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2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Liberalism

The plan is the definition of asserting biopolitical control – it spreads government influence which is tied to biopolitical control further into the private market – historical examples prove this move will steal biopolitical freedom from the worker. Don’t let the aff fool you – capitalism gained control by first taking the body of the employee- the aff mirrors the rise of liberalism – copying the successful capture of society by the liberal order with the goal of re-asserting biopolitical control.

Cook ’15 (Deborah, pHD in philosophy and faculty member at the University of Windsor in Canada, 3/12/15, “Really Existing Socialization and Socialism in Adorno and Foucault”, , Sage Journals, // AM)

In a now famous phrase, Foucault declared that the judges of normality are present everywhere (: 304). We now acquire our sense of who and what we are from the norms that these judges impose on us throughout our lives. This self-understanding becomes – in another memorable phrase – the prison of the body (: 30) because disciplinary norms serve as standards against which individuals judge themselves. Under constant surveillance, and the equally constant pressure to conform to disciplinary norms, individuals internalize these norms and become self-normalizing. This self-monitoring and self-correction effectively obviate the need for intensive observation. Since they are made aware that they may be subjected to the normalizing, panoptic gaze anywhere and at any time, individuals now examine and modify their own behaviour so that they will be accepted as ‘normal’, and fit in. In other words, individuals have become the perpetrators of their own subjection.

Foucault argues that disciplinary power was not, in the first instance, under state control; it was not originally the prerogative of the state. To be sure, Western states now deploy disciplinary techniques, especially in their police forces which provide ‘a supervision that seeks ideally to reach the most elementary particle, the most passing phenomenon of the social body’ (: 213–14). However, the disciplinary techniques that are now used by the police in the West first emerged on a ‘micropolitical’ level, in the institutions mentioned above, where power takes direct and strategic hold of bodies in order to alter and adjust them. Only after these techniques had developed and spread were they appropriated by the state. Moreover, Foucault contends that, even as disciplinary techniques were disseminated throughout institutions, the state developed a new, but complementary, type of power, which he calls biopower. Combining with disciplinary power, the biopolitical state eventually adopted neoliberal practices that now chart the treacherous waters between the Scylla of freedom and the Charybdis of security.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Green New Deal

The Green New Deal still engages with biopolitics but hides it using “green capitalism” to obscure its control. That makes it harder to resist biopolitics and neoliberal climate change

Luke ’09

(Timothy, university distinguished professor of  in the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences at , 11/30/09, , “A green new deal: why green, how new, and what is the deal?”, Taylor and Francis Online // AM)

While a backlash against neoliberalism reverberates in these plans, some neoliberal articles of faith remain. Indeed, the superstructure of the Green New Deal rests upon many foundational bases, and one of the deepest is ‘natural capitalism’. Developing more or less alongside the maturation of the Whole Earth Catalogue generation since 1968, the natural capitalism school provides an allegedly radical new vision of practicing local and global exchange by keeping ‘the environment’ as well as ‘the economy’ equally in mind in the marketplace (Hawken et al. ). Natural capitalism is suspicious of concentrated state power, and not entirely comfortable with the technocratic flavor of ecomodernization, but its devotees realize it needs both as political allies. Working together, green capitalists supposedly will turn to the smaller scale, fast-reacting, and broadly engaged responses of business enterprises eager to leverage the full-spectrum of pressing environmental problems as new market-building opportunities in full accord with the world's actually existing capitalist economies (Nordhaus and Shellenberger ). Natural capitalists reimagine the market and its complex division of labor as an allegedly underleveraged natural asset. The use of Nature as a capitalist tool has been stymied during the twentieth century by short-sightedness, greed, and waste as the big business practices of concentrated ownership, planned obsolescence, huge profits, and rapid return-on-investment distorted the traditions of commercial probity and rationality cherished by natural capitalists. Consequently, proponents of natural capitalism, like Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, Hunter Lovins or Ernest von Weizacker, reimagine the Earth itself as a complex economy rather than a primitive wilderness. The environment is not merely a site; it is an entrenched operational assemblage with an elaborate system of services that fundamentally must be reimagined in terms of cost, benefit, asset, liability, gain, loss and value. Business and environment are not opposing forces; instead they are all of one piece. In fact, the new business model is Nature itself. This article of natural capitalist faith really has taken root. Over the past twenty years, one sees the adoption, cooptation or mobilization of green affect, care or sensibilities in the ordinary conduct of everyday life itself. Whether it is in the realm of architecture, construction, design, farming, gardening, housing, clothing, management, planning, religion, technology, or urbanism, green business thinking has evolved into a fascinating regimen of everyday environmentality (Luke , ) that nests in the thinking and practices of producers, consumers, savers, commuters or everyday actors going about the conduct of their everyday biopolitical existence. Echoes of natural capitalism reverberate constantly through everyday environmentality, and this conceptual mobilization bears traces of the radical changes being made possible in human relationships with the non-human natural world by reimagining some ordinary factors of human life in the transformative terms of green consumerism (von Weizacker et al. ). Much of this spirit also is caught in the ads for a transnational energy corporation like British Petroleum (BP), using bright clean green and yellow product marketing pitches centered on sunflower images to reimagine its growing sales of fossil fuel-derived energy goods and services in an ecological life ‘beyond petroleum’. Other qualities of everyday environmentality surface in widely available chapbooks for living more ecological lives tied to green activism, green commercialism, green consumerism, green residentialism or green suburbanism. Such entrepreneurial-enablements for personal green new dealing truly do believe everyday green agency pursued for its own sake through the search for ‘everyday low prices’ will transform selves and societies. The green new deals, in turn, will materialize society-wide out of the green dimensions found in saving energy, resources, and money. The most thoroughgoing vision of everyday environmentality is mapped out by the ‘c2c’, or ‘cradle to cradle’, green design philosophy of the architects William McDonough and Michael Braungart. In Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things (McDonough and Braungart ), they offer new administrative design,

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Climate

Western-led climate policy marginalizes and oppresses underdeveloped populations through biopolitics. Basically, don’t solve climate change because biopolitics.

Grove 2010 [Assistant Professor in the Department of Global & Sociocultural Studies at Florida International University [Kevin J. Grove, Geopolitics Volume 15, Issue 3 “Insuring “Our Common Future?” Dangerous Climate Change and the Biopolitics of Environmental Security” IV] https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14650040903501070

