa, but they also know that US consumers are dependent on a range of goods that cannot be readily replaced in the near-term. Thus, despite a two to one asymmetry, “America does not have all the cards in this game, and China knows it.”10 There are limits to the power that comes from asymmetrical interdependence. Foreign Direct Investment In 2019, the total stock of US FDI in China reached US$269 billion while Chinese FDI in the United States reached US$145 billion, but annual flow rates have been decreasing as distrust on both sides tightens policy constraints. Rudd concludes that decoupling is happening in this area more rapidly than expected. Technology China’s program “Made in China 2025” and the goal to be first in Artificial Intelligence by 2030 have led the American government and companies to be more wary about a high degree of technology interdependence with China. Rudd concludes that a significant degree of technological decoupling is underway and that it “began nearly two decades ago when China decided to embark on internet sovereignty to restrict the free flow of information to its citizens.” A significant degree of technology decoupling is underway. Capital Markets The overall financial relationship is over US$5 trillion, including nearly two trillion in Chinese listings on US stock exchanges and US$l.3 trillion in Chinese official holdings of US government bonds. Rudd argues that “whatever strategic difficulties these two governments may have with each other, it continues to be in each countries’ interests to maintain these arrangements.” In other words, little decoupling. Currency Markets While China would like to see the yuan play a larger role in world markets, it is unwilling to make the domestic reforms to create deep and flexible convertible currency markets and a rule of law needed for the yuan to become a major reserve currency. Only 2 percent of global reserves are held in yuan; 62 percent are held in US dollars. The status quo will persist for a time. Education, Research, and Talent Over three million Chinese students have been educated in American universities over the past 20 years, and over 350,000 Chinese students study in the US each year. Over the past two years, however, there was a decline in international enrollments in American universities, and policy changes have made various types of visas more difficult to obtain. Rudd concludes that there are early signs of decoupling in the area of talent. Military There are other dimensions of interdependence in addition to the economic ones surveyed by Rudd, and they include military and environmental interdependence. In military terms, both countries hold each other hostage in nuclear deterrence, and despite the aspirations for strategic missile defense technology, it is unlikely that this relationship can be decoupled (for one thing, there are many ways to deliver weapons of mass destruction). Moreover, both countries are positively interdependent in slowing the spread of such weapons. Previously a one-time proliferator, China has become a supporter of the international non-proliferation regime. Environmental In the case of the environment, scientific evidence shows that climate change can do great damage to both countries. For example, melting glaciers in the Himalayas as well as in Greenland could inflict serious costs. China has now surpassed the United States as the largest producer of greenhouse gases, and together, China and the United States produce 40 percent of the global total. Neither country can solve this problem alone, nor can either decouple from it. Climate change obeys the laws of physics, not politics. And the 2020 coronavirus reminds us that pandemics respond to the laws of biology. Although epidemiological interdependence is asymmetrical, using it as a strategic weapon instead of cooperating would run a high risk of unintended consequences with uncertain strategic gains. Overall, while some types of interdependence produce asymmetrical vulnerabilities that can be used as weapons, other types produce a mutual vulnerability that is difficult to escape without cooperative measures. If power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, it is important to distinguish power over others from power with others. In some instances, such as climate change, power over interdependence can only be obtained with others. It is important to distinguish power over others from power with others.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › 2AC---No China War---Interdependence
Joseph S. Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21,
Understanding power and interdependence in the US-China relationship depends on understanding strategic objectives. If the US relationship with China is zero sum and China’s long-term objective is to destroy it, much like the aspirations of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s, then the less interdependence the better—though, as we have seen, some will be unavoidable. If, on the other hand, the relationship is more a mixed game or a cooperative rivalry in which coexistence is built into the environment, then US strategic objectives must include stability as well as competition, and interdependence can be used for both cooperative and rivalrous goals.
Deterrence is one example of when interdependence can be beneficial to enhance cooperative goals. Entanglement, or the existence of various interdependences, can mean that an attack would cause serious costs to both the attacker and target; it can mean that there are benefits to continuing the status quo. In other words, entanglement is an important means of making an actor perceive that the costs of an action will exceed the benefits, thus contributing to deterrence.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: China › No China Heg
Beckley 17 [Beckley, Michael, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion”, ] AA
China’s neighbors can check Chinese maritime expansion and will remain ca¬pable of doing so for the foreseeable future. Given this regional balance of power, the United States should adopt an “active denial” strategy to preserve the territorial status quo in East Asia. The strategy would aim to raise the costs of military aggression for China, without backing it into a corner, and would have three main elements. First, the United States would bolster the A2/AD capabilities of China’s neighbors by providing them with loans, arms, training, and intelligence. The goal would be to turn China’s neighbors into prickly “porcupines,” capable of denying territory to China but not of taking and holding terri¬tory themselves.168 Second, the United States would create buffers between U.S. and Chinese forces by stationing most U.S. forces in hardened bases scattered around the East Asian periphery, where they could be called upon in the event of war but otherwise kept beyond the reach of most of China’s forces.169 Decreasing the number of U.S. forces near China’s borders would reduce the likelihood of air and naval clashes, help reassure China that the United States does not intend to launch massive strikes on the Chinese mainland at the outset of a crisis, and increase the resilience of U.S. forces in the region by reducing their exposure to Chinese preemptive attacks. Third, the United States would backstop the local balance of power in war-time, but would plan to do so gradually. In minor conflicts, the United States would try to convince China to back down by using nonmilitary forms of coer-cion.170 The United States is uniquely empowered to impose financial sanc¬tions and embargoes on hostile countries (and to deny enemies the ability to respond in kind) because of its central role in global banking, plentiful energy resources, and unparalleled ability to disrupt international shipping and communications networks.171 In the initial stages of a conflict, therefore, the United States could use financial sanctions, embargoes, or cyber operations to try to achieve “victory without violence,” as it did in compelling Iran to ne¬gotiate curbs on its nuclear program and in deterring Russia from annexing eastern Ukraine.172 If the conflict escalated to war, the United States could initially “lead from behind,” supporting local forces with logistics, intelligence, and, if absolutely necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese forces operating in the combat theater rather than those stationed on the Chinese mainland. These strikes could be conducted from submarines, stealth aircraft, or road-mobile shore-based missile batteries strung along the first island chain—all of which are far less vulnerable to Chinese A2/AD forces than surface ships and non-stealth aircraft. If the United States needed to ratchet up the pain, it could es-calate horizontally before doing so vertically—that is, by opening new geographic fronts (e.g., by blockading the Strait of Malacca) rather than pour-ing U.S. forces into the main combat theater. This strategy obviously sacrifices military effectiveness for the sake of en-hancing crisis stability. The U.S. military could gain a