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2023 MNDI Kritik
1NC – Rhetoric of Poverty Kritik

Our alternative is to view poverty through the lens of strategic vulnerability. Focusing on the individuals in poverty prevent us from finding solutions. Instead, we look at how we can change the game to avoid structurally requiring poverty.

Hirschl et al, 2003 - Professor of Global Development at Cornell University [Thomas with Mark R. Rank and Hong-Sik Yoon December, The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare “American poverty as a structural failing: evidence and arguments” ZR]

Given the above arguments and evidence indicating that American poverty is primarily the result of structural failings, how might we reconcile this perspective with the earlier discussed research findings indicating that human capital and individual attributes largely explain who is at risk of experiencing poverty? An approach that bridges the empirical importance of individual attributes with the significance of structural forces has been the concept of structural vulnerability (Rank, 1994; 2000; 2001; 2004). This framework recognizes that human capital and other labor market attributes are associated with who loses out at the economic game (and hence will be more likely to experience poverty), but that structural factors predominately ensure that there will be losers in the first place. An analogy can be used to illustrate the basic concept. Imagine a game of musical chairs in which there are ten players but only eight chairs. On one hand, individual success or failure in the game depends on the skill and luck of each player. Those who are less agile or less well placed when the music stops are more likely to lose. These are appropriately cited as the reasons a particular individual has lost the game. On the other hand, given that there are only eight chairs available, two players are bound to lose regardless of their characteristics. Even if all the players were suddenly to double their speed and agility, there would still be two losers. From this broader context, the characteristics of the individual players are no longer important in terms of understanding that the structure of the game ensures that someone must inevitably lose. We would argue that this analogy applies with respect to poverty. For every ten American households, there are good jobs and opportunities at any point in time to adequately support roughly eight of those ten. The remaining two households will be locked out of such opportunities, often resulting in poverty or near poverty. Individuals experiencing such economic deprivation are likely to have characteristics putting them at a disadvantage in terms of competing in the economy (lower education, fewer skills, single-parent families, illness or incapacitation, minorities residing in inner cities, etc.). These characteristics help to explain why particular individuals and households are at a greater risk of poverty. However, given the earlier discussed structural failures, a certain percentage of the American population will experience economic vulnerability regardless of what their characteristics are. As in the musical chairs analogy, increasing everyone's human capital will do little to alter the fact that there are only so many decent paying jobs available. In such a case, employers will simply raise the bar in terms of the employee qualifications they are seeking, but nevertheless there will remain a percentage of the population at risk of economic deprivation. Consequently, although a lack of human capital and its accompanying vulnerability leads to an understanding of who the losers of the economic game are likely to be, the structural components of our economic, social, and political systems explain why there are losers in the first place. The critical mistake that has been made in the past has been that social scientists have frequently equated the question of who loses out at the game, with the question of why the game produces losers in the first place. They are, in fact, distinct and separate questions. While deficiencies in human capital and other marketable characteristics help to explain who in the population is at a heightened risk of encountering poverty, the fact that poverty exists in the first place results not from these characteristics, but from the lack of decent opportunities and supports in society. By focusing solely upon individual characteristics, such as education, we can shuffle people up or down in terms of their being more likely to land a job with good earnings, but we are still going to have somebody lose out if there are not enough decent paying jobs to go around. In short, we are playing a large scale version of a musical chairs game with ten players but only eight chairs. The recognition of this dynamic represents a fundamental shift in thinking from the old paradigm. It helps to explain why the social policies of the past two decades have largely been ineffective in reducing the rates of poverty. We have focused our attention and resources on either altering the incentives and disincentives for those playing the game, or in a very limited way, upgrading their skills and ability to compete in the game, while at the same time leaving the structure of the game untouched. When the overall poverty rates in the United States do in fact go up or down, they do so primarily as a result of impacts on the structural level that increase or decrease the number of available chairs. In particular, the performance of the economy has been historically important. Why? Because when the economy is expanding, more opportunities (or chairs) are available for the competing pool of labor and their families. The reverse occurs when the economy slows down and contracts. Consequently, during the 1930's or early 1980's when the economy was doing badly, poverty rates went up, while during periods of economic prosperity such as the 1960's or the middle to later 1990's, the overall rates of poverty declined. Similarly, changes in various social supports and the social safety net available to families will make a difference in terms of how well such households are able to avoid poverty or near poverty. When such supports were increased through the War on Poverty initiatives in the 1960's, poverty rates declined. Likewise, when Social Security benefits were expanded during the 1960's and 1970's, the elderly's poverty rates declined precipitously. Conversely, when social supports have been weakened and eroded, as in the case of children's programs over the past 25 years, their rates of poverty have gone up. The recognition of poverty as a result of the way the game is structured also makes it quite clear why the United States has such high rates of poverty when compared to other Western countries. These rates have nothing to do with Americans being less motivated or less skilled than those in other countries, but with the fact that our economy has been producing a plethora of low wage jobs in the face of global competition and that our social policies have done relatively little to support families compared to our European neighbors. From this perspective, one of the keys to addressing poverty is to increase the labor market opportunities and social supports available to American households. The structural vulnerability perspective thus recognizes the importance of human capital in being able to predict who is more likely to experience economic deprivation, while at the same time emphasizing the importance of structural constraints in guaranteeing that some Americans will be left out of the economic mainstream. In short, the structure of the American economy, accompanied by a weak social safety net and public policies directed to the economically vulnerable, ensure that a certain percentage of the American population will experience impoverishment at any point in time, and that a much larger percentage of the population will experience poverty over the course of a lifetime. The fact that three quarters of Americans will experience poverty or near poverty (at the 1.50 level) during their adulthoods is emblematic of these structural level failings. As noted at the beginning of this article, social scientists investigating poverty have largely focused upon individual deficiencies and demographic attributes in order to explain the occurrence of poverty in America. As such, they have reinforced the mainstream American ethos of interpreting social problems as primarily the result of individual failings. In addition, a culture of poverty perspective has occasionally been used to explain the occurrence of poverty within specific geographical settings such as inner cities or remote rural areas. This approach also tends to largely place the dynamic of poverty within the framework of individual deficiencies. We have argued and attempted to demonstrate in this article that such perspectives are misguided. Whereas individual attributes (such as human capital) help to explain who faces a greater risk of experiencing poverty at any point in time, the fact that substantial poverty exists on a national level can only be understood through an analysis of the structural dynamics of American society.

