Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › PERM › Perm – Do Both

NOT mutually exclusive

McDonald 17 Matt McDonald, Reader in International Relations at the University of Queensland, “Critical security in the Asia-Pacific: an introduction,” Critical Studies on Security, 5(3), 2017, pp.237-252, DOI /GoGreen!

There is also evidence to support the idea that in some instances, states are emphasising non-traditional security issues and cooperation associated with it as a mechanism for consolidating strategic partnerships driven by more traditional strategic concerns. This might be applied to the example of responses to the 2004 tsunami. Here, the United States, Japan, India and Australia established a coalition to coordinate aid delivery, in the process solidifying strategic relations while responding to regional disaster. Such a development suggests challenges associated with making clear distinctions between a traditional and non-security agenda, challenges heightened if non-traditional security is still viewed through the lens of state security.4

These issues raise important questions about the politics of security as applied to critical approaches, especially those that wish to contribute to debates about security practices: should our aim be to speak truth to power and articulate a bold vision for substantially different sets of approaches and actors, or to engage those institutions and actors with the capacity to enact change, attempting to encourage more progressive practices in the process? Of course, this is a simplistic binary in the sense that scholarship (and individual scholars) can do both. But it serves to remind us of the importance of engaging with the politics of security. This is central to Lee Wilson’s discussion of dynamics and practices of security in Indonesia in this special issue. Ultimately, we should be in a position to articulate grounds for incremental progressive change to those with the power to enact it, even while compelling ourselves to keep sight of a vision of security that is genuinely ethically defensible. This is a challenge for a critical approach to security, but one which intellectual openness, humility and reflexivity – combined with acceptance of a division of academic labour within the broad contours of such an approach – might go some way to addressing.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › !/T – Liberal Peace

Their Ks of lib-ism lack scholarly rigor and have it backwards—lib-ism’s failings come from it not being vigorously defended enough and historical anti-colonial resistance explicitly reflected liberal values—their K independently dooms positive reform in the Global South

Claudio, 17—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte's Philippines,” The Global South, Volume 11, Number 2, Fall 2017, pp. 92-107, dml)

First is the claim that liberalism is a universalizing Enlightenment idea that has imposed itself on colonial societies. In displacing other forms of non-Western thinking, critics say it creates a hierarchy between a civilized/liberal subject and an uncivilized/illiberal one, thus allowing for the violence of colonialism. The most prominent writer in this vein is Uday Singh Mehta (1999), who argues that imperialism was not a contradiction within liberal thought but inherent in it.2 Through colonialism, he contends, liberalism “found a project, with all the grandeur of scale, implicit permanence, purposefulness, and the absence of a need to negotiate with what is extant” (12). Mehta based his account largely on a critique of British liberalism and its effects on colonial India. But others have applied his arguments to other liberal empires. By examining the United States’ colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century, Julian Go challenges the narrative of an inclusive liberal nationalism in the US. He contends that one must think of “civic-liberal nations as liberal empire-states” (emphasis in original, 2017, 74). Drawing from the influential anti-liberalism of Losurdo (2014), Go claims that both “are predicated upon a core hierarchized binary of citizen and Other—that is, between those who are members of the community because they are rational, mature, and civilized, and those who are not” (74). It is in this manner, he concludes, that US liberalism has excluded various subaltern groups, from African-American slaves to colonial-era Filipinos.

To the critique exemplified by Mehta and Go, I offer two replies. First, liberalism’s universalism does not necessarily lead to colonialism. In fact, is it reasonable for a liberal who believes in rational deliberation to violently impose a set of beliefs on entire peoples? Scholars like Mehta are wont to emphasize the universalizing desires of liberalism (its first face), but they have neglected its other face, what Gray calls liberalism as modus vivendi—a liberalism that allows for “common institutions in which many forms of life can coexist” (2000, 6). A modus vivendi cannot be colonialism. And neither is colonialism a way of ordering liberty through institutions that enhance individual and collective freedoms. I must concede that at various points in liberalism’s history, the pendulum has swung towards its more universalizing tendencies. Yet to contend, as anti-liberal postcolonial theorists do, that liberalism is a universalizing project that imposes itself on divergent belief systems relies on an incomplete vision of the liberal project.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › !/T – Liberal Peace

Abdicating a defense of lib-ism’s self-correcting capacities leaves the vacuum open for authoritarianism while removing any checks on its rise

Claudio, 17—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte's Philippines,” The Global South, Volume 11, Number 2, Fall 2017, pp. 92-107, dml) [gendered language modifications denoted by brackets]

In all the criticisms cited above, critics reduce liberalism to a static idea, holding it up to the most stringent criteria, which are not equally applied to other existing political models. (To muster such vitriol against Marxism would certainly elicit accusations of fascistic anti-Communism). But any nuanced history of liberal thought must acknowledge the steady expansion of liberalism’s political and ethical horizons. Edmund Fawcett, for example, has shown how liberalism, which began as a credo of the elites (liberty for a select few) grew into liberal democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and thus became a grammar for mass politics (2014, 143). Thus, while we may concede that liberal ideas have previously marginalized women, the poor, and various racial others, we must also note its historical capacity for self-correction. Scholars like Mehta or Go are quick to point out liberalism’s sins but neglect how relatively quickly some of these sins were rectified.

