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2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: China—2NC

China threats are constructed to justify aggression towards China to protect American identity---makes their impacts a self-fulfilling prophecy

Turner 13, Oliver---Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, pp 1-22)

The modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose how ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon. Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the United States in perceptions of external danger. They demonstrate that, regardless of China's ability to assert material force or of the manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the reality of danger can be manufactured and made real. China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of ‘danger’— whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign immigrants— have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found.122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China ‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms. As ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are interpreted in such a way to make them threatening, regardless of Beijing's intentions. Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China's identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded. Joseph Nye argues that the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous. For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective assumptions about China and the material capabilities he describes. In late 2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that ‘the American people [want] to continue to build a growing friendship and strong relationship between the peoples of China and the United States’.124 The hope, of course, is that a peaceful and cooperative future can be secured. Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary focus of Washington's early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy, American interpretations of China must be acknowledged as a central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis of their relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and history informs us that particular American discourses of China have repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable realities about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always been inextricable from the potentialities of US China policy. As Sino-US relations become increasingly consequential the intention must be for American representations of the PRC— and indeed Chinese representations of the United States— to become the focus of more concerted scholarly attention. Only in this way can the contours of those relations be more satisfactorily understood, so that the types of historical episodes explored in this analysis might somehow be avoided in the future.

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: China—2NC

Empirics prove China won’t escalate conflict

Shifrinson, PhD, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Fredrick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, BU, ‘20

(Joshua, “The rise of China, balance of power theory and US national security: Reasons for optimism?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 43)

This framework carries large implications for scholars and policymakers seeking to understand China’s strategy as its power grows and US relative power declines. As noted, many analysts fear that a rising China will embark on a predatory course designed to push the United States down or from the great power ranks. Although it is difficult in the abstract to describe what the particular elements of Chinese predation may entail, the general concern seems to be that China will adopt steps that will rapidly shift the distribution of power its favour by enacting policies that are increasingly costly for a relatively declining United States to overcome, pushing the United States to exhaust itself competing or to surrender the issues at stake, and thus imperil the United States’ position as a great power. Elements of this approach might involve Chinese efforts to engage in economic warfare by hindering US economic competitiveness and limiting American economic opportunities; adumbrate US military advantages; undercut US credibility and prestige; and weaken US alliances in East Asia or beyond.55 Furthermore, recent Chinese actions in and around East Asia seemingly give credence to such concerns. After all, the last decade has witnessed China take an increasingly assertive stance in its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas56 ; enact an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea57 ; make political and economic inroads into Central Asia and Africa58 ; influence the domestic politics of Asia-Pacific states to favour pro-China policies; and expand its defence budget.59 Concurrently, trade tensions with the United States are rising, and the Chinese government has tried to buttress its authority by cracking down on domestic opponents.60

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: China

China threat discourse is a self-fulfilling prophecy---securitization legitimizes colonial occupation to create the conditions for miscalculation and militarization

Grydehøj et al 21, Adam---Research Center for Indian Ocean Island Countries, Michael Lujan Bevacqua---University of Guam, Megumi Chibana---Faculty of Business Administration at Kanagawa University, Nadarajah---School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Aká Simonsen---University of Greenland, Ping Su---Research Center for Indian Ocean Island Countries, Renee Wright---School of Global, Urban and Social Studies at RMIT University, Sasha Davis---Keene State College (“Practicing decolonial political geography: Island perspectives on neocolonialism and the China threat discourse,” Political Geography, vol 85, 2021)

The China threat discourse is linked to a bipolar worldview. Through the workings of Western historical analogy, China replaces past enemies, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as the ‘Other’ against which the West defines and understands itself (Kopper & Peragovics, 2019). Western and metropolitan states frequently contrast their own benignity with the China threat. As a result, despite arguments that engagement with China threatens islanders' ability to act in their own interests (due to ‘debt traps’), threatens island ecosystems (due to environmental destruction), and threatens the demographic dominance of islander populations (due to large-scale immigration), such island-centred arguments rapidly recede in the face of assertions of Western superiority.

The China threat discourse is not merely a means of distancing an island or archipelago from China but also a means of bringing an island or archipelago into closer relation with its existing colonial or metropolitan state. The USA is prominent here both because it has militarised numerous island territories worldwide and because other Western and metropolitan powers (e.g. Japan relative to Okinawa, Denmark relative to Kalaallit Nunaat, Australia relative to Papua New Guinea, France relative to New Caledonia) cannot represent themselves as equal competitors with China in a multipolar world and must position themselves as allies of the USA and potential alternatives to China. Such a bipolar perspective is unhelpful for islanders, who are cast as “pawns in a geopolitical chess game between larger powers,” included within this or that sphere of influence, rather than as actors in their own right (Davis, Munger, & Legacy, 2020).

2022 MGC Kritik
Links › L: AI Regs

The securitization and regulation of AI creates an algorithmic settler colonialism---relegating AI to elitist legal discourse disavows policymakers from the violent and exploitative effects of AI securitization

Stark et al 20, Luke Stark---Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Information and Media Studies at the University of Western Ontario, Daniel Greene--- Assistant Professor of Information Studies at the University of Maryland, Anna Lauren Hoffman---Assistant Professor with The Information School at the University of Washington (“Critical Perspectives on Governance Mechanisms for AI/ML Systems,” in The Cultural Life of Machine Learning: An Incursion into Critical AI Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, pp. 269-271)

However, this emphasis on AI through the lens of already existing cybersecurity discourses and as a national security problem risks further entrenching AI policy in the hands of the few. Securitization theory argues that discourses around “security” deploy particular “grammars of securitization” to connect “referent objects, threats, and securitizing actors together” to both depoliticize and control particular sociotechnical arenas (Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009). AI’s securitization shares similar traits with those of cybersecurity more broadly (which itself draws strongly from Cold War discourse around nuclear arms). AI’s “grammar of securitization” both reinforces AI’s status as an elite technical discourse and distracts from the effects of that same discourse on AI policymaking across the board. Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009) identify three “securitization modalities” which they suggest are particularly powerful in broader cybersecurity discourse: hyper-securitization or “a tendency both to exaggerate threats and to resort to excessive countermeasures”; everyday security practices, i.e., “situations in which private organizations and businesses mobilize individual experiences” to “make hyper-securitization scenarios more plausible by linking elements of the disaster scenario to experiences familiar from everyday life”; and technification, “a particular constitution of epistemic authority and political legitimacy” whereby some subjects are depoliticized into the realm of the “expert” (p. 1164). The concept of technification aligns closely with our observations in past work (Greene et al., 2019) and above: that most AI vision statements or sets of ethical principles seek to restrict debates around the societal impacts of AI to a coterie of technical experts whose positions are posited, chiefly by themselves, as technocratic and thus apolitical. Securitization rhetoric thus allows both industry and governments free reign to set the parameters for AI governance on their own terms. In its simultaneous insistence on the inevitability of AI technologies and that experts’ hold responsibility for ethical AI governance, much AI discourse also performs a flavor of hyper-securitization, hyping the disruption being produced by AI systems while disavowing the role of policy choices in accepting the deployment of problematic technologies. And in line with other surveillance technologies such as CCTV cameras, institutional actors are rapidly securitizing AI as a threat in itself if deployed by the wrong hands, while also advocating its use as a means to identify threats to the national polity (Cassiano, 2019; Chen & Cheung, 2017). The securitization of AI discourses and technologies also further exacerbates existing patterns of digital inequality and power asymmetries between the global North and South. Rumman Chowdhury and Abeba Birhane argue the extractive data practices of many AI firms constitute “algorithmic colonialism,” a digital analogue to the exploitative material extraction of natural resources and human capital to which the Global South has been subjected for centuries (Chowdhury, 2019). Algorithmic colonialism entails both the depredations of neocolonial powers (in particular the United States and China) and those of local elites supported by broader networks of global capital (Couldry & Mejias, 2019); it also includes algorithmic settler colonialism, through which settler colonial states look inward to exploit and dispossess the data heritage of indigenous populations (TallBear, 2013). Finally, it relies on globalized digital infrastructures to outsource and occlude the immense amounts of human labor of which “AI” services often actually consist: workers around the world are paid meagerly to clean and tag data, train models, and facilitate other purportedly automated services, while the more privileged developers of these systems reap the lion’s share of the financial reward (Gray & Suri, 2019; Poster, 2019a, 2019b). Securitization discourse, particularly around technification, thus seeks to push AI/ML systems out of the hands of citizens in both the global North and South and to install them as yet another weapon in the game of neoliberal great power politics. More broadly, securitization supports and underpins the various regulatory, technical, and discursive proposals outlined above designed to narrow the range of people and institutions able to have a say in the governance of AI/ML—to varying degrees, the proposed governance mechanisms for these technologies ensure their fate lies with a particular subset of more or less privileged individuals.

