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2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Disease

Disease securitization’s good – key to effective cooperation NOT militarization

Davies 17 Sara E. Davies, Griffith University, “Advocating Global Health Security,” Global Insecurity, eds. Anthony Burke and Rita Parker, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017, pp.253-272, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1 /GoGreen!

For the last two decades a strategy employed by health professionals, scientists, and diplomats has been to play the ‘health security card’ to achieve particular trade, diplomatic, strategic, and development goals (Elbe 2011). The presumption has been that the securitisation of health will harness global political leadership and resources. This marriage of health issues to security logic has been met with a mix of applause, caution, and critique (Feldbaumet al. 2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013; Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014). But the presumption has remained that, for the most part, the marriage of health issues to security will ‘harness political leadership and resources for various international health issues’ (Elbe 2011: 220). In the last 15 years, there have been three United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that have specifically referred to health matters – S/Res/1308 (2000), S/Res/1983 (2011), both concerning HIV/AIDs, and S/Res/2177 (2014) in response to the Ebola viral disease outbreak in West Africa. In December 2012, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed resolution A/67/L.36, Global Health and Foreign Policy, the fifth resolution on global health and foreign policy resolution to pass in the UNGA since the adoption of the first resolution on Global Health and Foreign Policy in 2008 (A/63/33). The UNGA also adopted resolution A/69/1 giving support to the measures recommended by UN Secretary-General to contain the Ebola outbreak (A/69/389 2014). The decision of the UNSC to adopt three resolutions on health matters in 15 years and the UNGA sessions on global health and foreign policy have received mixed views. Some point to these events as illustration of the weakness of the global health security narrative (Youde 2014). In particular, it has been noted that the Ebola outbreak in 2014 was initially met with no international capacity outside of the World Health Organization (WHO) to respond to this crisis. The creation of the UN Mission on Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) in September (2014) was the first, and some argue should be the last, effort to respond to a viral outbreak (Panel of independent experts 2015). Others contend that, given that there is no procedure under the UN Charter for the General Assembly or Security Council to examine health matters – let alone develop a mission like UNMEER – broader UN engagement in health beyond the WHO could point to the success of the global health diplomacy (McInnes 2015). The question is what does successful global health diplomacy look like? Do we see in practice the securitisation of health as essential to pursue international diplomatic engagement in global health? There have been recent claims that the successful international engagement in health initiatives such as the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria (Global Fund) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been achieved without asserting their necessity ‘primarily on security considerations’ (McInnes and Rushton 2013: 16; see also Sridhar 2012; Gagnon and Labonte 2011). However, the assumption remains that linking health issues, specifically health emergencies and infectious disease outbreaks to security discourse will create more opportunities for diplomatic cooperation and engagement (see Feldbaum et al. 2010; Hafner and Shiffman 2013). This chapter explores this argument beginning with the period where the phrase ‘global health diplomacy’ and ‘global health governance’ began to gain usage in international relations in the 1990s. In the first part of the chapter I briefly present the conceptual history of health security and its relationship to ‘global health diplomacy’. I explore the argument that the success of global health diplomacy has come from the preponderant use of security language, referents, and discourse (cf. Elbe 2011; Feldbaum et al. 2010; Kickbusch et al. 2007; McInnes and Rushton 2013). In the second part of the chapter I examine two cases, one where a type of security logic was deliberately employed to frame the ‘health emergency’ (Framework Convention on Tobacco Control or FCTC) and one where human rights logic was initially deployed when advocating for its creation (the Global Alliance for Vaccine Immunization or GAVI). I evaluate what ‘health security’ looks like in these global health initiatives and explore the presumption that ‘security discourse’ must be present in comparing these two major, successful global health initiatives. HEALTH SECURITY States have a history of formal international agreements addressing health matters and health threats, particularly infectious diseases, from the Decree of Quarantine in Ragusa-Dubrovnik in 1377 (Mackowiak and Sehdev 2002) to the International Sanitary Conference in 1851 (Fidler 2003) and the revised International Health Regulations in 2007 (Davies et al. 2015). However, the treatment of health as a ‘low politics’ priority at the international level remained the case through most of the formative years of nation-building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Fidler 1999). This was in spite of its great strategic benefit for colonial era expansion, winning wars and rapid industrialisation (Diamond 1997). In contemporary politics, a range of actors – such as foreign governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pharmaceutical companies, private donors, and international organisations – drive a variety of different health agendas that influence priorities within individual states and affect the resources that are available to individual health workers and opportunities for patients (Youde 2012). Likewise, the post–Second World War Bretton Woods system had a profound influence upon health-care policy and practice around the world, with key lending institutions like the World Bank promoting particular health-care systems and policies in their lending programmes (Sridhar 2012). In this period, key discourses such as ‘Health for All’, the Essential Medicines List, and Right to Health emerged in the absence of linkage to security. These discourses brought in a range of actors including international organisations,NGOs and transnational corporations with the power to shape health opportunities and outcomes within and amongst states (Gagnon and Labonté 2011). In the 1990s, however, foreign and defence ministries became increasingly interested in global health policy – particularly infectious diseases – which would be referred to as having a ‘securitising’ effect on health (McInnes and Lee 2006). 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 255 During the 1990s, key events combined with a paradigm shift in International Relations (IR) and security studies (particularly in Western developed countries with the end of the Cold War) (Paris 2001) to connect security to health (Enemark 2007; Collier and Lakoff 2008). Acute awareness was growing amongst Western states that they were not immune to health events such as infectious disease outbreaks. The outbreak and spread of HIV across developing and developed countries during the 1980s; fear of biosecurity attacks with the breakdown of security in laboratories across the former Soviet Union (Koblentz 2010); sudden outbreak of the plague in India in 1995 and the arrival of West Nile virus near New York City in 1999; and the return of ‘slow-burn’ diseases thought eradicated such as Tuberculosis (TB), measles and meningitis in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia (Price- Smith 2002). As well, new strains of disease, such as haemorrhagic dengue fever and drug-resistant malaria were on the rise due to significant climate change impact in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Pacific (Kim and Schneider 2013). Andrew Price-Smith argues that prior to President Clinton’s appointment of the National Science Council on Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases in 1995, developed states had grown complacent to the fact that ‘despite their enormous technological and economic power, it is extremely unlikely that developed countries will be able to remain an island of health in a global sea of disease’ (2002: 122). Clinton’s move created a wave of interest in other developed countries, particularly the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, all shifting to appreciate and contextualise health threats in foreign policy terms (McInnes and Lee 2012: 32). Until then, on the rare occasion that health policy was discussed at the international level it was in relation to (mostly) infectious disease outbreaks such as plague and cholera, or large-scale efforts such as the mass immunisation programme led by WHO to eradicate smallpox. During infectious disease outbreaks, emphasis had been squarely placed on the responsibility of the host state and regardless of the capacity of its public health system to effectively respond (Fidler 1999). Meanwhile, the spread and scale of HIV/AIDS raised fears about its potential to threaten state cohesion and national economies. There was a particular focus on military forces being at risk of HIV infection, and the political insecurity these infectious could bring in societies (Singer 2002; Elbe 2006). The apparent potential for HIV/AIDS to cause state collapse or serious disruption that could ricochet throughout neighbouring states 256 S.E. DAVIES was considered a realistic scenario in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as some parts of South and East Asia and the Pacific (Shisana et al. 2003; Ramiah 2006; Price-Smith et al. 2007). It was specific reference to the threat of HIV/AIDs on peacekeepers that led to the first resolution on health, Resolution 1308, being passed in the UN Security Council in 2000 (UNSC 2000). In response to these developments, a host of analysts, including Solomon Benatar (1998, 2002), Peter W. Singer (2002), Robert Ostergard (2002), called for IR to engage with the economic, humanitarian, political, and security ramifications of the AIDS epidemic. At the same time, David Fidler and Andrew Price-Smith called for equal attention to the economic, political, and social insecurity that stems from a range of infectious diseases already prevalent in countries (Fidler 2003; Price-Smith 2002). Using quantitative analysis of the relationship between infectious diseases and state capacity, Price-Smith claimed that ‘infectious disease [already] constitutes a verifiable threat to national security and state power’ (Price-Smith 2002: 19). Health security, Price-Smith (2002: 9) argued, referred to the threat of the disease on particular populations as well as the country’s economic and political stability becoming unsustainable as a result of a pathogen wiping out the core population base. While a disease may have a different impact in different states: [I]ncreasing levels of disease correlate with a decline in state capacity. As state capacity declines and as pathogen-induced deprivation and increasing demands upon the state increase, we may see an attendant increase in the incidence of chronic sub-state violence and state failure. State failure frequently produces chaos in affected regions as neighbouring states seal their borders to prevent the massive influx of disease-infected refugee populations. Adjacent states may also seek to fill the power vacuum and may seize valued territory from the collapsing state, prompting other proximate states to do the same and so exacerbating regional security dilemmas. (Price-Smith 2002: 15) In a similar vein, David Fidler’s seminal 1999 book International Law and Infectious Diseases argued that with the increased risk of drug-resistant microbes in the twenty first century, as identified by public health officials (Institute of Medicine 1992; Heymann 1996), it will become important to ‘understand the international politics of infectious disease control, or microbialpolitik’ (Fidler 1999: 19). Microbialpolitik, argued Fidler, was ‘wrapped up not only in traditional concerns such as sovereignty and power but also in the implementation of scientifically sound infectious disease policies at the national and international levels’ (ibid.). Both Fidler and Price-Smith argued that the risk of newly emerged infectious diseases and drug-resistant infectious diseases required that all governments engage with the problem as if they were threats to national security. Likewise, Laurie Garrett argued in 2001 that ‘a sound public health system, it seems, is vital to societal stability and, conversely, may topple in the face of political or social stability or whim. Each affects the other: widespread political disorder or anti-governmentalism may weaken a public health system, and a crisis in the health of the citizens can bring down a government’ (Garrett 2001: 5). These ideas continued to influence the global politics of health into the twenty-first century (Fidler 2009; Davies 2012). In a 2010 study on the influence of global health on foreign policy, Feldbaum and his colleagues found that most discussion and policy from diplomatic engagement focused on the interplay of national interests and security, which meant that most diplomacy focus and discussion was on the containment of infectious diseases (Feldbaum et al. 2010: 87). At the time, WHO also immersed itself in the health security argument: Collaboration between Member States, especially between developed and developing countries, to ensure the availability of technical and other resources is a crucial factor not only in implementing the [International Health] Regulations, but also in building and strengthening public health capacity and the networks and systems that strengthen global public health security will. (WHO 2007: 13) Of course, health diplomacy refers to the pursuit of international health cooperation on matters of concern to states (Kickbusch et al. 2007). It is the amalgam of cooperation in areas where there is the possibility of genuine technical cooperation for a diverse range of diseases (Youde 2012: 25). However, because health diplomacy involves the interplay of national interests, power and diplomatic compromise, ‘state interests have been critical to either the success or obstruction of such agreements . . . and issues of national security remain atop the foreign-policy hierarchy’ (Feldbaum et al. 2010: 87). The counter-narrative to the health security discourse described above is that the securitisation of health promotes an instrumental pursuit of health. To capture foreign policy interest and engagement, global health discussions produce a ‘hierarchy of illnesses’ whereby some health issues receive interest and resources whilst other equally deadly health matters do not (Youde 2012: 160). Jeremy Shiffman’s (2006: 411–420) work on the peaks and troughs of investment in global health initiatives has revealed that despite disease burden to a population, some infectious diseases (i.e. HIV/AIDS) consistently attract stronger short-term investment from donor states – primarily those that are contagious or linked to the national security interests of donor states. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the threat of infectious disease alone encapsulated all diplomatic engagement with health issues at the turn of the twenty-first century. The rise of non-traditional security has also been attributed to the increased influence of the introduction of different social science methods and theories to International Security Studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 188). This has influenced research into the subject matter of security studies and IR. If insecurity and grievances amongst the population played a large part in the civil wars that gripped the 1990s (Fearon and Laitin 2003), engagement with health is not just a security concern for developed states but also for developing states. In other words, appreciations of health security were not one-dimensional. It was possible to advocate for a vision of health security that sought to protect individuals as much as states. Indeed, a human centred appreciation of security – coined ‘human security’ by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (see MacFarlane and Khong 2006) – sought to redefine the ‘traditional’ security with issues and concepts under the umbrella term ‘non-traditional’ security, including health (Chalk 2006). Thus, there does appear to be a significant relationship between international health events and the direction of research and policy engagement (Davies 2012). In the last decade, events such as the United Nations Security Resolution on HIV/AIDS (S/Res/1308) and SARS create an explosion of IR engagement with global health governance, particularly in the area of health security. This ‘phenomenon’ has been witnessed again with the Ebola outbreak (Youde 2014). Amongst all these engagements, two key approaches have emerged. First, those who accept the inevitability of a ‘narrow’ approach to health and IR, focused on infectious diseases and bioterrorism as security threats (Koblentz 2012). Alternatively, there are those who articulate a broader vision related to development, state capacity, and cross-national health issues (Shiffman 2006; Nunes 2014; Rushton and Williams 2012). One of the central claims of the former approach is that health securitisation is an effective way of galvanising diplomatic engagement amongst states and other actors, resulting in the allocation of political will and material resources (Collier and Lakoff 2008; Elbe 2011; Hafner and Shiffman 2013). In the next part of the chapter I examine this core assumption. In particular, I explore whether the effectiveness of health initiatives is tied to their securitisation, focusing on the examples of two major health initiatives. I examine the Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) and the GAVI. Interest in these two cases comes from exploring the above presumption that security and health, particularly concerning infectious diseases, drives, and delivers policy momentum. While there is debate about whether that momentum translates into ‘real’ policy progress or whether it is mere rhetoric deployed at particular crises/events with no lasting impact, there is no debate that health security has dominated global health and foreign policy discourse (Feldbaum et al. 2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013). Below, I briefly examine the dominance of health security in successful global health initiatives – one where you would expect it to be deliberately deployed (GAVI) and one where it was not (TFI). TFI and GAVI, I contend, are interesting cases precisely because they confound the issueframing conventions about the relationship between health and security. CONFOUNDING EXPECTATIONS A global health initiative is defined in this chapter as ‘an emerging and global trend in health. They are usually focused on state, international organisation and public–private partnerships. Global initiatives typically target specific diseases and are supposed to bring additional resources to health efforts’ (WHO 2015). Case Selection and Discourse Analysis This section briefly compares two international health initiatives: the TFI and GAVI. The TFI sought to reach an international agreement under international law that countries would adopt to regulate the sale and production of tobacco. This global health initiative was in aid of preventing the unchecked rise of tobacco related illnesses – non-communicable diseases – including cancer (various), emphysema, heart disease, stroke, and diabetes (to name a few). In the case of the TFI, and in light of the 260 S.E. DAVIES literature discussion concerning health security above, it would be expected that there was little to no presence of security discourse in the early days of this initiative. It was (and is) about introducing tobacco control legislation, addressing unregulated sale and distribution of tobacco to address preventable tobacco-related diseases in young populations in already over-burdened public health-care systems (Roemer et al. 2005). In contrast, the GAVI is a public and private partnership between states, international organisations, pharmaceutical companies, and philanthropic donors that sought cooperation amongst this diverse group of actors to manufacture, purchase and deliver life-saving vaccines against deadly infectious diseases in the most remote, dangerous and impoverished locations around the world. GAVI is, ostensibly, the initiative where it would be expected to see initial employment of ‘security’ rhetoric given it is addressing the health insecurity of under five children in need of vaccination from, mostly, contagious infectious diseases. In fact, the immediate previous iteration of GAVI – the Child Vaccination Initiative – used security type discourse such as ‘mission’, ‘operation’, and ‘threat’’ under the steerage of a former US defence army medic (see Muraskin 2002). These cases were also selected because they shared some important features. Both the TFI and the GAVI are concerned with one specific health concern – tobacco and immunisation; both were launched within a similar time where health security discourse was gaining policy attention; both initiatives required the involvement of multiple stakeholders, including national governments, to enjoy success. The main difference, of interest to this chapter, is that the association of security with the health issue confound the type of cases analysed to date in the IR literature on global health security. I reveal below that the non-communicable, ‘slow moving’ health threat engaged more securitised discourse than the high morbidity communicable health threat. The comparison of the two cases was organised around a common framework involving three steps. 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 261 First, understanding the rhetoric and concepts used to frame the initiative. Each initiative has produced a significant volume of material outlining its purpose, scope and mandate. For the purposes of this chapter, I focused on the ‘founding’ document for each initiative. In the case of TFI, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2003, 8 years after the Convention was first proposed in the 1995 World Health Assembly. The Framework Convention was the outcome of the TFI and details ‘a regulatory strategy to address addictive substances; in contrast to previous drug control treaties, the WHO Framework Convention asserts the importance of demand reduction strategies as well as supply issues’ (WHO 2003). Included in the Framework Convention document analysed is an Annex 2, which details the history of drafting the Framework from 1995 to 2003. For GAVI, the document analysed is the GAVI Meeting of the Proto-Board in Seattle, July 1999. This document details GAVI’s terms of reference, mission, objectives, functions, structure, milestones, and budget priorities. An interest in the discourse used in the founding document of each initiative is informed by the premise outlined in the above literature – to what extent security frames were employed to justify, conceptualise, and operationalise these two global health initiatives which remain, successfully, in place today. Second, once accepting the premise that securitisation is deliberately engaged the two documents were analysed to identify a set of ‘benchmarks’ to guide its assessment of the extent to which a health initiative has aligned with security. Both documents were examined in detail for the presence of ‘speech acts’ (Hansen 2012) – the initiative itself or actors associated with the initiative identified an existential threat or risk and speech acts that called for the adoption of extraordinary measures. Was the initiative itself referred to as ‘security’, ‘threat’, or ‘risk’. Who was the ‘referent object’ identified – the group threatened; who was the functional actor capable of protecting the referent object from the identified threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 26–39); and what was the ‘scale’ of securitisation utitlised to emphasise the need for extraordinary measures (Buzan and Weaver 2009). Third, discourse analysis (Hansen 2012). In this case, the discourse within the two documents were analysed using NVivo Software. For the purposes of this chapter, I refer to three query searches conducted to analyse the perspectives being presented in the two documents concerning the threat the initiative is addressing, who the initiative is ‘protecting’ and 262 S.E. DAVIES who is responsible for such protection. To facilitate answering these three levels of inquiry, three query searches within NVivo of each document were conducted: (1) word frequency analysis, (2) text search of ‘security’ terms and, and (3) text search of ‘other’ normative terms (development, rights, economy). A word tree was then developed for the second and third text searches with a ‘in context’ search up to ten surrounding words (on either side) to enable understanding of the context and usage of the key words, i.e. ‘threat’ or ‘poor’ being searched in the document. The word frequency search assisted with identifying the primary actors discussed in the documents – i.e. who was identified as the referent actor intended for that initiative versus the functional actor necessary to give effect to the initiative. Findings Discourse analysis of the TFI and GAVI documents produced three key findings. The first, unexpected, find was that the TFI initiative was framed just as much in security terms as was GAVI. The number of securitisation ‘speech acts’ (Hansen 2012) searched and located in the Framework Convention was practically the same at GAVI – 0.08% and 0.07%, respectively (speech act terms: secure, threat, risk, mission, extraordinary, urgent). In both cases, the presence of security language was less than 1% of each document. What was significant was that in the search for ‘other’ normative terms (terms: responsible, rights, develop, needs, poor) – the Framework Convention was comparatively high at 1.05%, and a similar search for GAVI came at 0.4% references. However, given the Framework Convention is a legal document the presence of ‘right/rights’ partly accounts for high percentage compared to GAVI. Contextual analysis of these terms reveals further detail in how the documents framed the problem, the referent actor and the functional actor (see Table 14.1). In the Framework Convention – despite higher use of ‘other’ (nonsecurity) normative language than GAVI – there is a clear disposition towards identifying the state as the ‘functional’ actor responsible for taking measures necessary to protect the population from tobacco sale, use, and morbidity. The Convention directly refers to populations at risk (women and minors) and the need for member states to support civil society capacity to inform and educate tobacco awareness in these populations. Again, this is a legal instrument so the emphasis on member states is not surprising as they are the only signatories. However, even in ‘other normative’ references to rights, responsibilities and need – primary emphasis remains on the state as the functional actor protects the population at risk of addiction rather than alternative dominant frames such as the right to health, the right to information. The Framework Convention leans towards more ‘traditional’ security language in conceptualising the state–individual relationship concerning tobacco control: risk and risk mitigation; threat and protection. In the case of GAVI, the 0.07% security references in contrast with its 0.4% ‘other’ references hints at a different frame being brought to this initiative. However, it is not particularly clear until, again, the broader context of these terms is analysed. In the case of GAVI the focus is overwhelming on the ‘mission’ of the alliance and ensuring institutional clarity to support the primary focus – the right of the child to immunisation. This is clearly stated as seen above, particularly in the mission and responsibility statements (Table 14.1). The only time the roles of functional actors are associated with either security or other terms are in the context of securing commitment from actors (broad range of board membership from states to international organisations, pharmaceutical companies, and civil society), and development of health sector capacity. Despite GAVI addressing the containment of infectious disease, there is no threat language present. Securitised speech acts are practically absent – even when ‘security’ terms are located. The emphasis is overwhelming on rights and alleviating deprivation. Both initiatives confound the expectations prior to analysis – the infectious disease focused initiative is ‘under-securitised’ in comparison to the non-communicable focused initiative. Finally, hinted at above, the emphasis on primary actors in these two documents revealed key similarities – both focus on the institutional arrangements and the actors most closely associated with these arrangements. In the case of GAVI the board (comprised of international organisation, civil society, member states, pharmaceutical, and philanthropic members) is the primary functional actor; in the case of the TFI, the actor that looms largest is the organisation (namely, WHO) followed by signatory states to the Convention. Discussion about the population who are to benefit and arguably be empowered from these initiatives, is not discussed as much as the organisation and accordingly the implementation arrangements around the initiative itself. To some extent, given the nature of these two documents, this is not surprising. However, its presence in two documents for two very different initiatives may reveal that the pathology of organisations rather than the framing of an initiative requires further study when engaging with the comparative success and failure of global health diplomacy (Barnett and Finnemore 2003; Hanrieder 2015). 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 265 CONCLUSION What is the value of securitisation when it comes to building and sustaining global political interest in health issues? Some contend that global health security has not run its course and continues to have utility in building state interest, particularly the resources of foreign affairs and defence departments, to secure global health diplomacy objectives (Kickbusch et al. 2007; Feldbaum et al. 2010; Elbe 2011). Others contend it is a ‘smokescreen’ that captures short bursts of attention that are episodic and may have immediate impact but no essential ‘follow through’ (McInnes and Rushton 2013). In this chapter, I explored how global health initiatives securitise and what becomes of them. I deliberately chose two successful initiatives with the expectation that one had securitised a conventional health issue – vaccine preventable infectious diseases – and one had not – tobacco regulation. In examining the cases of TFI and GAVI, I looked at their core document: their mission and value statements reflected in, respectively, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the first meeting documents of GAVI. Speech acts, identified as the hallmark of securitising moves, were analysed in both documents and contrasted with ‘non-securitisation’ or ‘other normative’ language. The Framework Convention engaged in more securitising language or ‘speech acts’ compared to GAVI but both contained more references to human rights and responsibilities discourse. In neither case did it appear as if actors had taken a conscious decision to securitise the issue any more than they chose to articulate the issue in terms of human rights obligations. In the case of the Framework Convention where a focus on security was expected and to a greater extent seen here was an equally strong presence of human rights and ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ language. The security discourse may have helped capture attention but it was not the only discursive tool at play and neither did it obviously displace other discourses. In the case of GAVI, the initiative identified its primary mission as fulfilling the rights of the child; whereas for TFI, emphasis was member states fulfilling their responsibility to address the threat of tobacco related illness from tobacco usage. GAVI appears to have a single referent – the right of the child to health via immunisation; while TFI related to a multitude of actors. The operationalisation of the initiative(s) and their embeddedness in global health architecture dominated the discussion far more than the framing language. Framing language constituted a relatively small part of the discourse compared to the consuming discussion of institutional design. What this comparison of two global health initiatives reveals is that whilst security discourse might help capture the attention of states, it has not necessarily overtaken other policy frames such as human rights and ‘sovereignty as responsibility language’. Indeed, the key priority seems to be not whether the international community should be engaged with these issues, but the appropriate institutional design for initiatives to achieve these health goals.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Cybersecurity

