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2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › Presence Generic

Their Fordist strategy for military reduction leaves colonial power intact – the potential for redeployment is always present as long constant threats remain on the horizon – that makes intervention and miscalculation inevitable as presence is always shifting to address crises.

Davis 2011 Sasha Davis, Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Hawaii at Hilo, The US Military Base Network and Contemporary Colonialism: Power Projection, Resistance, and the Quest for Operational Unilateralism, Political Geography, 2011 CSUF JmB TDI

The world-wide stretch of American military power arises from particular places and is deployed unevenly across space (Enloe, 2007). It has become taken as a given in studies of economics, geography and cultural studies to point out that processes commonly referred to as “globalization” operate in this manner (Harvey, 1990; Massey, 1994). Military power functions in much the same way. The global network of American military power is controlled from key locales (White House, Pentagon, regional command centers, bases) and affects different places around the world in different ways. Military bases and training areas are only two key nodes in this network, but they are excellent sites to examine the places where the apparatus of military power touches the ground (Woodward, 2005). Although there are some excellent analyses of global military operations (see for instance Gerson & Birchard, 1991; Johnson, 2004, 2007; Lutz, 2009; Sandars, 2000) the base network is an ever-shifting mosaic that is difficult to pin down precisely. For instance, a seemingly simple question like “How many foreign US military bases are there in 2011?” has answers ranging from 34 to 737, to 850, to well over a thousand depending on a host of factors. These factors include how one defines “military”, how one defines a “base”, how one defines “foreign”, and how one defines whether a base is a “US” base (Critchlow, 2005; Johnson, 2004, 2007). For example, some communications and spy bases are not directly under the Department of Defense (DOD) and are not technically “military”. Some “bases” do not permanently house many US troops, but are essentially empty until needed. Some US bases are hard to define as “foreign” because they have been placed in parts of the world with current or recent colonial statuses like Guam, Hawaii, the Marshall Islands, the British Indian Ocean Territory, and Puerto Rico. Lastly, some foreign bases used by US military personnel are not officially “US” bases because they are technically under the jurisdiction of the host nation or are run by private security contractors that support US military objectives. Because of these multiple difficulties of definition it is hard to show a detailed list or map of the US base network. Despite this it is possible to trace its general shifting geography. Intellectual frameworks such as the Project for a New American Century’s 2000 Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For A New Century and government documents such as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy in 2004, the 2005 US Global Defense Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (the latest in DOD, 2010), give some detailed strategies for the ways in which the network of US bases should be organized. Without glossing over the important regional differences in the kind of attention the American government directs at different parts of the world e such as the “containment” of China, providing access to petroleum in Central Asia, and maintaining the surveillance of areas with large Muslim populations e it suffices to say that there are very few places left on the globe (or in its orbit) that are deemed to be outside the interest and vision of American power. Consequently, the network of bases is global as well. Increasingly it is designed to be a permanent infrastructure that allows military power to be shifted with post-Fordist efficiency from some sites in the network to other places “just-in-time” and according to perceived crises that challenge US hegemony. For instance in 2004 both former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Undersecretary Ryan Henry discussed the new base network side-by-side with a refusal to pinpoint geographically where they thought threats to the United States might be located. Henry only commented that the US “strove to base forces in locations that supported flexibility and speed of response to anywhere in an unpredictable environment” (Critchlow, 2005, 8 emphasis added). The DOD’s geographical imagination is one where presumably the whole world is an “unpredictable environment” and the US military must be able to act everywhere. Bases outside the continental United States are no longer for defending the regions or territory of the ally where the base is located. Instead, bases are now conceptualized as jumping off points for offensive operations or counterattacks. The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review was quite explicit about this fundamental shift. The report states, “The United States can no longer expect our forward forces to fight in place; rather, for most forward-stationed U.S. forces, their purpose is to undertake operations on short notice by deploying rapidly into near or distant theaters” (p. 6, emphasis in original). Based on this view of the world the DOD envisions constructing a flexible network of existing bases that can swell or contract based on shifting threats. Ideally, the nodes of the network (bases) would not be created or decommissioned through time. Instead the network would be stable and the amount of personnel and material at any given base would respond to the geography of the threat. The general tripartite architecture of this emerging network consists of Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward perating Sites (FOSs), and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). Main Operating Bases, as the name implies, would permanently have large numbers of personnel, solid infrastructure, and training areas. These bases are scattered around the globe to give ample general coverage of the major regions of the world. For other operations, however, the US must have access to bases closer to the sites of conflict. ForwardOperating Sites (FOSs) have small rotating staffs and pre-positioned materials that are ready to increase in size if necessary. Sometimes these are referred to as “light-switch operations” because large numbers of troops can arrive and all they have to do it “turn on the lights” to start operating (Garamone, 2005). Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, which hosts thousands of American military personnel, is an example of an expanded FOS. Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) are facilities with very small numbers of personnel (or none) that can be made usable on short notice. Also, these are often not technically “American” facilities which gives them political cover in localities and countries where there may be resistance to an American presence. Commentator Robert Kaplan described CSLs this way: Often the key role in managing a CSL is played by a private contractor. In Asia, for example, the private contractor is usually a retired American noncom, either Navy or Air Force, quite likely a maintenance expert, who is living in, say, Thailand or the Philippines, speaks the language fluently, perhaps has married locally after a divorce back home, and is generally much liked by the locals. He rents his facilities at the base from the hostcountry military, and then charges a fee to the U.S. Air Force pilots transiting the base. Officially he is in business for himself, which the host country likes because it can then claim it is not really working with the American military. Of course no one, including the local media, believes this. But the very fact that a relationship with the U.S. armed forces is indirect rather than direct eases tensions. (Kaplan, 2005) This is not only Kaplan’s view of CSLs. Former Undersecretary of Defense Henry (2006) also approvingly quotes the passage of Kaplan at length in his analysis of the contemporary global base network. Within this three-level structure of bases the decision of which bases are to be enlarged and which are shrunk depends, ideally, on the whim of the Pentagon and White House according to American grand political-economic strategies and their geopolitical vision de jure. There is, however, another important factor that shapes the US base network: resistance. This resistance comes in the form of popular protests against these bases as well as in the form of political restrictions the US military feels it may be subjected to in foreign territory. These locales hosting US bases are places that the global projection of military power “touches the ground” and are therefore critical sites for both enabling it and resisting it.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › Presence Generic

The aff’s sanitized restriction on the supposed excesses of militarism naturalizes exceptional violence—the impact is endless intervention and WMD warfare

Morrissey 11 (John Morrissey ', Lecturer in Political and Cultural Geography, National University of Ireland, Galway; has held visiting research fellowships at University College Cork, City University of New York, Virginia Tech and the University of Cambridge. 2011, “Liberal Lawfare and Biopolitics: US Juridical Warfare in the War on Terror,” Geopolitics, Volume 16, Issue 2, 2011) CSUF JmB TDI

In the ‘biopolitical nomos’ of camps and prisons in the Middle East and elsewhere, managing detainees is an important element of the US military project. As CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid made clear to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2006, “An essential part of our combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan entails the need to detain enemy combatants and terrorists”.115 However, it is a mistake to characterise as ‘exceptional’ the US military’s broader biopolitical project in the war on terror. Both Minca’s and Agamben’s emphasis on the notion of ‘exception’ is most convincing when elucidating how the US military has dealt with the ‘threat’ of enemy combatants, rather than how it has planned for, legally securitized and enacted, its ‘own’ aggression against them. It does not account for the proactive juridical warfare of the US military in its forward deployment throughout the globe, which rigorously secures classified SOFAs with host nations and protects its armed personnel from transfer to the International Criminal Court. Far from designating a ‘space of exception’, the US does this to establish normative parameters in its exercise of legally sanctioned military violence and to maximise its ‘operational capacities of securitization’. A bigger question, of course, is what the US military practices of lawfare and juridical securitization say about our contemporary moment. Are they essentially ‘exceptional’ in character, prompted by the so-called exceptional character of global terrorism today? Are they therefore enacted in ‘spaces of exceptions’ or are they, in fact, simply contemporary examples of Foucault’s ‘spaces of security’ that are neither exceptional nor indeed a departure from, or perversion of, liberal democracy? As Mark Neocleous so aptly puts it, has the “liberal project of ‘liberty”’ not always been, in fact, a “project of security”?116 This ‘project of security’ has long invoked a powerful political dispositif of ‘executive powers’, typically registered as ‘emergency powers’, but, as Neocleous makes clear, of the permanent kind.117 For Neocleous, the pursuit of ‘security’ – and more specifically ‘capitalist security’ – marked the very emergence of liberal democracies, and continues to frame our contemporary world. In the West at least, that world may be endlessly registered as a liberal democracy defined by the ‘rule of law’, but, as Neocleous reminds us, the assumption that the law, decoupled from politics, acts as the ultimate safeguard of democracy is simply false – a key point affirmed by considering the US military’s extensive waging of liberal lawfare. As David Kennedy observes, the military lawyer who “carries the briefcase of rules and restrictions” has long been replaced by the lawyer who “participate[s] in discussions of strategy and tactics”.118 The US military’s liberal lawfare reveals how the rule of law is simply another securitization tactic in liberalism’s ‘pursuit of security’; a pursuit that paradoxically eliminates fundamental rights and freedoms in the ‘name of security’.119 This is a ‘liberalism’ defined by what Michael Dillon and Julian Reid see as a commitment to waging ‘biopolitical war’ for the securitization of life – ‘killing to make live’.120 And for Mark Neocleous, (neo)liberalism’s fetishisation of ‘security’ – as both a discourse and a technique of government – has resulted in a world defined by anti-democratic technologies of power.121 In the case of the US military’s forward deployment on the frontiers of the war on terror – and its juridical tactics to secure biopolitical power thereat – this has been made possible by constant reference to a neoliberal ‘project of security’ registered in a language of ‘endless emergency’ to ‘secure’ the geopolitical and geoeconomic goals of US foreign policy.122 The US military’s continuous and indeed growing military footprint in the Middle East and elsewhere can be read as a ‘permanent emergency’,123 the new ‘normal’ in which geopolitical military interventionism and its concomitant biopolitical technologies of power are necessitated by the perennial political economic ‘need’ to securitize volatility and threat. Can a focus on lawfare and biopolitics help us to critique our contemporary moment’s proliferation of practices of securitization – practices that appear to be primarily concerned with coding, quantifying, governing and anticipating life itself? In the context of the US military’s war on terror, I have argued above that it can. If, as David Kennedy points out, the “emergence of a global economic and commercial order has amplified the role of background legal regulations as the strategic terrain for transnational activities of all sorts”, this also includes, of course, ‘warfare’; and for some time, the US military has recognised the “opportunities for creative strategy” made possible by proactively waging lawfare beyond the battlefield.125 As Walter Benjamin observed nearly a century ago, at the very heart of military violence is a “lawmaking character”.126 And it is this ‘lawmaking character’ that is integral to the biopolitical technologies of power that secure US geopolitics in our contemporary moment. US lawfare focuses “the attention of the world on this or that excess” whilst simultaneously arming “the most heinous human suffering in legal privilege”, redefining horrific violence as “collateral damage, self-defense, proportionality, or necessity”.127 It involves a mobilisation of the law that is precisely channelled towards “evasion”, securing classified Status of Forces Agreements and “offering at once the experience of safe ethical distance and careful pragmatic assessment, while parcelling out responsibility, attributing it, denying it – even sometimes embracing it – as a tactic of statecraft and war”.128 Since the inception of the war on terror, the US military has waged incessant lawfare to legally securitize, regulate and empower its ‘operational capacities’ in its multiples ‘spaces of security’ across the globe – whether that be at a US base in the Kyrgyz Republic or in combat in Iraq. I have sought to highlight here these tactics by demonstrating how the execution of US geopolitics relies upon a proactive legal-biopolitical securitization of US troops at the frontiers of the American ‘leasehold empire’. For the US military, legal-biopolitical apparatuses of security enable its geopolitical and geoeconomic projects of security on the ground; they plan for and legally condition the ‘milieux’ of military commanders; and in so doing they render operational the pivotal spaces of overseas intervention of contemporary US national security conceived in terms of ‘global governmentality’.129 In the US global war on terror, it is lawfare that facilitates what Foucault calls the “biopolitics of security” – when life itself becomes the “object of security”.130 For the US military, this involves the eliminating of threats to ‘life’, the creating of operational capabilities to ‘make live’ and the anticipating and management of life’s uncertain ‘future’. Some of the most key contributions across the social sciences and humanities in recent years have divulged how discourses of ‘security’, ‘precarity’ and ‘risk’ function centrally in the governing dispositifs of our contemporary world.131 In a society of (in)security, such discourses have a profound power to invoke danger as “requiring extraordinary action”.132 In the ongoing war on terror, registers of emergency play pivotal roles in the justification of military securitization strategies, where ‘risk’, it seems, has become permanently binded to ‘securitization’. As Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster point out, the “perspective of risk management” seductively effects practices of military securitization to be seen as necessary, legitimate and indeed therapeutic.133 US tactics of liberal lawfare in the long war – the conditioning of the battlefield, the sanctioning of the privilege of violence, the regulating of the conduct of troops, the interpreting, negating and utilising of international law, and the securing of SOFAs – are vital security dispositifs of a broader ‘risk-securitization’ strategy involving the deployment of liberal technologies of biopower to “manage dangerous irruptions in the future”.134 It may well be fought beyond the battlefield in “a war of the pentagon rather than a war of the spear”,135 but it is lawfare that ultimately enables the ‘toxic combination’ of US geopolitics and biopolitics defining the current age of securitization.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › Presence Generic

There is no new war or modern war but war as a product of territoriality and virtuality – the software update of US imperialism doesn’t require boots on the ground but rather the decolonization of military presence has produced nationalization and legal colonization for spaces that cannot be decolonized – this translates that the 1ACs reduction in military presence is deemed necessary because US militarism has already exerted its force of psychological warfare to be in propagandized as proxies for the US

