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2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › NATO

NATO is an international system of hegemonic masculinity which reinforces gendered hierarchies through a masculine protection logic

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 23-35. LJS

In order to understand how institutions can come to be ‘institution of hegemonic masculinity’, we first need to consider how they are gendered. Connell (2005: 73) argues that institutions ‘are substantively, not just metaphorically, gendered’. Gender is understood as prescriptive. It is based upon socially constructed perceptions of the activities and actions appropriate for each gender. It is also relational, which means that masculinities and femininities do not exist independently (Kronsell, 2016: 106). The gendering of institutions manifests in fluid, intersecting and contradictory ways, but largely in a manner that privileges those individuals or groups in positions of power within organisations – these are usually (though not exclusively) men. Consequently, patterns of inequality, disadvantage and subordination result from this gendered privileging. This means that ‘advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and feminine’ (Acker, 1990: 146). Institutions are gendered in the way they include, or exclude, gender from policy processes and this contributes to the way in which power is structured and normalised (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 582). Gender and gendered identities are intertwined in the day-to-day activities of the institution, rather than pre-existing in society or fixed to individuals (Mackay, Kenny and Chappell, 2010: 580). Gender can therefore be viewed as an organising principle (Walby, 2009: 260). These are built upon ‘organisation history and associated with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 2002: 844). Taking institutions seriously as gendered spaces equips us with an understanding of how actors, institutional culture and structures shape policies (Gains and Lowndes, 2014: 525). Institutions, conceptualised as both formal and informal rules and norms, do not operate in a bubble, rather they reflect wider social hierarchies and reproduce gender norms through including or silencing gender from the policy-making process (Guerrina, Chappell and Wright, 2018: 1041). NATO’s role as a military actor means it falls into the category of an ‘extreme case of the gendered organisation’ (Carreiras, 2006: 40). Britton (2000) outlines three criteria for gendered institutions which are applicable to NATO. These are: (1) structures that make a distinction between masculinity and femininity; (2) the preponderance of male bodies; and (3) built upon hegemonic masculinities (Britton, 2000). The formalisation of these norms contributes to the construction of gender regimes, reifying gendered power structures. A gender regime is a ‘set of interconnected gender relations and gendered institutions that constitute a system’ (Walby, 2009: 104, 2011: 301). Gender regimes refer to the configuration of gender relations in a particular setting, they exist in all institutional structures and at the same time are unique to each institutional context (Walby, 1997: 6). They are built upon ‘organisation history and associated with a different configuration of personal experiences and consciousness’ (Connell, 2002: 844). Gender regimes therefore operate in myriad ways and at different intersecting levels, from cultural to institutional and organisational. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 6) identify the gender regime of an institution as ‘the patterning of gender relations in that institution and especially the continuing pattern which provides the structural context of particular relationships and individual practices’. So, if we accept that institutions are gendered, what counts as an institution of hegemonic masculinity? In the broadest sense such institutions can be defined as ones ‘largely governed by men’ that have produced and recreated norms and practices associated with masculinity and heterosexuality (Kronsell, 2005: 281). This helps explain why women in minority positions among men in organisation structures were likely to become ‘tokens’, perceived of as representative of all women (Kanter, 1977: 382). However, in much the same way that hegemonic masculinity is not ‘numerically’ dominant, the conceptualisation of institutions of hegemonic masculinity incorporates more than the mere physical presence (or dominance) of men’s bodies. Institutions of hegemonic masculinity serve a particular (common) purpose: they are institutions or organisations where male power and dominance is reified and reinforced through organisational practices and discourses (see for example, Cohn, 1987). They are spaces within which particular masculine behaviours and practices are normalised, where particular understandings of masculinities (and femininities) are (re)produced and formalised. As Hooper notes: ‘Masculinity appears to have no stable ingredients and therefore its power depends entirely on certain qualities constantly being associated with men … masculine spaces are precisely the places where such associations are cemented and naturalised’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). In this sense, institutions of hegemonic masculinity provide such a space; where cultural norms that privilege men, and values associated with masculinity, intersect with institutional power structures and the physical presence of male bodies, to cement male dominance. The organisational space provides the link between cultural ideals and institutional power that Connell (2005: 77) argues is required for the establishment of hegemony. As Kronsell argues, ‘to be hegemonic, cultural norms must be supported by institutional power’ (Kronsell, 2005: 281). Though not exclusively ‘male spaces’, institutions of hegemonic masculinity are also traditionally patterned through a high level of segregation between the sexes and particular gendered divisions of labour. Institutions have traditionally constructed different spheres of activity for women and men to occupy – and this historically constructed division (and the norms it creates around male behaviour) helps to secure the continuity of institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2005: 285). Institutions of hegemonic masculinity therefore provide the structural space for the (re)production of particular cultural understandings of gender, power and inequality. Institutions of hegemonic masculinity are organisations where male power and dominance is reified and reinforced through both formal and informal practices and discourses. They are spaces within which particular masculine behaviours, ways of ‘being’ and ‘doing’ are normalised; where particular understandings of masculinities (and femininities) are (re)produced and formalised. Yet within institutions of hegemonic masculinity, masculinity itself is usually silent, or ‘unseen’ due to its ubiquity (Kronsell, 2005). The process of normalisation, of making masculine practices and behaviours the ‘norm for appropriate conduct’, makes masculinity appear ‘natural’ and therefore difficult to critique (Kronsell, 2005: 282–4). Masculinity is ‘not named’ because it omnipresent, all-encompassing within these particular institutions. Indeed, as Acker argues, ‘as a relational phenomenon, gender is difficult to see when only the masculine is present’ (Kronsell, 1990: 142). Masculinity is not a stable construct and appears to have no ‘stable ingredients’ (Hooper, 2001: 230). Institutions of hegemonic masculinity provide a key site for this contestation; where cultural norms which privilege men, and values associated with masculinity, intersect with institutional power structures and the physical presence of male bodies, to cement male dominance. The organisational space provides the link between cultural ideals and institutional power that is required for the establishment of hegemony (Connell, 2005: 77). It is important to stress here that existence of hegemonic masculinity in the military context does not preclude transformation of military institutions through challenging hegemonic masculinities. Such a transformation would create an institution which ‘equally values “masculine” and “feminine” traits, so much so that they cease to be masculine and feminine’ (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015: 12). Duncanson and Woodward argue that a ‘regendered military’ is one where: soldiering is not a masculine identity, but becomes much more fluid, and is constructed through relations of equality, empathy, care, respect, and recognition of similarities and shared experiences. The displacement of gendered dichotomies is immediately recognizable in this conceptualization. Not only are the meanings of masculinity and femininity questioned, but so is the valuing of masculinity over femininity and therefore the hierarchical thinking and material domination that has characterized gender relations. There therefore remain possibilities to displace hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 2005; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005). Even if these possibilities have been lost in application empirical case studies. As Duncanson (2015: 244) argues, to realise this, ‘hierarchical relations must be replaced with relations of equality, mutual respect, or empathy’. She critiques Connell’s (2002) suggestion that the transition phase should be one where a masculinity open to equality within women is hegemonised. Rather, the transitory stage has to be one where traditionally disparaged, feminized traits are newly valued and incorporated into ‘softer’ or hybrid masculinities. The forging of more equal relations is the ultimate, more challenging stage. The hybrid stage may make it more likely that relations of equality, mutual respect, empathy, and so on, are formed, however, so rather than dismiss the New Man syndrome in all its contexts, assuming it always camouflages the continuation of patriarchy, militarism, and neoliberalism, we can look to expose its contradictions and to push for those relations of equality. (Duncanson, 2015: 244) Implications for the masculinist protection logic Gender is an issue for the military (and military institutions) which ‘is often obvious, apparent and visible’ at the same time that it is ‘obscured, normalised, lived with and ignored’ (Woodward and Winter, 2007: 3). Hurley’s (2018: 16) study of men ‘doing’ gender work at NATO draws out the contradictions underpinning the way in which ‘women’s rights’ and equality are expressed within the institution. This is a recurring theme which manifests itself in NATO’s development and understanding of a gender perspective as we go onto discuss in Chapter 5. This finds gender issues articulated within a masculinist protection logic. Entwined with understanding NATO as an institution of hegemonic masculinity is therefore the logic of masculinist protection (Young, 2003). Understanding masculinist protection logic requires moving away from using gender in an explanatory manner or as a variable. For example, through attempts to connect the violence of states and institutions to particular behavioural propensities of women and men. Rather, it is necessary to understand gender as an element of interpretation. As Young (2003: 2) argues: viewing issues of war and security through a gendered lens … means seeing how a certain logic of gendered meanings and images helps organise the way people interpret events and circumstances, along with the positions and possibilities for action within them. The logic of masculinist protection extends the position of the male head of household as a protector of the family, to encompass male leaders more generally as protectors of a given population (Stiehm, 1982; Young, 2003). The logic of masculinist protection is premised on an understanding of variation and plurality in masculinities; specifically, the relationship between ‘dominative masculinity’ and that of the ‘protector masculinity’ (Young, 2003: 4). Masculinist protection recalls a ‘rather more benign image of masculinity’: ‘the role of this courageous, responsible and virtuous man is that of protector’ (Young, 2003: 4). This is constructed in opposition to an ‘other’ masculinity embodied by ‘bad’ men who exploit, harm and abuse the vulnerable for the pleasures of domination (Young, 2003: 4). The flip side to this coin is that ‘feminine subordination, in this logic, does not constitute submission to a violent and overbearing bully’ (Young, 2003: 5). Feminist subordination is not submission to a ‘dominative masculinity’ or the ‘bad men’. Subordination is this sense forms part of an exchange between the protector and the protected: ‘In return for male protection, the woman concedes critical distance from decision-making autonomy’ (Young, 2003: 4). As a consequence of this exchange the protected woman defers to the protectors judgement, looks up to him with gratitude for his manliness and admiration for his willingness to face the dangers of the world (Young, 2003: 5); this gratitude in turn reinforces his perception of his own masculinity and worth. And yet, power inequalities, domination and subordination persist within this logic: ‘the role of the masculine protector puts those protected, paradigmatically women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ (Young, 2003: 2). Drawing upon Foucault’s notion of pastoral power, Young suggests that masculinist protection is a power marked out by virtue and love (Young, 2003: 6), appearing ‘gentle and benevolent both to its wielders and to those under its sway’ (Young, 2003: 6). Military masculinity is as much about performance as it is about action (Partis-Jennings, 2017: 3). This understanding has parallels with Kronsell’s understanding of the presence and persistence of gendered norms in institutions. Here, gendered norms have been built into the ‘walls’ of institutions, whose structure appears so natural and ‘supportive’ that it becomes difficult to see them also as exclusionary barriers (Kronsell, 2005: 291). Couching gender mainstreaming initiatives and framing the gender perspective in a ‘supportive’ logic of masculine protection reinforces particular inequalities and barriers whilst projecting an image of care and consideration for women working both inside and outside of NATO. The logic of masculinist protection provides one particular way in which the hegemonic masculine norms of the organisation imprint on, condition and control understandings of the gender perspective. In this sense a logic of masculinist protection can be seen to be embedded within the hegemonic norms of NATO. At the more abstract level, NATO can be seen as a collectivisation of the security state, protecting its citizens from an ‘other’ and external threat, beyond the imagined borders of the alliance. The citizen, in this reading, as ‘protected’, defers decision-making autonomy to the nation state as protector and by extension the NATO alliance. In this sense NATO itself can be viewed as a masculinist protector, a role that reinforces the hegemonic militaristic ideals and norms that were identified above. This gendered logic helps NATO to define and locate itself and frame the gender perspective in a broader sense (Hurley, 2018). NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity We argue that NATO is an international military institution constituting a particular gender regime. This leads NATO to function as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. NATO is characterised by a particular gendered division of labour (both in regard to particular jobs that women and men ‘traditionally’ occupy, and to those that women are still excluded either formally or informally from) (Connell, 2002, 2006: 7). NATO is also characterised by gendered relations of power expressed through gendered institutional practices, symbolism and discourses. Although a complex institution with a dual political-military structure, NATO’s purpose is as a military alliance committed to collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management (NATO, 2010). NATO armed forces composed of national militaries are therefore a focal point of alliance activity. Yet, the national armed forces of NATO member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2013). This offers one way in which we can argue that NATO is premised upon hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2012). At this point, it is worth offering a note of caution when extrapolating from the ‘national’ to the ‘international’. As Connell and Messerschmidt note when discussing a ‘global gender order’: ‘it is tempting to assume a simple hierarchy of power and authority, running from global to regional to local’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 850) – or indeed from the national to the international. Power, authority and gender are constructed and contested at multiple, multifaceted levels. NATO is an institution made up of the military forces of multiple and varied national armed forces with particular cultural practices and variation and, in this sense, there is a danger of oversimplifying the concept of ‘the military’. However, as Goldstein (2001) has identified, militaries are ‘institutions that have largely been governed by men and have produced and recreated norms and practices associated with particular forms and ideals of masculinity that are surprisingly consistent across cultures and time’ (in Kronsell, 2012: 44). It can be legitimately argued that one of the reasons why NATO works effectively as a collective military alliance is the similarity in the military norms and practices across its 29 member states. Similarly, NATO’s supranational institutional structures have been developing and integrating for 70 years and have proved adept at accommodating various phases of expansion and the incorporation of new member states’ militaries. Invoking Enloe (2000: 131) to ask ‘where are the women?’ provides a valuable starting point for the study of international institutions and understanding if, and how, they operate as institutions of hegemonic masculinity. This question makes men visible in a way they were not before (Enloe and Zalewski, 1999: 138). It draws attention not just to the reliance of institutions on women, but on the relationship between women and men (Enloe, 2014: 131). The location of women and men within an organisational structure is indicative of the value ascribed to them. To understand the ways in which military institutions are gendered it is necessary to investigate not only the meanings of masculinity and femininity, but also to ask ‘how these meanings determine where women are and what they think about being there’ (Enloe, 2014: 8). Military institutions analyse their own gender and racialised cultures, often to support operational effectiveness (Henry, 2017b: 187). Such analysis is something NATO engages in, albeit selectively. As we discuss below, NATO has been elusive in publishing up-to-date figures on gender balance and diversity in NATO HQ in recent years. This stands in contrast to the push for transparency from the NCGP on gender and diversity among NATO armed forces. As we discuss in Chapter 2, the NCGP now publishes an annual report detailing the status of women and engagement with Women, Peace and Security across NATO member and partner states (NATO, 2017). There is therefore a significant discrepancy between the transparency expected of NATO member and partner states, compared to that practiced by NATO as an institution itself. Despite this opaqueness on sharing data on those employed at NATO HQ, efforts to address gender and diversity have emerged since the early 2000s. However, as Ahmed (2007) draws attention to, the language of diversity is problematic. For postcolonial scholars, it ‘reifies difference as something that exists “in” the bodies or culture of others, such that difference becomes a national property’ (Ahmed, 2007: 235). Management studies scholars have highlighted the commodification of ‘diversity’ and how it is bound up with neoliberal logics. Difference is individualised, and the term distracts from continuing systemic inequalities (Ahmed, 2007: 236). When institutions embrace ‘diversity’, it can be read as a lack of commitment to change (Ahmed, 2007: 236). In the context of a military institution, diversity takes on new meanings. Diversity for NATO is understood narrowly as referring to national representation or gender, rather than race, disability or other characteristics (NATO, 2011). For example, NATO does not collect data on the ethnicity of its staff (NATO, 2011). The focus on national representation is to be expected given this has proved a highly sensitive issue for an expanding multilateral institution (Dijkstra, 2015: 13). Yet, the silence in respect to race and ethnicity in NATO’s understanding of, and data on, diversity serves to depoliticise ‘diversity’ through divorcing it from wider intersectional understandings (Henry, 2017b: 185). The absence of efforts to address diversity beyond national representation and gender could indicate that this is a controversial issue among NATO member states. NATO relies on consensus-based decision making, reflective of its position as an alliance, rather than an supranational body. No member can be forced to take a position it does not agree with (Pouliot, 2016). The conflation of gender with diversity by NATO (NATO, 2016) is also problematic, but is perhaps reflective of a broader articulation of diversity within military contexts (Woodward and Winter, 2006; Kronsell, 2012). This understanding of diversity at a national level may help explain why diversity has been introduced at NATO in this way. Diversity as ‘gender diversity’ means adding women to existing structures, rather than seeking to ‘regender’ them (Duncanson and Woodward, 2015). An approach which ‘adds women and stirs’ does not challenge gendered structures. As Hudson (2009: 291) argues such liberal approaches ‘add’ women to the ‘discourse with the assumption that they will behave like men when given men’s roles and that the fundamental frameworks … though they were created by men for men, are unproblematic and will remain intact’. This contradicts the lived experiences of many women (Hudson, 2009: 291). Moreover, the gender diversity argument is problematic because it rests on the assumption that women are something inherently different to men, and will perform the diversity expected of them (Kronsell, 2012: 67). The result, as Kronsell (2012: 67) argues, is that ‘the majority is simultaneously constructed as homogenous and as naturally associated with the organisation’. In 2002, the NATO Prague Summit established a task force to address imbalance in gender, age and national representation. The subsequent report opposed the imposition of quotas to support representation but did recommend the creation of an Action Plan (NATO, 2011). These efforts predate NATO’s engagement with WPS and, until 2014, the two were treated as separate in NATO policies. This is despite the fact that UNSCR 1325 calls for the ‘increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions’ (United Nations Security Council, 2000). The Action Plan produced by the task force covered the period from 2007 to 2010. It is not available publicly.1 However, the NATO website states that the Action Plan had three key objectives: (1) to maintain a NATO Diversity Framework and Policy; (2) to improve NATO’s work environment; and (3) to promote the image of NATO as an ‘employer of choice’ (NATO, 2011), the third objective drawing attention to the instrumental benefits of being seen to engage with gender and diversity issues for improving NATO’s image. This is also reflected in NATO’s more recent engagement with WPS which has identified NATO’s engagement with the agenda as a positive public relations story (Wright, 2019: 98). It is not evident whether NATO revised the 2007–10 Action Plan as the related webpage has not been updated since 2011 (NATO, 2011). The approval and implementation of a revised Diversity Action Plan is an outcome for the 2016 NATO/EAPC Policy, yet the existence of such a document has not been made public. This could also indicate that there has not been one in place since the previous one expired in 2010. A revision of the Action Plan should be accompanied by the public release of up-to-date gender and diversity data so it is possible to review what progress NATO has made. Despite some advances in women’s representation, it is of little surprise that NATO has been accused of being an anachronistic ‘men-only club’ (Harrison, 2014). Reports on gender and diversity within the International Staff have not been made publicly available since 2012 (NATO, 2012c). The latest data on gender balance at NATO Headquarters comes from the Global Study on the Implementation of the WPS agenda commissioned by UN Women. The report finds that at NATO Headquarters in Brussels just six of the 38 (16%) executive leadership positions are held by women (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 258). NATO’s international military command structures (NATO HQ, Allied Command Operations -ACO, Allied Command Transformation – ACT) are also largely staffed by men. The NCGP is currently the only NATO committee to be headed by a woman. At the highest levels of NATO’s governance structures, some small progress has been made towards women’s inclusion. For example, representation of women in NATO’s principle decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), has significantly improved in recent years with women now making up 28% of permanent representatives (NATO, 2018c), compared to 11% just four years ago (Fellin, 2014: 22). In contrast, there are no women representatives on the Military Committee (NATO, 2018a). This could be viewed as surprising given women now account for 24% of NATO defence ministers (NATO, 2018b). However, it also reflects the fact that NATO armed forces member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2013), at an average of just 10.9% women (NATO, 2017). So while gendered institutions can and are found in all areas of social and political life, military institutions represent an ‘extreme’ case (Carreiras, 2006: 40). ‘Gender war roles’ have been shown to be a hardy feature, serving ‘to organise men’s bodies into military organisations and women’s bodies out’ (Kronsell, 2016: 2). The under-representation of women is the responsibility of member states, and in respect to the Defence Ministers, reflective of a wider absence of women in politics from key government portfolios (Annesley and Gains, 2012). Yet, the improvements made in working towards gender balance among permanent representatives, and in NATO defence ministers, also suggest that there is an appetite among member states for women to be better represented. NATO remains an institution dominated by men in decision-making roles. It is also a long way from even considering the possibility of a woman as Secretary General (Harrison, 2014). Yet the few senior women within NATO are increasingly visible in outward-facing roles. For example, Rose Gottemoeller became the first woman to hold the position of Deputy Secretary General in 2016. The NATO Spokesperson, Oana Lungescu, is another example of a woman appointed to a position central to the alliance’s public presentation, and the Press Office remains an exception as a department to reach a gender balance (six women to six men) (NATO, 2018d). The Assistant Secretary for General Public Diplomacy also provides an exception among the Assistant Secretary General Portfolios as one held more than once by a woman. The appointment of an Assistant Secretary General is much coveted by allies because of the prestige and influence which comes with the post. This has historically been a legacy position and dominated by the larger allies. However, Secretary General Rasmussen was successful in opening all positions, including Assistant Secretary General, to open competition (Dijkstra, 2015: 12). This paved the way for the Croatian Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović2 to take office in 2011. It is also noteworthy that GrabarKitarović became the unofficial figurehead for NATO’s engagement with Women, Peace and Security prior to the creation of the NATO Special Representative on WPS in 2012 (Baker, 2015). The position has also been held by two other women: Stefanie Babst (acting, 2010–11) and Carmen Romero (2016–). This demonstrates a trend for senior women within NATO to be appointed to roles with high public visibility, rather than those roles considered to constitute the core business of NATO as a defence and security institution (Wright, 2016: 358). The outsider observer could be left with the impression that there has been a greater challenge to the dominance of men’s bodies within NATO than there actually has been. Directing our scrutiny upwards to take intersectionality seriously through identifying the gendered and racialised structures upholding military institutions is also necessary. This requires moving beyond understanding multiple differences and their impact upon the individual. It requires exposing ‘intersecting oppressions or systems of oppression’ (Crenshaw, 1989; Crenshaw et al., 1991) in order to provide the tools to challenge the ‘hegemonic position of men (or some women)’ in military structures (Henry, 2017b: 195). An intersectional lens exposes the ‘privileges, benefits, and power gains maintained and crystallized through either the power of the military or the patriarchy itself’ (Henry, 2017b: 195). As Henry argues, only by re-politicising intersectionality through this understanding does it become possible to ‘smash imperial white supremacist capitalist heteropatriarchy’ (Henry, 2018). Perhaps reflective of NATO’s reluctance to address diversity as an issue related to race and ethnicity, the characteristics of the military male body within NATO are also noteworthy. From a visual analysis of Figure 1.1 (below) we see the dominance of white men’s bodies in the NATO Military Committee. This is also reflected in the composition of the NAC (although as noted above there are some women at the table) (NATO, 2018c). The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s pre-eminent decision-making body might be more diverse in terms of gender, yet it also glaringly white. Like the NAC, which is composed of member states’ permanent representatives to NATO, the Military Committee is made up of member states’ Military Representatives.3 Both forums rely on member states to populate them. NATO member states have a sizeable number of non-white citizens who are not reflected here. The composition of the NATO Military Committee also mirrors the European Union’s Military Committee (Kronsell, 2015: 9). The defining characteristics of elite military leaders across Europe and the West has changed little, bar a few exceptions, since NATO’s foundation 70 years ago. Militaries, particularly in a European and a North American context, are exemplars of institutions of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995: 213). The national armed forces of NATO member states are still overwhelmingly male-dominated (Schjølset, 2010). Traditionally, it is men and men’s bodies that have (almost exclusively) occupied the structures of military institutions, at every level in varying positions of power and subordination (Higate, 2003).NATO as an institution 33 The dominance of men’s bodies and masculine practices (Kronsell, 2015: 284) and a division of labour along gender lines both in terms of roles and physical space (Acker, 1990: 146–7) are evident within NATO. This recreates norms and practices associated with masculinity and heterosexuality, which when coupled with institutional power results in hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell, 2005: 281). However, in much the same way that hegemonic masculinity is not ‘numerically’ dominant among men (Connell, 2005), the conceptualisation of institutions of hegemonic masculinity incorporates more than the mere physical presence (or dominance) of male bodies. Describing an occupation as feminised or masculinised, or more generically as gendered, is not at the same as noting that it is dominated by men or women. Identifying where women and men are within the organisational structure is a useful starting point because military institutions are built on gender war roles, which tend to organise men’s bodies in and women’s bodies out (Kronsell, 2015). However, conflating the two can keep us from seeing contexts in which work dominated by men, for example, is more or less masculinised. It may also obscure the historical process through which definitions of gender-appropriate work are shaped. In addition to this dominance of men’s bodies, the norms, behaviours and discourses of NATO, transferred up and through national military structures, are also heavily masculinised. ‘Internal’ hegemonic masculinity (in Hinojosa’s (2010) conceptualisation) is also produced as a configuration of everyday social Figure 1.1 179th Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session, May 2018, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium.34 NATO as an institution practice (Hurley, 2018a). For example, perceived transgressions from the ideal type militarised masculinity are policed through trivialisation and feminisation (Hurley, 2018a: 4) or the ‘rules-in-use’ (Leach and Lowndes, 2007: 186). In this sense NATO is taken as a site of hegemonic masculinity wherein particular processes and relationships are located, through which individual and collective groups of men and women conduct gendered lives (Connell, 2005a: 71). NATO also occupies a position within the international security infrastructure and in this sense its actions (as a collective organisation) are situated, and saturated in international security discourses that value and privilege the masculine – ‘strength’, ‘rationality’ – over the feminine – ‘weakness, emotion’ (Via, 2010: 43; Tickner, 1992; Hooper, 2001) and are imbued with narratives of masculinist protection (Young, 2003) as we outline above. This leads us to argue that NATO is not just an institution of hegemonic masculinity but an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This extends the understanding of NATO’s as a ‘teaching machine’ sharing lessons on the integration of women in the military and the value of WPS (Enloe, 1981; Wright, 2016). There are two co-constituting elements to NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity (see Figure 1.2 below). First, NATO, we argue, through socialisation of 29 member states and a growing number of partner states, the value of military masculinity is ‘learned’. NATO states meeting at the level of the North Atlantic Council, through the Military Committee or in other fora such as committees (including the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives), learn from each other what NATO’s role in the world is and how this should be embodied. Through NATO operations, including the former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and current operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan, NATO, member and partner states work together and learn in practice what these values are. Second, NATO, as we argue above, has therefore taken on the role of masculinist protector which reinforces hegemonic militaristic, masculine ideals and norms. The enactment of this masculine protection logic further reinforces the notion of NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. This feeds into, and is further reinforced through, NATO’s role as ‘teaching machine’. Figure 1.2 Conceptualising NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity. The two aspects of NATO’s role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity are therefore co-constitutive. As we go into discuss in Chapters 2 and 5, this helps explain why NATO’s engagement with Women, Peace and Security and a gender perspective has been outward-facing, something NATO can engage with and utilise externally rather than being used to reflect inwards on NATO itself.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Military