2022 MGC Kritik
Core › Core: A2—“Perm do both”

The perm masks the violence of the 1ac by instrumentalizing the alt

Laura Sjoberg 13, Department of Political Science, University of Florida , Gainesville The paradox of security cosmopolitanism?, Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, 29-34

Particularly, Burke suggests that security cosmopolitanism ‘rejects a procedural faith in strongly post-Westphalian forms of government and democracy’ (p. 17) and reiterates that such an approach includes ‘no automatic faith in any one institutional design’ (p. 24). This seems to move away from one of the prominent critiques of, in Anna Agathangelou and Ling’s (2009) words, the ‘neoliberal imperium,’ as reliant on Western, liberal notions of governance to the detriment of those on whom such a form of government is imposed. Burke clearly problematizes this imposition, framing many of the serious problems in global politics as a result of ‘choices that create destructive dynamics and constraints’ (p. 15) at least in part by Western, liberal governments – characterizing modernity as culpable for insecurity. At the same time, the solution seems to be clearly situated within the discursive framework of the problem. Burke suggests that there should be a primary concern for ‘effectiveness, equality, fairness, and justice – not for states, per se, but for human beings, and the global biosphere’ (p. 24). Unless the only problem with modernity is the post- Westphalian structure of the state (which this approach does not eschew, but claims not to privilege), then this statement of values might entrench the problem. Many of the ideas of equality, fairness, and justice that come to mind with the (somewhat rehearsed) use of those words in progressive politics are inseparable from an ethos of enlightenment modernity. This may be problematic on a number of levels. First, it may fail to interrupt the series of choices that Burke suggests produce a cycle of insecurity. Second, it may fold back onto itself in the recommendations that security cosmopolitanism produces. This especially concerned me in Burke’s discussion of how to end ‘dangerous processes,’ where he places ‘greater faith in the ethical, normative, and legal suppression of dangerous processes and actions than in formalistic or procedural solutions’ (p. 24). It seems to me that there is a good argument that ‘suppression’ is itself a ‘dangerous process,’ yet Burke’s framework does not really include a mechanism for internal critique. Another problem that seems to confound security cosmopolitanism is evaluating the relationships between power, governance, and governmentality. There are certainly several ways in which Burke uses a notion of the state that distinguishes security cosmopolitanism from the mainstream neoliberal literature. For example, he characterizes the ‘state as an entity whose national survival depends on its global participation, obligations, and depen- dencies,’ (citing Burke 2013a, 5). This view of the state sees it as not only survival-seeking (in the neo-neo synthesis sense) but also dependent on its positive interactions with other states for survival. Burke’s approach to government/governance initially appears to be global rather than state-based, another potentially transformative move. For example, he sees the job of security cosmopolitanism as to ‘theorize and defend norms for the respon- sible conduct and conceptualization of global security governance’ (p. 21). At the same time, later in the article, Burke suggests entrenching the current structure of the state. His practical approach of looking for the ‘solidarity of the governing with the governed’ seems to simultaneously interrogate the current power structures and reify them. Burke says: Such a ‘solidarity of the governed’ that engages in a ‘practical interrogation of power’ ought to be a significant feature of security cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, security cosmopolitanism must be concerned with improving the global governance of security by elites and experts. (p. 21) This attachment to the improvement of existing structures of governance seems to be at the heart of what I see as the failure of the radical potential in the idea of security cosmopolitanism. When discussing how the power dynamics between the elite and the subordinated might change, Burke suggests that ‘voluntary renunciation of the privileges and powers of both state and corporate sovereignty will no doubt be a necessary feature of such an order’ (p. 25). Relying on the voluntary renunciation of power by the powerful seems both unrealistic and not particularly theoretically innovative. This seems to be at the center of a paradox inherent in security cosmopolitanism: Faith in the Western liberal state is insidious, but the Western liberal state does not have to be. Modernity causes insecurity, but need not be discarded fully. Some universalizations are dangerous, others are benign. Dangerous processes must be stopped, even if by dangerous processes. Moral entrepreneurship is the key, but ther e is no clear foundation for what counts as moral. The security cosmopolitanism critique is inspired by consequentialism, but lacks deontological foundations despite deontological implications. Burke calls for (and indeed demands) to ‘take responsibility for it’ (p. 23) in terms of ‘both formal and moral accountability’ (p. 24). In so doing, he endorses (Booth’s vision of) ‘moral progress’ (p. 25), despite understanding the insidious deployment of various notions of moral progress by others. Security cosmopolitanism, then, is a proclamation for radical change that is initially stalled by its internal contradictions and further handicapped by its lack of capacity to enact the very sort of radical change Burke sees it as fundamental to righting the wrongs he sees in the world. The result seems to be the (potential) reification of existing governments/governmentality through what essentially appears to be a non-anthropocentric ‘human security’ which cannot be clearly distinguished from current notions of human security (p. 15). It appears to remain top-down and without clear moral foundation while claiming significant improvement over existing approaches. This appearance/seduction of improvement without real promise for change might be more insidious than the nihilism of which many post-structuralists are accused, as it seductively appears to solve a problem it does not solve.

2022 MGC Kritik
Core › Core: FW—2NC

4---Epistemology comes first---IR constitutes itself through linguistic and discursive practices like the aff---policy cannot be disentangled from its epistemological justifications

Ringmar 14 – Erik Ringmar is professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Istanbul, Turkey; 2014 (“Performance, Not Performativity: An Embodied Critique of Post-Structural IR Theory”, Performativity and Agency in International Politics, Available online at , Accessed 03-08-2021)

When applied to the study of international politics, this position turns into a critique of the state, or rather, a critique of sovereignty. There is no state, say post-structural international relations scholars such as Cynthia Weber and David Campbell, at least if we take the state to constitute a pre-existing subject to which sovereignty can be attached as an attribute.9 Focusing on “institutions,“ the “people,“ or perhaps on the state as a transcendental idea, mainstream accounts always presuppose that which they intend to prove. Instead sovereignty must be understood as the process through which political subjects come to constitute themselves as such. “I suggest,“ says Weber, “that sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but in process and that all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted.”10

Weber's idea of “performatively enacted practices” needs further elucidation.11 Even if we reject the idea of a pre-given self, there is certainly the illusion of such a being, and the question thus becomes how that illusion arose. According to poststructural theory, the self is created through reiterative linguistic practices. Language precedes the human subject, they explain; we are born into language, and language is best understood as a semiotic structure where the meaning of each word is constituted by its difference from other words. It is, as Ferdinand Saussure once argued, the structure as a whole that ultimately determines what things mean. According to performativity theorists, in other words, structure is to practice as langue is to parole; as the abstract rules that make possible the production of grammatical sentences, that is, are to the production of an actual sentence.12 A structure, like langue, is a complex of rules with a virtual existence whereas practice, like speech, is an enactment of these rules in space and time.

2022 MGC Kritik
Core › Core: 1NC Shell

Vote neg to reject the 1AC in favor of insecurity---that interrogates and disrupts the epistemological failures of the 1AC

Philippe Bourbeau 15, Associate Professor, holder of the Canada Research Chair in Immigration and Security, in the Department of Political Science at the University Laval, Ph.D. from the University of British Columbia, Juha A. Vuori, Professor of World Politics at the University of Helsinki, Adjunct Professor of International Politics at the University of Tampere, 11/16/15, “Security, resilience and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 257-259

Securitization and desecuritization The ceteris paribus normative push, and political recommendation of the securitization approach has been ‘less security, more politics’, and the development of ‘possible modalities’ for the desecuritization of politics (Wæver 1989a, 52): it is generally (which can only be assessed in practice though) more conducive to treat identities as identities, religion as religion, the environment as the environment, and so on, and to engage their politics through the particular modalities and rationalities of those fields rather than those of security. In the received reading, whilst securitization raises issues into the realm of security policies and practices (arrow 2a in Figure 1), desecuritization lowers issues back into the realm of ‘regular politics’ or removes issues from the political agenda altogether (arrow 1 in Figure 1). Desecuritization can be achieved through a number of options: by simply not talking about issues in terms of security, by keeping responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals, and by moving security issues back into ‘normal politics’ (Wæver 2000, 253). These options can follow objectivist, constructivist or deconstructivist strategies in bringing about desecuritization (Huysmans (1995, 65–67). These strategies differ in regard to how the process relates to the claimed threat: has the threat been dealt with, can the security drama be somehow handled from without, or can identities beyond security threats be produced from within the process. Beyond conceptualizing desecuritization as an option or a strategy, it has also been viewed from the viewpoint of political actors (de Wilde 2008, 597), and their political moves in games of contestation and resistance (Vuori 2011a, 2015). There can be desecuritizing actors who evade, circumvent or directly oppose securitizing moves by, for example, emphasizing competing threats (de Wilde 2008, 597). Security policies aim at desecuritization (the solution to the threatening situation), but desecuritization can also happen independently from the actions of securitizing or desecuritizing actors: the original security problem may be solved, institutions may adapt through new reproductive structures, discourses may change (e.g., with the loss of interest or audiences), and the original referent object may be lost (de Wilde 2008). A key issue of debate has been on whether desecuritization can be considered to be an active political process, or whether desecuritization can only happen as a fading away of the issue (Behnke 2006, 65): the question is whether the logic and possibility of securitization is necessarily retained in explicit discussions of whether an issue has retained the status of a security issue. As empirical studies of securitization and desecuritization dynamics (e.g., Salter and Mutlu 2013; Lupovici 2014; Vuori 2015; Donnelly 2015) have shown, it is difficult to point to a definitive end point for either securitization or desecuritization: political and social situations evolve. Whichever the philosophical stance on how and whether desecuritization can be achieved (Vuori 2011a), such empirical studies show that political actors do make active desecuritization moves. Indeed, systematizing empirical studies of desecuritization, Hansen (2012, 529; 539–545) has identified four ideal type forms for the concept. In regard to its issues of concern, namely the status of enmity and the possibility of a public sphere, when a larger conflict is still within the realm of possibility, but when a particular issue is presented with terms other than security, we have an instance of (1) ‘change through stabilisation’ (arrow 2b in Figure 1); when another issue takes the place of a previously securitized issue, we have (2) ‘replacement’; when the originally phrased threat is resolved, we have (3) rearticulation; and finally, when potentially insecure subjects are marginalized through depoliticization, we have (4) ‘silencing’ (types 2–3 are represented by arrow 1 in Figure 1). The previous literature on both securitization (arrow 2a in Figure 1) and desecuritization (arrow 1 in Figure 1) has produced ample illustrations of both dynamics. As a brief example of how both dynamics can alter between the same political actors, we can use some of the vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations. China entered the Cold War in the Soviet camp and relied on the Soviet Union as the guarantee of the international security of the new People’s Republic. Chinese views in the late 1940s clearly structured the world into two opposing camps, with China firmly in the Soviet one (Mao 1949). In the 1950s, however, Sino-Soviet relations soured, and the following ‘Sino-Soviet split’ (Lüthi 2008) has been used as an example of the capacity of ‘parochial’ securitizations to become disaffected by or even be withdrawn from dominant ‘macrosecuritizations’ (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 257). Following the split, Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s were characterized by intensive ideological conflict, and Mao Zedong securitized Soviet revisionism as a major threat for the Chinese Communist Party (Vuori 2011b). Indeed, newly available documents suggest that it was the Chinese side, in effect Mao Zedong, which was more active in the pursuit of ideological conflict (Lüthi 2008, 2). In his securitization of the Soviet Union, Mao linked the revisionism he identified there to that which he also securitized domestically (Vuori 2011b), and the issue of revisionism was presented as an issue of life and death for the party. Sino-Soviet relations began to mend in the 1980s with the removal of a number of political obstacles and with the intensification of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union (Wishnick 2001). Yet, it is only with the fall of the Soviet Union that we can see an overall desecuritization in the form of rearticulation (Hansen 2012, 542–544) taking place in Sino-Russian relations. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, China’s line was not to take the lead in international affairs. China worked towards ‘world multipolarization’, which was exemplified with China and Russia forming a ‘strategic partnership’ in 1996. China and Russia even shared the same ‘threat package’ of ‘terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism’ (the ‘three evils’) within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Jackson 2006, 310). These are strong indicators of how the two states have managed to reform their identities away from the Sino-Soviet antagonism. In the overall state relations then, we can see a rearticulative desecuritization tactic at play on both sides: ever since the early 1980s, China’s policy towards the Soviet Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation rather than securitization. Desecuritization can be conceptualized in the above manner as a negative ontological corollary to securitization. Yet, it is also prudent to investigate securitization and desecuritization as political moves in order to potentially understand the logic of when and how they are wielded in practical politics. It is proposed here that in addition to instances where a securitized situation is dismantled (arrow 1 in Figure 1), desecuritization can also be viewed as a political move that can be deployed before ‘securitization plays’ in a game of securitization (arrow 2a in Figure 1). In other words, desecuritization moves – both in terms of discourse and practice – can be used in a pre-emptive manner before the threshold of securitization is reached (arrow 2b in Figure 1). For Wæver (2000, 254), silencing can be a strategy to ‘pre-empt or forestall securitization’. We argue here that beyond silencing, active desecuritization efforts can be made to block the escalation of a contention. Thereby, in addition to change through stabilization (Hansen 2012) and the silencing of an issue (Wæver 2000), there can be explicit rebuttals of security frames and claims before they are solidified into policy. This tactic can be termed ‘pre-emptive desecuritization through rebuttal’.