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

From the beginning of European expansion, war was neither interior nor exterior, as the territory was in some sense a smooth space in that it had not been nationalized, much less internationalized. War took place, but it lacked the political quality that makes Foucault’s inversion possible. As such, the laws of war found in Hugo Grotius and early discussions of Christian traditions of just war were ­ flagrantly disregarded, just as they had been in the Eu­ ro­ pean Crusades. And furthermore, decolonization does not return us to the romantic image of international politics either. In the aftermath of formal-­ legal colonization, every­ thing is nationalized but virtually none of the new national spaces resembles what could be called a sovereign territory except for those spaces that cannot be fully decolonized ­ because they are settler colonies. This is similar to the period in Eu­ rope before Westphalia in which sovereignty was claimed by the Catholic Church and some kings but had little ­ bearing on the organ­ ization of war in regard to questions like territorial integrity or “balancing.” The postcolonial period following World War II is one in which sovereignty is unequally distributed to the point of needing to describe the behavior of states, like the U.S. as supersovereign. There ­ is a further anachronism in Tiqqun and other Agamben-­ influenced extensions of Foucault’s war thesis. In almost all cases of the global war ­ t heses, and more generally the revival of Carl Schmitt’s work on liberal international order, the loss of the classical state system is a result of the exceptional politics following the American state of emergency in 2001 or a component of a lateness in capitalism generally starting after ­ World War II. Others ­ peg the creeping national security state to Cold War politics following the ideological struggle also after World War II. In the American case, the slippage between war, state making, and security begins long before September 11, 2001, and the rapid securitization of life that takes place during the Cold War. Such presentist accounts require a selective forgetting of how indebted Cold War and war on terrorism practices and politics follow traditions of counterinsurgency and nation building throughout the settlement and expansion of the American colonies, before and after ­ the modern republic. Put simply, the classical mode of warfare between isomorphic, mutually recognized sovereign states occurred at best provincially within the continent of Europe for a very short time. This period from which Foucault draws his logic describes neither the brutal and deterriorialized wars of religion that raged in Eu­ rope before the Treaty of Westphalia, nor the wars exported beyond the shores of Europe thereafter. Therefore, the attempt by Foucault and others to draw a distinction, even temporarily, between security’s project of policing and the sovereign state’s external application of war, while historically significant for a fleeting moment, is not helpful for understanding war before and after ­ the eigh­ teenth century. ­ The simple ­ distinction between internal war (security) and external war (war/international relations) is consumed in the empirical forge of the actual ­ history of warfare. On this point, I concur with Antonio Negri conceptually despite our differences of origin and periodization: “War has always pretended to have an ordering finality in postmodern capitalism. . . . ​ Ontologically, re­ sis­ tance immediately denies that claim. Modernity’s order can no longer suppress postmodern disorder; Hobbes crumbles before Guernica and Fallujah.” 99 Negri’s formulation would be quite accurate if instead of postmodern capitalism it was the longue durée from 1492 to the pre­ sent. The fight is not between a once great ­ and constraining modern order and a new reckless “postmodern order” but modernity itself as a global project in the operationalization of the planet for war. This does not mean we should forget Foucault’s inversion of the Clausewitzian formula between war and politics. It is usefully provocative, even if misleading. I think it is better instead to read Foucault as an amplification of rather than an inversion of Clausewitz. To say that politics is war by other means still requires the affirmation of Clausewitz’s original formulation of “politics as war by other means,” without which Foucault’s war as politics would have no object. For Foucault, of course, modern war has the population— its ­ survival, productivity, and health— as its object, both as a target and as a site of mobilization. 100 If there is a concept to be developed, it is one of war as a force that complicates, forms, and deforms the po­ liti­ cal landscape of the planet. Therefore, there ­ ought ­ not be an escalating number of concepts called war’s ­others. Security is as intimately a part of colonial, postcolonial, and precolonial warfare as policing is a formative ele­ ment of international politics. The difference, at best, is one of intensity. Instead, as I try to develop in the previous section, particularly in the Amer­ i­ cas, state making and politics more generally in the settlement context is a martial art and inseparable from practices of vio­ lence. So in this sense, despite a kind of Foucauldian or biopo­ liti­ cal turn in international relations scholarship, there is little ­ if any historical evidence to support a con­ temporary “liberal way of war” or some more insidious humanitarian version of warfare that came about in the aftermath of 9/11, or as part of the civilizing mission of the Cold War, as those ­ seduced by Carl Schmitt’s romantic vision of “real war” or Agamben’s post-9/11 state of exception have suggested. 101 War in the five-­ hundred-­ year epoch of the Eurocene has always thrived in the interregnum of definitions, national bound­ aries, racial classifications, humanizing missions, settlement practices, and economizing proj­ ects, or even entrepreneurial efforts at reordering the planet. War did not fall from grace. The Eurocene has never known grace, only war. Therefore, while war is not timeless, it has axiomatic tendencies that run through at least the last five hundred years rather than the last twenty or the last one hundred, and war has a semiautonomous trajectory of change that proceeds and exceeds the rise and fall of ideologies and changes in modes of production— many ­ of the most supposedly outmoded like primitive accumulation still thriving in the form of resource extraction, particularly in obvious states of war. And nowhere has this transideological consistency been more true than in the colonies and subsequent postcolonies in which the continuity of war overshadows the changes in justificatory discourse. The Eurocene as a martial geology has proceeded and exceeded mercantilism, vari­ ous stages of capitalism, and communism, and ­ w ill likely continue through the “postideological” throes of our new authoritarianism. Rather than pointing to ­ e ither a mode of production or a par­ tic­ u­ lar mode of destruction, the bits and pieces of quantity theories of war, annihilation over exhaustion, capital drives, desires for order and settlement, and the technics of Eu­ rope as well as the innovations of the Amer­ i­ cas and elsewhere have found new assemblages in new environments. The Eurocene, like Sloterdijk’s “extended operational space . . . ​ of Eu­ ro­ pean earth-­users,” takes place in the creative and formative collision between the never fully exogenous refinement and expansion of war on the Eu­ ro­ pean continent and the radically brutal laboratory of free-­ fire innovation in the periphery. 102 Unlike Hannah Arendt’s description of a boomerang where ­ there is a point of origin and a return, the ecological history of the Eurocene is one of attraction and vitality, renewal and mutation, experiment and habituation. 103 The distance and difference between the continents, technics, enmities, and habitats w ­ ere for the martial assemblage of the Eurocene the “­free energy” of Schrödinger’s voracious systems devouring negative entropy. What emerged from this habitat was then leveraged and refined to create what can now be called a global order. However, what is, I think, apparent is that such an order from an ecological perspective has amplified par­ tic­ u­ lar attributes and forms of life over ­ o thers rather than equally consuming bodies and nations.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › Offshoring

The 1AC is the software update for American imperialism – pragmatic restraint is the new liberal metric to redefine territoriality through extrajudicial means that justifies targeted killings – this is a self-fulfilling prophecy where under the threat of terrorist attack caused by the US drone program, the US can manipulate the real and the imaginary to expand the American drone program and justify interventionism

Slaven 19 [James T. Department of History, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia Pseudoisolationism: the Neoimperialism of the State(s) June 27, 2019 ] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

In Calling 911: geopolitics, security and America's New War (2003), Simon Dalby outlined American imperialism after 9/11 and how it became the standard for a new kind of imperial warfare. He argued that in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States struggled to understand that classical European geopolitics, where "mutually exclusive spatial entities" conflicted with one another, were no longer predominant (Dalby, 2003, p. 74, 82). In other words, without a clearly defined (i.e. territorially defined) enemy to confront, the American military reaction was left searching for a target (Dalby, 2003, p. 72). Subsequently, the United States used its military to invade and occupy, or otherwise simply to garrison, foreign territory in an attempt to neutralize threats to its national security (i.e. under the guise of self-defence; Dalby, 2003, p. 80). As this essay will later argue and as Dalby argued, despite the United States neglecting to "conquer, annex, or fundamentally remake" these territories (as would be expected of true classical imperialism), it has and continues to colonize these territories via new technologies, and thus its anti-imperial national identity is only surface level deep (Dalby, 2003, p. 82). In From a View to Kill: Drones and Late Modern Warfare (2011), Derek Gregory described how modem warfare, conducted virtually through drones, has changed the very conception of battlespace, itself (p. 190). He argued that from the viewpoint of the American drone program modem battlespace has expanded across the world. This virtual, globalized battlespace results in a new version of (American) imperialism that can be remotely enforced (Gregory, 2011, pp. 189-90). In other words, the virtual application of violent force has caused "time-space compression" which means that the American military can theoretically exercise violence everywhere and at all times, as this essay will later elaborate (Gregory, 2011, p. 192). In Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (1995), John Agnew similarly described how emerging technologies had the potential to change how states interact with space. Rather than colonizing space by controlling a place(s) "on the ground," new technologies allow states to colonize space by controlling it virtually, thereby controlling all places (Agnew, 1995, pp. 95-6). In other words, by controlling space virtually states can control space instantaneously, forgoing the traditional needs of an empire to establish and maintain physical control over a place via a physical presence. It is from the theoretical starting points of Dalby, Gregory, and Agnew that this essay will now begin. 3. Offshore Balancing Before exploring the neoimperialist reality of American offshore balancing, this essay will first briefly discuss what exactly offshore balancing as a foreign policy entails. By 2011, offshore balancing had been named by Newsweek as the Obama administration's foreign policy doctrine (Beinart, 2011). By 2016, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt had published the definitive work on offshore balancing titled "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy." Primarily evidenced by Obama's withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as his later infamous "Red Line" failure in Syria, offshore balancing (as the name suggests) is primarily characterized by, "eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States' military footprint... The United States would maintain substantial naval and air assets and modest but capable ground forces" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 74, 80). The doctrine also advocates: (1) buckpassing regional defence to smaller allies in order to check the rise of a potential hegemon; (2) minimizing the threat of anti-American terrorism by "respecting the sovereignty of other states"; (3) strengthening the American economy by reducing its military expenditures as a result of, in turn, reducing the level of troops the United States garrisons abroad (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, pp. 83-4, 87-8). Subsequently, the former president's foreign policy doctrine was dubbed in newspaper headlines and book titles: "Retreating Ashore," or America in Retreat (Hoffman, 2016; Rose, 2015). Critics of offshore balancing warned that this "neoisolationist" doctrine threatened America's global hegemony (Roskin, 2016, p. 7). Rather than conserving American economic and military strength in order to maintain the current balance of power (i.e. Pax Americana) by "husbanding military strength," American armed forces would require massive re-expansion, and therefore massive expenditure, when the United States is inevitably pulled into a conflict to check the rise of a regional power (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 82). Bret Stephens (2014), in America in Retreat, argues that: "Barack Obama offered a blueprint for a new foreign policy, demanding a smaller U.S. footprint in the world" (p. 67). However, these criticisms represent a flawed understanding of the doctrine and have misidentified it as some kind of "neoisolationism," when in fact there is no evidence of a global American retreat. Having discussed offshore balancing as a foreign policy, in theory, and its critiques, this essay will now examine the reality of offshore balancing. Neoisolationism, as has been discussed above, would mean a divergence from the Pax Americana status quo and therefore would entail some sort of global American 'retreat.' Although the world has indeed seen a gradual withdrawal of American troops from its vested regional interests, the American military presence has not withdrawn on a global scale. In other words, although there are literally fewer American "boots on the ground," the American military footprint has not changed-in fact, there's an argument to be made that it has actually increased. Shima Keene (2015) notes in Lethal and Legal: the Ethics of Drone Strikes, as of 2012, "the Pentagon was reported to have 7,000 drones under its control, representing approximately one-third of all U.S. military aircraft" (p. 1). Evidently, as the United States adopts offshore balancing more heartily, and the American military transitions to forces capable of exerting "over-the-horizon" pressure (i.e. air and naval forces), unmanned combat aerial vehicles play an increasingly large role (Allin & Jones, 2012, p. 89). Approximately 10 times more drone strikes were authorized under the Obama administration than under the George W. Bush administration-506 drone strikes compared to 50 drone strikes, respectively (Zenko, 2016). As Ian Shaw notes in Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance: "by 2013, around 95 percent of the US non-battlefield targeted killings were conducted by drones" (Shaw, 2016, p. 113). Furthermore, as Medea Benjamin (2017) writes for The Guardian, by 2016 the United States maintained a military presence in "70% of the world's nations, 138 countries-a staggering jump of 130% since the days of the Bush administration." Clearly, there is no evidence of "America in Retreat," and instead it would be more accurate to conclude that there is evidence of a sustained (if not, increased) level of American presence and intervention abroad. Furthermore, Mearsheimer and Walt's "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy" fails to mention UCAVs, even though it was written in 2016 (i.e. towards the end of the Obama administration years) when drone warfare had been well-established as both the new American modus operandi and as President Obama's legacy (Kaufman, 2018; Monbiot, 2012; Zenko, 2016). Although the authors of "The Case for Offshore Balancing" have apparently forgotten to mention the role of the drone program in contemporary foreign policy and military interventions, their critics are just as equally at fault for, by and large, having neglected to mention it. As Shaw clarifies: "as U.S. military technology has become more sophisticated, the significance of mass, force, and territoriality has shrunk (although by no means disappeared)" (Shaw, 2016, p. 132). So, as this essay has discussed thus far, despite the appearance of a "global American retreat" when measuring in terms of conventional military forces, the reality of the maintenance of a global, American military presence when measured in UCAVs is evident. Offshore balancing has been misdiagnosed as "neoisolationism," when in fact it merely appears that way, and it can therefore correctly be labelled pseudoneoisolationism. 4. The Drone Program: Redefining Territoriality This essay will now proceed to argue that the American, neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality can be examined, specifically, by looking at the targeting methods used in the drone program and the legality of drone warfare under international law. Strikes carried out under the American drone program are (theoretically) authorized using two sets of targeting methods: personality strikes and signature strikes. The targeted killing of individuals through both personality and signature strikes redefines the American state's understanding of territoriality, although signature strikes have much more profound implications, as will be discussed. As Shima Keene (2015) describes in "Lethal and Legal: The Ethics of Drone Strikes," personality strikes are situations wherein: "an individual whose identity is known is specifically targeted" (p. 24). However, signature strikes are situations wherein, as Keene (2015) once again clarifies: Unknown individuals often in groups are targeted... the precise identity of these individuals is unknown, [and therefore] the individuals targeted must match a pre-identified 'signature' of behaviour that the United States links to militant activity or association... patterns of behaviour are used to determine a target. (p. 25) Simply put, the United States does not know who it is killing in these signature strikes. However, as Keene emphasized in the quote above, it may be worth restating that: the United States does not know precisely who it is killing. So then, a more convincing argument might be made by investigating the "signatures" or patterns of behaviour that the United States sets out in signature strike targeting methods. However, upon investigation, what are considered signatures of terrorist behaviour have, as Keene (2015) puts it, "come under criticism" (p. 25). Greg Miller and Bob Woodward (2013) describe multiple strikes based on circumstantial evidence in "Secret memos reveal explicit nature of U.S., Pakistan agreement on drones": On March 23, 2010, the CIA launched missiles at a "person of interest" in a suspected al-Qaeda compound. The man caught the agency's attention after he had "held two in-car meetings, and swapped vehicles three times along the way." Other accounts describe militants targeted because of the extent of "deference" they were shown when arriving at a suspect site. Keene (2015) cites in her own work one instance when: "on February 21, 2010, 23 Afghan civilians were wrongly identified by a U.S. operated drone as enemy combatants and killed in airstrikes" (p. 27). Clearly then, it is not an oversimplification, after all, to say that the United States does not know who it is killing in these strikes. Shaw (2016) starkly notes: "if the pattern of life [emphasis added] is marked as a threat to national security, it can be eliminated" (p. 128). By examining drone strike targeting methods and their consequences, it becomes clear that the United States is engaged in a new kind of neoimperialist exercise. Specifically, by extrajudiciously killing individuals or groups of individuals through signature strike targeting methods the American state is exercising legal authority over non-citizens. Furthermore, the American state is exercising legal authority over a specific demographic (theoretically, this is military-age males) of a non-citizen population within a bounded geographic space (i.e. another state), rather than exercising legal authority over the whole population. On top of that, the individuals that belong to that particular demographic have no notice that they are under American law, unlike classical, imperialist occupations, because the American state subjectively determines whether or not certain "patterns of life" are a threat to national security (Keene, 2015, p. 27; Shaw, 2016, p. 128). At that point, whether or not the targeted individual(s) is known for certain to be a threat to national security (i.e. a terrorist), the individual is killed, and the right to surrender and defend themselves in a court of law is withheld (also known as extrajudicial killing; Keene, 2015, p. 12). So, by continuing to authorize drone strikes based on signature strike targeting methods, the American state is claiming and exercising legal authority over a specific demographic of non-citizens within a separate bounded geographic space (i.e. another state). Similar to the targeting methods used for authorizing drone strikes, the legality of drone strikes under international law has equally profound implications for territoriality. The United States has consistently harkened back to the September 11th terrorist attacks as the justification needed for targeted killings carried out under the drone program, and within the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) more generally. On September 12, 2001 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 which, while denouncing the September 11 terrorist attacks, recognized, "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter [of the United Nations]," referring to the right to self-defence as laid out in Article 51 of the Charter (United Nations Security Council, 2001; Anghie, 1996, 276). The United States specifically cites this right to self-defence as the legal basis for targeted killings (Keene, 2015, p. 16; see also Vavrichek, 2014, p. 32). However, the the legal basis for targeted killings also lies in equal part within International Human Rights Law (IHRL). As Diane Vavrichek (2014) notes in "The Future of Drone Strikes: A Framework for Analyzing Policy Options," IHRL states that lethal force may only be used against individuals who pose an "imminent [emphasis added] and substantial threat to life" (pp. 34-5). However, Vavrichek (2014) then goes on to cite a Department of Justice legal memo which, "concludes that, 'the condition that an operational leader present an "imminent" threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future' "(p. 37). This legal basis, grounded in the UNSC Resolution 1368 as well as IHRL, is precisely where the United States redefines its definition of territoriality. This neoimperialist redefinition relies on two concepts which it borrows from the UNSC Resolution 1368 and IHRL, respectively: self-defence and imminence. As Vavrichek (2014) notes: This usage is at odds with the definition of the word "imminent" and signals a departure from the historical criteria for a nation to act preemptively in self-defence only when the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." (p. 37) Similarly, Antony Anghie (1996), in Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, argues that "the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence... appears to extend the concept of self-defence well beyond traditionally understood boundaries of Article 51 of the UN Charter" (p. 276). This "historical departure" also signals a departure from traditional understandings of territoriality. By preemptively defending itself against individuals using signature strike targeting methods and therefore by understanding that those individuals pose an imminent threat to national security regardless of whether or not those individuals can practically reach American territory (i.e. the continental United States) in the immediate future, the United States is implying that American territory is no longer restricted by linear boundaries and traditional notions of territoriality, but instead has spread across the globe. It is only through this understanding that the American drone program is legally authorized to strike anywhere in the world since an individual in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Yemen, to offer up historical examples, can pose an imminent threat to American national security and therefore require preemptive actions in the name of self-defence. 5. Connecting the Dots This essay will now discuss the importance of discussing offshore balancing and the American, neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality in an effort to make it clear that not only is offshore balancing pseudoneoisolationist, but it is actually neoimperialist. In summary, it is important to discuss offshore balancing in tandem with the American drone program and its implications for territoriality because it becomes clear that it constitutes a dangerously attractive foreign policy option for politicians, and yet it still has not been properly identified as a neoimperialist doctrine. It would not be enough to discuss offshore balancing as a foreign policy and the neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality occurring under the American drone program, separately because that would be a failure to realize the neoimperialist reality of the current American foreign policy doctrine. By adhering to offshore balancing as a doctrine, the American military will suffer fewer casualties by relying more on UCAVs, which results in minimal domestic backlash, while maintaining American global hegemony (Bahador & Walker, 2012, pp. 248-9). Furthermore, it is a self-perpetuating foreign policy: public perception of the United States worsens inside the state(s) that the American drone program operates in, resentment builds among the populace, and, conversely, support for terrorist organizations grows (albeit, amongst a small percentage of the populace; Shah, 2010, pp. 86-7). Eventually this leads to a terrorist attack abroad, perhaps even within the United States (although it is difficult to discern how many terrorist attacks have occurred within the continental United States since 2001 since there is little consensus about what constitutes a terrorist attack), at which point there is a public outcry of support for military action and, potentially, support from the heads of allied states. As a result, the United States then has all the justification and support it needs to continue its drone program, and the self-perpetuating cycle begins, as Robert Kaplan (2015), in Imperial Grunts, puts it in his own words: "terrorism was both a cause and a symptom [of the GWOT]" (p. 7). Hall Gardner (2005) describes the same process in American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism ": State leaderships additionally use the threat of external terror (threats coming from outside the state) in order to obtain and sustain both allegiance and obedience, and to repress dissent. In The Politics, Aristotle argued that "the distant fear must be brought home"-in that [political] elites seek to preserve their power and influence and obtain both domestic and international allegiance to their goals by manipulating real and imagined (or exaggerated) fears that their 'constitutions' and basic freedoms might be subverted by enemies abroad. (p. 54) This dangerous, violent, cyclical misunderstanding is in part driven by a discourse based in the dichotomy of good and evil, as Bret Stephens (2014), himself, writes in America in Retreat (which was mentioned at the beginning of this paper): America needs to be the world's policeman... Cops merely walk the beat, reassuring the good, deterring the tempted, punishing the wicked... It is done because it has to be and there's no one else to do it, and because the benefits of doing it accrue not only to those we protect but also, indeed mainly, to ourselves. (pp. xv-i) This, of course, is a vast over-simplification of American foreign policy and ignores entirely the cyclical violence that is perpetuated by American foreign policy particularly within the context of the GWOT, as discussed above. However, to elaborate further would verge on overextending this essay's core argument. Rather, it should simply be stated that: the connection must be made between offshore balancing as a foreign policy and the implications of the drone program for American territoriality so that the present, neoimperialist reality of American foreign policy can be properly identified and understood as neoimperialist. 6. What Now? In conclusion, this essay has discussed offshore balancing as a foreign policy doctrine, how it has incorrectly been labeled "neoisolationist," and why pseudoneoisolationist would be a more suitable label. Then, the American drone program and its neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality through two aspects-targeting methods and legal justification-was discussed. Finally, it has been argued that these two subjects need to be examined together so that the neoimperialist reality of American foreign policy, perpetuated by the American drone program, can be properly identified as such. So, what now? Various scholars, such as Anghie (1996), are describing the emergence of a "new imperialism" (p. 274). Some, such as Robert Cooper, are even advocating for a kind of " 'defensive imperialism... a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.' " (as cited in Anghie, 1996, p. 274). Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that contemporary understandings of neoimperialism also need to be broadened in the wake of this new military technology-UCAVs-because, as this essay has discussed, they allow the United States to carry out a foreign policy that cannot be correctly labeled as imperialist nor neoimperialist (at least, not by the current parameters of either definition). Therefore, this essay suggests a new definition of neoimperialism be outlined to include the territorial implications created by the American drone program. With this expanded definition of neoimperialism, then offshore balancing, as a foreign policy, may correctly be identified by its true nature-not neoisolationist, but neoimperialist.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › Demilitarization