Liberalism’s expansiveness is present even in the US-based civic-liberalism that scholars like Go deride. For, as Richard Rorty reminds us, while the United States has had a history of subjugation and hypocrisy, its greatest minds, such as Walt Whitman and John Dewey, constantly infused their critiques with a vision of what a more inclusive US society could be in the future (1997, 8). The liberal experiment, always in the process of becoming, was premised on “replacing shared knowledge of what is already real with social hope for what might become real” (18). Liberalism is an idea centered on progress, and progress assumes that mistakes were once made. Otherwise, what are we to progress from?

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › !/T – Liberal Peace

Ks of lib-ism link to themselves by dismissing post-colonial liberal perspectives and the concrete needs of colonial subjects—rejecting lib-ism all too easily feeds into the growing wave of global fascism

Claudio, 19—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Conclusion: Resurrecting Plants,” Jose Rizal: Liberalism and the Paradox of Coloniality, 71-77, SpringerLink, dml)

Too often, with liberalism, we throw the baby out with the bathwater. In contemporary critical and cultural theory, criticisms of liberalism are almost mandatory. This is most true in the field of postcolonial theory or in philosophies of the Global South. For many postcolonial scholars, “western” liberalism is the common enemy of the politics and ideas from the margins of global knowledge production. At times, one may be led to think that, without liberalism as a common target, postcolonial theory would lose its cohesion. Postcolonies are, after all, different, and the philosophies their intellectuals have espoused have likewise been varied. Without a positive notion of theory from the Global South, scholars have turned to denigrating “liberal” modernity.1

Of course, some anti-liberal scholarship has surfaced dark legacies of the European tradition. But even these turn critique into blanket dismissal. For example, the scathing work of Uday Singh Mehta (1999) proves how British liberal intellectuals like Jeremy Benthan, James and John Stuart Mill, and Lord Macaulay defended imperialism, particularly in India. The idea of Western tutelage for “backward” societies, he contends, stems from the liberal embrace of universal values to the exclusion of different cultures and belief systems. Hence, “the liberal involvement with the British Empire is broadly coeval with liberalism itself” (ibid., 4). Echoing Mehta, the sociologist Julian Go (2017, 74) contends that “civic-liberal nations” are “empire-states” (emphasis in original) because they “are predicated upon a core hierarchized binary of citizen and Other—that is, between those who are members of the community because they are rational, mature, and civilized, and those who are not.”

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › !/T – Liberal Peace

Liberalism is resilient to the ALT – and even if imperfect, it’s the most practical way of organizing power for radical change – ALT throws fifty years of positive change out the window and only empowers worse illiberal populists

Isaac, 18—James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington (Jeffrey, “Putting Liberal Democracy First,” Dissent, Volume 65, Number 2, Spring 2018, pp. 151-159, dml)

Those of us who consider ourselves “left liberals” have expressed particular alarm about the symbolic and practical dangers posed by leaders such as Donald Trump and his supporters. To name but a few: mass rallies denouncing “the liberal media”; inciting and sometimes enacting violence against critics or protestors; calling for the imprisonment of political adversaries; racist and xenophobic rhetoric invoked to support Muslim bans, border walls, and mass deportations; conspiracy-mongering attacks on career civil servants as agents of “the deep state,” and on journalists as “enem[ies] of the American people”; and orchestrated campaigns of lying and disinformation under the banner of speaking “truth” directly to the people and opposing “fake news.” In many ways, these tactics and actions are all too reminiscent of the “origins of totalitarianism” discussed by Hannah Arendt in her 1951 classic of that title. To note this is not to deny the profound differences between the global crises of 1914–1945 and today. But it is to register profound fear for the future of liberal democracy.

Colleagues further to my left have been critical, sometimes harshly, of this liberal response. They insist that Trump is not quite so dangerous, and that the dangers he does pose are largely expressions of deeper tendencies of neoliberalism that require more fundamental challenge. It thus makes little sense, they argue, for the left to reflexively defend liberal democracy— liberal democracy itself is the problem, and the solution is its transformation. While tactically these arguments track the 2016 debates between supporters of Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, they also run deeper. Some on the left—whether enthusiastic Bernie supporters, or unenthusiastic supporters who nonetheless saw his candidacy as an opening—reviled Clinton for her neoliberalism, and could not bring themselves to vote for her even once she won the Democratic nomination. They argued that the threat posed by Trump was overstated since both parties are oligarchical and capitalist (they are), and thus essentially similar (they are not). This contingent believed that the real danger is not Trumpism but the corruption, hypocrisy, inequality, and violence plaguing liberal democracy itself.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › !/T – NATO Peace

Studies confirm NATO’s net violence-reducing – because of its liberalism

Recchia 11 Stefano Recchia, Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Cambridge; and Michael Doyle, Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science at Columbia University; “Liberalism in International Relations,” International Encyclopedia of Political Science, eds. Badie, Berg-Schlosser and Morlino, Sage, 2011, pp.1434-1439 /GoGreen!