No impact to securitizing cyber threats

Gomez 21 Miguel Alberto Gomez, Senior Researcher with the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, PhD candidate at the University of Hildesheim, Germany; and Christopher Whyte, PhD, Assistant Professor in the program on Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness at Virginia Commonwealth University’s L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs; “Breaking the Myth of Cyber Doom: Securitization and Normalization of Novel Threats,” International Studies Quarterly, 5-15-2021, DOI 10.1093/isq/sqab034 /GoGreen!

According to some, advancements in technological and organizational capabilities among capable state and stateaffiliated actors over the past decade increase the likelihood that offensive cyber operations (OCOs) might soon produce destructive physical effects (Saltzman 2013; Healey 2016). Expectations of real-world damage inflicted through cyberspace reinforce the “cyber doom” narrative that digital insecurity might result in a massive failure of social and economic processes across societies dependent on new information technologies and that dread of such failure permeates public perspectives on cyber issues (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009).

For those who study public opinion surrounding foreign policymaking, the “cyber doom” type of narrative is not especially uncommon. Environmental circumstances of sufficient visibility and meaning, such as the trauma-inducing experiences of 9/11 or the Cold War, often take on life of their own and affect opinion formation independent of an individuals’ priors or the cues of elites. Oddly, however, the oft-referenced notion of “cyber doom” appears paradoxical, even despite the link some scholars make between OCOs and physical effects.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – China

China threat discourse doesn’t cause war – BUT the ALT does

Hagstrom 14 – PhD, Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (Linus, “East Asia's Power Shift: The Flaws and Hazards of the Debate and How to Avoid Them,” Asian Perspective, 38.3)

Pan argues that the "China threat discourse" is "always intrin- sically linked to how US policymakers/mainstream China special- ists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example)" (2004, 306). Hagström demonstrates how the discourse on Japan's "abnormality" and "weakness" reproduces a standard of "normality" in world politics that is centered on the ability to go to war. Postwar Japan is socially constructed as deviant from this norm and thus as a threat to itself. This discourse, which emerges in both Japanese and Western academia and in Japanese political debate, legitimizes a road map for a more "realistic," "active," "responsible," and "nor- mal" Japan (Hagström 2014).∂ The power of the power-shift discourse does not stop at the production of identities and standards. The point is that identities and standards produce effects. Pan illustrates this by showing how the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996 was often understood as "further objective proof of the long-suspected 'China threat,'" but few acknowledged that "the 'China threat' discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis" (2004, 323, 320). Moreover, standards in Japan's "normalization" discourse have enabled Realpolitik changes in its foreign security policy. Chinese vigilance vis-à-vis Japan and the United States might also be interpreted as discursive phenomena-the theme of national reinvigoration is a product of the lingering notion that China has been continually humiliated and victimized by the great powers since the nineteenth century. As these examples illustrate, the ulti- mate power of discourse is the production of self-fulfilling prophecies. When self-fulfilling prophecies occur on both sides of a dyad, we might end up with a socially generated security dilemma (Johnston 2004).∂ Much research has warned of self-fulfilling prophecies in the East Asian context. Some observers suggest that US or Japanese discourses about China might produce policies of containment, Japanese "normalization" and "remilitarization," and US "rebal- ancing" toward East Asia (Pan 2004; 2012; Hagström 2012; Turner 2014a; 2014b). Nonetheless, Japan and the United States have not yet embarked on containing China. Instead, both countries have on the whole accommodated China's rise (Christensen 2006; Jerdén and Hagström 2012). In a similar manner, perceived increases in bellicose or nationalistic representations in Chinese discourses led some observers to jump to the mistaken conclusion that this had already resulted in a more assertive Chinese foreign policy (Jerdén 2014). As important as it is to remain vigilant against the emergence of socially constructed security dilemmas, we need to bear in mind that there is no deterministic connection between discourse and policy-just an enabling one. Dominant discourses create propensities for action but do not make any action inevitable. More empirically informed theorizing is needed to address the questions of how, when, and why discourses make some actions politically conceivable, easy to communicate, and sometimes even coercive (Holland 2013).∂ Reflecting on the possible power exercised through the alter- native approaches introduced in this special issue is also neces- sary. In this article we raise analytical and normative concerns about the ideas of a more "powerful" and "threatening" China, a "weak" Japan, and a "declining" United States. We argue that such representations risk offsetting balancing policies and a secu- rity dilemma in East Asia, in line with the self-fulfilling prophecy logic discussed above. These arguments clearly belong to another site of discursive power production. That we have not seen any obvious balancing policies in East Asia thus far might arguably be interpreted as one of its effects.∂ In fact, our critique of the power-shift debate might itself be criticized as denying or playing down Chinese power, which could have two effects: (1) China appears less powerful and thus less threatening, which allows it to arm itself with impunity and behave aggressively; and (2) the Chinese government can ignore calls to take on more international responsibilities with reference to the limited scope of its power. As William Callahan points out, attempts to counter the "China threat theory" within China often "refute 'Chinese' threats as a way of facilitating the pro- duction of an American threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on" (2005, 711). Adopting a nonintentional power con- cept allows us to see how even critical scholars, inside and out- side China, who profess no interest in exaggerating threats against China but rather "seek to deconstruct the discourse of 'threat,'" might play a role in accelerating this process (Callahan 2005, 711). In other words, intentional attempts to prevent the emergence of a self-fulfilling prophecy may actually play an unintentional part in creating one.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Bioweapons

Securitization of bioweapons attacks doesn’t result in militarization, only effective preparedness and response

Saunders-Hastings 14 Patrick Saunders-Hastings, epidemiologist and risk scientist with expertise in global health, infectious disease epidemiology and emergency preparedness, Ph.D. Population Health, University of Ottawa, M.Sc. Global Health, Brighton and Sussex Medical School, B.Sc. Biology, Queen’s University, “Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons,” E-International Relations, 1-8-2014, /GoGreen!

