Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 23-35. LJS
In order to understand how institutions can come to be ‘institution of hegemonic masculinity’, we first need to consider how they are gendered. Connell (2005: 73) argues that institutions ‘are substantively, not just metaphorically, gendered’. Gender is understood as prescriptive. It is based upon socially constructed perceptions of the activities and actions appropriate for each gender. It is also relational, which means that masculinities and femininities do not exist independently (Kronsell, 2016: 106). The gendering of institutions manifests in fluid, intersecting and contradictory ways, but largely in a manner that privileges those individuals or groups in positions of power within organisations – these are usually (though not exclusively) men. Consequently, patterns of inequality, disadvantage and subordination result from this gendered privileging. This means that ‘advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine’ (Acker, 1990: 146). Institutions are gendered in the way they include, or exclude, gender from policy processes and this contributes to the way in which power is structured and normalised (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 582). Gender and gendered identities are intertwined in the day-to-day activities of the institution, rather than pre-existing in society or fixed to individuals (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 580). Gender can therefore be viewed as an organising principle (Walby, 2009: 260). These are built upon ‘organisation history and associated with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 2002: 844). Taking institutions seriously as gendered spaces equips us with an understanding of how actors, institutional culture and structures shape policies (Gains and Lowndes, 2014: 525). Institutions, conceptualised as both formal and informal rules and norms, do not operate in a bubble, rather they reflect wider social hierarchies and reproduce gender norms through including or silencing gender from the policy-making process (Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018: 1041). NATO’s role as a military actor means it falls into the category of an ‘extreme case of the gendered organisation’ (Carreiras, 2006: 40). Britton (2000) outlines three criteria for gendered institutions which are applicable to NATO. These are: (1) structures that make a distinction between masculinity and femininity; (2) the preponderance of male bodies; and (3) built upon hegemonic masculinities (Britton, 2000). The formalisation of these norms contributes to the construction of gender regimes, reifying gendered power structures. A gender regime is a ‘set of interconnected gender relations and gendered institutions that constitute a system’ (Walby, 2009: 104, 2011: 301). Gender regimes refer to the configuration of gender relations in a particular setting, they exist in all institutional structures and at the same time are unique to each institutional context (Walby, 1997: 6). They are built upon ‘organisation history and associated with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 2002: 844). Gender regimes therefore operate in myriad ways and at different intersecting levels, from cultural to institutional and organisational. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 6) identify the gender regime of an institution as ‘the patterning of gender relations in that institution and especially the continuing pattern which provides the structural context of particular relationships and individual practices’. So, if we accept that institutions are gendered, what counts as an institution of hegemonic masculinity? In the broadest sense such institutions can be defined as ones ‘largely governed by men’ that have produced and recreated norms and practices associated with masculinity and heterosexuality (Kronsell, 2005: 281). This helps explain why women in minority positions among men in organisation structures were likely to become ‘tokens’, perceived of as representative of all women (Kanter, 1977: 382). However, in much the same way that hegemonic masculinity is not ‘numerically’ dominant, the conceptualisation of institutions of hegemonic masculinity incorporates more than the mere physical presence (or dominance) of men’s bodies. Institutions of hegemonic masculinity serve a particular (common) purpose: they are institutions or organisations where male power and dominance is reified and reinforced through organisational practices and discourses (see for example, Cohn, 1987). They are spaces within which particular masculine behaviours and practices are normalised, where particular understandings of masculinities (and femininities) are (re)produced and formalised. As Hooper notes: ‘Masculinity appears to have no stable ingredients and therefore its power depends entirely on certain qualities constantly being associated with men … masculine spaces are precisely the places where such associations are cemented and naturalised’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). In this sense, institutions of hegemonic masculinity