Relying on new insights from game theory, scholars during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized that so-called international regimes, consisting of agreed-on international norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, can help states effectively coordinate their policies and collaborate in the production of international public goods, such as free trade, arms control, and environmental protection. Especially, if embedded in formal multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), regimes crucially improve the availability of information among states in a given issue area, thereby promoting reciprocity and enhancing the reputational costs of noncompliance. As noted by Robert Keohane, institutionalized multilateralism also reduces strategic competition over relative gains and thus further advances international cooperation. Most international regime theorists accepted Kenneth Waltz's (1979) neorealist assurription of states as black boxes-that is, unitary and rational actors with given interests. Little or no attention was paid to the impact on international cooperation of domestic political processes and dynamics. Likewise, regime scholarship largely disregarded the arguably crucial question of whether prolonged interaction in an institutionalized international setting can fundamentally change states' interests or preferences over outcomes (as opposed to preferences over strategies), thus engendering positive feedback loops of increased overall cooperation. For these reasons, international regime theory is not, properly speaking, liberal, and the term neoliberal institutionalism frequently used to identify it is somewhat misleading. It is only over the past decade or so that liberal international relations theorists have begun to systematically study the relationship between domestic politics and institutionalized international cooperation or global governance. This new scholarship seeks to explain in particular the close international cooperation among liberal democracies as well as higher-than-average levels of delegation by democracies to complex multilateral bodies, such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NAFTA, and the WTO (see, e.g., John Ikenberry, 2001; Helen Milner & Andrew Moravcsik, 2009). The reasons that make liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about international cooperation are manifold: First, transnational actors such as nongovernmental organizations and private corporations thrive in liberal democracies, and they frequently advocate increased international cooperation; second, elected democratic officials rely on delegation to multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to commit to a stable policy line and to internationally lock in fragile domestic policies and constitutional arrangements; and finally, powerful liberal democracies, such as the United States and its allies, voluntarily bind themselves into complex global governance arrangements to demonstrate strategic restraint and create incentives for other states to cooperate, thereby reducing the costs for maintaining international order. Recent scholarship, such as that of Charles Boehmer and colleagues, has also confirmed the classical liberal intuition that formal international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO, independently contribute to peace, especially when they are endowed with sophisticated administrative structures and information-gathering capacities. In short, research on global governance and especially on the relationship between democracy and international cooperation is thriving, and it usefully complements liberal scholarship on the democratic peace.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › AT: ! – Value To Life

Extinction must precede ethics – their prioritization of ideology turns value to life and makes extinction inevitable

Schell 82 Jonathan, writer for the New Yorker and nuclear weapons expert, The Fate of the Earth

For the generations that now have to decide whether or not to risk the future of the species, the implication of our species’ unique place in the order of things is that while things in the life of mankind have worth, we must never raise that worth above the life of mankind and above our respect for that life’s existence. To do this would be to make of our highest ideals so many swords with which to destroy ourselves. To sum up the worth of our species by reference to some particular standard, goal, or ideology, no matter how elevated or noble it might be, would be to prepare the way for extinction by closing down in thought and feeling the open-ended possibilities for human development which extinction would close down in fact. There is only one circumstance in which it might be possible to sum up the life and achievement of the species, and that circumstance would be that it had already died, but then, of course, there would be no one left to do the summing up. Only a generation that believed itself to be in possession of final, absolute truth could ever conclude that it had reason to put an end to human life, and only generations that recognized the limits to their own wisdom and virtue would be likely to subordinate their interests and dreams to the as yet unformed interests and undreamed dreams of the future generations, and let human life go on.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › AT: ! – Value To Life

Value to life is inevitable and subjective – their assertions are the only scenario for negative value

Schwartz, et al 2 Lisa, Lecturer in Philosophy of Medicine, Department of General Practice, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK; Paul Preece, Theme Coordinator of Medical Ethics, Dundee Medical School, Ninewells, Dundee, UK; and Rob Hendry, Medical Advisor, Medical & Dental Defense Union of Scotland, Mackintosh House, Glasgow, UK, Medical Ethics: A Case-Based Approach, p. 112, November 2002 /GoGreen!