The Threat of Biological Weapons: A Justification of Biological Weapons Securitization 1. Introduction In 2001, when attacks were carried out in the United States involving Bacillus anthracis, the bacterial agent that causes anthrax, the threat of biological weapons came into sharper focus for the American government. These attacks were not the beginning of the biological weapons threat, but rather a point along a continuum of increasing risk. Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention defines biological weapons to include the “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes” as well as the “weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict”1. The use of biological weapons dates back centuries, but the fear of biological weapons of mass destruction, here defined as weapons that pose an existential threat to the target, is relatively recent2. Much of it is attributable to the rapid advances made in the biological sciences over the past decade, particularly with respect to the field of genomics, where there is a growing ability to manipulate genes3. This knowledge has a variety of applications in the field of bioweapons. Additionally, while states use of biological weapons was a concern through much of the 20th century, the possibility that rogue states or non-state groups would use biological weapons was largely ignored until the start of the 21st century1. Therefore, the threat of biological weapons has been framed as a security issue4. This essay examines whether, and to what degree, the threat of a biological weapons attack has been overstated with respect to the government’s response by drawing on securitization theory, which critically evaluates the process through which an issue comes to be viewed through a security framework. In addition, the essay will also use the precautionary principle, described by the 1998 Wingspread Statement as the notion that “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically”5. Though more often applied to considerations of environmental risk, in the case of biological weapons, the principle could be used to justify caution even in the absence of consensus surrounding the probability of an attack, simply due to the severity of the consequences if an attack was to occur. It will be argued that the biological weapons threat has not been overestimated and that the biodefense measures expressed in current policy and funding decisions are warranted. Despite measures such as likelihood-adjusted mortality, which may suggest the U.S. government response is an overreaction, other characteristics of the bioweapons threat justify its securitization and resulting prioritization in the government agenda. To do this, the essay provides a discussion of how the potential consequences of an attack pose an existential threat to the United States, how there is an inadequate degree of preparedness for such an event, how the mere possibility of an attack is enough to warrant high spending on preventive and preparative programs, and how the response has been appropriately measured given the threat. The focus will be on the United States government because it has taken such a prominent role in bioweapon securitization and biodefense funding. A single country, the US, was chosen as a point of focus to avoid confusion due to differing levels of threat and response across countries. Additionally, any exaggerations that may exist in how the media or the public portray and view the biological weapons threat will be ignored; though this could be related to the government’s decision to securitize bioweapons, this is a separate issue from government policy decisions in response to the security threat and is outside the scope of this paper. 2. Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons Securitization theory is a constructivist approach informing how certain issues become framed through a security lens6. It offers a useful analytical framework for understanding how, why, and what issues come to be viewed as security threats. Securitization is an active process wherein a securitizing actor, in this case the American government, presents and addresses an issue as an existential threat to a particular group, or referent object7. In these situations, emergency response measures and extensive resource commitments are considered justified7. Securitization theory generally promotes desecuritization as preferable because it avoids the negative consequences of securitization, including a heavy-handed state response, reduced democratic accountability, and the narrowing of public choice8. However, it also recognizes that securitization is sometimes appropriate. Recent considerations of securitization theory identify three criteria that, if fulfilled, justify securitization: an objective, existential threat, a referent object whose protection promotes human well-being, and a response appropriately measured to the particular threat6. In the case of bioweapons securitization, the second criterion is less controversial, given that the referent object is human population; thus, any harm to the referent object would directly reduce a human well-being. However, the question of whether securitization of biological weapons meets the other two criteria is more contentious. Skeptics may point to Colin Powell’s 2003 address to the United Nations as a case where the biological weapons security threat may have been exaggerated and securitization was promoted for political ends, thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the securitizing actor, the U.S. government. In his speech, Powell made the case for an invasion of Iraq by claiming Iraq had capabilities to produce biological weapons of mass destruction, including mobile bioweapons labs, a claim that later turned out to be false9. Critics also target the policies resulting from securitization, arguing that the capacity of aggressors to carry out large scale attacks causing mortality has been overestimated, calling into question whether an existential threat truly exists and whether the response has been appropriately measured10. Government funding may be seen as unjustifiably skewed in favour of biodefense, defined as the capacity to respond to a biological weapons attack, to the neglect of other key areas, such as endemic and pandemic diseases. For instance, Klotz calculated what is referred as the “likelihood-adjusted mortality” for biological weapons, pandemic diseases, and endemic diseases by multiplying the probability of occurrence by an estimate of mortality were an event to occur11. By comparing these values with government funding allocated to each category, he demonstrated that biodefense receives more funding than its likelihood-adjusted mortality estimate would suggest is warranted11. However, objections have been raised to this argument. Supporters of biodefense prioritization point to the fact that focusing solely on potential fatalities ignores other issues, such as the negative social and economic fallout from an attack12. Additionally, they point to the possibility that it is more expensive to combat intentional threats, where there will be an explicit effort to circumvent current practices by exploiting weaknesses12. It should also be considered that the probability of one attack is not independent from another, and that an increasing probability of success may elicit more attempts12. To follow will be an examination of whether government spending and policies constitute a justified response to the threat of biological weapons. Securitization is relevant in that it was a way for decision-makers to implement the policies they want and is justifiable to the extent that the programs themselves are necessary and appropriate. Despite other consequences of securitization, such as public fear, political manipulation, and a heavy-handed response, which may give the impression of an overreaction, the reality is that securitization was a means of enabling the implementation of certain policies and programs necessary to respond to the threat of biological weapons. 3. Consequences of an Attack A government’s decision to securitize an issue is a strategy to make extreme responses seem justified, and it centers on the perceived existential risk a threat poses to the population7. Beginning with a brief history of biological weapons use, this section will aim to defend the framing of biological weapons use as an existential threat by examining their ability to cause mortality or to generate negative social and economic fallout. A brief discussion of the potential catastrophic consequences of a smallpox attack will illustrate the argument. The use of biological weapons dates back centuries. Examples include the Tatars catapulting plague-infected corpses over city walls at the siege of Kaffa in the 14th century, the deliberate triggering of a smallpox epidemic among Native Americans via contaminated blankets in the 18th century during the French and Indian War, and the contamination of salad bars with salmonella at a restaurant in Oregon in the 20th century2. However, with the development of the germ theory during the 19th and into the 20th century, there was an increase in scientific knowledge about biological weapons10. States became increasingly interested in such weapons, with Japan establishing a bioweapons program between 1932-1945, the United States in 1942, and the Soviet Union in 197313. In 1972, in response to increasing concern about the threat of biological weapons, the United Nations proposed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (or BWC)14. The treaty came into effect in 1975, and banned the development, acquisition, and stockpiling of biological weapons1. However, it failed to halt the research and development of biological weapons, which have continued into the 21st century. Those who argue that government response to the biological weapons threat has been overstated point to very low mortality in previous attacks11. The anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United States, for example, resulted in only 5 deaths15. This argument could be used to urge governments to instead invest resources in areas that consistently cause higher mortality, such as infectious diseases like AIDS or even the seasonal flu. However, in carrying out a threat assessment, it is also important to look at the potential for mortality. Here it has been suggested future attacks may not be on the same relatively small scale as those in the past15. It is difficult to produce reliable estimates of fatalities that might result from an attack; there is huge variation in estimates and, often, little statistical evidence to support the predictions11. That said, it is agreed that, in theory, even small amounts of a dangerous biological agent could cause significant mortality if prepared and disseminated effectively16. For instance, the WHO estimates that 50kg of B. anthracis distributed upwind of a population of 500 000 would leave 95 000 people dead and 125 000 more incapacitated17. Other sources suggest that 100kg of B. anthracis, disseminated via a crop-sprayer, could kill as many as three million people, and comparable values have been projected for other agents2,18. Another concern is that a contagious biological agent will result in person-to-person transmission, creating a self-sustaining effect not present in any other weapons class10. While mass casualties are possible, it is also important to note that, even in situations with few casualties, biological weapons attacks may have profound social and economic ramifications3. Such attacks could lead to widespread social panic and disorder, resulting in self-destructive behaviour and creating what is called a “societal autoimmune effect” involving increases in crime and looting19. While there is little evidence to predict this would occur based on previous disaster situations (such as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, where the public reaction is described as effective and adaptive, rather than panicked and disruptive), it must remain a consideration20. The effects of a largescale attack involving biological weapons are unknown, and epidemics of highly fatal diseases may cause serious social disruption20. The economic consequences of biological weapons attacks are severe and suggest that investing in defense makes good economic sense. While there were only five deaths in the 2001 anthrax attacks, those attacks resulted in tens of billions of dollars in government spending21. Also, the financial sector may be negatively impacted if investor confidence plummets3. Similarly, an attack on the agricultural sector, which accounts for 15% of the United States GDP, could have severe economic ramifications3. If the biological agent being used is contagious, there could also be implications for trade and travel restrictions3. The SARS epidemic of 2003 showed the economic consequences of a highly infectious disease, essentially “crippling” some of the most dynamic cities in the world4. The Center for Biosecurity has estimated the economic cost of a biological weapons attack in the U.S. could exceed one trillion USD15. In short, there are social and economic consequences that, considered in conjunction with the potential for catastrophically high mortality, justify the framing of biological weapons as a significant existential threat to the United States. This is illustrated by considering the specific case of smallpox. The Variola virus, which causes smallpox, is an example of an agent that, if weaponized and used in an attack, would pose a serious existential threat to the United States22. It is highly contagious; in a 1972 outbreak in Yugoslavia, even with routine vaccinations, which are no longer carried out, the disease spread rapidly, with each affected individual infecting 11 to 13 others23. It is also lethal, with a 30% fatality rate1. Human populations are highly susceptible because, since eradication, vaccinations have not been given for 20 years24. Other features make smallpox an appealing option for bioterrorism: it has no treatment once symptoms occur; it would not be detected for 7-17 days; it is physically disfiguring; and the virus is stable in aerosol form1,24. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of smallpox is that those infected are contagious before symptoms appear. Simulations have been carried out, including a 1999 exercise by the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where a terrorist release of Variola virus grew into a global outbreak, which the health and emergency response system was unable to control22. Here it could be suggested that prevention efforts promoted by securitization are the only option, given the apparent inability to contain a global outbreak after an attack has occurred. While the dangers posed by the Variola virus are not contested, skeptics argue that it is too difficult to acquire to be a real danger10. However, there is significant concern over unaccounted Soviet Union smallpox samples, and a 1999 U.S. report pointed to evidence that secret stockpiles of the virus are held by North Korea, Russia, and Iraq1,25. It has also been suggested that the terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo holds quantities of the Variola virus22. Threat and risk assessments should not rely solely on the worst-case scenarios of biological weapons attacks, especially since practical challenges still limit terrorists’ ability to conduct attacks that will have the greatest possible effect. However, it is equally crucial to be aware of the wide range of consequences of such an attack. This section has argued that there could be serious ramifications on several dimensions, ramifications which justify the framing of biological weapons as an existential threat to the United States and warrant investment in an appropriate response capacity. Securitization, therefore, played an important role encouraging policy responses that were justified and appropriate. 