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2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › AT Perm

Perm fails - US is teaming up with Russia to block AI weapon regulations

David H. Freedman, 9/15/21, “US Is Only Nation with Ethical Standards for AI Weapons. Should We Be Afraid?”, Newsweek, David H. Freedman is a scientific journalist, author, and is a contributing writer at The Atlantic and Newsweek, - Maren Lien

That sets up a race-to-the-bottom in which the least ethical or most careless adversary—one that is most aggressive about fielding AI-enabled weaponry, regardless of reliability and safeguards—forces others to follow suit. Nuclear weapons could be placed under the control of flawed AI systems that watch for signs that someone else's AI nukes are about to launch. AI is "increasing the risk of inadvertent or accidental escalation caused by misperception or miscalculation," says James Johnson, a foreign-policy researcher at Ireland's Dublin City University and author of Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare. (Manchester University Press, September 2021). Both the U.S. and Russia have repeatedly refused to allow the United Nations' Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the main international body for weapons agreements, to ban lethal AI-controlled weapons. Meetings to discuss revisiting the CCW are planned for December, but there's little optimism an agreement will be reached; among the most powerful nations, only China has expressed support for such a treaty.  nations have discussed the possibility of an agreement, but nothing definite has emerged. If the U.S. is negotiating AI weapons separately with other countries, there's little public word of it. Even if diplomatic efforts led to limits on the use of AI, verifying adherence would be far more difficult than, say, inspecting nuclear missile silos. Military leaders in a hostile, competitive world are not known for their ability to resist advanced weaponry, regardless of consequences.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Alts › Corporeality

Encoding gender reproduces logics of disposability and authorizes war power against “hated” bodies – blurring the lines between artificial intelligence and embodiment is key to disrupting the naturalization of gender and racial formations

Wilcox ’16 (Lauren Wilcox, PhD, is a Staff Research Scientist in People & AI Research.--“Embodying algorithmic war: Gender, race, and the posthuman in drone warfare”—Article--Volume 48 Issue 1, February 2016--https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010616657947)//Marzz

In an early essay with contemporary resonances to the Black Lives Matter movement in the USA, Judith Butler analyzes the video-taped beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in the 1990s and the acquittal (despite the video evidence) of the police who beat King as indicating that ‘the visual field is not neutral to the question of race; it is itself a racial formation, and episteme, hegemonic and forceful’ and therefore ‘seeing’ is thus not a matter of direct perception as a means to truth but ‘the racial production of the visible, the workings of racial constraints on what it means to “see”’ (Butler, 1993: 16). An ‘inverted projection of white paranoia’ posited the object of violence as subject of violence. This case also speaks to the blurred lines between the war power and police powers of drone warfare and the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the use of violence against racialized bodies (Neocleous, 2014; Holmqvist, 2014). The designation of prayer as a signal of intent to do something ‘nefarious’, the movements of a vehicle as a ‘flanking maneuver’, the interpretation of movement of bodies in the back of a pick-up trick as the use of ‘human shields’ (not that these ‘human shields’ prevented the bombing of the vehicle), and perceived presence of only men and only adolescents or older suggests that greater accuracy of vision is unlikely to serve as a check on the mistakes of either algorithmic or visual analysis when the bodies are already perceived, or rather, felt to be dangerous. The logic of killing based not on identity but on these visual cues taken to resemble the algorithmic ‘pattern of life’ bears a striking resemblance to performative theories of gender in which ‘gender’ is not an essential identity one embodies; rather, one comes to be embodied as a subject through repeated behaviors and practices against a normative framework that renders some modes of life into the category of ‘hated’. J Halberstam writes, ‘Gender, we might argue, like computer intelligence, is a learned, imitative behavior that can be processed so well that it comes to look natural’ (Halberstam, 1991: 443). Halberstam purposefully blurs the line between artificial intelligence and embodied behavior in conjunction with Turing’s ‘other’ test. Somewhat less famous is Turing’s corollary test in which a person interacts over a terminal with a man and a woman in a different room, trying to ascertain from people who may be attempting to deceive the tester based on written language as to which respondent is embodied as a man or a women. While the first test simultaneously posits the possibility of ‘thinking’ without a (human) body (while constructing a cyborg whose represented and enacted bodies are linked via technology), the ‘gender’ Turing test opens up the possibility of failure to unite represented gender embodiment and enacted gender embodiment into a single identity. As Hayles writes, What the Turing test ‘proves’ is that the overlay between the enacted and the represented bodies is no longer a natural inevitability but a contingent production, mediated by a technology that has become so entwined with the production of identity that it can no longer meaningfully be separated from the human subject. (Hayles, 1999: xiii) Gender proves to be a feature of human embodiment that must be represented and read via different technologies, the reading of which will prove crucial for the process of racialization that makes certain bodies killable.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Alts › Corporeality

Posthuman feminist work analyze different bodies through means of differentiation—questions the process of becoming

Wilcox ’16 (Lauren Wilcox, PhD, is a Staff Research Scientist in People & AI Research.--“Embodying algorithmic war: Gender, race, and the posthuman in drone warfare”—Article--Volume 48 Issue 1, February 2016--https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010616657947)//Marzz

The work of posthuman feminists provides a necessary check on tendencies to theorize the drone as ‘other than human’ in ways that reinforce the separation of humans from techno-scientific practices, including the use of visual technologies, algorithms, and artificial intelligence in various configurations to enable ‘drone warfare’. The challenge the posthuman body poses is not the addition of new technological advances to an already-existing human body, but rather the addition of a body that is always already formed through norms and relations to others, whether these other are human, technological, or animal (see also Braidotti, 2013). Notably, N Katherine Hayles critiques the concept of the posthuman for its rehabilitation of a liberal subject of autonomy and individuality in the figure of the human. For Hayles, the posthuman ‘signals…the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will though individual agency and choice’ (Hayles, 1999: 286). As such, posthuman feminist projects critique a kind of ‘transhumanism’ that seeks to disembody consciousness or promote ‘other than’ or ‘more than’ human approaches that reify a particular normative version of humanity that enables distinctions between more or less worthy forms of life. Relatedly, posthuman feminist approaches take seriously the ways in which embodied differences are produced and lived, avoiding totalizing visions that might obscure the ways in which bodies are differentially produced through the interaction of technological processes with gendered, racial, colonialist, sexual, and other means of differentiation that are themselves emergent processes of identification and alignment with other bodies. As such, I understand the turn toward data and machine intelligence not as an ‘other than-human’ process of decision-making but as a form of embodiment that reworks and undermines essentialist notions of culture and nature, biology and technology, often but not necessarily in the service of projects of domination. Haraway’s concept of corporealization as ‘the interactions of humans and nonhumans in the distributed, heterogeneous work processes of technoscience’ (1997: 141) is highly relevant to theorizing drone warfare. Post-9/11 practices of security have intensified what Haraway describes as ‘corporeal fetishism’ (Haraway, 1997: 142) in which the sciences are imagined to be able to simplify and condense complex relationships and situated knowledges into singular digital maps of the body that are free from the alleged ‘failures’ of culture, but are in fact themselves corporealizing practices (see Pötzsch, 2015 for other examples). Following Haraway, I ask not to what extent drone warfare is embodied or disembodied, but rather, how bodies are corporealized in drone assemblages with a caveat that the corporealization is always in a process of ‘becoming’. The first aspect of corporealization I analyze is the production of targetable, killable bodies in drone assemblages.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Alts › Corporeality

There is a distinction between the ‘body and ‘embodiment’, human and computer, but technology connects them – posthumanism loops them both

Wilcox ’16 (Lauren Wilcox, PhD, is a Staff Research Scientist in People & AI Research.--“Embodying algorithmic war: Gender, race, and the posthuman in drone warfare”—Article--Volume 48 Issue 1, February 2016--https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010616657947)//Marzz