major advantage over the PLA if it simply unloaded on China’s bases, missile batteries, satellites, and radar installations at the outset of a conflict. The U.S. military generally favors this type of knock-out-punch strategy and for good reason: pinprick strikes and gradual escalation invite a grinding war of attrition. Why give the enemy a chance to fight back? Offensive doctrines make sense against weak states that do not have nuclear weapons. Against China, however, a military posture primed for rapid escala¬tion could be a recipe for disaster. For starters, an offensive posture risks turning minor disputes into major wars. China might be tempted to shoot first during a crisis, in a desperate at-tempt to stun the United States before the U.S. military wipes out the PLA’s offensive forces.173 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and China’s interven-tion in the Korean War are just two examples of this “use it or lose it” logic in action. In the years ahead, many events can, and almost surely will, spark crises between the United States and China; the two countries have long¬standing disputes over freedom of navigation, North Korea, Taiwan, and human rights, among other issues. A sensible U.S. security policy, therefore, must balance the need to deter China with the need to prevent disputes from escalating. Second, an offensive U.S. posture vis-à-vis China risks turning conventional wars into nuclear wars.174 Some of the systems that support China’s conven¬tional military forces—missile batteries, radars, satellites, submarines—also support its nuclear arsenal, so Chinese leaders might mistake U.S. strikes on these systems as a preemptive attack on China’s nuclear deterrent. Moreover, some PLA officials have suggested that China would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against a conventional attack on its homeland. Perhaps these declara- tions are bluffs, but is it really so hard to imagine that, in the heat of battle and when facing the potential loss of its offensive forces, China might fire off a nu¬clear weapon in the hopes of shocking the United States into a cease-fire? If China were poised to overrun East Asia, then it might make sense for the United States to risk nuclear war to check Chinese expansion. Better to address the problem than repeat the mistakes of the interwar period and appease ag¬gressors. China, however, is incapable of going on an Imperial Japan–style rampage across East Asia, so the stakes for the United States in a war between China and its neighbors would be moderate, and the main danger would be in doing too much rather than too little.175 Instead of rushing into a war with China, therefore, the United States should pick its battles selectively, escalate gradually, and let local actors do most of the heavy lifting. Some scholars argue that the United States should simply pull U.S. forces out of East Asia and hand over all responsibility for balancing China to local actors.176 Retrenchment, however, not only would reduce U.S. influence in the region, but also degrade crisis stability by undermining deterrence. China might be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and ramp up coer¬cive pressure on its demoralized neighbors. As Thomas Christensen has shown, successful security policy requires a balance of reassurance and deter-rence.177 Retrenchment is skewed too heavily toward the former. An active denial strategy, therefore, remains the United States’ best defense policy toward China. The strategy maintains deterrence, by reducing China’s ability to achieve a quick military victory, while enhancing crisis stability, by reassuring China that it will not be cold-cocked on the first day of a war. Compared to slaying the forces of fascism and communism, stabilizing East Asia is an admittedly underwhelming call to greatness. It is not a mission that Americans are any more eager to undertake than the great geopolitical cam¬paigns of the twentieth century. But it is just as virtuous and just as vital.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
LIO › 2AC---LIO Good---Laundry List
Deudney and Ikenberry, PhDs, 18
(Daniel, PoliSci@JohnsHopkins, G. John , InternationalAffairs@Princeton, , 6-14)
In many respects, today's liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order's success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winnertake- all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues. Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation. Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences. Today's dire predictions ignore these past successes. They suffer from a blinding presentism. Taking what is new and threatening as the master pattern is an understandable reflex in the face of change, but it is almost never a very good guide to the future. Large-scale human arrangements such as liberal democracy rarely change as rapidly or as radically as they seem to in the moment. If history is any guide, today's illiberal populists and authoritarians will evoke resistance and countermovements.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
LIO › AT: LIO Impact Turn
Fontaine, MA, 16
(Richard, , 11-30)
Successive presidents have used U.S. power to bolster the international order’s rules and punish transgressors. In the seven decades since the world shifted away from a spheres-of-influence order ruled by might alone, the liberal order has helped to preserve peace among the great powers, foster economic prosperity, and facilitate the spread of freedom. That’s why Republican and Democratic presidents alike have emphasized the importance of world order, while differing in key ways about how best to shape and bolster it. Democratic U.S. President Barack Obama’s 2015 national security strategy document, for instance, devotes an entire section to international order, stressing the United States’ obligation to reinforce and create “the rules, norms, and institutions that are the foundation for peace, security, prosperity,” and human rights. For Republican President George W. Bush, the goal was “to use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to build an atmosphere of international order and openness.” On the campaign trail, Trump articulated a very different view. Poorly negotiated trade pacts, he argued, have killed American jobs and sent them to lower-wage and currency-manipulating nations. U.S. taxpayers spend billions of dollars to uphold the country’s disproportionate responsibilities, while free riders grow prosperous off of the stability Washington provides. The United States takes on security responsibilities better left to locals, and the effort to fill vacuums and right wrongs on the world stage leads to misguided adventures such as the interventions in Iraq and Libya. Put this way, it’s clear why many Americans might reasonably conclude that the United States’ traditional role in global order is a raw deal and that a major course correction is needed—and soon. Indeed, a key lesson of the presidential election is that globalization and its current structures aren’t working for a major portion of the U.S. population. The traditional arguments used to defend globalization have fallen flat. If the global order, buttressed by U.S. power, purports to generate the blessings of security, prosperity, and freedom . . . well, a lot of Americans feel they’ve been missing out. They’re on to something. The international order so cherished by modern presidents has become increasingly frayed in recent years. Russia continues to challenge basic norms of sovereignty and self-determination in eastern Europe, and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has upended the notion of borders in the Middle East. China’s globally competitive state-owned enterprises have revealed gaps in global trade rules, and the United States has had little recourse to stopping its currency manipulation. Beijing’s claims over virtually the entire South China Sea and its attempts to limit freedom of navigation there pose a serious challenge to the traditional maritime order. North Korea and Iran have pursued nuclear programs in defiance of nonproliferation rules. Despite a formal embrace of universal human rights by the greater international community, freedom in the world continues a decade long decline. And just at the moment when the order needs bolstering, a number of the United States’ closest allies in Europe have embraced austerity and curtailed their spending on defense and foreign aid. In turn, they have looked, once again, to Washington to do the heavy lifting. It is clearly tempting for the United States to walk away. Yet to do so—or, more likely, to let the liberal order wither under neglect—would be profoundly dangerous. Its creation was a response to the destructive wars, economic depressions, and rise of dictatorships that marred the first half of the twentieth century. Since then, the world has seen the longest period of great-power peace in modern history, the largest number of people ever pulled up from poverty, and an unprecedented expansion of democracy. To paraphrase British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the liberal order is the worst form of international organization—except for all the others.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