4. Preparedness for an Attack This section will examine the capacity of the United States to mitigate the consequences of an attack, a primary aim of biodefense. For government action to be justified, the response must be appropriate to the given threat level. The argument will be that this is the case with biodefense programs, which must seek to address key weaknesses in the preparedness system. There is a general consensus that the United States has insufficient capabilities to respond effectively to a biological weapons attack3. Three primary components of preparedness will be addressed: the ability to detect an attack, the preparedness of the health care and emergency response system to respond, and the medical countermeasures that currently exist. It will be shown that there are important deficiencies in all three of these areas, further suggesting that programs aimed at developing a more appropriate response capacity are not overestimating the threat but are both justified and necessary. Biological weapons are a unique class from conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons because their effects may not be felt immediately26. It could take days before it becomes apparent that an attack has taken place; this is problematic as immediate treatment may be crucial to survival27. Oral antibiotics for inhalational anthrax, for example, should be administered within 48 hours of exposure, which leaves little time for detection and delivery1. Any delay in detection could result in a large number of casualties. Additionally, if the weapon agent is contagious, failure to detect and respond the attack may result in a greater spread of the infection. For this reason, adequate detection capabilities are essential to bioterrorism preparedness. Unfortunately, while funding for biodefense has led to improvements, such as biosurveillance systems that seek information on disease outbreaks, there are still weaknesses in the system15. The systems are still quite rudimentary, relying on a time-consuming process of clinician reporting, laboratory diagnostics, and the phoning, mailing, or faxing of reports15. To improve, biosurveillance must be modernized. We need more effective electronic reporting, quick, cheap, and reliable diagnostic tests, and the integration of public health surveillance data with that from other sectors such as law and intelligence agencies26. Currently, however, detection systems are not able to detect biological agents at relatively low concentrations, or to detect multiple biological agents with a single system, and they are not sufficiently portable and user-friendly26. Detection ability is further compromised by poor diagnostic capabilities in hospitals. One U.S. study found that 91.2% of U.S. hospitals surveyed lacked the necessary diagnostic technology to analyze and identify biological agents28. Hospitals have been targeted as the weakest link in the preparedness chain, in particular due to their inability to accommodate a sudden influx of mass casualties29. It has been found that 60% of hospitals lack such resources as the supplies, equipment, beds, and staff to respond to a mass casualty situation28. Consequently, hospitals lack the surge capacity to attend to patients; this could be disastrous in terms of victims not receiving life-saving treatment, the failure to quarantine infectious individuals, and the possibility of social disorder as a result of public frustration. The problem is that hospitals need far greater resources to respond to a bioterrorist attack than they do for everyday functioning30. Practice scenarios have demonstrated this resource shortage problem on more than one occasion. A simulated attack on a U.S. city that involved the pneumonic plague resulted in antibiotic shortages after just three days; the situation worsened until, at the end of the weeklong simulation, 3700 cases of plague had been identified and 2000 “deaths” had been reported31. Also of concern is the overall inadequacy of medical countermeasures for biological weapons, identified as one of the areas in greatest need of attention15. Of the twelve biological agents identified as posing the highest threat to the United States, only anthrax, smallpox, and botulism receive substantial funding for medical countermeasure development and acquisition15. One reason for this is that pharmaceutical companies are not as motivated to fund research and development addressing biological weapons since there is not as great a commercial market as there is for chronic diseases and influenza15. Even such practices as decontamination require funding and improvement. The decontamination procedures for B. anthracis, previously used in the 2001 anthrax attacks, while effective, were also slow and expensive, and could not be replicated in a situation with mass casualties15. In the discussion above, it was argued that high government funding is not overestimated but is appropriate and justified to implement biodefense initiatives required to improve response capacity. This was done by demonstrating that the United States is ill-equipped to deal with a significant biological weapons attack, and that this lack of preparedness risks further exacerbating the already potentially catastrophic consequences of a biological weapons attack. Securitization was useful in helping justify prioritizing funding to address this issue. 5. Probability of an Attack The potentially disastrous consequences of an attack and the lack of preparedness for such an event have been demonstrated, but perhaps none of that would matter (or justify prioritizing biodefense) if the probability of an attack by states or terrorists was negligible, due to an absence of capacity or will to carry out a biological weapons attack on the United States. This section will consider the likelihood of a biological weapons attack in the United States by states or terrorist groups. This issue is hotly contested, with some groups arguing that the chances of an attack are much lower than popular fears and perceptions would suggest, while others, like CIA Director Gross, believe it is “only a matter of time”, and predict another biological weapons attack on the United States before 202028,32. As noted earlier, this essay’s focus is not on whether media rhetoric is inflated or public perceptions unrealistic. Rather, it will be argued that the increasing availability of biological weapons and the documented intent of various hostile groups to acquire such weapons make an attack more likely. This is where we see the relevance of the precautionary principle, as an uncertainty surrounding the probability of an attack encourages us to adopt the principle, promoting caution where funding is allocated in light of the dire consequences that may arise were an attack to occur. Officially ratified in 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention addressed concerns relating to the increasing biological weapons threat1. While commendable, the convention had important flaws including an absence of any formal verification of compliance by states. For instance, after signing the declaration, the Soviet Union continued to develop their biological weapons program (unbeknownst to the global community)33. Soviet defectors later confirmed the scale of their program, describing a massive, covert operation34. Other countries have also been alleged to have biological weapons programs, including Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria33,35. While Iraq has since claimed that its biological weapons were all destroyed, this has been impossible to verify2. Additionally, with the recent emergence of biotechnology industries in low and middle-income countries, most notably Brazil and India, more states are gaining advanced scientific capacity that could potentially be applied to biological weapons development and production3. The key here is that many states now have the scientific and technological capacity to develop biological weapons, but there is a limited capacity for national states or international organizations to monitor such a process36. In the BWC definition of biological weapons, the primary focus is on intent—both in terms of the purpose of the microbial agent and the delivery system1. Intent is the determining factor in the classification of biological weapons, but this is extremely difficult to measure or prove until after an act has been committed. In the biological sciences, much research is readily applicable to justifiable ends (vaccines), as well as hostile ones (biological weapons). The United States will often accuse other states of hostile intent based solely on the presence of pharmaceutical and biotechnological expertise necessary for biological weapons development35. This can be viewed as an area of overreaction to the bioweapons threat, illustrating how securitization processes seem to legitimize some bad policy responses as well as good ones. Despite the fact that most states could use this expertise to develop biological weapons, the majority does not. This suggests that, while capacity is present, the intent to use biological weapons is limited. In fact, over the past century, there is only one confirmed case of a biological weapons attack by one state on another: Japan’s striking against China in the 1930s and 1940s1. It has been suggested that reasons for this may stem from fear of retaliation or the difficulties of controlling effects on civilians and combatants1. Most countries possessing biological weapons claim their purpose is to deter attacks or biological weapons use by others35. In the past, the prospect of terrorists using biological weapons received little attention3. It was generally believed that terrorists would not be able to engineer biological weapons because they lacked access to the necessary biological agents, the technological capabilities, and the specialized knowledge to weaponize and disseminate a biological weapon10. Skeptics still believe that the advanced genetic capabilities required to produce biological weapons will not be available to terrorists in the near future3. For instance, the ability to process a biological agent into aerosol form, the most effective delivery method, requires expertise across a wide range of scientific disciplines32. Also suspect is their ability to account for environmental and meteorological conditions that may disrupt weapon dissemination10, 32. However, a changing global and scientific landscape has led to a greater potential for the acquisition of biological weapons capacity by terrorist groups. For instance, during the Cold War, the Soviets reportedly employed approximately 55, 000 scientists and technicians at 6 biological weapons research labs and 5 production facilities37. Among other things, smallpox was weaponized into ballistic missiles and bombs38. In 1997, the United States conducted a visit to one of these research labs to find that the facility was half empty, poorly guarded, and that most of the scientists had left39. It is, therefore, possible that the biological agents, the equipment, and the human knowledge and expertise have since fallen into the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations. Additionally, methods of biological weapons production are now freely accessible via the Internet, and the technological requirements are not beyond the means of a determined, well-funded terrorist organization2. Moreover, recent scientific advances may support biological weapons production by enabling the production of a higher yield of high-quality product36. They may also support more effective weaponization, by making agents more resistant to environmental hazards or by making agents targetable against specific biochemical pathways36. As these capabilities spread across the globe, there will be a greater potential for terrorists to harness and use these techniques. While the capabilities of terrorists to engineer biological weapons may have been overstated in the past, this can no longer be said to be the case. It has been argued that two of the preconditions for assessing the threat of bioterrorism, vulnerability to an attack and terrorist capability, are in place; the only remaining consideration is intent40. It is important to determine whether the intent to acquire and use such weapons is present among terrorist groups. While terrorist groups have not often used biological weapons, it is unclear whether this is due to insufficient capabilities or lack of intent1. There are a variety of reasons why they may not be interested in the use of biological weapons, including viewing such weapons as illegitimate in military combat, risks of tactical failure, perceptions of high technical difficulty, and concerns about the indiscriminate nature of a biological weapons attack3. That said, various terrorist groups, including Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, have a documented interest in the acquisition of biological weapons, and with advances in biotechnology and weaponization, their use may become more attractive2, 41. Experts also point to a shift in terrorist intent: “post-modern” terrorism aims to inflict the highest mortality rather than make political statements through violence33. This makes biological weapons an attractive option for such groups; one estimate suggests that the cost to cause civilian casualties is only one dollar per square kilometer for biological weapons, compared to 800 and 2000 dollars per square kilometer for nuclear and conventional weapons, respectively42. In a similar vein, the recent “war on terror” has created an increasingly decentralized terrorist threat; biological weapons are particularly well-suited to this form of smaller, more informed terrorist groups28. In short, while the intent to use biological weapons has been documented in terrorist groups in the past, present circumstances may make the acquisition and use of biological weapons more attractive. To conclude, it is difficult to either predict or prevent a bioterrorism attack, which makes any assessment of attack probability, by necessity, subject to a high degree of estimation. However, due to the potential severity of consequences of an attack, the precautionary principle justifies the government decision to allocate spending according to the severity of consequences, recognizing a situation where it is better to overestimate than to underestimate the probability of an attack. As argued by Michael Moodie of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, “The odds (of bioterrorism) are increasing…we have to walk a fine line between hyping the risk…and trying to convince people that it is a possibility for which we need to invest resources”2. 6. Biodefense Funding The essay’s previous sections have argued that a biological weapons attack would pose an existential threat to the United States, that there is an inadequate capacity to respond to such an event, and that the possibility exists for such an attack to occur. This would suggest that a substantial amount of government funding should be allocated towards addressing this threat. The decision to securitize bioweapons facilitated this process. Critics who believe the threat has been overstated often argue that the government should not invest so heavily in biodefense, but instead, improve other sectors, such as reducing mortality from endemic disease11. Meanwhile, proponents may argue that a securitized issue should receive more funding than issues that are not framed as an existential threat4. This section will argue that the response, in terms of government spending, is justified in that it seeks to protect the public and has not exaggerated the threat of bioterrorism. This will be demonstrated by examining the degree of investment in biodefense, showing that a relatively small amount is allocated specifically to biodefense. In 2000, the United States federal budget proposed that 10 billion USD be allocated to counterterrorism programs, an increase of 3.3 billion dollars from the previous year10. This covered all forms of terrorism, but there was a greater focus on biological terrorism than in the past, with spending on medical countermeasures and defense measures increasing fourfold from 91 million USD in 1998 to 336.6 million in 20002. These trends intensified after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “Amerithrax” scare. While estimates vary, the consensus is that, since 2001, the United States government has invested between 50 and 100 billion USD towards research and development in response to the perceived threat of a biological weapons attack43. One calculation posited that the U.S. allocated 54.39 billion USD to civilian biodefense programs between 2001 and 201044. This did not include allocations to Bioshield, a program designed to address the lack of adequate medical countermeasures for terrorist attacks; 8.7 billion USD has been allocated since 200445. However, of civilian biodefense funding, 42.57 of the 54.39 billion USD was directed towards programs with multiple goals beyond biodefense improvement, such as basic infectious disease research, programs to improve public health planning and operations, and improving preparedness for a range of disasters44. One example is the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Hospital Preparedness Program, which seeks to improve surge capacity in healthcare facilities44. Some estimates suggest that up to 92% of biodefense funding has been directed to programs that serve secondary purposes, such as improving preparedness for disease pandemics and natural disasters15. One could argue that the amounts dedicated to biodefense as a percentage of entire budgets are not very substantial given the existential threat posed by an attack. The DHHS, the largest recipient of federal biodefense funding, has a budget of 879 billion USD, of which biodefense made up only 0.5%44. Similarly, biodefense makes up less than 1% of the Department of Homeland Security budget, and only 0.10% of the Department of Defense Budget44. Accordingly, it could be argued that the bioweapons threat does not, in fact, take as high a priority in terms of government funding as one might expect, given the associated security risk. Additionally, almost all of the increases in investments have arisen from new funding; other sectors are not suffering at the expense of biodefense prioritization12. High funding is appropriate independent of any controversy relating to estimates of attack probability, as the precautionary principle would suggest that decisive action is warranted given the potential for dire consequences, even with a low probability of the event occurring. These figures show that the funding response is not an overreaction but has been justified and appropriate given the documented threat of biological weapons, targeting programs that are likely to protect the public. 7. Conclusion The anthrax attacks of 2001 are a case where biological weapons were used against the United States in the absence of any direct provocation. Since then, though the issue is controversial, biological weapons have been considered an important threat to U.S. security. This essay has defended the securitization of the biological weapons threat as a means to an end. It is a process to engage in where it is necessary to get approval for policies that are, in themselves, necessary and justified. By analyzing the existential threat posed by bioweapons, the lack of preparedness by the United States for such an event, and the possibility of an attack, evidence presented in this essay suggests that these policies and the overall government response were appropriate. Taking these issues into account, the essay concluded that the threat of bioterrorism has not been overestimated; it warrants securitization and the resulting response measures. Moving forward now, government must recognize and respond to the reality of an increasing bioterrorism threat.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Biotech