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › AT: ! – Structural Root Causes

They have everything backwards – no structural root causes – AND radical transformation wouldn’t solve – BUT proximate focus does

John Horgan 14. Director of the Center for Science Writings at Stevens Institute of Technology, “To End War, Focus on Culture Rather than "Root Causes"”, Scientific American, 8-18, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/to-end-war-focus-on-culture-rather-than-root-causes/

When I started researching war, I also assumed that to get rid of war, we have to get rid of its root causes. The trouble is, scholars have identified countless causes of war. One pseudo-explanation (which I'm glad Kloor does not mention, and which I rebut early on in my book and in posts such as this) is that war stems from a compulsion bred into our ancestors by natural selection. Biology underpins war, as it underpins all human behaviors. The crucial question is, why does war break out in certain places and times and not others? The most popular non-biological explanations of war are what I call the Malthusian and Marxist hypotheses. The first posits that war stems from our tendency to over-reproduce and hence fight over land and other resources. The second holds that war stems from inequality, the tendency of societies (especially capitalist ones) to divide into haves and have-nots. Scholars have also blamed wars on religion, racism and nationalism, which Kloor mentions above, as well as such fundamental social traits as hierarchy, sexism and injustice. If you cherry pick, you always find evidence to support your favorite theory. But as scholars such as Lewis Fry Richardson (whom my friend David Berreby recently profiled) have shown, neither the Malthusian and Marxist theories nor any of the other explanations above can account for the vast diversity of wars. Moreover, some factors that provoke conflict, such as religion, can also inhibit it. Religion has inspired some of our greatest antiwar leaders, notably Gandhi and Martin Luther King. I have found only one theory of war that fits the facts. The theory holds that war is a self-perpetuating, contagious meme, which can propagate independently of other social and environmental factors. As anthropologist Margaret Mead put it in a famous 1940 essay, "Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity." In other words, the major cause of war is war itself, which has a terrible tendency to spread even to societies that would prefer to remain peaceful. I make this point in my book and in a 2010 blog post, "Margaret Mead’s war theory kicks butt of neo-Darwinian and Malthusian models." Here is an edited excerpt: In his 1997 book War Before Civilization, anthropologist Lawrence Keeley notes that war among North American Indians often stemmed from the aggression of just a few extremely warlike tribes, "rotten apples that spoiled their regional barrels." He added, "Less aggressive societies, stimulated by more warlike groups in their vicinity, become more bellicose themselves." Societies in a violent region, the political scientist Azar Gat emphasizes in his 2006 book War in Human Civilization, have a strong incentive to carry out preemptive attacks. Societies may "attack the other side in order to eliminate or severely weaken them as a potential enemy. Indeed, this option only makes the other side more insecure, rendering the security dilemma more acute. War can thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fear of war breeds war." Many people are pessimistic about ending war because they assume it will require radical social engineering. World peace will require eliminating poverty, inequality, sexism, racism or [fill in the blank]. We will need to eradicate religion, or all embrace the same religion. We will need to get rid of all nation states and become anarchists, or form a single global government. My analysis of war suggests that if we want to end war, we don't need to create a society radically different from our own, let alone a utopia. If we want to end war, we should focus on ending war and the culture of war rather than on supposed causal factors. If we can do that, we will take a major step toward solving many of our other social problems, as I argued in my previous post. And that brings me to Keith Kloor's final challenge to me. He devotes much of his column to a discussion of how extremists on both sides of the conflict between Israel and Palestine have "hijacked the peace process. Horrific spasmodic cycles of violence and death is the result." He asks me how we can "rid the world of extremist groups that sow the seeds of war." Kloor has his causation backwards. Just as war promotes poverty, tyranny, inequality and resource depletion at least as much as vice versa, so war promotes fanaticism. Once militarism seizes hold of a society, it can transform vast populations into virtual sociopaths. It turns decent, ethical, reasonable people into intolerant fanatics capable of the most heinous acts. Breaking out of what Kloor calls "spasmodic cycles of violence and death" can be extraordinarily difficult, but history offers many examples of societies that have done just that. Germany and France were bitter, bloody rivals for centuries. But it is now inconceivable that Germany and France—or any members of the European Union--would go to war against each other. One of my favorite examples of a nation that has renounced militarism is Costa Rica. Like many of its neighbors in Central American, Costa was once wracked by terrible violence. But after a bloody civil war in the 1940s, Costa Rica disbanded its army, freeing up more funds for education, health care, transportation and tourism. It is often ranked as one of the most peaceful, healthy, "happy" nations in the world.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › AT: ! – Endless War

No “liberal wars”

David Chandler 9, Professor of IR at University of Westminster, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics", Review of Dillon and Reid’s The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler_18-1.pdf

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’(p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’(p.84). In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity(p.6). As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’(p.84). It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic(p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human(against humans)are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them. This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’(p.85)Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control. It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war(the asserted purpose of the book). Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…(p.84) Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › AT: ! – Self-Authorization

Their self-authorization internal link is backwards – NATO’s liberal identification empirically constrains exceptional justifications for violence – which do NOT map to a West/non-West divide

Gill-Tiney 22 Patrick Gill-Tiney, Stipendiary Lecturer in Politics, St. John’s College, Oxford, “A Liberal Peace?: The Growth of Liberal Norms and the Decline of Interstate Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66(3), 2022, pp.413-442 /GoGreen!

