2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Impact---AT: OSCE Fails---AT: Ukraine
Teoman Ertuğrul Tulun 22, Analyst at the Avrasya Incelemeleri Merkezi Center for Eurasian Studies, “NATO Is Not Brain-Dead: How Can OSCE and NATO Help Stop the War in Ukraine?,” AVIM, March 2022
In an interview about two and a half years ago, French President Emmanuel Macron arrogantly claimed that NATO was brain dead and Europe was on the edge of the precipice, and he assertively questioned NATO's very future.[1] Corresponding to the same period, he also mentioned his long-time dream of developing a European military force.[2] This European military force is, in fact, the hypothetical joint Franco-German European army that France and Germany announced during the signing of a new "Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration" in Aachen on January 22, 2019.[3]
A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since 2019. The intervention, which Russia initiated under a "special military operation" towards Ukraine and which turned into a full-fledged war in fifteen days, has revealed how empty are the words Macron made for NATO two and a half years ago. The elapsed time has also proved that Macrons rhetoric about establishing a European Army is only wishful thinking. The war in Ukraine has caused grave concern in the Nordic countries. Certain EU member Nordic countries, which are very keen to preach lessons and to show the right way like teachers to non-EU European countries (including Turkey) on many subjects at every opportunity, this time began to see themselves in an imminent security threat. For example, according to a Deutsche Welle (DW) report, Sweden and Finland, who had stayed out of NATO due to their military nonalignment policy supported in the past by majorities of both Finns and Swedes, now seem to change their policy due to war in Ukraine.[4] As per the DW report, the shift in opinion is especially dramatic in Finland, and for the first time in its history, a majority of Finns are in favor of joining NATO. In this context., it is reported that nowadays, 53% Finnish population is in favor of joining NATO. It is stated that this rate was 19% in 2017. DW report also points to the development that the approval rate of NATO membership in Sweden rose to 41% in 2022 from 32% in 2017. These developments indicate that NATO, contrary to Macron's claims, is not in danger of brain death and is instead seen as the most reliable defence organization for some EU member states with the highest welfare level. It seems possible that the EU will become much more in need of the NATO security umbrella in the coming period. These developments show us that security is provided not with rhetoric but with reliable and powerful defence forces.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Impact---AT: OSCE Fails---AT: Ukraine
Andrew Lohsen 22, fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., “Can the OSCE Help Resolve the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?,” CSIS, 1/12/2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/can-osce-help-resolve-russia-ukraine-crisis
The flurry of diplomatic meetings dedicated to Moscow’s demands for a new security paradigm in Europe will culminate with discussions at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on January 13. The scheduled talks in Vienna have garnered little attention in comparison to bilateral U.S.-Russian discussions on January 10 and the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on January 12. In truth, few concrete outcomes are likely to result from the final round of discussions, which will take place during a regular session of the OSCE’s Permanent Council. The scope of Russia’s demands and the fundamental questions they pose are far too complex to be considered in a single meeting. Nonetheless, if Russia is willing to engage in diplomatic negotiations about the future of European security—as opposed to insisting on the West’s immediate acceptance of its demands in their entirety—and refrains from using them as a pretext for war, then the potential role of the OSCE in securing a new peace in Europe is worth close consideration.
As a forum for dialogue covering a broad range of regional security issues with an open membership policy, the OSCE arguably is the most appropriate of the aforementioned venues to consider Russia’s maximalist proposals. Yet the organization faces considerable constraints on its ability to serve as a useful platform for dialogue. In this regard, a look at the potential advantages and disadvantages of the OSCE in facilitating a resolution to the crisis is helpful in devising recommendations on how to improve its chances of success in breaking the impasse.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Impact---Organized Crime
David Luna 21, Founder and Executive Director of ICAIE, former U.S. diplomat and national security official with over 20 years of federal service, “Why We Must Confront the Growing Threat to National Security Posed by Illicit Economies and Cesspools of Corruption and Organized Crime,” LinkedIn Pulse, 2021, https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-we-must-confront-growing-threat-national-security-david-m-?trk=public_post_promoted-post
Illicit economies are not harmless and can have tremendous human, economic, societal and security costs and consequences.