Militaries act as organized reproduction of hegemonic masculinity and appropriate feminist analysis to violent ends

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 21-23. LJS

Militarised masculinities (plural) have been the source of much scholarly debate and discussion in the field of Critical Military Studies (see for example: Henry, 2017b; Higate, 2018; Henry, 2018). Military institutions are spaces which privilege militarised masculinities over femininities. This matters because they function as sites for the production of culture and gender. For example, the social capital ascribed to forms of martiality (associated with masculinity) within most societies contributes to the ‘glorification of men’s participation in violence and war’ (Enloe, 1994; Henry, 2017b: 187). As a result, it is necessary to examine the socialisation process which takes place in militarised settings (Henry, 2017b: 187). It is also important to note that this process is far from homogenous, indeed, it is complex and often contradictory. The shape militarised masculinities takes differs among military institutions tasked with defence of the air, sea and land. Further permutations are found at national, regional and international level military institutions. One consistency is that it has always been a feature of sustaining militaries and militarism more broadly. Militaries have, traditionally, constructed a very narrowly defined, hegemonic ideal of militarised masculinity. In this sense the (re)production and promotion of hegemonic masculinity in a military context is devised in relation to the primary aim of the organisation, of war fighting and the deployment of violence. As Connell identifies: ‘studies of state military forces show an organisational effort to produce and make hegemonic a narrowly defined masculinity which will make its bearers efficient in producing the organisation’s effects of violence’ (Connell, 2005: 259). The military is therefore a space where qualities associated with war fighting, security and defence are ‘constantly associated with men’ (Hooper, 2001: 230) and men’s bodies, where soldiering is intimately fused with masculinity. As an institution of hegemonic masculinity the military also promotes the association of men, masculinity and soldiering via physicality and sexuality, largely in opposition/relation to the feminine other (Morgan, 1994; Bourke, 1996; Hooper, 2001; Via, 2010). The promotion – and often aggressive reinforcement – of heterosexuality has been seen as an essential tool for promoting social cohesion and comradery between men within the military (Kronsell, 2012: 44). Traditionally, this fusion of men, masculinity and soldiering within militaries has been facilitated by a literal exclusion of the feminine and homosexual other. Where women have been included in military forces, their inclusion was initially premised on exclusion from particular roles and occupations, particularly those defined as ‘direct combat’ roles (see for example, Kornblum, 1984; Horrigan, 1992). And homosexual men and women have traditionally served without22 NATO as an institution disclosure of their sexual orientation. In this regard, Hinojosa identifies that hegemonic masculinity in the military manifests in both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ forms. External in the sense that: ‘masculine power is embedded in the structure of the institution’ (2010: 180). Examples of this can include the banning of women from particular combat roles and the military rank system, which ‘ensures that some men maintain dominance over other men and women’ (2010: 180–1) and represent the gendered division of labour that characterises Connell’s (2006) conceptualisation of institutional gender regimes. Internal hegemony in Hinojosa’s conceptualisation is ‘the hierarchical structuring of masculinities such that some constructs are dominant and privileged over other masculinities and femininities’ (2010: 181). For example, subordinate masculinities in a military context are often patterned on a civilian/military divide, the variation of occupational roles and across the various branches of the armed forces (Higate, 2003; Barrett, 2008; Duncanson, 2009). Hinojosa’s study of the construction of particular hegemonic masculine ideals in the American military found that non-military personnel, service members of different branches, ranks and occupational specialities were cast as less physically able, less self-disciplined, less willing to take risks by pre-active duty servicemen, thereby creating patterns of ‘discursive domination’ (2010: 179). In this sense, hegemonic masculinities within a military context are both (organisationally) structural and a configuration of everyday gendered social practice whereby individuals construct gender identities in relation and opposition to other women and men (Connell, 2005; Hinojosa, 2010: 181). In relation to the military, Duncanson (2013) argues that there has been a ‘softening’ of dominant forms of masculinity (see also, Niva, 1998; Whitworth, 2004); as the hegemonic ideal appropriates certain characteristics from both subordinate masculinities and femininity in order to ‘refashion’ the ideal and respond to shifting cultural expectations (Duncanson, 2013: 61–2). Like Demetriou (2001) and Messner (2007), the sceptical view is that this appropriation, whilst refashioning expectations and masculine ideals within the military, reinforces difference and inequality. For example, Duncanson suggests that ‘the new man of the military often depends on the construction of those in areas of conflict as primitive, inherently and excessively violent and barbaric, or as helpless victims’ (Duncanson, 2013: 61, 2009). The assertion here is that even ‘ostensibly progressive masculinities can have a deeply regressive effect’ and ‘often further disempowers those already lacking power, security and wealth’ (Duncanson, 2013: 61). Therefore, hegemonic masculinities, as an assemblage of appropriated traits that continue to be premised on reformulated patterns of exclusion and subordination inhibit rather than indicate a potential for transformative change. In a military context, hegemonic masculinity has been used to explain why it is that the creation of the ‘New Man’ (for example, the heroic peacekeeper, the humanitarian soldier scholar) has not resulted in gender equality or for that matter, genuine peace and security on many military interventions. Yet, perhaps the utility of the concept leads to too hasty conclusions in feminist scholarship; to the automatic assumption that change in masculinities is little more than the ‘flexibility of the machinery of rule’ (Duncanson, 2013: 71). Duncanson offers an important note of caution on the negative connotations of appropriation, change and transformation of hegemonic masculinity, stating that it is too deterministic. She argues that ‘there is nothing in the concept itself which necessitates an interpretation that it always inevitably shifts in order that men retain power; that it can never be transformed, dismantled’ (Duncanson, 2013: 63). Connell and Messerschmidt argue that research on hegemonic masculinity ‘needs to give much closer attention to the practices of women and to the historical interplay of femininities and masculinities’ (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 848). To do so, it is necessary to centralise interaction of women and men, of masculinities and femininities in and through specific institutional practices. In doing so, we provide examples of understanding the construction of particular hegemonic and subordinate masculinities and femininities within NATO. It is therefore necessary to avoid essentialism, and assumed (negative) types, while acknowledging the fluidity and hybridity between masculinities and femininities. Hegemonic masculinity therefore remains a valuable theoretical and analytical tool, particularly when applied to a militarised institutional setting such as NATO.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › “Manpower”

Use of the term “manpower” serves to gender labor in military institutions and devalue women’s roles

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Gendering NATO’s core tasks Collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 110-112. LJS

The use of ‘manpower’ to describe human resource management remains in common parlance by NATO and in the military setting more broadly. Yet it belies the contribution of serving women. Usually, it refers to the availability of suitable recruits to fill military capacity, and often the integration of women within the military service is understood as a means to shore up recruitment shortfalls. However, early Cold War manifestations within the alliance saw it also applied to the distribution of (men and women’s) labour across NATO member states, which was deemed relevant to European security and stability, when war was deemed highly possible (NATO, 1953). There was a particular focus on the availability of skilled labour or ‘manpower’ to support the defence industry, however, population surpluses and migration with Europe were also viewed as a potential source of unrest (NATO, 1953). For example, the Working Group on Labour Mobility considered the employment (and marital status) of civilian women across different industries (NATO, 1957), supporting the notion that women have always been of central importance to the functioning of the military, in roles from camp follower, to soldier (Enloe, 1989). It was therefore through discussion of recruitment shortfalls that NATO first considered the integration of women into NATO Forces in the 1950s (NATO, 1954). These preexisting institutional priorities are important to understand as a starting point when considering the push by Senior NATO Military Women to establish a Committee on Women in NATO Forces (as discussed in Chapter 3). Their efforts were not the first time NATO considered the integration of women, even if they did bring about a focal point and the establishment of formal gender machinery within the alliance. The Expert Working Group on Labour Mobility was tasked with addressing both surpluses and shortages of ‘manpower’, reviewing member countries’ immigration policies with the aim of facilitating labour mobility. The Working Group was specifically tasked with examining: (1) ways to intensify migration; (2) projects designed to mitigate the impact of manpower shortages on defence activities; and (3) preventive plans on labour market disturbance in the case of war. The Working Group was renamed in 1956 and became the Manpower Planning Committee (NATO, 2017). They considered the impact of Italy’s surplus and the UK’s shortfall of skilled workers in the defence industry (NATO, 1953). A particularly interesting aspect of the Working Group/Committee was that it requested reports from member states on their labour mobility status be submitted to them. The reports fed into the work of the group and provided a valuable overview of the status of labour mobility within the alliance. Questionnaires were issued to member states requesting information on ‘manpower’ mobilisation, the availability and training of scientific and technical ‘manpower’, arrangements for ‘manpower’ mobilisation in a crisis, the role of employment services and the status of ‘manpower’ employed by the host country of NATO HQ (NATO, 2017).3 So, while early consideration of ‘manpower’ issues was therefore solely instrumental, it remained deeply gendered, focusing implicitly on men’s recruitment. In a 1954 annual review on national military service, only a few countries enlisted women within the military (and this was primarily to release men for employment in more active roles due to manpower shortages) (NATO, 1954). Throughout NATO’s earliest years, most member states offered limited or no employment opportunities for women in the armed forces. By the 1960s and 1970s, many countries experienced a rise in public pressure for greater equality between women and men in society. Responding to these pressures, the armed forces, too, began increasing the numbers of women within the ranks, and eventually opened up more employment opportunities that were once exclusively reserved for men (Obradovic, 2014). NATO Officials have continued to shape and reshape their respective ‘personnel policies with one eye on the personnel needs dictated by military doctrine and the other eye on the preservation of the ideological bond between masculinity and military service’ (Enloe, 1993: 85). This does not mean, however, that the approaches of NATO member states have been consistent. Rather, member states have learned the value of women in the military through interaction with each other. This leads Enloe (1981) to argue that NATO has functioned as a ‘learning machine’ or ‘teaching machine’, sharing lessons on the integration of women into the armed forces. For example, the US was successful in increasing the number of women on active duty in its armed forces during the 1990s. These women were held up by these who would once have rejected such a move as an example of the US military’s ‘social enlightenment’ (Enloe 1993: 86). The US, a leading NATO ally, began to measure other NATO member states’ sophistication on ‘their ability to incorporate at least token numbers of women without jeopardising the military’s still crucial identification with masculinized patriotism’ (Enloe, 1993: 86). The official recognition of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) in 1976 led to a shift in focus for institutional consideration of ‘manpower’ issues. CWINF provided the framework for NATO’s role as a ‘teaching machine’ in respect of women’s integration. For example, the Netherlands took a proactive approach to the integration of women into the military through opening all ranks to women from the beginning of the integration process in the 1970s and putting in place an anti-discrimination policy (Carreiras, 2006: 151). This resulted in the Dutch Army being used as a test case by NATO, taking on a ‘ “pioneer” in eliminating restrictions on women in combat and operational functions’ (Carreiras, 2006: 155–6; Bolscher and Megens, 1991: 181). For a twenty-first-century NATO, globally engaged in a broad range of theatres and activities, the preoccupation with military recruitment persists. The move away from conscription towards all volunteer forces in an increasing number NATO member states has further elevated the issue of military recruitment (Obradovic, 2014). So, while the immediate motivation for addressing recruitment shortfalls may have changed, the concern remains a pressing one. As we discuss below in relation to crisis management (and in Chapter 5 on the value of a gender perspective), women’s integration into NATO armed forces is now based on a premise that they are an operational asset and provide ‘added value’. The reconciliation of a concern with ‘manpower’ and women’s status within NATO Forces continues to be a key challenge for NATO today, albeit in a different guise. Women’s integration in NATO Forces has never been motivated by a concern that NATO military forces reflect the composition of the population they are intended to protect. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given what we uncovered in Chapter 3, early reflections on the use of this term ‘manpower’ were unsurprisingly critical. For example, remarks by the first Chair of the Committee on Women in NATO Forces, Colonel Else Martensen-Larsen, in 1975, is indicative of the tension between valuing women as an asset and advancing the status of women within the military towards equality: Whoever first coined the word ‘manpower’ did a grave disservice to the women who today, in so many countries, are dedicating themselves to vital defence tasks. I have often thought that it would be worthwhile for the highest NATO authorities to take an active interest in women’s often difficult role as members of a marked minority placed in a predominantly male world. (For, if women have successfully invaded and conquered fields which were long exclusively the province of men, the armed services still remain in many countries a well-protected enclave.)