Hayles’s distinction between ‘body’ and ‘embodiment’ is particularly useful here: while ‘body’ is an abstract, idealized, universal construct, ‘embodiment’ is contextual, fully imbricated in culture, and never quite complies with the abstract idea of a ‘body’. This notion of incorporation is borne out in Hayles’s (1999) genealogy of cybernetics, which describes a shift from artificial intelligence to artificial life. The famous ‘Turing test’ is representative of the first wave, which attempted to divest information processing from a human body. This test, described by Alan Turing, suggests that the answer to whether or not machines can ‘think’ can be ascertained in an ‘imitation game’ in which a human poses questions at a computer terminal. If the human cannot tell whether the answers are generated by a human or a computer, then the computer can ‘think’. The machine’s ability to ‘think’ is based on its ability to imitate a human. While divesting information from its body, the Turing test also points toward cyborg subjectivity as it separates enacted bodies and represented bodies (through the terminal) while bringing them together in the technology that connects them. The second wave of cybernetics associated with artificial life sought to redefine and reorganize the boundaries of the human body in and through imbrication in technology and in relation to other bodies. Artificial life, in contrast to artificial intelligence, defines the human in terms of the machine: humans are understood as information processors that evolved intelligence. The contrast is between machines constructed to imitate humans (as in the Turing test) and what Hayles describes as ‘the computational model’ or ‘regime of computation’ in which all life, including humans, is understood as a kind of self-organizing machine. Human subjectivity is understood in relation to the machine. Both of these models exist in the figure of the posthuman, in which feedback loops between the human and the machine mutually inform and construct one another. Both the bodies of drone pilots as well as the bodies of those targeted by such algorithmic regimes exceed or overflow their constitution in this ‘regime of computation’, and as such point to the ways in which bodies as posthuman bodies must be considered in terms of multiple sources of corporealization. Thus, the use of algorithms and ‘big data’ techniques to produce targetable bodies is a process that cannot be separated from the greater process in which the drone assemblage is made of posthuman bodies: bodies corporealized as processors of information and also as information bundles. While this form of corporealization is a key feature of drone warfare, the massacre in Uruzgan province reveals that the visual and affective registers of embodiment are also necessary and are particularly crucial in the embodiment of gender and race in drone warfare.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Alts › Decolonial AI

Decolonial AI challenges US techno benevolence and opens space for sociotechnical interventions and affective community building

Mohamed et al. 20 (Shakir Mohamed is Senior Staff Scientist at DeepMind, Marie Therese, William Isaac, 07-12-20, “Decolonial AI: Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Artificial Intelligence” pp. 669-671 pp. 671)-qcl

How we build a critical practice of AI depends on the strength of political communities to shape the ways they will use AI, their inclusion and ownership of advanced technologies, and the mechanisms in place to contest, redress and reverse technological interventions. The systems we described in Section 3, although ostensibly developed to support human decision-makers and communities, failed to meaningfully engage with the people who would be the targets of those systems, cutting off these avenues of ownership, inclusion and justice. The historical record again shows that these situations manifest through paternalistic thinking and imbalances in authority and choice, produced by the hierarchical orders of division and binarisation established by coloniality (Gopal 2019; Said 1993; Fanon 1967; Nandy 1989). The decolonial imperative asks for a move from attitudes of technological benevolence and paternalism towards solidarity. This principle enters amongst the core of decolonial tactics and foresight, speaking to the larger goal of decolonising power. The challenge to solidarity lies in how new types of political community can be created that are able to reform systems of hierarchy, knowledge, technology and culture at play in modern life. One tactic lies in embedding the tools of decolonial thought within AI design and research. Contrapuntal analysis (Said 1993) is one important critical tool that actively leads us to expose the habits and codifications that embed questionable binarisms—of metropole and periphery, of West and the rest, of scientists and humanist, of natural and artificial—in our research and products. Another tactic available to us lies in our support of grassroots organisations and in their ability to create new forms of affective community, elevate intercultural dialogue and demonstrate the forms of solidarity and alternative community that are already possible. Many such groups already exist, particularly in the field of AI, such as Data for Black Lives (Goyanes 2018), the Deep Learning Indaba (Gershgorn 2019), Black in AI and Queer in AI, and are active across the world.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Impacts › Environment

AI fuels environmental degradation and leads to an ethics decline

Santa Clara University ND Santa Clara University, No date, "Artificial Intelligence and Ethics: Sixteen Challenges and Opportunities," No Publication, [AJL]

8. Environmental Effects Machine learning models require enormous amounts of energy to train, so much energy that the costs can run into the tens of millions of dollars or more. Needless to say, if this energy is coming from fossil fuels, this is a large negative impact on climate change, not to mention being harmful at other points in the hydrocarbon supply chain. Machine learning can also make electrical distribution and use much more efficient, as well as working on solving problems in biodiversity, environmental research, resource management, etc. AI is in some very basic ways a technology focused on efficiency, and energy efficiency is one way that its capabilities can be directed. On balance, it looks like AI could be a net positive for the environment [6]—but only if it is actually directed towards that positive end, and not just towards consuming energy for other uses. 9. Automating Ethics One strength of AI is that it can automate decision-making, thus lowering the burden on humans and speeding up – potentially greatly speeding up—some kinds of decision-making processes. However, this automation of decision making will presents huge problems for society, because if these automated decisions are good, society will benefit, but if they are bad, society will be harmed. As AI agents are given more powers to make decisions, they will need to have ethical standards of some sort encoded into them. There is simply no way around it: the ethical decision-making process might be as simple as following a program to fairly distribute a benefit, wherein the decision is made by humans and executed by algorithms, but it also might entail much more detailed ethical analysis, even if we humans would prefer that it did not—this is because Ai will operate so much faster than humans can, that under some circumstances humans will be left “out of the loop” of control due to human slowness. This already occurs with cyberattacks, and high-frequency trading (both of which are filled with ethical questions which are typically ignored) and it will only get worse as AI expands its role in society. Since AI can be so powerful, the ethical standards we give to it had better be good. 10. Moral Deskilling & Debility If we turn over our decision-making capacities to machines, we will become less experienced at making decisions. For example, this is a well-known phenomenon among airline pilots: the autopilot can do everything about flying an airplane, from take-off to landing, but pilots intentionally choose to manually control the aircraft at crucial times (e.g., take-off and landing) in order to maintain their piloting skills. Because one of the uses of AI will be to either assist or replace humans at making certain types of decisions (e.g. spelling, driving, stock-trading, etc.), we should be aware that humans may become worse at these skills. In its most extreme form, if AI starts to make ethical and political decisions for us, we will become worse at ethics and politics. We may reduce or stunt our moral development precisely at the time when our power has become greatest and our decisions the most important. This means that the study of ethics and ethics training are now more important than ever. We should determine ways in which AI can actually enhance our ethical learning and training. We should never allow ourselves to become deskilled and debilitated at ethics, or when our technology finally does present us with hard choices to make and problems we must solve—choices and problems that, perhaps, our ancestors would have been capable of solving—future humans might not be able to do it. For more on deskilling, see this article [7] and Shannon Vallor’s original article on the topic [8].

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Impacts › Economy

AI capitalism commodifies extracted data to reward dirty business practices of the powerful // OR (LINK) AI economies grows broader capitalistic economic system to reward and favor dirty business practices of the powerful

Verdegem 22, P. Dismantling AI capitalism: the commons as an alternative to the power concentration of Big Tech. AI & Soc (2022). Dr. Pieter Verdegem is a Senior Lecturer in Media Theory in the Westminster School of Media and Communication and a member of  (the Communication and Media Research Institute). – Maren Lien