This article shows that liberal interpretations of sovereignty, which emphasize international law, interdependence, free trade, democracy and individual rights and freedoms, have become increasingly prevalent in UN Security Council resolutions since 1970. Given that two non-western states, Russia/Soviet Union and China, are permanent members, I argue that the content of these resolutions reflects broad consensus between major powers—both western and non-western—as how these norms should be interpreted. This is not the same as arguing that these states share preferences or interests, rather, substantial differences remain, largely along the cleavage between the United States, Britain and France on the one hand and China and Russia on the other (Einsiedel and Malone 2018, 156-58).1 Yet, the collective positions of these states have evolved over time, suggesting a shift in how sovereignty is understood. The dominant role that these states have in shaping the international order means that their collective understandings may be taken as representative of the normative structure of international society at any point in time, with the expectation that this impacts all states in the system.2

I argue that as liberal interpretations of these fundamental norms increase, the likelihood of a dispute participant resorting to violence decreases. Through content analysis of all UN Security Council resolutions between 1970 and 2014 I first create a measure of the strength of liberal interpretations of sovereignty. This is then utilized in quantitative analysis of dispute participants in the period to explain the variation in the level of violence employed. I find statistical and substantive support for my theory, showing empirically that the growth in liberal norm interpretations is negatively associated with the likelihood of a state resorting to violence in an interstate dispute.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › IMPACT › Consequentialism Good

Evaluate causal consequences – subsumes the effects of representations – BUT conflating “causes” with “justifies” is ethically bankrupt

Fairclough and Fairclough 18—emeritus Professor of Linguistics at Lancaster University AND School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Central Lancashire (Norman and Isabela, “A procedural approach to ethical critique in CDA,” Critical Discourse Studies Volume 15, 2018 - Issue 2, 169-185, dml) [CDA=critical discourse analysis]

The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 30-34), but we are using it here in a general sense: for the view that an adequate framework for ethical evaluation and critique must include the comparison and evaluation of different arguments for different lines of action in a process of deliberation. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus. Nevertheless, deliberation can contribute to the quality of ethical critique by ensuring that a wide range of arguments are considered in making decisions, that all alternatives are taken into account and thoroughly criticized, and that people have to (at least) moderate their own partialities in evaluating a range of arguments collectively. To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses of action which they led to. The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have discussed this in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 96-97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. CDA and practical argumentation CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is oriented to action, including political discourse, but also managerial, organisational and other forms of discourse. The primary activity in such discourse is practical argumentation, argumentation over action, over what is to be done (e.g. what policies should be adopted). Practical argumentation should accordingly be the primary analytical focus in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This does not exclude other familiar forms of analysis (such as analysing representations) but subsumes them. The point of representing (or ‘framing’) an issue in a particular way is to create particular public attitudes and opinions, and thus legitimize or facilitate a particular course of action. Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, critique of discourse is a normal part of all discourse. It is a normal part of everyday practical argumentation: people find reasons in favour and against proposals for action, they consider alternatives, adopt them or discard them, and so on. A course of action worthy of being adopted is one that has withstood criticism. Agents may decide to discard proposals either because they are likely to be instrumentally inadequate in relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, or because they find them ethically problematic, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels: as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the critique that CDA itself is open to. There are therefore three main places where ethical values come into the picture: what values are arguers (e.g. politicians) arguing from? what are the values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the arguments of those arguers? what are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)? CDA is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It can itself be viewed as a form of practical argumentation (Fairclough 2013), open to the same critical questions that it directs at the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address ethical evaluations that are critical of their work. Moreover, the ethical judgement which is part of the normative critique carried out in CDA does not come out of thin air, but is built upon elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse. And CDA needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality, such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough 2003). We have argued that the primary focus of critical analysis in CDA should be practical argumentation and deliberation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This was based upon a claim about the character of political discourse, which we saw as primarily concerned with the question of what is to be done. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which (alternative) proposals are being tested. The framework for critical analysis of practical argumentation and deliberation which we have developed since 2012 provides CDA with an effective way of evaluating and critiquing discourse from an ethical point of view. One of its strengths is that it allows different approaches to thinking about ethical questions (deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics) to be combined within an ethical deliberative procedure for achieving impartiality. In a more recent version of this framework (Fairclough, I. 2016, 2018), deliberation is modelled as a critical procedure designed to filter out those practical conclusions (and corresponding decisions) that would not pass the test of critical questioning. Two distinct argument schemes are involved in deliberative activity types: an argument from goals, circumstances and meansgoal relations, and an argument from (negative or positive) consequences. Proposals are tentatively supported by practical arguments from goals, and are tested in the light of their potential consequences, via practical arguments from consequence. Goals are generated by various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can also be obligations, rights and duties. Critical questioning seeks to expose potential negative consequences of proposals and thus evaluate them in terms of their acceptability or reasonableness: if the consequences are on balance unacceptable for those affected, then it would be more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action. Unacceptable consequences are critical objections which can conclusively rebut a proposal. Where two or more proposals survive critical testing, one may be chosen as the better proposal on nonarbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact). In our view, the most significant perspective in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a consequentialist one (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, Fairclough, I. 2016). The term ‘consequence’ is however used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is likely to result in a situation that is illegal or unjust, then the proposal can be evaluated as unacceptable from both a consequentialist ethics and a deontological ethical position. Our framework can therefore accommodate deontological ethical issues within a broader consequentialist perspective. By inquiring into the motives of action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › FW › Scenario Analysis Good