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › IR

Gender Hierarchy represents the ordering principle of an anarchical system of IR – states operate according to constructed gendered identities where association with masculinity signals power, domination, honor, and chivalry in contrast to “weak” and “craven” femininities – this binary structure justifies the infinite exploitation and subordination of the feminized.

Sjoberg 17

Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “The invisible structures of anarchy: Gender, orders, and global politics,” Journal of International Political Theory. 2017.

The argument that gender is a constitutive element of the international system is an argument that assumptions about gender are embedded in the ordering principles of the international system. This is consonant with feminist observations of global politics, which have characterized the global political arena as a “patriarchal structure of privilege and control” (Enloe, 1993: 70). Others see the global political arena a place where “the structure of political communities has assumed gendered forms” (Steans, 2003: 43), and ordered by “gender relations [which] structure social power” (Pettman, 1996: 43). These observations are rooted in feminist work which shows gender operating in how political leaders are chosen (Tickner, 1992), how state governments work (Peterson, 1992), how militaries function (Enloe, 1989), and how economic benefit is distributed (Pettman, 1996). States have been shown their relative military prowess, judged and asserted their relative power, and demonstrated and adjusted their relative economic status through gendered competition using gendered language (e.g. Cohn, 1987). The gender hierarchy in the world “out there” can be read as replicated in the “commonsense ground” or traditional theorizing in IR, which feminist theorists (e.g. Tickner, 1988) have characterized as partial at best and unrepresentative at worst because it often analyzes the perspectives and lives of only a small, elite, male portion of the global population. Paralleling Waltz’s understanding that anarchy can be seen manifested in the function of units (states) in the international arena, in the distribution of relative capacities among those units, and in the execution of political processes, Sjoberg (2012) argued that gender is a constitutive factor in what states do, important in the distribution of states’ relative capacities, and formative of political processes among states. In substantiating the claim that gender is a constitutive factor in what states do, Sjoberg (2012) builds on previous feminist empirical work around the world3 to suggest that states define their identities in gendered ways, where gender and national identity are inextricably linked, as “all nationalisms are gendered” (McClintock, 1993) and women are often the essence and symbols of the reproduction of state and/or national identity (e.g. Yuval-Davis, 1997). Hegemonic masculinities are among the influences that constitute nationalisms as gendered, where there is an ideal-typical notion of masculinity that both states and the men in them are expected to live up to, creating a relationship between militarism, masculinity, and full citizenship (Connell, 1995; Young, 2003). For the influence of gender on distribution of capacity in the international arena, Sjoberg (2012) builds on the feminist argument that “the structural and ideological system that perpetuates the privileging of masculinist” in IR is “a principle cause for so many of the world’s processes [such as] empire-building, globalization, modernization” (Enloe, 2004: 4, 6). Differences between dominant gender presentations and subordinated gender presentations play a role in hierarchies in the international arena, where it can be commonplace “to infantilize, ignore, trivialize, or even actively cast scorn on what is thought to be feminized” (Enloe, 2004: 5). What is thought to be feminized is not just women but also states and other political actors. Feminist research has shown that association with gender-based characteristics has been used as a marker of relative power in many policy discourses in diverse places around the world (e.g. Agathangelou, 2002; Banerjee, 2012; Eichler, 2012; Weber, 1999; Zalewski, 1994). In support of the argument that gender matters in shaping political processes, Sjoberg (2012) discusses feminist work on a number of different processes in global politics, including diplomacy (Enloe, 2000), interstate jurisprudence (Charlesworth et al., 1991), international institutions (Moser and Moser, 2005), interstate competition (Peterson and Runyan, 2010), and militarization (Alexander, 2010). Feminist work on militarization, for example, has shown that gender norms are used to shape the will to fight, to sharpen training, to build group solidarity, and to condition responses to battlefield injury (e.g. Alexander, 2010; Eichler, 2012; Enloe, 1993, 2000; Goldstein, 2001; Sjoberg and Peet, 2011). While this section is not the place to definitively explore the nature, direction, and contour of the influence of gender on how the international system works, this short outline of existing evidence suggests that gender itself is an ordering principle in global politics, both influencing the identity of actors and organizing them along hierarchies within anarchy. Feminist research provides significant evidence that gender hierarchies are prevalent in global politics, and matter in not only the results but also the constitution of interstate interactions. It provides a mandate to consider gender hierarchy as an important part of the ways that we think about hierarchy in global politics. One can see these gender hierarchies manifest in a number of the everyday (violent) features of global politics— places where women are being held unequal to men at the local, state, and global levels. From rape culture to human trafficking, unpaid care labor to gender-based violence, nowhere in the world are women socially, economically, or politically held equal to men. That is hierarchy based on gender—gender hierarchy in global politics.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Cybersecurity

The field of cybersecurity reinforces patriarchal norms through threat construction and constraints within the industry

Millar, Shires, and Tropina 21

Katharine, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; James, Assistant Professor with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at the Leiden University, the Netherlands, and a fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council; Tatiana, Assistant Professor in Cybersecurity Governance with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. “Defence.” Gender approaches to cybersecurity: design, defence and response. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 2021. Pg 28-36. LJS