2022 MGC Kritik
Core › Core: 1NC Shell

Securitization causes endo-colonization---that makes ecological collapse, global war, and structural violence inevitable through a fear of difference---question their impacts because they’re founded on a simplified interpretation of the world

^^ Also a tech modernization link

Lacy 15, Mark---Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, 2015 (“Security, Technology, and Global Politics: Thinking with Virilio, PRIO New Security Studies, pp. 8-10)

For Virilio, attempts to contain the insecurity of geopolitics through improved global governance, 'free markets' and the liberal peace might transform security and war around the world, creating a world of perpetual peace and prosperity. The global economy - coupled with the acceleration of technology - might generate harmonious and creative societies where the unpleasant jobs have been replaced by machines and where there is a growing consensus that we need to accelerate and intensify distributive justice around the planet. Technology will not only improve our health and security - it will foster a cosmopolitan society built on the information technologies that expand the possibilities for dialogue. The war game will become the peace game that aids the improvement of the human condition. Virilio isn't so sure about the optimistic liberal view of history. For Virilio, we are surrounded by the 'propaganda of an endless progress', the promise of a world where technology and capitalism will overcome the problems and suffering that have blighted the human condition; the 'propaganda of progress' is the vision of the future one often finds in corporate depictions of the future that illustrate how new products will transform life, creating an existence where a multitude of technologies are effortlessly integrated into everyday life to create more rewarding and efficient work and relationships.27 Virilio is less certain that technology and capitalism will improve the human condition, asking us to pay attention to what lies underneath this propaganda of progress in the world around us - in the stress, suffering, paranoia, control, exhaustion and inequality that he thinks might intensify in coming decades. Progress (and the peace game), on this view, is a progress in the arts and technologies of control designed to manage the growing numbers of the 'living dead' that are excluded from the 'legitimate' economy, to control those that seek to exploit vulnerabilities in 'network' society. As we see later, for Virilio the peace game is the war game turned inward, toward what he calls the endo-colonization of society, the attempt to control the constantly mutating terrains of security in the post-Cold War world. The other side of the 'propaganda of an endless progress' is the 'administration of fear': Virilio suggests that we need to pay attention to the way fear (usually fear of otherness and difference) is used to distort debate over the problems we confront (so, for example, when fear of immigrants is presented as the cause of our economic woes and societal implosion - and the route to further disorder). For Virilio, we need to negotiate our way through both the propaganda of progress and the administration of fear, to pay attention to the way we can be captured by these 'easy' modes of responding to the world around us, to be constantly aware of these two very different traps. 9 Our world might be heading toward the realization of the liberal dream of progress but Virilio looks around and sees a world of accelerating ecological, economic and social degradation; politics becomes an increasingly narrow attempt to manage the insecurity and messiness in societies intent on realizing the dream of a fast and efficient consumer lifestyle. On this view, the politics of security that promises to control the messiness has a tendency to get out of control, nourishing the 'war-machine' and the 'military scientific complex', producing misguided security projects that generate chaos in the realization of policies that are often driven by fear, technological optimism about what technology and war can achieve, and a sense of cultural and racial superiority. 28 We might believe that we will learn from our mistakes (such as the wars that have dominated the first decade of the twenty-first century after 9111) but that is to become caught up with the 'propaganda of endless progress'. There is an excess to security that results in 'unnecessary wars' that become experimental zones for new technologies - and there is desire to control all aspects of life in increasingly intensive and extensive ways that risks to undermine civil liberties, tipping the balance of liberty and security toward the endo-colonization of society; an excessive focus on the problems of 'otherness' to the exclusion of the insecurity that comes from inside, from our financial systems or modes of consumption. Military and political elites get caught up in the seductive possibilities offered by new technologies, the god-like ability to control the world. Virilio comments that: the nature of absolute speed is also to be absolute power, absolute and instantaneous control, in other words an almost divine power. Today, we have achieved the three attributes of the divine: ubiquity, instantaneity, immediacy; omnivoyance and omnipotence. 29 We can see an example of this excess of security and the desire to obtain these attributes of the divine in the discovery in June 2013 that the National Security Agency obtained direct access to the digital infrastructures of Google, Facebook, Apple and other companies, allowing the PRISM program to access the emails, file transfers, search histories and live chats of all citizens, the metadata of the world. While this desire to become an omnipotent machine of surveillance might confront ethical and limits - or might confront the limits of what is possible, the excess of information - the intention is clearly to know everything. 30 Or we can see this desire to control the world from a distance in the development of drone technology: machines of vision and death that make possible control-at-a distance. In his preface to The Administration of Fear, Betrand Richard notes that 'this son of an Italian communist and a catholic from Brittany traces the rules of the game in which we are caught. And that we must escape' .31 We are trapped in a perverse situation where our societies are obsessed with security - but are governed with a security politics and economic policy that appears to be making the societies we live in more fragile (and thus requiring more 'security' and 'protection sciences'). The question that Virilio leaves us with is - after we negotiate through the propaganda of progress and the administration of fear - how do we escape the dangers of our accelerating reality, the darker possibilities made possible by the modem world? There is a sense in Virilio's work that past attempts to re-design how we live were not up to the task, producing new 'traps', new types of control. 10 So the optimistic 'liberal' student of international politics won't find much to agree with in Virilio's vision of politics and security. For the liberal optimist, the modem age has made it possible for our 'rationality' to overcome the irrational and dangerous aspects of the human condition; while there is much more to 'overcome' we are heading in the right direction and progress in this overcoming will be aided by new 'tools' and technologies; human existence is more civilized and secure than at any point in our history.32 The liberal will reply that information technologies are creating the foundation for a global public sphere that generates a 'transparent society' that makes it harder for states to hide what they do; Virilio replies that information technologies create new types of control and incarceration. Freedom and progress in this world order are illusions that mask the stress, control and inequality created by the system. The liberal will suggest that the continued growth in a interconnected global economy - where crisis is simply a glitch on the way to a world of progress for everybody around the planet - is a sign of the liberal capitalist world's resilience, its superiority to other ways of organizing human life.33 Virilio would reply that we should be careful not to mistake this resilience as proof of the universal or 'timeless' vitality or appeal of a capitalist (and not necessarily liberal) world order. The liberal sees global mobility as a symbol of the emerging cosmopolitan world order that overcomes the limits of locality and nationalism. Virilio sees global mobility in terms of forced migration, of border camps, of climate refugees, of habitats that can no longer support human life. Writing about Michel Foucault's studies of prisons and asylums Virilio comments: 'I think that the real imprisonment is just ahead. '34 For Virilio, the problems on the horizon will expose the fragility of the ways of organizing life that were enjoyed in the West through the second half of the twentieth century: rapid technological, ecological and geopolitical transformation will force us to confront a reality where it becomes difficult to hold on to the values and ideas that shaped political imaginations in the West during much of the previous century.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR › Gendered Violence Impact ext

Hegemonic masculinity and war detract from existing, ongoing gendered violence within a state and outside of it.