While data is often considered as a raw material or a commodity, it makes sense to conceptualise it as a form of capital too. This is part of a broader discussion about how value is generated in the contemporary economy (Arvidsson and Colleoni ; Mazzucato ), particularly how value is derived from data and what normative aspects are relevant in the context of data collection and extraction (Couldry and Mejias ; Mezzadra and Neilson ; Zuboff ). Sadowski () argues that treating data as capital allows for a more nuanced and detailed understanding of how AI capitalism functions and is organised. What is the problem with using data to create value, as a resource to develop and optimise AI systems? Mazzucato () analyses contemporary capitalism and highlights the critique that it rewards rent seekers over true value creators. Their rent seeking is based on overcharging prices, undercutting competition—by exploiting particular advantages, e.g., labour, or using a monopoly advantage. Where value creation refers to the use of different types of resources to produce new goods and services, value extraction is defined as “activities focused on moving around existing resources and outputs, and gaining disproportionally from the ensuing trade” (Mazzucato : 6). Data extraction is a particular type of value extraction. Sadowski (: 9) defines data extraction as: “data is taken without meaningful consent and fair compensation for the producers and sources of data”. Evgeny Morozov () follows a similar line of thinking and has coined data extractivism to refer to practices of tech giants launching products not for the revenue but for the data, which is afterwards monetised through different products and services (see also Couldry and Mejias ). It is clear we must scrutinise what the consequences are of data commodification and extraction in AI capitalism as well as considering alternatives.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Impacts › Economy

Economic positive feedback loop of AI gives powerful companies more power

Verdegem 22 , P. Dismantling AI capitalism: the commons as an alternative to the power concentration of Big Tech. AI & Soc (2022). Dr. Pieter Verdegem is a Senior Lecturer in Media Theory in the Westminster School of Media and Communication and a member of  (the Communication and Media Research Institute). – Maren Lien

Commodification is a central concept in CPE and refers to the processes, whereby online and offline objects, activities, ideas and emotions are transformed into tradable commodities, transforming use value into exchange value (Hardy ). In the context of AI capitalism, commodification is closely linked to datafication. The latter concept refers to the ability to render into data many aspects of the world that have never been quantified before (Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger ). Our social relationships, communication patterns, shopping behaviour, etc. are transformed into digital data (Couldry and Mejias ), which is an essential characteristic of the attention economy (Wu ). In AI capitalism, the interplay between data and digital platforms is important. Platforms are intermediaries that invite different types of users—producers and suppliers, consumers, advertisers, app developers, etc.—to engage and interact via their digital infrastructure (Srnicek, ; Van Dijck et al. ). Platforms are ideally positioned to function as a data broker: central in their business model is the possibility to capture, extract and analyse the data produced by the interactions on the platform (Crain ; West ). Using this extracted data as well as the skills workers gained when analysing it, made platform companies the leaders in the digital economy; working with data has become ever more important for gaining a competitive advantage (Srnicek ). What connects data and platforms are network effects. Network effects mean that the value of the network is determined by its size (Katz and Shapiro ). Platforms thus become more valuable as more users join it. Engagement and interaction are only possible if there are active users on platforms. Generating network effects is thus a key strategic focus for platforms (Srnicek ). The power of network effects goes hand in hand with the availability of data: this combination further strengthens the leading position of already powerful data companies (Srnicek ). Data-driven network effects entail that more users active on a certain platform, means more possibilities for data collection, analysis and extraction. Consequently, this results in more opportunities to use that data for improving the features and services offered by the platform. Better services open up the possibility to attract more users. A similar positive data feedback loop exists for AI too: better access to data means more opportunities to train ML models and better AI also results in better services and more users (Lee ; Srnicek ; Varian )

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Impacts › Economy

AI has broad societal and economic consequences – impact entire societies

Verdegem 22 , P. Dismantling AI capitalism: the commons as an alternative to the power concentration of Big Tech. AI & Soc (2022). Dr. Pieter Verdegem is a Senior Lecturer in Media Theory in the Westminster School of Media and Communication and a member of  (the Communication and Media Research Institute). – Maren Lien

An important aspect of understanding AI capitalism is to consider AI as a General Purpose Technology (GPT) (Trajtenberg ). GPT are enabling technologies, meaning that they open up new opportunities, in addition to offering complete, final solutions. Other examples of GPT are the steam engine, electrification and the Internet. They have three main characteristics: (1) they are widely used; (2) they are capable of ongoing technical improvement; and (3) they enable innovation in different application sectors (Bresnahan, 210: 764). AI qualifies this definition. Given their pervasiveness and the complementary waves of innovation they produce, GPT cause economic disruption. They affect entire economies, potentially drastically altering societies through their impact on pre-existing economic and social structures (Trajtenberg ). Economists study the impact of GPT in terms of the emergence of winners and losers. The winners are those associated with the emerging GPT, whereas the losers are those who cannot benefit from the unfolding GPT. However, looking at other GPT invites us to look beyond winners and losers and to consider GPT—and thus also AI—as a public utility. The importance of electricity and the Internet, for example, has opened debates about the need of regulation, and the decision to not merely leaving these technological developments over to the market alone, or at least to have some intervention from society in it. This is particularly important given the times we live in: during the pandemic, we all have witnessed the crucial role of digital platforms in everyday life. As such, we need to be aware that AI can facilitate a further polarisation of already unequal societies (Crawford ; Dyer-Witheford et al. ; Lee ). In any case, considering AI as a GPT and not just a digital technology that is owned and used by private entities but one that has broad impact on society, opens up new questions about how to conceptualise AI capitalism. This is where the work of Kate Crawford comes into place. In her book Atlas of AI, Crawford () offers a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of AI. According to her, AI simultaneously refers to technical approaches, social practices and industrial infrastructures (Crawford : 8–9). First, AI refers to technical approaches. Advancements in machine learning (ML) have been the most powerful contributor to the development of AI in the past two decades (Asaro ). ML is a paradigm that allows programs to automatically improve their performance on a particular task by learning from vast amounts of data (Russell and Norvig ; Lee ). It is based on statistical patterns and correlation in large data sets, starting to be used in the late 1980s–early 1990s. Earlier versions of machine intelligence—e.g., expert systems—were primarily rules-based, making use of symbolic logic and involving human experts generating instructions codified as algorithms (Agrawal et al. ). The problem was that they could not cope with the complexity of most applications. Unlike expert systems, powerful ML algorithms learn from the ground up, not from humans but from data (Alpaydin ). The rise of ML can be explained by more powerful and reliable computing infrastructure, which has made possible the development of systems driven by real-world data (Lee ). The availability of significant amounts of data further enables the development of learning algorithms that derive solutions using statistical methods. Deep learning (DL) and neural networks (NN) are the driving forces behind more recent developments in ML. In the early 2000s, ML pioneer Geoffrey Hinton (LeCun et al. ) demonstrated the power of DL neural networks: this allows automatically processing of unlabelled data, which has led to more effective applications of AI that we are now using every day (e.g., online services). Second, the social practices of AI refer to the classification systems, developed by humans, which are behind algorithms, ML/DL models and AI systems. Crucial questions that we need to ask here are: Who is involved in developing these classification systems? Who decides what classifications are used? and; What do they look like? Ultimately, these are political (power) questions about inclusion and representation (Crawford ). Important challenges exist around AI, bias, fairness and discrimination (Costanza-Chock ). Questions about how representative these classification systems are, are crucial in this. How to avoid bias and support inclusion in AI systems are important political issues that urgently need to be addressed (Brevini and Pasquale ). Last, the industrial infrastructures of AI refer to the computing power, algorithms and data sets that are the source of knowledge and production. This infrastructure not only entails the possibilities of collecting vast amounts of data—which are needed to train algorithms—but also the computational power necessary to develop and perform ML and DL models. Few companies have access to the required data sets, possess the necessary computational power to run ML/DL and are able to attract the brightest AI scientists, which means we are witnessing a concentrated industrial AI infrastructure, leading to AI oligopolies/monopolies (Dyer-Witheford et al. ; Riedl ). This gives a lot of power in the hands of a small number of corporations (Montes and Goertzel ) and is why we need to scrutinise economic power within AI capitalism. Offering an encompassing view of AI capitalism, is important: we need to be aware of how material AI is and that its production is based on natural resources, human labour and industrial infrastructures. Looking at the broader picture of change within technologies, beliefs and infrastructures simultaneously, however, also risks overlooking the issues of a concentration of power. To deal with this, we need to go back to political economy as this is the framework that puts power at the centre of its analysis. Political economy is particularly interested in the relationship between techno-economic systems and their impact of the broader societal structure (McChesney ). The industrial infrastructures of AI also contribute to a concentration of power, which has not only an impact on the social practices of AI but also how its technological development will happen in the future, which explains the importance of this perspective.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Impacts › War