How we think about defence – that is, what it means to defend and the common-sense actions we take to defend – is gendered. It reflects a series of norms associated with masculinity (e.g. protection, technical competence, autonomy, etc.) that derive from military understandings of national security.63 This is often positive since it makes cybersecurity intelligible for a wide range of non-experts through the use of parallel concepts and language. It can also, however, have negative effects. Many of the challenges associated with gender and cybersecurity defence derive from a mismatch between conventional understandings of national defence and cybersecurity, which is premised upon mitigating and managing, rather than eliminating, risks. Masculine norms and expectations that relate to using force to produce physical safety, for instance, may lead policy makers to downplay nonphysical harms in cybersecurity.64 Masculine gender norms around vulnerability can make admitting error, seeking help or working cooperatively more difficult.65 This can lead to reluctance to actively pursue cybersecurity defence or to be adequate transparent about failures to clients, employees or citizens. Such norms can also lead to the prioritization of some individuals and organizations – often those seen as socially prestigious or valuable for defence and protection (such as the State, the military or large corporations) – over others (such as civil society organizations and individuals, notably women and LGBTQ+66 people).67 A full gender perspective on cybersecurity defence recognizes that civil society and groups representing women and LGBTQ+ people have a need for, and a right to, cybersecurity defence – including the State resources (in terms of capacity-building, expertise and enforcement) needed to provide it. More specifically, different elements of cybersecurity defence raise separate gender issues. Threats need to be monitored through the continuous evaluation and analysis of networks, infrastructure and devices for potential intrusions or deliberate disruption.68 Following from this, at a basic level, what is considered to be a threat is gendered. Cybersecurity is typically concerned with military and corporate security (and thus threats relating to espionage and economic theft). A gendered understanding of cybersecurity threat, however, recognizes that those “traditional” threats, such as denial of service attacks on State services, have gendered outcomes.69 It also recognizes that intimate partner violence, doxing, cyberstalking and the non-consensual dissemination of intimate images (i.e. “revenge porn”) are also threats that can arise from the intrusion into or disruption of personal devices and networks.70 In terms of technical processes, insofar as threat monitoring relies on machine learning it is vulnerable to importing the gendered issues that typify the machine learning field, including gendered assumptions built into algorithms and biased data.71 Even this largely automated process rests on human judgments about organizational priorities, allocation of resources and capacity building – all of which open the potential for the creation or intensification of inequalities. For instance, an automated email filter that identifies potentially harmful emails should flag romantic scams as well as phishing emails and financial scams.72 The processes of preparing for and responding to threats are also gendered. Threat simulations, for instance, such as the common practice of fake phishing emails, often involve gender stereotyping (e.g. a woman in an assistant role, a man as CEO).73 There is a lack of gender-disaggregated data on phishing victims, which makes the gender consequences of phishing difficult to assess. But such an assessment is essential since, if many cybersecurity breaches result from human error, policy makers need to have a variety of approaches to the “human” making the errors. Bug bounty programmes, which are a spectrum of ways for “friendly” hackers to identify an organization’s vulnerabilities and defence responses through digital, social or physical vectors, raise associated issues. As these contests are designed to be anonymous, only pseudonymic data (i.e. pertaining to hackers’ aliases) is available on prolific bounty hunters and their payments. The consequences of this anonymity are unclear: it may make it easier for women and LGBTQ+ people to participate or it may exacerbate the gendered inequalities of cybersecurity and hacking culture more generally (see the case study below). Furthermore, the characterization of threats themselves, from the hooded hacker popular in media portrayals to code names and pictures used in cybersecurity technical reports, also often include gendered qualities and harmful stereotypes.74 Finally, attempts to protect organizations (and, to some extent, individuals) from the costs and harms arising from cybersecurity attacks, predominantly through cybersecurity insurance policies, should also be assessed for gender implications.75 As with all insurance, it is important that threat assessments include gender analysis; that the criteria for being insurable can be met by women, men and non-binary people; and that pricing for organizations and individuals does not rely on gender stereotypes or produce discriminatory gender outcomes.76 4.1 Case study: talent and expertise Talent and expertise is a widely recognized issue in the cybersecurity industry. Although the question of talent and expertise obviously pertains to all aspects of cybersecurity, we focus here on the practice of “defence” (i.e. implementing security) since it is typically understood as cybersecurity’s central activity. Issues around talent and expertise are often expressed as a “gap” in cybersecurity expertise, meaning that the number of positions available is greater than the number of people qualified to fill them.77 As demonstrated by research by organizations such as the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, this talent gap is global, although pressures are expressed differently in different local contexts.78 Many States have taken steps to incentivize people to join the cybersecurity industry and improve their level of skill once there. This is frequently complicated by competitive pressure between governments and the private sector, as government positions struggle to compete with private sector salaries.79 These issues with talent and expertise are exacerbated by gendered inequality, harms and visibility. Due to space constraints, this section discusses these dynamics quite generally. Understanding how and why gendered gaps, inequalities and harms operate in context, however, requires intersectional gender analysis that looks at how gender, race, sexuality, class, and rural or urban location, among other factors, interact to support the participation of some groups in cyber fields while marginalizing others. A recent survey by the International Information System Security Certification Consortium indicated that 24 per cent of cybersecurity professionals worldwide are women.80 The 2017 Global Information Security Workforce Study found that this lack of representation was accompanied by various forms of inequality, with 87 per cent of women reporting unconscious discrimination and 19 per cent overt discrimination.81 This is a widely recognized problem, with many websites and social media accounts creating “women in cybersecurity” networks and events specifically for women.82 Similar events, networks and capacity-building initiatives also exist to support the equality, equity and participation of queer people in cybersecurity.83 Following criticism of a lack of representation and visibility in cybersecurity conferences,84 events such as the RSA Conference – a prestigious series of international information technology (IT) events – have sought to ensure gender parity in keynote speakers and to increase the participation of women overall.85 We split the gender issues for cybersecurity talent and expertise into three separate areas: the broader gender dynamics in science, technology, mathematics and engineering (STEM) professions; gender in computer science and coding; and gender in the cybersecurity industry specifically. We recognize that not all cybersecurity positions are STEM or “technical” positions; the prominence of these positions within cybersecurity reflects a gendered valuation of jobs understood as “masculine” above others. These positions are also, however, where gender disparities are most evident, and so we focus on these positions in this section. 4.1.1 Gender dynamics in STEM Gender issues within STEM professions – again understood as a “gender gap” between men and women – are well-researched and typically understood in terms of pipeline and retention.86 It should be noted that much of this research and policy follows a binary, often heteronormative understanding of gender; much more needs to be done to understand the experiences and support the equitable participation of non-binary and queer people within STEM and cybersecurity. The causes of the “gender gap” are complex and context specific. Generally, barriers to gender equality in STEM include (a) disparities in access to infrastructure and education; (b) individual- and family-level financial constraints and priorities; and (c) the persistence of sociocultural and institutional gender norms that suggest STEM professions are predominantly for men.87 In some contexts, such as Malaysia and the Middle East, women’s participation in STEM education is considerable but is not translated into STEM careers.88 In the United States of America and the United Kingdom, in contrast, girls remain less likely to be encouraged to pursue study of STEM subjects and less likely to regard themselves as holding STEM talent or expertise.89 Many of the policies aimed at increasing the participation of women in STEM can also be applied to the cybersecurity industry. These include greater incorporation of STEM skills into girls’ education;90 the promotion of STEM university programmes to girls and women;91 actively recruiting women through campus visits and social media campaigns;92 offering mentoring and continuing education to women and girls already employed within organizations; and altering human resources policies to prioritize hiring and retaining women (e.g. by requiring that at least one woman be interviewed for all open positions; by improving parental leave policies, etc.).93 Disparities are often found in senior positions in STEM and technology start-ups and, given that cybersecurity is a young and fast-evolving field, the gendered dynamics of entrepreneurship are highly relevant.94 4.1.2 Gender in computer science and coding Fields that centrally involve computers and “coding” (an unsatisfactorily generic term for a wide range of distinct skills) have well-documented gendered problems. Although, again, it differs across contexts, there is a global digital literacy gap95 between women and girls and men and boys.96 Worldwide, “327 million fewer women than men have a smartphone and can access the mobile Internet”, while women are four times less likely than men to be IT professionals.97 It is worth remembering that early computing was relatively open to women and came to be seen as a masculine profession only as it rose in social prestige through its increasing importance to the economy.98 Research has demonstrated that some online communities arranged around coding – including gaming and hacking – demonstrate a masculinist culture that emphasizes aggressive language and individuated approaches to problem-solving and technical mastery, while devaluing characteristics perceived to be associated with femininity, such as empathy and the expression of emotion.99 These cultures can be explicitly misogynistic and homophobic, referring to women primarily as sex objects and to LGBTQ+ people in hateful and exclusionary terms.100 As these communities are often seen as a talent pool for cybersecurity expertise, there is a risk that cybersecurity recruitment will import anti-feminist and exclusionary norms (i.e. attitudes and practices that oppose and devalue gender equality and racial, ethnic and sexual inclusivity) into the workplace.101 This makes work environments uncomfortable (or hostile) to those who do not conform.102 The 2017 Global Information Security Workforce Survey found that 51 per cent of women in the field had experienced discrimination, compared to 15 per cent of men.103 This primarily affects women and marginalized groups, but may also affect men who do not identify with such norms.104 Workplaces that do not have an explicitly anti-feminist culture may still be organized and operated on the assumption that most workers are men and that values and practices associated with masculinity are neutral or “normal”.105 Although often without discriminatory or conscious intent, this perpetuates the gendered structure of cybersecurity expertise and thus influences hiring, opportunities for promotion and the ability to determine policy. Where women do enter these fields, their contribution is often framed with reference to essentialist characteristics such as emotional and social skills. Although these are positive attributes, framing women’s contributions predominantly in terms of, for example, empathy or caring solidifies gender stereotypes without necessarily increasing the value attributed to emotional, social and caring aspects of cyber expertise.106 A greater presence of women (and other members of marginalized groups) working in cybersecurity is believed to have two benefits. First, it can contribute to creative problem-solving and better policy governance and implementation through the introduction of diverse perspectives.108 Second, it is believed that these perspectives will lead to a gender perspective in cybersecurity overall.109 Research indicates that this can occur but that, without support, women and members of other minoritized groups may instead feel pressure to adapt to the workplace norm.110 Tokenized incorporation of women and members of minoritized groups, without recognizing their contributions or in ways that reinforce stereotypes, do not contribute to meaningful participation or greater equality.111 4.1.3 Gender in the cybersecurity industry Some gendered issues relate specifically to the cybersecurity industry. As the field of cybersecurity is growing in importance, influence and prestige, women’s participation in cybersecurity is a matter of equality and equity in terms of opportunities for success, recognition and earning potential. Some working practices in cybersecurity, such as the shift requirements of Security Operation Centres, require further analysis to assess their gendered implications. Similarly, many cybersecurity certification programmes require intense sprints with long hours, which is an impractical work model for people (more likely to be women) with childcare responsibilities.112 More subtly, the cultivation of work environments, institutional cultures and management styles that are skeptical of traditional or conventional authority, although often praised as a characteristic of an innovative workforce, agile organization and dynamic socio-technological sector, can facilitate a narrow understanding of masculinity (and discrimination) akin to the wider fields above.113 Addressing the “gender gap” in cybersecurity expertise therefore requires policies that promote the inclusion and participation of women and gender training to reduce harassment and discrimination and to support organizational and cultural shifts to value a variety of activities and capacities, including those usually more associated with femininity.114

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Cybersecurity

Technology designs spill out to create gendered cybersecurity that causes violence and victim-blaming

Millar, Shires, and Tropina 21

Katharine, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; James, Assistant Professor with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at the Leiden University, the Netherlands, and a fellow with the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council; Tatiana, Assistant Professor in Cybersecurity Governance with the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University. “Design.” Gender approaches to cybersecurity: design, defence and response. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 2021. Pg 18-20. LJS

Over and above the specific context of cybersecurity, technology design is gendered: it misunderstands, omits and consolidates certain gendered uses, it privileges perceived masculine practices over feminine ones, and it stereotypes femininity in problematic ways.25 These gendered aspects have direct impact on cybersecurity. Many technology designers are aware of the gendered implications of their work, and there are entire subdisciplines, including user experience and user-centred design, that seek to improve technology design along gendered lines.26 The following are select examples of gendered technology design: » Virtual reality prototypes have, like many technologies, omitted women almost entirely as their intended users.27 » The choice of women voice assistants for phones, smart speakers and devices, and satellite navigation has been shown to reinforce harmful assumptions about gendered power relationships.28 » The design of technologies directly marketed to women, known as “femvertizing”, often “prey[s] on women’s assumptive need to correct problematic behaviors or unacceptable physical deviancies”.29 Gendered assumptions about what is “normal” are deployed in advertising material to encourage women to purchase products that enable them to conform or minimize “abnormal” physical and personal characteristics. » There are gendered differences in academic and industry research on technology, as in other fields, including in citation practices.30 These broader gendered aspects of technology design influence cybersecurity in several ways. Most basically, the conception of cybersecurity employed in technological design is gendered. For example, the design of smart household devices has not adequately included intimate partner violence in the “threat modelling” phase of design, meaning that supposedly secure smart devices increase gendered risks.31 Even services designed to prevent this problem, such as online resources about leaving abusive relationships, can themselves be a risk to individuals if the abuser discovers the tool. Therefore, the designers of such tools – such as emergency “exit” buttons on the websites of victim organizations – have to take these risks into account in their threat models.32 To reduce the occurrence of these inadvertently dangerous blind spots, it is thus important that the design and threat-modelling processes include diverse perspectives and people from minoritized groups.33 Another example can be found in contemporary cybersecurity measures aimed at protecting individuals from privacy breaches or identity theft, which rely on the use of personal information as the backup for passwords and online account access. These assume that the “bad actor” is a stranger without other access to the middle name of a parent or the name of a first pet – an assumption not met in instances of intimate partner and family violence.34 The design of online identity-verification procedures thus has gendered effects due to the conception of “threat” they employ (and, in this case, omit). The burden of cybersecurity work is also gendered. Privacy settings on social media are more likely to be activated by women, especially for images.35 Women are expected to exercise near-total control over their own digital footprint (such as changing passwords and deleting social media accounts, etc.) in order to reduce their vulnerability to digital coercive control.36 Failing to act as a perfect digital user – due to a lack of time or literacy, or a reliance on technology for support and social connections – becomes a source of victim-blaming.37 There is also a trade-off here between different cybersecurity goals: permitting companies to design applications that access location and other data can be a way of preventing other privacy threats, even though the companies use this data commercially, which can itself be a threat. Finally, the advertising of cybersecurity technologies is gendered. Software that can remotely monitor phones and other devices is marketed as designed for child protection, enabling families to track the movements of their children online.38 But this software is also used in situations of intimate partner violence (and is often termed “stalkerware”).39 Google has banned all advertising of stalkerware to combat this dual-use problem.40 Overall, cybersecurity design inherits the gendered omissions, biases and reinforcement of gendered assumptions that are evident in technology design. The threat models, reporting and user-control procedures, and advertising of cybersecurity technologies mean that women (or the most vulnerable gender groups in a particular context) are more likely to have cybersecurity threats downplayed or omitted; more likely to have additional security burdens; and more likely to be affected by disingenuous cybersecurity advertising.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › Continuum of Violence

The 1AC’s focus on violence as the event of war recreates everyday forms of violence

Wibben 19

Annick T.R., Professor of Gender, Peace & Security at the Swedish Defence University. “Everyday Security, Feminism, and the Continuum of Violence.” Journal of Global Security Studies. 2019. LJS