Descriptive scenario analysis is vital to critical reflexivity – deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed epistemological assumptions, and empowers creativity and flexibility in thinking and advocacy

Barma 16 Naazneen Barma, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, PhD Political Science, UC-Berkeley; Brent Durbin, Professor of Government, Smith College, PhD Political Science, UC-Berkeley; Eric Lorber, attorney at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, JD University of Pennsylvania, PhD Political Science, Duke University; and Rachel Whitlark, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, PhD Political Science, The George Washington University; “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives, 17(2), 2016, pp.1-19, /GoGreen!

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.

Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › FW › AT: Policy Failure

Reversing policy failure does NOT require methodological consistency, merely causal policy relevance – ALT makes it worse through theoretical reification and alienating policymakers

--reification = confusing deliberately oversimplified theory with the complex reality it attempts to describe

Desch 19 Michael C. Desch, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Notre Dame International Security Center at the University of Notre Dame, “Conclusions, Responses to Objections, and Scholarly Recommendations,” Chapter 9, Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security, Princeton University Press, 2019, ISBN 978-0-691-18121-9, pp.250-251 /GoGreen!

There are, of course, some nuts-and-bolts issues that scholars should be mindful of if they want to participate in the broader policy debate. Since policymakers have short attention spans given the number and breadth of issues they have to deal with, scholarly efforts to engage them need to be brief in conveying their ideas.70 This explains why Op/Eds are particularly influential and why so many are optimistic that blogs could play a similar role. Moreover, policymakers find much current scholarly work—from across the methodological spectrum—inaccessible. The common sentiment animating their views is that scholars should cut the jargon. Policymakers don’t want scholars to write in Greek or French, but rather just plain English.71

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › FW › Framework – 1AR

No neg offense — critical theory and problem-solving theory aren’t mutually exclusive.

Andrews 13 — Nathan Andrews, Trudeau and Vanier Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Canada), former Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at Queen's University (Canada), holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada), 2013 (“Beyond the Ivory Tower: A Case for ‘Praxeological Deconstructionism’ as a ‘Third Way’ in IR Theorising,” Third World Quarterly, Volume 34, Number 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 59-60)

International Relations (IR) theory is typically divided into two: traditional (often known as problem-solving/rationalist) theory and critical (often referred to as reflectivist/interpretivist) theory. Traditional theories remain the most predominant in the field of study as they often have powerful proponents and a larger number of disciples. The Oxford English Dictionary defines tradition as ‘a long established and generally accepted custom or method of procedure, having almost the force of a law’.3 In this context anything ‘traditional’ is ‘observant [end page 59] of, bound by tradition’.4 The origins of the theories are what make them cohere as traditional theories of IR and include realism (neorealism and critical realism); the English School; and liberal theories (liberalism, neoliberalism, global governance and cosmopolitanism). These are theories that often dwell on ancient and classical writings from Aristotle to Voltaire, and are sometimes committed to (re)interpreting these writings as though they were written for this contemporary age. They are also traditional because they possess the force of law where, for instance, the ‘realist gambit’5 has been dominant as well as the (neo)liberal ‘common-sense’.6

Theories considered to be critical include feminism, post-structuralism, securitisation and postcolonialism, among others. The question then is: what makes them ‘critical’? As Steven Roach asserts, ‘what makes critical IR theory “critical” is its self-awareness as a theory’—an awareness woven into the critical traditions of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Habermas, Derrida and Butler7—and we can certainly add Michel Foucault among other post-Enlightenment French philosophers. It is argued that critical theory was introduced into IR in 1981 with the publication of Robert Cox’s Social Forces, States and World Orders and Richard K Ashley’s Political Realism and Human Interests.8 A discussion of the so-called ‘great debates’ will show that critical theorists are generally post- positivist and to a large extent anti-foundationalist in that they do not accept any objective, Archimedean point or standard by which ‘legitimate’ knowledge should be measured. And they are also postmodern in the sense that they oppose the teleological measurement of human progress that characterises Enlightenment thinking, in addition to their quest to deconstruct established interpretations (discourse) in order to ascertain their embedded ‘silences’. It is based on this common ontological and epistemological orientation that neo- Gramscian theory and deconstructionism manage to fit under critical IR theory.