AI extremely unpredictable and dangerous – used to fuel endless war

Santa Clara University ND Santa Clara University, No date, "Artificial Intelligence and Ethics: Sixteen Challenges and Opportunities," No Publication, [AJL]

Artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies are rapidly transforming society and will continue to do so in the coming decades. This social transformation will have deep ethical impact, with these powerful new technologies both improving and disrupting human lives. AI, as the externalization of human intelligence, offers us in amplified form everything that humanity already is, both good and evil. Much is at stake. At this crossroads in history we should think very carefully about how to make this transition, or we risk empowering the grimmer side of our nature, rather than the brighter. Why is AI ethics becoming a problem now? Machine learning (ML) through neural networks is advancing rapidly for three reasons: 1) Huge increase in the size of data sets; 2) Huge increase in computing power; 3) Huge improvement in ML algorithms and more human talent to write them. All three of these trends are centralizing of power, and “With great power comes great responsibility” [2]. As an institution, the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics has been thinking deeply about the ethics of AI for several years. This article began as presentations delivered at academic conferences and has since expanded to an academic paper (links below) and most recently to a presentation of “Artificial Intelligence and Ethics: Sixteen Issues” I have given in the U.S. and internationally [3]. In that spirit, I offer this current list: 1. Technical Safety The first question for any technology is whether it works as intended. Will AI systems work as they are promised or will they fail? If and when they fail, what will be the results of those failures? And if we are dependent upon them, will we be able to survive without them? For example, several people have died in a semi-autonomous car accident because vehicles encountered situations in which they failed to make safe decisions. While writing very detailed contracts that limit liability might legally reduce a manufacturer’s responsibility, from a moral perspective, not only is responsibility still with the company, but the contract itself can be seen as an unethical scheme to avoid legitimate responsibility. The question of technical safety and failure is separate from the question of how a properly-functioning technology might be used for good or for evil (questions 3 and 4, below). This question is merely one of function, yet it is the foundation upon which all the rest of the analysis must build. 2. Transparency and Privacy Once we have determined that the technology functions adequately, can we actually understand how it works and properly gather data on its functioning? Ethical analysis always depends on getting the facts first—only then can evaluation begin. It turns out that with some machine learning techniques such as deep learning in neural networks it can be difficult or impossible to really understand why the machine is making the choices that it makes. In other cases, it might be that the machine can explain something, but the explanation is too complex for humans to understand. For example, in 2014 a computer proved a mathematical theorem, using a proof that was, at the time at least, longer than the entire Wikipedia encyclopedia [4]. Explanations of this sort might be true explanations, but humans will never know for sure. As an additional point, in general, the more powerful someone or something is, the more transparent it ought to be, while the weaker someone is, the more right to privacy he or she should have. Therefore the idea that powerful AIs might be intrinsically opaque is disconcerting. 3. Beneficial Use & Capacity for Good The main purpose of AI is, like every other technology, to help people lead longer, more flourishing, more fulfilling lives. This is good, and therefore insofar as AI helps people in these ways, we can be glad and appreciate the benefits it gives to us. Additional intelligence will likely provide improvements in nearly every field of human endeavor, including, for example, archaeology, biomedical research, communication, data analytics, education, energy efficiency, environmental protection, farming, finance, legal services, medical diagnostics, resource management, space exploration, transportation, waste management, and so on. As just one concrete example of a benefit from AI, some farm equipment now has computer systems capable of visually identifying weeds and spraying them with tiny targeted doses of herbicide. This not only protects the environment by reducing the use of chemicals on crops, but it also protects human health by reducing exposure to these chemicals. 4. Malicious Use & Capacity for Evil A perfectly well functioning technology, such as a nuclear weapon, can, when put to its intended use, cause immense evil. Artificial intelligence, like human intelligence, will be used maliciously, there is no doubt. For example, AI-powered surveillance is already widespread, in both appropriate contexts (e.g., airport-security cameras), perhaps inappropriate ones (e.g., products with always-on microphones in our homes), and conclusively inappropriate ones (e.g., products which help authoritarian regimes identify and oppress their citizens). Other nefarious examples can include AI-assisted computer-hacking and lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), a.k.a. “killer robots.” Additional fears, of varying degrees of plausibility, include scenarios like those in the movies “2001: A Space Odyssey,” “Wargames,” and “Terminator.” While movies and weapons technologies might seem to be extreme examples of how AI might empower evil, we should remember that competition and war are always primary drivers of technological advance, and that militaries and corporations are working on these technologies right now. History also shows that great evils are not always completely intended (e.g., stumbling into World War I and various nuclear close-calls in the Cold War), and so having destructive power, even if not intending to use it, still risks catastrophe. Because of this, forbidding, banning, and relinquishing certain types of technology would be the most prudent solution.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Surveillance

AI used to unethically monitor innocent civilians

Schneier 16 Bruce Schneier, 02-08-2016, " Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World" W. W. Norton & Company, [AJL]

Aside from such obvious abuses of power, there’s the inevitable expansion of power that accompanies the expansion of any large and powerful bureaucratic system: mission creep. For example, after 9/11, the CIA and the Treasury Department joined forces to gather data on Americans’ financial transactions, with the idea that they could detect the funding of future terrorist groups. This turned out to be a dead end, but the expanded surveillance netted a few money launderers. So it continues. In the US, surveillance is being used more often, in more cases, against more offenses, than ever before. Surveillance powers justified in the PATRIOT Act as being essential in the fight against terrorism, like “sneak and peek” search warrants, are far more commonly used in non-terrorism investigations, such as searches for drugs. In 2011, the NSA was given authority to conduct surveillance against drug smugglers in addition to its traditional national security concerns. DEA staff were instructed to lie in court to conceal that the NSA passed data to the agency. The NSA’s term is “parallel construction.” The agency receiving the NSA information must invent some other way of getting at it, one that is admissible in court. The FBI probably got the evidence needed to arrest the hacker Ross Ulbricht, aka Dread Pirate Roberts, who ran the anonymous Silk Road website where people could buy drugs and more, in this way. Mission creep is also happening in the UK, where surveillance intended to nab terrorists is being used against political protesters, and in all sorts of minor criminal cases: against people who violate a smoking ban, falsify their address, and fail to clean up after their dogs. The country has a lot of cameras, so it “makes sense” to use them as much as possible. Other countries provide many more examples. Israel, for instance, gathers intelligence on innocent Palestinians for political persecution. Building the technical means for a surveillance state makes it easy for people and organizations to slip over the line into abuse. Of course, less savory governments abuse surveillance as a matter of course—with no legal protections for their citizens. All of this matters, even if you happen to trust the government currently in power. A system that is overwhelmingly powerful relies on everyone in power to act perfectly—so much has to go right to prevent meaningful abuse. There are always going to be bad apples—the question is how much harm they are allowed and empowered to do and how much they corrupt the rest of the barrel. Our controls need to work not only when the party we approve of leads the government but also when the party we disapprove of does.

2022 CNDI Kritik
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AI leads to violence towards innocent civilians

Schneier 16 Bruce Schneier, 02-08-2016, " Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World" W. W. Norton & Company, . [AJL]

Another harm of government surveillance is the way it leads to people’s being categorized and discriminated against. George Washington University law professor Daniel Solove calls the situation Kafkaesque. So much of this data is collected and used in secret, and we have no right to refute or even see the evidence against us. This will intensify as systems start using surveillance data to make decisions automatically. Surveillance data has been used to justify numerous penalties, from subjecting people to more intensive airport security to deporting them. In 2012, before his Los Angeles vacation, 26-year-old Irishman Leigh Van Bryan tweeted, “Free this week, for quick gossip/prep before I go and destroy America.” The US government had been surveilling the entire Twitter feed. Agents picked up Bryan’s message, correlated it with airplane passenger lists, and were waiting for him at the border when he arrived from Ireland. His comment wasn’t serious, but he was questioned for five hours and then sent back home. We know that bomb jokes in airports can get you detained; now it seems that you have to be careful making even vague promises of international rowdiness anywhere on the Internet. In 2013, a Hawaiian man posted a video on Facebook showing himself drinking and driving. Police arrested him for the crime; his defense was that it was a parody and that no actual alcohol was consumed on the video. It’s worse in the UK. There, people have been jailed because of a racist tweet or a tasteless Facebook post. And it’s even more extreme in other countries, of course, where people are routinely arrested and tortured for things they’ve written online. Most alarming of all, the US military targets drone strikes partly based on their targets’ data. There are two types of drone targeting. The first is “targeted killing,” where a known individual is located by means of electronic or other surveillance. The second is “signature strikes,” where unidentified individuals are targeted on the basis of their behavior and personal characteristics: their apparent ages and genders, their location, what they appear to be doing. At the peak of drone operations in Pakistan in 2009 and 2010, half of all kills were signature strikes. We don’t have any information about how accurate the profiling was. This is wrong. We should be free to talk with our friends, or send a text message to a family member, or read a book or article, without having to worry about how it would look to the government: our government today, our government in five or ten years, or some other government. We shouldn’t have to worry about how our actions might be interpreted or misinterpreted, or how they could be used against us. We should not be subject to surveillance that is essentially indefinite.