The affirmatives articulation of demilitarization as a benign anti-imperial action plays into a system of global governance that seeks to integrate all opposition into the liberal order. Imperialism isn’t about territorial acquisition; it is a structure of feeling that requires the narrative of the grateful native to sustain itself, like how the insidiousness of the aff is hidden by tropes of altruism. They actually advance and streamline the development of new counter-insurgent tactics facilitated by spatial peace-making.

Wai 14 [Zubairu Wai is an associate professor of Political Science at Lakehead University. Professor Wai's research focuses on questions about power, knowledge, identity, and representation in the discourses, and political economy of violence, conflicts, state formation, development, and international interventionism, as well as on epistemological questions regarding the conditions of Africanist knowledge, and disciplinary practices in African Studies and International Relations. “The empire's new clothes: Africa, liberal interventionism and contemporary world order,” Review of African Political Economy, 42: 142, 2014) CSUF JmB TDI

In Global Governance and New Wars (2001), British political scientist Mark Duffield tells the story of how, as a result of conflicts in the 1990s, and concerns in the West about their implications for global peace and security, a major political project was formulated, the expressed aim of which was to impose what he calls a ‘liberal peace’ on the areas in the South affected by incidents of political unrest, civil wars and armed conflicts. This liberal peace project, Duffield tells us, is produced and exerted through a strategic complex of actors and achieved through a set of practices among which is the radicalisation of development and the incorporation of conflicts and security in development discourse and practice. Discursively, underdevelopment, which was once understood as an economic condition, has now been redefined as a dangerous political condition that not only causes conflict, but also engenders a vicious circle of self-perpetrating and mutually reinforcing violence and impoverishment (38). As a result, a new politics of developmentalism, of which humanitarian interventionism is an integral part, has resulted from a fundamental shift in official aid policy towards both conflict resolution and the reconstruction and transformation of conflict societies along contemporary liberal ideologies of governance favoured by the West. The transformational aims of these policy prescriptions are thus embodied in this new global politics of development and humanitarian interventionism legislated and promoted by the major Western governments and their aid agencies, the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the International Financial Institutions, donor and aid organisations, international NGOs and so forth. Rather than merely being a technical system of support for Southern societies affected by political unrest, civil wars, armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters or ‘state failure’, these arrangements, Duffield tells us, are part of a larger system of global governance, the transformational aims of which are to pacify Southern societies and impose a liberal peace on their disorderly terrains. That is, a new politics of ‘humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy’ (2001, 11). From this per- spective, ‘liberal peace’ is an altruistic political project born out of the West’s desire to pacify the world by dealing with conflicts and humanitarian disasters which are now thought to not only constitute a development and humanitarian challenge for the societies in which they occur, but also constitute a security threat and challenge for the West. One would have expected that a scholar who has the good sense to recognise these pro- cesses along the lines he specifies would, at least, be alarmed by their political implications, if not critical of their ethos and the types of power relations they are embedded in and make possible. However, Duffield does not seem to be bothered by this liberal interventionist project. He defines it as a ‘shared system of moral responsibility’ (2001, 260) even though he argues that this new ethico-political reality represents a ‘moral rearming of the West’. He dismisses those, such as Noam Chomsky (1999) and Frank Furedi (1994) among others, who have drawn attention to the fact that this enhanced ability of the West to intervene and impose its will on Southern societies is a function of a new ideology of imperialism, as harking back to an outmoded thinking that is incapable of coming to terms with a form of power and authority that is radically different from imperialism. To Duffield, the new politics of humanitarian interventionism, and the system of global gov- ernance that potentiates it, does not represent ‘an unchanging reality’ or the reworking of old imperialist formulas. Rather it is based on ‘liberal power’, not ‘imperial power’ (which assumes that liberal power cannot in fact also be imperial power). He writes: The current concern of global governance is to establish a liberal peace on its troubled borders: to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies as a way of avoiding future wars. The ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability. In achieving this aim, liberal peace is different from imperial peace. The latter was based on, or at least aspired to, direct territorial control where populations were ruled through juridical and bureaucratic means of authority. The imperial power dealt with opposition using physical and juridical forms of pacification, sometimes in an extreme and violent manner. Liberal peace is different; it is a non-territorial, mutable and networked relation of governance. The aim of the strategic state – non-state complexes that embody global governance is not the direct control of territory. Ideally, liberal power is based on the management and regulation of economic, political and social processes. It is power through the control and management of non-territorial systems and networks. As a result, liberal strategic complexes are usually averse to the long-term costs and responsibilities that controlling territory implies. (Duffield 2001, 34) The implication of this argument is that the current militarisation of Africa through Western interventions in places such as Coˆte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, CAR, among others, should be seen as attempts by the West at pacifying a turbulent continent given to internecine conflicts, and establishing a liberal peace on the disorderly terrains of its ‘illiberal spaces’. They are not imperialistic because they do not thrive on direct territorial control, and other forms of juridical, bureaucratic and militaristic forms of rule exerted from an imperial centre of authority. What this means in turn is that, for Duffield (2001), a system of dom- ination can only be imperialistic if it is based on a territorial acquisitive logic that imposes or seeks to impose its rule spatially through physical, juridical and bureaucratic forms of power and control. This characterisation of contemporary world order converges with that of Hardt and Negri (2000), who have suggested the passage of global power from an order based on the ascendancy of the nation-state to another based on the structural irrelevance of the nation-state. They write: The boundaries defined by the modern system of nation-states were fundamental to European colonial and economic expansion: the territorial boundaries of the nation delimited the centre of power from which rule was exerted over external foreign territories through a system of chan- nels and barriers that alternately facilitated and obstructed the flows of production and circula- tion. Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries. Eventually nearly all the world’s territories could be parcelled out and the entire world map could be coded in European colours: red for British territory, blue for French, green for Portuguese, and so forth. Wherever modern sovereignty took root, it constructed a Leviathan that overarched its social domain and imposed hierarchical territorial boundaries, both to police the purity of its own identity and to exclude all that was other. (xii) In contrast to imperialism is what Hardt and Negri call Empire, which they posit as the new order that has, since the end of the Cold War, been effectively regulating global relations. Empire, they tell us, does not establish any territorial centre of power, nor does it rely on fixed boundaries or barriers in exerting its authority. Rather, it is ‘a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers’ (2000, xii, emphasis in original). A geocentric order ‘com- posed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule’, Empire is the political project that effectively regulates global exchanges and the new global sovereign power that governs the realm of global economic and social relations (Ibid.). The reluctance of many theorists to recognise these major shifts in global power, Hardt and Negri contend, owes largely to the fact that ‘they see that the dominant capitalist nation- states have continued to exercise imperialist domination over the other nations and regions of the globe’. While not underestimating ‘these real and important lines of continuity’, it is important, they counter, ‘that what used to be conflict or competition among several imperi- alist powers has in important respects been replaced by the idea of a single power that over- determines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right’ (2000, 9). The power thus involved is fundamentally new and therefore not merely a simple reformulation and perfecting of old imperialist practices, as most theorists of contemporary world order believe. It is ‘a new notion of right . . . a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts’ (7). In this sense, Empire ‘marks a paradigm shift’ in global politics (Hardt and Negri 2000, 8, emphasis in original). The United States might occupy a privileged position in this new global reconstitution of imperial authority, Hardt and Negri tell us, and this is partially explained by the continuity of its importance from being the principal figure in the struggle against international socialism and the Soviet Union to being the central figure in the newly unified imperial world order. However, it is not the centre of a new imperialism nor the new imperialist power. And, even though the power of Empire ‘is born through the global expansion of the internal US constitutional project’, the United States ‘does not, and indeed no nation can today form the centre of an imperialist project’ (2000, 182, xiv). Empire, thus, should be understood as imperial not imperialist, for in contrast with imperialism, which always seeks ‘to spread its power linearly in closed spaces and invade, destroy and subsume subject countries within its sovereignty’, Empire ‘is constructed on the model of rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular relations in networks across an unborn terrain’ (182). It therefore ‘can only be conceived as a univer- sal republic, a network of powers and counterpowers structured in a boundless and inclusive architecture. This imperial expansion has nothing to do with imperialism, nor with those state organisms designed for conquest, pillage, genocide, colonisation, and slavery. Against such imperialisms, Empire expands and consolidates the model of network power’ (166). In this regard, those which were once ‘the distinct national colours of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow’ (xiii). Liberal peace, Empire or postcolonial imperialism? It is not my intention to rehearse here the criticisms that have been levied against Duffield and, especially, Hardt and Negri, in part, because I believe that they offer compelling, even if ideologically ambivalent and depoliticised accounts of contemporary world order. What I want to do instead is call into question the problematic ways they have interpreted that order, the power which produces it, the system of domination it makes possible, and the logic that undergirds the ethos of its practice. Central to this is an origin-diffusion problem based on a ‘first in Europe then elsewhere’ structure of time (Chakrabarty 2000, 8); that is, a historicist evolutionist epistemology that posits the West as the only rational Hegelian historical subject capable of inscribing world-historical events and processes (Wai 2012). In this epistemological schema, and the Eurocentric accounts they construct, the non-west only features as areas or objects to be acted upon by a historically stalwart Western agency that for Duffield, is transforming the world in the quest for stability and thus is imposing a liberal peace on the illiberal spaces and turbulent terrain of the South; and for Hardt and Negri, has inscribed a transformational global system that originates in, and spreads outward from, the West to the rest, reconstituting world order and presiding over a number of transitions: from disciplinary society to society of control; from state- based sovereignty to geocentric sovereignty that has revealed the structural irrelevance of the nation-state, and from imperialism to Empire of capital. All of these processes are assumed to have their origins in the West, and then diffused outward to the rest of the World. Remaining faithful to epistemological schemas that construct hierarchies of power and knowledge and mobilise Eurocentric categories to colonise other ways of knowing and being, these analyses tell us very little about the role of the South, other than as areas acted upon by a historically dynamic Western agency. Coming from the dominant and dominating milieus, our authors’ interpretations thus betray a fidelity to a positionality and privilege of location that is firmly ensconced in the traditions of their ethnos. This is, in part, what pushes them to theorise global processes from the certainty of Eurocentric perspectives that prevents them from seeing the form of power that the current liberal world order is: a violent and intrusive imperialistic power that hides its will to domination in tropes of altruism and facile concerns over human rights. Linked to this is the hasty rush to judgement about the nature of an emerging world order in the immediate post-Cold War environment. The old, as Gramsci (1971) would say, was dying, but the new which was coming into being was not exactly known, so many began to speculate and, in some cases, rushed to hasty conclusions about the nature of political processes unfolding under concrete historical conditions. Disciplinary international relations scholars and globalisation theorists, for example, had a field day in trying to decipher this emerging global power-political landscape. In the ‘hysteria of naming’ (Stallybrass 1990) which followed, the race was on to coin the best phrase or come up with the best moniker and the next big idea to describe or capture the changing configurations in an emergent but still uncertain world order. Francis Fukuyama (1989), for example, inscribed his ‘end of history’ thesis on a vulgar Hegelian historicist ideological landscape (Roth 1995). In crude cultural essentialist language, Samuel Huntington (1993) warned of a ‘clash of civilisation’. An almost hysterical Robert Kaplan (1994) claimed to have detected ‘a coming anarchy’ in West Africa, a nightmarish scenario of criminal violence, bloody conflicts and state implosion, demographic stress, environmental degradation and resource scarcity that he posited as the fate of the rest of the world, depicting it in the crassest sensational journalistic language. Some of the other epithets used were ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’ (Barber 1992), ‘Clash of Fundamentalisms’ (Ali 2003), ‘Clash of Globalisa- tions’ (Gill 2003) and, for our present purpose, ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2000) and ‘Liberal Peace’ (Duffield 2001). The problem though was that the theories and concepts used were less suggestive of an emerging global power structure and more indicative of a supposedly definitive and extant world order; they were less speculative and more depictive of reality imagined as actually existing, as if the new landscape of global power were not a formative process forged out of multiple conjunctural agonistics, but one that had come into being fully formed and already crystallised into the world order imagined or speculated about. It is within this general atmosphere that Empire and Global Governance and New Wars emerged. Hardt and Negri, for example, admit to locating the conception of their project at the midpoint between the Persian Gulf War (1991) and the war in Kosovo (1999), which they understand as signal events in the construction of Empire (2000, xvii). The fact that the ‘world’ (through the United Nations) appeared to have acted in concert to militarily evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990 – 91, and Western states, under the banner of NATO, intervened against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999, seemed to have signalled the emergence of a world order based on a single network of power that they would go on to theorise as Empire. Conveniently forgetting the numerous other cases even during this period (Bosnia, East Timor, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc.) that tended to suggest a world in flux, this rush to judgement about processes unfolding under concrete historical conditions now came to highlight the inadequacy of a theoretical enterprise which had been predicated on the rejection of imperialism as a reality of contemporary world order, once an angry United States began to explicitly reassert its power and tried to redefine the world in its image in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Imperialism that Hardt and Negri had told us was over now stood stark and manifested itself rather forcefully, as the US and its allies grappled with the uncertainties of a rapidly changing reality of world order, and sought to gain control over it. The second issue relates to our authors’ problematic and (even static) conception of imperialism, which they see primarily as a territorial acquisitive phenomenon. For Duffield as well as Hardt and Negri, and this has already been mentioned earlier, a system of dom- ination only qualifies as imperialistic if it has a territorial acquisitive logic. Imperialism, however, is not, and has never been, a static and unchanging reality of power and domination. It does not have to function, and has never really functioned, only through a single logic of rule or method of operation. It does not have to be a territorial acquisitive phenom- enon for it to be imperialist; and though it usually does, it does not even necessarily have to have an overtly economic logic for it to be imperialist. As Edward Said (1993) often reminded us, imperialism is more than an economic or territorial acquisitive phenomenon. A system of domination, it is more than simple acts of accumulation and acquisition for it occurs on and ‘beyond the level of economic laws and political decisions’ to conquer, to annex, to dominate and to exploit. Rather, it also is an ideational phenomenon, usually ‘supported, and perhaps even impelled, by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination’ (9). These impressive ideological formations constitute a ‘structure of feeling’ about ‘empire’, which, in the words of Sherene Razack, designates a ‘deeply held belief in the need and the right to dominate others for their own good’ (2004, 10). It is this structure of feeling that defines the self-conceptions of individuals living within the imperial centres ‘believing deeply in the “illusion of benevolence” and requiring, as before, grateful natives’ (Ibid.). Imperialism is a complex and multi-faceted reality of power. It covers, as Robert Young (2001) reminds us, ‘a range of relationships of domination and dependence that can be characterised according to historical and theoretical or organisational differences’ (26). Originally used to designate ‘a political system of actual conquest and occupation’, and increasingly coming to be associated with the Marxist conception ‘as a general system of economic domination, with direct political domination being a possible but not necessary adjunct’ (Ibid.), imperialism today plays itself out more as a set of relationships (both formal and informal, direct and indirect) which involves the processes, policies and practices by which empire is established and maintained, and by which a state or group of states controls or seeks to control the effective political destinies of other states and societies, and this can be achieved by force of arms, political persuasion and collaboration, economic, social or cultural imposition, coercion and dependence (Doyle 1986, 45). It also involves ‘the practice, the theory and attitude of a dominating metropolitan centre in relation to the distant territories and peoples’ it directly or indirectly controls, dominates and exploits (Said 1993, 9). It thus can function perfectly without any formal colonisation or acquisition of territories. In fact, it can even also function against its own economic interests (Young 2001). From the preceding, I contend that that which has been conceptualised as Empire and liberal peace is in fact a neo-imperialist posture potentiated by a Western will to power and domination. It is a desire or an attempt at restructuring global power and imposing an imperial order on the world. However, this desire does not transform the violent and hierarchical form of power it is constitutive of into a decentred and deterritorialised phenomenon. Neither does it represent a disinterested reality of global do-goodism and benevolence, as is usually suggested in studies purporting to explain the current imperial moment we live in. Rather, it is a hierarchical notion of power that re-territorialises and re-centres global relations within blocks of power through spatial displacement and the redefinition of traditional notions of sovereignty, while reworking, and even perfecting, the violent and exploitative logics of imperial power that have historically violated the integrity of non-Western societies and still stand in the way of especially African self-determination into diffused networks of power and privilege. Empire and liberal peace are manifestations of this neo-imperialistic posture: a reality of imperial globality; imperialism without empire, or colonialism without colonies; in other words, postcolonial imperialism. Obviously, these relations of domination are not static and unchanging, neither are they unchallenged and haplessly absorbed, but constantly mutate and are reconstituted through hierarchical modes of power as well as through appropriating the concerns of anti-colonial forces aimed at the negation of such imperialistic orders. This imperial reality is both geopolitical, in that it aims to project the power and political, economic and ideological interests of the dominant states in the world through the production and domination of the global space; and geocentric, in projecting its power through the spatial politics of seeking to unite the entire global sphere under a single network of imperial authority. However, the fact that this notion of right is liberal, or that Western powers now broadly agree on how to approach their imperial politics of domination, does not make it post-imperialist. What this signifies instead is the intensification, or maybe even perfection, of an imperial politics of domination produced and impelled by a ‘liberal consensus’ in the West. By liberal consensus, I refer to the ideological convergence in the West about the need to remake the world and impose liberal governance mechanisms on global socio-economic and political relations (Harvey 2005). Just as nineteenth-century Europe used the occidental mantle of a ‘civilising mission’ to justify its imperial domination of the world, postcolonial imperialism has defined its political project on the basis of the need to pacify the world through the use of juridical and militaristic modes of interventions in order to structure the world in line with the ideological preferences of liberalism and Western ‘universal’ norms and cosmopolitan values. Among these are the trinity of democracy, human rights and good governance, and the imposition of neoliberal market mechanisms on global social relations: deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and financialisation.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › Debasing Movements