LIO › 2AC---LIO Good---Checks Russia/China Expansion
Deudney and Ikenberry 21 – Deudney is a Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 11/26/21 (Daniel and John, “Getting Restraint Right: Liberal Internationalism and American Foreign Policy”, Survival, Volume 63 Issue 6, accessed 6/22/2022)//jd
Within this balance-of-power alliance the United States may be dominant, but its writ stops far short of empire. It is a hierarchical order with liberal characteristics – a mixed and complex system built around institutions, bargains, partnerships, alliances and norms of diffuse reciprocity.41 What is distinctive about this type of order is that it is bargained, with the lead state providing services and frameworks for cooperation. In return, it invites participation and compliance by other states, starting with the subsystem of liberal democracies. In formal terms, there are three features of liberal hegemony that separate it from empire. Firstly, the leading state sponsors and operates in a system of negotiated rules and institutions. Power disparities still afford advantages to the hegemonic state, but the arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power is reined in to the degree required to keep the order going. Secondly, the leading state provides an array of public goods – or club goods – in exchange for the cooperation of other states. Historically, these have included security and support for an open trade regime.42 Thirdly, the hegemonic order provides channels and networks for reciprocal communication and influence. These informal ‘voice opportunities’ arise from informal access to the policymaking process of the hegemonic state and the intergovernmental institutions that make up the system.43 Alliances and multilateral institutions provide mechanisms for communication and ‘pulling and hauling’ between states within the order.44 While formal decision-making is not shared, the system works more like a pluralist domestic regime than an empire.45 The United States’ hegemony does afford it asymmetrical power. While this leaves partners with less influence, it also facilitates collective decision-making.46 Those exhorting America to ‘come home’, motivated by a critique of America as empire, are arguing for a world order which will advance and not retard empire in the international system. The Quincy prescription of radically reducing the US global footprint is an invitation to other powers to extend their imperial reach. Other great powers, notably China and Russia, have been quite explicit in their ambition to extend their domination of neighbouring peoples and to create regional and world orders that reflect and support their anti-democratic, anti-liberal and kleptocratic qualities. The liberal order among democracies, led by the United States, remains the best middle path between anarchy and empire. For the United States to abandon it would mark a historic decline in the prospects for individual liberty, democratic accountability and social justice.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
LIO › 2AC---LIO Good---Solves Hypocrisy
Mazarr, PhD, 18
(Michael J, SeniorPoliticalScientist@RAND, , 8-7)
With 70 years of hindsight, it is clear that some of the hopes of the architects of the postwar order have been at least partly fulfilled. The multilateral processes those architects created have helped stabilize the global economy and deter aggression. By aligning three-quarters of the world economy around a broad set of norms, they created a powerful gravitational pull toward stability at the center of world politics. Nations knew that to sustain their competitiveness, they could not oppose the prevailing order. By joining its own power to this multilateral project, moreover, the United States helped legitimize its role in the world—and earned forbearance for the times when it failed to live up to its own ideals. Allison argues that the order-busting hypocrisy of U.S. military action since 2001 “speaks for itself.” But few international behaviors speak for themselves. They are interpreted by other countries in the context of wider understandings of power and purpose. The association of U.S. power with a shared order has helped mitigate reactions to its misuse. The United States may well have reached the end of this tolerance, which is why Allison’s instinct for restraint hits the mark. But the answer is to reinvigorate, not forsake, the multilateralism that once assuaged antagonism toward U.S. power. The creators of the postwar order set out to do something both limited and revolutionary. They aimed to work within the constraints of national self-interest and international balances of power to build institutions and processes that could shape the character of world politics. The system they made has succeeded in important ways, even if only as one of several factors that have kept the peace and made the world rich. As the world enters an era of greater international competition, U.S. policymakers should take care not to underestimate the importance of the postwar system. The order is far from a myth; it is the United States’ most important competitive advantage.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
LIO › 2AC---LIO Sustainable
Ikenberry 18 – is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 3/9/18 (John, "Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive", Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 32.1, accessed 6/22/22)//jd
This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. The logic of hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica, the nineteenth-century hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. For hegemonic realists, the debate today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war order? Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China, beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the lurking questions of the power transition perspective. But does this vision of power transition truly illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic leadership. Here one would note that there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order. Far-flung security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain intact. But there may be even deeper sources of why the liberal world order will survive 19 continuity in the existing system. This would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might be that the power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American power. In fact, international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power. The rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power. This is true in two respects. First, international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions. There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions, starting with the United Nations. There is a sprawling array of international institutions, regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights, and political relations. Some of these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise, they do not simply confront an American-led order; they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states. The United States embraces many of the core global rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization. But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others. Generally speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the Responsibility to Protect. Second, there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the international order. The struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority. That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations. These observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power transition. Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and institutions and not others. Moreover, stepping back, the international orders that rising states have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order. The British-led order that Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. The contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past orders. It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms. There are also both regional and global domains of governance. This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and institutions. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, change in the existing American-led order might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation. The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
LIO › 2AC---LIO Sustainable
Deudney and Ikenberry 21 – Deudney is a Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 11/26/21 (Daniel and John, “Getting Restraint Right: Liberal Internationalism and American Foreign Policy”, Survival, Volume 63 Issue 6, accessed 6/22/2022)//jd