Their rhetoric and assumptions shape their policy - their definition of poverty determines the framework for implementing solutions

2023 MNDI Kritik
1NC – Rhetoric of Poverty Kritik

Disrespecting the poor takes out solvency – the rhetoric of poverty undermines people’s trust and cooperation with government programs.

Lister, 2005 – Professor of Social Policy Loughborough University [Ruth Jan 2005, “Poverty and Social Justice: recognition and respect” , EH]

So there are lessons here for how public services are delivered and for how both politicians and the media talk about those in poverty. A recent report based on a national survey of parenting in poor environments recommended that ‘services and professional support staff need to find ways to demonstrate respect for parents’ own “expertise” in their own lives…Training in listening and engaging seriously with parents’ own concerns, and negotiating in partnership with them about the best course of action may be needed for health and social care workers who support parents’ (Ghate and Hazel, 2004, p. 23). The survey found that at present ‘parents often felt disempowered by the way they were treated by busy professionals’ and feared that seeking help risked a loss of autonomy. In similar vein, the Gellideg study recommended that ‘agencies and local authorities should be aware of the power relations at play when they are interacting with vulnerable people and adopt a code of conduct with guidance on acceptable standards of behaviour towards the men and women using their services. Care should be taken at all times to ensure that no-one is being marginalised by inappropriate attitudes’ (Buhaenko et al., 2003, pp21-2). I think that is a message that politicians could also do well to take on board.

2023 MNDI Kritik
1NC – Rhetoric of Poverty Kritik

When confronted with the rhetoric of poverty, we have an ethical obligation to Identify it and stand against its assumptions. Our silence endorses them. Our speech act against them is the only ethical response.