provide such a space; where cultural norms that privilege men, and values associated with masculinity, intersect with institutional power structures and the physical presence of male bodies, to cement male dominance. The organisational space provides the link between cultural ideals and institutional power that Connell (2005: 77) argues is required for the establishment of hegemony. As Kronsell argues, ‘to be hegemonic, cultural norms must be supported by institutional power’ (Kronsell, 2005: 281). Though not exclusively ‘male spaces’, institutions of hegemonic masculinity are also traditionally patterned through a high level of segregation between the sexes and particular gendered divisions of labour. Institutions have traditionally constructed different spheres of activity for women and men to occupy – and this historically constructed division (and the norms it creates around male behaviour) helps to secure the continuity of institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2005: 285). Institutions of hegemonic masculinity therefore provide the structural space for the (re)production of particular cultural understandings of gender, power and inequality. Institutions of hegemonic masculinity are organisations where male power and dominance is reified and reinforced through both formal and informal practices and discourses. They are spaces within which particular masculine behaviours, ways of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ are normalised; where particular understandings of masculinities (and femininities) are (re)produced and formalised. Yet within institutions of hegemonic masculinity, masculinity itself is usually silent, or ‘unseen’ due to its ubiquity (Kronsell, 2005). The process of normalisation, of making masculine practices and behaviours the ‘norm for appropriate conduct’, makes masculinity appear ‘natural’ and therefore difficult to critique (Kronsell, 2005: 282–4). Masculinity is ‘not named’ because it omnipresent, all-encompassing within these particular institutions. Indeed, as Acker argues, ‘as a relational phenomenon, gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present’ (Kronsell, 1990: 142). Masculinity is not a stable construct and appears to have no ‘stable ingredients’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). Institutions of hegemonic masculinity provide a key site for this contestation; where cultural norms which privilege men, and values associated with masculinity, intersect with institutional power structures and the physical presence of male bodies, to cement male dominance. The organisational space provides the link between cultural ideals and institutional power that is required for the establishment of hegemony (Connell, 2005: 77). It is important to stress here that existence of hegemonic masculinity in the military context does not preclude transformation of military institutions through challenging hegemonic masculinities. Such a transformation would create an institution which ‘equally values “masculine” and “feminine” traits, so much so that they cease to be masculine and feminine’ (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015: 12). Duncanson and Woodward argue that a ‘regendered military’ is one where: soldiering is not a masculine identity, but becomes much more fluid, and is constructed through relations of equality, empathy, care, respect, and recognition of similarities and shared experiences. The displacement of gendered dichotomies is immediately recognizable in this conceptualization. Not only are the meanings of masculinity and femininity questioned, but so is the valuing of masculinity over femininity and therefore the hierarchical thinking and material domination that has characterized gender relations. There therefore remain possibilities to displace hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Even if these possibilities have been lost in application empirical case studies. As Duncanson (2015: 244) argues, to realise this, ‘hierarchical relations must be replaced with relations of equality, mutual respect, or empathy’. She critiques Connell’s (2002) suggestion that the transition phase should be one where a masculinity open to equality within women is hegemonised. Rather, the transitory stage has to be one where traditionally disparaged, feminized traits are newly valued and incorporated into ‘softer’ or hybrid masculinities. The forging of more equal relations is the ultimate, more challenging stage. The hybrid stage may make it more likely that relations of equality, mutual respect, empathy, and so on, are formed, however, so rather than dismiss the New Man syndrome in all its contexts, assuming it always camouflages the continuation of patriarchy, militarism, and neoliberalism, we can look to expose its contradictions and to push for those relations of equality. (Duncanson, 2015: 244) Implications for the masculinist protection logic Gender is an issue for the military (and military institutions) which ‘is often obvious, apparent and visible’ at the same time that it is ‘obscured, normalised, lived with and ignored’ (Woodward and Winter, 2007: 