Dutta, Ishita. “Feminist Perspective of the War,Peace and Politics in International Relations.” Modern Diplomacy, 14 May 2021, moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/05/15/feminist-perspective-of-the-warpeace-and-politics-in-international-relations. Accessed 7/22/22 //ONHS IF

India is a land where Mahatma Gandhi and his ideas of non-violence were born, but it is also the land where Mahatma Gandhi was assassin by Godse for preaching ‘Feminine’ ‘non-violent’ politics and for making Indian men less ‘manly’ by promoting peace. Masculinity is a social definition given to men and boys in society, it is associated with strong, powerful, brave, and macho characteristics. The understanding of security is limited for many years in international relations (IR) and hence the understanding of a secured state is associated with a leader who has masculine characteristics capable of handling security. Politics across the world is understood in the terms of power and strength of the leader and other masculine characteristics associated with being ‘manly’ enough to control a state. While feminine characteristics are associated with weak, soft, and gentle behavior, even when women are elected as leaders, they are expected to hold strong manly characters to stay in politics. Indira Gandhi, the first female prime minister of India, prefer being addressed herself as ‘sir’ and her policies did not include a gender perspective. In Gender, Justice and the Wars in Iraq (2006), Laura Sjoberg demonstrates that women’s presumed status as innocent civilians make wars harder, not easier, for them, by defining them as protected without regard for their actual safety. On Iraq’s economic sanctions, feminist insights from the study of economic sanctions as the war in international relations are not only valuable for their contribution to IR’s theories of sanctions, but also for their generalizability to IR’s crucial questions, such as what constitutes foreign policy, what counts as war, and how war affects people Feminists see that war and military are often threats to women’s and other vulnerable groups’ security as they are competitors for scarce resources during and after a war on which women may depend more than men, instead of seeing military power as part of a state’s defense against security threats from other states, it should be seen as a product of patriarchy. The large defense spending on soldiers and military weapons rather than creating a safe society for women at home or spending on climate action that could create safer lives for women is an example of a masculine approach to war. The feminist approach in IR demonstrates how the security of individuals is related to national and international politics and how international politics impacts the security of individuals even at the local level. IR feminist theories focus on social relations through gendered lens,rather than power relations or anarchy, they see an international system constituted by socially constructed and gender hierarchies that contribute to gender subordination rather than traditional understanding of security. In 2019 In the Lok Sabha elections of India, Narendra Modi, and his party used his 56-inch chest in the election campaign to associate his capability of handling the security of India with ‘manly’ characteristics. While more than 3 lakhs of children die due to starvation in India every year, the Indian prime minister wins elections by boasting about his 56-inch chest capable of defeating terrorists. Feminists believe that the social construction of masculine characteristics is reflected in politics especially in IR because political theory and practice are both dominated by men. The understanding of war and violence is also associated with men, it praises soldiers, diplomats, and leaders that promote protection from war. Modern Enlightenment science has incorporated a belief system that equates objectivity with masculinity and a set of cultural values that simultaneously elevates what is defined as scientific and what is defined as masculine. The western liberal and realist understanding of masculinity and politics are limited and discriminatory towards women. While the world is facing nationalism wave in politics, leaders like Narendra Modi, Donald Trump and Putin promote a masculine idea of Security in the world to protect their national interest and secure nation through military expansion. The understanding of security, war, and politics are interlinked in creating the foreign policy of a country. In a country like India, the United States, or Russia where leaders promote masculine characters through their election campaigns, where the state controls the reproductive decisions of women, or in a country like India where weapons are worshiped, the foreign policy and politics of the state are influenced by masculine characters and are valued for national security. Rape, domestic violence, harassment against women in their own country is not subjected to war but a traditional understanding of the war in IR as feminists have pointed out is as if women require protection during war and soldiers are fighting to protect the honor of women, in reality, it is often women’s protectors (men) who provide the greatest threat in everyday life. For feminist scholars, a security that is global and multidimensional with political, economic, and ecological facets that are as important as its military dimensions. The security of individuals and their natural environment is considered as much as the security of the state. National security needs to be inclusive of security of all from security threats such as domestic violence, rape, poverty, gender subordination, and ecological destruction as well as war. For example, Sweden has a feminist foreign policy, which means the understanding of security is through a gendered lens, feminist foreign policy not only broadens what security means but also who is guaranteed security in the world. While feminism is a new approach of though in IR, the case study of Sweden explains the importance of feminist foreign policy that believes in gender equality in decision making, promoting peace and does not promote masculine characteristics associated with war and use of force in foreign policy and makes secure, happier nations. While the discourse of security is dominated by masculine characteristics in IR, states can be secured with wider perspective of human security associated with gendered lens.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR › AT Perm/AT TVA

The TVA is illegitimate – it relies on the structures of liberal feminism and state apology. We reject the use of the state – it legitimizes hegemonic masculinity and reframes the state as our “protector”.

Al-Thani, Dana KJ. "Knowledge Production in International Relations: A Poststructural Feminist Critique of Liberal Feminism." Inquiries Journal 14.02 (2022). Accessed 7/22/2022 //ONHS IF

Having argued that the core focus and methodology of the liberal feminist study of IR are gendered through a critique from the poststructural feminist lens, this section argues that the means by which liberal feminism studies IR also has consequences for the practice of IR. Thus, in highlighting the consequences of the liberal feminist study of IR on the practice of IR, this essay contends that the practice of IR is also inherently political. Drawing back on the liberal feminist claims analysed in the previous section, it is clear that liberal feminism wrongfully assumes that in utilising a positivist framework to study the subordination of women objective knowledge is produced. However, the knowledge that is produced by the popular liberal feminist analysis of IR does have a significant influence on the practice of IR specifically for the way that equality is defined and achieved. If the liberal feminist methodology of studying gender oppression is by examining their rights under the law then liberal feminism is actively producing individualist knowledge (Baehr, 2013). The liberal understanding of individualism is best described by John Stuart Mill who stated that "over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign" (Mill, 1859:13). When this definition is applied to feminism it becomes clear that the goals of liberal feminism are that which emphasise the right of the individual such as, equality under the law, personal autonomy, freedom from discrimination from the state on the basis of gender and/or sex, etc. Thus, liberal feminism makes the assumption that the individual exists freely from its social condition. This liberal feminist understanding of the individual is rejected by poststructural feminism, as the poststructural feminist standpoint would argue that there is no such thing as the "fundamental or essential self, but instead, 'we speak ourselves into existence within the terms of available discourses' (Davies, 2000a, p. 55)" (Barrett, 2005:83). Thus, the poststructural feminist understanding of the relationship between the individual and discourse breaks down the liberal feminist notion of agency and autonomy, contending that the individual is a socially constructed phenomenon and every 'self' comes from and is defined by various discourses (Ibid:83). However, poststructural feminism does recognise some level of autonomy in recognising that the individual can control the discourses they are defined by and take up discourses that "disrupt hegemonic cultural narratives" in order to turn against the structures that produced them (Ibid:87). The opposing understanding of the significance of the individual between poststructural and liberal feminism highlights the political nature of knowledge produced by liberal feminism. Liberal feminism attempts to apply the Enlightenment concept of the "autonomous rational individual as a universal model of selfhood and starting point for political action" (Hooper, 2001). However, this concept disregards the fact that the female subject has been defined and constructed in an opposing manner to the male subject, thus the Enlightenment model is one that was constructed for a specific subject. Ultimately it is this disregard that not only defines the liberal feminist practice of achieving equality but the crux of the poststructural feminist critique on liberal feminism, as the liberal feminist commitment to the Enlightenment, manifests in a way that makes the practice blind to the politics of the very institutions it supposes will extend autonomy to deserving individuals. Therefore, in applying the poststructural feminist lens to the liberal feminist understanding of the individual, it becomes clear that liberal feminism has limited its practice to a constructed reality that overlooks the actual political needs of the female subject by wrongfully equating it to the male subject. The State Having investigated the effect of liberal feminist knowledge on the practice of liberal feminism within IR, via its political goals and conception of the individual, this essay now turns to the liberal feminist understanding of the state. Thus, this section argues that by applying the poststructural feminist lens it becomes clear that the liberal feminist understanding of the state is one that is riddled with political and gendered knowledge specifically through the role of the state as a 'protector'. As has been previously shown, the liberal feminist understanding of the state is that its role is to protect its citizens from coercive interference by protecting their rights both domestically and internationally from other states (Baehr, 2013). However, the liberal feminist understanding of the state as a 'protector' is a masculine understanding of international relations that applies gender binaries to the international stage in order to excuse non-cooperative behaviour. In her book, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, Judith Tickner analyses the feminist perspective on security arguing that the "security-seeking behaviour of states is described in gendered terms'' that ultimately impacts the practice of IR (1992:49). According to Tickner, states legitimise their security-seeking behaviour by appealing to "masculine hegemony", by which the state takes on the paternal role of 'protector' in order to justify violence (Ibid:49). Furthermore, Tickner highlights that in order to further legitimise security-seeking behaviour states utilise the ideology of the family in order to invoke a sense of community within the state so that there is a perception of national identity and community that needs protecting (Ibid:54). While Tickner takes on the broader feminist critique of popular understandings of security and the role of the state on the international stage, her critique is full of poststructural insights that highlight the cracks in the liberal feminist logic and the politics of its knowledge. Firstly, focusing on Tickner's claim that the state is described as a 'protector', many different things come to light. While liberal feminism is a feminist theory it differs from the majority of other feminist theories by critiquing who is involved in what processes rather than criticising the knowledge produced by popular IR theories. Therefore, liberal feminism follows the same popular logic that the state is a protector. The poststructural feminist understanding of binaries highlights that the protector/protected binary utilised when describing the state is a part of the larger masculine/feminine binary that plagues IR. This description of the state as a 'protector' not only feminises the domestic by describing it as incapable of self-preservation but delegitimises notions of peace by favouring the idea of 'protection' as it insinuates that peace is a naive ideal. Secondly, the process of a national identity drawing upon the ideology of family is one riddled with gender binaries that further delegitimises domestic politics. The state is both feminine and masculine. The home base for a state is the family/the feminine, whereas the state in IR is the action/the masculine. The separation of the state's public and private spheres into masculine and feminine descriptors highlights the power of language within discourses of IR as the liberal feminist description of the state, which it supposes to be neutral, is in fact not only gendered but actively devalues the feminine in order to maintain the current status quo of state behaviour. In all, by applying the poststructural feminist lens to the liberal feminist understanding of the state's role as a 'protector' the argument that knowledge production is always inherently political in the study and conduct of IR is further supported by uncovering the gendered nature of the liberal conception of the state. Conclusion In conclusion, while this essay recognises that poststructural feminism itself has no stance on the politics of knowledge production in the study and conduct of IR, poststructuralism still offers a valuable methodology by which political meaning can be uncovered. Thus, by utilising poststructuralism alongside feminism it becomes clear that the liberal feminist way of producing knowledge in the study and conduct within IR is inherently political as it is both based in and perpetuates a larger gender discourse within IR that has consequences. By adopting the poststructural feminist stance in order to critique liberal feminist notions of knowledge production, this essay analysed the foundations of liberalism and poststructuralism, the role of feminism with each theory respectively and then used the poststructural feminist lens in order to problematise the knowledge that liberal feminism has produced and legitimised on objectivity within IR and the consequences that knowledge has on the knowledge produced around concepts of the individual and the state. This investigation, in turn, revealed the underlying power dynamics within said structures and the way that gender within IR functions as a tool of not only oppression but legitimisation. Therefore, with this in mind, it remains the claim of this essay that the process of knowledge production is always inherently political in the conduct and study of IR

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR › Alt Ext

Without embracing vulnerability and a new way of thinking about the political, the postwar condition recreates nationalistic violence and hegemonic sovereign power