Since the middle of the twentieth century, as American power and influence has expanded, so have its liberal accomplishments. Over seven decades under American auspices, the post-war liberal international order has lifted more boats in terms of economic growth and rising incomes than any other order in world history. It provided a framework for struggling industrial societies in Europe and elsewhere to transform themselves into modern social democracies. Japan and West Germany were integrated into a security community and were able to fashion distinctive national identities as peaceful great powers. Western Europe subdued old hatreds and launched a grand project of union. With American prodding, European colonial rule in Africa and Asia largely came to an end. The G7 system of cooperation among Japan, Europe and North America fostered growth and managed a sequence of trade and financial crises.61 Beginning in the 1980s, countries across East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe opened up their political and economic systems and joined the broader order. As the United States experienced its greatest success as a world power with the peaceful end to the Cold War, countries around the globe wanted more, not less, US leadership. These monumental developments are rarely mentioned in indictments of American liberal internationalism.62 Modern liberal states are built around various values that are sometimes in tension with one another – liberty and equality, individualism and community, openness and social stability, hierarchy and sovereign equality. The Western system provided a framework within which liberal states could manage these trade-offs. The post-war system of ‘embedded liberalism’ provided mechanisms and capacities for these states to define the terms of economic openness. Governments were given tools to reconcile and balance the benefits of open trade with demands for economic stability and social protection. The alliance system facilitated sharing the costs of security protection. Alliances – along with the wider system of multilateral institutions – produced greater solidarity and community among Western and rising non-Western liberal democracies. The bargains and institutions behind the liberal-international order gave these states the ability to balance hierarchy and sovereign equality. The United States used its pre-eminent position to underwrite and lead the order, but its binding institutional ties with other liberal states produced a restraint on its power. The fostering of cooperation among the world’s democracies did not eliminate old-style power politics, which the United States and other liberal states continued to practise inside and outside the Western system. But the deep accomplishment of the post-war liberal order was the construction of a cooperative environment in which liberal democracies could provide tools and capacities to enable governments to navigate economic and security interdependence, balance their often conflicting values and principles, and secure rights and protections for their societies.63 This US-led order reflected liberal statecraft, rooted in republican and liberal theory. It was and remains a pragmatic and reform-oriented endeavour to strengthen the ability of liberal democracies to survive and flourish. In a world of rising interdependence and illiberal great-power challengers, liberal democracies will surely want to renew rather than abandon their distinctive, liberal-internationalist approach to order building.64
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
LIO › 2AC---LIO Sustainable
Deudney and Ikenberry 18 - Deudney is a Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, July/August 2018 (Daniel and John, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order", Foreign Affairs, , accessed 6/22/22)//jd
THE RESILIENT ORDER After World War II, liberal democracies joined together to create an international order that reflected their shared interests. And as is the case with liberal democracy itself, the order that emerged to accompany it cannot be easily undone. For one thing, it is deeply embedded. Hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people have geared their activities and expectations to the order’s institutions and incentives, from farmers to microchip makers. However unappealing aspects of it may be, replacing the liberal order with something significantly different would be extremely difficult. Despite the high expectations they generate, revolutionary moments often fail to make enduring changes. It is unrealistic today to think that a few years of nationalist demagoguery will dramatically undo liberalism. Growing interdependence makes the order especially difficult to overturn. Ever since its inception in the eighteenth century, liberalism has been deeply committed to the progressive improvement of the human condition through scientific discovery and technological advancements. This Enlightenment project began to bear practical fruits on a large scale in the nineteenth century, transforming virtually every aspect of human life. New techniques for production, communication, transportation, and destruction poured forth. The liberal system has been at the forefront not just of stoking those fires of innovation but also of addressing the negative consequences. Adam Smith’s case for free trade, for example, was strengthened when it became easier to establish supply chains across global distances. And the age-old case for peace was vastly strengthened when weapons evolved from being simple and limited in their destruction to the city-busting missiles of the nuclear era. Liberal democratic capitalist societies have thrived and expanded because they have been particularly adept at stimulating and exploiting innovation and at coping with their spillover effects and negative externalities. In short, liberal modernity excels at both harvesting the fruits of modern advance and guarding against its dangers. This dynamic of constant change and ever-increasing interdependence is only accelerating. Human progress has caused grave harm to the planet and its atmosphere, yet climate change will also require unprecedented levels of international cooperation. With the rise of bioweapons and cyberwarfare, the capabilities to wreak mass destruction are getting cheaper and ever more accessible, making the international regulation of these technologies a vital national security imperative for all countries. At the same time, global capitalism has drawn more people and countries into cross-border webs of exchange, thus making virtually everyone dependent on the competent management of international finance and trade. In the age of global interdependence, even a realist must be an internationalist. The international order is also likely to persist because its survival does not depend on all of its members being liberal democracies. The return of isolationism, the rise of illiberal regimes such as China and Russia, and the general recession of liberal democracy in many parts of the world appear to bode ill for the liberal international order. But contrary to the conventional wisdom, many of its institutions are not uniquely liberal in character. Rather, they are Westphalian, in that they are designed merely to solve problems of sovereign states, whether they be democratic or authoritarian. And many of the key participants in these institutions are anything but liberal or democratic. Consider the Soviet Union’s cooperative efforts during the Cold War. Back then, the liberal world order was primarily an arrangement among liberal democracies in Europe, North America, and East Asia. Even so, the Soviet Union often worked with the democracies to help build international institutions. Moscow’s committed antiliberal stance did not stop it from partnering with Washington to create a raft of arms control agreements. Nor did it stop it from cooperating with Washington through the World Health Organization to spearhead a global campaign to eradicate smallpox, which succeeded in completely eliminating the disease by 1979. More recently, countries of all stripes have crafted global rules to guard against environmental destruction. The signatories to the Paris climate agreement, for example, include such autocracies as China, Iran, and Russia. Westphalian approaches have also thrived when it comes to governing the commons, such as the ocean, the atmosphere, outer space, and Antarctica. To name just one example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which has thwarted the destruction of the ozone layer, has been actively supported by democracies and dictatorships alike. Such agreements are not challenges to the sovereignty of the states that create them but collective measures to solve problems they cannot address on their own. Most institutions in the liberal order do not demand that their backers be liberal democracies; they only require that they be status quo powers and capable of fulfilling their commitments. They do not challenge the Westphalian system; they codify it. The un, for example, enshrines the principle of state sovereignty and, through the