2022 CNDI Kritik
NEG › Links › Surveillance

AI systems eliminate the possibility of consent based on the sheer amount of data collected and utilized for services

Varon & Peña 21 (Joana, Executive Directress and Creative Chaos Catalyst at Coding Right, Paz Latin American Institute of Terraforming, “Artificial intelligence and consent: A feminist anticolonial critique”, Econstor, Institute for Internet and Society, Berlin, Vol. 10, Iss. 4, https://doi.org/10.14763/2021.4.1602 , pp. 8-11)-qcl

Traditionally, it has been considered by data protection regulations that there is an invasion of privacy if there is no consent from the data owner to the data processor unless there are legal obligations, vital interests, public interest, or legitimate interests. These are also some of the legal bases for processing personal data under several acts of data protection legislation compatible with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). While being presented as the primary basis for data processing, meaningful consent in the use of personal data in digital services has been largely problematised as ineffective (Lee et al, 2017). But the already known problems such as notification, choice, and proper withdrawal of consent (Jones et al., 2018) can be exacerbated by artificial intelligence systems that collect huge amounts of data, process and generate new data. In this context, even if AI system controllers really want to obtain transparent and meaningful consent, they just cannot do it because they don’t know where data is going and how it’s going to be utilised (Nissenbaum, 2018). Furthermore, controllers of these systems also say they don’t have the ability to inform us about the risks we are consenting to, not necessarily as a matter of bad faith, but because of increasingly powerful computational methods such as machine learning working as a black box (Tufekci, 2018; Carmi, 2020). For other authors, the unpredictable and even unimaginable use of data by AI systems are even considered a feature, not a bug. For this same reason, companies and parties collecting and processing data have an incentive to leave unspecified the range of potential future applications (Jones et al., 2018; Cohen, 2018). This system’s opacity has been considered a major problem for meaningful consent, for example, regarding the uses of AI in medical diagnosis consultations (Astromskė et al., 2020). Even so, the criticism of consent in AI is still not very extensive, and it is largely influenced by the criticism of digital consent, focusing on the transparency and unpredictability aspects of the systems. Much of the concerns around consent on data processing have been approached by self-regulation solutions, the Federal Trade Commission in the United States being one of its main sponsors. For researcher Daniel Solove (2013), under the current approach of privacy regulation—that he would call “privacy self-management”, but is also called “privacy as control” by other scholars (Cohen, 2018)—policymakers try to provide people with a set of rights to enable them to make decisions about how to manage their data. This is an individual framing of consent, based on the assumption that we are all autonomous, free, and rational individuals with the capacity to consent, disregarding our possibility of doing so due to unequal power dynamics. Two have been the main measures of mitigation in this framework of self-regulation: anonymisation and transparency and choice (also called notice & consent) (Barocas & Nissenbaum, 2009; Nissenbaum, 2011). For Barocas and Nissenbaum (2009), this approach has an appeal to stakeholders and regulators basically because notice and consent—as a way to give individual control to users—seems to adequately fit in the popular definition of privacy as a right to control information about oneself. In the same way, notice and consent seem consistent with the idea of a free market, “because personal information may be conceived as part of the price of online exchange, all is deemed well if buyers are informed of a seller’s practices collecting and using personal information and are allowed freely to decide if the price is right” (Nissenbaum, 2011, p. 34). In general terms, the critical voices on the model of notice and consent could be divided into two general groups: One that we call—borrowing the denomination from Nissenbaum (2011)—“critical adherents”, which are moderate in their critics and focus on improving procedures of the model of consent, more than criticizing the liberal paradigm. While the other group is much more radical in terms of not believing at all in the model of notice and consent, basically because they don't believe in the paradigm of privacy as individual control and autonomy. The main criticism of critical adherents focuses on the way consent is being offered to citizens. They are critical about the idea of consent as “take it or leave it” and believe in a more granular model of consent (Solove, 2013). They are also critical about the idea of choice as “opt-out” and push for a model of “opt-in” (Nissenbaum, 2011; Hotaling, 2008). Likewise, this group acknowledges that privacy policies are long, legalistic, and really hard to digest for regular citizens; it is also an unrealistic burden for individuals to notice and review hundreds of online contracts from start to finish (Hotaling, 2008) and, in this context, they also advocate increasing transparency (Nissenbaum, 2011). Nevertheless, in addition to its unpredictability and opacity, artificial intelligence brings new challenges to the classic free model of notification and consent. AI systems applied to social programmes can induce personal information from individuals in unexpected and even manipulative ways. And also, many of these applications challenge the form of screen-based notification and consent model, since, most of the time, it is not a software that has direct interaction with the users who feed the system with their data, for instance, when they rely on technologies such as facial recognition or the “Internet of Things” (Jones at al., 2018). For more severe critics of liberal consent, meaningful consent requires meaningful notice. In reality, the information provided about data collection, its processing, and use tends to be vague and general, or too cryptic for non-lawyers. For Nissenbaum (2011), the traditional notion behind “online privacy” suggests that “online” is a distinctive sphere where protecting personal information is always framed in the context of commercial online transactions. As we have mentioned before, Julie E. Cohen goes further and considers privacy as an environmental condition (Cohen, 2012, 2018). Thus, protecting privacy effectively requires a willingness to depart more definitively from subject-centred frameworks in favour of condition-centred frameworks (Cohen, 2018). Therefore, only this form of criticism considers structural power relations when addressing consent and data processing. Following Cohen, Carmi (2018) goes even further and stresses that meanwhile legal and tech narratives frame online consent as if people—their data self or data bodies—were a defined, static, and almost tangible piece of personal property, our everyday realities as subjects are far away from that: we present ourselves in a fluid—never fixed—way depending on the context. Static categorisation, hierarchical evaluation according to the values of those in power and separation of different human beings to be targeted for surveillance and control was at the heart of colonisation practices. It is again at the heart of Digital Welfare States, as this is exactly what predictive algorithms and risk modeling systems operated by these welfare programmes are doing to determine social services, affecting a wide variety of aspects in life: work conditions, pensions, education, health, support for people with disability, and many others.