Illicit economies come with vulnerabilities to peace and security — including corruption, violence, chaos, organized crime, terrorist financing and instability. Illicit economies are the lifeblood of today’s bad actors, enabling kleptocrats to loot their countries, criminal organizations to co-opt states and export violence and terrorist groups to finance their attacks against our societies.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Impact---Ethnic Conflict---AT: Defense
Simone Florio 12, Faculty of Political Science and Sociology at the University of Granada, “The Fragmentation of Geopolitical Space”, The International Relations and Security Network, 11-26, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=155328&tabid=1453404549&contextid774=155328&contextid775=155325
Editor’s Note: Today's special feature lays the foundations for our week-long look at how separatist and secessionist movements may be impacting upon regional and global security dynamics, both now and in the future. Indeed, as a counter to last week’s state-centric meditation on grand strategy, we present today excerpts from Simone Florio's "The Fragmentation of Geopolitical Space: What Secessionist Movements Mean to the Present-day State System." The article not only charts the growing clamor for political secession since the end of the Cold War, it also explores its deeper implications for international security. In doing so, it then sets the stage for a follow-on series of case studies on secessionist movements in Europe, China and the wider Middle East.
The last century witnessed an extraordinary multiplication of sovereign states. Epochal changes such as the dissolution of 20th century empires, the decolonization process, and the end of the Cold War determined the division of the world landscape into nearly two hundred separate polities. But the trend to geopolitical fragmentation still has momentum: partially recognized and de facto states constitute a big challenge for international order, while a conspicuous number of active secessionist projects continue to threaten the territorial integrity of many countries. This article reviews the complex questions that the trend to geopolitical fragmentation is posing to global society, reviewing a number of normative secession theories and evidencing in them a more hospitable approach to new state formation. Given the current regime of sovereign states, framing a global approach to the problems posed by separatist groups seems almost inconceivable; for the time being, it seems likely instead that the international community will continue accepting new states on a case-by-case basis, often in response to Great Power interests or non-negotiable nationalist projects, without advancing international law on state creation or global standards of statehood as a whole. This article provides support for the claim that adopting a global perspective and more functional attitudes towards geopolitical restructuring are paramount for effectively dealing with violence deriving from the clash of nationalist separatist drives and state-centric conservatism.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Impact---Ethnic Conflict---AT: Defense
Dr. Beverley Crawford 9, Associate Director of the Institute of European Studies and Lecturer of International and Area Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, “Ethnic Conflict in Georgia: What Lies Ahead”, 4-17, http://rpgp. berkeley.edu/node/87
Ironically, at the same time that the demands of exclusive cultural groups for state sovereignty and "national self-determination" escalate around the globe, support for the international legal norms of established state sovereignty and non-intervention has also disappeared. Together, these two trends are dangerously explosive. We are likely to see more oppression of minorities in ethnically defined states, more slaughter of innocent civilians caught in cultural conflicts, the continued violent breakup of sovereign countries, and more invasions and occupation of disputed territory, as powerful countries--nursing other resentments and fears against one another--seize the opportunity to take sides. It will thus not be long until nuclear powers end up confronting one another. The absurd trigger for this conflict will be the nationalist demands of ethnic and sectarian political entrepreneurs--who are often just thugs in disguise. Note the timing of the U.S. announcement of a missile defense pact with Poland, as Russian tanks rolled through Georgia to halt Georgia's military incursion into Ossetian territory. Unless we act quickly to reach wider international agreement on global solutions to violent cultural disputes, more exclusive territorial claims of small and distinct cultural groups and violent responses to those claims will suck nuclear powers into deadly international conflict.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Impact---Ethnic Conflict
Kimon Valaskakis 14, Former Canadian Ambassador to the OECD, “Separatism Everywhere: The New Global Epidemic,” Huffington Post, 03/19/14,
Like modern marriages, half of which end in divorce, there is a new and ominous global threat: the break-up of previously stable political entities through separatism.
Crimea wants to leave Ukraine. Scotland has scheduled an independence referendum from Britain in September 2014 and Britain is considering one to possibly leave Europe in 2015. Catalonia's referendum to secede from Spain is in November 2014, and Quebec may possibly organize its own in the next couple of years. Wallonie, Corsica, North Italy, Bretagne etc. may one day follow suit. There is even talk of splitting California in two!