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › FW › Framework – 1AR

The most important question is: How can we actually make the world a better place? Only our framework asks it.

Andrews 13 — Nathan Andrews, Trudeau and Vanier Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Canada), former Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at Queen's University (Canada), holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada), 2013 (“Beyond the Ivory Tower: A Case for ‘Praxeological Deconstructionism’ as a ‘Third Way’ in IR Theorising,” Third World Quarterly, Volume 34, Number 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 66-67)

Contours of praxeological deconstructionism: research programme54

It remains problematic to think along the lines of the strict distinction Robert Cox makes between problem-solving or rationalist theories and critical or interpretivist theories of IR because in essence ‘[all] theory is political and [all] political action is theory-laden’.55 The rigidity that comes with the two main approaches, or ‘theoretical churches’, does no specific good to the field in general. While there is dignity in difference, there is hope in some degree of commonality. The approach being promoted here is more congenial to critical theory thanks to its reflexivity but it also embraces mixed methods. The quest is to problematise the ‘problem-solving/critical theory’ binary that we have been presented with in the field of IR, based on the argument that it is arbitrary and often a misrepresentation of the many theories and research traditions that often attempt to exhibit both characteristics. In some cases what is considered to be solving a problem actually solves nothing, since the theory can be so removed from the world ‘out there’ that it attempts to describe, revealing an overpowering ‘practicality deficit’ in the theory’s core assumptions.56

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › FW › Framework – 1AR

Our framework solves their offense, but their framework links to ours.

Andrews 13 — Nathan Andrews, Trudeau and Vanier Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Canada), former Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at Queen's University (Canada), holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada), 2013 (“Beyond the Ivory Tower: A Case for ‘Praxeological Deconstructionism’ as a ‘Third Way’ in IR Theorising,” Third World Quarterly, Volume 34, Number 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 67-69)

The second premise derives from some critical scholars’ refusal to offer specific alternatives. Richard Ashley (as well as many post-structural, postcolonial, and post-development scholars), for instance, will argue that it is not the goal of critical theory to provide alternatives, as such an endeavour defeats the self-reflexivity that undergirds the theory. But this is problematic because, while these theories reveal the agency in the theory, there is no clarity of purpose in terms of ‘actionable’ leeway for the agent. Also, instead of glorifying realism, for instance as offering a ‘timeless wisdom’,66 the followers in this camp should be more reflexive so as to overcome the inert determinism and parochialism that underpin their theorising. Closely related to the second justification is the argument that the purpose of both theoretical and empirical analyses is not only to understand the world but also to change it. This change is not possible if critical theorists engage solely in inward-looking critiques of existing theories without providing a programmatic understanding of what their perspectives entail or how the existing condition can improve. [end page 67] Additionally, as the need for theoretical pluralism becomes more apparent, PD assists in making sure the notion of ‘pluralism’ moves from being a buzzword to an actual practice. Essentially most IR theories have four main themes in common: power, order, structure and agency—although the emphasis placed on each of these elements differs from theory to theory. Praxeologically oriented deconstruction helps to elucidate these four components without taking any aspect of them for granted. The argument here recognises the ontological and epistemological difficulties one falls into when thinking of a ‘third way’—the difficulty of having so many established scholars and theorists disagree with the approach on many grounds, even including grounds of originality and usefulness. But the point is that, while we emphasise, for instance, what Ashley calls the ‘four p’s’—process, practice, power and politics67—we need to explore the structure and utility of the state in contemporary world politics—and by so doing unveil the axes of domination in existing structures. This is therefore an approach which symbolises the mutually constitutive synergies between knowledge/theory and praxis/practice, as explained below, rather than one that seeks to revolutionise the entire field of study by turning it upside down.

This approach does not simply seek to reimagine ‘deconstruction’ but rather attempts to show that deconstruction, without praxis, ends at a point which leaves the individual subject unable to ascertain what options of social transformation are available.68 The main contention in recent times has been between those who call themselves ‘rationalists’ and the ‘constructivists’, although neither possesses a concise set of theoretical and methodological assumptions that explain the entirety of IR. As the socio-political phenomena IR addresses are often subjective and context-specific, there is no ‘scientific truth’ to be had which will transcend space and time. The ontology of PD, as evident from Figure 1, is that there is no one world or ‘truth’ out there, if any, and in the same manner there is no single way of knowing or standard by which ‘good’ knowledge is measured. In this case ‘truth is always contingent, always a matter for debate and always partial’, meaning that ‘truth is not “out there”, waiting to be discovered’.69 Rather, there are multiple understandings which reside in [end page 68] different sites—times and spaces. A ‘third way’ is thus crucial, especially for people who are concerned with both discursive interpretations and real (emancipatory) alternatives.70 It is only in this way that the discipline can become transformative or pro-change while taking into cognisance the fact that change can occur from both within and outside established arenas of power. PD also shows that there is no point in ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’; although the water is dirty, the baby can be saved lest the purpose of bathing the baby itself becomes self-defeating. This speaks to the freedom and flexibility this approach gives to the researcher in choosing from multiple perspectives.71

2022 SDI Kritik
AFF AT: K—Security › FW › Framework – 2AC

Second, rejoinder – turns their offense – centering stasis on comparative solvency is key to critical purchase and avoiding cooption – if ALT solvency does NOT match the scope of their impacts, then links are NOT offense

Visoka 19 Gëzim Visoka, Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University, “Critique and Alternativity in International Relations,” International Studies Review, 21(4), 2019, pp.678-704, DOI 10.1093/isr/viy065 /GoGreen!

