Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › aff › at: russia

NATO is not to blame for the Russian invasion

Stemplowska 22 -- Zofia Stemplowska is a Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. Published April 27, 2022. “NATO enlargement is not to blame for Russia’s war in Ukraine” //DG

Is NATO enlargement partly responsible for the Russia-Ukraine war? Zofia Stemplowska argues that rather than blaming countries in eastern Europe for their desire to join NATO, we would be better served by examining the role Russian energy exports to western Europe have played in propping up Vladimir Putin’s regime.

Many voices in the UK and US press – in the Financial Times, the New York Times, the Guardian, and others – suggest that NATO is partly to blame for the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. The argument is that by accepting NATO enlargement up to Russia’s borders, and by failing to decisively rule out Ukrainian membership, NATO holds some responsibility for Russia’s invasion.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › aff › perm: do both

Perm do both: US can leave NATO and cooperate with NATO countries independently – US and EU ties prove

EU 2022 (European Union official statement on cooperation with the United States, “EU – US cooperation”, )//MargaretE

The EU and US economies are the most integrated in the world. While broadly acknowledging that this privileged relationship holds more potential for both sides, the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs has been working for many years to further promote transatlantic economic cooperation by reducing regulatory obstacles to doing business across the Atlantic. The cooperation focuses on diverging regulations or duplicative requirements that often cause unnecessary barriers and costs for companies, including small businesses.

The transatlantic economic and trade relationship remains the backbone of the world economy, contributing to growth and jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. Total US investment in the EU is 3 times higher than in all of Asia, whereas EU investment in the US is around 8 times the amount of EU investment in India and China together.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › aff › nato good / withdrawal bad

NATO key to Russia deterrence, prosperity, and democracy – outweighs economic costs

Lloyd 2019 (Lindsay Lloyd is the Senior Advisor, Freedom and Democracy at the George W. Bush Institute. He previously served as Director of the Human Freedom Initiative at the Bush Institute, where he led original research and programmatic efforts to advance freedom and democracy in the world, “NATO: still relevant in a dangerous world” //MargaretE