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Impact---Laundry List
Igor Sherbak 21, Игорь Николаевич Щербак, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Leading Researcher of the Department of European Security of the IE RAS, V.N.S. IMI MGIMO of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “ОБСЕ в эпоху вызовов европейской безопасности - проблемы и перспективы,” Современная Европа, no. 7 (107), 2021, translated by Yandex, doi:10.15211/soveurope72021144151
Выход исследования «Трансформация многосторонности: вызовы и возможности для ОБСЕ», подготовленного авторским коллективом швейцарских экспертов во главе с известным дипломатом Т. Гремингером, под эгидой Женевского центра политики безопасности по тематике ОБСЕ является закономерным событием. Оно отражает тот факт, что Швейцария играет активную роль в продвижении ценностей и важного значения Организации в деле обеспечения европейской безопасности и сотрудничества. Это вписывается в традиционный контекст швейцарской внешней политики, основанной, как указывается в предисловии к книге, на посредничестве и мирном урегулировании конфликтов. Председательство Швейцарии в ОБСЕ в 1996 и 2014 гг. отмечено важным вкладом в урегулирование конфликтов на Балканах (содействие в реализации Дейтонских соглашений) и запуск Специальной мониторинговой миссии ОБСЕ на Украине (СММ).
Особо выделяется в тот период инициативная роль и.о. председателя ОБСЕ, министра иностранных дел Швейцарии Дидье Буркхальтера в развертывании высокотехнологичной СММ ОБСЕ на Украине, которая продолжает выполнять важные функции по сдерживанию кризисной ситуации в регионе и содействию диалогу между сторонами в конфликте.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Impact---Laundry List
Stanislav Ivanovich Chernyavskiy & Elnur Tadzhaddinovich Mehdiev 18, Chernyavskiy is Ph.D. in historical sciences, Director of the Center for post-soviet studies of the Institute of International Research (IMR), professor of World political processes sub-faculty of the MGIMO (U) MFA of Russia; Mehdiev is Ph.D. in historical sciences, scientific researcher of the Center for post-soviet studies of the Institute of International Research (IMR) of the MGIMO (U) MFA of Russia, “Сравнительный анализ ОБСЕ и НАТО по обеспечению международного мира и безопасности,” or, “A Comparative Analysis of OSCE and NATO Commitments on International Peace and Security,” Евразийский Юридический Журнал, no. 2 (117), 2018, translated by Yandex
Начиная с конца XIX - начала XX века мировое сообщество начало предпринимать серьезные шаги на пути разработки мирных средств для урегулирования международных споров между государствами во избежание кровопролитных войн. В этом отношении стоит особо отметить проведение двух Гаагских мирных конференций в 1899 и 1907 годах, по итогам которых были приняты несколько международных документов о законах и обычаях войны. Это были первые конференции, собравшие большое количество государств-участников, на которых на универсальном уровне обсуждались вопросы международного мира и безопасности.
Возможности усовершенствования того, что уже было начато, вновь оказались доступны и необходимы для установления нового мирового порядка по окончании Первой мировой войны. Был достигнут заметный прогресс в области международно-правового регулирования мирного разрешения споров между государствами. В частности, стоит отметить возникновение института санкций с подписанием Версальского мирного договора в 1918 году. В качестве «санкций» в этом договоре отмечались меры для привлечения к уголовной ответственности главного виновника в развязывании мировой войны - императора Германии Вильгельма II. Была учреждена такая организация, как Лига Наций, а также Постоянная Палата Международного Правосудия как международный судебный орган, действовавший при Лиге Наций. Главным призванием Лиги Наций было эффективное поддержание и обеспечение международного мира и безопасности, с чем, впрочем, организации справиться не удалось. Эта организация, созданная с целью эффективного поддержания и обеспечения международного правопорядка, закрепляла в своем Статуте положения, касательно принудительных мер, которые можно было бы применить к государству, совершившему международнопротивоправное деяние1 .