Dire warnings on the “dangers” of climate change are reinvigorating past debates over environmental security. However, one strain of this debate is exceeding the state-based logics of security found in more conventional environmental security approaches. The UNFCCC's goal of avoiding “dangerous climate change” that, inter alia, threatens sustainable development has inspired volumes of research on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and has increasingly become incorporated into World Bank and UN development programmes. However, much of this research has yet to examine the cultural and political effects of framing climate change through the loaded language of security. As a result, there has been little critical analysis of the emergence of a variety of disaster risk management and insurance-based adaptation strategies that attempt to offer security against the effects of dangerous climate change. This article articulates the insights of critical environmental security studies with recent research on biopolitical security and post-structural critiques of development to unpack the biopolitical and geopolitical assumptions that animate discourses on dangerous climate change and disasters. My argument here is twofold. First, I suggest that risk management and catastrophe insurance have political effects: these biopolitical technologies sustain the global social and political order that the history of Western-led “development” has produced. Second, along these lines, dangerous climate change discourses extend the project of earlier environmental security discourses, specifically, the attempt to secure Western ways of life against the effects of environmental change. In securing “sustainable development,” discourses on dangerous climate change combine biopolitical technologies of risk management with geopolitical technologies of security to sustain the exclusion and containment of underdeveloped populations, and the mobility of the global elite, that characterise contemporary practices of development. Throughout the 1990s, doomsday accounts of environmental degradation as a security threat captivated audiences both lay and professional with nightmare scenarios of environmentally induced conflict and migration from the global South to the global North.The events of 11 September 2001 pushed these concerns off the security map. However, there has since been a resurgence of interest in the environment as a security issue, largely through explorations of the so-called “dangers” of climate change.Today, a growing number of academic, government, and military officials are reanimating discourses and themes associated with the 1990s environmental security literature to explore how climate change may drive violent conflict, alter geopolitical relations, and threaten US and EU national security interests. However, this reanimation of environmental security discourses exceeds its erstwhile state-based security logic. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has made avoiding “dangerous climate change” the central pillar of its mission. Although the UNFCCC's definition is notoriously vague, this concept generally refers to atmospheric changes that threaten basic functions of social and ecological systems. This encompasses threats to individual livelihoods and “sustainable development” along with more traditional security issues. International organisations such as the World Bank and other UN agencies have begun to incorporate these issues into their development agendasThe intersection of dangerous climate change with disasters has become one of their chief concerns. According to this discourse, the increasing frequency and intensity of catastrophic weather events destroys valuable infrastructure, diverts scarce resources into recovery efforts, and creates financial risks that can deter investment, all of which can hinder or set back development. Despite volumes of research that operationalise “dangerous climate change”, Critical security studies have shown that metaphors of security are political resources bound up in the creation and reproduction of power relations and particular forms of social order. The need to critically interrogate the “politics of security” play in dangerous climate change discourses is especially pressing given the recent emergence of new adaptation measures designed to reduce exposure to hazards and mitigate the effects of dangerous climate change. Risk management and insurance-based adaptation strategies such as catastrophe insurance offer a case in point. Catastrophe insurance has gained attention as a potentially potent adaptation strategy in small island developing states (SIDS) and other regions exposed to the threat of hurricanes. Insurance is said to enable SIDS to transfer disaster risk to global financial markets, which reduces each states' financial vulnerability and allows an influx of capital after a disaster to spark recovery efforts. Through the setting of premiums, insurance also creates financial incentives to modify behaviour in ways that reduce risk exposure However, even as new insurance technologies such as the Caribbean Catastrophic Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) are unveiled to much fanfare, there is an unacknowledged politics at play. Insurance is, in Dillon's phrasing, a “widely underrated” biopolitical technology – that is, a mechanism of government that regulates and produces life – that operates through commodifying and managing contingency.The emergence of insurance as a security mechanism thus reflects rearticulations of environmental security discourses through biopolitical rationalities of security. Rather than offering security through geopolitical strategies that identify and exclude sources, of danger, insurance maximises the productive potentials of emergent life through managing the contingent forces and relations that constitute a milieu of action. As Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue, biopolitics is a problem to be explained rather than a catchall explanatory condition.In other words, the emergence of biopolitical mechanisms of security reflects context-specific social, ecological, and political problems of government that give rise to new security concerns. In this light, the emergence of insurance and risk management as adaptation strategies raise a number of questions about the nature of environmental security. What are the various biopolitical logics and rationalities of power that enframe climate change as a security problem that can be solved through risk management and insurance? How do risk these biopolitical technologies attempt to create security against the threats of dangerous climate change? And finally, what are their cultural and political effects? This paper unpacks the biopolitical assumptions that structure discourses on dangerous climate change and disasters and advances two central arguments. First, it argues that risk management and catastrophe insurance have political effects. Drawing on post-structural critiques of development, security, and biopolitics, I argue that, as deployed within the institutional discourses of the World Bank and UN, risk management and insurance sustain the forms of social and political order that Western-led “development” has produced. This is accomplished through enrolling risk management and climate science in the development industry's efforts to transform an unruly world of difference into techno-managerial spaces of control and domination. Second, in making this claim, this paper also expands critical environmental security studies through articulating this field with recent research on biopolitical security. In this light, far from being apolitical and “technical,” institutional discourses on dangerous climate change extend the project of earlier environmental security discourses – specifically, the attempt to secure Western ways of life against the effects of environmental change. Discourses on dangerous climate change put biopolitical technologies of risk management to work alongside and through geopolitical technologies of security to sustain the exclusion and containment of underdeveloped populations, and the mobility of the global elite, that characterise contemporary practices of “development.” Insuring “our common future” – to borrow the title of the Brundtland Report that put sustainable development on the map– here involves transfers of risk management knowledge, technologies and resources to underdeveloped states, which strengthen their ability to contain and manage their populations in an emergent socio-ecological setting. This paper is organised as follows: The first section reviews academic and policy work on dangerous climate change and disasters, and puts forward an argument for examining these through the lens of critical security studies. The second, third, and fourth sections analyse World Bank and UN discourses on dangerous climate change and disasters. The second section unpacks the biopolitical and geopolitical assumptions underpinning these discourses. The third section situates these visions of security within the contemporary social and political context of development; specifically, an ongoing “global civil war” between competing modes of “species life.” A key argument here is that climate change poses a direct challenge to the legitimacy of Western-led development interventions organised around “eradicating poverty.” The fourth section then examines how risk management and insurance address this challenge through constructing a new cartography of environmental security and creating so-called “cultures of insurance” in underdeveloped states. A short conclusion suggests possibilities for further critical engagements with biopolitical technologies of climate change security.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Bio security

The 1AC is an instance of biosecurity that prioritizes absolute human survival creating the state of exception within debate rounds.

Esposito 22 [Bianca Maria Esposito, PhD Student in Cultures and Society of Contemporary Europe at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa (Italy), April 16, 2022, “Immunity and Biosecurity: Reading the Pandemic as a Mutual Relation Between Protection and Obedience”, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Political Theology Volume 24, NO. 4, pgs. 367-383, https://doi.org/10.1080/1462317X.2022.2064094, JMH]

Agamben opens his book Where are we now? The Epidemic as Politics–a book written in parts and chapters like the posts he published on his online blog during the first Italianlockdown12–quoting Saint Jerome: “The ship is sinking, and we are debating its cargo. Jerome, Hier.Epist.123.15.1.”13Thefirst thing that Agamben seems to willingly exclude from his discourse is the economy, basically the “cargo on our ship. “Everything, the fundamental architectural problem, the very structure of our Western world, came into light with this pandemic “as our houses and cities started to burn,” Agamben writes.14 That’s why we need to analyze the great political and ethical transformation which resulted from the declaration of a state of exception that suspended all our individual liberties, like the freedom of movement or cult, in order to preserve our biological life. Every other dis-course that doesn’t concern the way the sovereign power is deciding over our bodies and liberties is useless. It is as if the “shipwrecked claimed to govern their own shipwreck.” In fact, what Agamben wants to analyze in both his last books–Where are we now? and Quando la casa brucei[Eng. When the house is burning]–is the way in which political powers adapted to the pandemic by overtaking the democratic system and its constitutional rights in order to give form to a new governmental strategy that Agamben calls the “great transformation.”16Agamben speaks predominantly about the Italian situation between March and April 2020, when Italian citizens experienced the temporary suspension of their constitutional rights in the name of health and common security, which was unparalleled since World War II. The question that Agamben asked himself in such a situation is: how is it possible that with the “excuse” or the “invention” of an epidemic,17contemporary powers abandoned “the paradigm of bourgeois democracy–with its rights, its parliaments, and its constitutions–and replaced it with new apparatuses whose contours we can barely glimpse”18? Moreover how did they justify the suspension of all constitutional warranties in such a situation? Agamben’s answer is: through the declaration of a “state of exception” that is based on the introduction of a “sanitation terror” and a new religion of health, that is founded on fear and that turned a citizen’s right–namely, the right to health–into a judicial obligation. This new political disposit if that works through the conjunction of a religious approach to medicine and the sovereign use of the state of exception, is what Agamben calls “biosecurity.” A new technique of government that is only possible because the technologies that sustain our social and physical distancing were already there to bring us to a new structure of human relations that became almost immaterial through the use of technologies like the internet.19But what makes biosecurity–this whole new system of power–really dangerous, is its capacity of convincing people to accept, maybe for the first time in human history, all sorts of limitations of individual liberty in the name of a health threat as if it were a war enemy:“ just as it was asserted in the face of terrorism that freedom should be abolished in order to defend freedom, now we are told that life has to be suspended in order to protectlife.”20The Italian reaction to the pandemic was from this point of view truly interesting, Agamben claims. The first Western country that was facing this emergency in 2020 reacted like China21: both closed up its citizens in their apartments and granted them the only freedom to leave the house for urgency or “necessity.” All citizens had to carry a self-certification form that justified their movements in case of a police investigation. Agamben’s critique of this new “governing technique” has given rise to much criticism from behalf of Italian jurists and intellectuals.22When the Italian government declared the “state of emergency”23 facing a situation of contagion that was clearly out of control, Agamben spoke about a state of exception, yet making no distinction between “state of exception” and “state of emergency,” as some jurists argued.24Moreover the declaration of this state of emergency was compared by Agamben to Hitler’s declaration of the state of exception in 1933 when the Constitution of Weimer was not abolished but formally preserved, suspended and weakened by the ideological construction of a totalitarian government that wasn’t illegal, but that brought about a totalitarian regime.25Thiscomparison, as well as his remarks on the“ invention of an epidemic,”26whereby he indirectly criticized the obligation of mask-wearing as a dehumanizing practice in a world where human beings are gradually reduced to becoming faceless, numbers anddigits,27aroused a lot of criticism among Italian intellectuals.28This controversy led Agamben to clarify and explain his use of the term “invention” referring to Foucault’s philosophy: “Invention” in the political sphere should not be understood in a purely subjective sense. Historians know that there are, so to speak, objective conspiracies that seem to function as such without being directed by an identifiable subject. As Foucault showed before me, governments that deploy the security paradigm do not necessarily produce the state of exception, but they exploit and direct it once it occurs. Hence, what we have to consider as the most important aspect of Agamben’s perspective is not his ambiguity–an ambiguity that risks to transform his philosophical thought into a sort of conspiracy theory–, but rather his attention towards the historical transformations of politics and the way the political power claims to govern human life in its biological aspects. Without agreeing with the radical statements he made in some chapters–i.e., when he disputes the seriousness of the epidemic, relativizing the number of deaths–, we cannot ignore the fact that Agamben described exactly what happened during the first lockdown in Italy. Millions of people accepted a sovereign “decision” because of their fear of death and their feeling of insecurity. The fact that a democratic government was taking an almost military control over its citizens in order to protect their health, or rather their “bare life,” seemed justified, reason able and legitimate. If we read Agamben’s texts situating them more broadly within his previous works–like Homo sacer I: Sovereign Power and Bare Life30andState of Exception31–we can understand why the Italian philosopher speaks about the epidemic as the realization of a political strategy that separates the political, cultural and social “forms of life” from the simple biological survival. Just as he spoke about terrorism and its military reaction as a political response to fear that permitted to introduce some new laws in the name of protection and security, enforcing the national security state, he views the epidemic as an opportunity for the biopower of the state to be enforced. The latter would satisfy a wide-spread desire for safety that was induced through the media which in turn managed to amplify “sanitation terror.” As we know from his various works, Agamben reads biopolitics negatively, anchoring it to the Schmittian sovereign declaration of the “state ofexception”32 that separates the “bare life”–Walter Benjamin’s bloßes Leben, the biological “nude life”(gr.zōé)–from the political existence–the so-called “form of life”(gr.bíos)–which is the proper human way of living. This juridical and sovereign separation between zōé and bios excludes some individuals from the political life, allowing the sovereign power to reduce their existence to a biological survival that can turn into death or extermination. This is the case for example of the exiles, the refugees, the prisoners of war and others, who the states actively exclude from political participation and full humanity. But what happens if the separation between zōé and bios is applied not only to a part of the population, but to all citizens of a state, Agamben seems to ask? What does it mean to turn the end of politics–namely the higher good of a community, like it was for Aristotle(Foucault, 1976)33–into the mere biological survival of the individuals? And how was it possible to accept to live in this temporal suspension of the state of law as if it were anormal condition? Referring to the Italian situation, Agamben writes: Earis revealing many of the things that we pretended not to see. The first is that our society believes in nothing beyond bare life. It is clear that Italians are ready to sacrifice practically everything–their normal life conditions, their social relationships, their work, even friend-ships, as well as their religious and political convictions–when faced with the danger of getting sick. But bare life is not something that unites people: it blinds and separates them.34The contemporary world has accepted the political recourse to the “state of exception” as normal, accepting to live in a perpetual crisis where freedom has been sacrificed for security reasons because it was already accustomed to think about biological life as its highest value. One could summarize what Agamben means by “biosecurity” in the following terms: the disposition of individuals to accept the juridical obligation to sacrifice all aspects of life in the name of security and health. Modern politics–Agamben writes–is from top to bottom, biopolitics: what is at stake is ,ultimately, biological life as such. The new element is that health is becoming a juridical obligation that has to be fulfilled at all costs The major problem in this situation is, Agamben claims, that when biological preservation becomes the political priority over all common living, every social relationship is abandoned. Bare life and the fear to lose it, is something that separates individuals, not something that brings them together. Fear has made us think about our neighbor as a potential infector. In this situation even the dead were abandoned and their bodies cremated without ceremonies. For security reasons all forms of sociality have been sacrificed, funerals and marriages have been suspended and public spaces, like schools or universities, have been abolished and replaced by technologies that allow us to work remotely from home. Agamben accuses also the catholic Church and Christians to have abandoned their true message: to visit the sick and not to sacrifice everything to the immanent life.36This transformation in our relationship to every “other”–Agamben claims–will have ethical and political consequences that we cannot now foresee. What does it mean to live in a society that believes only in individual survival? And is it possible to live a “political life” in a democracy that forces us to “social distancing”? Asking those questions, Agamben speaks against the manipulation of fear and the sacralization of science. He wants to warn us about the dangers of setting our liberal-democratic rights aside preferring a technological-sanitary despotism that reduces the intensity of our life and its need for political recognition to a simple question of governing the biological survival of a population.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Generic