2022 CNDI Kritik
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AI used unethically to gather data on citizens

Schneier 16 Bruce Schneier, 02-08-2016, " Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World" W. W. Norton & Company, [AJL]

“Governments and corporations gather, store, and analyze the tremendous amount of data we chuff out as we move through our digitized lives. Often this is without our knowledge, and typically without our consent. Based on this data, they draw conclusions about us that we might disagree with or object to, and that can impact our lives in profound ways. We may not like to admit it, but we are under mass surveillance. Much of what we know about the NSA’s surveillance comes from Edward Snowden, although people both before and after him also leaked agency secrets. As an NSA contractor, Snowden collected tens of thousands of documents describing many of the NSA’s surveillance activities. In 2013, he fled to Hong Kong and gave them to select reporters. For a while I worked with Glenn Greenwald and the Guardian newspaper, helping analyze some of the more technical documents. The first news story to break that was based on the Snowden documents described how the NSA collects the cell phone call records of every American. One government defense, and a sound bite repeated ever since, is that the data collected is “only metadata.” The intended point was that the NSA wasn’t “collecting the words we spoke during our phone conversations, only the phone numbers of the two parties, and the date, time, and duration of the call. This seemed to mollify many people, but it shouldn’t have. Collecting metadata on people means putting them under surveillance. An easy thought experiment demonstrates this. Imagine that you hired a private detective to eavesdrop on someone. The detective would plant bugs in that person’s home, office, and car. He would eavesdrop on that person’s phone and computer. And you would get a report detailing that person’s conversations. Now imagine that you asked the detective to put that person under surveillance. You would get a different but nevertheless comprehensive report: where he went, what he did, who he spoke with and for how long, who he wrote to, what he read, and what he purchased. That’s metadata. Eavesdropping gets you the conversations; surveillance gets you everything else. Telephone metadata alone reveals a lot about us. The timing, length, and frequency of our conversations reveal our relationships with others: our intimate friends, business associates, and everyone in-between. Phone metadata reveals what and who we’re interested in and what’s important to us, no matter how “private. It provides a window into our personalities. It yields a detailed summary of what’s happening to us at any point in time.”

2022 CNDI Kritik
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“Digital democracy” is a myth – US mass surveillance, weakening data privacy protections, banning location all expose the coercive hypocrisy of US “digital authoritarianism”

Klyman 22

Kevin Klyman researches US-China relations and has written data protection policies adopted by the World Health Organization. “Biden’s Campaign for “Digital Democracy” Is Really a Giveaway to Big Tech”, Jacobin. 6/26/22. --JrH

Mejias asked Jacobin, “How can ‘digital democracy’ be so different from ‘digital authoritarianism’ if they run practically on the same technologies and infrastructures? We should be concerned about how easy it would be, technologically, to switch from the former to the latter.” “Belarus used equipment provided by the American company Sandvine to block millions of websites and censor news and social media in the midst of mass protests.” In the United States, algorithmic decision making is already used to  people,  them housing, and  if they receive medical care. The US government’s surveillance capabilities are only growing. The NSA’s surveillance programs are nine years after Edward Snowden exposed them, allowing the US government to covertly  the rest of the world’s internet traffic, read people’s emails, and hack into their devices. In addition, key provisions of the Patriot Act — which  the government to spy on Americans and people outside the United States with no oversight —  in effect. US tech companies devour as much sensitive data as possible. The  of all cross-border data traffic passes through the United States, with 70 percent of global internet traffic  through northern Virginia, the headquarters of many US intelligence agencies. Microsoft, Amazon, and Google  more than half of the world’s major data centers, and along with Meta, they  the rights to two-thirds of the capacity of the world’s undersea fiber-optic cables, which form the  of the internet. As Google’s cofounder Larry Page  twenty years ago, “Everything you’ve ever heard or seen or experienced will become searchable. Your whole life will be searchable.” Government of the People, by the Algorithms, for the Corporations America’s technology policy priorities abroad encompass three key objectives: banning data localization, weakening data protection laws, and eliminating digital services taxes. This deregulatory agenda would eliminate nontariff barriers employed by poor countries to develop their local tech ecosystems and keep predatory multinationals at bay. The US government and Big Tech have relentlessly pressured countries to abstain from adopting such measures — purportedly in the interest of democracy. Data localization regulations  that data generated in a country is stored or processed in that country. The Center for Strategic and International Studies — which Facebook  to work on data localization and digital authoritarianism —  that “data localization can be used as a tool of digital authoritarianism to limit democracy and human rights. . . . This is intended to facilitate these governments’ ability to carry out ‘a crackdown on free expression, privacy, and a range of human rights.’” This is undoubtedly true in many cases. China’s 2017 cybersecurity law  that foreign firms not only store data within China but also provide technical support to Chinese security services conducting investigations. But data localization can also have significant economic benefits for low-income countries. Requirements to store data where it is collected force multinationals to invest in local data centers and data processors, often creating more competition among local companies that store data. Local data storage also  the speed of digital services since the information that fuels applications does not have to be fetched from halfway across the world. Moreover, it lowers  because data does not have to pass through expensive international transit points. This is, in part, why the European Union has adopted de facto data localization requirements. In 2020, the total capacity of data centers in sub-Saharan Africa was just one-quarter that of the city of London. To rectify this gap, Africa’s largest economies, such as , , , Algeria, and , have adopted data localization rules, while countries like Ghana are in the process of implementing similar measures. These laws have  a gold rush on the continent, bringing in billions of dollars of investment and  local data center capacity in the last five years. In Kenya and Nigeria, the price of data has  by 90 percent, due in large part to localization.Data localization can also deliver myriad noneconomic benefits. Storing data locally makes it  for foreign governments to surveil a country’s citizens because they must do so from a significantly greater distance. In the case of the United States, “It is much cheaper for the FBI to issue a national security letter compelling a US-based data host to provide access to their data centres than it is for the NSA to gain access to data stores outside of the USA.” Furthermore, data that is stored locally can be audited by local regulators, enabling them to carry out their democratically mandated functions. Nick Dearden, the director of Global Justice Now, told Jacobinthat measures banning data localization are “going to make it impossible for regulators to properly control what Big Tech is doing and constrain these companies’ activities in the public interest.” Free-market ideologues have dismissed these justifications for data localization measures, paternalistically  that poor countries are “shooting themselves in the foot” by pursuing “digital mercantilism.” The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation has even gone so far as to  that the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, OECD, and US Agency for International Development “all need to cut off foreign aid” to countries with data localization laws.

2022 CNDI Kritik
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Surveillance capitalism weaponizes digital technology to control communities and turns democracy promotion – US/Big tech partnership reproduces economic inequality, human rights violation and environmental degradation

Hynes 21

Hynes, PhD, is  lecturer in Political Science and Sociology at the National University of Ireland Galway, specializing in environmental sociology, Mobilities and sustainability research. (2021). "Digital Democracy: The Winners and Losers", The Social, Cultural and Environmental Costs of Hyper-Connectivity: Sleeping Through the Revolution, Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 137-153.  --JrH

The digital ICT revolution promised much for democratic politics in the twenty-first century but so far has delivered little but disruption. The dawn of the internet age was to bring a decisive shift towards the citizen and information was to become free and limitless, and enlightenment and empowerment would follow. But while digital technologies provide us with the opportunity to accumulate quantities of information that one time may not have been possible, big tech and the state remains much better equipped than any private citizen to take full advantage of this opportunity. In many ways, digital technology has been weaponised against the very system it was purported to support and defend and the citizens it was meant to engage, protect and enlighten. Authoritarian regimes across the world have seized upon the opportunities provided by such technology to increase surveillance and control of their people while simultaneously spreading misinformation and confusion, undermining many of the established Western liberal democracies. It would be rather naïve to think that democratic governments are not also regularly using similar digital surveillance technique under various guises and security apparatuses. And all the while big tech is the real big winner. The pioneers of surveillance capitalism Google were emboldened and benefitted from historical events when a national security apparatus, galvanised by the attacks of 11 September 2001, saw the emergent capabilities and the promise of some certainty in how Google’s storage and use of huge stocks of personal data could be used to shadow and predict the behaviour of individuals.Zuboff believes that the concepts underpinning surveillance capitalism are facilitating the overthrow of the people’s sovereignty and is a prominent force in the perilous drift towards democratic deconsolidation that now threatens Western liberal democracies themselves. And this is a common complaint in the twenty-first century; democracy itself has lost control of corporate power in the form of big tech companies, who use whatever means possible to hoard vast wealth and influence while fuelling inequality, damaging the planet and avoid paying their fair share of taxes.Today’s big tech behemoths exist in a political culture that has grown accustomed and accommodating to their every need, and Runciman argues, in the United States, this was further cemented by the Supreme Court decision in the Citizens United case of 2010 to grant corporations the same rights to free speech as individual citizens. The ideals and very notion of liberal democracy are now under constant pressure from many angles, and the traditional hierarchy of power is also under increasing danger. The power of modern corporate power, in the form of big tech, has grown exponentially over the past decade to the point where it now has the wherewithal to undermine how democracy itself operates and not be overly worried about the consequences. A major imperative now for every citizen and democratic nation must be to reassess the inequitable influence of big tech corporate power and the internet, particularly as it relates to our personal data, and to question: who owns and controls such power, and what right do they have to use and misuse our personal data to undermine our key democratic institutions? Democracy must be seen to represent the wishes of the people rather than viewed as a system of corporate tyranny.