3). Hurley’s (2018: 16) study of men ‘doing’ gender work at NATO draws out the contradictions underpinning the way in which ‘women’s rights’ and equality are expressed within the institution. This is a recurring theme which manifests itself in NATO’s development and understanding of a gender perspective as we go onto discuss in Chapter 5. This finds gender issues articulated within a masculinist protection logic. Entwined with understanding NATO as an institution of hegemonic masculinity is therefore the logic of masculinist protection (Young, 2003). Understanding masculinist protection logic requires moving away from using gender in an explanatory manner or as a variable. For example, through attempts to connect the violence of states and institutions to particular behavioural propensities of women and men. Rather, it is necessary to understand gender as an element of interpretation. As Young (2003: 2) argues: viewing issues of war and security through a gendered lens … means seeing how a certain logic of gendered meanings and images helps organise the way people interpret events and circumstances, along with the positions and possibilities for action within them. The logic of masculinist protection extends the position of the male head of household as a protector of the family, to encompass male leaders more generally as protectors of a given population (Stiehm, 1982; Young, 2003). The logic of masculinist protection is premised on an understanding of variation and plurality in masculinities; specifically, the relationship between ‘dominative masculinity’ and that of the ‘protector masculinity’ (Young, 2003: 4). Masculinist protection recalls a ‘rather more benign image of masculinity’: ‘the role of this courageous, responsible and virtuous man is that of protector’ (Young, 2003: 4). This is constructed in opposition to an ‘other’ masculinity embodied by ‘bad’ men who exploit, harm and abuse the vulnerable for the pleasures of domination (Young, 2003: 4). The flip side to this coin is that ‘feminine subordination, in this logic, does not constitute submission to a violent and overbearing bully’ (Young, 2003: 5). Feminist subordination is not submission to a ‘dominative masculinity’ or the ‘bad men’. Subordination is this sense forms part of an exchange between the protector and the protected: ‘In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy’ (Young, 2003: 4). As a consequence of this exchange the protected woman defers to the protectors judgement, looks up to him with gratitude for his manliness and admiration for his willingness to face the dangers of the world (Young, 2003: 5); this gratitude in turn reinforces his perception of his own masculinity and worth. And yet, power inequalities, domination and subordination persist within this logic: ‘the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ (Young, 2003: 2). Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of pastoral power, Young suggests that masculinist protection is a power marked out by virtue and love (Young, 2003: 6), appearing ‘gentle and benevolent both to its wielders and to those under its sway’ (Young, 2003: 6). Military masculinity is as much about performance as it is about action (Partis-Jennings, 2017: 3). This understanding has parallels with Kronsell’s understanding of the presence and persistence of gendered norms in institutions. Here, gendered norms have been built into the ‘walls’ of institutions, whose structure appears so natural and ‘supportive’ that it becomes difficult to see them also as exclusionary barriers (Kronsell, 2005: 291). Couching gender mainstreaming initiatives and framing the gender perspective in a ‘supportive’ logic of masculine protection reinforces particular inequalities and barriers whilst projecting an image of care and consideration for women working both inside and outside of NATO. The logic of masculinist protection provides one particular way in which the hegemonic masculine norms of the organisation imprint on, condition and control understandings of the gender perspective. In this sense a logic of masculinist protection can be seen to be embedded within the hegemonic norms of NATO. At the more abstract level, NATO can be seen as a collectivisation of the security state, protecting its citizens from an ‘other’ and external threat, beyond the imagined borders of the alliance. The citizen, in this reading, as ‘protected’, defers decision-making autonomy to the nation state as protector and by extension the NATO alliance. In this sense NATO itself can be viewed as a masculinist protector, a role that reinforces the hegemonic militaristic ideals and norms that were identified above. This gendered logic helps NATO to define and locate itself and frame the gender perspective in a broader sense (Hurley, 2018). NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity We argue that NATO is an international military institution constituting a particular gender regime. This leads NATO to function as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. NATO is characterised by a particular gendered division of labour (both in regard to particular jobs