Ross, 1991 Prof. of Law at the University of Pittsburgh [Thomas, June Georgetown Law Review “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness”, , MZ]

B. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE READER When we read an opinion dealing with the constitutional status of poverty we are engaged in an activity with moral connotations. After reading the opinion, no morally neutral position is available to us. If we speak about the case, we take on the role and responsibility of the critic. The discourse of the critic is the discourse of normative analysis. In one way or another, we speak of what ought to be. Our membership within the community of law makes even silence a morally charged position. When a member of our community reads, for example, the Wyman case, and is silent, she has chosen not to speak, not to act as a critic, not to engage in explicit normative discourse. She makes this choice after reading an opinion that requires a mother receiving AFDC benefits either to allow the government access to her home, without a warrant and without notice, or to go without the benefits that are essential to feed and care for herself and her child. 208 What reaction to this case is without moral connotation? The very act of reading the Court's poverty cases imposes a responsibility on the reader. We know this responsibility in its other manifestations. If we were members of a church community and read a text from the governing body setting forth the church's position on the ordination of women, we would not imagine that we could read and be silent without moral connotation. If our City Council passed a resolution regarding the rights of gay men and women in the community, we would not suppose that we could read the document and have no responsibility whatsoever for its message. It is the responsibility of a reader within a community to choose a position on the texts that express the community's position on important matters. What, then, is the ethic of reader responsibility? It is to read with the largest measure of care, imagination, and knowledge we can muster. We should recognize the nature and consequences of the choices set forth in the text. We should seek to listen to the arguments of the text, yet break past the confines of those arguments, using our imagination and our knowledge of the world in which these decisions will be played out. We must become the most skillful readers we can be, because the process of reading is always followed by the necessity of our own choice in the matter. A description of poetic metaphor provides a way of thinking about how our responsibility as readers of the Court's poverty cases might be discharged. Max Black, a poetry scholar, created a description of the process whereby a poetic metaphor provides meaning.2°9 Imagine looking at the starry night sky through a piece of painted glass on which several lines have been etched. You would see a night sky through the glass with some stars revealed and others obscured. Experiencing a poetic metaphor is like looking through the etched glass. The metaphor reveals and obscures various parts of its subject, creating a new vision of the subject. 210 The Court's rhetoric is our etched glass and the night sky is the context and legal issues of poverty presented in each case. The reader's responsibility is to look past the night sky as composed by the etched glass of the Court's rhetoric and to see the context and legal issues of poverty as completely as possible. The essential flaw of this allegory as a description of either reading poems or reading the Court's rhetoric of poverty is its suggestion that the subject is a fixed thing, external to the observer. When we encounter a poetic metaphor, our own sense of its subject, whether it is an abstraction like love or a tangible thing like a tree, becomes part of the reading and part of the meaning.211 We face a similar problem in reading the poverty cases. We bring to the reading some idea of poverty. The rhetoric not only seeks to reveal and obscure, it also invites. The reader is invited to supply cultural stereotypes of poverty. It is as though the reader is looking through an etched glass at a night sky that she in part creates by the process of looking. Thus, the reader must not merely see the pieces obscured by the Court's rhetoric, she must realize also that what she sees is in part shaped by the assumptions she brings to the reading. If, for example, she brings the assumption of the moral weakness of the poor to the reading, she must struggle to see that assumption in her reading. She must struggle to bring that assumption out of the murky place of the unstated and assumed into the light of the explicit assertion, where she can judge its truth for herself.

2023 MNDI Kritik
1NC – Rhetoric of Poverty Kritik

The impact is mass genocide – the scapegoated party becomes symbolic of all evil and must be destroyed

Colman, 1995 - professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco [Arthur “Up from Scapegoating.” p. 7-11]