Our biotech reps are a criticism of – NOT complicit with – racist scientific epistemologies – calling for entangled responsibility facilitates expanded political imagination

Chandler 18 David Chandler, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Biopolitics 2.0: Reclaiming the power of life in the Anthropocene,” Contemporary Political Theory, 9-20-2018, DOI: 10.1057/s41296-018-0265-9 /GoGreen!

Biopolitics was once the preserve of critical Foucauldian-influenced theorists. This is no longer the case. The rise of new materialisms, networked and object-oriented ontologies and demands for the ‘renaturalization of politics’ (Grosz, 2011; Sharp, 2011) have turned the political into the biopolitical in much of radical contemporary political theory. Here, the biopolitical is often in tension with the Foucauldian discourses of the last few decades, affirming alternative possibilities rather than merely critiquing regimes of power (Malabou, 2008; Kirby, 2011; Taussig, 2018). One factor in this shift has been the impact of anthropogenic climate change and global warming on the contemporary political imagination, increasingly refracted through conceptualizations of the Anthropocene (Tsing, 2015; Cohen et al., 2016; Chandler, 2018). A second factor has been that the life sciences no longer appear to support understandings of deterministic differences but rather to cast evolution in sympoietic and entangled ways, making biology appear as no longer essentialising but as increasingly importable into politics, in ways which disrupt modernist or liberal conceptions of the culture/nature divide (Haraway, 2016). Two important but very different engagements, which reflect these affirmative readings of biopolitics, are reviewed here, from the fields of postcolonial literature and gender and race in international politics. I’d like to start by laying out the insights and framing of Stephanie Fishel’s The Microbial State. This book is a well-worked deployment of the new materialist thesis of the world of ‘lively matter’ (the cover and publicity blurb feature a ringing endorsement from leading political theorist Jane Bennett). Fishel locates her work firmly in the camp of posthumanism, counterposing the modernist, ‘anthropic’ account of the state as ‘the body politic’ to one that takes into account the ‘biospheric’ and the ‘microbial’ (p. 2). The key conceptual point is to highlight that the biological is crucial to the bounded imaginary of the state as a community analogous to the human body. Both these conceptions of the bounded political subject – the individual in liberal political theory and the state in international theory – are products of the biopolitical blurring of culture and nature in atomising and essentialising ways. Fishel critically uses the life sciences as a lens for alternative political imaginaries of complex and overlapping communities, which seek to overcome the homogenising ‘body’ metaphors of contemporary political discourse and the ‘autonomous and autarkic’ subjects of the biopolitical they produce (p. 15). Thus we move well beyond Foucault’s Biopolitics 1.0, where biopolitics is a technology of management and control. Instead, Fishel provides a ‘reversal of biopolitical critique, one that emphasizes vitality connection and entangled responsibility’ (p. 21): ‘This book takes life as a creative intensity that can offer new solutions, and new ways of engaging with the world’ (p. 21). In the inversion or ‘reversal’ of biopolitical critique, the world and its entangled relationality becomes a potential cure for the dangerous ‘immunitarian’ and essentialising biopolitical logic of individual and state rights and interests (p. 27). The metaphors of entanglement, contamination, sympoeisis and intra-active becomings can facilitate and enable a new (multi-species) politics, capable of addressing the crises of global warming and species extinction in the Anthropocene. Perhaps the most important conceptual move, in a range of interesting treatments, is the importance attached to the ‘microbial’ of the book title. Modernist, or human-centred, views of development and security treat the human or the state as separate and distinct entities and therefore as the referent for politics, through metaphors of conflict and militarism – with treatment as ‘intervention’, germs as ‘enemies’ or the ‘war’ against cancer (p. 49). Microbial and other entangled or relational metaphors enable alternative ontologies of being and becoming. If we seriously want to tackle contemporary problems, perhaps the starting point should instead be to ask, ‘What would a microbe do?’ (p. 56) Microscopic bacteria may seem ‘small and simple’ but they are what enable life to exist and highlight that living organisms are enmeshed in their environments, inside and out, enabling us ‘to envision political community as an assemblage of multispecies groupings’ (p. 56). Microbes enable us to go beyond binaries of self and other and to bring ‘system-based understandings of complex processes’ to the political realm, enabling ‘different forms of practice for sustainable, ethical, global living with one another, and with other life forms, as a bodies politic’ (p. 61). Processual and entangled ways of understanding politics change our attitude to problems and their governance; the questions become ‘more about various ecological relationships and balance, rather than resistance to invasion’ (p. 63). Key to microbial political possibilities is the removal of the keystone of modernist politics – the individual as subject – which ‘places the separateness of the human being as its most important trait’ (p. 69). ‘Biologically, at least, we are not intrinsically individuals, but collective super-organisms, assimilating multiple species and millions of individual organisms’ (p. 68). Microbial worlds enable us to question liberal and rationalist approaches that prioritise the individual over all other entities and collectives (this chimes well with other feminist science studies-informed work, equally suspicious of a liberal rights framework, for example, Clarke and Haraway, 2018). Microbially-imagined or posthuman forms of governance enable creative awareness that ‘[I]n Kantian and humanist terms, an individual is always an end, not a means; therefore, the will of the individual cannot be sacrificed without consent’ (p. 69). Thus in Fishel’s reworking of the biopolitical, key targets are liberal conceptions of ‘freedom’ (p. 69), ‘sovereignty, law and democracy’, which will need to be redefined. Microbes enable us to see the artifice behind the distinctions of liberal political theory, of separate entities with distinct rights and interests: ‘From this perspective it is impossible not to see the similarities between relationships in the internal relations between members of microbiotic communities in the human gut and the relations between member of a political society’ (p. 75). Rather than conflictual self-interests – the stuff of human-centred political communities – microbes enable us to imagine a politics of collaboration: ‘the human gut, in this book… is exemplified as a community in which very few relationships are pathogenic’ (p. 87). The microbial message of multi-species becoming is clear, with ‘new definitions of health for the state based on expanded notions of health through plurality… plurality and stimulation, not autonomy and purity, lead to strength’ (p. 90). Fishel is well aware that what I am calling ‘Biopolitics 2.0’ – with its affirmative use of biological metaphors – runs the risk, associated with all imports from biology into the political, of carrying ‘illiberal and conservative connotations’, but she stresses that ‘modern biology and current biological thinking’ are different, ‘no longer based on static equilibrium or a bare struggle for survival expounded by neo-Darwinist theories of evolution’ (p. 101). Rather than fixed entities fighting for distinct interests, microbial imaginaries are ones of collective and sympoietic becoming. This is a process of constant change and transformation, of ‘posthuman becoming’ and ‘biocultural hope’; entanglements with others make all of us ‘co-evolved symbionts’ (p. 102) where ‘the world is a joint product between the human and the non-human… composing the world together’ (p. 105). Fishel’s thesis of ‘the reversal of biopolitics’ claims to ‘open a space to reformulate biopolitics more positively by affirming life as vital and relational rather than a purely mechanical reaction against that which is Other’ (p. 108). Fishel is keen to flag up that in ‘mining the hermeneutic potential of the life sciences’ (p. 113) she is not forwarding ‘science as a Western imperial project’ (p. 116) – but seeking rather ‘to redesign, traverse, and complicate the body politic’ through using ‘alternate visions of science’ to ‘demonstrate that hybridity and heterogeneity are necessary elements for understanding the nature of the individual and the individual’s connection to the larger world’ (p. 116). The contemporary biological turn – with its rejection of Darwinist conceptions of ‘survival of the fittest’ and imaginaries of the ‘tree of life’ with separate and distinct lines of evolution – here provides a powerful critique of liberal imaginaries of security and development, with the underlying deterministic telos of hierarchy, competition and progress. The ideas of the contemporary life sciences – which are rewriting nature as creative and interactive rather than as passive and determined and emphasise hybridity, transference across species boundaries, symbiosis and sympoietic becoming – would seem a vital source of inspiration for alternative political imaginaries. The second book under review, Deepika Bahri’s Postcolonial Biology, engages the biopolitical moment from the angle of rereading and deconstructing embodied themes of transformation, hybridity and transference across racialized boundaries in postcolonial literature. It is productive to read her book alongside Fishel’s as Bahri both complicates and reinforces the points made above regarding the political and conceptual productivity of biologically-informed political imaginaries. Bahri states from the outset that her book ‘claims biology as a valid – indeed a crucial – area of interest for critical postcolonial studies’ as ‘[T]he socio-political challenges of the twenty-first century require us to look beyond biologically deterministic conceptions of racialized difference to porous, pliable, and plastic bodies and psyches as critically embattled zones of conflict in the wake of imperial modernity’ (p. viii). Bahri’s point is that the blurring of the nature/culture divide and the view of life as hybrid, processual, disruptive and transformative – rather than differentiated, deterministic and static – is not simply the preserve of contemporary posthumanist theorists but was already present in colonial discourses of governance with the ‘implicitly reincarnative politics of the so-called civilizing mission in imperial modernity’ (p. 2). Whilst it is easy to cast modernity as hegemonised by a Darwinian ‘racist science’ which ‘assumed that genetics locked in differences between races’, the colonial gaze, in fact, ‘implied an as-yet scientifically unverified but implicit belief in human bioplasticity and aesthetic reformation’ (p. 3). Ideas of distinct bounded bio-social political communities – or bodies politic – ‘were complicated by imperial designs on impressionable, plastic body-minds at the level of ideology as well as the micromanagement of the subject’s bio-physiology’ (p. 3). For Bahri, today’s new materialist or posthuman ontologies of human and non-human entanglement of nature and culture can be read as already implicit in, and also as a response to, colonial discourses of civilizing mission (p. 3). Bahri highlights that Darwinian perspectives, with their implied lines of genetic determination, were not as dominant in the early twentieth century social sciences as socio-biological discourses of indeterminism, with Lamarckian views of acquired characteristics the bridge between culture and race (p. 152 n. 25). Colonial and postcolonial views of the bio-social thus become an ‘instructive precursor to the nexus of capital, corporation, and the biopolitics of hybridity in the global present’ (p. 5). While old biological determinism produced ‘bad science and even worse politics’ (p. 6), the construction of the body as ‘pliant, bio-mentally plastic and permeable’, for Bahri, ‘is a battlefield no less worthy of our urgent attention’ (p. 6). Thus the contemporary revisiting of the biopolitical – Biopolitics 2.0 – is perhaps more usefully understood as a struggle waged on the grounds of a Lamarckian creationism, where bottom-up ‘bio-cultural hope’ stands as an open and creative counter to top-down views of the manipulation of hybrid becomings, central to the colonial mission. Bahri examines how colonial discourses operated not on a strict separation between biology and culture, but rather on the construction of a sliding scale interconnecting nature and culture, which imbricated both the life sciences and the humanities, constructing them as distinct and yet flexibly co-constitutive disciplines. It was this continuum that enabled ideas of racial distinction and genetic determination to easily morph back and forth with ideas of social, cultural and environmental hybridity and transformation. The colonial civilizing mission inevitably overlaid views of fixed genetic distinctions and determinations with bio-social discourses of epigenetic transformation, which blurred the distinction between culture and nature, enabling colonial hierarchies to be constructed and played out through transformative imaginaries that biologized cultural attributes. Bahri draws out well how these colonial discourses exposed the ‘weak link’ of modernist or Enlightenment thought, in politicizing the biological as the keystone of Otherness. In the bio-social construction of the Other as inferior there is the implication that the outside is always already present on the inside, as more real or ‘authentic’. Thus, in her citing of Fanon, for the colonial mind, it is always the Other who is the ‘bringer of biology’ or the one who ‘symbolizes the biological’ (p. 29). Bahri’s book engages with three novels, all of which deal with postcolonial framings of hybrid becoming: Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children; Hari Kunzru’s The Impressionist; and Julian Barnes’ Unofficial Englishmen, Arthur and George. The key characters in these novels all aspire to becoming other, confronting postcolonial biology through discourses of culture and aesthetics with the body as the site or battleground of bio-cultural adaptive transformation. It is the ‘biological body, its sounds, odours, excretions, urges, emissions, and expressions’ upon which the ‘civilizational project’ is expressed and measured (p. 11). Culture and nature are conflated at the same time as they are constructed as two poles of the human and the non-human. The key point being made is that the politics of race is an epiphenomenon of a deeper and more essential aspect of modernist and Enlightenment thought, the distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, which overcodes racial and colonial discourses of ‘civilization’ and today’s ‘developmental aesthetics’ (p. 135). Bahri’s work is also useful to understand today’s import of the contemporary life sciences into radical political imaginaries, as she seeks to draw from the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, who maintained the colonial ‘sliding scale’ but used this to critique the empty and ‘hollowed subject’ of the bourgeois rationalist Enlightenment (p. 31). The continuum and interplay between the biological and the socio-cultural-political was maintained, but the radical goal was to return to an awareness of the interdependencies, interconnections and entanglements of the ‘biological’. While the colonial civilizing mission sought to develop a bio-social science of transformation and hybridity to enable ‘becoming modern’ or ‘becoming liberal’, the radical response was to flag up the artifice and hubris of modernity’s attempt to repress or erase our entangled biological being. Thus for Biopolitics 2.0, with a more affirmative framing of nature and the biological, the weak link – exposed by the colonial discourse of ‘civilizing mission’ and blurring of the biological and cultural – can be turned against the advocates of the modernist episteme. Having understood the inherently oppressive logic of ‘instrumental rationality’ and the human/non-human, nature/culture hierarchical divides, the way is then clear for the return of biology as an alternative way of conceiving ‘life’ without modernist/colonial binaries and bifurcations (p. 142). Thus it is possible for the colonial discourses of plasticity with their ‘vague sociobiological indeterminism’ (p. 152 n. 25) to become repurposed for imagining creative and open alternative futures. The underlying stakes in biologically-inflected discourses of transformative and hybrid becoming were inevitably imbricated within universalist and modernist paradigms of development and progress. This is still the case today, except that the idea of the ‘sliding scale’ of civilization is transposed. In the Anthropocene, ideas of the superiority of the ‘human’ over the ‘nonhuman’ or of ‘culture’ over ‘nature’ or of ‘civilized’ over ‘indigenous’ have lost their credence. It is little surprise that the crisis of modernity has enabled the inversion of hegemonic, modernising and colonial frames of transformation. This fundamental shift, nurturing a new and affirmative assessment of the life that was previously repressed or excluded is well reflected in the two books reviewed here. Whereas Foucauldian-informed biopolitical critique railed against the reduction of the human to ‘bare life’, or of political life to biological existence, Biopolitics 2.0 inverses the assumptions, seeking to reinvest ‘mere life’ with meaningfulness and value: even life in its smallest and simplest microbial forms can make the human look insignificant and facilitate more creative political imaginaries.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Arms Regulation / Prolif

No prolif link – empirics disprove and it’s NOT racist to say others are just as likely as we are to make mistakes and argue pragmatically that more prolif is worse

Müller 18 Harald Müller, Professor of International Relations at the University of Frankfurt, Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, head of the Peace Studies Foundation of Hesse, Associate Fellow and former Director of Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, member of German delegations to the NPT Review Conferences, member and chair of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Co-chair of the Working Group on Peace and Conflict Research of the German Foreign Office, PhD international relations, Goethe University Frankfurt, “Arms Control and Arms Reductions in Foreign Policy,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, vol.1 A-H, ed. Cameron G. Thies, Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780190605919, p.80-81 /GoGreen!

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND ARMS CONTROL Arms Control does not completely discard self-help as the basis of national security, but entrusts a more or less significant piece of it to cooperation with potential enemies.3 For this reason, Arms Control is a difficult subject for (purist) realism and neorealism, but also for post-modernism. Realism and neo-realism expect states to pursue self-help as the only reliable basis for their national security. Cooperative security efforts admit that at least part of one's own security is dependent on the partners' compliance with agreed rules. Arms Control also requires a more relaxed attitude toward the problem of relative gains, the somehow unequal distribution of gains emerging from cooperation (Grieco, 1990). Since it is extremely difficult to (define exact balances (numerical balances, for example, neglect differences in geopolitical situations, qualitative aspects, or intangibles like differences in training, etc), relative gains are not only certain to occur, but difficult to assess exactly. Even the notion of an exchange of renunciation, in exchange for a security guarantee, is implausible in the face of the security dilemma, as the guarantor might defeat or may mutate into the enemy of tomorrow. That Arms Control happens in reality is thus somehow puzzling. For post-modernists, Arms Control is only thinkable as a hegemonic project to maintain power differentials, not as a non-hegemonic common endeavor that serves all participants well. Both realists and post-modernists are only at ease with unilateral, hegemonic Arms Control imposed on others, notably on defeated states after war (for example, Iraq in 1991). For post-modernists, post-colonialists, and critical security scholars, non-proliferation is the paradigm of hegemonic Arms Control as an attempt to prevent others from obtaining the weapons that oneself possesses, and the conceding of the difference by middle powers like Canada or Sweden is only explainable by the discursive hegemony of the nuclear weapon states (Keeley, 1990). These critics are right to see roots of non-proliferation thinking in the racist ideology of the colonial era, parts of which have been transported into the 20th century and resonate still in the "rogue state” discourse, with the thrust that “civilized” states must keep “barbarians” at bay by maintaining the difference in military power (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Gusterson, 1999; Mathur, 2014). This critique, however, has several weaknesses. It ignores that non-proliferation was deployed first with Germany and Japan, then already members of “the West,” as the primary targets,4 that the first victims of U.S. export controls in the 1970s were advanced European states and Japan, and that controversies over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the first two decades of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) were between Western governments more than between the West and the non-aligned (Bccker et al., 2013); moreover, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a main organ of Western nuclear export controls includes today Brazil, China, Mexico, Kazakhstan, and South Africa, non-Westem members that are more than fig leafs. It is the United States that is pushing the membership of India and has terminated “nuclear apartheid" as far as India is concerned. Conversely, most European states have not joined the “rogue state" discourse, and many Western Arms Control and non-proliferation experts have never accepted the distinction between “reasonable" Northern nuclear weapon states and “irrational” Southerners. To the contrary, they have warned against the risks in South Asia because of the proven risks of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, where only a lot of luck saved [human]mankind from a global nuclear holocaust (e.g., Gavin, 2010; Muller, 2013a).s It should also be noted that multilateral Arms Control treaties apart from the NPT have been negotiated in a North-South forum such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC/CWC), and that recent conventional disarmament treaties such as the Ottawa Convention (anti-personal mines) and the Oslo Convention (cluster munitions) were initiated and pushed by coalitions of Western and Southern middle powers against the express will of Northern and Southern great powers (United States, Russia, China, India). The simple categorization of West against South is no less ideological and misleading than the traces of racist thinking in a limited part of the Arms Control discourse. In contrast, Arms Control presents a solvable puzzle for rationalists with their emphasis on absolute gains and their acceptance of positive sum games and the-information and transparency providing function of institutions that manage and administer Arms Control agreements (e.g., the classic Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). The exchange of renunciation and guarantee appears more plausible to a rationalist when the guarantee is embedded in institutions that render faithfulness more probable (like institutionalized alliances), or in deployment patterns that make use of armed forces in response to an attack more likely (e.g., tripwire-type deployment). Rationalist liberal institutionalism finds good empirical confirmation in Arms Control regimes. Indeed, most agreements are endowed with organizations that serve as channels for communication, arenas for sorting out behavioral ambiguities of members and clarifying ambivalences in the language of prescriptions and prohibitions, and supply transparency by reporting and verification and can, after all, take decisions. Not only multilateral treaties have such organizations (like the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] working for the NPT or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] working for the CWC), but even the bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia are usually managed by bilateral standing commissions.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Arms Regulation / Prolif

No disarm trade-off link – there’s ZERO uniqueness since it’s NOT on the table now – BUT our reps snowball to it, which is offense

Müller 18 Harald Müller, Professor of International Relations at the University of Frankfurt, Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, head of the Peace Studies Foundation of Hesse, Associate Fellow and former Director of Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, member of German delegations to the NPT Review Conferences, member and chair of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Co-chair of the Working Group on Peace and Conflict Research of the German Foreign Office, PhD international relations, Goethe University Frankfurt, “Arms Control and Arms Reductions in Foreign Policy,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, vol.1 A-H, ed. Cameron G. Thies, Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780190605919, p.77-80 /GoGreen!