This year, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization marks its 70th anniversary. In the world of international statecraft, such long-lasting alliances are exceedingly rare. NATO’s longevity is due in part to the fact that it combines national interest, which can be fleeting, with national values, which are hopefully more lasting. The initial alliance between the United States, Canada, and 10 European nations founded in 1949 has grown to encompass 29 countries. Once ratified by all current members, North Macedonia will join as NATO’s 30th member. Some, though, most notably the president of the United States, have questioned whether NATO membership is still in the U.S. national interest. While the White House avers that the U.S. commitment to NATO remains solid, even the perception of a breach between Europe and America would foster Russia’s longstanding desire to rupture the alliance. The Trump administration’s concern over burden sharing is by no means a new issue – it has been an off-and-on irritant over much of the alliance’s history. In the 1970s, Europe was spending approximately 45 percent of what the United States was spending on defense. The Center for Transatlantic Relations notes that three factors combined to address the disparity: Moscow was becoming more belligerent, America was preoccupied in a longstanding conflict in Vietnam, and Europe was enjoying a period of relative prosperity. By the end of the Cold War, Europe was spending approximately 78 percent of U.S. levels. Today’s situation is somewhat analogous: Moscow is becoming more belligerent, America is engaged in a 17-year war in Afghanistan (side-by-side with our NATO allies), and Europe is enjoying relative prosperity. And European defense spending is beginning to rise. As Daniel Fried, the assistant secretary of state for Europe from 2005 to 2009, put it, “By all means, America should push for greater allied defense spending. But today (and everyday) let’s also remember — and respect — the sacrifice that others have made for us.” The values that bind the alliance have remained constant, but NATO has not been static. In fact, its durability is linked to its flexibility – changing and modernizing as threats have grown and receded. It’s important to recognize that NATO succeeded in its core historical mission – deterring an aggressive rival and keeping the West strong and free. Established in the first phase of the Cold War, NATO was one response to the vacuum created after World War I, when America sought to disengage from Europe’s power struggles and conflicts. In contrast to the Senate’s refusal to approve the treaty establishing the League of Nations, America sought after World War II to fashion a new and lasting international architecture. That included the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the forerunner of the World Trade Organization), and a host of security agreements and alliances, most notably NATO. Beginning with President Harry S. Truman and continuing through the Cold War, presidents and Congresses of both parties embraced this American-made architecture that helped the United States realize historic prosperity, saw freedom expand across the globe, and prevented a devastating nuclear war with an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union. While regional conflicts were frequent and often bloody, the theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD) contained the 50-year standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. The uneasy peace was costly and often tense – the Cuban Missile Crisis, conflict in the Middle East, Vietnam – but a cataclysmic third world war was avoided. Western resolve, expressed in the alliance, prevented Soviet aggression and victory. The reduced tensions of détente largely fell apart after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, awakening Americans and Europeans alike to the fact that the Soviets still posed an existential threat. The decision to deploy a new class of missiles in Europe spawned the nuclear freeze movement and severely strained the alliance. But the fact that NATO held together was a key moment in the Soviet Union’s defeat. Western resolve placed unsustainable pressure on the Soviets and their allies. The system collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s, as a new Soviet leader found it impossible to compete. The rise of the independent labor union Solidarity in Poland led to free elections, as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev refused to intervene. The fall of the Berlin Wall and a series of mostly bloodless revolutions rolled out across Central and Eastern Europe. And long suppressed nationalism within the Soviet Union – in Lithuania, Ukraine, and elsewhere – led to the dissolution of the USSR itself on December 26, 1991. The map of Europe was remade. Fifteen states emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union. Most of them, including Russia, sought a democratic and free market future. Many declared their ambition to join the European Union and NATO. Over the next two decades, 13 post-communist nations took their rightful places as full members of the North Atlantic Alliance. But the question arose – what was the purpose of NATO when its main foe was no longer a threat (or even existed)? Since the fall of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, NATO has reinvented itself. The alliance built to face down the Soviets has taken on new challenges and missions, proving it remains the most important U.S. alliance. NATO’s current mission was laid out in 2010. The alliance remains a mutual defense pact – each member commits to defend the others against attack, including against “new threats to the safety of our citizens.” It also maps out the importance of conflict management – preventing and managing conflicts and stabilizing post-conflict situations. NATO is committed to working with partners around the globe, to working toward a world without nuclear weapons, and to allow European democracies that meet the standards for membership to join the alliance. One of the first major tests for the post-Soviet NATO occurred after Yugoslavia’s dissolution. NATO took the leading role in ending the fighting and bringing stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina. From 1999 on, NATO has played a similar role in Kosovo. Ending the bloodshed was a key U.S. political priority during the Clinton administration. While the United States could have addressed these crises alone, our NATO partners worked with us and carried some of the load. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NATO’s Article V was activated for the first and only time in the alliance’s history. Article V of the NATO Treaty commits each member to defend the others when under attack. For America’s NATO partners, the attacks on Washington and New York were just the same as an attack on Rome, Berlin, Toronto, or Oslo. Invoking Article V was more than just a rhetorical expression of solidarity – our NATO allies, along with other partners like Australia, have fought with the United States in Afghanistan. More than 1,000 soldiers from NATO partners have been killed. While you may disagree on the merits of American involvement in Bosnia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan – they were national security priorities of the U.S. government. In each conflict, America’s NATO partners took up arms in American-led engagements. Having allied support lessened the burden and furthered the security priorities of the United States. Sadly, the original rationale for NATO has returned in new, insidious ways. The Russian experiment with democracy that begin in the late 1980s has been all but extinguished. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has moved away from liberalism and democracy toward a state now best characterized by authoritarianism, crony capitalism, and corruption. Most importantly, Putin has acted aggressively to restore power and land lost when the Soviet Empire imploded. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, on the south of Ukraine. Moscow has sought to encourage separatist movements in several former Soviet republics. In 2014, Russia stepped up its longstanding military interference in Ukraine by annexing Crimea. And in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia has pursued aggressive policies, aimed at restoring its influence. Countries across the region have faced new kinds of threats, as Moscow works to manipulate and discredit democratic institutions. Moscow has also sought to silence critics and boost its influence in longstanding democracies. In 2006, former intelligence agent Alexander Litvinenko was assassinated in the United Kingdom. Cyberattacks have been detected in Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and elsewhere. And in the United States, Russia undertook an unprecedented campaign to stoke divisions and influence the 2016 election campaign. While the immediate threat of military conflict between Russia and the United States is low, Russia and other states pose a serious and changing threat to America and its allies. NATO is an essential first line of defense.. NATO’s mission remains first as a military alliance, but from the earliest days, it was also a community of values. And while at times NATO has chosen to look the other way, promoting democracy among its members has always been a consideration. Article 10 of the NATO Charter states that by unanimous agreement, any other European state that can further the principles of the alliance and contribute to its security may be asked to join. Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952, even though both countries underwent long periods of military rule. Even today, with rising concerns about democratic backsliding in countries like Hungary and Turkey, both countries remain active members of the alliance. But NATO’s commitment to values became much more explicit as the former communist nations began jockeying for inclusion. Would-be members must demonstrate they are market economies and stable democracies based on a respect for human rights and the rule of law. Aspirants must live in peace with their neighbors, peacefully resolving disputes. And joining NATO requires civilian and democratic control over the military. Seventy years on, NATO remains a vital partnership and resource for the United States. It has contributed blood and treasure to the two most recent major conflicts – Iraq and Afghanistan. It has adapted in response to the new threats emanating from Moscow, shoring up defenses in the Baltic region, partnering with states in Russia’s crosshairs like Ukraine and Georgia, and providing important communications and coordination to defend against the ongoing cyberwarfare. NATO’s critics are not wrong to urge increased defense spending across the alliance. Most American presidents have done so and our NATO allies are responding to the call. But the United States as a global power will always shoulder a greater share of the burden. As this history shows, we should look at NATO not as a drain on our resources, but rather as a net plus. America and its NATO allies have faced tensions and estrangement over policy issues. But even when tensions have been high, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have always recognized that the alliance is mutually beneficial. Fundamentally, NATO has endured because it is a community of shared values – of democracy, freedom, market economics, solidarity, and mutual respect. The United States and our partners share a strong interest in preserving this partnership – it has worked to our common benefit for 70 years and continues to do so today.