that women and men ‘traditionally’ occupy, and to those that women are still excluded either formally or informally from) (Connell, 2002, 2006: 7). NATO is also characterised by gendered relations of power expressed through gendered institutional practices, symbolism and discourses. Although a complex institution with a dual political-military structure, NATO’s purpose is as a military alliance committed to collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management (NATO, 2010). NATO armed forces composed of national militaries are therefore a focal point of alliance activity. Yet, the national armed forces of NATO member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2013). This offers one way in which we can argue that NATO is premised upon hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012). At this point, it is worth offering a note of caution when extrapolating from the ‘national’ to the ‘international’. As Connell and Messerschmidt note when discussing a ‘global gender order’: ‘it is tempting to assume a simple hierarchy of power and authority, running from global to regional to local’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 850) – or indeed from the national to the international. Power, authority and gender are constructed and contested at multiple, multifaceted levels. NATO is an institution made up of the military forces of multiple and varied national armed forces with particular cultural practices and variation and, in this sense, there is a danger of oversimplifying the concept of ‘the military’. However, as Goldstein (2001) has identified, militaries are ‘institutions that have largely been governed by men and have produced and recreated norms and practices associated with particular forms and ideals of masculinity that are surprisingly consistent across cultures and time’ (in Kronsell, 2012: 44). It can be legitimately argued that one of the reasons why NATO works effectively as a collective military alliance is the similarity in the military norms and practices across its 29 member states. Similarly, NATO’s supranational institutional structures have been developing and integrating for 70 years and have proved adept at accommodating various phases of expansion and the incorporation of new member states’ militaries. Invoking Enloe (2000: 131) to ask ‘where are the women?’ provides a valuable starting point for the study of international institutions and understanding if, and how, they operate as institutions of hegemonic masculinity. This question makes men visible in a way they were not before (Enloe and Zalewski, 1999: 138). It draws attention not just to the reliance of institutions on women, but on the relationship between women and men (Enloe, 2014: 131). The location of women and men within an organisational structure is indicative of the value ascribed to them. To understand the ways in which military institutions are gendered it is necessary to investigate not only the meanings of masculinity and femininity, but also to ask ‘how these meanings determine where women are and what they think about being there’ (Enloe, 2014: 8). Military institutions analyse their own gender and racialised cultures, often to support operational effectiveness (Henry, 2017b: 187). Such analysis is something NATO engages in, albeit selectively. As we discuss below, NATO has been elusive in publishing up-to-date figures on gender balance and diversity in NATO HQ in recent years. This stands in contrast to the push for transparency from the NCGP on gender and diversity among NATO armed forces. As we discuss in Chapter 2, the NCGP now publishes an annual report detailing the status of women and engagement with Women, Peace and Security across NATO member and partner states (NATO, 2017). There is therefore a significant discrepancy between the transparency expected of NATO member and partner states, compared to that practiced by NATO as an institution itself. Despite this opaqueness on sharing data on those employed at NATO HQ, efforts to address gender and diversity have emerged since the early 2000s. However, as Ahmed (2007) draws attention to, the language of diversity is problematic. For postcolonial scholars, it ‘reifies difference as something that exists “in” the bodies or culture of others, such that difference becomes a national property’ (Ahmed, 2007: 235). Management studies scholars have highlighted the commodification of ‘diversity’ and how it is bound up with neoliberal logics. Difference is individualised, and the term distracts from continuing systemic inequalities (Ahmed, 2007: 236). When institutions embrace ‘diversity’, it can be read as a lack of commitment to change (Ahmed, 2007: 236). In the context of a military institution, diversity takes on new meanings. Diversity for NATO is understood narrowly as referring to national representation or gender, rather than race, disability or other characteristics (NATO, 2011). For example, NATO does not collect data on the ethnicity of its staff (NATO, 2011). The focus on national representation is to be expected given this has proved a highly sensitive issue for an expanding