permanent members of the Security Council, the notion of great-power decision-making. All of this makes the order more durable. Because much of international cooperation has nothing at all to do with liberalism or democracy, when politicians who are hostile to all things liberal are in power, they can still retain their international agendas and keep the order alive. The persistence of Westphalian institutions provides a lasting foundation on which distinctively liberal and democratic institutions can be erected in the future. Another reason to believe that the liberal order will endure involves the return of ideological rivalry. The last two and a half decades have been profoundly anomalous in that liberalism has had no credible competitor. During the rest of its existence, it faced competition that made it stronger. Throughout the nineteenth century, liberal democracies sought to outperform monarchical, hereditary, and aristocratic regimes. During the first half of the twentieth century, autocratic and fascist competitors created strong incentives for the liberal democracies to get their own houses in order and band together. And after World War II, they built the liberal order in part to contain the threat of the Soviet Union and international communism. The Chinese Communist Party appears increasingly likely to seek to offer an alternative to the components of the existing order that have to do with economic liberalism and human rights. If it ends up competing with the liberal democracies, they will again face pressure to champion their values. As during the Cold War, they will have incentives to undertake domestic reforms and strengthen their international alliances. The collapse of the Soviet Union, although a great milestone in the annals of the advance of liberal democracy, had the ironic effect of eliminating one of its main drivers of solidarity. The bad news of renewed ideological rivalry could be good news for the liberal international order.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---AT: Multipolarity Inevitable
Klein ’21 [Brian P.; Brian P. Klein is a geopolitical and economic strategist. He previously served as a U.S. diplomat and trade official.; 12-30-21; " The Many Signs of American Renaissance”; https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-many-signs-of-american-renaissance-51640801897; Barrons; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]
The end of 2021 couldn’t come fast enough. A year that started with January’s insurrectionist storming of the Capitol is ending with Omicron’s December surge, threatening a tentative economic recovery. And plenty of bad news happened in-between. Social strife, rising inflation, a disastrous U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, and political gridlock in Washington makes it seem like America is an empire in decline. Except that the data doesn’t back up this catchy political punchline. Rather than another year highlighting the inevitable end of U.S. economic and political influence as authoritarian governments rise around the world, 2021 showed an American renaissance in the offing. The U.S. economy is poised for a strong 2022. That’s making the world’s authoritarian leaders nervous. Driven by the recovery, U.S. international influence is growing again after years of retrenchment. From Moscow to Beijing to Istanbul, excessive state control is causing economic pain for the people in the grip of authoritarianism. Their international political isolation is growing. It’s easy to take a negative view on U.S. prospects. At first glance, perceptions of U.S. democracy around the world are strikingly low among other advanced democracies, such stalwart proponents as the UK, Germany, and Japan. According to an early 2021 Pew research poll, 57% agreed that the U.S. political system “used to be a good example” for others, but only 17% felt that it still is. That seems ominous, but look closer. Another Pew survey of these same countries, also in early 2021, found 61% had an overall positive view of the U.S., compared to the 27% who viewed China favorably. This preference extended to economic relations as well. When asked which country was more important for “strong economic ties,” 64% preferred the U.S. versus 21% choosing China, despite many viewing China as the dominant global economic power. Part of these favorable views may have to do with the U.S. re-engaging with allies. As Russia cuts back on natural gas sales to Europe just as winter bites, the U.S. is increasing exports of liquified natural gas to these countries. Russian troops are on Ukraine’s borders, and Putin is attempting to wring security guarantees out of Washington. But the White House is refusing to be split off from NATO in a joint approach to Moscow. China has amped up military threats to Taiwan. Record numbers of military fly-bys near Taiwan prompted Washington and Tokyo to state their support for the island. Chinese flights dropped dramatically shortly after. China has also sustained its militarization of the South China Sea, despite losing its case under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. In response, the U.S. has strengthened military ties with Australia and India in an actual pivot to an Indo-Pacific strategy. These are not the moves of a country in decline, but rather one that puts alliances first in lieu of unilateral action. As the U.S. economy begins to thrive again, it is helping consolidate global influence chipped away by a more insular approach. The domestic economy has remained remarkably robust, even with the trifecta of supply chain bottlenecks, rising prices, and a Covid slowdown that for several months earlier this year devastated the services industries (restaurants, movie theaters, hotels). Consumer spending rose a solid 8.5% from the beginning of November through late December over the same period a year ago. Holiday-specific sales rose 10.7% over prepandemic 2019 spending levels. This can be partly attributed to forced Covid-induced savings and the Federal Reserve’s seemingly insatiable desire to print money. People have been feeling so flush with cash that they’ve been quitting their jobs in droves. Economic resilience is behind yet another positive trend: Countries around the world are making longer-term bets on U.S. growth with increased foreign direct investment. After several years of declines, inbound FDI soared. For the third quarter of 2021, $74.5 billion flowed into the country, a 68% increase over the same period a year ago. Second quarter figures were 144% higher than the year ago period. And both were significantly higher even compared with 2019 prepandemic levels. How are the leading authoritarian countries faring? According to the OECD, while the U.S. economy expanded by 0.6% in the third quarter over the second, China grew only 0.2%, and Russia declined by 0.8%. The challenges of continued U.S. growth and sustained global influence are hardly insignificant. Threats to a free and fair 2022 midterm election cannot be taken lightly. Failure to pass legislation to stem climate change, bridge the enormous wealth gap, and improve education would certainly degrade U.S. competitiveness. But these would be entirely self-inflicted wounds. And they are largely within Washington’s power to overcome. For countries like China and Russia, their problems are systemic and unlikely to improve because the efforts needed to reverse these trends threaten the authoritarian systems that caused them in the first place—namely, centralized economic control and a rogue’s list of political-military relationships with countries like North Korea, Syria, and Iran. Every new year brings with it hopes for change. As 2022 dawns, signs are good that the U.S. will muster the will to keep this political and economic revival going. That in turn will help reassert a positive influence around the globe when the world needs it the most.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---AT: Multipolarity Inevitable
Saksena ND, leads Defence Businesses and Pre-Sales for Innefu Labs (an information security R&D startup), previously a Product Manager for Reliance Jio’s Security & Loss Prevention vertical; worked with think-tanks, policy advocacy groups, and international affairs journals in the past, (Amit, "Is Multipolarity Inevitable in International Politics?," International Affairs Forum, , kav)
As history will show, realists will argue, and the liberals will nibble on their thumbs, unipolarity often exhibits symptoms of the wave function collapse, a quantum mechanics term which essentially means the return of an object to an initial level, after elevating due to external build-up (factors indirectly affected by the object). Metaphorically applying this definition to the context of sovereign states, gives us the root cause of all the major events which have molded our global politics into its present state. Be it the World Wars, atomic bomb, democratization or the Cold War, history is abounding with examples of unipolarity being only a passing stage in a vicious circle of this global game.