2022 CNDI Kritik
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FRT perpetuates racism and misogyny through inherent bias

Wolfe & Dastin 19 (Jan Wolfe Reuters Jounralist, Jeffrey Dastin, Technology Correspondent at Reuters News Agency 12-20-2019, accessed on 6-25-2022, Reuters, "U.S. government study finds racial bias in facial recognition tools", https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crime-face/u-s-government-study-finds-racial-bias-in-facial-recognition-tools-idUSKBN1YN2V1)-qcl

The study by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) found that, when conducting a particular type of database search known as “one-to-one” matching, many facial recognition algorithms falsely identified African-American and Asian faces 10 to 100 times more than Caucasian faces. The study also found that African-American females are more likely to be misidentified in “one-to-many” matching, which can be used for identification of a person of interest in a criminal investigation. While some companies have played down earlier findings of bias in technology that can guess an individual’s gender, known as “facial analysis,” the NIST study was evidence that face matching struggled across demographics, too. Joy Buolamwini, founder of the Algorithmic Justice League, called the report “a comprehensive rebuttal” of those saying artificial intelligence (AI) bias was no longer an issue. The study comes at a time of growing discontent over the technology in the United States, with critics warning it can lead to unjust harassment or arrests. For the report, NIST tested 189 algorithms from 99 developers, excluding companies such as Amazon.com Inc that did not submit one for review. What it tested differs from what companies sell, in that NIST studied algorithms detached from the cloud and proprietary training data. China’s SenseTime, an AI startup valued at more than $7.5 billion, had “high false match rates for all comparisons” in one of the NIST tests, the report said. SenseTime’s algorithm produced a false positive more than 10% of the time when looking at photos of Somali men, which, if deployed at an airport, would mean a Somali man could pass a customs check one in every 10 times he used passports of other Somali men. SenseTime said the report “reflects an isolated case” and that what it submitted had bugs it has addressed. “The results are not reflective of our products, as they undergo thorough testing before entering the market (and) all report a high degree of accuracy,” it said. Yitu, another AI startup from China, was more accurate and had little racial skew. Microsoft Corp had almost 10 times more false positives for women of color than men of color in some instances during a one-to-many test. Its algorithm showed little discrepancy in a one-to-many test with photos just of black and white males. Microsoft said it was reviewing the report and did not have a comment on Friday morning. Congressman Bennie Thompson, chairman of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, said the findings of bias were worse than feared, at a time when customs officials are adding facial recognition to travel checkpoints. “The administration must reassess its plans for facial recognition technology in light of these shocking results,” he said.

2022 CNDI Kritik
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LAWs turn case – it leads to more conflict since nations will view war as a more viable option and risks falling into the wrong hands risking terror attacks and even genocide

Anzarouth 21 (Matthew Anzarouth, 12-2-2021, accessed on 6-25-2022, Harvard Political Review, "Robots that Kill: The Case for Banning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems - Harvard Political Review", https://harvardpolitics.com/robots-that-kill-the-case-for-banning-lethal-autonomous-weapon-systems/)-qcl

In the days leading up to its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. military conducted a drone strike that killed 10 civilians in Kabul. The timing of this tragedy, in the midst of the mass evacuation from Afghanistan, casts doubt on the U.S. military’s promise to stop serving as a global policeman. The Biden administration has not ended the “forever wars” — it has simply elected to fight them with robots in the sky rather than boots on the ground. Pointing to the drone strike in Kabul as prime evidence, many experts warn of the dangers of Biden’s ‘over-the-horizon’ counterterrorism strategy, which uses imprecise semi-autonomous drones to replace human soldiers and combat terrorists from afar. Little attention, however, is being paid to an even more threatening weapon that may define the coming decades of war. Soon, guided missiles and semi-autonomous drones may be replaced by fully autonomous weapons that have the ultimate say over who lives and who dies. Lethal autonomous weapon systems are being introduced into military arsenals, and the United States, Russia, South Korea, Israel and the United Kingdom have shown a keen interest in their development. Unlike semi-autonomous drones, LAWS can select targets and attack them without any human intervention. These weapons are still in their infancy and, over time, will likely develop greater autonomy and more capabilities. One type of autonomous weapon would, after being activated by a human operator, fly around the world, identify its targets and fire missiles at them. An existing preliminary version of this weapon is the Israeli Harpy, which is programmed to roam around in the air in a predetermined loitering area, detecting and attacking enemy radar emitters. Political scientist Michael C. Horowitz posits in Dædalus that as technology progresses militaries may even use LAWS that serve as operations planning systems, autonomous battle systems that “could decide the probability of winning a war and whether to attack, plan an operation and then direct other systems — whether human or robotic — to engage in particular attacks.” The appeal of LAWS to countries like the U.S. and Russia is quite intuitive. If a country can fight wars with ruthless efficiency, accurately pick out terrorists from hundreds of feet in the sky, and spare the lives of thousands of soldiers, why wouldn’t it do so? A closer inspection reveals that the costs of this technology vastly outweigh the benefits. The Danger in Killer Robots The use of LAWS would lower the threshold for states going to war, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Many philosophers, political scientists and governments have expressed the concern that militaries will resort to conflict more often if they do not need to rely on soldiers and can use LAWS instead. Domestic populations will be less wary of conflict if it no longer means seeing fellow citizens risk their lives on the battlefield. The threshold-lowering effect of LAWS is particularly relevant in the context of a current bipartisan trend in the U.S. against intervention. It is plausible that without LAWS, the era of U.S. unilateral interventions and the war on terror would come to an end. Recognizing the failures of wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, politicians on both sides of the political spectrum are pushing not to send troops abroad to risk their lives. But the option of using LAWS and sidestepping the costs to a country’s soldiers threatens to reverse this anti-war trend and provide militaries with a politically palatable way of fighting wars. There could be catastrophic consequences if we liberate militaries from political constraints preventing them from going to war. The first wave of the proliferation of LAWS may simply look like the natural progression of our current drone capabilities. For instance, Russia may have already used autonomous drones to attack targets in Syria, but these weapons are only different from current semi-autonomous drones in the greater degree of risk assumed by eliminating human intervention. In other instances, however, the use of LAWS will present substantial advantages that make them different in kind from drones as we know them. Consider, for example, Azerbaijan’s use of Israeli-supplied IAI Harop drones in the war with Armenia in 2020. The loitering munition system used by the military allowed tiny and hardly-detectable autonomous drones to circle over the enemy’s defense line, pick out targets and attack them, an ability that proved decisive in Azerbaijan’s victory in the war. To understand what a world with LAWS will look like in the long term requires a bit of imagination. Perhaps a post-withdrawal Afghanistan will involve weapons like the Harop drones constantly roaming the skies and diving into the ground to take out targets. Or maybe we will see the chilling predictions of science fiction come true. In their book AI 2041, writers Chen Qiufan and Kai-Fu Lee express their fear that LAWS will fall into the hands of armed groups and terrorists. They describe a “Unabomber-like scenario in which a terrorist carries out the targeted killing of business elites and high-profile individuals,” using autonomous drones that rely on facial recognition to identify their targets. Leading expert in artificial intelligence Toby Walsh warns of these weapons falling into the hands of dictators and being used as tools of ethnic cleansing. Even if we assume that LAWS are operated primarily by legitimate militaries, additional complications arise when we consider what happens in the case of unjust killings. Philosopher Robert Sparrow argues that the autonomy of LAWS makes it impossible to hold anyone accountable for illegitimate killings they commit. If the robot acted autonomously, tracing accountability back to another agent seems morally objectionable and legally infeasible. But it would also be unjust to not punish illegitimate killings. This dilemma presents a so-called ‘responsibility gap’, where no one can be held responsible for illegitimate killings, and wrongful acts of war go undeterred. Preventing The Next Arms Race Despite these grave concerns, countries are pushing ahead in the research and development of LAWS. With large military powers leading the race, there are two potential outcomes if this trend goes uninterrupted. One is that LAWS become tools with which powerful militaries destabilize other regions, starting a new chapter of the ‘forever wars’ without boots on the ground. The second potential outcome is that LAWS become front and centre in conflict between the large military powers leading the race. They may drag us into a new war between superpowers without the mutually assured destruction that prevents nuclear warfare since LAWS can engage in a series of smaller, yet still extremely impactful, attacks that will not be deterred by the threat of retaliation.