Väyrynen, Tarja. “Rethinking National Temporal Orders: the Subaltern Presence and Enactment of the Political.” Review of International Studies, vol. 42, no. 4, 2016, pp. 597–612., doi:10.1017/S0260210515000595. Accessed 7/22/22. //ONHS IF

Feminist IR has drawn attention to bodies such as Kaisu’s in the literature where the role of women’s corporeality in symbolising the nation and its honour is studied, particularly in times of violence and war.26 The abject figures of, for example, ‘comfort women’ who have been subjected to nationalistic violence and ‘female terrorists and torturers’ taking part themselves in violence and war have been also brought to the research agenda of feminist IR. 27 Recently, Christine Sylvester’s War as Experience: Contributions from International Relations and Feminist Analysis28 has opened up a new domain for the study of violence and war as a corporeal and a mundane phenomenon. She suggests that war should be studied as an institution whose actual mission is to injure the human body and destroy normal patterns of interaction. Due to the overtly abstract notion of war in IR starting with states, organisations, fundamentalists, security issues and weapons systems, ordinary people and their bodies are overwhelmingly absent in IR and its studies of violence and war, and consequently of postwar peace too.29 Sylvester’s view resonates with Julia Kristeva’s quest for research that seeks concrete instances of ‘women’s time’. This type of research emerges from lived experiences and, thereby, can reveal alternative temporalities not heard in mass media or politics.30 Kaisu is certainly an ordinary person and yet she does more than could be expected from the ‘ordinary’: her performance and temporality disrupt and destabilise, and as such, stand as guarantee for the reconfiguring of the space of the political. Kaisu’s speech act as such does not constitute the political contestation. Rather, the contestation comes forth through an ensemble of performance at a moment when there is an ‘opening’ in the national historiography.31 In short, she exemplifies Sylvester’s point on the importance and unexpectedness of the mundane and corporeal in relation to war and to postwar national identity politics as well as Kristeva’s notion of alternative temporalities that rupture linear ‘normal’ time. To understand the ways Kaisu has symbolically functioned as an abject who has not been ‘taken into account’ 32 and how her narrative brings an anxiety to the core of the imagined unitary postwar Finnish nation, this article derives from the psychoanalytically oriented IR that examines the nexus between war and collective identity, memory, and history.33 In this vein of thought, war and violence are seen to be a constitutive and, at the same time, traumatic event in the nation’s existence as it reveals the instability of the sovereign subject that was thought to provide security. Jenny Edkins argues that sovereign power cannot provide full security for its members. Instead, it sends individuals to their deaths in the name of the survival of the collective self. It is in this sense, that war and violence constitute a trauma in the nation’s existence: they reveal the unstable nature of sovereign power as a security provider. 34 The postwar moment that follows the war and violence is a potential moment of social disintegration, in which the cohesive power of the ideology that has created the nation’s identity as the primary security provider loses its efficiency. In Jenny Edkin’s words, this is ‘trauma time’ when nothing is certain and no decision is assured.35 In a similar vein, Peter Burgess summarises the characteristics of the national subject during this moment by arguing that ‘the subject is, … unstable, exposed, threatened and at risk’. 36 Hence, a new master narrative is needed to stabilise the identity of the sovereign power and to make the war and the collective trauma readable for the national subjects. Postwar memory work is of primary importance when the mastery of the postwar anxiety is created and its collective effects are controlled. Since the nation’s identity is rendered extremely truncated, impossible, mutilated, and antagonistic during the war, collective memory work, and particularly history writing, functions as a tool to cement a closure. National history works to secure for a contingent nation the false unity of the national subject evolving through time. According to Prasenjit Duara, ‘the subject of History is a metaphysical unity devised to address the aporias in the experience of linear time’. 37 Furthermore, as a number of scholars have pointed out, the way in which wars are remembered and war history written is fundamental to the production and reproduction of postwar sovereign political power.38 By 2010, when Kaisu told her story, the Finnish nation had largely sedimented a master narrative of its post-Second World War national history and location in world politics.39 By coincidence, in the same year postwar ‘abject history’ got some official recognition when the Prime Minister’s Office and the National Archives of Finland commissioned a study on the children of foreign soldiers in Finland. It was the first officially initiated attempt to deal with the question of children fathered by foreign soldiers, and consequently the relations between Finnish women and foreign armies. However, Kaisu’s public appearance carried more historical weight than the officially commissioned report40 that was published a year later as her performance exposed her as a living container of residual historical material whose subaltern past made visible the disjuncture with the present view of the national self.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR › Alt Ext

A feminist security theory is a needed disruption to the status quo. Only after we center feminist action and embrace vulnerability can we unearth and expunge power disparities and the violence of realism.

Talley Diggs, 6-15-22, Women, the State, and War: Considering Feminist Navigation of Security — THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, https://www.iar-gwu.org/print-archive/7wok9nnd579m390qfsflq5x3x7p3c7, Accessed: 7-22-2022, //ONHS IF [edited for ableist language]

This paper argues for the utility of a feminist security theory (FST) that is developed from the intersection of feminism and the transnational security agenda. Theoretical lacunae exist in the security field because feminist theory is often granted only peripheral prioritization or no priority at all. FST is necessitated by the IR community’s anemic subpar effort to appropriate academic space to the nexus of security and feminism. These gaps in policy and discourse have begun to shrink, because “FST has subverted, expanded, and enriched notions of security” by questioning “the supposed nonexistence and irrelevance of women in international security politics,” as well as “the extent to which women are secured by state ‘protection’ in times of war and peace.”15 Within the nexus of feminist theory and a transnational security agenda, the dichotomy between traditional state security and newer notions of human security creates an evident aperture in feminist rhetoric and practiced security policy. Heidi Hudson describes her feminist perspective of the politics of security, stating: Today, more than ever, human security coexists uneasily with security. Since the analytical potential of feminist epistemology cannot be divorced from its political and transformative value, a critical feminist perspective on the study of security, and especially human security, is crucial to overcome certain gender silences. Feminist critiques of so-called natural or depoliticized gender dichotomies within state-centric discourse delegitimize discriminatory practices and institutions as socio-historical constructions and ‘repoliticize’ orthodox views of security by challenging the role of the state as provider of security. Gender is intrinsic to the subject matter and politics of security.16 A critical gender lens is imperative in identifying the power disparities that threaten women’s peace and security, which may otherwise go undetected or unchallenged by mainstream IR analysis. In the absence of feminist deconstruction, the gendered natures of war, peace, and security may not be exposed and recognized as products of the inherently gendered societies within which they occur. Without exposing this cycle, peace and security are compromised for all. Blanchard identifies “the functions of feminist scholarship in any disciplinary intervention—the critique of existing theory, the reconceptualization of core concepts, and the expansion of empirical knowledge.”17 It is not until realism’s assumptions about security are countered by feminism’s inclination to question the root of all assumptions that the biases inhibiting inclusive security can be identified and expunged. A disjunction in discourse and policy has emerged as a result of the incongruity between mainstream IR approaches to state security and feminist approaches to human security. I argue that advocacy efforts for human security, such as the security of women in war, are annulled and objectives are misrepresented when conducted in political institutions grounded in state security. This is due to the differences in how insecurities are perceived by proponents of human security and by bodies that are mandated to protect state security and interests. The utility of a security theory that employs a feminist lens rests in its keen dismissal of the status quo. The essence of realism— focusing on “what is” and not “what should be”—implies a dedication to status quo maintenance. Realists accept the international structures in existence under the assumption that what exists is unequivocally normative. Security, as it is interpreted by IR policymakers, suggests the necessary return to the status quo following a deviation from the norm. That which is deemed “insecure” is classified as such by its perceived abnormality—and thus its threat to the status quo. Therefore, the “task of feminist analysis—rendering the familiar strange, in this case by problematizing the naturalness of ‘security’” instigates scrutiny of classifications of security and insecurity.18 If states protect women during war from insecurity (identified as abnormal harms), what does that imply about states’ recognition of the daily harms occurring in times of peace that have been normalized within the contexts of a patriarchal society? I have illustrated the backdrop of realism and security studies to contextualize the framework within which feminist theory strives to broaden traditional security discourse. Through an array of reviewed literature, I have contextualized two theories to war, peace, and security: the mainstream realist approach focused on state security and the peripheral feminist approach interested in human security. By challenging the assumptions of realism, feminists problematize the status quo and question patriarchal structures to demand “where are the women?” Some scholars have argued for the necessary merger of the two theories into a feminist security theory to effectively address and combat the insecurities threatening peace and propagating conflict. Rethinking security with a feminist lens creates new analytical tools to assess existing policies in determining who is intended to receive protection from state-sanctioned security measures? Furthermore, from which insecurities are they protected?

2022 Michigan Kritik
Fem IR › AT Not Intersectional

The K’s new view of the world through vulnerability creates a new language to view IR- that’s key to disrupting problematic narratives surrounding the western view of non-white, non-western women.