Innovative work on global security issues comes not just from different traditions within security studies (global or not), but by talking across fields of study. This might include engaging peace and conflict studies, geography, anthropology, and more. Feminist security studies (FSS) is a case in point: whereas it is often read as a subfield or particular approach within security studies, it was certainly not conceived as such since “feminist aims and the scope of their concerns explodes its confines at every possible turn” (Wibben 2011, 113; see also Sjoberg and Lobasz 2011; Shepherd 2013; Elias and Roberts 2015; Chisholm and Stachowitsch 2017). From the outset of feminist engagements with global politics, security issues were a key concern—whether in the 1980s when feminist international relations (IR) scholars began to make their mark on the field (see Wibben 2017 for an overview of FSS) or in their much earlier engagements in attempt to first prevent World War I and, later, to mitigate its effects (see, e.g., Confortini 2012; Owens 2018; Tickner and True 2018). Feminist scholars would maintain that gendered (security) relations, while instantiated differently across the globe and over time, could fulfill Jon Western’s (2016, 100) litmus test for being both global in scale, “worldwide in either cause or effect,” and global in reach, though “their impact is usually local or regional.” Hence, traditional security scholars ignore gender relations and feminist scholarship and uncover their role in relation to security studies at their own peril—traditional security scholars are, as Cynthia Enloe (e.g., 2015) would formulate it, not being particularly realistic. Paying attention to gendered (security) relations often involves moving beyond states, even as state practices are also deeply gendered (Peterson 1992; Parashar, Tickner, and True 2018). Consequently, the space provided by journals such as JoGSS is crucial to push the conversation forward. Of course, many critical security scholars have long questioned the state as the primary referent object of security studies: debates about broadening and deepening security in the 1990s (see, e.g., Lipschutz 1995; Krause and Williams 1997) opened up conversations about the study of security as fundamentally a political project (Wibben 2016a), thus making room for scholars to look not just at individual and human security, but everyday and vernacular security as well (VaughanWilliams and Stevens 2016; see also Benzig, this issue). At the same time, feminist scholars in a variety of disciplinary traditions also increasingly started to frame their conversations about peace, violence, and the war system in terms of security (e.g., Tickner 1992; Reardon 1993). Noting that, “until women have control over their own security, a truly comprehensive system of security cannot be devised” (Tickner 1992, 30), feminist scholars tend to pay close attention to the impact of security policies on the everyday lives of people (see, e.g., Sylvester, 2011, 2013; Wibben 2016b; Gentry, Shepherd, and Sjoberg 2018; Ní Aoláin et al. 2018). Departing from a large part of traditional security studies research, feminist scholars challenge common sense notions that wars are fought to protect vulnerable populations and show that civilians are, especially in ethno-nationalist wars, explicitly targeted (Enloe 1998; Hansen 2000, 2001, 2006; Carpenter 2005; McLeod 2016). Rather than offering security for all their citizens, states may threaten their own populations through direct or structural violence reflected in war-fighting priorities embedded in a variety of state institutions (Reardon 1985; Peterson 1992; Tickner 1992; Enloe 1993, 2000; Young 2003). Feminists contribute to debates about the increasing import of sophisticated technologies into the practice of war, from nuclear strategy to drones, which asserts that it depersonalizes killing, offers the illusion of clean warfare, and obscures accountability (Cohn 1987; Masters 2005; Wilcox 2015; Bayard de Volo 2016; Clark 2018). Some scholars also directly engage traditional theories of security (Sjoberg 2010, 2013; Wibben 2011; Detraz 2012) and security policy (Stachowitsch 2012; MacKenzie 2015). An ever-increasing amount of research looks at the impact of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions (Shepherd 2008; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; McLeod 2016), as well as efforts to address sexualized violence in war (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013; Cohen 2016). Other scholars have made important contributions to the study of private military companies from a feminist perspective (Stachowitsch 2012; Eichler 2015). While many traditional sciences assume gender neutrality, feminists make gender, that is, the socially constructed femininity/masculinity distinction that shapes our perception of, and response to, the world, a central category of analysis. They are concerned, above all, with gendered power relations and also note how they are molded by intersecting axes of oppression (Collins 2000). Consequently, feminist scholars argue that concepts and ideas about security, as well as security practices and institutions, are shaped by gender: gender (along with class, caste, race, sexuality and more) structures the hierarchies that dictate what and who is taken seriously. To analyze these power relations, feminist security studies “includes approaches, for instance, that pay attention to the workings of gender in order to ask questions about security; it also includes scholarship that refuses any line of distinction that separates ‘security’ from the workings of gender” (Stern and Wibben 2014, 2). Journals such as the International Feminist Journal of Politics and Security Dialogue as well as, more recently, Critical Military Studies and Critical Studies on Security have published excellent work in this area, which should be included in more global security syllabi. This past year brought us two new handbooks on gender and conflict/security (Gentry, Shepherd, and Sjoberg 2018; Ní Aolaín et al. 2018), joining previous efforts to provide an overview of the field (e.g., Detraz 2012). A key theoretical contribution feminist peace and conflict studies scholars have made to feminist understandings of security is the notion of a continuum of violence between peace and wartime that also transgresses the boundaries of private/public and international/domestic realms (see, e.g., Moser 2001; Cockburn 2004). Violence against women, as feminist scholars have pointed out with increasing frequency, is part of a multidimensional continuum of violence (Cockburn 2004; see also O’Rourke 2013; Pratt and Richter–Devroe 2014) that “extends from violence in the home, to the structural violence of poverty, to the ecological violence associated with the depletion of our planetary resources and natural disasters, to the violence of war and its aftermath” (True 2012, 5; see also Tickner 2001). Working with these notions, and paying attention to gendered (and intersecting) power hierarchies, has allowed feminist scholars to note important continuities from the pre- through the postwar environment (Jacobs, Jacobsen, and Marchbank 2000; Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen 2001; Moser and Clark 2001; Giles and Hyndman 2004; Cohn 2013). For example, as Henshaw also notes in this issue, existing societal expectations about gender roles shape not only women’s positions during wartime, but also significantly mold war’s aftermaths. Importantly, while there are always conflicting notions of femininity, the way in which gender roles (for women, men and trans*, given that gender is a relational category where changes always affect the full spectrum) change during and after wars is not straightforward. While the disruption of violent conflict offers new openings, for example, for women to take on roles as combatants or new positions in the formal economy, it simultaneously can lead to greater scrutiny of their activities, such as their sexual relations (Sylvester 1993; Pettman 1996; Ahäll 2015 ˚ ; Gentry and Sjoberg 2015). Literature is accumulating regarding women’s participation in fighting forces (e.g., Stiehm 1996; Alison 2009; MacKenzie 2012; Sylvester 2013; Parashar 2014; Gentry and Sjoberg 2015; Henshaw 2017; Vastapuu 2018), which provides manifold insights into the ways in which these venues of participation in war are shaped not just by gendered expectations, which influence whether women take on only support or also combat roles, but also by age, race, class, indigeneity, and more. Leena Vastapuu’s (2018) study of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes in Liberia is a case in point: she examined how young women, who were fairly empowered during their time in the fighting forces despite their often traumatic entry into this life, found the aftermath difficult to navigate. Paying attention not just to gender, but also to social status (class) and differences in rural and urban locations, provides for greater insight into everyday (in)securities and the need to account for these in interventions by the international community. What we learn from Vastapuu (2018), and what other scholars have also described (MacKenzie 2012; Mazurana and Cole 2013; Basini 2016; Mazurana, Krystalli, and Baaré 2018; Henshaw, this issue), is that peace negotiations and settlements that structure war’s aftermaths leave much to be desired when examined from a feminist perspective. Crucially, a focus on armed actors in violent conflicts often exclude women from the negotiating table to begin with. What is more, if little attention is paid to gender and its intersections with class or race, “peace” tends to imply a “return” to prewar societal relations (which can reinforce societal exclusion as Benzig notes in this issue), or, worse, it may institute new fundamentalisms. This postwar gender anxiety, as Henshaw (this issue) calls it, can have dire consequences for women who took on varied new roles during the violent conflict. At the same time, it has proven impossible to put the genie back in the bottle in its entirety, so to speak: many women will refuse to return to their old roles in postwar societies (Berry and Rana 2019). Indeed, permanent shifts in societal norms can be expected. Paying attention to these conflicts at the everyday, microlevel is important to understand complex contemporary global phenomena such as the ability of extremist movements to recruit young men to enact violence as a way of (re)asserting their masculinity in the face of (perceived or actual) threats to their traditional livelihoods (Parpart and Zalewski 2008; Kimmel 2018). Deeply contextual historical case studies by area experts, which are a traditional strength of feminist scholarship, are needed to most accurately assess specific security environments, as Emy Matesan (this issue) shows in relation to Islamist movements (for a feminist take, see Brown 2011, 2018; Eggert 2016). This kind of research requires the inclusion and, indeed, promotion of a variety of methods (see also Fiona Adamson, this issue) to capture the experiences of people from all walks of life in order to name, as well as challenge, the long colonial histories of their grievances (Chowdry and Nair 2004; Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Tuhiwai-Smith 2012; Rutazibwa 2016). Using innovative methods like autophotography (Vastapuu 2018), narrative analysis (Wibben 2011; Shepherd 2012; Mehta and Wibben 2018), or poetic reimaginings (Sylvester 1993; Zalewski 2013; Ling 2014) should become as much part of the toolbox of global security scholars as survey research or experimental methods. What is more, being curious about what has heretofore been taken for granted and also being willing to be surprised, as Cynthia Enloe (2004) urges, can lead to the production of new knowledges, as Bettina Benzig (this issue) finds when challenging overly optimistic assessments of vernacular security. Similarly, studying sexualized violence in the Congo, Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern (2013) developed a “methodology of unease” when “little was as we had (unwittingly?) expected it to be, and the unease that ensued from then on served as our methodological guide and compass”(Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2016, 124).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › Links › China

The 1AC’s portrayal of China as an aggressive masculine threat serves as a reductionist view of Chinese culture to justify U.S. “Just Warrior” saviorism

Sjoberg 10

Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives. 2010.

Power transition theorists found that “occupation of a high position in the international hierarchy is associated with war involvement, irrespective of other attributes (ideology, etc.) of the state occupying that position.”88 Even if those states at the top of the international hierarchy are more likely to be involved in wars,89 feminists question the assumption that this is because nations with the capacity to fight wars are necessarily more likely to fight. Feminist reformulation (R1) (see Table 5.1) posits that the content and salience of a state’s hegemonic masculinity will be a factor in its bellicosity. The feminist argument is that the more competitive a state’s hegemonic masculinity, the more likely that state is to make war; this risk is compounded by high salience. In World War II Germany, a competitive form of masculinity was very salient. George Mosse’s study of the ideal German man90 in the 1930s reveals him as: Tall and muscular, he has no fat on his body and no hair anywhere but on his head. His broad, contoured shoulders narrow to a thin waist. He has a fine colorless chiseled face with a strong prominent square jaw. He is the flawless man … , not only did he embody the older aristocratic values of bravery, courage, and chivalry, but mirroring bourgeois values, he was also disciplined, orderly, and restrained … The perfect man, therefore, was committed to sacrifice and heroism, in other words, soldierly values that put the nation ahead of the individual.91 This German masculinity “increasingly came to be linked to ideas about nationalism.”92 This idea of masculinity became increasingly salient as “the nationalist press often portrayed Jewish men as the exact opposite of the manly ideal in looks and behavior … jittery, restless, greedy, selfish, and … ugly—nearly deformed.”93 In the 1930s, “German fascists … took the notion of masculinity to its awful, ghastly, and seemingly logical extreme.”94 Perhaps this can be contrasted with the case of a rising China. Kam Louie, a scholar of Chinese masculinities, explains that while “Western stereotypes of the ‘real man’ have described the Occidental male as forming his notion of male-self within images of toughness, courageousness, and decisiveness, … in the Chinese case, the cerebral male model tends to dominate the macho, brawny male.”95 The Communist Revolution in China has further demilitarized Chinese masculinity,96 since, while “the core meaning of wen-wu97 still revolves around cultural attainment and martial valour … [ideal-types of masculinity have been shaped by] Communist insistence that able-bodied citizens work [which] … has generated idealized images of workers and peasants” rather than soldiers.98 Louie suggests that the current Chinese hegemonic masculinity is less aggressive and militaristic, and that it is both more open and less salient now than it has been previously.99 Given these two examples, the feminist reformulation (R1) would expect bellicosity from 1930s Germany rather than contemporary China. The same empirical evidence that PTT uses could instead support a feminist argument that Germany’s level of interest in aggressive masculinity made Germany a belligerent state, and that a dissatisfied China would have less interest in war than the 1930s Germany. A feminist reinterpretation would expect that Germans’ hypercompetitive hegemonic masculinity in the 1930s would motivate German leaders and citizens to try to subordinate other masculinities, while the Chinese government, following their more cerebral hegemonic masculinity, would place less priority on competition with other states.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › 1NCs › Generic – Feminist Security Studies

Prioritize a Feminist Security Studies approach to IR – gender analysis represents a crucial and central aspect of conceptualizing war and requires a complete overhaul of how we normatively view IR

Sjoberg 13

Sjoberg, British Academy Global Professor of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway University of London. “The (Genderless) Study of War in International Relations,” Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War, Columbia University Press, 2013.