The Permissive Effect of Prohibition Norms. One of the criticisms of critical security studies scholars has been that the prohibition of some weapons has had the effect of legitimizing non-prohibited weapons (Cooper, 2011; Mathur, 2011). Indeed, there is the ‘‘permissive’’ effect, which results from the stigmatization of the prohibited weapons as inhuman, which implies in turn that weapons not banned simultaneously are not equally inhumane. For material and psychological reasons, the focus on banning a specific weapon system will very probable prevent efforts to ban other weapons with comparable effects at the same time: The campaign to get rid of incendiary weapons (napalm) in the 1980s postponed action on landmines and cluster munitions for one and two decades, respectively. The material factor is the resource restraint (financial, time, diplomatic capital) of ban proponents (NGOs and like-minded governments), which makes it difficult to tackle more than one item at a time. The psychological effect is the impossibility of focusing and maintaining attention of both activists and the public (media and people) on more than one issue in a certain time-span (Rosert, 2015, 2016). As the sequence from incendiary weapons (prohibited in 1983), to anti-personal mines (prohibited in 1997), to cluster munitions (prohibited in 2009) demonstrates, however, this permissive/preventive effect is determining only temporarily. In the long-term, the opposite effect can be observed, “issue cascading”: the successful subjection on one type of weapon under the anti-humanitarian stigma makes it easier for a follow-up campaign to frame the next candidate for a ban in a way that promises success. The framing of a weapon type in analogy or comparison with an already stigmatized one (grafting) becomes easier as more weapons fall under a ban, and more characteristics and attributes are available to draw parallels to a weapon that is still permitted (Price, 1998, pp. 627-631). If permissive or preventive effects mean that old Arms Control stands in the way of new Arms Control, the cascading effect shows that old Arms Control can engender new Arms Control. Real World Effects. So far, the discussion has dealt with the effects of Arms Control on state behavior. Changed state behavior, of course, has effects on the physical world: Due to the implementation of Arms Control agreements, there are fewer nuclear weapons (between 15,000 and 16,000 instead of more than 60,000, at the height of the Cold War), fewer chemical weapons, fewer biological weapons, and fewer states possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the world, and fewer conventional weapon systems in Europe than would have been the case otherwise. The most impressive numbers come from humanitarian Arms Control groups: According to the Red Cross, the number of victims of landmines was at 20,000 the year before the Ottawa Convention. It has gone down to 3,500 per year since. By the end of 2015, international production and transfer of these weapons had commensurately shrunk, including by some non-members producers, quite a remarkable external effect of the norm; even 48 non-state armed groups have renounced the use of mines on the initiative of the NGO Geneva CalL Twenty-nine states were declared to be mine-free through efforts under the Ottawa Convention (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016). By the end of 2014, 3.68 million anti-personal mines had been destroyed in operations pursuant to the Convention (Landmines Report, 2009, p. 1; Landmines Report, 2015, p. 2). Surprisingly, in light of so many lives saved, some scholars belonging to the Critical Security Studies school contend that humanitarian Arms Control constitutes a well-concealed submission of civil society to the imperatives of Western militarism (Beier, 2011; Cooper, 2011; Mathur, 2011, 2012, 2014). This assessment of the mine campaign as "reconstitution of the West (and Western interest)” having “played a crucial (even decisive) role in the construction of the 'landmine crisis’” (Krause & Latham, 1998, p. 44) remains mysterious: First, both the Ottawa and the Oslo conventions were opposed by the quintessential Western power, the United States. Second, both were enthusiastically supported by the main victims of the prohibited weapons, namely the countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (Price, 1998, pp. 640-641). One could suspect that, based on ideological doctrine, some scholars are critical of all but their own perceptual biases, a strong similarity to some of the realist and neo-conservative critics of arms control, which they so enthusiastically condemn. Back to the independent-dependent variable relationship: The structurationist school of constructivism, orientated to the work of Anthony Giddens, takes the middle ground by constructing a dialectical relationship by which processes of Arms Control and processes of broader policy would mutually influence each other. As Arms Control has been conceptualized as a way to mitigate the security dilemma, its likely effects should be tangible there. Measures that reduce the ambiguity of intention and capabilities, and measures that, notably, reduce the capability for large-scale, speedy offensives should have strong positive impacts on mutual perception and help to foster security cooperation on a broad scope (Peters, 1992). They give signals of the absence of aggressive intentions and thereby help overcome the fundamental uncertainty, which is at the heart of the security dilemma (Lamb, 1988, pp. 225-234). The "Gorbachev effect” on the West was exactly that. ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSES Academic and political discourses on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in general, as well as in specific political fields of action, are framed in four different perspectives: deterrence, defense, disarmament, and humanitarian discourses.2 The deterrence approach is dominated by nuclear weapons: The regulation of arms is seen as maintaining a stable deterrence relationship, understood as the mutually assured capability to strike back after a first strike, accompanied by measures that make a first strike as unlikely, unprovoked, and unattractive as possible. Consequently, nuclear weapons, seen as embodying the greatest deterrence value, enjoy a legitimate existence (e.g., Quinlan, 2009; Riihle, 2009; Tertrais, 2011), though the idea of conventional deterrence has also been pursued (Gerson, 2009; Mearsheimer, 1985). Where the deterrence discourse prevails, certain Arms Control measures fall in disregard. For example, de-alerting (putting strategic nuclear forces on low alert) or even de-mating the nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, could be seen as destabilizing deterrence against a first strike. Shifting to a no first-use doctrine could be interpreted as opening one's nuclear forces for a first strike conducted by non-nuclear means. Arms control in a deterrence discourse could even advocate, under •certain circumstances, a build-up of nuclear forces if numbers have diminished below a perceived minimum that is seen as vulnerable to the combined offensive capabilities of potential enemies. The Chinese aversion against transparency is also stability-motivated, lest transparency could facilitate first-strike targeting against Bejing s comparably small arsenal. Arms control is a servant of deterrence and is limited by the perceived requirements of the latter. The defense discourse means the capability to react once deterrence fails and a ruthless enemy pursues conquest or extermination. Arms control, in this discourse, must recognize the need and serve the maintenance of a robust defense posture, which nowadays must inevitably include defense against missiles. At the conventional level, the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty came closest to the ideal arms control agreement: By reducing, and establishing an exact balance for, those five weapon systems needed for a large-scale, territory-grabbing land attack, while not touching those weapons indispensable for defense (like air defense or anti-tank systems), it granted the two participating alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a chance for successful conventional defense This formula, however, is hardly applicable to the nuclear sector: deterrence can only be upheld through the offensive capability to strike even after having suffered an attack. Effective defenses could annihilate this capability for the party forced to strike second. It is hardly possible, therefore, to achieve conventional defense and nuclear deterrence on the basis of the same discourse, but only by combining the two. The defense discourse on Arms Control is structured in a way that Arms Control advocates must always fight an uphill battle against the argument of military utility/necessity. This burden of justification has hampered and frustrated advocates of international humanitarian law in the context of the Geneva Protocols and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) time and again (Mathur, 2012; see below). The disarmament discourse has a moral overtone in that weapons are seen as immoral and dangerous items that, whatever their military value, must be dismantled. They are framed in discourses of stigmatization (Shamai, 2015), in which the stigma is connected to their destructive power (WMD as threat to [human]mankind), cruelty that causes unnecessary and lasting suffering (chemical weapons, incendiary weapons), and indiscriminate effects on civilians (all WMD, antipersonal mines, cluster munitions) (Borrie, 2009; Price, 1998,2007; Rosert, 2015,2016). Stigma is not confined to WMD, but can be glued to other weapons systems as well; hence, weapons singled out for disarmament discourses are not dependent on the particular strategic value; to the contrary, part of the discourse consists of contesting this value to disempower arguments of military utility, which are usually deployed by opponents of the prohibition. Proponents of disarmament are even busy denying the utility of nuclear weapons for both warfare and deterrence (Harrington, 2009; Wilson, 2007, 2008). Today, disarmers rely strongly on humanitarian arguments; the disarmament and humanitarian discourses tend to amalgamate. The humanitarian discourse; finally, asks for measures that serve best the goal of human security: the survival, well-being, and integrity of individuals, notably civilians; consequently, the weapons that have the most devastating effect and discriminate least between combatants and civilians are subject to the demand for elimination, notwithstanding their ascribed military value. It is noteworthy that today's humanitarian discourse, manifested in a broad array of weapon types from antipersonal mines to nuclear weapons, has evolved from the tradition of the legal discourse on the humanitarian law of war that prevailed into the 1990s. There, the basic formula was to weigh humanitarian concerns and military utility. The humanitarian discourse was thus dominated by the defense and deterrence discourses. Today’s humanitarian Arms Control discourse gives priority to human concerns over military utility and links humanitarianism with disarmament, not with constraints on weapons use. Given the weight of military considerations in the attitudes and decision making of nation-states, this does not eliminate completely the weighting of military aspects. But, the burden of proof has shifted. In the old humanitarian law discourse, humanitarians had to argue against "military utility." In the new discourse, opponents of prohibition have to argue for indispensability and irreplaceability of the weapons in question (Price, 1998, p. 632). As a consequence, in the nuclear weapons field, a majority of states is not satisfied anymore with small steps of arms reduction, transparency measures, and confidence building; rather, they push for a fast elimination of nuclear weapons, preceded by the conclusion of a nuclear weapons ban (Borrie, 2014; Kmentt, 2015). The reason for the conservatism of the classical discourse on humanitarian law is not so much the past practices of the legalistic discourse of international humanitarian law (Mathur, 2012) as the result of the balance of political power, with great powers prevailing that wanted their utilitarian concerns (fighting and winning wars) to weigh heavily in the resulting treaties. The new discourse, in contrast, was created by a coalition of humanitarian and disarmament NGOs, and smaller and middle powers that push their causes because they have more moral concerns than stakes in fighting and winning wars, or in the weapons needed for war or for deterrence (Borrie, 2014). The intrinsic nature of the discourses has not engendered the change, but shifts in coalitions and discursive power (Mathur, 2012).

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Arms Regulation / Prolif

No arms regulation link – desecuritizes and spurs identity transformation, NOT Otherization – empirics flow AFF

Müller 18 Harald Müller, Professor of International Relations at the University of Frankfurt, Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, head of the Peace Studies Foundation of Hesse, Associate Fellow and former Director of Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, member of German delegations to the NPT Review Conferences, member and chair of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Co-chair of the Working Group on Peace and Conflict Research of the German Foreign Office, PhD international relations, Goethe University Frankfurt, “Arms Control and Arms Reductions in Foreign Policy,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of Foreign Policy Analysis, vol.1 A-H, ed. Cameron G. Thies, Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780190605919, p.85-88 /GoGreen!