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › CP Key---2NC
Matthew Levinger 18, George Washington University, “Forging Consensus for Atrocity Prevention: Assessing the Record of the OSCE,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 11: Iss. 3: 60-74, http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1505
The Path Forward: Building Cooperative Capacity for Atrocity Prevention
In an October 2016 interview, OSCE General Secretary Lamberto Zannier observed that “the OSCE as a security organization is facing a very complicated environment,” because of the “return of geopolitics” involving “divisions in Europe that we haven’t seen in a long time,” aggravated by global challenges including terrorism along with migration stemming from violent conflicts and the effects of climate change. Zannier observed:
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › CP Key---2NC
Matthew Levinger 18, George Washington University, “Forging Consensus for Atrocity Prevention: Assessing the Record of the OSCE,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal: Vol. 11: Iss. 3: 60-74, http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1505
In recent years, however, some observers have questioned the effectiveness of the OSCE’s work, remarking on the “growing futility”9 of the OSCE as the EU has expanded its political and security-related missions. During the Cold War, a clear demarcation existed between the structure and function of the European Economic Community (EEC) and that of the CSCE: the EEC was a regional organization focusing on the economic integration of Western Europe, whereas the CSCE was an informal dialogue process promoting cooperative security measures between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In 1993, the EEC was subsumed under the EU, which had a more comprehensive mission including a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Over the past quarter-century, a “functional convergence” has occurred between the EU and OSCE. Not only has the EU expanded eastward into the former Warsaw Pact region, it has increasingly taken on political and security functions, such as election monitoring and security sector reform, that had previously been the province of the OSCE.10 The eastward expansion of NATO and the EU has also put the Russian Federation on the defensive. Russian leaders have argued that “instead of acting as a genuine transatlantic organization, the OSCE has evolved into an institution that seeks to act as a tool of Western influence, pushing forward an agenda of excessive intrusion and potential destabilization in Russia’s neighborhood.”11 As long ago as 2006, one expert asserted: “The OSCE is in crisis. . . . There can be no doubt but that the OSCE today, as compared to its heyday during the Cold War, is a far less visible landmark on the European institutional landscape than was formerly the case.”12
This essay will argue that the OSCE continues to play a unique and vital role in preventing and containing ethnic conflict in Europe and Central Asia, but that its greatest distinctive strength— the capacity to help foster shared political norms supporting “common and comprehensive security”—has eroded since the late 1990s. Part I of the essay will discuss the original operating concept of the CSCE and OSCE, which sought to constitute a cooperative transatlantic security community through the promulgation of shared norms. Part II will examine the erosion of the normative consensus between the Eastern and Western participating States of the OSCE since the late 1990s, focusing on some Eastern states’ distrust for the Western democracy promotion agenda. Finally, Part III will examine the prospects for a more robust role of the OSCE in protecting civilians from violent conflict and mass atrocities, given the increasing tensions among Eastern and Western OSCE participating States in recent years.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Overview
Stephen Blank 12, PhD, Senior Fellow @ Strategic Studies Institute - US Army War College, "Making Sense of Moscow’s Syrian Gambit," 6/27/12,
Beyond that Moscow was and still may be equally anxious that the “Arab Spring” or some analogue of it might erupt in Central Asia where it even publicly voiced its apprehensions about that in April 2011.[xi] Any such uprising might spread throughout Central Asia and trigger an explosion on a scale resembling or even surpassing Syria’s current travails. And there are analysts who have publicly warned that such a revolution could occur under the inspiration of Arab events.[xii]
Moreover, Russian perceptions of disaster were quickly confirmed as Libya fell into civil war and as it became clear that Islamist factions might actually take power in one or more of the affected Arab states.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Overview
Alexandra Kuimova 18, Research Assistant with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme, Specialist Degree from Kazan Federal University, and Siemon T. Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure Programme, “Georgia and Black Sea Security”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Background Paper, December 2018, p. 1-2
The Black Sea region is experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Ukraine in 2014.
Georgia revised its defence policy significantly after the fighting between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia in August 2008. Since then, Georgia has continued to perceive Russia’s foreign policy as aggressive and a major threat to its security. Georgia views membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union as strategic priorities. Georgia actively participates in and supports NATO activities in the Black Sea region, which it sees as a means to ensure stability in the region.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › OSCE NB › Overview
Holly Ellyatt 22, staff at CNBC, “Could there be war between Russia and the West? Strategists predict what could happen next,” CNBC, 4/29/2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-should-the-west-prepare-for-war-with-putin.html
“If there’s a border spillover right now, we’re still probably most likely looking at something like Moldova being vulnerable to an invasion,” he said.