The government is using the “illness” of poverty to establish a state of emergency, using policy to reduce its citizens to a state of “bare life”

Sfetcu 2022 [Nicolae, Researcher at The Romanian Academy, November 2022, , “Biopolitics and Geopolitics” IV Romanian Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Telework, https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics/]

Giorgio Agamben is a well-known Italian philosopher who investigates the concepts of the state of emergency, the way of life (borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein) and the homo sacer. The concept of biopolitics (starting from the work of Michel Foucault) is found in many of his writings. Agamben says that what is manifesting in this pandemic is the growing tendency to use the state of emergency as a normal paradigm of government, through a militarization of those areas where there are people proven to be infected. Such a formula will allow the government to quickly extend the state of emergency to all regions. He lists a number of serious restrictions on freedom imposed by pandemic restrictions. These restrictions would be disproportionate to the real threat. Once terrorism is exhausted as a justification for exceptional measures, "epidemics could provide the ideal pretext for expanding these measures, beyond any limitation." (Agamben 2020d) Thus, "in a vicious circle, the restriction of freedom imposed by governments is accepted in the name of a desire for security, which was created by the same governments that now intervene to satisfy it." (Agamben 2020a) 5 Agamben notes that "the media and the authorities are doing everything possible to create a climate of panic, thus causing a true state of emergency, with severe limitations on movement and the suspension of daily life and work activities for entire regions": "Faced with the frantic, irrational and completely unfounded emergency measures adopted against an alleged epidemic ... why the media and the authorities are doing everything possible to spread a state of panic, thus causing a genuine state of emergency, with serious limitations to move and suspend daily life in entire regions?” (Agamben 2020c) Later, Agamben returns with some clarifications (Kotsko 2020a) introducing the concept of “naked life”: “The first thing that the panic wave, which paralyzed the country, clearly showed, is that our society believes in nothing but naked life.” People ”… are prepared to sacrifice practically everything – normal living conditions, social relations, work, even friendships and religious or political beliefs – to avoid the danger of falling ill. The naked life, and the fear of losing it, is not something that brings men and women together, but something that blinds and separates them. Other human beings, like those in the plague described by Manzoni, are now seen only as potential contaminators to be avoided at all costs or at least to keep at a distance of at least one metre. The dead – our dead – have no right to a funeral and it’s not clear what happens to the corpses of our loved ones. Our fellow humans have been erased and it’s odd that the Churches remain silent on this point. What will human relations become in a country that will be accustomed to living in this way for who knows how long? And what is a society with no other value other than survival?” "Men have become so used to living in conditions of permanent crisis and emergency that they don’t seem to notice that their lives have been reduced to a purely biological condition, one that has lost not only any social and political dimension, but even any compassionate and emotional one. A society that lives in a permanent state of emergency cannot be a free one. We effectively live in a society that has sacrificed freedom to so-called “security reasons” and as a consequence has condemned itself to living in a permanent state of fear and insecurity." (Kotsko 2020a) According to Agamben, we've come to talk about the virus in terms of war. A war against an invisible enemy. "The enemy isn’t somewhere outside, it’s inside us." (Kotsko 2020a) Followers of Michel Foucault's biopolitics argue that this is a new concept instrumental in "reconceptualizing the limits of sovereign power: not as fixed territorial boundaries at the outer edge of the territorial state, but infused through bodies and diffused into societies and everyday life". (Vaughan-Williams 2009, 9)

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Link › 1NC --- Generic

Biopolitics subjugates populations through abusive regulatory practices, framing controlling policy under the guise of liberal democracy as a means of “fiscal optimization” through which to strengthen control societies.