NATO strength is an impact filter – extinction

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › aff › nato good / withdrawal bad

Withdrawal blows up the world--causes Russian SOI AND balkanization.

Michael Rühle 18---Heads the Energy Security Section of NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division. Previously, he served as a speechwriter for six NATO Secretaries General.[Published: 4-23-2018. "Imagining a world without NATO." Atlantic Council. Accessible: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/imagining-a-world-without-nato/]

What would a world without NATO look like? It is a useful question to ask. For the end of NATO would mean far more than merely the disappearance of a bureaucracy at the outskirts of Brussels. The end of NATO would mean the end of a unique institutionalized political and military link between Europe and North America—with consequences that range from merely uncomfortable to outright dangerous.

The end of NATO would be the end of transatlantic collective defense. Europe would have to provide for its security without the United States. Establishing a purely European defense, however, would overwhelm the Europeans politically, financially, and militarily. Not only would it require significantly higher defense expenditures, but also massive investments in defense research and development and much more rationalized defense procurement – just when the United Kingdom, Europe’s biggest defense player, is distancing itself from the EU. It would ultimately require a genuine European security policy, including a consensus on a European nuclear deterrent. In short, it would require a quantum leap in the process of European integration that is utterly unrealistic.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › aff › nato good / withdrawal bad

NATO withdrawal fails – lack of deterrence, irreplaceability, and unchecked Russia risks global conflict

Sweeney 2020 (Mike Sweeney is a Governmental Relations Professor at Colorado Tech with a BA and a masters in political science from Cal State, “What is NATO good for?”, )//MargaretE