He noted that Russia has a long history of using “nuclear brinkmanship” as a way of preventing the West from pursuing security policies that it doesn’t like, with the escalation in hostile rhetoric aimed at deterring NATO members from making heavy arms deliveries to Ukraine.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › Solvency---Cyber---AT: Say No
Adina Ponta 21, advisor to the Committee on Information Technology and Communications in the Romanian Parliament, teaching lecturer at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania and a postdoctoral researcher at the Law School’s Center for Business Law & Information Technology, “Legal Instability in Cyberspace and OSCE’s Mitigation Role,” Juridical Tribune, vol. 11, no. 3, 12/28/2021, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.24818/TBJ/2021/11/3.01
Fifth, as the coordinating fora for CBMs, the OSCE, has accumulated political capital of addressing States’ reluctance regarding information-sharing and inherent challenges that create multi-stakeholder cooperation problems. During the previous rounds, the OSCE gained an overview on which objectives can reasonably be achieved multilaterally, and which ones are more suited for bilateral cooperation mechanisms.53 Deriving lessons learned from past processes enables better approaches to national interests, concerns, and operational practices.54
It would be utopic to believe that major powers will agree on interpretations of every legal institution. Even the experts of the Tallinn Manual Process could not agree on basic principles, although as mentioned, they mainly originated from like- minded states and cultures. The first part of this paper highlighted that the process of norm-creation may matter as much as the destination, as participants agree to disagree and understand each other’s differences and underlying rationales.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › Solvency---Cyber---AT: Non-Binding
Adina Ponta 21, advisor to the Committee on Information Technology and Communications in the Romanian Parliament, teaching lecturer at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania and a postdoctoral researcher at the Law School’s Center for Business Law & Information Technology, “Legal Instability in Cyberspace and OSCE’s Mitigation Role,” Juridical Tribune, vol. 11, no. 3, 12/28/2021, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.24818/TBJ/2021/11/3.01
Although the OSCE process cannot force States to implement their recommendations, it can employ preventive and quiet diplomacy, as well as results- orientated dialogue to find common grounds on emerging security challenges.52 As GGE processes share almost overlapping mandates with the OEWG, the OSCE can be among the most promising venues for multilateral cybersecurity cooperation. In this regard, the OSCE’s ability to bring the United States and Russia to the conversation table is crucial, and with EU support, it should strive at engaging Chinese representatives as well. The People’s Republic of China, which takes a similar view to Russia, also participated in the GGEs, but is not an OSCE member. The preliminary conversations should focus on national interpretations and application of fundamental international law principles. To ensure a candid exchange of views, initial conversations should be held under Chatham House Rule and avoid public scrutiny.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › Solvency---Cyber
A. A. Ivanov 21, А. А. Иванов, professor at N. A. Dobrolyubov Nizhegorod State Linguistic University, “Механизмы Обеспечения Кибербезопасности Нато И Обсе: Сравнительный Анализ,” or “Mechanisms for Ensuring the Cyber Security of NATO and the OSCE: A Comparative Analysis,” Издательство “Перо,” 2021, pp. 156–158, eLibrary
Today, with the development of several new instruments of international cooperation, states have begun to resort to collective activities in cyberspace to solve problems that have become much broader than issues of other forms of security. The most influential structures dealing with security issues are NATO and the OSCE. Paying special attention to the principles of collective protection, both organizations strive to develop their vision for solving problems. They have their own legislation, tactics, many countries are members of both NATO and the OSCE, but the question of reaching consensus in cyberspace remains open. The research is aimed at studying the differences in the approaches of the two organizations based on the analysis of responsible mechanisms pursuing goals for the effectiveness of the policy in cyberspace. As a result, the author assesses the future actions of the two organizations.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › Solvency---Cyber
Matthew Rojansky 18, Director of the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center, “Can a US-Russia conflict be contained?,” European Leadership Network, 10/17/2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/can-a-us-russia-conflict-be-contained/
Secondly, on broadening the scope and participants of the dialogue: Current US and European sanctions on Russia have undoubtedly had a punishing impact on the Russian economy, but at the same time, opportunities to engage the private sector and technical experts from both countries in solving shared problems have been too often overlooked. For example, Russian and US negotiators have so far tip-toed around vital but difficult topics like setting rules for interstate cyber conflict, countering the rise of radicalization via cyberspace, and increasing transparency and accountability around advanced biotechnology. Private sector actors on both sides would have considerable interest in advancing these dialogues, which might take place within what Trump and Putin called in Helsinki a “working group” of Russian and American business leaders. The surrounding domestic politics are atrocious and sanctions cast a pall over discussions generally, but Washington has enough additional positive and negative arrows in its quiver to seek much more from U.S.-Russia dialogue.