Sfetcu 2022 [Nicolae, Researcher at The Romanian Academy, November 2022, , “Biopolitics and Geopolitics” IV Romanian Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Telework, https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics/]

Biopolitics and Geopolitics Biopower is a term coined by Michel Foucault, referring to the practice of modern nation states by "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations". (Foucault 1990, 140) Foucault used the term to refer specifically to public health practices, among other regulatory mechanisms. Biopower control people in large groups, through an anatomo-politics of the human body, and biopolitics of the population through social institutions of discipline. Power is codified in both social practices and human behavior, as the human subject gradually accepts subtle regulations and expectations of the social order, (Policante 2010) "an explosion of many and varied techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations": (Foucault 1990, 140) "By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called biopower." (Foucault et al. 2009, 1) A specific way of applying biopower is what Foucault calls “massifying”, (Foucault et al. 2009, 55–86) which uses scientific apparatus and equipment. This anatomo-politics of the human body correlates with the new knowledge of science and technology under the guise of a liberal democracy, where life itself becomes a deliberate political strategy and an economic, political and scientific problem, to which the nation state is coupled. (Foucault et al. 2009) Foucault argues that while the stated purpose of biopower is to maximize life, it also has a dark side: when the stakes are life itself, anything can be justified by the state, thus being able to easily eliminate groups identified as threatening the life of the nation, or of humanity. (Foucault 1990, 137) Foucault draws attention to what he calls the major political and social project, namely the "milieu intérieur" (inner environment), as a support for the truths uttered by the authorities. In the modern version, the government is thus presented to the population in the media as a means of efficiency, fiscal optimization, political responsibility and rigor, forming a public discourse of government solidarity and social consensus. (Foucault et al. 2009, 283) Biopolitics is a concept that takes into account the management of the life and populations of a governed region. According to Foucault, biopolitics is "to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order." (Foucault 1990) In political science, the term has two different meanings: a poststructuralist one identical to the meaning attributed by Michel Foucault (denoting social and political power over life), and another that refers to biological studies and political science. (Liesen and Walsh 2011) Foucault speaks of a style of government that regulates populations through "biopower" in all aspects of human life. (Foucault et al. 2009, 1)

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › FW › 2NC --- FW

Rejection of biopolitics and movement towards neoliberalism allows us to move from societies to communities wherein the subjects of government are understood as individuals with identity, able to form their own sets of beliefs, values, and commitments.

Sörensen 2012- Associate Professor and Senior Lecturer in the School of Global Studies, Gothenburg University [Jens Stilhoff, Development Dialogue, April “The Failure of Statebuilding – Changing Biopolitics and the Splintering of Societies” IV, https://www.academia.edu/27448172/The_Failure_of_Statebuilding]

But the modernist project and its inherent universalism was also challenged on other grounds, notably from the left, from perspectives such as postmodernism, multiculturalism, feminism and sustainable development philosophy. In their effect these either share premises with neoliberalism or contain premises which neoliberalism has had a tremendous capacity to appropriate. Just as with neoliberalism, they all concern a new way of conceptualising the plane of reference for government, its objects, subjects, targets and mechanisms. Nicholas Rose has argued that we see a ‘detotalisation’ of society where the thought-space of the social is fragmented. It is fragmented in terms of multiculturalism, and in political controversies over the implications of pluralism, of ethnicity, religion, sexuality, ability and disability, together with conflict over the competing and mutually exclusive ‘rights’ and ‘values’ of diferent communities (Rose 1999: 135). The subjects of government are now understood as individuals with ‘identities’, which not only identify them, but do so through their allegiance to a particular set of community values, beliefs and commitments (Rose 1999: 135). Here, ‘community’ emerges as the ideal territory for the administration of individual and collective, argues Rose, and individual conduct no longer appears ‘socially determined’ but shaped by values that arise from ties of community identification (p 136). We thereby have a replacement of ‘society’ with ‘community’, or ‘communities’. This form of social breakdown is quite compatible with neoliberalism and implies a similar break with aggregate biopolitics. A shifting plane of reference on the part of government towards ‘civil society’ or ‘community’ constitutes no threat to neoliberal thought, and these can both be exposed to market logic and ideas of self-reliance. But community, like society, is not a natural formation; it has to be constructed. The new correlate of government is mapped out, its distinctions and borders defined, and its interests and values identified. Society does not disappear in this process, but it is reworked through new categories that regenerate – or threaten – it. In Western societies the new conceptualisation is exemplified in concerns related to minority communities, 56 Development Dialogue April 2012 – The End of the Development-Security Nexus? gender equality, specific community programmes and afirmative action. This entails a biopolitical separation that is mirrored in international development and security policy. In the global periphery liberalism rediscovers multi-ethnic post-conflict societies as tribal, communal and sectarian, features, which are not merely discovered and addressed but re-generated as a necessary correlate of government in the new kind of governmental rationality. As David Campbell has argued, liberal governance and ethnic national leaders have come to share a common ‘ethnic cartography’ (Campbell 1999). Campbell’s reference was to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but an extreme illustration would be the US counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq, especially from 2007 onwards. Following the complete breakdown of the Iraqi state under the US occupation from 2003, Iraqi society was rapidly divided and mobilised along its ethnic-religious fault lines. Resistance blended with civil war and the ethnoplural city of Baghdad became increasingly ethnically divided (Gregory 2008). The US counterinsurgency strategy popularly called ‘the Surge’ emphasised these divisions. Violence diminished only after a reduction of inter-ethnic contact surfaces, through segregation, walled-of neighbourhoods, and pay-outs to tribal leaders who mobilised their respective followers. The shared ‘ethnic cartography’ reflected biopolitical control measures that operated along ethnic-religious fault lines (Gregory 2008).

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Policy simulations do not create solutions, but cement regimes of violence within debate.

Stypinska 22 [Diana Stypinska, Lecturer in Social Theory at University of Galway, Galway, Ireland, November 1, 2022, “Social Media, Truth and the Care of the Self”, Palgrave Macmillan, pgs. 83-92, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18108-5_5, JMH]

Ideology ‘corresponds to a corruption of reality through signs’, argues Jean Baudrillard, and, therefore, ‘the goal of the ideological analysis [is] to restore the objective process’ (2008: 27). Simulation, on the other hand, ‘corresponds to a short circuit of reality and to its duplication through signs’ (Baudrillard 2008: 27). As such, Baudrillard claims, ‘it is always a false problem to wish to restore the truth beneath the simulacrum’ (2008: 27). Indeed, as I have demonstrated in previous chapters, simulation produces its own peculiar duty of truth, which re-anchors its functionaries in the coordinates of the former. In line with this, I would like to posit that post-truth, in and of itself, is not ideological; it is simulational. Post-truth, that is to say, is not so much a symptom of a corruption of our reality, but, rather, that of its progressive substitution with the order of simulacrum. Crucially in this context, simulation should not be conceived as an external force—one that swooped down upon us, as it were, violently snatching us up and unconsensually entrapping us in its forceful grip. Contrariwise, it would be far more accurate to consider simulation as something that we actively welcomed—and continue to do so, in an utter disregard for, and ongoing denial of, the reasons behind, and the consequences of, this act. Here, let us briefly return to the origins of the term ‘post-truth’. According to Oxford Languages, the contemporary definition of ‘post-truth’ can be traced back to a 1992 essay by Steve Tesich published in The Nation magazine (see 2016). In it, Tesich offers some reflections on the ‘Watergate symptom’, a term coined in reference to the Watergate scandal as a means of designating a wider shift in the North American mentality (1992). As Tesich expounds, [e]ither because the Watergate revelations were so wrenching and followed on the heels of the war in Vietnam, which was replete with crimes and revelations of its own, or because Nixon was so quickly pardoned, we began to shy away from the truth. We came to equate truth with bad news and we didn’t want bad news anymore, no matter how true or vital to our health as a nation. We looked to our government to protect us from the truth. […] We would see only what our government wanted us to see, and we saw nothing wrong with that. We liked it that way. Our government was looking after us. (1992: 12, 13) Both Tesich and Boorstin presented a damning diagnosis of the American culture, warning of the dangers of the denial of reality. ‘We are rapidly becoming prototypes of a people that totalitarian monsters could only drool about in their dreams’, proclaimed Tesich (1992: 13). All the dictators up to now have had to work hard at suppressing the truth. We, by our actions, are saying that this is no longer necessary, that we have acquired a spiritual mechanism that can denude truth of any significance. In a very fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world. (1992: 13) As this shows, the problem of post-truth was never a question of epistemology. Contrariwise, the post-truth problematique is rooted in a desperate attempt to hold on to the capitalist ‘happy consciousness’—that is, ‘the belief that the real is rational and that the system delivers the goods’ (Marcuse 2007: 84)—by any means available. And by the late twentieth century, the only such means were those of the abandonment of reality. What Mark Fisher refers to as a ‘depressive hedonia’, namely, ‘an inability to do anything else except pursue pleasure’ (2009: 22) [author’s emphasis], is thus fundamentally co-extensive with our post-truth condition. It follows that our contemporary duty of truth is the expression of the imperative to constant, unimpeded flow of an unsublimated desire for gratification. Simulation enables us to eliminate the obstructions to this flow, as such, facilitating an increasing automatization of desire. Crucially, simulation does not shelter us from the physical world and our daily troubles. This, however, should come as no surprise. After all, the delusions that it affords us were, from the very onset, geared towards the preservation of the capitalist imaginary. In effect, by their very design, they are bent on the protection of the existence of the status quo, not us. By guaranteeing our entrapment within private subjective orbits (cf: Mills 2000), simulation operationalizes and sustains our deference to the logic of economicization; it does not have any purchase on the effects of the latter. So far this has largely translated itself into ‘reflexive impotence’ (Fisher 2009: 21). That is to say, we lived in the awareness that things were bad, but we believed that there was nothing that we could do about it (see Fisher 2009: 21). Nothing apart from, that is, attempting to obtain ‘at least some gratification through identification with the existent’ (Adorno 1991: 150). Today, however, the escalating libidinal frustrations are driving many to action. Temporary gratifications offered by the digital enactment of simulation-powered delusions, in short, are no longer enough. Indeed, it would appear that the days of reflexive impotence are numbered, soon to be replaced with widespread physical insurgencies of the impotent. As Luke Mogelson, the author of The Storm is Here, demonstrates, the 2021 attack on the US Capitol was but a sample of what is to come (see 2022). He argues that the Americans are in imminent danger of ‘more frequent and larger-scale eruptions of gun violence’ and, that with so many ‘people with considerable influence and power’ now calling for a civil war, its prospect is far from outlandish (quoted in Fox 2022; see also Orth 2022). Likewise, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi warned us that if a radical change does not take place, the future of Europe will be that of ‘mass violence’ and ‘inter-ethnic civil war’ (see 2011: 122). With inflation in the eurozone at an all-time high (see Liboreiro 2022) and an intensifying energy crisis (see Horowitz 2022), there is no question that many are now alarmingly close to the boiling point. It is becoming blatantly clear that our unsublimated desires cannot be contained by the digital. To be sure, simulation no longer constitutes just an assault on the real; now it leads to real assaults. Such are its ‘true pleasures’: by automatizing our desires, by making ourselves neglectful of ourselves, others, and the world, we traded off our ability to meaningfully intervene into the present—all for an economic dreamworld that could never deliver on its promises. The perpetually accelerated play of simulation hence came to accelerate the demise of not only truth and politics, but that of our very existence. Let us make no mistake here: what we are losing today is more than critical agency; it is humanity.