At its climax, the Cold War saw the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., and the United States left as the only superpower in the world. The world order was reset, and amidst extreme chaos and failing governments, the United States emerged as a beacon of hope. Freshly independent states wanted to rebuild themselves in America’s image. Nations worldwide went into a frenzied state of enhancing their economic and politico-social conditions. The underlying principle was simple. The United States was perceived as an individual hegemon. And states, dubious of the hegemon’s intentions, vied to enhance their own influence and security. As neoliberalism dictates, the singular rise of a nation state forces the others to balance its influence, which in turn can only be achieved by individually augmenting their own influence.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---AT: Multipolarity Inevitable
Farrell and Newman 3/7 [Henry J. Farrell, Abraham L. Newman; Henry Farrell is the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Agora Institute Professor of International Affairs at SAIS, 2019 winner of the Friedrich Schiedel Prize for Politics and Technology, and Editor in Chief of the Monkey Cage blog at the Washington Post. Abraham L. Newman is an American political scientist and professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University and Director of the Mortara Center for International Studies.; 3-17-22; "US is the only sanctions superpower. It must use that power wisely”; https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/us-is-the-only-sanctions-superpower-it-must-use-that-power-wisely/articleshow/90285787.cms?from=mdr; The Economic Times; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]
For years, many believed that a world of global economic networks and interdependence — countries intimately connected via supply chains and finances — made war obsolete. That is part of the reason Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was so shocking. But the international economy itself has turned into a battlefield. The conventional war in Ukraine has unleashed a swift and staggering economic conflict, led by the United States and its allies against Russia. And that war is being waged with new weapons, forged in the post-Cold War age of global networks. As much as we talk about multipolar politics, when it comes to global networks, there is just one superpower: the United States. Many global networks have centralized economic chokepoints, and the United States is able to seize these, turning them into tools of coercion. No other country can match this ability. America can now redeploy global networks to entangle and suffocate oligarchs, banks and even entire countries, as Russia has painfully discovered. It is now up to the United States to determine how to steward this enormous power. If it overreaches, it might provoke a military response or create the incentive for its adversaries to create and foster their own alternative networks. The Ukraine war may be a turning point. Will we end up with a fragmented world economy where military and economic conflict become two sides of the same coin? Or will we figure out ways to contain economic conflicts and stop them from spiraling into further military confrontations?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---Decline = Fake News
Jackson, 22 (Lauren Jackson, 1-7-2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, The New York Times, "The Idea of American Decay", https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/07/podcasts/america-decline-capitol-riot.html)
The idea that America is in decline isn’t new. For decades, academics have warned that partisan gridlock, politicized courts and unfettered lobbying were like dangerous substances — if taken in excess, America’s democratic systems were at risk of collapse. But what happens when the idea itself gets mainlined? When words like “died,” “decline” and “dagger” sit near “America” on front pages across the country? When a majority of the American public rewrites the story they tell themselves about their country’s standing in the world? That’s what some experts say is happening now — that the Capitol riot and its aftermath have normalized a sense among Americans that the country, its economic system and its standing in the world are in decline. New data supports this claim: 70 percent of Americans believe the U.S. is “in crisis and at risk of failing,” according to a recent poll. Fortifying America’s democracy is not just about ensuring the trustworthiness of elections, but also about safeguarding Americans’ belief in the possibility of change. So what happens when that self-conception falters — when Americans begin to believe their country isn’t winning, but instead is losing a long battle? A fractured collective narrative at home “Jan. 6 and then the Republican reaction is a really important turning point in the perception of American decline,” said Francis Fukuyama, a political scientist and author. Mr. Fukuyama noted that while he had been writing about American political decay for years, the concept had assumed more systemic import after the Capitol riots — and wider acceptance. Just a few years ago, a majority of Americans believed the U.S. was one of the greatest nations in the world. In a Pew Research survey from 2017, 85 percent of respondents said either that the U.S. “stands above all other countries in the world” or that it is “one of the greatest countries, along with some others.” Additionally, 58 percent of those surveyed said the American democracy was working “somewhat” or “very well.” “Prior to the rise of all this populism,” Mr. Fukuyama said, “there was a basic progressive narrative to American history. And that was based on a Declaration of Independence and a Constitution that were flexible enough to be modified over time to be made more inclusive.” “This American narrative that has held us together, it doesn’t hold anymore,” he said, adding that the riot, “more than anything that happened during the Trump presidency, I think does underline that.” Now, nearly two-thirds of respondents in the NPR/Ipsos poll agreed that U.S. democracy is “more at risk” now than it was a year ago. Among Republicans, that number climbs to four in five. This narrative persists on both sides of the political spectrum — with each side pointing the finger at the other as a threat to the nation’s well-being. It’s also a narrative that has direct effects on American democracy — polarizing partisanship on national and local levels, affecting critical legislative functions like passing budgets and limiting social consensus-building in response to crises like Covid. The Themes of the Jan. 6 House Committee Hearings In light of these varied crises, “what is most striking is not what has changed but what has not,” Peter Baker, The Times’s chief White House correspondent, wrote on the anniversary of the Capitol Riots. “America has not come together to defend its democracy; it has only split further apart.” It is this growing chasm that some political theorists say will be most difficult to reconcile in the interest of shoring up America’s democratic institutions. “We have two Americas,” James Morone, a professor of political science at Brown University, said, with Americans in urban centers experiencing the benefits of globalization while many in rural areas feel left behind as the American middle class shrinks. These two Americas also often inhabit opposing factual realities, allowing misinformation to persist and even fuel violence. “And here’s the thing: Each is represented by a different party. That’s one reason the two-party system is breaking down.” Rippling effects abroad This national self-doubt also has implications for the perception of American strength and supremacy globally, a challenge for President Biden’s foreign policy as his administration struggles to win back the global repute thrown into question by four years of “America First.” In his address at the Capitol on Jan. 6, Mr. Biden said, “Both at home and abroad, we’re engaged anew in a struggle between democracy and autocracy.” Donald J. Trump and his allies continue to push a false retelling of the 2020 election, in which Democrats stole the vote and the Jan. 6 riot to disrupt President Biden’s certification was largely peaceful or was staged by Mr. Trump’s opponents. This approach is part of a broader transformation of authoritarian tactics globally, as Max Fisher, the Interpreter columnist at The Times, points out. “Dictators have shifted emphasis from blunt-force repression (although this still happens, too) to subtler methods like manipulating information or sowing division, aimed at preventing dissent over suppressing it,” he wrote. Now, history is being rewritten in Russia, Hungary and China, where governments are repressing and sanitizing elements of national history in favor of contemporary politics — as is also happening in the United States. This tactical similarity with foreign autocrats, some experts argue, throws American ideals into question internationally. “If crucial facts can be denied by a major American party and millions of American citizens, aren’t all American claims to truth and rationality suspect?” said Robert Daly, director of the Kissinger Institute on China. “For as long as I can remember, U.S. democracy, even with its flaws, was held up as the gold standard of democracy worldwide,” said Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America program at the Wilson Center. Now, according to a Pew Research survey, a median of just 17 percent of respondents said democracy in the U.S. is a good example for others to follow. America still benefits from some positive reputational assessments around the world, with a majority of respondents to the Pew survey expressing favorable opinions on America’s technology, its military and its entertainment output. But some experts argue those sources of soft power are also under threat in conjunction with democratic backsliding. “One of the side effects of losing the democracy is losing control over the markets,” Rebecca Henderson, a professor at Harvard Business School, said, adding, “I think it’s an incredibly dangerous moment. I think we absolutely could lose the democracy.”