What war theorizing shares is a lack of, and a lack of commitment to, gender analysis. This is, of course, a broad and sweeping generalization that is more accurate and applicable to some theorists and paradigms than others, but is generally fair when applied to war studies.320 For example, between 1945 and 2006, the five highest-ranked security journals published articles with gender analysis in them in less than one-quarter of 1 percent of their content.321 Much of the ground-breaking work in critical security studies mentions gender marginally, if at all, and generally fails to adopt gender analysis into its work.322 In Levy and Thompson’s recent (otherwise excellent) book summarizing war theorizing, “gender” makes an appearance twice—in two footnotes.323 The first one problematizes the “over-aggregation” of human nature in first-image analyses of war, given that they treat “the male and female as indistinguishable and neglect any possible impact of gender on the causes of war.”324 The second discusses “demographic trends” such as “surpluses of men” and “youth bulges” as causes of war.325 Neither do serious gender analysis in the terms this book intends to engage. This is not to say that mainstream war studies has never paid any attention to gender, or that gender has been completely absent from critical theorists’ work on war and conflict. It is, instead, to make two distinct (and hopefully more modest) claims. The first is that, to the extent that gender has been taken up in war theorizing, it remains peripheral and has not become a central part of research programs outside feminist security studies considering the nature, constitution, causes, and consequences of war(s).326 The second is that, to the extent that mainstream studies of war have considered gender, they have actually been largely talking about a partial and limited idea of gender that involves women as a biological sex being imbued with characteristics gendered feminine for the purpose of analyzing war.327 This second claim will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2, when I lay out this book’s feminist approaches to studying war ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically. For now, it is the first claim—that gender theorizing remains absent from (and when not absent from, marginal to) both mainstream and critical war theorizing—that lays the foundation for this book’s work. In the remainder of the text, I seek to analyze and problematize “genderless” war studies. In calling war studies genderless, I am not implying that it is somehow gender neutral or without gender implications. Quite the opposite, I am arguing that it is impossible to think about war well without gender analysis and that doing so obscures the empirical operation of and normative consequences of gender in the nature, causes, performances of, and consequences of war(s). Gender is necessary, conceptually, to understanding the nature of war(s); empirically, to understanding wars’ causes and consequences; ethically, to understanding its implications; and prescriptively, to understanding how to stop wars. Gender does “analytical and normative work” and serves as a “resource for thought” in almost every aspect of how we fight wars and how we read them.328 War, wars, and the study of both are fundamentally (if not unalterably) gendered and, therefore, feminist theorizing about war is not only a part of, but a crucial piece of, the war puzzle.329 Feminist theory “raises the question of what kind of politics and theory would be possible without the work accomplished by gendered logics” in war theorizing.330 Also, when I call war studies genderless, I am not arguing that the work I outlined in this chapter does not have a relationship with gender theorizing—I am arguing that its relationship is (normatively and empirically) negative, problematic, and untenable. These relationships between gender theorizing and security or war studies have variously been called “impossible,”331 “awkward,”332 “uneasy”333 “limited,”334 and akin to “exile.”335 While (many in) IR generally and security studies specifically have conceded that feminist scholarship may exist at the margins, gender analysis “does not simply ‘add’ gender to an unchanged object of study, but . . . force[s] a more radical rethinking of what properly constitutes I/international R/relations to begin with, transforming the boundaries and conceptual basis.”336 This work starts with the feminist analysis of and deconstruction of war theorizing. It requires showing the gendered nature of that theorizing, of the meaning, causes, and consequences of war(s) at each level of analysis. The logics, tools, and insights of the approaches to war(s) in this chapter will be used, melded, critiqued, reformulated, called out, and engaged throughout the rest of this book’s theorizing of war through feminist lenses. Engaging the genderless study of war is a crucial part of the project of feminist war theorizing, because, as Kimberly Hutchings argues, “one can hope . . . to loosen the hold of masculinity on meaning and life only once one has first appreciated how much work is accomplished by masculinity’s logical structure.”337 Chapter 2 introduces the feminist theory tools to begin to see, and deconstruct, the influence of masculinity’s logical structures on war theorizing.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › 1NCs › Generic – Feminist Security Studies

This androcentric world order makes extinction inevitable—war and environmental degradation

Nhanenge 2007 [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, paper submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of master of arts in the subject Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT”]

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological ‘isms’ of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust. Such actions are denial of wisdom. It is working against natural harmony and destroying the basis of existence. But as long as ordinary people leave questions of technology to the "experts” we will continue the forward stampede. As long as economics focus on technology and both are the focus of politics, we can leave none of them to experts. Ordinary people are often more capable of taking a wider and more humanistic view than these experts. (Kelly 1990: 112-114; Eisler 1990: 3233; Schumacher 1993: 20, 126, 128, 130).

2022 CNDI Kritik
Neg › 1NCs › Generic – Feminist Security Studies

Security cooperation with NATO enforces global hegemonic masculinity through recreation of military masculinities and imperial violence

Wright 22

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda.” Cooperation and Conflict. April 2022. Pg 3-4. LJS

NATO is a political-military alliance built on consensus decision-making. Moving beyond its Cold War origins, the alliance’s remit has expanded significantly beyond a sole focus on collective defence to include crisis management and cooperative security. This has seen NATO’s focus enlarge from a regional one to a global one, with recent engagements in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo, for example. Its status as a multilateral institution means it is limited by its members’ priorities and therefore sensitive not to implicate NATO or NATO member states in wrongdoing (Hebert, 2012). In centring NATO as an ‘institution of international hegemonic masculinity’ (Wright et al., 2019), in this analysis, it is possible to shed light on the peculiarities of NATO’s WPS work to date, against which engagement with civil society takes place. This has two co-constituting elements, first, internally, existing gender norms and expectations of masculinity and femininity reflective of a hierarchical military institution are (re)created and (re)enforced through NATO’s engagement with WPS (Wright et al., 2019: 71). For example, men working on WPS at NATO navigate both the trivialisation and the feminisation of such work and must (re)negotiate their own identities. Yet in so doing they reinforce the importance of men speaking to and listening to other men (rather than women) reinforcing the gendered status quo (Wright et al., 2019: 93; see also Hurley, 2018a). Second, externally, as a transnational military alliance, NATO acts as a ‘teaching machine’ in which member and partner states learn the value of WPS as a ‘military tool’ through socialisation with each other (Wright et al., 2019; see also Enloe, 1981). This means perpetuating an understanding of WPS as a means to support operational effectiveness through ‘the role of masculinist protector which reinforces hegemonic4 Cooperation and Conflict 00(0) militaristic, masculine ideals and norms’ (Wright et al., 2019: 34). This patriarchal logic puts ‘women and children, in a subordinate position of dependence and obedience’ to justify the waging of war (Young, 2003: 2), for example, NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan (Wright, 2019). It is reinforced through the stories NATO tells internally about its WPS engagement (Hurley, 2018b) and externally in public diplomacy (Wright, 2019) and to support partnerships with other states but also celebrities (Wright and Bergman Rosamond, 2021) and now civil society. Thus, interrogating civil society perceptions of NATO in this context adds an additional dimension to understanding how NATO seeks to legitimise itself as a WPS actor, further constituting its role as an institution of international hegemonic masculinity.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › Impacts › NATO Deterrence Fails- Underfunded

No NATO Deterrence- underfunding

Franklin D. Kramer and Barry Pavel June 13, 2022 [Distinguished Fellow Board Director Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Senior Vice President and Director Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security; NATO priorities: Initial lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war; Atlantic Council;]

As a starting point, it is important to recognize that almost all NATO nations, other than the United States, have—in the words of a recent European Union (EU) analysis—had “years of defence underspending, which has led to an accumulation of gaps and shortfalls in the collective military” capabilities.1 Most importantly in the context of the current environment, the “capacity to operate full-spectrum and at high intensity was neglected.”2 That neglect, and the concomitant need to focus on reestablishing the capacity for high-intensity battle, is well recognized by NATO military leaders. For example, France’s “Strategic Vision of the Chief of Defense Staff” specifically sets forth the requirement to be able to “respond…in a high-intensity conflict.”3 Yet, as a recent RAND report stated: France’s capacity to sustain a high-end, conventional conflict nonetheless is limited. The French military might be able to accomplish all its assigned missions at once, but it lacks depth, meaning that such demanding operations would quickly exhaust both its human and material resources.” What is true for France is similarly true for other European militaries, including—perhaps most importantly—Germany, which has suffered from years of underspending and strategic neglect. In addition, while operating at a different scale in terms of resources and reach, the US military itself is insufficiently prepared, in particular, in terms of its munitions and supply inventories for a sustained, high-intensity conflict. However, these deficiencies are entirely remediable if appropriate measures are taken. The initial requirement for success in high-intensity conflict is, of course, simply to have sufficient weapons and support available. The EU analysis includes the need to “[r]eplenish stockpiles” among the “most urgent capability gaps.”4 Taking lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war, those stockpiles should include anti-armor capabilities and man-portable and medium-range air defenses, each of which adds to the maneuver capability and lethality of ground units. Additionally, unmanned aerial vehicles for both sensing and attack and long-range fires have proved to be key battlefield weapons, and air defenses for rear areas are also critical. Finally, inventories of precision-guided munitions for air forces need to be substantially increased. All of the foregoing should be undertaken in the context of a potential conflict that, as the Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated, can extend for multiple months—and perhaps even years. So, inventories and replenishment capacities need to be established with such a timeframe in mind. NATO should utilize the defense planning process to set the necessary targets. There should be no doubt, however, that achieving the requisite level of capability will require significant defense-budget increases, as the gap has been very substantial. As the EU analysis states: Had all Member States spent 2% of their GDP on defence with 20% dedicated to investment, since 2006 until 2020, this would have resulted in an additional approximately EUR 1,100 billion for defence, of which around EUR 270 billion on investment.” As that analysis makes clear, just meeting NATO’s 2-percent defense-spending goal will not be sufficient to resolve the substantial readiness and sustainment deficiencies in any reasonable timeframe. To be sure, the 2-percent goal is important, but NATO needs to establish an additional readiness/sustainment initiative over a shorter period—perhaps three or four years—that would substantially increase the readiness of national forces. The large increases in Germany’s investment budget provide a model for a budgetary approach that should be undertaken by other countries. Germany has promised to reach 2 percent annually, including by spending one hundred billion euros over a four-year period on investment.5 Other countries should follow the German approach and establish special investment-funding streams focused on readiness and sustainability that would be designed to resolve the shortfalls in a three-to-four-year period. Along with the funding increases, and as an additional part of a NATO readiness/sustainment effort, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) should be given the task (and authority) to review and report on the readiness of the forces that will be called upon in the event of a contingency. A focused effort on readiness and sustainability, generated through the defense-planning process and overseen by the SACEUR, will significantly enhance NATO’s deterrent and defense posture.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › Links › At: EDT Link

Incorporations of EDTs raise NATO functionality and strength.