multilateral institution (Dijkstra, 2015: 13). Yet, the silence in respect to race and ethnicity in NATO’s understanding of, and data on, diversity serves to depoliticise ‘diversity’ through divorcing it from wider intersectional understandings (Henry, 2017b: 185). The absence of efforts to address diversity beyond national representation and gender could indicate that this is a controversial issue among NATO member states. NATO relies on consensus-based decision making, reflective of its position as an alliance, rather than an supranational body. No member can be forced to take a position it does not agree with (Pouliot, 2016). The conflation of gender with diversity by NATO (NATO, 2016) is also problematic, but is perhaps reflective of a broader articulation of diversity within military contexts (Woodward and Winter, 2006; Kronsell, 2012). This understanding of diversity at a national level may help explain why diversity has been introduced at NATO in this way. Diversity as ‘gender diversity’ means adding women to existing structures, rather than seeking to ‘regender’ them (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015). An approach which ‘adds women and stirs’ does not challenge gendered structures. As Hudson (2009: 291) argues such liberal approaches ‘add’ women to the ‘discourse with the assumption that they will behave like men when given men’s roles and that the fundamental frameworks … though they were created by men for men, are unproblematic and will remain intact’. This contradicts the lived experiences of many women (Hudson, 2009: 291). Moreover, the gender diversity argument is problematic because it rests on the assumption that women are something inherently different to men, and will perform the diversity expected of them (Kronsell, 2012: 67). The result, as Kronsell (2012: 67) argues, is that ‘the majority is simultaneously constructed as homogenous and as naturally associated with the organisation’. In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit established a task force to address imbalance in gender, age and national representation. The subsequent report opposed the imposition of quotas to support representation but did recommend the creation of an Action Plan (NATO, 2011). These efforts predate NATO’s engagement with WPS and, until 2014, the two were treated as separate in NATO policies. This is despite the fact that UNSCR 1325 calls for the ‘increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000). The Action Plan produced by the task force covered the period from 2007 to 2010. It is not available publicly.1 However, the NATO website states that the Action Plan had three key objectives: (1) to maintain a NATO Diversity Framework and Policy; (2) to improve NATO’s work environment; and (3) to promote the image of NATO as an ‘employer of choice’ (NATO, 2011), the third objective drawing attention to the instrumental benefits of being seen to engage with gender and diversity issues for improving NATO’s image. This is also reflected in NATO’s more recent engagement with WPS which has identified NATO’s engagement with the agenda as a positive public relations story (Wright, 2019: 98). It is not evident whether NATO revised the 2007–10 Action Plan as the related webpage has not been updated since 2011 (NATO, 2011). The approval and implementation of a revised Diversity Action Plan is an outcome for the 2016 NATO/EAPC Policy, yet the existence of such a document has not been made public. This could also indicate that there has not been one in place since the previous one expired in 2010. A revision of the Action Plan should be accompanied by the public release of up-to-date gender and diversity data so it is possible to review what progress NATO has made. Despite some advances in women’s representation, it is of little surprise that NATO has been accused of being an anachronistic ‘men-only club’ (Harrison, 2014). Reports on gender and diversity within the International Staff have not been made publicly available since 2012 (NATO, 2012c). The latest data on gender balance at NATO Headquarters comes from the Global Study on the Implementation of the WPS agenda commissioned by UN Women. The report finds that at NATO Headquarters in Brussels just six of the 38 (16%) executive leadership positions are held by women (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 258). NATO’s international military command structures (NATO HQ, Allied Command Operations -ACO, Allied Command Transformation – ACT) are also largely staffed by men. The NCGP is currently the only NATO committee to be headed by a woman. At the highest levels of NATO’s governance structures, some small progress has been made towards women’s inclusion. For example, representation of women in NATO’s principle decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has significantly improved in recent years with women now making up 28% of permanent representatives (NATO, 2018c), compared to 11% just four years ago (Fellin, 2014: 22). In contrast, there are no women representatives on the Military Committee (NATO, 2018a). This could be viewed as surprising given women now