Underwood, Jasmine, "Feminist International Relations and “Epistemic Blank Spots”: Entrenching Hegemony?" (2016). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 1679. //ONHS IF

How do these themes/categories and tools of inquiry work together to depict the images of marginalized women and women in the developing world? Putting these together with the seven building tasks,7 we can gather how feminist International Relations literature has constructed and deconstructed the idea of the “third world women” and disrupted stereotypes and preconceived images of women around the world. The basic task of dismantling and decentering the current theoretical paradigms of mainstream IR by challenging its “western” origins served as the foundation to call into question the supposed objectivity of knowledge developed within the boundaries of this discipline (Sign Systems, and Knowledge). This ultimately leads to deconstruction of the masculinities, and consequently, the femininities derived from mainstream IR, which challenges the universalism of its principles. These principles are the basis under which knowledge is disseminated within the field and they dominate the ways in which we think about the world. Thus, to deconstruct and challenge these principles then “problematizes” all of the concepts and practices derived from them. When considering how feminist IR challenged and problematized development, this served as the basis for the building tasks of practices and politics. While international relations and the international system advocate for development as benevolent, in practice, this concept has been enacted (at times) with various self-interested outcomes by those in positions of power. Tickner pointedly referred to development as a “western project” and other theorists critiqued the western frame of development models and practices. Furthermore, if one thinks about the politics of development, this concept is complexly used to withhold social goods such as foreign aid or development assistance. The buildings tasks of relationships, identities, and connections are closely intertwined and dependent upon each other, especially in feminist IR. The literature also challenged, developed, and weaved together the various aspects of identity of women around the world. Challenging the views of women in the developing world also involved challenging how women in the developed world view their own status and position. Take, for example, the concepts of complicity and insider/outsider identities. The feminist IR literature strongly asserted that through actions such as underpaid household labor or unfair labor practices used to produce globally-shipped goods (e.g. buying items produced in sweatshops) women have participated in aspects of patriarchy that disadvantage others. Another example is “femocrats” or women in power who condone—or even advocate—certain policies that are steeped in hegemonic masculinity, such as war. These are women that have upheld certain aspects of patriarchy because it is beneficial to maintaining their own power. Thus, it forces women in the developed world to think about their relationship and connection to their counterparts in developing countries, particularly in ways that do not create them as abstract figures. If these women are oppressed, if they are “third world”; if they are disadvantaged, then, those in the “first world” are not disconnected from their position. This oppression did not—and does not—happen by coincidence. Women in the First World/developed countries/Global North bear some responsibility, whether implicitly or explicitly, in maintaining the disadvantaged social status of those outside the west. Furthermore, an interesting aspect of this analysis of feminist IR literature was not in how these pieces talked about women in developing countries or the “Third World,” but in how these women weren’t spoken about. Not in terms of making them invisible, but in not attempting to describe them; not attempting to speak for them, but straying away from one-dimensional or homogenized views of their lives. It seemed that the goal was simply to “trouble” the existing images and ways in which we think about these women and their lives. The task was not necessarily to describe, but instead, to deconstruct. Perhaps, this was a method to counter existing, problematic narratives, but without co-opting the stories of marginalized women for scholarly purposes. The previously identified themes and categories will be carried forward to the second part of the discourse analysis on policy literature. The purpose of the next chapter is to see if any of these objects in feminist IR literature have influenced and/or appear in the discourse of international women’s development policy. Summary When looking at the overall discourse of feminist IR literature, the not only stresses the idea of adding women to IR, but which women are added and whose voices are heard. This is disruptive to the discipline because of its agendered assumptions. The texts repeatedly and purposefully situate gender and international relations within a western context, to serve as a reminder that the international system has a specific sociocultural frame. This creates situated identities within this frame that may have been imposed upon individuals, particularly women in the “Third World”/ “Developing” world/ “Global South.” By giving examples of women’s agency, particularly in reference to women’s movements and civil society, it serves to uncover and build an image of these women separate from “western” created concepts. Often, images of marginalized individuals are depicted in relation to those in power, highlighting the (hierarchical) differences. Telling a plurality of stories decenters the singular frame in which one can see the world. Despite these attempts at disruption, the use of dichotomies shows the power of language and that one can only exist so far “outside the system” (even when aware of its pitfalls). This “discursive slippage” is a result of unconscious, habitual, and inherited language (Hooper, 2001; Runyan & Peterson, 2010). The continued use of western-imposed, hierarchical dichotomies means that uncovering new ways to view international relations requires new language to speak about international relations. Otherwise, feminist IR will disrupt discourse in one context, while entrenching it in another.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap K › Links › Alt Solves AI (communism)

Communism stops AI from controlling the economy

Feng Xiang 18, professor at Tsinghua University, one of China’s most prominent legal scholars, spoke at the Berggruen Institute’s China Center workshop on artificial intelligence in March in Beijing, 5/2/2018, “AI Will Spell the End of Capitalism,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/05/03/end-of-capitalism/, PB

beijing—The most momentous challenge facing socio-economic systems today is the arrival of artificial intelligence. If AI remains under the control of market forces, it will inexorably result in a super-rich oligopoly of data billionaires who reap the wealth created by robots that displace human labor, leaving massive unemployment in their wake.

But China’s socialist market economy could provide a solution to this. If AI rationally allocates resources through big data analysis, and if robust feedback loops can supplant the imperfections of “the invisible hand” while fairly sharing the vast wealth it creates, a planned economy that actually works could at last be achievable.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Cap K › Links › Link – Space Assets

Space Assets are Capitalist.

Fabio Tronchetti, 8-1-2018, "The Trump administration and outer space: promoting US leadership or heading towards isolation?," Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2018.1505827 /GBN KK

As said above, the Trump Administration is promoting a sort of ‘space capitalism’. In fairness, the notion of ‘space capitalism’ was introduced under the Obama administration and found its first visible manifestation in the adoption of the of 2015. The Act contains a section dedicated to the regulation of space mining activities that aims at promoting the emerging US space mining industry through governmental support and the protection of rights, including the recognition of property rights over the extracted space resources under US law (Title IV). The Trump administration has endorsed the notion of ‘space capitalism’ and has openly voiced its support to US legislative proposals that incorporate it. In this respect, a draft bill entitled the American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act assumes particular relevance. The Act, which has been adopted by the House of Representatives on 24 April 2018, and is currently under consideration in the Senate, promotes the deregulation and the easement of licensing procedures of the previously unregulated ‘on-orbit’ space activities, including on-orbit refueling, space resources utilisation, etc., as well as commercial remote sensing systems. Accordingly, the Act attributes to the Secretary of Commerce, operating through the Office of Space Commerce, competence to authorize these activities. In doing so, the Space Free Commerce Act disregards the recommendation made under the Obama Administration to confer to the FAA regulatory competence over new on-orbit activities and takes away from NOAA the competence to regulate private remote sensing activities.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › AT Economy/Security Link

GOP always wins the messaging debate on economy and security.

Gallup 21(Gallup, Inc., 10-6-2021, Gallup, Inc. is an American analytics and advisory company based in Washington, D.C. Founded by George Gallup in 1935, the company became known for its public opinion polls conducted worldwide. Starting in the 1980s, Gallup transitioned its business to focus on providing analytics and management consulting to organizations globally. ,GOP Now Viewed as Better Party for Security, Prosperity, Gallup, ,) Jkap

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Americans by significant margins now view the Republican Party as better than the Democratic Party at protecting the nation from international threats (54% to 39%, respectively) and at ensuring the nation remains prosperous (50% to 41%). The 15-percentage-point GOP advantage on security matters is its largest since 2015, while its nine-point edge on prosperity is its largest since 2014. Last year, the GOP had a narrow advantage on international matters while the parties were essentially tied on economic matters. More of this change has come from declines in Americans perceiving the Democratic Party as better on these issues than from increases for the Republican Party. Meanwhile, the public is narrowly divided (41% Republican Party, 38% Democratic Party) as to which party can better handle whichever issue it deems the most important facing the country. Americans most commonly name the coronavirus pandemic or the government itself as the most important problem. The latest results are from Gallup's annual Governance survey, conducted Sept. 1-17. The survey was conducted just after the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and amid heightened numbers of coronavirus infections and a weaker-than-expected U.S. employment report. Protection From International Threats The 39% of Americans saying the Democratic Party will do a better job in the next few years of protecting the U.S. from terrorism and other international threats is down significantly from 46% last year. At the same time, there has been a smaller increase in the percentage of U.S. adults perceiving the Republican Party as better in this area, from 50% to 54%. Line graph. Americans' perceptions of which political party can better protect the United States from international terrorism and other military threats. In 2021, 54% say the Republican Party is better and 39% say the Democratic Party is. The Republican Party has led most years except 2007 and 2012. Its advantages had typically been in the single digits from 2016 through 2020 before expanding this year to 15 points. Americans typically see the Republican Party as more capable on national security matters, but the 15-point gap in favor of the GOP this year is the largest since a 16-point advantage in 2015. The party had an even larger 23-point gap in 2014, a time when the Obama administration was struggling to deal with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and renewed Middle East violence (IMPORTANR), among other issues. Keeping the U.S. Prosperous As is the case on international matters, there has been a seven-point drop in the percentage of Americans who say the Democratic Party is better able to keep the U.S. prosperous, from 48% to 41%. Now, 50% say the Republican Party is better, compared with 47% in 2020. Republicans have had at least a small advantage on this for most of the past decade, with the current nine-point lead tying 2011 and 2014 as the largest for the GOP during this period. The only years since 2010 that Republicans have not led are 2012 and 2020, the two years in which Democratic candidates were elected president. The last time that at least half of U.S. adults said the Republicans were better at keeping the country prosperous was in 1989, although there have been several measures of 48% or 49% since then. Line graph. Americans' perceptions of which political party would be better able to keep the United States prosperous. In 2021, 50% say the Republican Party would be better and 41% say the Democratic Party would be. The Republican Party has led most years since 2010 except 2012 and 2018. From 1992 through 2009, the Democratic Party typically led. Republicans led between 1988 and 1991. From 1992 through 2009, Americans typically said the Democratic Party was better at keeping the country prosperous, including advantages ranging between 11 and 20 points the last four years of that period. Those latter years spanned the housing market crash, the financial crisis and the Great Recession, which began while Republican George W. Bush was president. Handling the 'Most Important Problem' By 41% to 38%, U.S. adults say the Republican Party rather than the Democratic Party can better handle whichever problem they name (in an open-ended question format) as the most important facing the country. Last year, 47% said the Democratic Party and 39% said the Republican Party could better address the most important problem, when the coronavirus pandemic, the government and race relations were most commonly named as that issue. This year, again, the coronavirus pandemic and government rank as the top two problems. In both 2020 and now, those identifying the coronavirus as the most important problem widely say the Democratic Party can better handle it, including a 57% to 28% Democratic edge this year. By contrast, those naming the government as the top problem are much more inclined to say the Republican Party can better handle it (60% to 19%), whereas last year, when President Donald Trump was in office, more said the Democratic Party could (51% to 44%). To a large degree, this shift reflects wide party differences this year in perceptions that the government is the most important problem, with 31% of Republicans but only 9% of Democrats naming it. Last year, 29% of both Democrats and Republicans said the government was the most important problem. Historically, Democrats have more often had an edge in terms of being perceived as better able to handle whichever problem Americans think is most important. However, opinions have mostly been closely divided. The largest advantage for either party came in 2006 and 2007, when Democrats held leads of 17 and 15 points, respectively, at a time when Americans considered the war in Iraq to be the top problem. Line graph. Americans' perceptions of which political party can better handle whichever problem they think is the most important facing the country. Forty-one percent say the Republican Party can better handle that problem, while 38% say the Democratic Party can and 20% do not see either party as better. Democrats have usually led on this though the advantages have been small in most years. Independents Primarily Behind Expanded GOP Advantages As might be expected, Republicans and Democrats overwhelmingly view their preferred party as better able to handle the most important problem, to keep the country safe from international threats and to keep the country prosperous. Thus, when perceptions of which party is better able to handle these issues change, as occurred this year, independents are usually behind those shifts. Since last year, there have been double-digit declines in the percentages of independents who say the Democratic Party is better at handling the most important problem (from 42% to 31%), at keeping the nation secure (from 43% to 31%) and at keeping the nation prosperous (from 47% to 35%). Republicans' gains on these same issues have been smaller, as some independents have shifted to saying neither party is better able to handle these issues. There has been an eight-point increase among independents in saying the Republican Party is better at keeping the country prosperous (from 43% to 51%), a five-point increase for keeping the nation secure (from 48% to 53%) and a nonsignificant two-point change on the most important problem (from 29% to 31%). Bottom Line Americans now generally see the Republican Party as better than the Democratic Party at handling two key government objectives -- protecting citizens from international threats and promoting a strong economy. Despite these issue advantages, the Democratic Party still maintains a slight edge in overall favorability, as it has for nearly all of the past decade even as the GOP has typically led on these issue measures. These results, therefore, suggest the Republican Party has not been able to translate its competence edge on key issues to a more positive image of the party overall. While advantages in party favorability and perceived issue competence are desirable heading into next year's midterm elections, it is not clear that either will be necessary to achieve success. In the last three midterm elections, neither party had a significant edge in favorability, but Democrats had a strong showing in 2018 and the Republicans did in 2010 and 2014. And while Republicans had advantages in perceived handling of national security and the economy in 2010 and 2014, they also did in 2018. Most often, performance in midterm elections hinges on the popularity of the incumbent president at the time of the election. With Joe Biden in office and his approval rating slumping, unless it improves substantially over the next year, Republicans would likely gain seats in Congress in next year's elections, and control of one or both chambers of Congress.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Midterms › AT Economy/Security Link