Borchert et. al 21 (Heiko Borchert, John Allen, Marcin Zaborowski; Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting and Research AG, a consulting boutique focusing on strategic affairs. He is Associate Partner of Wise Pens International, a European consultancy specializing on maritime security policy and advice, and member of the board of the Journal for Foreign and Security Policy; John Allen is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces; Marcin Zaborowski is the Former Executive Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). In 2001, he received his Ph. D. in International Studies from the University of Birmingham in the UK; “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address”; 12/13/21; https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address)//akg

Emerging technologies are the geo-economics Achilles heel NATO needs to address to deter aggressors, write General John Allen, Heiko Borchert and Marcin Zaborowski. General John Allen is President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Dr Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affair consulting boutique and Marcin Zaborowski is policy director of the future of security program at the Bratislava-based think tank GLOBSEC. To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment. To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies. The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals. Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies. NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond. First, NATO needs to embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations. In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies. Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element. Second, economic security requires NATO to shape mindsets about defence investments and sustainability. Already today, defence companies face financial challenges as banks cancel bank accounts or refrain from covering export risks. The emphasis on environmental, social, and governance criteria (ESG) that increasingly shapes and determines financial investments will reinforce these problems as defence is considered toxic. But a narrow interpretation of ESG that considers defence incompatible with the world view underpinning ESG is detrimental to NATO’s ambition to invest in companies. It also means other investors will likely shy away from investing in the same companies. Therefore, the Alliance needs to step up activities with the European Commission, which works on a classification system to identify ESG-compliant activities, to make defence investments compatible. Third, business is the first line of defence in a geoeconomic world, and NATO needs a platform to discuss geoeconomics with business. Today, the NATO Industry Forum is the leading gathering to address defence industrial matters with defence companies. However, the emphasis on emerging technologies underlines the importance of non-defence companies. Therefore, NATO should envisage a new special format of the North Atlantic Council to meet with the NATO Industry Forum members – and possibly also the European Commission – to allow state and corporate leaders to jointly engage on the proposed economic security agenda. Fourth, strategic-level public-private dialogue also breathes new life into deepening cooperation with the private sector. NATO should become an early adopter of the solutions developed with allied money. Making NATO the launch customer sends important market signals and provides companies with an initial track record confirming the relevance of their solutions. In addition, the Alliance should step up efforts to incorporate business into military operations. Logistics companies already play a crucial role, and traditional defence businesses provide frontline support. The next stage comes with closely integrating digital companies to leverage their contribution. But for non-defence companies to provide frontline support, NATO not only needs the right mindset, but the Alliance also needs to think about incentives such as covering personnel risks on overseas deployments. Finally, NATO’s ability to stimulate innovation and ensure economic security also depends on how it does business. Critically, NATO needs to strive for a mission and capabilities-based innovation portfolio that maximises the value of allied money. NATO may take a page from the financial services industry and use a real options approach to manage technological risk and drive technology development. This approach prices technology building blocks like financial options, advances risk mitigation, speeds up technology adoption and gives force planners and developers more leeway to maximise input and output. In addition, NATO should offer strategic hedging solutions for defence critical raw materials by combining corporate demand estimates with AI-based insights on financial and raw material markets. This will facilitate optimal, company-tailored hedging strategies to mitigate the corporate security of supply and price risks. Overall, NATO’s relevance in the 21st century remains tackling defence challenges in a new strategic environment, increasingly defined by emerging and rapidly changing technologies and the profoundly important role of the private sector. To this purpose, NATO has embraced innovation and emerging technologies. This step, however, makes NATO subject to a new geoeconomic dynamic that unfolds around competition for standards, business models, technologies, and supply chains. This requires NATO to make economic security a core element of its new Strategic Concept to ensure NATO’s edge. In turn, this will provide a sound basis for expanded cooperation with the European Union, and make NATO an esteemed partner of the new Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council, the new body set up to enhance the EU-U.S. technology, economic, and trade partnership.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › Links › At: EDT Link

Cooperation on EDTs is key to deterrence- shows resolve and willingness to defend the alliance

JORDAN BECKER, DOUGLAS LUTE, AND SIMON SMITH et al 6/28/22

Jordan Becker is an academy professor and director of the Social Science Research Lab at the United States Military Academy, West Point. He is also affiliated with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels, and IHEDN and IRSEM at the French École Militaire. Ambassador Douglas Lute is the former U.S. permanent representative to NATO and retired from the U.S. Army at the rank of lieutenant general. Simon Smith is an associate professor at Staffordshire University and is the editor-in-chief of Defence Studies.

DON’T LET RUSSIA DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dont-let-russia-dominate-the-strategic-concept/

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › Links › At: EDT Link

Integrating EDT’s into NATO’s strategic doctrine is key to maintain the alliance’s effective deterrence

JORDAN BECKER, DOUGLAS LUTE, AND SIMON SMITH et al 6/28/22

Jordan Becker is an academy professor and director of the Social Science Research Lab at the United States Military Academy, West Point. He is also affiliated with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels, and IHEDN and IRSEM at the French École Militaire. Ambassador Douglas Lute is the former U.S. permanent representative to NATO and retired from the U.S. Army at the rank of lieutenant general. Simon Smith is an associate professor at Staffordshire University and is the editor-in-chief of Defence Studies.

DON’T LET RUSSIA DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT; War on the Rocks; https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/dont-let-russia-dominate-the-strategic-concept/

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › Links › At: Cyber Link

Cooperation on cybersecurity is key to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense mission

Franklin D. Kramer, Lauren Speranza, and Conor Rodihan et al in 2020

Franklin D. Kramer is a distinguished fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and a board director of the Atlantic Council;Lauren M. Speranza is director of Transatlantic Defense and Security at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA);Conor Rodihan is an assistant director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative; NATO needs continuous responses in cyberspace; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/nato-needs-continuous-responses-in-cyberspace/

President-Elect Joe Biden’s transition team has declared cyber threats as “one of the defining challenges of our time.” In its early days, the incoming US administration must take on cybersecurity threats as one of its key priorities. Nowhere will that effort be more important than with the United States’ closest Allies at NATO, a cornerstone for Western security. Today, NATO’s security is threatened by Russia’s and China’s continuous cyberattacks on the Alliance and its members. To accomplish its mission of deterrence and defense, NATO needs to implement a strategy of proactive, continuous responses to China and Russia in cyberspace, where great power competition is playing out in real time. Russia and China challenge NATO and its members in cyberspace on a daily basis, as part of ongoing hybrid campaigns to undermine the transatlantic community. The Kremlin’s actions have involved intrusions into Allies’ critical infrastructures, manipulating Allies’ elections through hacks and disinformation, and even blocking GPS information critical to NATO activities. The Chinese government has engaged in cyber espionage against Allies’ military capabilities; intellectual property theft related to sensitive technologies, industries, and infrastructure; and disinformation against transatlantic countries, including around the coronavirus. These efforts to weaken NATO countries and Alliance cohesion represent a persistent threat to Allied security. NATO has recognized the collective dangers of these hybrid attacks in cyberspace. Up to this point, however, the Alliance has taken a reactive approach, responding as if Russian and Chinese cyber attacks are each isolated incidents. But because Russian and Chinese cyber efforts are part of continuous campaigns directed at the overall capability of the Alliance, NATO’s response has been insufficient, failing to reduce or dissuade further attacks. To assure the security of its members going forward, NATO needs its own continuous response campaign to these threats. President-elect Biden and his team have pledged to renew US leadership in cooperation with Allies and partners. That agenda should start at NATO, and a key focus should be on cybersecurity. In early NATO meetings, the Biden administration should champion a cybersecurity continuous-response campaign, built around three key actions.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › Links › At: AI/Cyber Link

No link- NATO is unified in its integration of cyber and AI into the alliance mission

Nick Fouriezos 6/29/22

Atlanta-based writer with bylines from every US state and six continents; Blinken: NATO is ‘more united, more focused’ after historic summit; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/blinken-nato-is-more-united-more-focused-after-historic-summit/

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken pushed for world leaders to continue sustained action—in supporting Ukraine, in pressuring Russia, and in reinforcing NATO on the heels of its historic decision to invite Finland and Sweden to join the defensive alliance. “NATO is emerging from this summit more united, more focused, and with more assets to deal with a multiplicity of challenges,” Blinken said, praising the solidarity shown in this week’s gathering in Madrid. The conversations at the two-day NATO Public Forum, taking place on the sidelines of the Madrid summit, brought together a number of global leaders in person and virtually, including US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who reaffirmed US support for Article 5, the principle of collective defense, as “ironclad.” “This alarming challenge to national sovereignty must be met by a unified global commitment to peace and security,” Pelosi said of Russian aggression, while also calling for action to defend against China through continued “cooperation with our Asia-Pacific partners to bolster cybersecurity, counter disinformation, and preserve our collective defense.” This week, NATO nations agreed on a new Strategic Concept that declares the Alliance’s priorities in staving off military and economic threats from Russia and China, reasserting shared democratic values and human-rights protections, and battling new threats from the realms of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. “All of these things are challenges we have to meet and face,” Blinken said, “but we know that we’re going to be more effective in doing it if we actually have a shared, common approach.”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › N/U › Deterrence Low Now

NATO is divided now and deterrence is low- only cooperation can solve

Mcnamara 22 [Thomas E. McNamara is a United States diplomat and State Department official. “Putin's Challenge to NATO and to the Global Enterprise'”. 5-1-2022. ProQuest. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2658311974/fulltext/6E0C463534C946DDPQ/1?accountid=3672. Accessed 7-1-2022; MJen]

The West, however, must deal with Putin as he is. He has legitimate complaints about short-sighted Western policies. For years the U.S. has devalued diplomacy out of ignorance and hubris, which undermines national security and NATO. NATO and EU expansions were good ideas, but were uncoordinated, and poorly developed and executed. Abandoning most arms control, which benefited American-Russian mutual security, was a major mistake, leaving our European allies to face Putin's missile threats. None of those, however, justifies Putin's war in Ukraine. Putin's unilateral, military threats fundamentally challenges the post-Cold War order, not just in Ukraine. The West's biggest mistake, however, was failure to maintain a credible NATO deterrent posture in Europe. European nations allowed their military capabilities to deteriorate; some became impotent. The Alliance was blind and unresponsive to leadership and policy changes in Moscow over two decades. Putin is not Gorbachev or Yeltsin; yet NATO acted as though he were. NATO ignored U.S. urgings to strengthen itself, and the warnings of its East Central European members even after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and take-over of part of the Donbas. These errors make NATO partly responsible for the invasion of Ukraine - a sin of omission. The immediate reaction of NATO to the invasion is a plus, provided it is a first step of a new era in European security thinking and NATO policies.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › N/U › N/U- Cyber Focus

NATO already has EDT at the center of its strategic doctrine for the next 15 years

JOHN CURRAN 7/1/22

NATO Sets $1 Billion Defense Tech Fund, Cites AI, Space Tech Needs; MeriTalk; https://www.meritalk.com/articles/nato-sets-1-billion-defense-tech-fund-cites-ai-space-tech-needs/

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is launching a new one billion euro (U.S. $1.04 billion) defense technologies investment fund that is likely to cover tech including artificial intelligence, NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg said on June 30 at a press conference in Madrid. The investment fund is separate from the new Defense Innovation Accelerator unveiled earlier this week. NATO announced plans for the innovation accelerator on June 29 as part of a new “strategic concept” that names Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to NATO allies’ security and stability and wraps cybersecurity initiatives more tightly into the alliance’s strategy. The NATO Innovation Fund “is unique,” Stoltenberg said on June 30. “It is the world’s first multi-sovereign venture capital fund ever.” He said the fund will invest its money in “early-stage start-ups, and other deep-tech funds across 22 participating nations.” The fund is geared to operate over a 15-year period. The goal of the effort, he said, will be “harnessing the best of new technology for transatlantic security,” and “maintaining our technological edge [that] has helped to keep our Alliance strong and our nations safe for more than seventy years.” “Today, nations that do not share our values, like Russia and China, are challenging that lead in everything from Artificial Intelligence to space technologies,” Stoltenberg said. “It is essential that we do everything in our power to remain at the forefront of innovation and technology.” “This Fund, alongside DIANA, NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic, will help to do just that,” he said. “The NATO Innovation Fund will help bring to life those nascent technologies that have the power to transform our security in the decades to come.”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff › N/U › N/U- Cyber Focus

NATO already expanding its strategic doctrine to center cyber defense- it’s a key part of their deterrence strategy

Jon Harper 6/29/22

Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, NATO unveils new Strategic Concept, pledges support for new ‘defense innovation accelerator’; FedScoop; https://www.fedscoop.com/nato-unveils-strategic-concept-pledges-support-for-new-defense-innovation-accelerator/

Plans also call for enhancing cybersecurity. “Building on last year’s adoption of a new Cyber Defense Policy for NATO, Allied leaders will endorse a new action plan to strengthen cyber cooperation across the political, military, and technical levels,” the White House said. “As an operational domain for NATO, cyber will also be a key component of NATO’s strengthened deterrence and defense posture. Building on lessons learned from the conflict in Ukraine, Allies will decide at the Summit to use NATO as a coordination platform for offering national assets to build and exercise a virtual rapid response cyber capability to respond to a serious cyber-attack. The United States will offer robust national capabilities as part of this support network.” Cyberspace is now “contested at all times,” the Strategic Concept stated. “Malign actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, interfere with our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede our military activities,” it said. The alliance intends to expedite its “digital transformation,” adapt the NATO Command Structure for the “information age” and enhance its cyber defenses, networks and infrastructure. “We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights,” the document said. The new Strategic Concept — the first update in more than a decade — also focuses on space as a key technology area and warfighting domain. “We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools,” it said, noting that “a single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty” and trigger collective defense responses that could include armed conflict. The alliance also intends to boost the resilience of its space and cyber capabilities which are at risk of being attacked.