NATO frankly does its best work when no one hears about it. Its strength lies in the day-to-day military cooperation it fosters and the general sense of deterrence and stability it promotes. These contributions are neither as dramatic as facing off against the Red Army at the height of the Cold War, nor as controversial as the Libyan intervention, but they would be glaring in their absence. Why arbitrarily remove the structure that provides that stability—both with Russia and also among NATO’s many disparate members? Withdrawing NATO protection from the Baltic states or the smaller Balkan members, for example, will not preclude the possibility of their becoming involved in a war with Russia or Serbia; just the opposite, it could make it more likely. Once such a conflict begins, is it certain the United States will not be entangled or affected even if it is no longer actively participating in NATO? Again, it is worth reiterating that NATO is an instrument. Many of the alliance’s opponents may actually be opposed to the way the United States and its partners have employed force since the end of the Cold War—especially in the case of operations falling under the rubric of regime change. The argument, implicit in Posen’s OpEd, for example, is that NATO needs to be taken away from reckless U.S. policymakers to prevent them from future adventures. This argument is backwards. Yes, the consequences of three decades of continuous military operations should be examined. But increasing national restraint and making better strategic decisions seems like a smarter path than summarily scrapping an effective, tested tool that could play an essential role in a wiser foreign policy. NATO’s advocates are also prone to hyperbole, but one word that is not an overstatement is irreplaceable. It would be difficult—if not impossible—to recreate NATO or something like it from scratch. Still, even irreplaceable doesn’t imply permanence if the alliance’s value cannot readily be established and sold to the populations of its constituent members, especially Americans. Demography is not on the alliance’s side. Should NATO survive to celebrate its centennial, the generation being born at that time will be as far removed from the end of the Second World War as someone born in 1969 was from the conclusion of the American Civil War. Even the September 11th attacks—and NATO’s ensuing invocation of Article 5—will be a half century in the past. In short, shared historical experience or even simple nostalgia will not be enough to sustain the alliance through the twenty-first century. NATO needs to show that it is not just relevant, but crucial to continued security in Europe and, to be blunt, the broader interests of its essential member, the United States. The most effective way of doing that is reinforcing the image of NATO as a vehicle for stability, something which has been recently diminished. There are legitimate arguments to be made that NATO now endangers American security by having antagonized Russia through enlargement and increased the likelihood of confrontation, possibly a nuclear one, rather than decreasing it.[15] That relations between America and Russia—and overall stability in Eastern Europe—might be far worse without the alliance is also true, but is a difficult sell in trying to promote the alliance’s relevance. NATO needs to be an active participant in visibly promoting stability, beyond the important day-to-day but low-key role it plays in this regard. Some potential steps are obvious, the most high profile of which would be a public declaration on closing the alliance to further expansion after the current candidacy of North Macedonia is vetted. To be clear, such a move need not be taken in a vacuum. In general, NATO must engage with Russia and some sort of quid pro quo shouldn’t be ruled out on ending further expansion of the alliance. Cessation of Moscow’s support for separatist activities in Transnistria and the Donbass certainly should be on the table as should guarantees from Russia that Belarus and Ukraine would be free to pursue their own independent relationships with the West, perhaps to someday include the possibility of membership in the European Union if either state wants it.[16]

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › at: perm

NATO withdrawal halts cooperation – backlash towards France proves

Schmidt 2021 (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal

Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, )//MargaretE

French withdrawal was also costly and politically salient. French withdrawal undermined the deterrent threat at the core of NATO’s mission, damaging the credibility of the alliance. Withdrawal also brought direct material costs. It removed the legal basis for the presence of allied military officers in France, expelling the alliance’s headquarters from Paris and forcing the relocation of NATO to Brussels.78 French withdrawal from NATO was also well publicized. It garnered global media coverage and formed the context of de Gaulle’s visits to Moscow and Phenom Phen in the summer and fall of 1966 in which he asserted French independence in foreign affairs, challenged US supremacy, and sought to establish France as a broker in the Cold War. Non-NATO states were aware of de Gaulle’s withdrawal and capable of incorporating the event into assessments of the reliability of France’s treaty commitments, factors that favor withdrawal as unreliability.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › at: perm

Leaving NATO ends security cooperation – material goods and wrecked credibility halts negotiations

Schmidt 2021 (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal

Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, )//MargaretE

Even if unilateral exit is lawful, it can impact the distribution of material benefits across states by producing an asymmetric change in states’ legal obligations. Prior research has shown that the nature of strategic interactions varies by issue areas, shaping the emergence and design of international agreements.41 Koremenos draws a theoretically motivated distinction concerning the nature of cooperation in the issue areas of security, economics, human rights, and the environment.42 I build on this research by considering how the distributional consequences of unilateral exit varies across these issue areas.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › at: perm

Withdrawal wrecks cooperation – breaches trust and wrecks negotiation credibility

Schmidt 2021 (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal

Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, )//MargaretE

My central argument begins from the premise that unilateral exit entails the violation of the type of moralistic trust known as particularized trust.13 Trust is the willingness to put one’s wellbeing in another’s hands. Moralistic trust is trust based on the belief that others share your normative commitments. Trust of the moral variety exists on a continuum from generalized to particularized trust. Generalized trust is a belief that others are inherently trustworthy, because everyone is part of the same moral community. It reflects an optimistic disposition toward human nature. Moving down the continuum from generalized trust toward particularized trust involves narrowing the inclusivity of one’s community. Particularized trusters are those who trust members of their community and regard others with skepticism. They divide the world into in-groups and out-groups defined in terms of their normative commitments. The etymology of particularized trust is that “A trusts B,” whereas the etymology of generalized trust is simply that “A trusts.”14 Generalized trust is dispositional. Particularized trust is relational.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › at: perm