account for 24% of NATO defence ministers (NATO, 2018b). However, it also reflects the fact that NATO armed forces member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2013), at an average of just 10.9% women (NATO, 2017). So while gendered institutions can and are found in all areas of social and political life, military institutions represent an ‘extreme’ case (Carreiras, 2006: 40). ‘Gender war roles’ have been shown to be a hardy feature, serving ‘to organise men’s bodies into military organisations and women’s bodies out’ (Kronsell, 2016: 2). The under-representation of women is the responsibility of member states, and in respect to the Defence Ministers, reflective of a wider absence of women in politics from key government portfolios (Annesley and Gains, 2012). Yet, the improvements made in working towards gender balance among permanent representatives, and in NATO defence ministers, also suggest that there is an appetite among member states for women to be better represented. NATO remains an institution dominated by men in decision-making roles. It is also a long way from even considering the possibility of a woman as Secretary General (Harrison, 2014). Yet the few senior women within NATO are increasingly visible in outward-facing roles. For example, Rose Gottemoeller became the first woman to hold the position of Deputy Secretary General in 2016. The NATO Spokesperson, Oana Lungescu, is another example of a woman appointed to a position central to the alliance’s public presentation, and the Press Office remains an exception as a department to reach a gender balance (six women to six men) (NATO, 2018d). The Assistant Secretary for General Public Diplomacy also provides an exception among the Assistant Secretary General Portfolios as one held more than once by a woman. The appointment of an Assistant Secretary General is much coveted by allies because of the prestige and influence which comes with the post. This has historically been a legacy position and dominated by the larger allies. However, Secretary General Rasmussen was successful in opening all positions, including Assistant Secretary General, to open competition (Dijkstra, 2015: 12). This paved the way for the Croatian Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović2 to take office in 2011. It is also noteworthy that GrabarKitarović became the unofficial figurehead for NATO’s engagement with Women, Peace and Security prior to the creation of the NATO Special Representative on WPS in 2012 (Baker, 2015). The position has also been held by two other women: Stefanie Babst (acting, 2010–11) and Carmen Romero (2016–). This demonstrates a trend for senior women within NATO to be appointed to roles with high public visibility, rather than those roles considered to constitute the core business of NATO as a defence and security institution (Wright, 2016: 358). The outsider observer could be left with the impression that there has been a greater challenge to the dominance of men’s bodies within NATO than there actually has been. Directing our scrutiny upwards to take intersectionality seriously through identifying the gendered and racialised structures upholding military institutions is also necessary. This requires moving beyond understanding multiple differences and their impact upon the individual. It requires exposing ‘intersecting oppressions or systems of oppression’ (Crenshaw, 1989; Crenshaw et al., 1991) in order to provide the tools to challenge the ‘hegemonic position of men (or some women)’ in military structures (Henry, 2017b: 195). An intersectional lens exposes the ‘privileges, benefits, and power gains maintained and crystallized through either the power of the military or the patriarchy itself’ (Henry, 2017b: 195). As Henry argues, only by re-politicising intersectionality through this understanding does it become possible to ‘smash imperial white supremacist capitalist heteropatriarchy’ (Henry, 2018). Perhaps reflective of NATO’s reluctance to address diversity as an issue related to race and ethnicity, the characteristics of the military male body within NATO are also noteworthy. From a visual analysis of Figure 1.1 (below) we see the dominance of white men’s bodies in the NATO Military Committee. This is also reflected in the composition of the NAC (although as noted above there are some women at the table) (NATO, 2018c). The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s pre-eminent decision-making body might be more diverse in terms of gender, yet it also glaringly white. Like the NAC, which is composed of member states’ permanent representatives to NATO, the Military Committee is made up of member states’ Military Representatives.3 Both forums rely on member states to populate them. NATO member states have a sizeable number of non-white citizens who are not reflected here. The composition of the NATO Military Committee also mirrors the European Union’s Military Committee (Kronsell, 2015: 9). The defining characteristics of elite military leaders across Europe and the West has changed little, bar a few exceptions, since NATO’s foundation 70 years ago. Militaries, particularly