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The alternative is a rejection of the 1AC’s auto simulated policy solution in favor of impotentiality.

Stypinska 22 [Diana Stypinska, Lecturer in Social Theory at University of Galway, Galway, Ireland, November 1, 2022, “Social Media, Truth and the Care of the Self”, Palgrave Macmillan, pgs. 83-92, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18108-5_5, JMH]

Farkas and Schou argue that what is presently needed is ‘another way of understanding both the democratic tradition as well as politics and the political’ (2020: 142). Clearly, this task is both conceptual and normative. It is conceptual insofar as it requires us to create other vocabularies than those currently structuring post-truth worlds. To grasp the dynamics of politics, we need to move beyond existing premises. Doing so is, however, also an imminently normative endeavor, on two accounts. First, because it asks us—as people currently inhabiting post-truth worlds—to think and act differently. We are prompted to rethink what we are doing. Second, proposing a shift in our existing ideas of politics and the political is also normative in the sense that it can pave the way for other modes of doing politics and democracy in the future. If we shift how we think through questions of politics, then we will also come to see that the status quo does not suffice. (Farkas and Schou 2020: 142) Their ardent call for ‘the formulation of proper alternatives’ (Farkas and Schou 2020: 157) seems to, however, overlook the fact that social theorists have been proposing such alternatives for a very long time. Indeed, one does not need to look hard to find a plethora of alternative visions of the future (see, for instance, Gorz 1983). Hence, as much as I endorse the sentiments underpinning Farkas and Schou’s stance, I nevertheless see it as necessary to question the viability of their proposals. Indeed, in light of my analysis, a certain naïveté can be situated at the core of the impassioned accounts such as theirs, namely, the one concerning the actuality of what has happened and what is happening. Indeed, what my analysis suggests is that our post-truth predicament is the consequence of the unyielding pursuit of economic rationality, rather than a symptom of ‘genuine demands for breaking with the status quo’ (Farkas and Schou 2020: 126). A patent case in point here is the fact that the anti-capitalist social movements—such as, for instance, Extinction Rebellion—do not tend to utilize the post-truth frame. To be sure, post-truth tactics are the remit of the establishmentarian agents and alt-right conspiracists: the likes of Donald Trump, Brexiteers, and white supremacists—to name but a few. An argument could be, of course, made that such tactics are a response to the threat of systemic change posed by the anti-capitalist groups. Approaching post-truth as a tool of counter-critique (cf: Stypinska 2020), however, barely scratches the surface of its problematique, overlooking the deeper issue of the libidinal economy of which it is an expression. From this perspective, the call to keep reinventing the non-capitalist wheel ad infinitum, at the very best, smacks of poor strategy. Indeed, the problem is not the lack of viable alternatives. Alas, it seems to lay in the fact that the societies we live in seem to be more interested in ‘influencing’ and ‘trolling’—on- and offline—than paying any heed to structural solutions. This is not to imply that we ought to resign ourselves to the current state of affairs. Rather, I would suggest, it is to affirm the necessity of being cautious of the urge to purposiveness (cf: Agamben 2018). Being, as we are, the products of the Western paradigm that places action, rather than being, as the place of ethics, we are inadvertently positioned ‘in debt with respect to [our] own end’ (see Agamben 2018: 63). According to Giorgio Agamben, praxis ‘is the place where this debt is settled and incessantly rekindled’ (Agamben 2018: 63). As such, purposiveness is yet another trap. Or, to put this differently, it is another expression of the paradigm of efficacy that culminates in sheer functionality (cf: Heron 2018). Agamben argues that the way out of this logic is the embrace of ‘impotentiality’: ‘not simply the potential to do this or that thing but potential to not-do, potential not to pass into actuality’ (1999: 180). This, he asserts, constitutes the ‘possibility of privation’ (Agamben 1999: 181) [author’s emphasis]. The key, in short, is to deactivate the economic apparatus, making it inoperative. As Agamben explains, inoperativity is not another action alongside and in addition to all other actions, not another work beyond all works: It is the space—provisional and at the same time non-temporal, localized and at the same time extra-territorial—that is opened when the apparatuses that link human actions in the connection of means and ends, of imputation and fault, of merit and demerit, are rendered inoperative. (2018: 85) Such a space can be opened by thinking. However, following Miguel de Beistegui, I contend that the thinking that we need is not simply ‘a natural disposition’, ‘one we can decide to activate (or not)’ (2022: 2). It emerges, and does so slowly, at times painfully, whether individually or historically. It struggles to come to life, and it struggles to survive. It is constantly fighting off demons that continue to haunt it, perpetually rising from the mud that lies at the bottom of its pond. It is an effort, and it needs all the help it can get to get off the ground. (Beistegui 2022: 2) Such thinking is a matter of care—care unencumbered by urgency or, indeed, expediency. Care that begins with introspection and aims at the development of ‘a full, perfect, and complete relationship of oneself to oneself’ (Foucault 2005: 320). It is a thinking that understands its own process and is capable of resisting the imperative to the perpetual actualization of praxis. Thinking, that is, whose purpose exceeds purposiveness. I appreciate that this is not exactly the ‘practical solution’ that so many of us are after, and that the picture I paint in this book is gloomy. To that, I respond with the words of Theodor Adorno: [w]ithin absolutized praxis, only reaction is possible and for this reason the reaction is false. Only thinking could offer an escape, and then only that thinking, the results of which are not prescribed—as is so frequently in those discussions in which it is predetermined who is right and which therefore do not advance the cause—but rather degenerate without fail into tactics. When the doors are barricaded, it is doubly important that thought not be interrupted. It is rather the task of thought to analyse the reasons behind this situation and to draw the consequences from these reasons. It is the responsibility of thought not to accept the situation as finite. If there is any chance of changing the situation, it is only through undiminished thought. (1991: 200, 201) The surrendering of one’s thinking to the solutionist imperative implies its instrumentalization. Hence, in sooth, it is an act of resignation—and of neglect. Recall the ancient philosophical practices of the care of the self and others that I keep returning to throughout this book: the Socratic endeavours to induce a constant perplexity, the Cynics’ embraces of re-evaluation as a driving principle of the mode of life. These were the actions irreducible to their immediate effects. They agitated the sensibilities to unsettle the dominant rationality. They did not prescribe; they were an imperative to ‘open thinking’ that ‘points beyond itself’ (cf: Adorno 1991: 202). Consider also the Foucauldian conception of subjectivity as a point of tension between the self and the world, as something irreducible to the existing expectations and desires. Digital simulations pixelate this tension, turning it, and therefore our very (dis)positions, to mere code. With the news that metaverse is on its way (see Anderson and Rainie 2022), we ought to seriously consider the automatizing implications of the digital technologies of the subject. Further simulation will not save us; it will only intensify the neglect of that which makes us human. To care, and to transform, we must learn how to think openly.

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The 1AC is an instance of liberal governmentality that values market shares and financialization above the needs of the people.