Unity is the important concept in all scapegoating activity; the scapegoat represents the group's push toward its own wholeness by excluding its disparate elements. Thus scapegoating can be detected anywhere there is a transfer of negative attribution from one part of the system to another, or from one part of the system to an object outside the system, in order to fulfill what is perceived to be a unifying survival function for the system as a whole. The creation of a scapegoat requires a process akin to the psychological mechanisms of projection and projective identification in that it uses an other to contain aspects of oneself. The scapegoat is created by "projecting" the darker side of group life, the darker side being the reality of evil and sin in society. For the individual, the shadow contains those elements of the psyche that are not accepted as his or her own. As individuals we attempt to project that shadow onto others. Likewise, the group finds common negative ground in the scapegoat. But the scapegoat is not identical to the shadow; the scapegoat is a collective creation, a symbolic compromise for many individuals' negative projections. One can say that the scapegoat is humanity's societal vessel for the shadow - a vessel which is, by definition, innocent of the burden it assumes. The scapegoat is a very ancient archetype and scapegoating an ancient activity, so ancient that there are few societies where evidence of the practice has not been found. We have records of animals used as scapegoats that go back to ancient Hittite and Sanskrit texts. The works of modern authors who have used the scapegoat as a major theme (Dostoyevsky, Jackson, Lessing, for example) all hearken back to ancient days and a collective symbol that incorporates the worst of our projections in a strange, inanimate object. It is an image that taps our most primitive parts even today. An early biblical story, the basis of Yom Kippur and one that underlies the crucifixion of Jesus captures the fundamental Western image of the scapegoat. The story begins with the Israelites fleeing Egypt. Aaron and God soon find that the law and monotheism are not sufficient to colltain the Israelites who, after years ofenf<)rced slavery, have no experience taking responsibility for their own behavior. The priests arc overwhelmed with the sin offerings of a guilty people and begin a return to primitive practices rather than staying within the new laws. After several priests have been killed for violating the law, God takes a new look at what is really possible with his chosen people. First the priests create a Day of Atonement, the current Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, during which individual and collective sins of omission and commission are acknowledged and forgiven. But even this symbolic process is not sufficient, and the scapegoat is added. Hilt the goat, Oil which the lot fell to be the scapegoat, shall he presented alive be/()re the Lord, to make an atonement with him, and to let him go for a scapegoat into the wilderness. (Lev. 16:10) The power of this biblical scapegoating process is seen in the phenomena of contagion. Referring to the man who takes the scapegoat into the wilderness, the narrative reads: And he that let go the goat, for the scapegoat shall wash his clothes, and bathe his flesh in water, and afterward come into the camp. (Lev. 16:26) The process of contagion underlines a frequent functional difference between group projection and the creation of the scapegoat and individual projection and the creation of the external bad object. In scapegoating, the projection is so generalized that there is little possibility of retrieval. A boundary is erected between group members and scapegoat – the wilderness or death itself – which insures what Hitler called "the final solution." Contagion requires this boundary. It is usually not enough for the scapegoat to be exiled. It must be destroyed. Even so, the symbolic vessel of the chosen animal cannot, because of its compromise quality, entirely contain the projected evil. The person who touches the scapegoat runs the risk of becoming the next scapegoat. Most horribly, the inadequacy of this process of containment gradually requires more and more potent symbols: objects or animals become increasingly inadequate and the flesh-and-blood scapegoating of humans and human subgroups becomes an acceptable practice. This has required sophisticated rationalizations based on what Eric Erickson (1972) has called pseudospeciation to describe how a ruling or dominant group can justify locating the scapegoat function in its slaves or any other group cast as different and lower than itself. We have many examples from modern times – Armenians, Amerindians, South African Blacks, European Jews, Palestinians – all used as scapegoats in order to serve the hoped-for but specious unity of nationhood, much as individuals use shadow projections to serve the hoped-for but conscious individuation of the person. And here we see a critical connection between the growth processes in individuals and in groups, for scapegoats not only deter group development but also hamper integration of shadow projections, a necessary step in the individuation process. As long as there are scapegoats – unintegrated shadow figures for the group – integration of the shadow within the individual is an illusion. One might even say that, for the individual, the process of individuation will always be held hostage to the presence of the scapegoat in the larger community. Perhaps this feels like too heavy a burden for the individual to accept-to take on the responsibility for the scapegoats of the world as part and parcel of one's own attempts to integrate the personal shadow. Religious traditions have encountered this dilemma in the personage of Torquemada and the Spanish Inquisition, for example, and in the modern-day "neutrality" of the Pope and other religious leaders during the Holocaust. As we have seen, Jung's definition of individuation does not emphasize this connection between individual shadow and group scapegoat. His model, including the way it has been interpreted, tends to deemphasize the need to burden ourselves with the suffering of others as part of our own growth processes. To imagine the individuation process this way, however, is to accept that man is an island, that the suffering in the world is someone else's responsibility and does not grow from us or affect us. I for one reject this possibility. Individuation is an awesome burden precisely because it requires a connected, integrated outlook. Individuation demands that our bonds with other humans be included in the equation of our own development. We are all part of the scapegoating process. We are all a part of others' suffering. By our silence, we give it passive support and supply our shadows with more energy, defeating each of our attempts at integrating the archetype. We must not only accept our responsibility for the scapegoat, we must do something about it. Individuation under any other terms can be just narcissistic play.