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---Hegemonic Stability Theory
Kovac 2/19/22 [2/19/2022, Kovac, Igor, Igor Kovac, a visiting researcher at The Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS), located at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). He received my Ph.D. at the University of Cincinnati, and he currently serves as the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Slovenian Prime Minister. He has held a pre-doctoral fellow position at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University, and has obtained a M.A. in International Studies from The Vienna School of International Studies, M.S. in Sport Science, and a B.Sc. in International Relations, both from University of Ljubljana respectively., “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, University of Cincinnati, ]//AA
2. PERVASIVE HEGEMONY THEORY “In /a/ sense, money and languages have similar characteristics, and the US dollar is the lingua franca for today’s international monetary system.”58 The crux of the Pervasive Hegemony Theory is the ‘buy-in’ dynamic, by which the hegemon and non-hegemonic states both reinforce the hegemony. Since the latter is defined as a set of rules, norms, and principles of how the hegemon centers the world economy around it. This means that the hegemon and non-hegemonic states either display their commitment to existing economic rules or consensually embrace new ones. Hence, assuming that monetary relations are the most important aspect of economics, and that politics and economics are not independent, the rules composing a monetary system is at the core of hegemony, and its change is my dependent variable. Being interested in enduring hegemony, I want to observe how a hegemony endures even when it must change this quintessential dimension—the monetary system. I operationalize the International Monetary System (IMS) and its rules through the monetary trilemma59 and the manner of its functioning in terms of adjustment, liquidity, and confidence.60 Still, theoretically the more important question is why do non-hegemonic states and the hegemon alike ‘buy-in’? I argue that it is due to the hegemonic ownership of the central monetary unit. Thus, this is my independent variable, which is composed of two elements: first, the central position—referring to the most important node in a network;61 second, the ownership—meaning a control over the production of the monetary unit. Therefore, I operationalize this variable by measuring the network centrality of the hegemon’s monetary unit over time (e.g., reserves, transactions). As such, if the global centrality of the hegemon’s currency is stationary (mean and variance do not change through time)62 even in times of economic crises, and during a subsequent change in the IMS, we can talk about the presence of a ‘buy-in’ and this hegemony may be classified as a pervasive hegemony. Hence, the ownership of a central monetary unit creates a system where the non-hegemonic states can extract the benefits of using the hegemon’s currency only if they ‘buy- in’ first, i.e., reproduce the IMS. The latter sequence is necessary as the hegemon may not be willing to procure its currency, particularly in times of crisis. Moreover, the ownership of the central monetary unit plugs into the risk-aversion of non-hegemonic states, so they do not seek an alternative monetary unit, as existing monetary centrality sufficiently generates the framework for their fulfillment of autonomy and maximizing national interests. Instead of seeking alternatives, they reinforce the new rules of hegemony, i.e., of the monetary system. Subsequently, the hegemon does not roll back its currency, and the non-hegemonic states may continue to reap benefits from using the hegemon’s currency. The hegemon reaches the same conclusion through an opposite perspective. Namely, the hegemon realizes that it is through the provision of a central monetary currency that it can generate a new consensus on the rules, norms, and principles of the IMS that would reflect its own selfish interest better. Therefore, the hegemon is interested in securing such a new monetary system first, before making its currency available. Hence, both sides reinforce the hegemony, while at the same time both sides follow their selfish and rational national interests. US pervasive hegemony, is therefore, the story of US dollar centrality.63 Helleiner sums it up perfectly: “Washington has played little direct role in promoting dollarization abroad. Nevertheless, the United States has profited from this development.”64 For example, according to one estimate, the annual return on US investments overseas is 1.2% higher than its payments on overseas debt.65 However, the literature66 is divided along the fault line of US dollar persistence in its global dominance,67 and an evolution away from US dollar-based system towards multi- currency world.68 Furthermore, it is also skeptical about US benefits from its hegemony.69 Helleiner and Kirshner “argue that there are three distinct sets of /.../ assumptions that dominate the literature on the future of the dollar: those embodied in market-based, instrumental, and geopolitical approaches to the subject.”70 In all three of these approaches one finds scholars that support the decline of US hegemony and predict a bleak future for the US dollar, as well as those who predict the sustainable dominance of the US dollar and hence US hegemony.
The US has created a stable international order, that can be easily undone by diminishing hegemony.
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Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---Economic Sustainability
Kovac 2/19/22 [2/19/2022, Kovac, Igor, Igor Kovac, a visiting researcher at The Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS), located at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). He received my Ph.D. at the University of Cincinnati, and he currently serves as the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Slovenian Prime Minister. He has held a pre-doctoral fellow position at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University, and has obtained a M.A. in International Studies from The Vienna School of International Studies, M.S. in Sport Science, and a B.Sc. in International Relations, both from University of Ljubljana respectively., “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, University of Cincinnati, , AA]
As such, conditions for successful balancing against United States and breaking up its hegemony were perfect in 2008. Thus, if non-hegemonic balancing were to take place, one should expect it to be seen at that point. Such balancing should be reflected in diminishing global confidence in the US dollar and its shrinking role in the global economy. Yet, the story we have experienced since 2008 is very different. Figure 5 shows the contemporary dominant position of the US dollar in comparison to other currencies according to five criteria. Furthermore, looking at the US dollar position dynamically since 2008 brings us to the same conclusion. If anything, the global position, and dominance of the US dollar has actually increased after 2008. It has not stayed the same, nor has it declined. Figure 6 portrays the issuance of international credits and what is astonishing is that with the rise of the amount of credits issued, also the amount of them issued in US dollar increases, while those in Euro or Japanese Yen decrease. Therefore, the US dollar has also strengthened its relative credit issuance position after 2008.