A final missed opportunity, one especially important for the West to signal interest in engagement with the whole of Russia beyond Putin, is the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE embodies the values and legacy of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris – monumental deals that facilitated the Cold War’s peaceful end. Yet the OSCE’s most visible roles today are its election observer missions and special monitoring mission in Ukraine, and the Organisation’s centrepiece, the Permanent Council in Vienna, at which all 57 participating states are represented, has become little more than an echo chamber for mutual recriminations. Now is the time for jump-starting meaningful dialogue between Russians and Americans, with Europeans at the table— on this, a hopeful sign underway in the OSCE’s Structured Dialogue initiative aimed at exploring foundational questions about threat perceptions and conflict resolution.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › Solvency---Cyber
Adina Ponta 21, advisor to the Committee on Information Technology and Communications in the Romanian Parliament, teaching lecturer at the Babeș-Bolyai University in Romania and a postdoctoral researcher at the Law School’s Center for Business Law & Information Technology, “Legal Instability in Cyberspace and OSCE’s Mitigation Role,” Juridical Tribune, vol. 11, no. 3, 12/28/2021, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.24818/TBJ/2021/11/3.01
4. The process of consolidating existing norms under the OSCE umbrella
4.1 The old and new role of the OSCE
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › Solvency---AI---AT: Stanley-Lockman
Zoe Stanley-Lockman & Lena Trabucco 22, Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University and a PhD in Law at iCourts Center of Excellence in International Courts at the University of Copenhagen, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, edited by Justin Bullock et al., Oxford University Press, 03/18/2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.69
Importantly, we do not argue NATO is the only—or even the most important—actor shaping AI governance in international security. Other contributors in this Handbook impressively detail efforts at both state and regional levels. Our aim has been to convince sceptics that NATO has a role that is not replicated by other stakeholders in the international security environment. NATO has particular influence, procedures, and the competency to institute certain governance mechanisms—namely standardization and policy planning—that it can build on without needing to expend time building new institutions from scratch. Beyond just a role, NATO is incentivized to emerge as a steward of AI governance and use these mechanisms for future operations, should the Alliance wish to maintain its unique position as a leader encouraging policy alignment, defense planning, and military standardization.
More broadly, this chapter illustrates that regional and international organizations have high stakes for military AI governance. As development, procurement, and implementation of AI is accelerating, it is imperative that international organizations facilitate cooperation among states and industry partners to guide responsible military AI implementation aligned with core values and legal obligations. The convening and coordinating power of international organizations, among other governance tools, is a necessary step for state cooperation and policy alignment. How exactly NATO interacts with other international organizations in the security architecture, including the UN and EU, is a political topic that will also have important implications for the composition of international technology governance regimes, and is a subject for further research.
2022
Georgetown
Counterplan
OSCE CP › Solvency › Solvency---2NC
Tatiana Parkhalina 19, Татьяна Пархалина, deputy director at the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, President of the Association of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, “Россия - Запад: Перманентная Конфронтация Или Выход Из Кризиса?,” or, “Russia - The West: Permanent Confrontation or A Way Out of the Crisis?,” Европейская Безопасность: События, Оценки, Прогнозы, no. 53 (69), 2019, translated by Yandex
Триггером послужили события в и вокруг Ук раины 2013-2014 гг., когда Украина и ЕС обсуж дали подписание соглашения об ассоциации этой страны с Евросоюзом, результатом чего явился сначала мирный, а затем вооруженный Майдан, российская операция по присоединению Крыма и развитие событий на юго-востоке Украины. Россия и Запад по-разному оценивают причины сегодняш него кризиса: Россия считает, что Запад перешел Рубикон, когда поддержал вооруженное свержение законного режима Януковича после того, как пред ставители трех стран Евросоюза дали ему гарантии безопасности; Запад считает, что Россия перешла Рубикон, когда нарушила Будапештский меморан дум 1994 г., являясь одним из трех гарантов терри ториальной целостности Украины в обмен на отказ последней от ядерного оружия, а затем вмешалась в развитие событий на юго-востоке этой страны.
Различная трактовка причин кризиса приводит к тому, что ни одна из сторон не готова «посту питься принципами» и начать серьезный разговор об основах новой разрядки. На наших глазах про исходит дальнейшая эскалация. В рамках острей шей информационной войны обе стороны исполь зуют любые средства, дабы подорвать репутацию друг друга, и как бы исключают возможности для будущих договоренностей.