Perm fails -- treaty withdrawal halts cooperation

Schmidt 2021 (Averall Schmidt researches the politics of international law, focusing on the consequences of states' decisions to violate, contest, or withdraw from treaties for the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “Breach of Trust: How Treaty Withdrawal

Shapes Cooperation Among States”, July 21 2021, )//MargaretE

What explains persistent cooperation in the face of withdrawal by some states, but not others? More broadly, how does treaty withdrawal affect the prospects of international cooperation? I argue that the consequences of withdrawal on international cooperation are best explained by viewing exit as a breach of norm-based trust. When states exit treaties they violate the norm that agreements must be kept (pacta sunt servanda), undermining the foundation of trust upon which cooperation is based. States perceive exit as a violation of international norms and, consequentially, react with indignation. This sense of being wronged drives states to punish the norm-violating state by isolating it internationally and avoiding cooperation with it in the future. As a result, state parties to the treaty of withdrawal – those whose trust has been violated – begin to opt out of ratifying agreements to which the withdrawing state is a member.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › at: nato k2 democracy

NATO fails to spread democracy and enables American adventurism

Posen 19 - Barry R. Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, Director Emeritus of the MIT Security Studies Program, and serves on the Executive Committee of Seminar XXI. (“Trump Aside, What’s the U.S. Role in NATO?” New York Times, March 10th, 2019. ) CTF

President Trump has many bad ideas. Reconsidering America’s role in NATO isn’t one of them.

NATO, a military alliance, was formed specifically to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating Europe, whose principal powers — Germany, France, Italy and Britain — had been so devastated by World War II that they were vulnerable to Soviet coercion, subversion or conquest. NATO also became a vehicle for rehabilitating the Axis powers — Germany and Italy — under the victors’ tutelage.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › at: nato k2 deterrence

Deterrence fails – countless empirics

Ruhle 2015 (Michael Rühle is currently Head of the Hybrid Challenges and Energy Security Section, in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff, “Deterrence: What it can (and cannot) do” )//MargaretE

If only it were so easy. History abounds with examples of deterrence failing despite a balance of forces, and even cases in which the weaker side attacked the stronger. In some cases, the weaker side banked on the element of surprise. The military leadership of Imperial Japan, for example, was fully aware of US military superiority. But if a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base would destroy a major part of the US Pacific Fleet while paralysing Washington politically, Japan might stand a chance of prevailing. In 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked the militarily superior Israel – not because they hoped to win, but because they wanted to re-establish the political clout they had lost after Israel had defeated them in the 1967 Six-Day-War. Israel had not seen the attack coming: why would two militarily inferior countries even think of attacking an opponent that was certain to emerge victorious? This self-assuredness led Israel to ignore the many warning signals about a pending attack. As a result, the rapidly advancing armies of Egypt and Syria were initially much more successful than expected. Military superiority had not ensured deterrence.

Another important example for the pitfalls of deterrence is provided by the 1982 Falklands War. Argentina, which contests the United Kingdom’s authority over the islands in the South Atlantic, knew only too well about the superiority of the British armed forces. However, over the course of several decades the UK had gradually been reducing its military protection for the islands. Thus, while London kept emphasising that the Falklands were British, the military Junta in Buenos Aires became convinced that such statements were mere lip service. When the Junta faced a domestic crisis that threatened its rule, it tried to generate support by stirring patriotic feelings and occupied the islands. Deterrence had failed because the United Kingdom had ignored an important factor. Striking a tough pose while at the same time reducing the means to make good on it undermines one of deterrence’s most important ingredients: credibility. The story did not end there, however. Much to Argentina’s surprise, the British Navy sailed to the South Atlantic and re-conquered the islands. General Galtieri, the Chief of Argentina’s military Junta, later admitted that he never believed that a European country would be ready to pay such a high price for a few insignificant islands so far away. Argentina, too, had miscalculated.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › at: nato k2 deterrence

NATO cooperation fails to deter hybrid war – empirics

Halas 2019 (Matus Halas works as a Senior Researcher at IIR and member of the Centre for European Politics. He studied international relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague (Ph.D.) and political science at the Faculty of Arts of Comenius University in Bratislava (Mgr.). In the past, he worked as a lecturer at the Baltic Defense College in Estonia (2016-2018), editor of the scientific section of the SME journal (2015) and assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations in Bratislava (2011-2015), “Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics”,