Securitizing of political revolutions cedes power to fascists that make conflict more likely

Saliba 15 is a PhD student at the Humboldt University zu Berlin and research fellow at the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) Department for Democracy & Democratization “The Securitisation of Stability and the Demise of the Arab Uprisings” CSUF JmB TDI

The uprisings that swept across the Arab World in 2011 were remarkable in many ways. They constituted a serious challenge to the authority of the most coherent bloc of authoritarian regimes. During spring that year, the streets across Arab capitals were filled with people expressing their grievances and demanding change. The protests broke with the orientalist and paternalistic perception of ‘respected’ authoritarian leaders. The Arab uprisings also taught us that demography matters. It was the disenfranchised youth that initiated the protests in most places, a faction of society that never before appeared on the stage as a relevant political actor. Young Arabs assembled and screamed the same slogans towards the parliaments and palaces from Sanaa to Rabat. Despite all that, four years on – except for Tunisia – we are left with consolidated dictatorship,[and] outright civil war or failed states, recently illustrated by the coup of the Houthi militia in Yemen and the violent fourth anniversary of the revolution in Egypt. Although the phenomena of state disintegration and the reinstatement of strongmen such as Al-Sisi in Cairo seem to be at opposite ends of a spectrum, they are closely related. The revival of authoritarianism after popular uprisings against these regimes can partly be explained by the failure to consolidate stability, in Libya, Egypt and Yemen. Consequently, fellow despots the region legitimised their crack down of protests with increasing instability in the neighbourhood and the deteriorating regional security situation. Thus beyond specific domestic drivers the restoration of authoritarian rule can be seen as a response to increasing uncertainty about the outcomes of the Arab revolutions. Popular support for mass protests throughout the region dramatically declined over the course of 2011. In some instances, this was due to the coercive response by the regimes (as in Syria or Bahrain). In others, the decline can partly be explained by fear of instability (Morocco, Jordan and Algeria). An activist from the protest movement in Morocco summed up: ‘the aftermath of the popular uprisings in Syria, Libya and Egypt scared the people from the street. They preferred stability over the possibility of chaos’. Many regimes credibly established the importance of security and stability as an effective counter narrative to the expression of grievances under authoritarian rule. The former general and new Egyptian president Al-Sisi drew on the longing for security and stability in parts of the population setting out his saying: ‘We are threatened by the terrorist […] who seek the destruction of our life, safety and security’. This emphasis on law-and-order in the face of spreading instability and crumbling statehood went hand in hand with denying any legitimate alternative to the politics of an iron fist. In fact, demonising political opponents as anarchists or fundamentalists is part of the winning strategy. Such rhetoric can increasingly be found in speeches of autocrats across the region from Bashar Al Assad to Mohammed VI of Morocco: The construction of a threat in the face of a popular uprising is not a new strategy and has proven effective for those states that were able to avoid a regime breakdown. It has a similarity with what the . However, even in Tunisia – the lighthouse of the Arab Uprisings – threat scenarios are constantly to prevent substantial reform of the interior ministry and the related security forces. Amine Khali a Tunisian researcher working on transitional justice said: ‘The window for security sector reform is closing. The interior ministry successfully pacted with old and new elites in the face of growing security concerns in order to avoid substantial reform and accountability’. What is so worrying about this development? The answer boils down to the fact that the authoritarian elements have prevented change by successfully creating a threat and imposing themselves as the only alternative. They have instrumentalised fear in their favour and ultimately the regimes themselves. After this rather pessimistic account one question remains: What lessons can we draw from this? As mentioned in the beginning of the article, an entire generation, which constitutes the majority of the population in the Arab World, has risen up against oppression. Although they might become disillusioned and fall back into political apathy, their grievances will not fade as long as despotism reigns in the region. For as long as the underlying reasons are not addressed the new stability of the iron fist might only be short-lived. The next time the young generation makes their voices heard the West should be prepared to stand by their side. To help them overcome the fear of chaos and anarchy.Pressing for an inclusive and open transition process in which less institutionalised civil society groups have a real say in the political negotiations that determine the rules of the game can ensure the participation of oftentimes-sidelined groups. Empowering less institutionalised groups through capacity building and resources provides another option.Most importantly, the acceptance of the rules that apply for a smooth political transition process has to be ensured. Compliance with such rules should be monitored and insisted upon by foreign governments as well as activists and politicians in transitioning countries alike. Installing credible independent arbitration mechanisms domestically and regional or even international ones to intermediate in times of crisis between actors in negotiations might help to avoid one-sided escalations of politicised debates in crucial areas.A rush to fast elections not only marginalises less institutionalised groups (such as the youth) but also introduces competition for political power and thus makes consensual decision-making amongst actors less likely. The balance between inclusion, consensus and universal suffrage at the ballot box is crucial for transition processes and has to align legal as well as democratic standards to avoid alienation amongst actors during a first transition phase.All the three aforementioned points: inclusive and consensual decision-making, limited politicisation and competition and the respect of the rules and the transition roadmap are crucial in order to avoid sliding from uncertainty into violence, conflict or even disintegration.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › Africa

The US debasing project in Africa is nothing new but is an integral part that justifies the United State’s drone program which creates a territoriality of violence in which the US can maintain its military posture without physical presence

Kindervater 2017 [Katharine Hall, postdoctoral fellow in the Society of Fellows and the Department of Geography at Dartmouth College. Drone strikes, ephemeral sovereignty, and changing conceptions of territory. Territory, Politics, Governance, 5(2), 207-221.] CSUF JmB TDI