Economy and security are a one-way street. Republicans are always seen more favorably on these issues.

Hubbard 21 Kaia Hubbard 10-6-21, “GOP is Better at Handling Security and Prosperity, Poll Says,” US News, https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-10-06/gop-is-better-at-handling-security-and-prosperity-poll-says//mt

By significant margins, Americans now view the Republican Party as better than the Democratic Party on two key issues: protecting the nation from international threats and ensuring the nation's economic prosperity, a new poll found. More than half of Americans, 54%, believe that the GOP will do a better job than the Democratic Party at protecting the nation from international terrorism and military threats in the next few years, according to a Gallup released Wednesday, while just 39% believe the Democratic Party is better suited to do so. About 50% of Americans likewise believe that the Republican Party will do a better job at keeping the country prosperous, while 41% believe the same about Democrats. The two GOP advantages mark the largest gaps in more than five years. The survey, conducted between Sept. 1-17, comes after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which Americans generally supported in theory, but not in the "chaotic and deadly way in which it was executed," an earlier notes. The polling also came amid a weaker than expected employment , and surging coronavirus infections. But when it comes to what Americans deem to be the most important problem facing the country, most commonly the coronavirus and the handling of the government itself, Americans are nearly split on which party can better handle the issues, with 41% believing the Republican Party can do so, and 38% the Democratic Party. However, those who listed the coronavirus as the top issue facing the country widely say the Democratic Party is more equipped to handle it, while those who said the government is the top issue are more inclined to believe the Republican Party is better suited to handle the situation.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Baudrillard › Epistemology key – AT IR K

The only way to truly access political thought is to relearn the epistemology of the state and state building – the post structuralist approach of the K is key to relearning International Relations

HEHIR, AIDAN. “Hyper-Reality and Statebuilding: Baudrillard and the Unwillingness of International Administrations to Cede Control.” Third World Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 6, 2011, pp. 1073–87. JSTOR, . //ONHS IF

The post-structuralist approach, in so far as a coherent approach exists, sees the discipline of IR as part of a wider movement in social thought, emphasises the necessity of an interdisciplinary methodology, and seeks to 'unsettle established categories and disconcert the reader'.4 The theory derives much of its inspiration from Michel Foucault, who argued that power and knowledge are intimately linked, with one implying the other. Using the example of the prison system, Foucault suggested that a generic set of assumptions, derived from particular societal power relations, can be identified as underpinning all aspects of society.5 A dominant discourse or a 'regime of truth' is held to impose critical limits upon our ability to think politically about particular problems faced.6 Post-structuralist analyses, therefore, interrogate discourse on a particular theme to highlight the inherent assumptions which perpetuate a particular dominant belief.7 The manner in which the discourse of intervention and statebuilding is framed involves a strategy whereby 'the need to do something [is presented] as evident'.8 popular portrayal of intra-state crises and domestic political disorder lacks political analysis and facilitates the idea that the solution can only be found in externally co-ordinated administrative, as opposed to political, action. The discourse presupposes a distinction between 'we' and 'they' which narrows the The debate to a focus on 'whether and how "we" should help "them"'.9 The assumption - inherent in the discourse on intervention and statebuilding - that external involvement occurs only after a disaster has erupted is considered to be false given the often casual relationship between external actors and internal collapse.10 The discourse of intervention and statebuilding reproduces power asymmetries; the West is portrayed as the powerful saviour while the 'other' is cast as the needy victim inhabiting a chaotic distant world." The appropriation of 'the good life' and the conflation of human rights and Western value, it is claimed, has facilitated the image of a barbarous hinterland and a civilised core and resulted in human rights becoming a means by which the legitimacy of the present order has in fact been bolster the liberal notion of spreading the good life is in fact a means b 'other' is further mystified and the homeland is venerated. The pr international administrators is inspired more by the sense of purp worth it inspires in them than by the actual good it does for the 'vi discourse serves to reassure the core that there is a differentiated locate this other 'somewhere else, outside'.14 This binary vision is apparent in the rhetoric surrounding th threat posed by 'failed states'. The 2002 National Security Stra United States famously suggested that the US was threatened more than by aggressive states and this heralded the emergence of emphasis on the ostensibly causal link between intra-state colla proliferation of various forms of criminality, instability and, i global terrorism. The Commission on Weak States and US Nation provides an indicative statement of this hypothesis: Weak and failed governments generate instability, which harms the drags down their neighbors and ultimately threatens US interests in effective international system, providing the foundation for continuity, and, not least, protecting Americans from external threats to ou According to this perspective the threat menacing Western soc from sub-state groups that thrive on the conditions endemic in fa The 2005 National Intelligence Strategy of the United States des states as 'breeding grounds of international instability, violence, an In the fight against failed states democracy has been regularly bedrock of stability and key to security; the USA's 2005 National In Strategy describes democracy as, 'the stoutest pillar of support' security and notes, 'the lack of freedom in one state endangers the freedom of others . . . failed states are a refuge and breeding extremism'.17 Democracy is seen as a panacea and a key weapon against terrorism the spread of which - from the core to the per axiomatically good for all.18 What constitutes a 'failed state', however, is open to interpretation of the manifestation of failure a broad divergence is evident to whether the failure manifests as coercive or administrative in terms of the former, Robert Jackson believes a state to be failed i or will not safeguard minimum civil conditions, ie, peace, order, se domestically. [Failed states are] hollow juridical shells that anarchical condition domestically.'19 Another characteristic, however, deemed to be indicative of state where the state fails to meet the needs of the population and 'capacity gap'.20 The definition provided by Foreign Policy and Peace describes as 'failed' those states that 'lack the authoritative collective decisions or the capacity to deliver public service countries, the populace may rely entirely on the black market taxes, or engage in large-scale civil disobedience. The term 'failed state' thus refers to states manifesting two coercive incapacity and administrative incapacity. This diversity states necessarily undermines broad extrapolations derived from t posed by 'failed states' and generic threats emanating from 'fair Additionally, there is very little evidence to support the claims states breed terrorism or are a major threat to international stability.22 Indeed, Justin Logan and Christopher Preble speculate the claims that failed states are inherently threatening seem so d one wonders whether the arguments may not simply be a v generating support for foreign interventions'.23 When used in the global insecurity, therefore, the term is less an objective assess state's domestic condition and more a rhetorical term employs a subjective manner to aid the conceptualisation of a world divided group of progressive states and a periphery comprising failed sta As a term, therefore, 'failed states' lacks real descriptive merit myriad manifestations of failure. This is not to suggest that there is thing as failed states but rather that the range of states which poten into this category is so great that it is not possible to formulat towards this amorphous group. Yet, as is evident, policy produced in the past 10 years have regularly warned of the me by 'failed states' as though there was a generic manifestation. The term appears, therefore, to conform more to a desire to sim complexities of the world into a bifurcated vision of 'good' and 'f 'Failed state' is thus largely a pejorative term used to reaffirm a the core, first, that existing dangers emanate from the periphery an that the periphery is qualitatively differ from the core. Creating a world from where all ills emanate - especially terrorism - enables the shift of blame from itself to the failed states. Self-identification involves the creation of an 'other' against which one can contrast oneself; 'failed states' have served as this referential point.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Baudrillard › Link – US influence/imperialism

An expanded US influence expands the US’ nation brand – the K is key to explore the impacts of relationships that arrive as a result of the transition of governance into the simulacra.