Yet one doesn’t have to look for a long time in order to find a proof of deterrence failure at the sub-conventional level already happening on a regular basis and in line with the third row of Table 1, which depicts the logic of deterrence by using Boolean algebra. The Estonian island Vaindloo in the Gulf of Finland witnessed at least half a dozen violations of its airspace by Russian state-owned aircraft in 2018. Since Estonia has virtually no air force or ground-based air defence systems and relies entirely on the NATO Baltic Air Policing as regards the protection of its airspace, in this case one can hardly expect a use of kinetic force similar to the shooting down of the Russian Su-24 in November 2015 after a very similar incursion into the Turkish airspace. These violations easily stay below the Article 5 threshold in the given context with no risk of conventional escalation under present conditions. But they represent a constant reminder of the limited ability of the three Baltic states to protect their sovereignty. How Estonian military personnel will react to these airspace violations after Estonia procures a medium-range air defence system and how the allies will react if Estonia for whatever reason decides to shoot down the aircraft, remains to be seen.

Another example of the lacking sub-conventional deterrence and intentional pushing and probing below Article 5 is the already mentioned visit of the U.S. President Obama in Tallinn in September 2014 and the events that occurred immediately after his visit. In a rather symbolic move, just two days after Barack Obama declared that “the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London”, Russian FSB agents kidnapped the Estonian Internal Security Service officer Eston Kohver and took him across the border into the Russian Federation, where he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. The abduction helped to cement the reputation of the FSB as “the most aggressive Russian special service targeting Estonia” (EISS 2016, p. 14), although Kohver was then swiftly exchanged in a Cold War-like swap for a Russian spy on a bridge over the border river Piusa shortly before a meeting between Putin and Obama. The border between Estonia and Russia remains an unresolved issue in general. Just about a decade ago and thanks to the territorial changes after WWII, a small part of Estonia could have been reached only by taking a short section of a road through the Russian territory. Although an alternative detour has been built in recent years, the final resolution of the problem by an exchange of territory as proposed in the Estonian-Russian State Border Treaty signed in 2014 is not going to materialise due to the Russian refusal to ratify the treaty.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › at: nato k2 deterrence

NATO deterrence fails – Baltics prove NATO isn’t key to stop hybrid war

Halas 2019 (Matus Halas works as a Senior Researcher at IIR and member of the Centre for European Politics. He studied international relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague (Ph.D.) and political science at the Faculty of Arts of Comenius University in Bratislava (Mgr.). In the past, he worked as a lecturer at the Baltic Defense College in Estonia (2016-2018), editor of the scientific section of the SME journal (2015) and assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations in Bratislava (2011-2015), “Proving a negative: why deterrence does not work in the Baltics”,

The increased Russian foreign policy assertiveness and the related security concerns associated with the Eastern Flank of NATO caused a revival of interest in European deterrence after more than two decades of neglect. Yet the absence of a military invasion into the Baltics does not necessarily imply a successful deterrent threat. Quite the contrary: a detailed analysis using Boolean logic suggests that deterrence does not really work in the Baltics, neither at the conventional, nor at the sub-conventional level. A lack of capabilities undermines the credibility of NATO’s conventional deterrence posture despite its clear effort to communicate the threat to the other side. The only reason why the lack of capabilities on the Eastern Flank has no negative consequences for the Alliance is because Russia has (currently) no need to advance its state interests by resorting to military force. At the same time, deterrence fails repeatedly at the subconventional level and it will probably continue to fail in the future. Incidents like the relocation of the Bronze Soldier Memorial in 2007, the kidnapping of a security officer in 2014 or the violations of airspace in 2018 can escalate to a full-blown crisis. Limiting the number of such incidents should be the main goal of the cumulative deterrence of hybrid threats.