2022 CNDI Kritik
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Autonomous weapons exacerbates racism in war- perpetuates idea of “the other”

Galliott 21 Galliott, Jai. "Humans, autonomous systems, and killing in war." Research Anthology on Military and Defense Applications, Utilization, Education, and Ethics. IGI Global, 2021. 240-257. [AJL]

While the distances involved show the powerful role of distance and autonomous systems in overcoming moral-emotional qualms and the socialised inhibition to killing, there are a range of other mechanisms that further this and make it even easier for systems operators, designers, programmers and the like to contribute to deployment of lethal force without regard for the consequences of their individual actions or jus in bello norms. The first additional mechanism that Grossman (1995, p. 161) explicitly notes – and the one that is most relevant to America’s use of autonomous platforms, but will only mention briefly here – is cultural difference, which perpetuates racial and ethnic differences and allows warfighters to further dehumanise the enemy. Military forces have long been trying to get their troops to think of the enemy/ies as ‘inferior forms of life...as less than human’ (Watson 1978, p. 250). Put simply, the further one is technologically distanced from the enemy, the easier it is to think that they are distinctly different to you in some way and the easier it is to kill them. Unmanned systems separate soldiers from the cultural environment that they would operate in if they were in the field and, in that sense, permit them to racially demonise and ‘other’ the enemy. Connected to cultural distance is moral distance, which involves legitimising oneself and one’s cause (Grossman 1995, p. 164). Once it has been determined that the enemy is culturally inferior, it is not difficult for operators of unmanned platforms to incorrectly suppose that their counterparts are either misguided or share their leaders’ moral guilt and think that this warrants waging unconstrained violence against those with the supposedly morally inferior cause (Grossman 1995, 164-7). In the case of highly autonomous systems, it may involve a less overt process, whereby contributing technical actors find it difficult to account for cultural differences in code, whether it be in a sensing or action mode, resulting in the same consequences.

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Autonomous weapons makes killing easy- diminishes humans to dots on a screen

Galliott 21 Galliott, Jai. "Humans, autonomous systems, and killing in war." Research Anthology on Military and Defense Applications, Utilization, Education, and Ethics. IGI Global, 2021. 240-257. [AJL]

In order to fully understand the issues associated with autonomy, one must place lethal autonomous weapon systems on a spectrum with other forms of autonomous weaponry. At one end we have close range, then middle range and long range at other end. Close range, for our sake, involves any easily attributable kill at ‘point-blank’ range, whether with one’s bare hands, an edged weapon or even a projectile weapon. According to Grossman (1995), the key factor in close range killing is the undeniable responsibility one holds for the act. John Keegan and Richard Holmes (1986) cite the story of an Israeli paratrooper during the capture of Jerusalem in 1967: ‘we looked up at each other for half a second and I knew that it was up to me, personally, to kill him’ (p. 266). When a soldier kills at this range, more than any other, it’s an intensely vivid and personal matter (Grossman 1995, p. 115). One can see the raw emotions on their enemy’s face, hear their cries and smell the gunpowder. The Israeli paratrooper mentioned above goes on to say that having shot his enemy at close range, he could see the hate on his enemy’s face and that ‘there was so much blood...[he] vomited, until the rest of the boys came up’ (Keegan and Holmes 1986, p. 266). Combat at close proximity is an interpersonal affair, so much so that it is incredibly difficult to deny the enemy’s humanity. For this reason, Grossman says, the resistance to close-range killing is ‘tremendous’ (Grossman 1995, p. 118). At midrange – where you can still see and engage the enemy with handgrenades, sniper rifles and so on, but usually without being able to gauge the extent of the +XPDQV$XWRQRPRXV6\VWHPVDQG.LOOLQJLQ:DU wounds inflicted – the experience of killing changes. At this range in the spectrum, the soldier can begin to deny responsibility for the fatal shot or blow if there are others present and participating in the act of killing. One is still located on the battlefield and can hear the gunfire and feel the stress, but the distance between adversaries makes the act of killing both physically and psychologically easier, and thus more morally troubling (Grossman 1995, p. 113). At long range, at which one must use some sort of mechanical, electrical or digital assistance to view or interact with others and potential victims, there is evidence to suggest that killing is made even easier. Among those who we have historically considered least reluctant to kill are pilots, artillery numbers and missile silo attendees. Gwynne Dyer (2010, p. 57) writes that while being observed by their fellows puts pressure on them to kill (as was the case with the gunners in Vietnam), it has much more to do with the distance between them and their targets and how it acts as an emotional and moral buffer. She aptly notes that on the whole, ‘gunners fire at grid references they cannot see; submarine crews fire torpedoes at ‘ships’ (and not, somehow, at the people in the ships); and pilots launch their missiles at ‘targets’’ (Dywer 2010). Grossman (1995) also reports that in his extensive career researching and reading on the subject of killing in combat, he is not aware of a single instance in which an individual operating at such long range has refused to kill. We also have numerous examples of long distance killing made easy. Dyer (2010) reminds us that in the early nineteen forties, for instance, the British Royal Airforce ‘firebombed’ Hamburg. Using early bomber aircraft, munitions blew in windows and doors over four square miles and resulted in a firestorm which left seventy thousand people dead, mostly women, children and the elderly (Grossman 1995). A further eighty thousand died in the firebombing of Dresden, two hundred and twenty-five thousand in Tokyo and many millions more in bombing conflicts since (Grossman 1995). If the bomber crews had to kill each of these people with a flamethrower or, as Whetham (2012) writes, slit each of their throats with a knife, the majority would be unable to do it. The awfulness of killing people at such close proximity and the emotional trauma inherent to each act, and to the collective acts, would have been of such magnitude that they simply would not have happened. Figure 1. Distance, Technology and Resistance to Killing As indicated on the chart above, killing conducted with the most basic semi-autonomous systems belongs at the beginning end of the long-range killing spectrum, followed by higher level autonomous systems, which when roughly grouped together, might even be worthy of its own designation: killing at keyboard range. The contention here is that there is no other tactical weapon on the battlefield today that facilitates killing with such physical and psychological ease and that it becomes a rather clinical and dispassionate matter, easing any of their operators’ existing moral qualms. Noel Sharkey (2010) offers support this argument in drawing attention to reports collected by Singer. Amongst a variety of other disturbing statements, he cites one twenty-one year old soldier who talks about his acts of killing with casual indifference: ‘the truth is, it wasn’t all I thought it was cracked up to be. I mean, I thought killing somebody would be this life-changing experience. And then I did it, and I was like, ‘All right, whatever’ (Singer 2009, p. 391). Later, he says that ‘killing people is like squashing an ant. I mean, you kill somebody and it’s like ‘all right, let’s go get some pizza’ (Singer 2009, p. 392). In this clinical killing environment, in which it seems reasonable to propose that some human targets are divested of their humanity, respect for the laws of war wanes. Many ‘war porn’ videos show raw footage of Predator strikes with people being reduced to little more than ‘hot spots’ or ‘blips’ on the screen, with operators often failing to take the necessary precautions to ensure noncombatants are protected. And, of course, it is not difficult to imagine how someone coding an artificially intelligence autonomous weapon might come to minimise the impact of their effort in reducing decisions regarding people to keystrokes. Again, it seems that obscuring ‘targets’ in this way and increasing the distance to the maximum possible, makes it easier for to kill in an indiscriminate and disproportionate fashion.