STABILITY AND CHANGE Arms Control: Conservative or Transformative? As the "impact” discussion indicated, Arms Control can be looked at from two opposite perspectives concerning stability and change. Arms control aims at stability; critical security approaches have thus labeled arms control as a conservative, status-quo orientated strategy (Krause & Cooper, 2011; Krause & Latham, 1998). This school has also ascribed certain attributes of the concept to Western culture, thereby reifying the West as completely American without accounting for the considerable differences within the West (which shows, for example, in the related EU strategies [EU, 2003a, 2003b, 2016]). In this spirit, critical scholars have labeled as Western such attributes as the “necessity of deterrence," a “preference for one's own preponderance," and a “focus on proliferation” as if the Soviet Union had not shown the same traits all throughout the Cold War, and as if Russia had not followed the Soviet predecessor in this respect as well. But there is also a transformational perspective: Arms Control as a vehicle for inducing, accompanying, and reinforcing a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between two or more states; the template for this approach is, as will be discussed later, the years from 1985 to 1992, when the Cold War dissolved. Naturally, the concept of disarmament shows the greatest affinity to the transformational approaches. This transformational perspective leaves the dogmatic connection between arms control and stability behind. Stability by arms control is itself an instrument to foster dynamic change, just as homeostasis in young organisms is the condition for dynamic growth. This perspective opens the broader view on the relation of Arms Control and historical time. A reading of the history of arms control results in three models to conceive this relationship. Arms Control Through Time: Three Models. The first model corresponds to the enlightenment intuition of steady progress: Arms Control, once started, will create islands of cooperation in a still formidable sea of self-help. But successful agreements have an impact beyond technical constraints or limited cooperation gains. The factor of “learning,” enabled by agreements and their institutional settings, changes the relationship between former rivals and antagonists incrementally, but potentially profoundly (Nye, 1989). New information mitigates the security dilemma, as both capabilities and intentions of the partner become better understood and more predictable. Admitting transparency on agreed level of forces, which reduce opportunities and incentives to attack first—whether conventional or nuclear—build down the image of the enemy as a nefarious and implacable antagonist poised to devour neighbors and enemies. Arms Control works as a conduit for reassurance; the reassured party imputes more benevolent intentions on. its opposite. Institutional settings—domestic, bilateral, and multilateral—create new bureaucratic routines, produce more information, help to solve problems of ambiguity and suspicions of non-compliance, and inculcate cooperative practices in the daily work of decision makers and bureaucrats. Moreover, successful Arms Control agreements set incentives to try more daring ones. In the process, states might redefine their own security interests. Of course, Arms Control is not able to drive this process alone. Rather, its political effects help to encourage steps in other areas of the conflicting relationship, arid such steps (and their domestic repercussions) stimulate in turn new efforts in Arms Control. Throughout this development, increasing transnational communities (epistemic and otherwise) connect the national discourses of the participating countries by importing common knowledge, serving as interpreters of the ''other’s” views and actions, and working as advocates of cooperation (Nye, 1987, 1989) The Gorbachev years of 1985 to 1991 provide an impressive example for this dynamic. In the best case, it might turn islands of cooperation into a continent (Evangelista, 1999; Risse, 2000). The second model is a significant modification of the first one. It preserves the long-term vision of a cooperative world, but (informed by the historical experiences of the last 60 years) understands the Arms Control process as a series of waves, each of which leaves the world in a more cooperative state than the previous one: a pure self-help system gives way to an arms-control driving detente constellation, followed by a new political ice age in which, however, some of the Arms Control achievements of the detente period survive. A second Arms Control wave, followed by another ice age ensues, with again a few new lasting gains for cooperative security, and so on. This model accounts for the multifactorial political environment in which Arms Control has to operate. Power shifts among nations, national revolutions, or domestic polarization, can replace elites well socialized into the concepts and practices of Arms Control with nationalist, unilateralist, and supremacist elites, who see the only way to security and status in absolute superiority or even aggression and conquest. This account of the process toward more cooperation through ups and downs reflects better the experiences since 1960. A tentative success after the Cuban missile crisis, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, was followed by five years of stagnation, caused by the toppling of Khrushchev in Moscow, alienation through the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The conclusion of the negotiations on the NPT toward the end of 1968 opened the first wave of Arms Control in the period of detente. After the— supposedly hawkish—presidency of Richard Nixon had installed itself, strategic arms negotiations started quickly. The next decade saw four agreements of strategic nuclear arms, two on testing, two multilateral treaties to prohibit biological and environmental weapons, and a couple of confidence-building measures to avoid severe crises between the superpowers, plus those in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the “Helsinki Document”). However, this period came to a halt at the end of the decade when conservative concerns about perceived growing Soviet nuclear superiority and cheating, and Soviet inroads in the developing world produced a climate no longer conducive to Arms Control—SALT II remained observed by the two parties, but unratified. The early Reagan years were confrontational, with unfettered armament, and token Arms Control talks in order to pacify a concerned Western public on both sides of the Atlantic. Gorbachev’s ascendancy to power changed the situation (Arnett, 1990; Evangelista, 1999). Starting with new CSCE confidence-building measures in 1986 (the “Stockholm Document’' later dramatically enhanced by the series of “Vienna Documents”), a cascade of bilateral (INF Treaty, START I, START II), multilateral regional (CFE Treaty and the unprecedented Open Sky Treaty, which grants the parties mutual information-gathering overflight rights), and multilateral global (Chemical Weapons Convention, Ottawa Convention on anti-personal land mines, and the indefinite extension of the NPT) measures followed in close sequence. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was the last hurrah, but failed to attract the necessary “advice and consent” in the U.S. Senate, which was already dominated by archconservative forces led by Senator Jesse Helms, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee. From 1997 on, the political climate cooled down. Arms Control froze with the George W. Bush administration. The Moscow Treaty on strategic nuclear arms—a treaty without specifications, with a termination date of 2012 and no verification—was the only achievement, neutralized through the far more weighty abrogation of the ABM-Treaty by the Bush administration, which led to the prompt abrogation of START II by Russia, followed by Moscow's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty; the multilateral Oslo Convention banning cluster munitions succeeded only because the United States, opposed to this agreement, did not possess a veto position. Obama's revival of Arms Control yielded the New START Treaty, the agreement for the reduction of weapons-grade plutonium with Russia, and the Arms Trade Treaty, in. an all too brief period of new detente that ended at the latest with the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014. The notion of waves has a lot of empirical evidence to support it. One interesting indicator is the titles of writings on the subject that have appeared over time. A Farewell to Arms Control? (Young, 1972), "Arms Control: The Possibility of a Second Coming” (Freedman,1982), “Farewell to Arms Control?” again (Nye, 1986), “The Death of Arms Control” (Sullivan, 1987), The Future of Arms Control (Ball & Mack, 1987), “The Folly of Arms Control” (Schell, 2000),7 “The Rise and Fall of Arms Control” (Bohlen, 2005), all indicate a shifting between the highs and lows of the theme. It also indicates that experts did not always agree on whether they were feeing a high or a low. Young's book was written during the years of the first big Arms Control wave. Freedman’s "second coming" was authored in the first years of the Reagan Administration’s dark years for Arms Control. Nye s “Farewell” and Sullivan's “Death,” written from quite different positions, appeared when Gorbachev moved Arms Control on its path of greatest success, as acknowledged by the more optimistic Nye. Curiously, “The Death of Deterrence” (Dando & Rogers, 1984) falls between the “second coming" and the "death” of Arms Control. That these waves lead toward ever-increased security cooperation in a spiral-shaped process, however, is not self-evident. Consequently, the third model drafts a circular process. Progress is only temporary and will be overtaken by the eternal, harsh forces of the international power struggle. Of course, this is the view of the more pessimistic version of realism: Arms Control ebbs and floods alternate, but Arms Control achievements are fully or almost fully lost in each ice age: “progress” does not hold. Security cooperation and its legal and institutional sediments are a marginal phenomenon, dependent on temporary interest constellations. When interests shift, or when a power shift changes the hierarchy of the international system, the achievements of the past period will erode or explode, and the system returns to the dangerous competition, including its military aspects, which is its natural state (Mearsheimer, 1995; see also Mearsheimer, 2001 for the theoretical background). Among the three models, the “spiral model" has most to show empirically. As Joseph Nye (1987, 1989) observed already in 1987, even the icy early 1980s left much of the Arms Control achievements intact, such as the NPT, naval confidence-building measures, and the CSCE process with its confidence-building (the European allies prevailed over U.S. preferences). During the George W. Bush years, NPT, CWC, and BWC continued (the latter one after heroic rescue activities by the Europeans), the mutual reductions pursuant to the Moscow Treaty took place, the INF Treaty remained in force, as did CSCE confidence building, and even the Open Sky Treaty. The same applies to all global multilateral treaties. A second observation: Phil Farley counted, in his contribution to probably the best book on Arms Control that has ever been written, eight negotiations that had failed before 1987 (Farley, 1988, pp. 620,627-629). During the 28 years that have since passed, six of these eight have been successfully concluded.8 Up to now, the "spiral model" appears to hold, despite setbacks in the early 1980s, the years of the George W. Bush Administration, or the present impasse; thus, the hopeful Kantian vision of ever-closer security cooperation is still on the table.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – AI: LAWS

No impact to securitization – hybridization and grafting undercut legitimation effects and extreme responses

Hynek 22 Nik Hynek, professor specializing in security studies at the Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University; and Anzhelika Solovyeva, lecturer specializing in strategic studies at the Department of Security Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University; “Over-securitizing Autonomous Weapons Systems: The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots,” Chapter 5, Militarizing Artificial Intelligence: Theory, Technology, and Regulation, Routledge, 2022, ISBN 978-1-003-04548-9, pp.113-128 /GoGreen!

A securitizing move is, according to the original definition by the Copenhagen School, a specific rhetorical structure or discourse – or, more precisely, a speech act – that frames an issue as an existential threat, i.e., a security issue (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 25–26). The central goal of this chapter is the identification and analysis of such speech acts because speech acts have indeed been the main means by which the Campaign has increasingly sought to securitize AWS. Since other means have also been employed, we will draw intellectual resources from other approaches to securitization theory too. There is still more, however, that we can borrow from the Copenhagen School. Wæver (1995) pointed to the performative dimension of the move: ‘the utterance itself is the act [emphasis added]’. He even defined the process as ‘[t]he performance of the security act’. Huysmans (2006: 147) accurately spotted the linguistic practice turning from mere description to performative acts as one of the organizing principles in social and political relations. One important caveat is that performativity is not the same thing as a theatre performance, but is about the ways in which the discourse is reiterated and networks are created (Ringmar 2019). In this chapter, we systematically illustrate how a particular communication within a distributed network produces and reinforces a shared understanding of insecurity. What deserves special note is that the emergent security issue is not necessarily linked to a real existential threat but has to be constructed and presented as such a threat (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 24). There have been insights showing that it does not stop with a politically and socially constructed threat. Discourses of insecurity are often about representations of ‘danger’ with material consequences (Campbell 1992). This concept is important for us too because the kind of threat we examine here has been constructed through, inter alia, discourses and representations of danger.

A person or a group that performs the speech act is a securitizing actor. Success depends to a great extent on the authority position held by the actor. Only a few actors and groups do in fact have ‘the power to define security’. Among them are political leaders, governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists, and pressure groups (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 31 and 40). Therefore, the Copenhagen School gave us a hint as to the nature of securitizing actors. Wæver (1995: 57) insisted specifically, however, that ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, [typically] by elites’. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 21) reaffirmed the principle in their joint book: ‘Traditionally, by saying “security,” a state representative [emphasis added] declares an emergency condition.’ The limitation of the approach of the Copenhagen School is that it restricts the actors who can legitimately construct security primarily to political leaders. Also, the Copenhagen School provided initial instruction on how to assess the role the audience plays in constructing insecurity, yet this is another limitation. Success, in their view, depends on the audience being convinced that the issue is an existential security threat. The issue is securitized only if and when emergency measures that go beyond standard political procedures are accepted as justified (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 23–25). The audience’s role is, therefore, limited to the mere fact of their accepting the truth of the discourse. Other approaches to securitization theory will allow us to compensate for these limits.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: L – Generic

“Justifies” is NOT “causes” – the link oversimplifies – securitizaton’s more likely to fizzle out in the face of contestation and budget constraints than result in their impacts

Goddard 15 Stacie E. Goddard, Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College; Ronald R. Krebs, Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota; “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It Should, and How It Can,” Duck of Minerva, 9-18-2015, /GoGreen!

Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others [are ignored] fall on deaf ears. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security does not crowd out all other spending priorities—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. Nor does simply declaring something a matter of national security guarantee its funding—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › T/N – Ontological Security Good

Hybrid warfare in particular disrupts NATO’s ontological security – the AFF solves by insulating NATO from existential fear

Maria Mälksoo 18, Senior Lecturer in International Security at the Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, “Countering hybrid warfare as ontological security management: the emerging practices of the EU and NATO,” European Security, 27:3, 374-392, https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/772169/mod_resource/content/0/malksoo.pdf

Hybrid warfare indicates a multitude of possible contingencies, generating anxiety about one’s ability to remain oneself and to continue to act. It is thus linked to “anxiety over the vulnerability of [Western] power” (Bell 2012, pp. 230–231), threatening the West about losing its particularistic form of existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 455). Anxiety, in contrast to fear, which per Giddens (1991, p. 43) constitutes a response to a specific threat, concerns “perceived threats to the integrity of the security system of the individual” (Giddens 1991, pp. 44–45, cf. Browning and Joenniemi 2017, p. 38; Rumelili 2015). OS-seeking aims to mitigate the effects of such hard uncertainty, bringing it within bearable limits (Mitzen 2006, p. 346). Routines are instrumental here, as they “pacify the cognitive environment … ‘inoculating’ individuals against paralytic, deep fear of chaos” (Mitzen 2006, p. 347).

Being able to survive the “hybrid threats” is directly pertinent to the survival of the EU and NATO as particular kinds of organisations, underpinned and driven by specific values – which cannot be sacrificed or diluted in the struggle for physical and institutional survival. Yet, hybrid warfare disturbs the OS of the EU and NATO in subtly distinct ways. Due to the particularities of their institutional set-ups and historical foundations, the OS drives of the two organisations are somewhat distinctive. NATO’s history is occasionally told through its surpassing of a sequence of crises, albeit the end of the Cold War and the collapse of its original enemy created a situation of unprecedented uncertainty and ontological insecurity for the Alliance. Meanwhile, the EU’s ontological insecurity is a more recent phenomenon, stemming mostly from the Eurocrisis and the looming possibility of a Grexit a few years ago; the refugee/migration crisis in Europe of 2015 (Dingott Alkhoper 2018; Mitzen 2018); the actual UK decision on Brexit in 2016 (Browning 2018); and the rise of populist politics within the EU (Kinnvall, Manners, Mitzen 2018) and the United States. NATO as a military alliance has been historically more accustomed to the othering practices of concrete geographical places, whereas the EU is generally regarded as an organisation that has risen above geopolitical othering, juxtaposing itself to Europe’s dark past instead (Rumelili 2018, Subotic 2018, and Della Sala 2018). Accordingly, the EU might be more at home with hybrid threat management due to its historically broader conceptualisation of security through the paradigm of intertwined risks rather than being focused more strictly on “the threat, use and control of military force” in the manner of a traditional defence alliance (Walt 1991, p. 212; Manners 2002). Regardless of its perpetual transformer’s self-image, hybrid threats represent the uncomfortable “hard” or “fundamental” uncertainty for NATO (cf. Mitzen 2006, p. 346) and are thus ontologically disturbing for the security of its self as a traditional alliance with a collective security pledge bound to “armed attack” against one or more of its member states.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › T/N – Ontological Security Good

Their thesis is backwards – “Western” identity is locked in – attempting to destabilize it threatens ontological security, which flips their impacts – strengthening collective identity via security cooperation solves

Bahar Rumelili 15, Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department of International Relations, Koc University, Istanbul, “Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security,” Journal of International Relations and Development volume 18, pages52–74 (2015), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jird.2013.22

With regard to ontological security, the distinction between security and insecurity is the more critical one. In a state of ontological insecurity, the Self experiences instability and uncertainty of being. Ontological insecurity refers to a state of disruption where the Self has lost its anchor for the definition of its identity and, consequently, its ability to sustain a narrative and answer questions about doing, acting, and being (Kinnvall 2004). It may arise from deep uncertainty (Mitzen 2006a) and/or from the failure to have its sense of Self affirmed by others (Zarakol 2010). Conversely, in a state of ontological security, the Self experiences a stable, certain, and consistent social existence, where it remains in control about its identity and capacity for action. While I do not rule out the possibility of a state of ontological asecurity, where the Self is simply not concerned with the stability and certainty of its identity, I do not explore this possibility and how it varies across different states of physical security in this article.

Having identified different states of physical and ontological security, I make the further assumption that since ontological and physical security are distinct, states of security do not vary uniformly across the ontological and physical layers of security. One can be at a state of physical insecurity while being at a state of ontological security, and vice versa. Consequently, Table 1 charts out the four possible states of security based on the conception of security as both ontological and physical.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › T/N – Objectivity Good

The scientific truths that undergird our scholarship are real – poststructuralism is coopted by corporations and post-truth politicians to worse material effect than anything we said and turns ALT solvency

Gómez-Baggethun 20 Erik Gómez-Baggethun, Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Faculty of Landscape and Society, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, and Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, “More is more: Scaling political ecology within limits to growth,” Political Geography, vol.76, January 2020, DOI 10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102095 /GoGreen!

Half a century ago, constructionist claims played an important role in critical scholarship, showing how analytical categories we take for granted as universal truths did not exist in other times and places, and exposing how these categories were exploited by elites to exercise power (e.g. Foucault, 1971). Authors like Wittgenstein, Benveniste and Lacan exposed the articulations between language and the way we understand reality, putting into question dominant forms of realism that magnified the absolute and universal character of scientific truths. In this line of reasoning, intellectuals associated with postmodern1 and post-structuralist thinking, like Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva, Foucault, Deleuze, Baudrillard, Jameson, and Lyotard challenged established beliefs surrounding scientific panaceas and the dogmas of modernity. In doing so they contributed to erode beliefs in certainties, allegedly emanating from reason, that shielded the exercise of power by endowing it with the unquestionable authority of scientific truth.