Lucarelli 10 [Stefano Lucarelli, Assistant Professor of Political Economy, 2010, “Financialization as Biopower”, Academia.edu, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Financialization-as-Biopower-Lucarelli/1b922f25f84f3148fa1ebf351e6c1e32803c6ce6]

First of all, financialization can be defined as the diversion of domestic economy savings to stock market shares. Ever since the 1980s, the American economy has been characterized by the process of financial market liberalization and the consequent explosion of new financial tools: thus the passage from a Keynesianism built on a pact between producers in an environment of a monetary system that binds currency and financial maneuvers—already weakened by president Nixon’s declaration of the inconvertibility of the dollar to gold in 1971—to a financial Keynesianism based on private deficit spending, in which the largest financial market deregulations are accompanied by the diminution of social incomes distributed by the welfare state. We are facing an evolution in liberal governmentality. In other words, financial Keynesianism is a modality of liberal governmentality. Shareholder value becomes the principle macro-economic indicator, the scepter and the pastoral that govern both investment and consumption through the wealth-effect.15 For a psychological dynamic that would be worthy of further study but that represents a necessary condition of stability of the American economic model (here intended as ideal-type), the wealth- effect induced by an increase of value in the markets affects consumption behaviors more than the expected wealth due to an increase in wages.16 The model has a high risk of instability; the fact that financial crises have followed one after another so quickly over the last few years is proof of this. The exercising of liberal govern- mentality means that this form of specific command over individual behavior is reintroduced each time: the rule that has been consolidated consists in passing from one bubble to the next,17 forcing individuals to believe that their wealth depends more on financial markets than demands for wages or other forms of possible claims. Following this approach, the wealth-effect represents the form of command typical of financial Keynesianism, here understood as liberal governmentality. The dynamic that goes from profit to financial market and vice-versa substitutes the principle political decisions in the Fordist-Keynesian paradigm: the productivity-wage connection and the production-mass consumption connection. The impact of financial returns on patrimonial decisions becomes the key factor in investment decisions; these must keep count of the financial returns, and not only on the variations in demand. Consumption continues to depend on the accumulation of traditional income from labor (i.e. wages) but a variable that measures the value of the financial tools that families own intervenes too. If financialization is highly developed—which is if family wealth depends more on the quote of income coming from financial markets than wages—wage moderation, favoring companies’ profitability, increases financial returns; thus a dynamic founded on the wealth-effect aimed at favoring private consumption while even facing falling real wages can be triggered. The level of production becomes a consequence of financial value. This inverts the relations between the real sphere and the financial sphere that prevailed under Fordism: the market dynamic replaces wages as source of cumulative growth. This inversion also revolutionizes social control mechanisms that concern the individuals in the modern world. In other words, the wealth-effect that supports the financial world’s thought process depends on the degree of subsumption not only of labor, but of life itself and finance (this is where biopower’s feature lies). In macroeconomic terms, this dependent relation is translated in the growing liquidity that financial markets attract starting with private savings that were previously invested in State bonds. Even so, this growing liquidity is not enough by itself. There is a second explanatory variable necessary so that the wealth-effect continues: it is the common sense that forms between individuals about the reasons that should explain the production of money by means of money, and about the hierarchy of needs to satisfy in order to maintain an acceptable social status. The logic of valorization leads to the transformation of social relations. More precisely, this means that financialization is a form of socialization that makes liberal governmentality evolve. So, it is comprehensible as to why the analysis of financialization cannot be limited to the study of the conditions of the macroeco- nomic sustainability of the system; it also requires paying particular attention to the social codes through which human relations are reciprocally limited. We must thus understand these conventions that settle in the population, starting from the business world. A convention furnishes a valuation system a priori, pointing out the whole of the social rules able to make the different behavior of single individuals homogeneous. Therefore, it presupposes a theory of imitation. This is the observational point that Keynes uses to explain the generation of long-term expectations:

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The 1AC extends the power of the necropolitical war machine to surveil and manage the activities of citizens. The apocalypse is coming now, but the plans proliferation of scenarios makes bare life inevitable.

Stümer and Loest 22 [Jenny Stümer, researcher for Centre for Apocalyptic and Post-Apocalyptic Studies, Felicitas Loest, managing director of the Centre for Apocalyptic Studies and Post-Apocalyptic Studies, 2022, Editorial Apocalyptica, “The Apocalyptic World, Why Begin with The End of the World”, https://doi.org/10.17885/heiup.apoc.2022.1.24602, JMH]

As we move forward with Apocalyptica’s first issue, the world is looking dire: Anthropogenic climate change is accelerating, the petrochemical experiment is in full force, resources are depleting, species are vanishing, climate refugees are met with increasingly militarized borders, forests are burning, oceans are dying, we all have plastics in our blood and the COVID-19 pandemic still holds a strong grip on the world. Meanwhile Vladimir Putin has raised the stakes of nuclear threat once more as millions are fleeing a war-torn Ukraine. In Yemen Children are starving. Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos are colonizing space. The Far right is on the rise around the globe and disaster capitalism is feeding off the poor. People are tearing each other apart on social media. Oil spills, earthquakes, hurricanes and school shootings are common news events. Homelessness is endemic. The necropolitical war machine is tearing through the Middle East. Algorithmic governance has put us under constant surveillance. Scientists have glued their hands in protest to the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy while Don’t Look Up is the second most watched film on Netflix. Kentanji Brown Jackson is being badgered at her confirmation hearing and the Dakota Access Pipeline is still transporting toxic crude oil to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe reservation. Slow violence has gained traction; the Hyperobject is disintegrating We are faced with a plethora of catastrophes; a cataclysm of apocalyptic scenarios all of which propose the unravelling of a destructive way of inhabiting the Earth, or an anti-relational refusal of the (common) world, while constantly doubling down on the gendered, raced, colonial, and environmental violence that have impelled these devastating patterns in the first place. The simultaneity of apocalyptic upheaval, in other words, provokes a peculiar convergence of premonitions, experiences, and time lines, where one end is haunted by an /other, giving rise to new challenges that demand our questioning of what it meant, means, and will mean to live through the end times. Following Karan Barad, it is obvious that these different apocalypses do not merely exist side by side but that they can live “inside” each other (2018, 57), uprooting the past and throwing us back to the future as the present slips away. In other words, there are many endings and many worlds, but it is through the philosophical trope of the pluralist apocalypse that we can come to approach the interconnectedness and intersectionality of these various (up)endings. Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the colonial assault on the Americas, Africa, and Australasia, two World Wars, slave ships, famines, genocides, invasions, dispossessions, storms, floods, diseases, and the coming bee extinction; these earth /world-shattering events can (and should) not be equated, of course, but they interlace and blend in ways the apocalypse as a figure of thought can make tangible and therefore, thinkable. In this sense, apocalypse as an intellectual project reminds us that death and catastrophe cannot be simply relegated to what Malcom Ferdinand describes as “off-world spaces, far removed from European Centers” (2021, 65) — if not for lack of trying — and that the disasters of past and present are neither neutral nor natural but subject to political and cultural forces that we can and must interrogate. At the Käte Hamburger Centre for Apocalyptic and Post-apocalyptic Studies (CAPAS) we work with the premise that the apocalypse provides a way into thinking through these complex and urgent entanglements. We propose that apocalypses are productive, that they are more than theological abstractions and that the world(s) they are upending are not a given. We assume that apocalypses have happened and that they prompt us to question how we make sense of /in a disaster-ridden world. Optimistically speaking, apocalypses are transformative: They are about the creation of novel and emancipatory collective imaginaries that undo pervasive conceptions of the world and trouble established ontological and epistemological promises of the ways we may inhabit this planet. As NK Jemisin puts it, “the end of the world is happening as we speak. The question becomes whether it’s the kind of world that needs to go.” (Jemisin 2018, 477). In this vein, we want to broaden the notion of the apocalypse beyond ideas of disaster projected onto a future that ideally requires no change from us. Instead, apocalypses and post-apocalypses invoke a possibility of constructive upheaval, revolutionary energy, and radical difference. Jemisin’s provocative evocation of what John Drabinski, with reference to Aimé Césaire might call “the apocalyptic word” reminds us that “out of the end of the world, beginning is possible” (572) and that the end of history has not actually happened. As Oxana Timofeeva puts it, “the end of the world is a permanent reality. History doesn’t have an end” (2014). Rather, “the end of the end of history” (Timofeeva 2014) can free us to reshape our world(s), in so far as its inscribed futurelessness marks a “starting point for thought” (2020, 4) in Jessica Hurley’s words. The end thus produces “a place for struggle and resistance and somehow, impossibly, for hope” (Hurley 2020, 4). In this sense, living and thinking with apocalypses changes the horizon of how we orient the present and deal with the environmental and human consequences of Western chronopolitics. As Drabinski has further explained, “without apocalypse, there is always and only the despair of the past dragged into a melancholic present and future” (2016, 567). Our approach to the end of the world then is respectful to the destructions of past, present, and future, but, at the same time, it is defiantly enthusiastic, refusing the apocalypse as a bad object per se. Instead, we utilize the end as an opening, as Césaire would insist: Apocalypse, in this sense, unlocks new ways of thinking and being in and with the world. In line with these bearings, we treat the apocalypses as end and beginning. Apocalypse as a mode of thinking, writing and working together teaches us about the limits and potentialities of ‘world’, ‘worlds’, and ‘worlding’; raising questions about what it means to think with, against and beyond the end today. What movements, politics, ideas, geographies, sensibilities, stories, and images might be considered (post)apocalyptic or invoke debates and feelings about the end of the /a world? How do apocalypses entangle temporalities of past, present, and future? How do crisis and catastrophe shape human and non-human actors and their interconnections? And, how does the apocalypse as an idea help us to address escalating global as well as local challenges in ways that may articulate the promise of more just political futures and fuller relationships with each other and the world? Apocalyptica makes room for exploring these questions, utilizing the apocalypse as a point of uncovering and connection. Of course, etymologically the word apocalypse refers to a revelation; it marks an unveiling or disclosure, elucidating something that is hidden or less obvious. At the same time (and perhaps more commonly) we tend to think of apocalypses as catastrophic events that are shocking, crushing, and overthrow the status quo. We hope that this journal can be a venue for both of these nuances: presenting, discovering and illuminating novel approaches and ideas about the end of the world that in some sense mark a form of obliteration, a shattering of established worlds and ways of being and thinking. This includes a commitment to our transdisciplinary mission — an effort to encourage the possibility of open-access dialogue between different fields as well as with and between diverse epistemologies and cosmologies, toppling the boundaries that keep us apart. The apocalypse as an academic venture requires the exploration of a variety of theoretical and methodological consideration as it invites a broad range of experiential and experimental case studies. We maintain that where apocalypses and their envisioned aftermaths produce a series of practical, intellectual, and creative opportunities that engage with the possibility of plural worlds, embodied futurities, or non-linear temporalities, they can reflect on the cultural or lived experiences, haunting sensibilities, and productive fantasies that employ the un /making of worlds. If, as Jacques Derrida puts it in his musings on the apocalyptic tone in philosophy, “disclosure not only opens to vision or contemplation, not only affords seeing but also affords hearing/ understanding,” (1984, 5) then we need to explore each other’s way of relating to the world (or refusing it) in order to fully appreciate and endorse the emancipatory potentials of apocalyptic thinking and writing