2023 MNDI Kritik
1NC – Rhetoric of Poverty Kritik

The discourse of poverty stigmatizes and dehumanizes the poor – labels rely on and reinforce stereotypes of the poor.

Lister 2004 - Professor of Social Policy, Loughborough University [Ruth Poverty and Social Justice: recognition and respect EV] 

Nevertheless, research also shows how resilient many living in poverty are in their struggle to get by – particularly women who are typically the main managers of poverty and who act as shock-absorbers of poverty as they try to protect their children from its worst effects, often to the detriment of their own physical and mental health. Generally the picture painted is one of constant restrictions; doing without; running out of money at the end of the week; limited choice; no room for spontaneity; damaged family relationships; isolation from the wider society. ‘Existing not living’ is a recurrent phrase used by people in poverty to describe its material impact. Bringing up children in poverty is particularly tough. The inability to meet children’s needs and demands makes parents feel guilty and a failure and can lead to family tensions. Research shows that both parents and children place great emphasis on ‘participation’: the right of every child to share in the activities, experiences and lifestyle of the community in which s/he is brought up. Both also fear its negative corollary: exclusion. In a materialistic world the ability for an individual child to participate largely depends on access to goods, services and activities, most of which have a financial cost. 10 A more recent study talked to children themselves. It found that children in poverty often don’t ‘fit in’, particularly with regards to the ‘right’ clothing. The ‘wrong’ clothing can mean bullying and general exclusion. They often can’t ‘join in’ shared social activities with their peers because of the cost. The children spoke of ‘their fears of social difference and stigma’ (Ridge, 2002) In the words of a child in a separate study carried out by Save the Children Wales with children in deprived communities: ‘People think you’re different and treat you different if you’re poor (Crowley and Vulliamy, u.d. p15). Othering ‘the poor’ This brings us to the psychological impact of the way people in poverty are often treated. In a study I was involved in, ‘poverty was associated with loss of self esteem, feelings of powerlessness, anger, depression, anxiety and boredom’ (Beresford et al., 1999). In another report, one woman put it graphically: ‘You’re like an onion and gradually every skin is peeled off of you and there’s nothing left. All your self esteem and how you feel about yourself is gone – you’re left feeling like nothing and then your family feels like that’ (UKCAP, 1997). Stigma, lack of respect and denial of dignity are constant refrains when people in poverty talk about how they are treated by the wider society; the most recent example can be found in the Report of the Child Poverty Task Group (2004) published this week by the Welsh Assembly Government. Two contributions at a national poverty hearing held by Church Action on Poverty (CAP) are typical: ‘The worst blow of all is the contempt of your fellow citizens. I and many families live in that contempt’ and ‘I just feel very angry sometimes that people are ignorant to the fact that we are humans as well and we do need to be respected’ (Russell, 1996). The Commission on Poverty, Participation and Power, of which I was a member and half of whose members had direct experience of poverty, reported ‘the lack of respect for people living in poverty was one of the clearest and most heartfelt messages which came across to us as a Commission’ (CoPPP, 2000). Participants in the South Wales Oxfam GB study spoke of their dislike of the stigma they felt attached to their estate. Stigma, lack of respect and denial of dignity are constant refrains What people in poverty are reacting to is a process of what we might call ‘othering’ i.e. they are treated and talked about as people who are ‘other’ to the rest of us. It is a process of differentiation and demarcation, by which the line is drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and through which social distance is established and maintained. The line is imbued with negative value judgements that construct ‘the poor’ variously as a source of moral contamination, a threat, an ‘undeserving’ economic burden, an object of pity or even as an exotic species. 11 Language is an important part of the process. By and large, the language and labels used to describe ‘the poor’ have been articulated by the more powerful ‘non-poor’ – the media, politicians, academics. It is a language that is rooted in history with its division of the poor into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ groups. The more obviously demeaning examples today are 'underclass' and ‘welfare dependant’ – and the American terms ‘white’ or ‘trailer trash’. But the less value-laden word ‘poor’ is itself problematic. It is an adjective that we ‘apply’ to ‘them’ but people in poverty themselves are often reluctant to wear what they perceive to be a stigmatising label, with its connotations of inferior as in ‘poor quality’. Typically they are not asked how they want to be described.