As the FBI Director’s comments about shrinking the world made at a Minneapolis press conference indicate, space is an important figure in today’s discourse surrounding the US government’s use of drones and the ever-evolving war on terror. Proponents and critics alike stress that the drone allows for shrinking space or distance and overcoming territorial limits, enabling targeting at increasingly large distances and extending the spatial reach of the military with limited risk to US soldiers. Further, perhaps in part because of these characteristics, the drone has become a weapon and surveillance tool (Kindervater, 2016) that is increasingly deployed in territories outside of war zones and met with relatively little resistance – examples of which can be found in Libya, Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen. If the contemporary global drone wars raise questions about the changing space of war, they also produce related questions about the meaning of territory, and more specifically the relationship between territory and the projection of force. For example, as drone strikes exceed the “traditional” limits of the battlefield, does the relevance or salience of the territory of the nation-state fall away, especially as it relates to sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction? Have new or different conceptions of territory emerged in the war on terror and contemporary drone wars? This article examines the role of territory in the United States’ deployment of lethal drones, and does so by looking at two publicly available documents that provide legal justifications for drone targeting operations. Focusing on these legal justifications throws into relief the malleable, dynamic, and multiplicitious character of territory, as well as how territory and authority are mobilized and constructed in relation to the law and the projection of force. I argue that territory is mobilized in these documents to legally justify the use of force and the reach of US sovereign power. By drawing on conceptions of territory that are dynamic and malleable, the Obama Administration attempts to place drone strikes squarely within the law, effecting a new landscape of mobile and ephemeral sovereignty that stands in contrast to conventions of state sovereignty that are fixed to static demarcations of territory. The first section of the article is devoted to a close reading of a Department of Justice memorandum and white paper, which outline the US government’s justification for drone strikes outside war zones as well as against US citizens. In these documents, how the space of war is characterized becomes important for determining the legality of a strike. Here, law/legal justification and territory work together to produce a shape-shifting field of state violence and the use of force. Territory and the space of the battlefield become important bolsters to the United States’ authority to strike, yet the concept of territory that underpins these documents is far from fixed and static. Thus, the second section turns to recent efforts by critical geographers to develop dynamic and networked concepts of territory and how this might help us to think through the significance of territory to the execution of drone strikes, leading to the emergence of a more ephemeral and fluid form of sovereignty. The article concludes by revisiting the concept of territorial design advanced in this special issue in light of this engagement with US drone strikes. As I discuss, looking at territory through the lens of the contemporary drone strike allows us to see the tensions and connections between the constitution and demarcation processes of territory as well as the multiplicity of state territory. Drone strikes, law, and territory Since September 11, 2001, two public government documents provide the most comprehensive account of the government’s justification of the use of drone strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, extending state power and the projection of force outside of delineated battle spaces. The 2010 Memorandum for the Attorney General from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (“Memorandum”) and the 2011 draft of a Department of Justice White Paper (“White Paper”) each outline a legal argument in support of drone strikes, with particular focus on the lawfulness of targeting American citizens abroad. Together, the documents reveal not so much the rationales for drone strikes, but the – sometimes contradictory and conflicting – frameworks of authority and power that the Obama administration places these strikes within. Territory is a central figure in these frameworks. In what follows, I introduce the arguments made in these documents and then look more closely at the roles of territory and the law in producing the spaces of contemporary drone wars. The 2010 Memorandum specifically focuses on affirming the legality of a drone strike targeting Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen, by assessing whether or not the strike would violate federal criminal laws or the Constitution of the United States. The conclusion of the document –that these strikes are legal –is supported by three main arguments, which the Memorandum moves through in order, yet also keeps fairly distinct from one another. This has the effect of making it difficult for the reader to distinguish exactly what the legality of the strikes hinges on – a difficulty compounded by redacted portions of the text. The first consideration of the Memorandum is whether, in the case of targeting al-Awlaki, the actions of the government would fall under a public authority justification for the criminal codes it would otherwise violate. If the targeting of Awlaki fell under the public authority justification, it would not be considered an “unlawful killing” or murder by the state. The Memorandum argues that this justification would apply for either DoD or CIA drone strikes because it would constitute a “lawful conduct of war” (Office of Legal Counsel, 2010, p. 20). To make this argument, which is the most detailed section in the Memorandum, the authors argue that al-Awlaki as an individual falls within the scope of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The Memorandum authors argue, “…the AUMF itself does not set forth an express geographic limitation…” (Office of Legal Counsel, 2010, p. 24). What is important, therefore, is the status of those involved in the conflict, not the location of the conflict, which is seen to extend globally and to move with the individuals involved. Following this, and in what begins to feel like circular reasoning to the reader, the Memorandum concludes that because the military would follow the rules of International Humanitarian Law in its targeting procedures, these actions would be under the conduct of war and thus fall under the public authority justification. The second and third major justifications put forward in the Memorandum rely on evidence that al-Awlaki is actively taking part (or planning to take part) in hostile actions directed against the United States. It first determines that the United States would not fall subject to the War Crimes Act because of al-Awlaki’s legitimate status as a target. Second, the Memorandum demonstrates that there are no constitutional limitations placed on killing Awlaki as a US citizen because the threat he poses is greater than the violation of his constitutional rights. The argument that the US government would prefer to capture him, but deems it infeasible, is used to bolster this claim. Any evidence presented that the United States had tried to capture him, if it exists, has been redacted. Focused also on the targeted killing of a US citizen more generally, and not directly referencing al-Awlaki, the 2011 Department of Justice White Paper parallels many of the arguments and conclusions outlined in the 2010 Memorandum, with sections focused on Constitutional limitations, the public authority justification, and war crimes. The 2011 White Paper, however, adds a more specific legal framework for when lethal force is justified. It states that: …where the following three conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force would be lawful: (1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 1). These three stipulations represent the most concise guidelines across available government documents for the authority to strike, and they center on an official within the US government making the determination of a threat. Once this determination is made, and the individual target in question is associated with a terrorist group, killing this individual is deemed lawful as long as capturing him/her is seen as difficult and the “laws of war” are followed. Focusing on the first stipulation, a central component of the target determination is whether or not the individual poses an imminent threat. Much of the justification for this stipulation that follows in the White Paper deals with what constitutes an imminent threat and how norms of sovereignty and territory are taken into consideration. According to its authors, the possibility of an imminent threat authorizes the United States to target an individual under the justification of self-defense (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 1). This targeting practice also does not violate another state’s sovereignty, such as Yemen or Pakistan’s sovereignty; either the lethal action is undertaken with the consent of that state, or that state is unwilling to accept or take action on its own, rendering US action justified by the immediacy of the threat. In other words, imminent threat trumps other states’ control of their own territories. In addition to self-defense, the White Paper also draws on the AUMF for justification of targeted killing outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, arguing that under the AUMF the United States is involved in a “non-international conflict” with terrorist groups whose nature (as per the AUMF remit) has no geographical limitation. The categorization here of “non-international conflict” is a legal term found in the laws of armed conflict and refers to a conflict between a state and non-state organized armed groups. This is contrasted to an “international” conflict between two states. The White Paper thus essentially defines the drone strike as an act of war in two ways, or from two angles. The first is through the AUMF – that these strikes fit within the scope of this authorization of force. The second is through the definition of a non-international conflict – that the nature of the US engagement against terrorist groups puts it within this type of conflict, and therefore expands it globally. While this might be redundant (the 2011 White Paper is no more clear and no less circular than the 2010 Memorandum), the authors clearly seek to emphasize the lack of geographical limits and territorial boundaries to the potential scope of drone strikes and US projection of force and authority. The self-defense and AUMF/non-international conflict justifications come together in a peculiar way around the idea of a threat’s imminence. In the White Paper the authors are working with a general and fairly broader concept of imminence, one that is tied more to the longer temporality of the war on terror (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 7). An imminent threat is not a “ticking time bomb” scenario, but rather signaled by participation in a terrorist group that is continuously planning attacks. At first glance, it is unclear why the argument of imminent threat is necessary to the legal framework if, as the 2010 Memorandum (along with parts of the 2011 White Paper) makes clear, attacks against Al-Qaeda members and affiliates are justified globally under the AUMF and the existence of a “non-international conflict.” The broad concept of imminence seems unnecessary and redundant, perhaps even adding further confusion. Yet the emphasis on imminence reflects the importance of temporality to the justification of lethal force. This is not a long-standing or permanent justification, but rather one that is temporary, ephemeral, and must be repeatedly renewed for the individual/threat in question, wherever they are located. Connected to this particular understanding of imminent threat, in both the Memorandum and the White Paper the drone strike is also justified spatially. The interpretation of the AUMF as having no geographical limits and the definition of “non-international conflict” as not tied to states gives the legal framework of drone strikes global reach. Indeed, the landscape of force projection that emerges out of these documents renders “non-international conflict” sort of a misnomer: it might be better described as a hyper-international or global conflict. In this understanding of conflict, “traditional” or “fixed” international boundaries do not matter in the way they seem to have in the past (as containers or delimiters of violence, reach of power, etc), at least when it comes to determining where force can or cannot be used. In this legal view, drones strikes outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are not beyond the battlefield; they rather are incorporated in a redefined battlefield. Furthermore, this is a battlefield tied less to territorial space and more to the individual who produces that battlefield through his/her associations or actions. Recent critical scholarship in geography seeks to make sense of this redefined battlefield or battle space as it relates to the use of drones, and a common theme in this scholarship is the role that law plays in justifying and extending the use of force: it is through law that geographies of war are expanding and changing. This emphasis on law seems to fit with the US government’s selection of the law as the avenue through which to justify strikes, even if the legal arguments themselves are incomplete, fuzzy, or debatable. While there is a rich and growing set of literature on war and law, here I focus on three prominent examples from this scholarship in geography that address drone strikes and the space of contemporary war specifically and demonstrate how law and violence are intertwined in different ways: (1) Derek Gregory’s writings on the geography of drones strikes, particularly as it relates to his concept of the “everywhere war,” (2) Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter’s exploration of the relationship between law and technology, and (3) John Morrissey’s mobilization of the term “lawfare.” Taken together, these scholars help us to think about the role of law in producing contemporary geographies of war, but also point the way forward from the analysis of the Memorandum and White Paper above to understanding the role of territory as a political technology (Elden, 2010) in shaping the Obama administration’s legal justifications for drone strikes. In “Drone Geographies,” Derek Gregory argues that drones must be understood within a matrix of military violence that is connected to and producing new visualities and experiences of the battlefield (Gregory, 2014, p. 7). Running through his discussion of various components of this matrix (which includes the development of homeland security, techniques of viewing at a distancing, and the emergence of global threats) is a sense that a new spatiality of war is emerging. War is no longer “over there” or contained within a defined geographical area; rather the “there” of war is “everywhere.” The concept of everywhere war captures not only the endless nature of war today – its persistent temporality – but also its spatial scope, where it is increasingly difficult to delineate spaces of war from spaces of peace (Gregory, 2011, p. 238-239). In everywhere war, the global spatiality of war is tied to its temporality, which has become increasingly “event-ful.” Violence can now happen anywhere, at any time: Violence can erupt on a commuter train in Madrid, a house in Gaza City, a poppy field in Helmand or a street in Ciudad Juarez: such is the contrapuntal geography of the everywhere war. It is also to claim that, as cartographic reason falters and military violence is loosed from its frames, the conventional ties between war and geography have come undone… (Gregory, 2011, p. 239) Gregory explores three cases of the everywhere war: US drone attacks in Pakistan, the drug war between the United States and Mexico, and cyberwar. These examples show the blurring of the boundaries of war and violence more generally. Furthermore, Gregory finds that the question of legality features prominently in each case. It “runs like a red ribbon throughout the prosecution of late modern war” (Gregory, 2011, p. 247). For Gregory, the everywhere war spreads largely because war is framed in a seemingly neutral and objective legal language. For example, when drone strikes, even those carried out by the CIA, are justified through an urgent and legal language of “self-defense” – as we saw for example in the Memorandum and White Paper – little attention is given to civilian casualties or to the strikes’ ever-expanding nature. The legal framework thus serves to mask the effects of its violence, at least from a Western point of view. For Gregory, framing this violence within a legal apparatus is key to enabling the everywhere war, and involves an intensifying relationship between legality, security, and war. As Gregory concludes: The invocation of legality works to marginalize ethics and politics by making available a seemingly neutral, objective language: disagreement and debate then become purely technical issues that involve matters of opinion, certainly, but not values. The appeal to legality – and to the quasi-judicial process it invokes – thus helps to authorize a widespread and widening militarism of our world. (Gregory, 2011, p. 247) Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter take up how this legal apparatus works more explicitly in their investigation of the relationship between law and technology in drone strikes in the FATA region of Pakistan. Looking at the increase of drone strikes in FATA as well as the history of the region, Shaw and Akhter argue that FATA is produced as an exceptional place – justifying continuing violence and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty – through the region’s legal status and through the object of the drone itself. FATA has been an exception within Pakistani law (here they draw on Agamben’s concept of the space of exception) since at least the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation, which rendered the area outside of the reach of the law. The Pakistani government has continued this designation in one form or another up to the present. While FATA long has been a frontier region where law is suspended, what is significant about contemporary drone strikes in FATA is how law (as the suspension of law) works along with the object of the drone to create FATA also as a space of exception for the United States (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1497). They suggest that the drone itself acts as an exception of sorts, making certain actions inside FATA acceptable. As Shaw and Akhter argue, the drone is an object that has been fetishized by the military so that its human element or relations are rendered invisible (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1492). It is, in other words, the drone that can be used in FATA, not other military technologies: …the legal-historical geography of the terrain acts in concert with the object itself to produce drone warfare in FATA: it is not simply a matter of drones operating over an undifferentiated enemy landscape. Rather, uneven geo-legalities of war, state, and exception make drone warfare a reality in certain spaces and not others. (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1500) In examining the intersections of law, geography, and technology in FATA, Shaw and Akhter provide insight into the specificities of the FATA region, yet it is not clear how their argument holds up when other kinds of incursions into Pakistan are considered, such as the Navy Seal raid that killed Osama bin Laden, or when the lens is turned to other drone strikes around the globe, such as those in Yemen or Somalia. Something more fundamental seems to be happening in the relationship between law, territory, and expanding spaces of killing. Trying to understand the more general relationship between war, space, and law (Jones and Smith, 2015), some geographers have turned to the concept of “lawfare” –a term describing the waging of war through law or the weaponization of law. John Morrissey argues that the United States has deployed two forms of lawfare in waging the war on terror. The first is through detention and rendition, creating exceptional spaces where individuals lose their legal status. The second is through the protection of military personnel in forward deployed areas, where soldiers and individuals connected to the military are granted legal status in expanding new spaces of war. Both of these ways that law is extended or negated are biopolitical, Morrissey argues, and involve the regulation of life and management of populations (Morrissey, 2011, p. 285). In other words, war and violence expand through lawfare, understood by Morrissey as a technique of biopolitics, implying that biopolitics merges with geopolitics (Morrissey, 2011, p. 290). As Morrissey writes, “The US military’s liberal lawfare reveals how the rule of law is simply another securitization tactic in liberalism’s ‘pursuit of security’; a pursuit that paradoxically eliminates fundamental rights and freedoms in the ‘name of security’” (Morrissey, 2011, p. 297). Morrissey and others thus provide a way to understand how law functions as a fundamental component of contemporary war. Law is central across this scholarship, albeit in different ways, to understanding the expanding deployment of drones. Drone strikes are not exceptions to the law, but rather the law is an important factor in the production of contemporary drone wars. A chief way that this works in the Obama administration’s legal justifications is through a reimagining of territory. The mobilization of territory in these legal texts, and in particular a reworking of state power in relation to territory, is a key aspect supporting the use of drone strikes. Bringing a more dynamic concept of territory to bear on this legal framework reveals not just that war and state violence are expanding through lawfare, but that both the meaning of state sovereignty and the spatiality of the projection of force is changing similarly as well.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › 1NC—Generic

Liberal militarism outweighs – it causes a permanent war economy, that plays on maintaining existential threats where the US can justify actions to maintain the violence of military actions without physical presence

Hedges, 22 [Chris, former Middle East bureau chief @ New York Times, Pulitzer Prize winner, M.Div @ Harvard: “A return to permanent war is here: First it will bankrupt America, then destroy it,” published by Salon on 5-26-2022, DOA 6-24-2022, ] CSUF JmB TDI

Democrat or Republican. It does not matter. War is the raison d'être of the state. Extravagant military expenditures are justified in the name of "national security." The nearly $40 billion allocated for Ukraine, most of it going into the hands of weapons manufacturers such as Raytheon Technologies, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, is only the beginning. Military strategists, who say the war will be long and protracted, are talking about infusions of $4 or $5 billion in military aid a month to Ukraine. We face existential threats. But these do not count. The proposed budget for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in fiscal year 2023 is $10.675 billion. The proposed budget for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is $11.881 billion. Ukraine alone gets more than double that amount. Pandemics and the climate emergency are afterthoughts. War is all that matters. This is a recipe for collective suicide. There were three restraints to the avarice and bloodlust of the permanent war economy that no longer exist. The first was the old liberal wing of the Democratic Party, led by politicians such as Sen. George McGovern, Sen. Eugene McCarthy and Sen. J. William Fulbright, who wrote "The Pentagon Propaganda Machine." The self-identified progressives, a pitiful minority, in Congress today, from Rep. Barbara Lee —who was the single vote in the House and the Senate opposing an open-ended authorization allowing the president to wage war in Afghanistan or anywhere else — to Rep. Ilhan Omar are now dutifully lining up to fund the latest proxy war. The second restraint was an independent media and academia, including journalists such as I.F Stone and Neil Sheehan along with scholars such as Seymour Melman, author of "The Permanent War Economy" and "Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War." Third, and perhaps most important, was an organized antiwar movement led by religious leaders such as Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King Jr. and Phil and Dan Berrigan, as well as groups such as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). They understood that unchecked militarism was a fatal disease. None of these opposition forces, which did not reverse the permanent war economy but curbed its excesses, now exist. The two ruling parties have been bought by corporations, especially military contractors. The press is anemic and obsequious to the war industry. Propagandists for permanent war, largely from right-wing think tanks lavishly funded by the war industry, along with former military and intelligence officials, are exclusively quoted or interviewed as military experts. NBC's "Meet the Press" aired a segment May 13 where officials from Center for a New American Security (CNAS) simulated what a war with China over Taiwan might look like. The co-founder of CNAS, Michèle Flournoy, who appeared in the "Meet the Press" war games segment and was considered by Biden to run the Pentagon, wrote in 2020 in Foreign Affairs that the U.S. needs to develop "the capability to credibly threaten to sink all of China's military vessels, submarines and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours." The handful of anti-militarists and critics of empire from the left, such as Noam Chomsky, and the right, such as Ron Paul, have been declared persona non grata by a compliant media. The liberal class has retreated into boutique activism where issues of class, capitalism and militarism are jettisoned for "cancel culture," multiculturalism and identity politics. Liberals are cheerleading the war in Ukraine. At least the inception of the war with Iraq saw them join significant street protests. Ukraine is embraced as the latest crusade for freedom and democracy against the new Hitler. There is little hope, I fear, of rolling back or restraining the disasters being orchestrated on a national and global level. The neoconservatives and liberal interventionists chant in unison for war. Joe Biden has appointed these warmongers, whose attitude to nuclear war is terrifyingly cavalier, to run the Pentagon, the National Security Council and the State Department. Since all we do is war, all proposed solutions are military. This military adventurism accelerates the decline, as the defeat in Vietnam and the squandering of $8 trillion in the futile wars in the Middle East illustrate. War and sanctions, it is believed, will cripple [debilitate] Russia, rich in gas and natural resources. War, or the threat of war, will curb the growing economic and military clout of China. These are demented and dangerous fantasies, perpetrated by a ruling class that has severed itself from reality. No longer able to salvage their own society and economy, they seek to destroy those of their global competitors, especially Russia and China. Once the militarists cripple [incapacitate] Russia, the plan goes, they will focus military aggression on the Indo-Pacific, dominating what Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, referring to the Pacific, called "the American Sea." You cannot talk about war without talking about markets. The U.S., whose growth rate has fallen to below 2%, while China's is 8.1%, has turned to military aggression to bolster its sagging economy. If the U.S. can sever Russian gas supplies to Europe, it will force Europeans to buy from the United States. U.S. firms, at the same time, would be happy to replace the Chinese Communist Party, even if they must do it through the threat of war, to open unfettered access to Chinese markets. War, if it did break out with China, would devastate the Chinese, American and global economies, destroying free trade between countries as in World War I. But that doesn't mean it won't happen.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › 1NC—Generic

The 1ACs project of demilitarization as a strategy splits between the peaceful and wartime efforts that makes the violence mystified under debasing practices meant to transform into a martial form of politics