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Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Definitions › Definitions

Disciplinary Power.

DEMİRBAŞ ‘19 ELİF DEMİRBAŞ, Bogazici University MS, Brandeis University PhD, University of Massachusetts, Lowell, 2019, https://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12622927/index.pdf ED

A counterpart of disciplinary power, bio-power emerged somewhat later, though these two types of power were undeniably linked in their formation. Foucault explains how sovereign power could no longer organize the modernizing Europe, with its demographic explosion and continuous industrialization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Foucault, 2003, p. 249). “So much so that far too many things were escaping the old mechanism of the power of sovereignty, both at the top and at the bottom, both at the level of detail and at the mass level” (ibid, p. 249). First, disciplinary power emerged to take care of the details. By using surveillance and training, disciplinary power was applied on the individual body, so as to shape and mend the body to fit the appropriate norms of the disciplinary society. Hence, we see the formation of schools, hospitals, barracks, workshops, asylums and punitive institutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These strategies formed what Foucault terms as the micro-physics of power, which is “a study of the forms and means of power focused on individuals and the details of their behavior and conduct” (Gordon, 2001, p. xxiv). For the mass level, however, a second type of power emerged, which is termed by Gordon as the “macro” physics of power (cited in Collier, 2009, p. 81), centered not on the individual body, “man-as-body,” but on the multiplicity of men, “man-as-species” (Foucault, 2003, p. 242). Perhaps the best way to explain what bio-power is to compare its working mechanisms with those of disciplinary power. The most striking difference 66 between two types of power is, as mentioned above, that while disciplinary power is applied on individual bodies, bio-power is applied on masses or populations. The former disciplines, trains and uses surveillance and other direct measurers in achieving its aims. The latter, however, regulates and coordinates. It does not use constant surveillance of individual bodies but uses more overall measures. Or, to put it more precisely, bio-power transforms disciplinary power’s mechanism of surveillance of individual bodies into statistical estimates of an entire population. While disciplinary power tries to optimize each individual’s capacities, bio-power tries to achieve or maintain an average level of optimal capacities in a population. Bio-power does not care about each individual conforming to the norm as disciplinary power does. Its aim is to achieve an overall level of compliance to the norm; because bio-power is not “centered on the body as machine” as disciplinary power is, it is “focused on the species body” (Foucault, 1978, p. 139).

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Definitions › Definitions

Necropolitics.

Verghese, 2021 [Namrata, writer and Phd candidate at Stanford, Mar 10 2021, Teen Vogue, “What is Necropolitics? The Political Calculation of Life and Death” https://www.teenvogue.com/story/what-is-necropolitics]

Necro comes from the , meaning “corpse.” Necropolitics then translates to the “politics of death.” Philosopher Achille Mbembe  necropolitics as “the capacity to define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is not.” In other words, necropolitics is a framework that illuminates how governments assign differential value to human life. The closer you are to dominant power, the more your life is worth. In the United States, if you’re a straight, white, able-bodied, cisgender, wealthy, Christian man, this is great news for you. But the further away you are from those axes of privilege, the less your life is worth under the logics of necropolitics — and the more precarious your existence becomes.

Even if you’ve never encountered the term necropolitics before, you probably already understand it as a gut instinct. Have you heard of “collateral damage”? It’s a phrase . It suggests that some people may have to die to achieve an abstract societal good. It is not a coincidence that the victims of these bombings are, by and large, not white, not wealthy, not Christian, and not American. “Collateral damage” justifies the . Our governments rationalize their deaths as the only means by which the rest of us can lead better lives. This, to me, is the heart of necropolitics: One person’s life comes at the expense of a more vulnerable person’s death. Or, : “The calculus of life passes through the death of the Other.”

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Definitions › Definitions

Biopolitics.

Camarena 14

Carlos Gomez Camarena (Literature Department, Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de Mexico), 2014, “Biopolitics,” Encyclopedia of Critical Psychology, https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-1-4614-5583-7 //MLT

Biopolitics is the attempt to explain the history of civilization through the laws of cellular life and the most elementary biology (Starobinski, 1960). It is for this reason that social Darwinism and sociobiology are only two aspects of a wider phenomenon, the mechanisms of which Foucault worked to expose. According to Foucault’s thought, biopolitics is a way of thinking about governmental practice through the categories of living beings constituted in a population (health, hygiene, birthrate, longevity, races). Biopolitics is a way of exercising power by multiplying the disciplines (demographics, statistics, and the analysis of wealth) and institutions (schools, headquarters, hospitals) that reorganize learning, education, and order in society. Roberto Esposito, (2008, p. 15) suggests that the structure of biopolitics is so intricate that the terms “life” and “politics” can be conjugated in two ways: a politics that governs life (biopower, politics over life) and a life that governs politics (biopolitics, the politics of life). Thus, while biopower exhibits a negative facet, biopolitics is the positive face of the relationship between power and life. Other authors such as (Bazzicalupo, 2010) prefer the terms biopower and affirmative biopolitics.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Definitions › Definitions

Homo sacer definition.

Tagma, Halit Mustafa, 2009, prof. in the Political Science department at Arizona State University ("Homo sacer vs. homo soccer mom: Reading Agamben and Foucault in the war on terror.") Alternatives 34.4 (2009): 407-435. https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/030437540903400403 Rs

At such a juncture, it is timely to reflect on a body of scholarship that contributed to a growing literature on Guántanamo Bay, the “war on terror,” and our more general understanding between sovereignty and political violence. This literature has offered various interpretations of the different forms of political violence that have come be known as indefinite detention, torture, and extraordinary rendition. In the growing body of popular and scholarly studies on the “war on terror,” the most interesting and popularized analogy used to identify the status of Guántanamo prisoners is the figure of homo sacer. Advanced by Giorgio Agamben, the concept of homo sacer refers to “a body that can be killed but not sacrificed.” In most studies of the “war on terror” this analogy is taken as obvious. For example, quoting a US senator, Slavoj Zizek underlines how the prisoners are regarded as expendable biological creatures: “The inmates at Guántanamo were those that were missed by the bombs.”3 Nevertheless, important questions can be raised with respect to this hasty connection between the concept of homo sacer and the prisioners in Guántanamo, and in this article I want to engage in a careful theoretical analysis of aspects of Guántanamo that problematize the association. Moreover, I want to suggest that while Agamben is trying to both correct and build upon Foucault’s understanding of biopower, his neglect of the details and nuances of Foucault’s work has lead him to betray important components of Foucault’s understanding of biopower.

2023 MNDI Kritik
Biopower Kritik --- MNDI AHP › Definitions › Definitions

Michel Foucault!

