Traditionally, it has been considered by data protection regulations that there is an invasion of privacy if there is no consent from the data owner to the data processor unless there are legal obligations, vital interests, public interest, or legitimate interests. These are also some of the legal bases for processing personal data under several acts of data protection legislation compatible with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). While being presented as the primary basis for data processing, meaningful consent in the use of personal data in digital services has been largely problematised as ineffective (Lee et al, 2017). But the already known problems such as notification, choice, and proper withdrawal of consent (Jones et al., 2018) can be exacerbated by artificial intelligence systems that collect huge amounts of data, process and generate new data. In this context, even if AI system controllers really want to obtain transparent and meaningful consent, they just cannot do it because they don’t know where data is going and how it’s going to be utilised (Nissenbaum, 2018). Furthermore, controllers of these systems also say they don’t have the ability to inform us about the risks we are consenting to, not necessarily as a matter of bad faith, but because of increasingly powerful computational methods such as machine learning working as a black box (Tufekci, 2018; Carmi, 2020). For other authors, the unpredictable and even unimaginable use of data by AI systems are even considered a feature, not a bug. For this same reason, companies and parties collecting and processing data have an incentive to leave unspecified the range of potential future applications (Jones et al., 2018; Cohen, 2018). This system’s opacity has been considered a major problem for meaningful consent, for example, regarding the uses of AI in medical diagnosis consultations (Astromskė et al., 2020). Even so, the criticism of consent in AI is still not very extensive, and it is largely influenced by the criticism of digital consent, focusing on the transparency and unpredictability aspects of the systems. Much of the concerns around consent on data processing have been approached by self-regulation solutions, the Federal Trade Commission in the United States being one of its main sponsors. For researcher Daniel Solove (2013), under the current approach of privacy regulation—that he would call “privacy self-management”, but is also called “privacy as control” by other scholars (Cohen, 2018)—policymakers try to provide people with a set of rights to enable them to make decisions about how to manage their data. This is an individual framing of consent, based on the assumption that we are all autonomous, free, and rational individuals with the capacity to consent, disregarding our possibility of doing so due to unequal power dynamics. Two have been the main measures of mitigation in this framework of self-regulation: anonymisation and transparency and choice (also called notice & consent) (Barocas & Nissenbaum, 2009; Nissenbaum, 2011). For Barocas and Nissenbaum (2009), this approach has an appeal to stakeholders and regulators basically because notice and consent—as a way to give individual control to users—seems to adequately fit in the popular definition of privacy as a right to control information about oneself. In the same way, notice and consent seem consistent with the idea of a free market, “because personal information may be conceived as part of the price of online exchange, all is deemed well if buyers are informed of a seller’s practices collecting and using personal information and are allowed freely to decide if the price is right” (Nissenbaum, 2011, p. 34). In general terms, the critical voices on the model of notice and consent could be divided into two general groups: One that we call—borrowing the denomination from Nissenbaum (2011)—“critical adherents”, which are moderate in their critics and focus on improving procedures of the model of consent, more than criticizing the liberal paradigm. While the other group is much more radical in terms of not believing at all in the model of notice and consent, basically because they don't believe in the paradigm of privacy as individual control and autonomy. The main criticism of critical adherents focuses on the way consent is being offered to citizens. They are critical about the idea of consent as “take it or leave it” and believe in a more granular model of consent (Solove, 2013). They are also critical about the idea of choice as “opt-out” and push for a model of “opt-in” (Nissenbaum, 2011; Hotaling, 2008). Likewise, this group acknowledges that privacy policies are long, legalistic, and really hard to digest for regular citizens; it is also an unrealistic burden for individuals to notice and review hundreds of online contracts from start to finish (Hotaling, 2008) and, in this context, they also advocate increasing transparency (Nissenbaum, 2011). Nevertheless, in addition to its unpredictability and opacity, artificial intelligence brings new challenges to the classic free model of notification and consent. AI systems applied to social programmes can induce personal information from individuals in unexpected and even manipulative ways. And also, many of these applications challenge the form of screen-based notification and consent model, since, most of the time, it is not a software that has direct interaction with the users who feed the system with their data, for instance, when they rely on technologies such as facial recognition or the “Internet of Things” (Jones at al., 2018). For more severe critics of liberal consent, meaningful consent requires meaningful notice. In reality, the information provided about data collection, its processing, and use tends to be vague and general, or too cryptic for non-lawyers. For Nissenbaum (2011), the traditional notion behind “online privacy” suggests that “online” is a distinctive sphere where protecting personal information is always framed in the context of commercial online transactions. As we have mentioned before, Julie E. Cohen goes further and considers privacy as an environmental condition (Cohen, 2012, 2018). Thus, protecting privacy effectively requires a willingness to depart more definitively from subject-centred frameworks in favour of condition-centred frameworks (Cohen, 2018). Therefore, only this form of criticism considers structural power relations when addressing consent and data processing. Following Cohen, Carmi (2018) goes even further and stresses that meanwhile legal and tech narratives frame online consent as if people—their data self or data bodies—were a defined, static, and almost tangible piece of personal property, our everyday realities as subjects are far away from that: we present ourselves in a fluid—never fixed—way depending on the context. Static categorisation, hierarchical evaluation according to the values of those in power and separation of different human beings to be targeted for surveillance and control was at the heart of colonisation practices. It is again at the heart of Digital Welfare States, as this is exactly what predictive algorithms and risk modeling systems operated by these welfare programmes are doing to determine social services, affecting a wide variety of aspects in life: work conditions, pensions, education, health, support for people with disability, and many others.