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

While the terms “militarism” and “militarization” emerged to explain Cold War military build-up and its social, ideological and international consequences (Shaw 1991), there has been a significant resurgence of the concept recently (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). “Militarization” is now deployed in numerous disciplines to describe an array of phenomena. The International Feminist Journal of Politics has been a hub for the publication of feminist “militarization” research, including on topics such as militarized masculinities (Enloe 2003; Masters 2005; Eichler 2006; Duncanson 2009; Welland 2015; Tidy 2015); the militarization of political leadership (Cannen 2014; Athanassiou 2014); women’s lives (Shigematsu 2009); spaces such as memorials (Szitanyi 2015), heritage sites (Demetriou 2012) and border zones (de Lacy 2014); gender relations (Cockburn 2010); and feminism itself (Wright 2015). Yet with remarkably few exceptions (Enloe 2000, 3; Lutz 2002, 723; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013) the concept of “militarization” is infrequently defined or analyzed. Perhaps it seems self-evident, but “militarization” is a concept. Like any concept it guides our attention in certain directions, but it also limits our scope. Arguably the most influential text on “militarization” in feminist thought is Cynthia Enloe’s classic book, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000). The book opens with a now-famous question: how do they militarize a can of soup? Enloe describes a can of soup containing pasta cut into the shape of Star Wars weapons, illustrating her central argument that “militarization” is a broad social and gendered process: In the Star Wars soup scenario a lot of people have become militarized – corporate marketers, dieticians, mothers, and children. They may not run out to enlist in the army as soon as they have finished their lunch, but militarization is progressing nonetheless. Militarization is never simply about joining a military. It is a far more subtle process. And it sprawls over far more of the gendered social landscape. (Enloe 2000, 2) In this account, all sorts of things can become “militarized”: people, values, cultures and products. Further, “militarization” is a gendered process best understood by examining women’s experiences of it (Enloe 2000, 3). This analysis enabled the study of hitherto-unexamined connections, shedding light on the labor performed by laundresses, sex workers, military wives, nurses, mothers and other women across the globe. Building on previous work (Enloe 1983; Enloe [1989] 2014), it highlighted that investment in the military and military values is not necessary or natural: they can be disinvested from and resisted. However, the “militarization” concept underestimates the extent to which we live with war: how marginalized people, those who are racialized, disabled or poor, are subject to war-like (martial) forms of politics. Returning to Enloe’s can of soup, in a blog post critiquing the concept of militarism, Cowen makes this intervention: “If, in one of the most incisive critiques of militarism, Enloe asks ‘how do they militarize a can of soup?’ and questions how the pasta within assumes the shape of “star wars satellites,” then we are also interested in the central fact of the can” (n.d.). Napoleon commissioned the design of canning to support the supply of far-flung battlefields; “thus, the can of soup was always already ‘militarized’, and bypassing the can for the noodles hides perhaps more than it reveals” (Cowen n.d.). Drawing on other scholarship that has dispensed with the concept of “militarization” (Amoore 2009), Cowen’s (2014) later work on logistics illustrates that global supply chains have not been “militarized” or “securitized”: rather the science of logistics emerged from war. Picking up from such interventions, we can say that the can of soup, as a material object, was always already “of war” and therefore cannot accurately be said to have been “militarized.” “Militarization” frameworks cannot adequately account for this imbrication of “war” and “society” (Kienscherf 2016). This may seem like a counterintuitive statement. Isn’t the concept of “militarization” precisely about drawing out how social (gendered) relations are permeated by military values and cultures? However, by holding the categories of the military and of the social (or, war and peace) as separate until “militarization” happens, the concept implicitly presumes a status prior to militarization. It underestimates war-like forms of politics because it blithely assumes that war is “naturally” separate from the “social landscape.” In this sense, the concept is much like that of securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), which holds that security forms the exception to politics. “Politics” (or social relations) is implicitly treated as un-security or un-military until securitizing or militarizing processes occur, even if they occur pervasively. From this perspective, a reverse process can take place: desecuritization (Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004) or demilitarization. What “militarization” holds out is the hope that military encroachment on an otherwise unmilitarized past can be reversed; this drastically underestimates the extent to which warfare and military strategy are intrinsic to “political” or “social” relations. As with the can of soup, when we dig, we usually find that those “civilian” things that are claimed to be in danger of “militarization” have much deeper roots in warfare, and that the peaceful “domestic” political order for which we yearn has been fundamentally shaped from the outset by warfare and colonial violence. The concept of militarization ironically elides the fundamentally warlike history of liberal politics precisely through its critique of (supposedly exceptional) military encroachment or trespass on them. Relatedly, research conducted through the lens of “militarization” has tended to foreground gender analysis, for example, through the concept of “militarized masculinities,” or emulation of Enloe’s focus on women’s lives. Even if we are attentive to how this may play out differently for racialized or poor women, the analytical foregrounding of “women’s lives” positions systems of gender as primary in understanding “militarization.” Gathering considerations of race, disability, poverty and Indigeneity under gender by pursuing a methodology focused in the first instance on the lives of women (or on masculinities) risks subsuming varied systems of power, leaving us unable to capture how they might work differently than gender. When we also center race, Indigeneity and disability it immediately becomes clear that there is no natural peaceful order, and that the concept of “militarization” is pallid and half-hearted in its ignorance of the war-like relations that permeate “peaceful” domestic civil order (James 1996; Davis 2002, 2003). In IR, the work of |Richter-Montpetit (2007, 2014) is central to understanding race and the production of liberal violence. She argues that torture is not an aberration from liberal order but forms part of a lineage of anti-Black violence, from the institution of chattel slavery through contemporary law and criminal justice, demonstrating that violence against racialized bodies and the law have existed in mutual relation throughout US history. Thus, “racialized taxonomies and the larger racial formation they gave rise to were not simply manufactured by law. Rather, law was shaped by, and simultaneously enabled a wider set of processes and technologies of race-making” (RichterMontpetit 2014, 52). The concept of “militarization” cannot take stock of these histories because it assumes a peaceful order that has been breached by militarism. Only by eschewing forms of analysis that assume a (breached) separation between military and civilian spheres can we avoid this kind of dangerous oversight. For this reason I propose an alternate concept: “martial politics.” “Martial” denotes that a thing is war-like, or that it derives from battle, war, or the military – that it is “of war.” It describes the process by which war and peace are imbricated. Assessing “martial politics” involves evaluating the historical roots and present expressions of this imbrication. “Martial politics” dispenses with the before/after temporality of “militarization” and the assumed separation between military and civilian, war and peace. It denies any innocent domain of “normal” politics by pointing to the martial nature of contemporary and historical political formations. “Martial politics” is the liberal norm, not the exception. Illustrating the potential value of this concept, the following sections of this article apply it to two key empirical sites of supposed “militarization”: the police and the university. The empirical material in this article focuses primarily on the US as an avowedly liberal state, and on matters that traditional IR scholars would relegate to “domestic politics” (i.e., the study of race, disability, policing, education and universities). Contrary to such traditions, the article views the US as a site of ongoing settler colonialism, founded in and continually produced through the legacy of chattel slavery, and thus very much a “global” space. From this perspective, I argue that neither the police nor the university have been “militarized” and instead illustrate how contemporary forms of policing and knowledge production are vested in longer trajectories of martial politics.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › 1NC—Persian Gulf

The alternative is a critical history of US military presence in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. The linear narrative of the 1AC articulates existence as a field of endemic violence that requires Pastoral State action; exposing the historical production of this current moment is the only way to reanimate pedagogies oriented around producing better futures

Giroux and Evans 15 [Henry, Distinguished Visiting Professorship @ Ryerson University and Chair in English and Cultural Studies Department @ McMaster University, and Brad, senior lecturer in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies @ University of Bristol, “Disposable Futures: The Seduction of Violence in the Age of the Spectacle,”] CSUF JmB TDI

There is an important point to stress here regarding the logics of brutality. Violence is easily condemned when it appears exceptional. This also unfortunately precludes more searching and uncomfortable questions. Normalized violence, by contrast, represents a more formidable challenge, requiring a more sophisticated and learned response. Exposing more fully how these normalized cultures of cruelty shape the historic moment is the main purpose of this work, as it is integral to the critical imagination and those forms of political agency necessary for successfully living in a nonviolent and civilian future. Our motivation for writing this book is driven by a commitment to the value of critical pedagogy in countering mechanisms of dehumanization and domination at play in neoliberal societies and beyond. We have no time whatsoever for those who reason that violence may be studied in an “objective” or “rational” way. There are no neutral pedagogies indifferent to matters of politics, power, and ideology. Pedagogy is, in part, always about both struggle and vision—struggles over identities, modes of agency, values, desires, and visions of the possible. Not only does the apologetics of neutrality lead to the most remiss intellectualism when the personal experience of violence is reduced to emotionless inquiry, but it also announces complicity in the rationalizations of violence that depend upon the degradation of those qualities that constitute what is essential to the human condition. Thus, education is by definition a form of political intervention. It is always disentangling itself from particular regimes of power that attempt to authenticate and disqualify certain ways of perceiving and thinking about the world. The larger issue is that not only is education central to politics, but the educative nature of politics begins with the assumption that how people think, critically engage the world, and are self-reflective about the shaping of their own experiences and relations to others marks the beginning with a viable and oppositional politics. We dare to perceive and think differently from both neoliberal rule and the increasingly stagnant and redundant left, which does little to counter it. The world that we inhabit is systematically oppressive and tolerates the most banal and ritualistic forms of violence. It educates us of the need for warfare; it prizes, above all, the values of militarism and its conceptual apparatus of “civic soldierology.” It sanctions and openly celebrates killings as if they are necessary to prove our civilization’s credentials. It takes pride, if not pleasure, in punishing peoples of distinct racial and class profiles, all in the name of better securing society. It promotes those within that order with characteristics that in other situations would be both criminalized and deemed pathological. And it invests significantly in all manner of cultural productions so that we develop a taste for violence, and even learn to appreciate aesthetics of violence, as the normal and necessary price of being entertained. This book inevitably draws upon a number of critical visionaries whose fight for dignity cannot be divorced from their intellectual concerns. The spirit of the late Paulo Freire in particular is impressed upon each of these pages. His critical pedagogy was unashamedly tasked with liberating both the oppressed and their oppressors from the self-perpetuating dynamics of subjugation. Freire’s prose echoed the humanizing call for a more just, literate, and tolerant world. He remains a strong influence in the field of education and in other areas of practice that require thinking about the possibility of an ethics of difference that resists violence in all its forms. The power and forcefulness of Freire’s works are to be found in the tensions, conflicts, poetry, and politics that make it a project for thinking about (non)violence meaningfully. Siding with the disempowered of history—those at the raw ends of tyranny—Freire’s work calls for a more poetic image of thought that is a way of reclaiming power by reimagining the space and practice of cultural and political resistance. His work thus represents a textual borderland where poetry slips into liberation politics, and solidarity becomes a song for the present begun in the past while waiting to be heard in the future. Freire, no less trenchant in his critique of illegitimate rule, refuses to dwell in hopelessness. His resistance is empowering because it is infused with a fearless belief in people’s abilities and finds reasons to rejoice in the transformative possibilities of living: The more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can transform it. This individual is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This person is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into a dialogue with them. This person does not consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or she does commit himself or herself, within history, to fight at their side. Freire is not our only source of inspiration. Nearly a century ago Walter Benjamin responded to the tyranny of his times by writing his famous “Critique of Violence.” Ours is a different age. And yet the need for a critique adequate to our times is as pressing as ever. We are not lacking in knowledge of our own oppression. Let’s be sure of that. Oppressive power reveals enough of its violent traces for even a casual cartographer to expose its deceptions or else retreat into conspiracy. What we do lack is a rigorous critique of the historical moment and its varied modes of imaginative resistance. Such modes of artistic imagination are as important as contemporary sources of oppression are in mediating suffering in the service of established contemporary power. This requires a critique of violence that once again encourages us to think beyond its necessity, so as to make clear that in a world in which violence is normalized, it once again becomes possible to imagine the unimaginable, particularly the notion that collective resistance not only is possible but can transform the world with confidence. Hence, while authors like Steven Pinker cloud our perception by claiming the current era is the least violent era in human history, relying upon credo per capita human death rates etc., it takes only a slightly different angle of vision to see the current social order’s full range of preventable violence: impoverishment, financial predation, malnutrition, mass incarceration, and rapidly accelerating deforestation, ecological degradation, and irreversible biocide. Pinker would do well to acknowledge that political violence is poorly understood if it simply refers to a failure of liberal modernity. Political violence cannot be reduced to such a crude and reductionist metric. Indeed, conventional demarcations between times of war and times of peace, zones of security and zones of crises, friends and enemies, have long since evaporated. We live in complex and radically interconnected societies, whose social morphology has radically altered our sense of the world such that we are taught to accept insecurity as the natural order of things. This is fully in keeping with the proliferation of media output, factual and fictional, that bombards us continuously with images of violence and catastrophe for subtle political gain. Indeed, what is new about the current historical conjuncture is not only a commodified popular culture of entertainment, but the emergence of a predatory society in which the suffering and death of others becomes a reason to rejoice rather than mourn. Extreme violence has become not only a commodified spectacle, but one of the few popular resources available through which people can bump up their pleasure quotient. Our critique begins from the realization that violence has become ubiquitous, “settling like some all-enveloping excremental mist … that has permeated every nook of any institution or being that has real influence on the way we live now. We cannot escape its spectre. Its presence is everywhere. It is hardwired into the fabric of our digital DNA. Capitalism in fact has always thrived on its consumption. There is, after all, no profit in peace. We are not calling here for the censoring of all representations of violence as if we could retreat into some sheltered protectorate. That would be foolish and intellectually dangerous. Our claim is both that the violence we are exposed to is heavily mediated, and that as such we are witness to various spectacles that serve a distinct political function, especially as they either work to demonize political resistance or simply extract from its occurrence (fictional and actual) any sense of political context and critical insight. Moving beyond the spectacle by making visible the reality of violence in all of its modes is both necessary and politically important. What we need then is an ethical approach to the problem of violence such that its occurrence is intolerable to witness. Exposing violence is not the same as being exposed to it, though the former too often comes as a result of the latter. The corrupting and punishing forms taken by violence today must be addressed by all people as both the most important element of power and the most vital of forces shaping social relationships under the predatory formation of neoliberalism. Violence is both symbolic and material in its effects and its assaults on all social relations, whereas the mediation of violence coupled with its aesthetic regimes of suffering is a form of violence that takes as its object both memory and thought. It purges the historical record, denying access to the history of a more dignified present, purposefully destroying the ability to connect forms of struggle across the ages. Memory as such is fundamental to any ethics of responsibility. Our critique of violence begins, then, as an ethical imperative. It demands a rigorous questioning of the normalized culture of violence in which we are now immersed. It looks to the past so that we may understand the violence of our present. It looks to the ways that ideas about the future shape the present such that we learn to accept a world that is deemed to be violent by design. This requires a proper critical reading of the way violence is mediated in our contemporary moment; how skewed power relations and propagators of violence are absolved of any wider blame in a pedagogical and political game that permits only winners and losers; how any act of injustice is made permissible in a world that enshrines systemic cruelty.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › 1NC—Persian Gulf

Rightsizing is the software update for American imperialism – offshoring is the new liberal metric to redefine territoriality through extrajudicial means that justifies targeted killings – this is a self-fulfilling prophecy where under the threat of terrorist attack caused by the US drone program, the US can manipulate the real and the imaginary to expand the American drone program and justify interventionism

Slaven 19 [James T. Department of History, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia Pseudoisolationism: the Neoimperialism of the State(s) June 27, 2019 ] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