The deconstructionist machinery set in motion by these authors, however, soon proved double edged. Naïve realism –the original target of this criticism– fell in disgrace and social constructionism gradually became the mainstream in cultural studies. Eventually, and with some support of the media, vulgarized variants of this criticism contributed to expand a generalized climate of moral relativism, skepticism and cynicism that, in words by Lévy (1987: 20), installed us in an obsessively modest way of thinking that makes of uncertainty its last word, and which ‘extreme relativism has resulted in a generalized idiocy’ (cited in Naredo, 2015). In another critical account Sahlins (2002: 49) notes that ‘one of the more poignant aspects of the current postmodernist mood is the way it seems to lobotomize some of our best graduate students, to stifle their creativity for fear of making some interesting structural connection […] or a comparative generalization. The only safe essentialism left to them is that there is no order to culture’. Critics suggest that epistemic relativisms that reduce interpretations of reality to mere ‘narratives’, ‘discourses’ and ‘social constructs’ have been instrumental for today’s generalized skepticism and cynicism (Boghossian, 2007; Sokal & Bricmont, 1999; Zerzan, 1994). Naredo (2015) further notes that this epistemic climate, initially conceived as a healthy critique to established ideas, later came to be exploited by the status quo to mask the dark sides of progress –such as environmental destruction from economic growth–, behind a nebulous of uncertainty. Decades of scholarship devoted to deconstruct ‘truth’ paved the way for a golden era of relativism. Post-truth, a concept used to describe the disappearance of shared objective standards for truth and the undifferentiated blurring of facts, values, knowledge, opinion, and belief that characterizes today’s intellectual climate (Biesecker, 2018), may be looked at as the ultimate Frankenstein of this epistemological drift. According to Frankfurt (2005: 16), –who foresaw the post-truth coming long ago: ‘The contemporary proliferation of bullshit has deeper sources in various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality’.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: Objectivity Bad

Objectivity is good – ALT fails without it

Jones 4 Branwen Gruffydd Jonens, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, Goldsmiths University of London, Ph.D. Development Studies, University of Sussex, “From Eurocentrism to Epistemological Internationalism: power, knowledge and objectivity in International Relations,” paper presented at Theorising Ontology, Annual Conference of the International Association for Critical Realism, University of Cambridge, August 2004, /GoGreen!

The ‘common-sense’ view pervading recent discussions of epistemology, ontology and methodology in IR asserts that objectivity implies value-free neutrality. However, objective social inquiry has an inherent tendency to be critical, in various senses. To the extent that objective knowledge provides a better and more adequate account of reality than other ideas, such knowledge is inherently critical (implicitly or explicitly) of those ideas. 30 In other words critical social inquiry does not (or not only) manifest its ‘criticalness’ through self-claimed labels of being critical or siding with the oppressed, but through the substantive critique of prevailing ideas. Objective social knowledge constitutes a specific form of criticism: explanatory critique. The critique of dominant ideas or ideologies is elaborated through providing a more adequate explanation of aspects of the world, and in so doing exposing what is wrong with the dominant ideology. This may also entail revealing the social conditions which give rise to ideologies, thus exposing the necessary and causal relation between particular social relations and particular ideological conceptions. In societies which are constituted by unequal structures of social relations giving rise to unequal power and conflicting interests, the reproduction of those structured relations is in the interests of the powerful, whereas transformation of existing structured relations is in the interests of the weak. Because ideas inform social action they are casually efficacious either in securing the reproduction of existing social relations (usually as an unintended consequence of social practice), or in informing social action aimed at transforming social relations. This is why ideas cannot be ‘neutral’. Ideas which provide a misrepresentation of the nature of society, the causes of unequal social conditions, and the conflicting interests of the weak and powerful, will tend to help secure the reproduction of prevailing social relations. Ideas which provide a more adequate account of the way society is structured and how structured social relations produce concrete conditions of inequality and exploitation can potentially inform efforts to change those social relations. In this sense, ideas which are false are ideological and, in serving to promote the reproduction of the status quo and avoid attempts at radical change, are in the interests of the powerful. An account which is objective will contradict ideological ideas, implicitly or explicitly criticising them for their false or flawed accounts of reality. The criticism here arises not, or not only, from pointing out the coincidence between ideologies and the interests of the powerful, nor from a prior normative stance of solidarity with the oppressed, but from exposing the flaws in dominant ideologies through a more adequate account of the nature and causes of social conditions 31 . A normative commitment to the oppressed must entail a commitment to truth and objectivity, because true ideas are in the interest of the oppressed, false ideas are in the interest of the oppressors. In other words, the best way to declare solidarity with the oppressed is to declare one’s commitment to objective inquiry 32 . As Nzongola-Ntalaja (1986: 10) has put it: It is a question of whether one analyses society from the standpoint of the dominant groups, who have a vested interest in mystifying the way society works, or from the standpoint of ordinary people, who have nothing to lose from truthful analyses of their predicament. The philosophical realist theory of science, objectivity and explanatory critique thus provides an alternative response to the relationship between knowledge and power. Instead of choosing perspectives on the basis of our ethical commitment to the cause of the oppressed and to emancipatory social change, we should choose between contending ideas on the basis of which provides a better account of objective social reality. This will inherently provide a critique of the ideologies which, by virtue of their flawed account of the social world, serve the interests of the powerful. Exemplars of explanatory critique in International Relations are provided in the work of scholars such as Siba Grovogui, James Gathii, Anthony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Jacques Depelchin, Hilbourne Watson, Robert Vitalis, Sankaran Krishna, Michel-Rolph Trouillot 33 . Their work provides critiques of central categories, theories and discourses in the theory and practice of IR and narratives of world history, including assumptions about sovereignty, international society, international law, global governance, the nature of the state. They expose the ideological and racialised nature of central aspects of IR through a critical examination of both the long historical trajectory of imperial ideologies regarding colonized peoples, and the actual practices of colonialism and decolonisation in the constitution of international orders and local social conditions. Their work identifies the flaws in current ideas by revealing how they systematically misrepresent or ignore the actual history of social change in Africa, the Caribbean and other regions of the Third World, both past and present – during both colonial and neo-colonial periods of the imperial world order. Their work reveals how racism, violence, exploitation and dispossession, colonialism and neo-colonialism have been central to the making of contemporary international order and contemporary doctrines of international law, sovereignty and rights, and how such themes are glaring in their absence from histories and theories of international relations and international history. Objective social knowledge which accurately depicts and explains social reality has these qualities by virtue of its relation to its object, not its subject. As Collier argues, “The science/ideology distinction is an epistemological one, not a social one.” (Collier 1979: 60). So, for example, in the work of Grovogui, Gathii and Depelchin, the general perspective and knowledge of conditions in and the history of Africa might be due largely to the African social origins of the authors. However the judgement that their accounts are superior to those of mainstream IR rests not on the fact that the authors are African, but on the greater adequacy of their accounts with respect to the actual historical and contemporary production of conditions and change in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. The criteria for choosing their accounts over others derives from the relation between the ideas and their objects (what they are about), not from the relation between the ideas and their subjects (who produced them). It is vital to retain explicitly some commitment to objectivity in social inquiry, to the notion that the proper criterion for judging ideas about the world lies in what they say about the world, not whose ideas they are. A fundamental problem which underlies the origin and reproduction of IR’s eurocentricity is the overwhelming dominance of ideas produced in and by the west, and the wilful and determined silencing of the voices and histories of the colonised. But the result of this fundamental problem is flawed knowledge about the world. Eurocentricity is therefore a dual problem concerning both the authors and the content of knowledge, and cannot be resolved through normative commitments alone. It is not only the voices of the colonised, but the histories of colonialism, which have been glaring in their absence from the discipline of International Relations. Overcoming eurocentricity therefore requires not only concerted effort from the centre to create space and listen to hitherto marginalised voices, but also commitment to correcting the flaws in prevailing knowledge – and it is not only ‘the Other’ who can and should elaborate this critique. A vitally important implication of objectivity is that it is the responsibility of European and American, just as much as non-American or non-European scholars, to decolonise IR. The importance of objectivity in social inquiry defended here can perhaps be seen as a form of epistemological internationalism. It is not necessary to be African to attempt to tell a more accurate account of the history of Europe’s role in the making of the contemporary Africa and the rest of the world, for example, or to write counter-histories of ‘the expansion of international society’ which detail the systematic barbarity of so-called Western civilisation. It is not necessary to have been colonised to recognise and document the violence, racism, genocide and dispossession which have characterised European expansion over five hundred years.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › LINK › AT: Threat Inflation

Our threats are real and objectively knowable – institutional incentives militate against threat inflation, NOT for

Ravenal 9 Earl C. Ravenal, Distinguished Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society, 21(1), 2009, pp.40-43 /GoGreen!

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates).

In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › ALT › AT: ALT – Abolish NATO

NATO isn’t going anywhere – refusal to participate doesn’t solve any of their impacts – nor do anything about emerging tech; regardless of the goal, security cooperation is a superior method to achieve it than NOT

Gilli 20 Andrea Gilli, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College, former visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University, Johns Hopkins University, Columbia University, and Harvard University, ““NATO-mation”: preparing for technological transformation,” Chapter 2, “NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, NDC Research Paper No.15, December 2020, pp.25-26 /GoGreen!

What are the implications of the growing capabilities and dissemination of AI, ML and BD for NATO? Is the Atlantic Alliance powerless when faced with this wave of technological change, or could it adopt some measures to handle and address the ensuing challenges and opportunities? And what should Allies do? Should they pursue arms control or promote research and development, address legal and ethical questions, or just focus on the tactical integration of these new technologies? How can the Allies exploit their combined, but diverse, set of skills, capabilities and experiences so as to harness the power of AI?

Building on the previous discussion of AI as a GPT, it appears that the challenge for NATO is subtle, multifaceted and significant. First, in an age of accelerating technological change and growing domain applicability, catching up with industry leaders and innovators becomes more and more difficult for those that lag behind.73 This means that waiting is not a solution – even though acting prematurely, in a realm of great uncertainty, is inherently difficult and risky.74 Second, governments cannot expect that individuals, firms and organizations will be able to embrace and successfully exploit the new wave of technological transformation alone, without advice, support, direction, vision or investments in infrastructure. Third, while some countries will have an advantage, others will find the transition more difficult. Regardless of this, technological transitions do not occur in a vacuum, as they require the alignment of incentives among a multiplicity of actors, organizations and institutions, as well as the provision of complementary services and goods for the new technologies to flourish and be adopted.75 Fourth, and more important for NATO, without coordinating and cooperating on their investments in the necessary complementary assets, goods and services, Allies could find themselves having to face additional hurdles.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › ALT › AT: ALT – Poststructuralism

Poststructural analysis fails

Rodwell 5 Jonathan Rodwell, PhD candidate, Manchester Metropolitan University, post-graduate studies at The University of Birmingham, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” 49th Parallel: An Interdiscplinary Journal of North American Studies, iss.15, Spring 2005, /GoGreen!

However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical.

My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value, post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › ALT › AT: ALT – Poststructuralism

No purchase in academia nor outside

O’Callaghan 2 Terry O’Callaghan, Lecturer in the School of International Studies, University of South Australia, “Jim George and the Repudiation of Realism: Challenging Postmodern Wisdom,” Chapter 3, International Relations and the “Third Debate”: Postmodernism and its Critics, ed. Darryl S.L. Jarvis, Praeger, 2002, ISBN 0-275-96000-5, pp.80-82 /GoGreen!

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George’s scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude, women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows. Indeed, on practical questions such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George’s latent idealism and underscores how George’s schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George’s audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the “other,” to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard! 1 .

Moreover, why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized and the oppressed have to say? There is precious little evidence to suggest that “listening” is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September I I is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the “marginalized” and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › ALT › AT: ALT – Poststructuralism

The ALT solves nothing – BUT even if it did, transition wars outweigh

Jarvis 2K Darryl S.L. Jarvis, Senior Lecturer, Government & International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney, PhD University of British Columbia, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline, University of South Carolina Press, 2000, ISBN 1-57003-305-6, pp.128-129 /GoGreen!

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recommends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley’s torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, modernism, or realism emanate a “violence” that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self-professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, published, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theoretical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even revolutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as “Down with positivism and rationality”? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of wrar in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocuous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations.

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any wray speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations?

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › PERM › Perm – Do Both

There’s no essential incompatibility between securitization and transformation – adding the ALT overcomes residual links, or it was never effective in the first place

Loader 7 Ian Loader, Professor of Criminology and Director of the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford; and Neil Walker, Professor of European Law in the Department of Law at the European University Institute, and the Tercentenary Professor of Law at the University of Edinburgh; Civilizing Security, Cambridge University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-511-28506-6, pp.89-93 /GoGreen!

These critical observations on the current security constellation impart some valuable warnings, some of which, as noted, are shared by liberal critics of the ‘war on terror’. They suggest, first and foremost, that democratic societies risk spiralling into a vicious circle of terror–fear–repression whose all too likely consequence is the erosion, perhaps even demise, of democratic government and the rule of law (Rorty 2004). As political elites respond to acts of terror with ‘security measures’ that seek to assuage public insecurity (and anger) by further empowering police and military institutions, they do several things: not only do they direct the resources of the partisan state at already often unpopular and over-policed minority populations (both at home and abroad); they also institutionalize public anxiety in ways that make it difficult to envisage cultural conditions that will permit ‘temporary’ exceptional measures to be repealed, and leave themselves with little practical choice but to respond to the next terrorist attack with yet more – still tougher – ‘security solutions’. As each ‘ordering measure brings into being new ambiguities and ambivalences which call for further measures, the chase never ends’ (Bauman and Tester 2001: 79; see, also, Dillon 1996: 127).

For liberals the practical task is to find ways of responding to terror (and the fear and loathing that it generates, or reinforces, or renews) in ways that break out of this insecurity-heightening, democracy-corroding spiral (see, for example, Ackerman 2004; Ignatieff 2004; Dyzenhaus and Hunt forthcoming). This too, more broadly, is the impulse that informs this book – one that holds that it is possible in this field to envisage and create virtuous circles that both civilize security and release the civilizing potential of security. The variant of state scepticism we have been concerned with here presses, however, a more disquieting claim – one that presents a serious critique of such possibilities. From this perspective there is no obvious route away from a world in which exceptionalism has become what Agamben (2004a: 2 and passim) calls ‘the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics’ – and certainly not one which travels under the banner of security. We are faced with what looks set to become an unceasing war against terror in which partisan, exceptional states name and chase new enemies, fortify borders as they violate them, suspend law in the name of law, and undermine democracy in an effort to save it. How, in such a world, the leftist state sceptic asks, can we speak meaningfully about, let alone begin to construct, a socially coherent project of collective security?