An assertion that a deterrent threat prevented a military attack is probably the closest thing one can have in strategic studies to the article of faith. One might easily claim, and many in fact do, that an absence of evidence documenting the existence of God is not necessarily evidence of its absence. Some of us thus keep believing in God despite the lack of evidence. And it is similar for deterrence: it is notoriously difficult to prove its success, because the absence of an aggressive action might be caused by other factors than the deterrent threat itself. In other words, the absence of an attack is not necessarily evidence of a successful deterrence. Most of the scholars recognise that (see Buzan 1987, pp. 163–164, Morgan 2003, pp. 117–129, Paul 2009, p. 3, Rid 2012, pp. 142–143, Freedman 2013, p. 159) and still, we rarely question this article of faith. But one does not have to wait for the invasion to occur in order to investigate the existence of deterrence, and this text aims to do exactly that. It tries to examine the security environment at NATO’s Eastern Flank at both the conventional and the sub-conventional level in order to find out if deterrence works in the Baltics.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency – russia

A European army is k2 deter Russia

Braw 2/9 – Elizabeth Braw is a columnist at Foreign Policy and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. (“To Deter Russia, Europe Needs More Military Integration,” Foreign Policy. February 2nd, 2022. ) CTF

Now, six years later, the 414 Tank Battalion is finishing its deployment in Lithuania, the first time in post-World War II history a permanently integrated unit comprising two countries has deployed to a third country. That’s surely a good sign given that Macron and various other European leaders—past and present—have for years been advancing the idea of some form of joint European military capability.

If Russian leader Vladimir Putin backs down from the Ukrainian border this time, European countries can thank their lucky star—Washington. In their current setup, they are hardly able to deter Russia. That, of course, is the reason Macron and others argue that a “true European army” is indispensable.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency – russia

A European system is key to stabilize Russia

Menon 22 – Rajan Menon is the director of grand strategy at Defense Priorities. (“A NEW AND BETTER SECURITY ORDER FOR EUROPE,” Defense Priorities. February 15th, 2022. ) CTF

NATO EXPANSION AND PERPETUAL CRISES IF EUROPE’S SECURITY ORDER EXCLUDES RUSSIA

Not every dispute between Russia and Ukraine or Russia and Georgia can be chalked up to NATO expansion.1 Yet the denial of any connection flies in the face of the evidence. Every post-Cold War Soviet and Russian leader (Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin) has condemned NATO expansion. Moreover, Russia’s preoccupation with, and antipathy toward, that project reflects a historical pattern: great powers seek spheres of influence and resist adversaries’ attempts to establish a military presence within them.2 That may not be commendable or desirable, but it does mean Russia’s behavior cannot reasonably be viewed as aberrant or indeed wholly different from that of other great powers, including the United States.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency – russia

NATO hinders EU-Russia Cooperation

Klijn 10 – H.M. Klijn is a Senior Research Fellow within the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute. (“Europe’s Virtual Security Debate and a New Transatlantic Relationship,” Jstor. July 10th, 2010. ) CTF

The sudden demise of the Soviet bloc caught the world by surprise, so no wonder at the time the alliance did not contemplate disbanding itself. And given its continuation, it would have been politically impossible to reject newly independent countries’ wishes for accession. And yes, it took NATO to intervene in the Yugoslav civil war, be it belatedly in Bosnia and controversially in Kosovo. But it is obvious that the original gist has been taken out of the alliance, and judging by the arduous strategy debate it has not been replaced by a successor gist. In essence, NATO has been and is changing from a singleminded military alliance into a multi-purpose platform enabling countries to cultivate their bilateral ties with the US. That is why it will prove impossible to erect a European pillar within NATO, as some commentators suggest should be done. Why else would recently acceded member states, apparently not trustful of NATO’s consensus machinery in article 5 situations, be lobbying so actively with the US for additional security guarantees? And would most allies send their units into Afghanistan because they feel their national security is at stake in the Hindu Kush or because they want to curry favour with Washington? When last February the Dutch coalition government fell over the extension of its Uruzgan mission, the first question raised was whether this implied that the Netherlands would be kicked out of the economic G20 forum.

Of course, it makes sense for countries to ally themselves with the world’s foremost power, and only for that reason NATO will continue to exist for some time to come. But increasingly, the de facto EU-US-NATO triangle is becoming untenable. On the one hand, sustaining US-led NATO as Europe’s primary security forum at the end of the day runs counter to EU ambitions in the field of foreign and security policy; on the other hand it ties Europe to a more global US security agenda that, deep down, it does not subscribe to and that it is certainly not willing to shoulder financially. Finally, as long as Europe remains a function of US security policy, this will put a curb on its ability to forge comprehensive partnerships with third parties.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency -- cyber

The EU has resources for cyber defense – it solves the aff

Cerulus 2/21 - Laurens Cerulus leads POLITICO Europe’s team of reporters covering cybersecurity, privacy and data protection issues as Cybersecurity Editor. (“EU to mobilize cyber team to help Ukraine fight Russian cyberattacks,” Politico. February 21st, 2022. ) CTF

The European Union will activate a team of cybersecurity experts to help Ukraine fight off cyberattacks from Russia, officials told POLITICO.