In Calling 911: geopolitics, security and America's New War (2003), Simon Dalby outlined American imperialism after 9/11 and how it became the standard for a new kind of imperial warfare. He argued that in the aftermath of 9/11, the United States struggled to understand that classical European geopolitics, where "mutually exclusive spatial entities" conflicted with one another, were no longer predominant (Dalby, 2003, p. 74, 82). In other words, without a clearly defined (i.e. territorially defined) enemy to confront, the American military reaction was left searching for a target (Dalby, 2003, p. 72). Subsequently, the United States used its military to invade and occupy, or otherwise simply to garrison, foreign territory in an attempt to neutralize threats to its national security (i.e. under the guise of self-defence; Dalby, 2003, p. 80). As this essay will later argue and as Dalby argued, despite the United States neglecting to "conquer, annex, or fundamentally remake" these territories (as would be expected of true classical imperialism), it has and continues to colonize these territories via new technologies, and thus its anti-imperial national identity is only surface level deep (Dalby, 2003, p. 82). In From a View to Kill: Drones and Late Modern Warfare (2011), Derek Gregory described how modem warfare, conducted virtually through drones, has changed the very conception of battlespace, itself (p. 190). He argued that from the viewpoint of the American drone program modem battlespace has expanded across the world. This virtual, globalized battlespace results in a new version of (American) imperialism that can be remotely enforced (Gregory, 2011, pp. 189-90). In other words, the virtual application of violent force has caused "time-space compression" which means that the American military can theoretically exercise violence everywhere and at all times, as this essay will later elaborate (Gregory, 2011, p. 192). In Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (1995), John Agnew similarly described how emerging technologies had the potential to change how states interact with space. Rather than colonizing space by controlling a place(s) "on the ground," new technologies allow states to colonize space by controlling it virtually, thereby controlling all places (Agnew, 1995, pp. 95-6). In other words, by controlling space virtually states can control space instantaneously, forgoing the traditional needs of an empire to establish and maintain physical control over a place via a physical presence. It is from the theoretical starting points of Dalby, Gregory, and Agnew that this essay will now begin. 3. Offshore Balancing Before exploring the neoimperialist reality of American offshore balancing, this essay will first briefly discuss what exactly offshore balancing as a foreign policy entails. By 2011, offshore balancing had been named by Newsweek as the Obama administration's foreign policy doctrine (Beinart, 2011). By 2016, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt had published the definitive work on offshore balancing titled "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy." Primarily evidenced by Obama's withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as his later infamous "Red Line" failure in Syria, offshore balancing (as the name suggests) is primarily characterized by, "eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States' military footprint... The United States would maintain substantial naval and air assets and modest but capable ground forces" (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 74, 80). The doctrine also advocates: (1) buckpassing regional defence to smaller allies in order to check the rise of a potential hegemon; (2) minimizing the threat of anti-American terrorism by "respecting the sovereignty of other states"; (3) strengthening the American economy by reducing its military expenditures as a result of, in turn, reducing the level of troops the United States garrisons abroad (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, pp. 83-4, 87-8). Subsequently, the former president's foreign policy doctrine was dubbed in newspaper headlines and book titles: "Retreating Ashore," or America in Retreat (Hoffman, 2016; Rose, 2015). Critics of offshore balancing warned that this "neoisolationist" doctrine threatened America's global hegemony (Roskin, 2016, p. 7). Rather than conserving American economic and military strength in order to maintain the current balance of power (i.e. Pax Americana) by "husbanding military strength," American armed forces would require massive re-expansion, and therefore massive expenditure, when the United States is inevitably pulled into a conflict to check the rise of a regional power (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2016, p. 82). Bret Stephens (2014), in America in Retreat, argues that: "Barack Obama offered a blueprint for a new foreign policy, demanding a smaller U.S. footprint in the world" (p. 67). However, these criticisms represent a flawed understanding of the doctrine and have misidentified it as some kind of "neoisolationism," when in fact there is no evidence of a global American retreat. Having discussed offshore balancing as a foreign policy, in theory, and its critiques, this essay will now examine the reality of offshore balancing. Neoisolationism, as has been discussed above, would mean a divergence from the Pax Americana status quo and therefore would entail some sort of global American 'retreat.' Although the world has indeed seen a gradual withdrawal of American troops from its vested regional interests, the American military presence has not withdrawn on a global scale. In other words, although there are literally fewer American "boots on the ground," the American military footprint has not changed-in fact, there's an argument to be made that it has actually increased. Shima Keene (2015) notes in Lethal and Legal: the Ethics of Drone Strikes, as of 2012, "the Pentagon was reported to have 7,000 drones under its control, representing approximately one-third of all U.S. military aircraft" (p. 1). Evidently, as the United States adopts offshore balancing more heartily, and the American military transitions to forces capable of exerting "over-the-horizon" pressure (i.e. air and naval forces), unmanned combat aerial vehicles play an increasingly large role (Allin & Jones, 2012, p. 89). Approximately 10 times more drone strikes were authorized under the Obama administration than under the George W. Bush administration-506 drone strikes compared to 50 drone strikes, respectively (Zenko, 2016). As Ian Shaw notes in Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance: "by 2013, around 95 percent of the US non-battlefield targeted killings were conducted by drones" (Shaw, 2016, p. 113). Furthermore, as Medea Benjamin (2017) writes for The Guardian, by 2016 the United States maintained a military presence in "70% of the world's nations, 138 countries-a staggering jump of 130% since the days of the Bush administration." Clearly, there is no evidence of "America in Retreat," and instead it would be more accurate to conclude that there is evidence of a sustained (if not, increased) level of American presence and intervention abroad. Furthermore, Mearsheimer and Walt's "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy" fails to mention UCAVs, even though it was written in 2016 (i.e. towards the end of the Obama administration years) when drone warfare had been well-established as both the new American modus operandi and as President Obama's legacy (Kaufman, 2018; Monbiot, 2012; Zenko, 2016). Although the authors of "The Case for Offshore Balancing" have apparently forgotten to mention the role of the drone program in contemporary foreign policy and military interventions, their critics are just as equally at fault for, by and large, having neglected to mention it. As Shaw clarifies: "as U.S. military technology has become more sophisticated, the significance of mass, force, and territoriality has shrunk (although by no means disappeared)" (Shaw, 2016, p. 132). So, as this essay has discussed thus far, despite the appearance of a "global American retreat" when measuring in terms of conventional military forces, the reality of the maintenance of a global, American military presence when measured in UCAVs is evident. Offshore balancing has been misdiagnosed as "neoisolationism," when in fact it merely appears that way, and it can therefore correctly be labelled pseudoneoisolationism. 4. The Drone Program: Redefining Territoriality This essay will now proceed to argue that the American, neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality can be examined, specifically, by looking at the targeting methods used in the drone program and the legality of drone warfare under international law. Strikes carried out under the American drone program are (theoretically) authorized using two sets of targeting methods: personality strikes and signature strikes. The targeted killing of individuals through both personality and signature strikes redefines the American state's understanding of territoriality, although signature strikes have much more profound implications, as will be discussed. As Shima Keene (2015) describes in "Lethal and Legal: The Ethics of Drone Strikes," personality strikes are situations wherein: "an individual whose identity is known is specifically targeted" (p. 24). However, signature strikes are situations wherein, as Keene (2015) once again clarifies: Unknown individuals often in groups are targeted... the precise identity of these individuals is unknown, [and therefore] the individuals targeted must match a pre-identified 'signature' of behaviour that the United States links to militant activity or association... patterns of behaviour are used to determine a target. (p. 25) Simply put, the United States does not know who it is killing in these signature strikes. However, as Keene emphasized in the quote above, it may be worth restating that: the United States does not know precisely who it is killing. So then, a more convincing argument might be made by investigating the "signatures" or patterns of behaviour that the United States sets out in signature strike targeting methods. However, upon investigation, what are considered signatures of terrorist behaviour have, as Keene (2015) puts it, "come under criticism" (p. 25). Greg Miller and Bob Woodward (2013) describe multiple strikes based on circumstantial evidence in "Secret memos reveal explicit nature of U.S., Pakistan agreement on drones": On March 23, 2010, the CIA launched missiles at a "person of interest" in a suspected al-Qaeda compound. The man caught the agency's attention after he had "held two in-car meetings, and swapped vehicles three times along the way." Other accounts describe militants targeted because of the extent of "deference" they were shown when arriving at a suspect site. Keene (2015) cites in her own work one instance when: "on February 21, 2010, 23 Afghan civilians were wrongly identified by a U.S. operated drone as enemy combatants and killed in airstrikes" (p. 27). Clearly then, it is not an oversimplification, after all, to say that the United States does not know who it is killing in these strikes. Shaw (2016) starkly notes: "if the pattern of life [emphasis added] is marked as a threat to national security, it can be eliminated" (p. 128). By examining drone strike targeting methods and their consequences, it becomes clear that the United States is engaged in a new kind of neoimperialist exercise. Specifically, by extrajudiciously killing individuals or groups of individuals through signature strike targeting methods the American state is exercising legal authority over non-citizens. Furthermore, the American state is exercising legal authority over a specific demographic (theoretically, this is military-age males) of a non-citizen population within a bounded geographic space (i.e. another state), rather than exercising legal authority over the whole population. On top of that, the individuals that belong to that particular demographic have no notice that they are under American law, unlike classical, imperialist occupations, because the American state subjectively determines whether or not certain "patterns of life" are a threat to national security (Keene, 2015, p. 27; Shaw, 2016, p. 128). At that point, whether or not the targeted individual(s) is known for certain to be a threat to national security (i.e. a terrorist), the individual is killed, and the right to surrender and defend themselves in a court of law is withheld (also known as extrajudicial killing; Keene, 2015, p. 12). So, by continuing to authorize drone strikes based on signature strike targeting methods, the American state is claiming and exercising legal authority over a specific demographic of non-citizens within a separate bounded geographic space (i.e. another state). Similar to the targeting methods used for authorizing drone strikes, the legality of drone strikes under international law has equally profound implications for territoriality. The United States has consistently harkened back to the September 11th terrorist attacks as the justification needed for targeted killings carried out under the drone program, and within the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) more generally. On September 12, 2001 the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 which, while denouncing the September 11 terrorist attacks, recognized, "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter [of the United Nations]," referring to the right to self-defence as laid out in Article 51 of the Charter (United Nations Security Council, 2001; Anghie, 1996, 276). The United States specifically cites this right to self-defence as the legal basis for targeted killings (Keene, 2015, p. 16; see also Vavrichek, 2014, p. 32). However, the the legal basis for targeted killings also lies in equal part within International Human Rights Law (IHRL). As Diane Vavrichek (2014) notes in "The Future of Drone Strikes: A Framework for Analyzing Policy Options," IHRL states that lethal force may only be used against individuals who pose an "imminent [emphasis added] and substantial threat to life" (pp. 34-5). However, Vavrichek (2014) then goes on to cite a Department of Justice legal memo which, "concludes that, 'the condition that an operational leader present an "imminent" threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future' "(p. 37). This legal basis, grounded in the UNSC Resolution 1368 as well as IHRL, is precisely where the United States redefines its definition of territoriality. This neoimperialist redefinition relies on two concepts which it borrows from the UNSC Resolution 1368 and IHRL, respectively: self-defence and imminence. As Vavrichek (2014) notes: This usage is at odds with the definition of the word "imminent" and signals a departure from the historical criteria for a nation to act preemptively in self-defence only when the "necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation." (p. 37) Similarly, Antony Anghie (1996), in Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, argues that "the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence... appears to extend the concept of self-defence well beyond traditionally understood boundaries of Article 51 of the UN Charter" (p. 276). This "historical departure" also signals a departure from traditional understandings of territoriality. By preemptively defending itself against individuals using signature strike targeting methods and therefore by understanding that those individuals pose an imminent threat to national security regardless of whether or not those individuals can practically reach American territory (i.e. the continental United States) in the immediate future, the United States is implying that American territory is no longer restricted by linear boundaries and traditional notions of territoriality, but instead has spread across the globe. It is only through this understanding that the American drone program is legally authorized to strike anywhere in the world since an individual in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Yemen, to offer up historical examples, can pose an imminent threat to American national security and therefore require preemptive actions in the name of self-defence. 5. Connecting the Dots This essay will now discuss the importance of discussing offshore balancing and the American, neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality in an effort to make it clear that not only is offshore balancing pseudoneoisolationist, but it is actually neoimperialist. In summary, it is important to discuss offshore balancing in tandem with the American drone program and its implications for territoriality because it becomes clear that it constitutes a dangerously attractive foreign policy option for politicians, and yet it still has not been properly identified as a neoimperialist doctrine. It would not be enough to discuss offshore balancing as a foreign policy and the neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality occurring under the American drone program, separately because that would be a failure to realize the neoimperialist reality of the current American foreign policy doctrine. By adhering to offshore balancing as a doctrine, the American military will suffer fewer casualties by relying more on UCAVs, which results in minimal domestic backlash, while maintaining American global hegemony (Bahador & Walker, 2012, pp. 248-9). Furthermore, it is a self-perpetuating foreign policy: public perception of the United States worsens inside the state(s) that the American drone program operates in, resentment builds among the populace, and, conversely, support for terrorist organizations grows (albeit, amongst a small percentage of the populace; Shah, 2010, pp. 86-7). Eventually this leads to a terrorist attack abroad, perhaps even within the United States (although it is difficult to discern how many terrorist attacks have occurred within the continental United States since 2001 since there is little consensus about what constitutes a terrorist attack), at which point there is a public outcry of support for military action and, potentially, support from the heads of allied states. As a result, the United States then has all the justification and support it needs to continue its drone program, and the self-perpetuating cycle begins, as Robert Kaplan (2015), in Imperial Grunts, puts it in his own words: "terrorism was both a cause and a symptom [of the GWOT]" (p. 7). Hall Gardner (2005) describes the same process in American Global Strategy and the "War on Terrorism ": State leaderships additionally use the threat of external terror (threats coming from outside the state) in order to obtain and sustain both allegiance and obedience, and to repress dissent. In The Politics, Aristotle argued that "the distant fear must be brought home"-in that [political] elites seek to preserve their power and influence and obtain both domestic and international allegiance to their goals by manipulating real and imagined (or exaggerated) fears that their 'constitutions' and basic freedoms might be subverted by enemies abroad. (p. 54) This dangerous, violent, cyclical misunderstanding is in part driven by a discourse based in the dichotomy of good and evil, as Bret Stephens (2014), himself, writes in America in Retreat (which was mentioned at the beginning of this paper): America needs to be the world's policeman... Cops merely walk the beat, reassuring the good, deterring the tempted, punishing the wicked... It is done because it has to be and there's no one else to do it, and because the benefits of doing it accrue not only to those we protect but also, indeed mainly, to ourselves. (pp. xv-i) This, of course, is a vast over-simplification of American foreign policy and ignores entirely the cyclical violence that is perpetuated by American foreign policy particularly within the context of the GWOT, as discussed above. However, to elaborate further would verge on overextending this essay's core argument. Rather, it should simply be stated that: the connection must be made between offshore balancing as a foreign policy and the implications of the drone program for American territoriality so that the present, neoimperialist reality of American foreign policy can be properly identified and understood as neoimperialist. 6. What Now? In conclusion, this essay has discussed offshore balancing as a foreign policy doctrine, how it has incorrectly been labeled "neoisolationist," and why pseudoneoisolationist would be a more suitable label. Then, the American drone program and its neoimperialist redefinition of territoriality through two aspects-targeting methods and legal justification-was discussed. Finally, it has been argued that these two subjects need to be examined together so that the neoimperialist reality of American foreign policy, perpetuated by the American drone program, can be properly identified as such. So, what now? Various scholars, such as Anghie (1996), are describing the emergence of a "new imperialism" (p. 274). Some, such as Robert Cooper, are even advocating for a kind of " 'defensive imperialism... a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values.' " (as cited in Anghie, 1996, p. 274). Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that contemporary understandings of neoimperialism also need to be broadened in the wake of this new military technology-UCAVs-because, as this essay has discussed, they allow the United States to carry out a foreign policy that cannot be correctly labeled as imperialist nor neoimperialist (at least, not by the current parameters of either definition). Therefore, this essay suggests a new definition of neoimperialism be outlined to include the territorial implications created by the American drone program. With this expanded definition of neoimperialism, then offshore balancing, as a foreign policy, may correctly be identified by its true nature-not neoisolationist, but neoimperialist.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › 1NC—Persian Gulf

You should be skeptical of their internal link claims Persian Gulf presence is not the end all be all of Iranian fear of US military presence – after Iraq the US shifted engagement where hard power resources of boots on the ground become obsolete and instead soft power resources or drone strikes and arm sales maintains the violence of US militarism

Fawcett 2023 [Louise, Professor of International Relations and Wilfrid Knapp Fellow and Tutor in Politics. The Iraq War 20 years on: towards a new regional architecture. International Affairs, 99(2), 567-585.] CSUF JmB TDI

The first level examined here is the international one, from which arguably all other changes flowed. IR scholarship is frequently criticized for its top-down, overly ‘systemic’ perspective, focusing on the agency of major states, which can occlude the effects of local influences and actors, but in this case such a perspective is inescapable. In contrast with other major regional events which had strong local as well as international origins (the Arab–Israel wars, Lebanon’s wars, the Iranian Revolution or the Iran–Iraq War, for example), this was a top-down decision: a war that ‘did not need to happen and certainly not when it did’,39 and one opposed by multiple regional and international actors. The US decision to go to war and remake the Iraqi state, and to refashion the Middle East, was critical in facilitating new international alignments, changing perceptions of US power, and opening the way to a new regional balance of power and institutions. The effects were greater because the Iraq War occurred at a time when US unipolarity was still at its height; the Middle East constituted one of the most important testing grounds of the ‘new world order’ articulated by President George W. Bush following the Gulf War of 1991, and the ‘Asia pivot’ was still a project in the making. If that new world order had been bruised by the events of the later 1990s, including the demise of the MEPP and the rise of anti-western Islamic extremism, it had not been broken, and in some ways the Iraq War decision was further confirmation of that. But the protracted nature, cost and ultimate failure of that war to achieve its stated goals had a significant impact on US influence in the region and the wider world, lessening its diplomatic reputation.40 In the words of Joseph Nye, it at once marked the end of the ‘unipolar moment’, the ‘fall of US hegemony’ and the failure of ‘democratic enlargement’41—large claims, but the message was not lost on either allies or rivals. None of this was intended. President Obama spoke of the war as one that should not have been authorized and waged, but he also spoke of moving ‘beyond Iraq’ and ‘renewing American leadership’.42 Any renewal of leadership, however, would not take place in the Middle East theatre, and not on the same terms. The Iraq War heralded a distinctive change in the nature of US involvement in the region, from high to low intensity—highlighted by the withdrawal from Iraq itself, and later Afghanistan, and its taking more measured roles in Libya and Syria. Lynch notes how three consecutive presidents effectively downgraded their security commitments to the region.43 True, this was not disengagement, but ‘shifting engagement’.44 In terms of military bases and arms exports, the US footprint in the region remains far larger than that of any other power, notwithstanding withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan.45 In this regard, the path dependence of US military commitment and overseas presence is striking.46 Still, after Iraq, the willingness to use traditional hard power resources has declined, with a preference for a light military presence, air power or ‘surrogate’ warfare, using proxy actors, drones and sanctions regimes with consequences that are unpredictable in terms of reputation and results.47 The assassination, in January 2020, of Iran’s General Soleimani by a US-ordered drone strike was illustrative of such a strategy, one designed to downgrade Iran as a regional power, visible also in the renewed sanctions regime after US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Alongside this reduced appetite for direct intervention, the soft power resources of the United States were evidently eroded, including its credibility and status as a leading regional power, with consequences for allies and enemies alike. This was not the ‘new beginning’ that Obama promised in his Cairo speech.48 Some of this could have happened anyway, or happened elsewhere, in the light of new global challenges and growing multipolarity, but events in Iraq were decisive in determining the new character of US involvement. Approving a new arms deal in July 2022, President Biden sought to reassure regional allies, but the wider lessons of US policy have not been lost on Arab states as they seek greater autonomy and new partners. Nor were those lessons lost on America’s competitors or allies further afield. Both Russia and China, which opposed the war, and helped to block the possibility of any favourable UN Security Council resolution, were ultimately beneficiaries, though in different ways. They shared US concerns about Iraqi pretensions and stability in the Gulf, and were not inclined, at that time, to mount a robust opposition to the US intervention, for reasons that had to do with domestic politics and their international standing. However, they stood to gain materially and strategically in distancing themselves from the conflict and its subsequent fallout. New opportunities arose for these two powers and their aspirations to global influence: in supporting a sovereignty-first and pro-UN position, they were on the ‘right side’ in the Iraq War. For China the opportunities in MENA were mostly economic— the region became central to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, unveiled in 2013. By 2020 China had become a major trading partner of regional states and importer of Middle East oil, but was also at the forefront of nuclear energy cooperation.49 However, scholars have also noted that the war had another effect on China, encouraging it to ‘think globally’; to move away from isolationism and enjoy the benefits of membership in an expanded international society.50 For Russia, the opportunities were economic, strategic and political, hastening the opportunity, effectively seized by President Putin, to re-establish a regional foothold—one lost since the 1960s.51 After the Libyan intervention, which Putin opposed, that opportunity was provided decisively by the Syrian civil war, which also aligned with Russia’s more activist ‘counter-revolutionary’ foreign policy as reflected in the colour revolutions: ‘Russia’s response to the Arab Spring, most notably the diplomatic, political, and military support it provided for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, represented a major return of Russian power and influence in the region.’52 Russia’s growing influence in Syria was made possible not only by changes in its own foreign policy orientation, but also by the reduced US appetite for intervention after Iraq. For both Russia and China, therefore, the Iraq War helped to erode the myth of western omnipotence and open the Middle East as a competitive space for economic and strategic opportunity.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › 1NC—Persian Gulf