More broadly, alternativity in critical IR theory needs to be rescued from never-ending conceptual reifications, which have ended up making ontological assentation about the world become completely detached from the world. In this regard, there is a growing realization in IR that “critique is a necessary but secondary task; the priority is to return to practical theory as quickly as possible” (Levine 2012, 69). Recalibrating the purpose of alternativity in critical theory requires recalibrating knowledge production, not only to unmask power relations and the dynamics of dominance and to create space for a politics of resistance but also to generate practical knowledge for political action that challenges, confronts, and disrupts existing power relations and offers alternative solutions for reshuffling social relations on more emancipatory and inclusive terms (see Duvall and Varadarajan 2003, 85; Murdie 2017; Deiana and McDonagh 2018). A feature of critical peace and conflict studies is a congruence between the emancipatory and problem-solving perspectives, which should be predicated on the conciliation of knowledge, the expansion of onto-politics of peace, and the pluralization of epistemological and methodological approaches. The recent methodological work by J. Samuel Barkin and Laura Sjoberg (2017) on interpretive quantification is a promising move toward this much-needed pluralist fertilization within critical theory. In particular, a stronger linkage between criticality, alternativity, and practicality could help critical security, peace, and conflict theories to offer alternatives that would maintain critical impetus while simultaneously strengthening ties to practical and societal problem-addressing solutions. Genealogical studies would blend well with a critical analysis of conceptual and policy alternatives (see Milliken 1999). Statistical analysis with an emancipatory hypothesis coupled with critical analysis would contribute to subverting policy practices and would normalize alternative knowledge about peace, justice, and emancipation.

The recent practice-turn in IR offers new bridges between scholars and practitioners, making it possible to translate critical knowledge into practice without compromising the normativity and criticality of scholarly works (see Bigo 2011). A forum on pragmatism published in this journal has implicitly highlighted the importance of alternativity in understanding global politics and generating impactful knowledge beyond the existing epistemological and methodological divides (see Hellmann 2009). Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, 701) have argued for “the orientation of research toward the generation of useful knowledge.” Practicality is essential for generating alternatives. For instance, Jonna Nyman (2016, 142) argues that “a pragmatic, practice-centred approach . . . can help us gain practical knowledge of how security works and understand the value of security better, as well as help us to suggest alternative possibilities.” Similarly, Navnita Chadha Behera (2016, 154) argues: “theorizing in IR needs to step out of the rarefied atmosphere of its academe, develop a healthy scepticism toward its canonical frames, and open up to the possibilities of learning from everyday life and experiences of people and their living traditions and practices.” Practicality shifts the focus from abstract criticality and normativity to contextual critiques that account for everyday practices and interactions. This would be essential for rescuing critique from becoming a postempirical endeavor.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – R&D turn

Non-unique and link turn – DoD is losing the tech race now – investing more in R&D is key to combine the private and military sectors to maintain their competitive edge

Hoffman, 20

[Daniel, retired clandestine services officer and former chief of station with the Central Intelligence Agency. His combined 30 years of government service included high-level overseas and domestic positions, 7-13-2020, “The US cannot compete with China if our military doesn’t invest in R&D”, The Hill, , accessed 7-18-2022, BB]

The Department of Defense (DOD) last month declared that 20 Chinese companies, including telecommunications firm Huawei and video surveillance company Hikvision, are a threat to U.S. national security because of their relationship with the Chinese military. DOD emphasized that Chinese president Xi Jinping’s military-civilian fusion strategy of exploiting high-technology is the blueprint for “China’s global ‘return’ to military preeminence.”

2022 SDI Disadvantage
Affirmative › 2AC – Regulation good

All their link evidence assumes reactionary regulation, not liability regulations

Maliha, 21

[George, MD, is a second-year internal medicine resident at the University of Pennsylvania Health System, 7-13-2021, “To Spur Growth in AI, We Need a New Approach to Legal Liability”, Harvard Business Review, , accessed 7-18-2022, BB]

Granted, a regulatory scheme that attempts to specify an AI system completely will almost certainly hamper innovation. But those costs may be acceptable in particular areas such as drug development, where comprehensive Food and Drug Administration regulatory schemes can replace liability completely.