The EU’s Cyber Rapid Response Team includes around 10 national cybersecurity officials of six European countries — Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania — who can provide assistance to countries under cyberattack. The team falls under the EU's defense cooperation program PESCO; it will be its first deployment.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency -- cyber

EU coordination solves hybrid responses

Atlamazoglou and Moyer 6/1 – Constantine Atlamazoglou works on transatlantic and European security and holds a master's degree on security studies and European affairs. Jason C. Moyer is a Program Associate at Global Europe Program. (“A Strategic Compass: The European Union expands its toolbox,” Wilson Center. June 1st, 2022. ) CTF

In Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s class at Georgetown University, she likened each element of U.S. power - development aid, sanctions, bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy - to a tool in the U.S. problem-solving toolbox. When faced with a challenge, the United States can employ one or more of these tools. With the launch of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, the European Union is adding a handful of new tools to its own toolbox, to better respond to current and future challenges.

Promising a “quantum leap” in decisive security matters in the next decade, the EU is stepping into its role as a security provider and global actor. The document is significant for the EU; it can be seen as a parallel to the United States’ National Security Strategy in its scope.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency – generic

AT: Affs Answers to EU Bad

Menon 22 – Rajan Menon is the director of grand strategy at Defense Priorities. (“A NEW AND BETTER SECURITY ORDER FOR EUROPE,” Defense Priorities. February 15th, 2022. ) CTF

There are two commonplace objections to the idea of European strategic autonomy. The first is that without the American defense guarantee Europe will revert to disunity, even conflict. The other is that the large number of European states will bedevil regional cooperation on security. But instability in Europe, while a possibility, is but one conceivable outcome. The extensive interdependence within Europe (intra-E.U. exports approached $300 billion in 2020, and for most members, exports within the European Union accounted for between 50 and 75 percent of their total exports), the continent’s embrace of democracy, and the European Union and its supranational organizations will, together, help prevent conflict and ease cooperation.32 The European Union has central institutions and a common currency (within the eurozone) and bank; and the European states party to the Schengen Agreement have eliminated border controls—all while increasing the number of member states. This achievement demonstrates a multiplicity of sovereign states can in fact cooperate extensively, indeed to a point verging on integration. Besides, the claim that Europeans cannot manage their own affairs without an American military presence amounts to saying that current American strategy toward the continent must continue indefinitely, regardless of changing conditions on the home front and the redistribution of power in the world.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
nato withdrawal cp › neg › eu solvency – generic

The US leaving NATO is k2 European stability and resolves all the NATO bad stuff

Riise 19 – Karsten RiiseMaster has a master of Science (Econ) degree from Copenhagen Business School. (“NATO Was Never Only About Russia,” Modern Diplomacy. December 23rd, 2019. ) CTF

It is today sadly forgotten, that NATO was created not with one, but with two objectives. The second objective of NATO was to retain inner peace, that is, keep the peace amongst NATO’s own members. When NATO was created, future peace between Germany and its neighbors was yet far from secured, especially as seen from the perspective of Germany’s neighbors at the time, not least France. Thus, the saying of NATO-creator Lord Ismay included that NATO should “keep the Soviet Union out”, but also “the Germans down”, that is, to keep NATO members safe, also from themselves. NATO was never only about Russia.

Today Germany is a great and constructive neighbor in Europe. But Europe sadly still sees other inner-neighbor relations, which unfortunately cannot yet be considered absolutely stable. One only needs to refer to the afterglows of the Yugoslav wars. From that perspective, it can be argued that all Balkan countries should be part of NATO — not to protect them against “Russia”, or to strengthen NATO externally for that matter, but simply to enhance the safe development of all the Balkan countries concerning one another. Bosnia-Herzegovina is especially relevant here since the country is not even fully stabilized internally yet. There are also other less warm neighbor issues, but still potential minority-heats, notably related to eastern NATO members. NATO keeps all such inner-relations from potentially flaring up, which may also be said to be in the interest of Russia, and of Russia’s partner in the Balkan area, Serbia. We should note too, that the EU also has a vital and overlapping interests to co-work in this region.