Kaneva, Nadia. “Simulation Nations: Nation Brands and Baudrillard’s Theory of Media.” European Journal of Cultural Studies, vol. 21, no. 5, London, England: SAGE Publications, pp. 631–48, doi:10.1177/1367549417751149. 2018 Accessed 7/20/22 //ONHS CF

I have argued that Baudrillard’s assault on the real, as he theorizes media-saturated consumer societies, contains a radical potential for the analysis of nation brands. His notion of hyperreality points to the erasure of distinctions between the nation and its simulations. As the signs of nation brands circulate through media networks, they encounter other media signs, all of which intertwine in the play of appearances and seek to seduce media audiences. At the same time, what differentiates promotional simulacra, including nation brands, from other media signs is the overtly programmatic, strategic nature of promotional messages which, by definition, aim to alter perceptions. In that sense, nation brands have become integral to what Baudrillard calls ‘strategies of the real’ in contemporary media cultures. This is the Janus-faced nature of nation brands as simulacra – they claim to simultaneously reflect and alter the reality of the nation. Baudrillard’s theory of hyperreality offers one way to explain how this seemingly impossible feat is made to look real. Furthermore, Baudrillard (2001) describes a ‘precession of simulacra’, whereby non-referential models are used to manufacture simulations that stand in for the real. Based on this argument, the ‘core idea’ of a nation-branding campaign – derived through an obligatory distillation process (Aronczyk, 2013) – serves as the model that precedes the simulation nation that is conjured up through media. This process was clearly at play in Kosovo’s branding, in Ruslana’s Eurovision act and in numerous other nation-branding exercises. Among other things, this means that the simulation nation is not bound by historical fact, although simulacra of history and antiquity abound in its media manifestations. Rather, the simulation nation is created de novo each time it appears in the flickering lights of media screens only to disappear once again as the lights go out. But if there is no way to tell apart the real from the simulated, what can be the basis of critical inquiry into the workings of nation brands and media? How can research peer through the play of appearances and what could be its task? In my view, Baudrillard’s theoretical excursions are of limited help as we tackle these questions because they have little to say about the material aspects of media industries or institutions. Although his critical project starts as a revision of Marx’s critique of political economy, his later work abandons a focus on materiality and focuses instead on ‘the image form’ that emanates from the media, that is, the simulacrum (Merrin, 2005: 155). However, more than simulacra machines, the media exist as material networks of circulation, as technological systems, as profit-driven industries and as professional and cultural institutions, governed by economic, political and technological logics. That is where critical inquiry can continue to intervene and for that we need to look beyond Baudrillard. One source of inspiration can come from Marxist critiques of commercial brands as technologies for the creation of capital (e.g. Arvidsson, 2005). Drawing on Baudrillard, global media brands such as Apple, Google and Facebook can be seen as pure simulacra. Yet, beyond their hyperreal properties, these brands have also generated tremendous amounts of capital, expropriating human desires for sociality. What, if anything, is different about nation brands in comparison to commercial brands? What kinds of profits do they generate, in what ways and to whom do these profits accrue? Andrew Wernick’s conceptualization of the commodity-sign as an object with a dual purpose can be particularly helpful as we seek to move beyond Baudrillard but to retain the value of his critique. Following Wernick, nation brands are revealed to be more than clusters of promotional signs but also ‘objects-to-be-sold’, that is, they are units of media content that are created to generate profit within a system of market exchange. Although they are typically produced with public funds, nation brands as commodity-signs generate profits primarily for private media companies and for promotional outfits (Kaneva, 2015). The justifications for and consequences of this transference of wealth need further analysis. Furthermore, the logic of commodity-signs is not limited to promotional messages but applies to other media content as well. This is illustrated by the fact that some transnational media corporations today have special sales and production teams who approach national governments with ‘package’ offers that include country-specific news content paired with promotional videos, both of which are created by the media organization (Bolin and Ståhlberg, 2015). Media practices that blur the lines between editorial and promotional content have been examined in relation to consumer brands (e.g. Einstein, 2016). However, the impact of such trends on politics and governance needs further exploration. One example of possible implications can be seen in the recent proliferation of ‘fake news’ – fabricated content, the whose main goal of which is to generate maximum attention and, therefore, maximum profit. Despite its ‘unreality’, such content has been linked to shifts in political opinions and decisions, but the scope of this influence is still poorly understood. A related line of research would entail mapping the ways in which commodity-signs enter and move through the circulatory streams of global media networks. Some interesting work on this topic already exists (e.g. Valaskivi and Sumiala, 2014), but much remains to be done. A focus on circulation needs to acknowledge that promotion transcends the boundaries of ‘campaigns’ and infiltrates all forms of media that are not identifiable as ‘advertising’ (e.g. Aronczyk and Powers, 2010; Wernick, 1991). Exposing the industrial and technological protocols of media corporations would shed new light on the ways in which capital is enmeshed in the processes of assembling or dispersing national and transnational publics. These processes have important consequences for political mobilization, for the symbolic production of nationhood and for the construction of shared social realities more broadly. The lines of inquiry I have outlined above are far from exhaustive and are limited by their particular focus on media. The materiality of nationhood – how it is experienced by individuals on a daily basis, how it is enacted in institutional and policy contexts and how it intersects with simulations of the nation – is worthy of its own exploration, but that is a task for another study. At the conclusion of this theoretical exploration, we should be wary of making totalizing claims about the triumph of hyperreality. Nevertheless, we should retain at least one insight from Baudrillard, namely, that simulation functions ‘not only as a mode of communication but also as a mode of social control’ (Merrin, 2005: 24). Despite his self-professed nihilism, Baudrillard never abandoned the goals of social critique and transformation and therein lies the main value of his work.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Baudrillard › Link – A5/transparency

Clarifying article 5 reaffirms the newfound project of hegemonic visibility – that reifies operational warfare. 2 impacts – (i): a new form of control through warfare, and (ii): manufacturing the deaths and violence the aff seeks to prevent.

Dan Öberg (2016) War, transparency and control: the military architecture of operational warfare, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29:3, 1132-1149, //ONHS IF

In this article I have argued for the need to examine the way warfare exerts control through discourses of transparency. In so doing I draw upon the insistence that we live in an era of ‘hegemonic visibility’ (Baudrillard 2014, 11) in which global wars are fought to extend a ‘matchless transparency’ (Virilio 2000b, 23) to the world. To analyse this, I have investigated military doctrines so as to illustrate how they render a mental and visual space and time of warfare visible through operational coding. I argue that this logic creates a military architecture characterized by an excess of Kafkaesque bureaucratic and organizational procedures in which warfare becomes a derivate of planning and modelling. At the end point of this logic we find a Weltanschauung characterized by US military operations conducted in ‘an operational environment that is ever expanding’ (AFDD 2007b, 1) where future threats are preemptively erased in real time. Such “transparent warfare” is closely connected to the “liberal way of war” as it helps to manage and mobilize visual regimes employed in and through warfare. One important point outlined in this article is the way the military architecture relies on an operational violence which cuts through political space and time and invests it as calculable, decipherable and foreseeable. The “hegemonic visibility” that Baudrillard has drawn our attention to is therefore an inherent part of the way the military architecture renders itself, the global battlefield and future political subjectivity transparent, and in doing so it helps to affirm a liberal way of life. Dillon and Reid have convincingly argued that the centre of gravity of the liberal way of war is the future itself (2009, 148). But while Dillon and Reid claim such policing centres around biopolitical stakes (particularly the discrimination of which life is worth living and which isn’t), I would argue that liberal control is also waged through the way it renders the future image of global time and space visible through operational coding. Henceforth, the targeting and erasure of future political subjectivity through hegemonic visibility play an important part in the way global liberal governance functions. Arguably, the most important impact of this technique is the way operational violence indicates a type of governing which aims to reduce space/time to a derivate of global warfare and cut it from its political potential. The form and the content of the military architecture—its excess of information coupled with the urgency to render the world transparent and control it—come together as an attempt to conduct a violent futurology which attempts to exhaust and govern the present. We are now in a position to better respond to the conundrum in the introduction of this article—that both the proponents of and those who challenge warfare invoke the need for increased transparency of the battlefield. Those who wish to see and construct the future battlefield rely on the details of its imagery in order to kill. Likewise, those who want to prevent or illustrate the unlawful nature of such attacks rely on virtual reproduction in order to know and prove that the attacks took place. However, if our contemporary world is understood to be enmeshed in an ideology of excessive visibility, the commonsensical answer “more transparency” becomes part of the problem rather than a solution. If seen accordingly, better visibility does not change the fact that control is exerted through the production of a constant demand for transparency that in turn masks the way the military architecture is founded on and enacts control through this very demand. As Chamayou has illustrated by quoting interviews with mutilated victims from drone attacks: When you ask Sadaullah, or Karim, or S. Hussein and others like them what they want, they do not say ‘transparency and accountability’. They say they want the killing to stop. They want to stop dying. They want to stop going to funerals—and being bombed even as they mourn. Transparency and accountability, for them, are abstract problems that have little to do with the concrete fact of regular, systematic death. (Chamayou 2015b, 149) Chamayou is no doubt correct in that more transparency is of little help to the victims of drone violence. However, as I have tried to illustrate in this article, it is not only the actual killings on the global battlefield but the way an ideology of transparency underlies the military supporting system which unveils warfare as a modelling and operationalization of administrative routines which manufacture such killings. If one is to challenge the way drones kill, one needs to understand the supporting system which creates a demand for the killing mechanisms. Every military “telecommuting office worker/hunter” is refracted in relation to an architecture that provides and manufactures an excess of visibility, invisible limits, illusions of choice, erasures and blind spots. This architecture creates a demand for a particular type of violence as it helps to unveil a world which is transparent, open-access, logical, measurable and always connected to the operational. This is not to say that operational warfare always works, or that the demand is always there. It is simply to say that operational warfare aims to keep the potential for violent techniques of control in place by unveiling itself as a particular kind of organizational routine. How would one challenge “transparent warfare”? If there is a “Baudrillardian” wager in relation to critiquing warfare as a means for control, it would arguably be that one needs to do so without reifying the value of transparency. Instead one should aim to ‘potentiate what is new, original, unexpected’ (Baudrillard 1990b, 148) in the military architecture itself. This article has strived to look for the potentially new in operational warfare, so as to tease out the politics of the processing and modelling of warfare. The challenge to “post-heroic” war consists in investigating the various logics of and consequences transparency has as a means for control. The novelty of this relation resides in the way warfare is not, as many tend to argue, first and foremost about a response to practical problems when conducting military operations. Rather, it is characterized by the potential to violently unveil global space (as an area of operations) and global time (as a battle rhythm) to maintain and control political becoming. It remains to be seen if it is possible to create hidden spaces and times, uncoded by operational warfare (see also Baudrillard 2014, 10), that are not conditioned by the hegemonic visibility of military architectures. In my view, to investigate and affirm such a project is a timely and important task for a future critical war studies.