The 1AC is a normalization of militarism – it’s a cold world politics that normalizes that war is always already occurring and the affs reduction of presence in the gulf is a means to securitize global supply chains that have yet to be militarized for the sanctity and the survivability of the empire

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

While the terms “militarism” and “militarization” emerged to explain Cold War military build-up and its social, ideological and international consequences (Shaw 1991), there has been a significant resurgence of the concept recently (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). “Militarization” is now deployed in numerous disciplines to describe an array of phenomena. The International Feminist Journal of Politics has been a hub for the publication of feminist “militarization” research, including on topics such as militarized masculinities (Enloe 2003; Masters 2005; Eichler 2006; Duncanson 2009; Welland 2015; Tidy 2015); the militarization of political leadership (Cannen 2014; Athanassiou 2014); women’s lives (Shigematsu 2009); spaces such as memorials (Szitanyi 2015), heritage sites (Demetriou 2012) and border zones (de Lacy 2014); gender relations (Cockburn 2010); and feminism itself (Wright 2015). Yet with remarkably few exceptions (Enloe 2000, 3; Lutz 2002, 723; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013) the concept of “militarization” is infrequently defined or analyzed. Perhaps it seems self-evident, but “militarization” is a concept. Like any concept it guides our attention in certain directions, but it also limits our scope. Arguably the most influential text on “militarization” in feminist thought is Cynthia Enloe’s classic book, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000). The book opens with a now-famous question: how do they militarize a can of soup? Enloe describes a can of soup containing pasta cut into the shape of Star Wars weapons, illustrating her central argument that “militarization” is a broad social and gendered process: In the Star Wars soup scenario a lot of people have become militarized – corporate marketers, dieticians, mothers, and children. They may not run out to enlist in the army as soon as they have finished their lunch, but militarization is progressing nonetheless. Militarization is never simply about joining a military. It is a far more subtle process. And it sprawls over far more of the gendered social landscape. (Enloe 2000, 2) In this account, all sorts of things can become “militarized”: people, values, cultures and products. Further, “militarization” is a gendered process best understood by examining women’s experiences of it (Enloe 2000, 3). This analysis enabled the study of hitherto-unexamined connections, shedding light on the labor performed by laundresses, sex workers, military wives, nurses, mothers and other women across the globe. Building on previous work (Enloe 1983; Enloe [1989] 2014), it highlighted that investment in the military and military values is not necessary or natural: they can be disinvested from and resisted. However, the “militarization” concept underestimates the extent to which we live with war: how marginalized people, those who are racialized, disabled or poor, are subject to war-like (martial) forms of politics. Returning to Enloe’s can of soup, in a blog post critiquing the concept of militarism, Cowen makes this intervention: “If, in one of the most incisive critiques of militarism, Enloe asks ‘how do they militarize a can of soup?’ and questions how the pasta within assumes the shape of “star wars satellites,” then we are also interested in the central fact of the can” (n.d.). Napoleon commissioned the design of canning to support the supply of far-flung battlefields; “thus, the can of soup was always already ‘militarized’, and bypassing the can for the noodles hides perhaps more than it reveals” (Cowen n.d.). Drawing on other scholarship that has dispensed with the concept of “militarization” (Amoore 2009), Cowen’s (2014) later work on logistics illustrates that global supply chains have not been “militarized” or “securitized”: rather the science of logistics emerged from war. Picking up from such interventions, we can say that the can of soup, as a material object, was always already “of war” and therefore cannot accurately be said to have been “militarized.” “Militarization” frameworks cannot adequately account for this imbrication of “war” and “society” (Kienscherf 2016). This may seem like a counterintuitive statement. Isn’t the concept of “militarization” precisely about drawing out how social (gendered) relations are permeated by military values and cultures? However, by holding the categories of the military and of the social (or, war and peace) as separate until “militarization” happens, the concept implicitly presumes a status prior to militarization. It underestimates war-like forms of politics because it blithely assumes that war is “naturally” separate from the “social landscape.” In this sense, the concept is much like that of securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), which holds that security forms the exception to politics. “Politics” (or social relations) is implicitly treated as un-security or un-military until securitizing or militarizing processes occur, even if they occur pervasively. From this perspective, a reverse process can take place: desecuritization (Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004) or demilitarization. What “militarization” holds out is the hope that military encroachment on an otherwise unmilitarized past can be reversed; this drastically underestimates the extent to which warfare and military strategy are intrinsic to “political” or “social” relations. As with the can of soup, when we dig, we usually find that those “civilian” things that are claimed to be in danger of “militarization” have much deeper roots in warfare, and that the peaceful “domestic” political order for which we yearn has been fundamentally shaped from the outset by warfare and colonial violence. The concept of militarization ironically elides the fundamentally warlike history of liberal politics precisely through its critique of (supposedly exceptional) military encroachment or trespass on them. Relatedly, research conducted through the lens of “militarization” has tended to foreground gender analysis, for example, through the concept of “militarized masculinities,” or emulation of Enloe’s focus on women’s lives. Even if we are attentive to how this may play out differently for racialized or poor women, the analytical foregrounding of “women’s lives” positions systems of gender as primary in understanding “militarization.” Gathering considerations of race, disability, poverty and Indigeneity under gender by pursuing a methodology focused in the first instance on the lives of women (or on masculinities) risks subsuming varied systems of power, leaving us unable to capture how they might work differently than gender. When we also center race, Indigeneity and disability it immediately becomes clear that there is no natural peaceful order, and that the concept of “militarization” is pallid and half-hearted in its ignorance of the war-like relations that permeate “peaceful” domestic civil order (James 1996; Davis 2002, 2003). In IR, the work of |Richter-Montpetit (2007, 2014) is central to understanding race and the production of liberal violence. She argues that torture is not an aberration from liberal order but forms part of a lineage of anti-Black violence, from the institution of chattel slavery through contemporary law and criminal justice, demonstrating that violence against racialized bodies and the law have existed in mutual relation throughout US history. Thus, “racialized taxonomies and the larger racial formation they gave rise to were not simply manufactured by law. Rather, law was shaped by, and simultaneously enabled a wider set of processes and technologies of race-making” (RichterMontpetit 2014, 52). The concept of “militarization” cannot take stock of these histories because it assumes a peaceful order that has been breached by militarism. Only by eschewing forms of analysis that assume a (breached) separation between military and civilian spheres can we avoid this kind of dangerous oversight. For this reason I propose an alternate concept: “martial politics.” “Martial” denotes that a thing is war-like, or that it derives from battle, war, or the military – that it is “of war.” It describes the process by which war and peace are imbricated. Assessing “martial politics” involves evaluating the historical roots and present expressions of this imbrication. “Martial politics” dispenses with the before/after temporality of “militarization” and the assumed separation between military and civilian, war and peace. It denies any innocent domain of “normal” politics by pointing to the martial nature of contemporary and historical political formations. “Martial politics” is the liberal norm, not the exception. Illustrating the potential value of this concept, the following sections of this article apply it to two key empirical sites of supposed “militarization”: the police and the university. The empirical material in this article focuses primarily on the US as an avowedly liberal state, and on matters that traditional IR scholars would relegate to “domestic politics” (i.e., the study of race, disability, policing, education and universities). Contrary to such traditions, the article views the US as a site of ongoing settler colonialism, founded in and continually produced through the legacy of chattel slavery, and thus very much a “global” space. From this perspective, I argue that neither the police nor the university have been “militarized” and instead illustrate how contemporary forms of policing and knowledge production are vested in longer trajectories of martial politics.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Prolif Good: Deterrence---1ar

French umbrella provides assurance and solves runaway prolif.

Schlee ’20 — Rene; Country Director of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. March 5, 2020; "Tracking the German Nuclear Debate"; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; ; //CYang

A withdrawal of Germany from nuclear sharing with the Americans would have further advantages. Coordinated with other countries of nuclear sharing, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, one could send the important political signal to the Eastern European NATO countries that even a minimal nuclear deterrent under French leadership would satisfy German as well as European security interests. Moreover, it would enable Germany to present itself with new credibility in matters of nuclear disarmament. At present, Germany is in the dilemma of only being able to commit itself internationally to nuclear disarmament with half its strength, since nuclear weapons are on its own territory. However, the withdrawal from nuclear sharing could give new impetus to the debate on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.”

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Prolif Good: Deterrence---1ar

Only unequivocal pressure forces Europe to take ownership. Multiple studies confirm.

Schnaufer ’21 — Tad A. II; Former Editor-in-Chief for the Global Affairs Review, PhD Candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, M.A. in Global Affairs from New York University. January 15, 2021; “US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies”; Georgetown Journal of International Affairs;

The Trump administration has threatened NATO allies to the point that they fear the United States may withdraw from the organization or not fulfill its obligations to Article V unless the allies meet the objective of spending two percent of their GDP on defense. Past administrations have called for NATO allies to contribute more to the alliance for decades. However, they have never called into question the US commitment to Europe. Yet, this pressure has forced the European allies to start taking greater ownership of their security at the cost of warm relations with the United States as seen through allied leader’s statements.

In order to pressure allies, the United States has to send costly signals, such as withdrawing troops from Europe, to demonstrate that their security interests have diverged. This political pressure acts as a forceful method to motivate NATO allies to do more because it provides a credible threat of exclusion from the benefits of US protection. Within NATO, only the United States maintains and controls the conventional and nuclear capacity to deter and defend against existential threats to the alliance. No other ally has the expeditionary military capacity to do so. For example, Estonia is not worried about being abandoned by Romania, Portugal, or even Germany, knowing none of them could bring a sizable military force to bear in response to a Russian invasion or fait accompli. In this case, Estonia’s chief concern revolves around the United States’ guarantee of their sovereignty through NATO. Suppose the United States can make credible claims that it is willing to abandon an ally and not fulfill its treaty obligations. In that case, the ally will experience a drastic incentive to increase its military capabilities to defend itself.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Prolif Good: Deterrence---1ar

U.S. security cooperation is the key factor.

Quencez ’21 — Martin; Research Fellow in the Security & Defense Program, Associate Researcher for the European Council on Foreign Relations, PhD Candidate in Contemporary History at the Sorbonne Nouvelle University. September 22, 2021; “The US cannot escape the European strategic autonomy debate”; The Progressive Post;

The US, however, plays a more ambiguous part, and appears as the elephant in the room in most European discussions. In fact, European strategic autonomy is still very much about the US. Despite many attempts to consolidate and expand the concept to broader issues, the inertia of this debate is a perfect illustration of the inability of transatlantic partners to reform and recalibrate their relationship in order to adapt to the 21st century geopolitical environment.

The balance of power within the transatlantic security and defence partnership provides the framework for the strategic autonomy discussion. Within the alliance, the US remains a security provider, while European powers are mostly security benefiters. US political leaders — from Eisenhower to Trump — have repeatedly criticised European “security free-riding”, but their European counterparts were less than eager to change this comfortable position.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Prolif Good: Deterrence---1ar

Ukraine and a slew of other factors provide momentum — it’s more possible now than ever.

Witney ’22 — senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. His topics of focus range from the European Security and Defence Policy to the Middle East Peace Process. Witney previously served as the first chief executive of the European Defence Agency in Brussels. High Representative Javier Solana chose him in January 2004 to lead the project team charged with developing the concept and blueprint for the agency. May 26, 2022; "Five reasons driving European defence integration after the Ukraine invasion"; ECFR; https://ecfr.eu/article/five-reasons-driving-european-defence-integration-after-the-ukraine-invasion/; //CYang

On 18 May, the European Commission released a new set of proposals that aim to put some forward movement into the European defence ‘project’. Nothing new there, you might think: the past quarter-century is littered with the wrecks of repeated previous efforts to get member states to match their words with action. So far, the irresistible force of the arguments for greater European defence integration — “spend more, spend better, and spend more together”, in the time-honoured mantra — has made little headway against the immovable object of national inertia and vested interests. Could this time be different?

The proposals (a Joint Communication by the Commission and European Defence Agency) respond to a tasking from EU leaders at their 11 March emergency summit at Versailles, in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The instruction was to “put forward an analysis of the defence investment gaps by mid-May and to propose any further initiative necessary to strengthen the European industrial and technological base.”

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Prolif Good: Deterrence---1ar

NATO is a paper tiger. Only a Eurodeterrent solves.

Barndollar ’19 — Gil; Senior Research Fellow at CSS and a Senior Fellow at Defense Priorities. He was Director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. He holds an AB in history from Bowdoin College and MPhil and PhD degrees in history from the University of Cambridge. April 8, 2019; “NATO Is 70 and Past Retirement Age”; National Interest; ; //CYang

It is appropriate to judge post–Cold War NATO a failure. The alliance is a paper tiger, beset with slashed European defense budgets and hollow forces. It has become a social club and an appetizer, a prelude to European Union membership for the formerly-communist states of eastern and southern Europe. What it is not is a credible military alliance. Nor is it making America more secure.

NATO’s performance in the foolish limited wars of the past two decades has demonstrated Europe’s failure to take either funding or fighting seriously. In the Kosovo air campaign of 1999, the Royal Air Force nearly ran out of bombs and spare parts. Moreover, it was U.S. aircraft that had to conduct about two-thirds of all sorties during the seventy-eight-day war.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Prolif Good: Deterrence---1ar

The nuclear umbrella is unsustainable and fails to prevent proliferation or solve deterrence.

Walt ’21 — Stephen; columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. March 23, 2021; "It’s Time to Fold America’s Nuclear Umbrella"; Foreign Policy; ; //CYang

Why is this statement so intriguing? Because it shows the authors of this report recognize that Europe as a whole might be more secure if it could rely on a locally based deterrent instead of continuing to shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. And if that is true for the nations of Europe, then it might well be true for others. Although the report’s authors are opposed to new states joining the nuclear club (Britain and France are already members), their statement clearly implies that deterrence would be strengthened if states facing serious external threats had a nuclear guarantee that didn’t depend on Uncle Sam.

This is hardly a new issue. Since fairly early in the nuclear age, the United States has used nuclear weapons to “extend deterrence” and shield some of its allies. It sought to convince potential adversaries that the United States might use its formidable nuclear arsenal if these allies were attacked, even if the United States was not. Of course, there was always some chance that a war involving one of the United States’ allies might escalate to the nuclear level, either by accident, through inadvertence, or via deliberate decision, no matter what U.S. leaders said in advance. Even so, Washington went to considerable lengths to make its nuclear umbrella credible, partly to discourage enemies from attacking but also to convince its allies not to get nuclear weapons themselves.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Prolif Good: Deterrence---1ar

Prolif is inevitable but must come immediately to shore up defense against an autocratic entente, shore up alliances, the LIO and deterrence. No impact or cascade.

Helberg ’21 — Jacob; a senior advisor at the Stanford University program on geopolitics and technology. He is an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. May 11, 2021; "Unified Threats Need Decentralized Deterrence"; Foreign Policy; ; //CYang

Last month, the U.S. intelligence community released its worldwide Annual Threats Assessment. The report covered the usual range of risks facing the United States and the globe, from drug trafficking to regional instability to cyberattacks. Yet front and center in the intelligence community’s assessment — listed ahead even of pandemics like the coronavirus — were two key threats: “China’s Push for Global Power” and “Russian Provocative Actions.”

China and Russia are increasingly aligned, forming an autocratic entente aimed squarely at the West. More concerning, the two revisionist powers are putting themselves on a war footing. A strategy of decentralizing U.S. deterrence can help defend the liberal international order against the threat of autocratic territory grabs.