in a European and a North American context, are exemplars of institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995: 213). The national armed forces of NATO member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2010). Traditionally, it is men and men’s bodies that have (almost exclusively) occupied the structures of military institutions, at every level in varying positions of power and subordination (Higate, 2003).NATO as an institution 33 The dominance of men’s bodies and masculine practices (Kronsell, 2015: 284) and a division of labour along gender lines both in terms of roles and physical space (Acker, 1990: 146–7) are evident within NATO. This recreates norms and practices associated with masculinity and heterosexuality, which when coupled with institutional power results in hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2005: 281). However, in much the same way that hegemonic masculinity is not ‘numerically’ dominant among men (Connell, 2005), the conceptualisation of institutions of hegemonic masculinity incorporates more than the mere physical presence (or dominance) of male bodies. Describing an occupation as feminised or masculinised, or more generically as gendered, is not at the same as noting that it is dominated by men or women. Identifying where women and men are within the organisational structure is a useful starting point because military institutions are built on gender war roles, which tend to organise men’s bodies in and women’s bodies out (Kronsell, 2015). However, conflating the two can keep us from seeing contexts in which work dominated by men, for example, is more or less masculinised. It may also obscure the historical process through which definitions of gender-appropriate work are shaped. In addition to this dominance of men’s bodies, the norms, behaviours and discourses of NATO, transferred up and through national military structures, are also heavily masculinised. ‘Internal’ hegemonic masculinity (in Hinojosa’s (2010) conceptualisation) is also produced as a configuration of everyday social Figure 1.1 179th Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session, May 2018, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium.34 NATO as an institution practice (Hurley, 2018a). For example, perceived transgressions from the ideal type militarised masculinity are policed through trivialisation and feminisation (Hurley, 2018a: 4) or the ‘rules-in-use’ (Leach and Lowndes, 2007: 186). In this sense NATO is taken as a site of hegemonic masculinity wherein particular processes and relationships are located, through which individual and collective groups of men and women conduct gendered lives (Connell, 2005a: 71). NATO also occupies a position within the international security infrastructure and in this sense its actions (as a collective organisation) are situated, and saturated in international security discourses that value and privilege the masculine – ‘strength’, ‘rationality’ – over the feminine – ‘weakness, emotion’ (Via, 2010: 43; Tickner, 1992; Hooper, 2001) and are imbued with narratives of masculinist protection (Young, 2003) as we outline above. This leads us to argue that NATO is not just an institution of hegemonic masculinity but an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This extends the understanding of NATO’s as a ‘teaching machine’ sharing lessons on the integration of women in the military and the value of WPS (Enloe, 1981; Wright, 2016). There are two co-constituting elements to NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity (see Figure 1.2 below). First, NATO, we argue, through socialisation of 29 member states and a growing number of partner states, the value of military masculinity is ‘learned’. NATO states meeting at the level of the North Atlantic Council, through the Military Committee or in other fora such as committees (including the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives), learn from each other what NATO’s role in the world is and how this should be embodied. Through NATO operations, including the former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and current operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, NATO, member and partner states work together and learn in practice what these values are. Second, NATO, as we argue above, has therefore taken on the role of masculinist protector which reinforces hegemonic militaristic, masculine ideals and norms. The enactment of this masculine protection logic further reinforces the notion of NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This feeds into, and is further reinforced through, NATO’s role as ‘teaching machine’. Figure 1.2 Conceptualising NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. The two aspects of NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity are therefore co-constitutive. As we go into discuss in Chapters 2 and 5, this helps explain why NATO’s engagement with Women, Peace and Security and a gender perspective has been outward-facing, something NATO can engage with and utilise externally rather than being used to reflect inwards on NATO itself.