2022
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Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---U.S. Heg High Now
Bessner 22 - is an Assistant Professor in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, 4/7/22 (Daniel, “Ending Primacy to End U.S. Wars”, Quincy Institute, , accessed 6/26/22)//jd
It is painfully obvious today that U.S. officials remain committed to primacy even though the strategy has led the United States into several expensive wars of questionable value to the nation’s fundamental security interests — Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria — all of which have diverted resources that could have been better spent on improvements at home. Moreover, polling suggests that younger generations are becoming increasingly skeptical of primacy and more interested in participating in international organizations, which indicates that now is an apt time to reconsider a grand strategy that decision-makers embraced more than 75 years ago.22 Biden’s August 31, 2021, speech announcing the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan makes Washington’s continued devotion to primacy very clear. The president declared that the United States remains committed to combating threats from “across the world,” from Somalia to Syria, from Iraq to Africa and Asia, and will use its “over-the-horizon capabilities” to launch attacks when and where it thinks it should.23 The entire globe, it appears, remains under the U.S. ambit. Thus the United States retains 750 military bases and other facilities abroad, and thus the nation devotes almost $800 billion per annum to its military budget.24 In his Afghanistan speech, Biden cast China as the central threat to U.S. interests.25 Indeed, in his first speech to Congress as president, on April 28, 2021, Biden affirmed that the United States is “in competition with China and other countries to win the 21st Century.”26 While competition does not necessarily imply military conflict, Biden’s speech was followed by an increased military budget as opposed to other sorts of investments — in science, technology, and education, for instance. In early April 2022, Biden approved an additional $29 billion increase in defense spending.27 This suggests that the Biden administration remains fundamentally committed to primacy — that is, armed global domination. The idea seems to be that either the United States militarily dominates China or China militarily dominates the United States. Among the policy planners, no third scenario can be imagined. It is painfully obvious today that U.S. officials remain committed to primacy even though the strategy has led the United States into several expensive wars of questionable value to the nation’s fundamental security interests. According to primacy’s advocates, the globe cannot peacefully encompass a plurality of powers and interests: It can accommodate only one power that rules through domination, or what is euphemistically termed “leadership” when the U.S. is the hegemon. This is why “primacists” are so worried about China: They view international relations as a zero-sum game. As Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay argue in The Empty Throne, “a world with no leader would leave the United States poorer and less secure than if it continued to lead globally.”28 Indeed, Daalder and Lindsay are quite worried about China, affirming in no uncertain terms that “[a] Chinese-dominated world would not be friendly to the United States.”29 When making arguments such as this, primacists fail fully to consider that a more multilateral world might be defined by cooperation instead of security competition. Rush Doshi, who is currently a member of Biden’s National Security Council, likewise frames international relations in zero-sum terms. In The Long Game, Doshi worries that China has developed “a grand strategy to displace American order” and become “the world’s leading state.”30 The only thing the United States can do, Doshi concludes, is “adopt an asymmetric approach that blunts Chinese advances at lower cost than China expends in generating them.”31 Cooperation is barely thinkable. Over the past several years, U.S.–China relations have soured markedly. The Trump administration, which was replete with China “hawks,” instituted several tariffs on Chinese imports that provoked retaliatory measures and resulted in a minor trade war between the two countries. Trump also undertook several other actions that indicated his administration’s hostility toward China. He launched a vigorous campaign to limit the reach of Huawei, the highly competitive telecommunications giant, eventually pressuring Canadian authorities to arrest Meng Wanzhou, the company’s chief financial officer, on bank fraud charges (charges since dropped). In 2019, Trump’s Treasury Department officially labeled China a currency manipulator; that same year, the president signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, which authorized sanctions against those who commit human rights abuses in Hong Kong. Trump’s insistence that Covid–19 was a “Chinese virus” was merely the crudest reflection of his administration’s view that China was the main threat to U.S. supremacy.32 The Biden administration has similarly pursued a number of policies intended to counter China’s rise. The Federal Communications Commission, the Commerce Department, and the Treasury have blacklisted numerous Chinese companies as the administration has sanctioned several individuals in connection with Beijing’s Hong Kong policy and its treatment of the Uighur population in Xinjiang Province. The administration has also prevailed upon NATO to declare China a security risk. Moreover, Biden has continued Trump’s ban on U.S. investment in Chinese defense-technology companies and, earlier this year, forbade U.S. officials from attending the Winter Olympics in Beijing.33 Finally, last June the Senate passed the U.S. Innovation and Strategic Competition Act, which is specifically intended to combat China (particularly in the technological sphere); the House approved a related America COMPETES Act in January 2022.34 What, exactly, is Biden willing to risk in his attempt to ensure the U.S. remains the prime power wherever and forever? Might he, or a future president, risk war?
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Counterplan
Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---U.S. Heg High Now
Feirut Murat Ozkaleli and Gunes 21, Professor at School of Public International Affairs in international relations and comparative politics, Ph.D. from University of Colorado, MA from University of Denver, form chair of international relations department at Harran University, former associate director of graduate school at Lefke, former director of the Middle East Research Center at Zirve; Ali Gunes, ADA University, School of Public and International Affairs, Teaching Fellow CERGE-EI Foundation, December 2021, "Allied but Deviating NATO in the Multipolar World: Exploring Time Profiles of Western Alliance Cohesion Using Ideal Point Estimations," Global Governance 27(4) p. 561-586, , kav
Utilizing ideal points, we proposed cohesion, deviation, and adhesion measures to empirically explore security alliance cohesion, Member State deviations, and third state adhesions. Our findings suggest that security alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact had higher cohesion than other UN members, that external threat increased security alliance cohesion, and that the United States turned out to be the most significant deviating member in NATO since 1980, while third countries such as Australia, South Korea, and Japan were more aligned with the NATO alliance whereas Israel was more aligned with the United States. By using our measures, one can study any alignment pattern among any state groups in the UN, even without a priori identifications of state groupings. Measures developed and tested in this study can provide researchers with strong diagnostic tools. The study contributes to the overall UNGA voting literature by providing statistical inferences about the validity of the data.
We believe that the approach and new measures presented here could be useful to investigate cohesion levels in other intergovernmental organizations such as the EU and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as economic communities like BRICS, while pinpointing each state’s political distance vis-à-vis each other or to a defined group of states. Furthermore, using this approach and these new measures could help researchers to concentrate on specific questions (e.g., whether the foundation of BRICS really brought Member States together on the issues of high politics, or whether Brexit could have been predicted). In other words, while the approach offered here was utilized more for descriptive purposes, it presents a superior alternative to measure variance across time, increasing our predictive power for actual or potential dramatic policy shifts at Member State and at (any) group level by using the UNGA voting data.
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Uniqueness › Sustainability › 2AC---UQ---No Heg Decline
Brands and Beckley, 22 (made the, 3-14-2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, American Enterprise Institute - AEI, "The Return of Pax Americana? | AEI", https://www.aei.org/articles/the-return-of-pax-americana/)
The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Russia from brutalizing Ukraine, but they can still win the larger struggle to save the international order. Russia’s savage invasion has exposed the gap between Western countries’ soaring liberal aspirations and the paltry resources they have devoted to defend them. The United States has declared great-power competition on Moscow and Beijing but has so far failed to summon the money, the creativity, or the urgency necessary to prevail in those rivalries. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor. In shocking them out of their complacency, he has given them a historic opportunity to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition—not just with Russia but also with China—and, ultimately, to rebuild an international order that just recently looked to be headed for collapse.
This isn’t fantasy: it has happened before. In the late 1940s, the West was entering a previous period of great-power competition but had not made the investments or initiatives needed to win it. U.S. defense spending was pathetically inadequate, NATO existed only on paper, and neither Japan nor West Germany had been reintegrated into the free world. The Communist bloc seemed to have the momentum. Then, in June 1950, an instance of unprovoked authoritarian aggression—the Korean War—revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy. The policies that won the Cold War and thereby made the modern liberal international order were products of an unexpected hot war. The catastrophe in Ukraine could play a similar role today.