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy – popular encyclopedia of philosophy [“Michel Foucault (1926-1987)” IV] https://iep.utm.edu/foucault/

Michel Foucault was a major figure in two successive waves of 20th century French thought–the structuralist wave of the 1960s and then the poststructuralist wave. By the premature end of his life, Foucault had some claim to be the most prominent living intellectual in France. Foucault’s work is transdisciplinary in nature, ranging across the concerns of the disciplines of history, sociology, psychology, and philosophy. At the first decade of the 21st century, Foucault is the author most frequently cited in the humanities in general. In the field of philosophy this is not so, despite philosophy being the primary discipline in which he was educated, and with which he ultimately identified. This relative neglect is because Foucault’s conception of philosophy, in which the study of truth is inseparable from the study of history, is thoroughly at odds with the prevailing conception of what philosophy is. Foucault’s work can generally be characterized as philosophically oriented historical research; towards the end of his life, Foucault insisted that all his work was part of a single project of historically investigating the production of truth. What Foucault did across his major works was to attempt to produce an historical account of the formation of ideas, including philosophical ideas. Such an attempt was neither a simple progressive view of the history, seeing it as inexorably leading to our present understanding, nor a thoroughgoing historicism that insists on understanding ideas only by the immanent standards of the time. Rather, Foucault continually sought for a way of understanding the ideas that shape our present not only in terms of the historical function these ideas played, but also by tracing the changes in their function through history.

2023 MNDI Kritik
MISC › Cap K Turns Case - UBI

A basic income with automation will not reduce inequality because it will occur within the capitalist system

Scheidel 2018 - professor of humanities and history at Stanford University, [Walter Scheidel, September 10, 2018 “Can inequality only be fixed by war, revolution, or plague?”, The Economist, , ZR]

Walter Scheidel: No, but we need to appreciate that measures that worked well in the past may have done so because they were taken in the unique context of massive violent shocks and threats: the world wars and communism. This requires us to be more creative in dealing with inequality. Above all we must think harder about feasibility. It is not enough for economists to come up with recipes to reduce inequality, we also need to figure out how to implement them in an environment that is politically polarised and economically globalised. Both factors limit our scope for intervention. The Economist: How do artificial intelligence and automation fit in to your thinking? Will they be a calamity for employment and thus for equality? Or might they unleash extraordinary productivity and improvements in living standards that actually narrow inequality? Ideally we would like education to keep up with technological change to make sure workers have the skills they need to face this challenge. But in practice there will always be losers, and even basic-income schemes can take us only so far. At the end of the day, someone owns the robots. As long as the capitalist world system is in place, it is hard to see how even huge productivity gains from greater automation would benefit society evenly instead of funneling even more income and wealth to those who are in the best position to pocket these gains.

2023 MNDI Kritik
MISC › Poverty Impacts

Poverty impacts a person’s health, education and chances of survival

Lister, 2005 – Professor of Social Policy Loughborough University [Ruth Jan 2005, “Poverty and Social Justice: recognition and respect” , EH]

The impact of poverty – both immediate and longer term – depends in part on whether it is a short term, long term or recurrent experience. One of the main developments in poverty research in recent years has been the ability to supplement traditional snapshot measures with longitudinal data that track what happens to people over a number of years. While some people may experience only one or two brief spells of poverty, others are trapped for years, if not a lifetime, or move frequently in and out of poverty over many years, without ever enjoying genuine security. Thus government figures show that over the period 1991-2001, as many as half of all individuals spent at least one year in a household measured as poor and one in six spent at least five years. In contrast, only one per cent spent all 11 years at this income level. Research by the Centre for Research in Social Policy at Loughborough University estimated that just under one in ten children had experienced persistent and severe poverty over a five year period in the 1990s (Adelman et al., 2003). Where poverty is long-term or recurrent it is likely to impact negatively on health, education and general life chances. Poverty affects the very likelihood of a baby surviving: a baby born into social class V is more than twice as likely to die within 12 months as a baby born into social class 1. As the Foundation’s report on the South Wales Valleys found, ‘the people with the greatest need too often have the poorest [health] services’ (Winckler, 2003, p.38). The government frequently cites the statistic that by the age of 22 months there is a 14 percentage point gap between the educational development of children in social classes I and II and of children in classes IV and V. One study of literacy and numeracy found that social and economic disadvantage was the most important factor in hindering basic skills development. It concluded that arguably the most powerful educational policy would be to tackle child poverty directly (Robinson, 1997). Poverty’s more immediate material impact manifests itself through deprivation. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation Poverty and Social Exclusion Survey found that of the UK’s population of 58 million:  some 9.5 million cannot afford to keep their homes adequately heated, free from damp and decently decorated;  nearly 7.5 million do not have the money to participate in common social activities  a third of children go without at least one necessity such as adequate clothing and three meals a day, and nearly a fifth go without two or more;  roughly 6.5 million adults cannot afford essential clothing;  some 4 million do not have enough money for an adequate diet (Gordon et al., 2000). Qualitative studies give more of a feel of what such deprivation means for those experiencing it. An overview of 30 such studies reveals that ‘life on a low income…is a stressful and debilitating experience’ especially for those living on benefit who ‘face a struggle against encroaching debt and social isolation where even the most resilient and resourceful are hard pressed to survive’ (Barclay, 1996).

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › AT Speaking for the Poor

Attempts to include poor peoples’ voices do not increase their participation – they have been false promises and short term projects.

Lister, 2005 – Professor of Social Policy Loughborough University [Ruth Jan 2005, “Poverty and Social Justice: recognition and respect” , EH]

There is now acceptance in government of the principle that disadvantaged groups should have a say in decision-making that affects their lives. Here in Wales, the principle informs the Communities First programme – how successfully I do not know and I hope some of you might be able to comment on this. In England, it has likewise been central to the philosophy of the New Deal for Communities and the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. However, as John Gaventa of the Institute for Development Studies has warned, the growing acceptance of the principle of participation does not necessarily translate into ‘voice with influence’ (2002). Oxfam GB (2004) writes that, despite the progress that has been made, ‘people in poverty (and/or in disadvantaged communities) are still systematically excluded from key decisions affecting their lives’. Part of the problem, it identifies, is that centrally imposed targets can undermine genuine local involvement so that local people have no real power. Moreover, all too often involvement in community regeneration programmes is rushed and limited to superficial consultation, without any feedback to the people who have given their time to the exercise. This often reflects a tension between the understandable desire for quick gains and the need for time to do the necessary community development work to make a reality of community involvement. This is sometimes called building community capacity. But there is also a need to build capacity among officials and professionals to engage in this way of working. A rare acknowledgement of this can be found in the recent Home Office report, Building Civil Renewal. As Oxfam GB (2004) writes: it is vital to shift the ideas and beliefs of service delivers and decisionmakers towards people in poverty, so that the latter are treated with the same respect that any other citizen feels entitled to – failure to do so is a recipe for continuing alienation from government and its efforts. Unless decision-makers have the political will and mechanisms to really listen to what women and men in disadvantaged communities are saying about the barriers that face them, long-term solutions will continue to be elusive. One of the clear messages received by the Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power (2000) was that ‘people experiencing poverty see consultation without commitment, and phoney participation without the power to bring about change, as the ultimate disrespect’. A similar message is reported in the Foundation’s report on the South Wales Valleys: ‘So many people have told us that they were weary of repeatedly being asked for their views but nothing happening. People…want to see action on the ground, and evidence that they are respected and valued’ (Winckler, 2003, p42).

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › AT Rhetoric of Poverty

The majority of those living in poverty do not work – labor statistics prove.

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020 [September Report 1099 “A profile of the working poor” https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/working-poor/2020/home.htm#:~:text=Highlights%20from%20the%202020%20data,series%20low%20(4.0%20percent) EH]

In 2020, 37.2 million people, or 11.4 percent of the nation’s population, lived below the official poverty level, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.1 (See the technical notes section for examples of poverty levels.) Although the poor were primarily adults who had not participated in the labor force during the year and children, 6.3 million individuals were among the “working poor” in 2020, according to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); this measure was essentially unchanged from 2019. The working poor are people who spent at least 27 weeks in the labor force (that is, working or looking for work) but whose incomes still fell below the official poverty level. In 2020, the working-poor rate—the ratio of the working poor to all individuals in the labor force for at least 27 weeks—was 4.1 percent, little different from the previous year’s figure (4.0 percent). (See table A, chart 1, and table 1.) In 2020, the working-poor rate of people in the labor force for 27 weeks or more was 4.1 percent and was little changed from a year earlier, when it reached a series low (4.0 percent). (See chart 1.)Full-time workers remained much less likely to be among the working poor than part-time workers. Among people in the labor force for 27 weeks or more, 2.6 percent of those usually employed full time were classified as working poor, compared with 10.2 percent of part-time workers. (See table 1.)