2023 MNDI Kritik
1NC – Rhetoric of Poverty Kritik

The Discourse of Poverty excludes poor people because to talk about solving poverty, we place ourselves in the role of the Hero, never in the role of a poor person.

Olsen, 2010 - Professor of Socio-Economics, Social Statistics at University of Manchester [Wendy “Poverty as a Malaise of Development: A Discourse Analysis in its Global Context”, https://www.escholar.manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:29857&datastreamId=SUPPLEMENTARY-1.PDF ZR]

Discourse Analysis I will describe three discourses in some detail in this chapter. First it is important to set out what a discourse is. Discourses are combinations of communicative acts that fit together. In society, generally, we have neoliberal discourse, marxist discourse, radical feminist discourse and so on. Focusing concretely on poverty-talk, there are some images to take into account, apart from texts and documents (see Table 1). A detailed breakdown of the components of three discourses is hinted at in Table 2. I will define discourse and then explain (and critique) each of the three. This is great fun but it is best to conclude by constructing an alternative. I can only sketch out that alternative here – which I call a transformationalist analysis of development – but there are plenty of 3 authors working in this area. These authors are generally known as the post-development school. The title refers mainly to being post-neoliberal, post-economism, and post-capitalist in what the authors seek. (You can think these aspects over while) Initially, I will run through the existing, much more reformist, discourses. A discourse is a context-specific local set of rules or norms that kick in when people are interacting or communicating (Fairclough, 2001). The local rules need not always be followed. But discourses do shape how we communicate about poverty. Thus we might label the poor; target the poor; help the poor; eradicate poverty (or try to); or complain about the creation of poverty. According to the discourse being used, you might be able to combine 2-3 of these activities. But you can’t both ‘target’ the poor and ‘be’ poor at the same time! The targeter is implicitly separate from an isolable group called the poor. It is, at this deeper level of semantics, language in use, or ontology, that we say that the discourse is a set of rules. Poor people don’t talk about poverty, as they are (by definition, within poverty discourse) too busy scratching out a living somewhere. The speaker about poverty is constructed as a heroic, non-poor, figure, who is doing something about a problem.

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › 2AC --- UBI Link Turn

Foucault literally supports UBI—it’s key to combat biopolitics by ensuring individual autonomy, which is a critical distinction from other welfare programs.

Amanov 22

Shamsaddin Amanov, 2022, "The Right to Exist: The Position of Universal Basic Income in the Works of the Most Influential Contemporary Philosophers," University of Szeged, https://philpapers.org/archive/AMATRT.pdf //MLT

My initial guess prior to research about the standpoint of Foucault on UBI was negative in terms of supporting UBI. I thought that his "Power and Subject" concepts seemed relevant to UBI - State is the "power," and UBI recipients are "subjects." If UBI is implemented, there will be another state institution that dominates us. I have already encountered criticism like "UBI will not give us freedom; instead, it will take away freedom." I thought this is how a Foucauldian approach would evaluate UBI. The institution that will pay UBI to the citizens must certainly serve the hands of the power in some ways. In Western history, states have always played the role of security - protecting their citizens' rights. However, with the implementation of UBI, the relationship between power and citizens will radically change because now power will directly feed all citizens. Therefore, I have started to question that on the way to being liberal welfare states through UBI, is it possible that governments will turn into unexpected authoritarian regimes? A social policy aimed at even a relative equalization, even a relative leveling out, according to Foucault, can only be anti-economic. The goal of social policy cannot be equality. “Social transfers are of a very limited character. Broadly speaking it is not a matter of maintaining purchasing power but merely of ensuring a vital minimum for those who, either permanently or temporarily, would not be able to ensure their own existence.” (Foucault, 1979a) UBI is not a social transfer. Social transfers’ benefactors can be community donors, NGOs alongside the central government. UBI, as a right of the citizens, is given by only the government - a responsible body of the safety net. I believe that for this exact reason, Foucault evaluated UBI over other transfer programs. Milner (2016) and Touren (2016) argued that Michel Foucault supported UBI. Milner wrote that Foucault supported UBI in the sense that UBI would free people from state intrusion. Foucault (1979b) wrote that it does not and should not bother us to know why people descend below the layer of the social game; whether they are a drug addict or willfully unemployed is irrelevant. He continues by saying that we must care about the actual problem and the solution, and those who support “negative income tax” claim that we have to provide social assistance to meet the basic needs of people. Foucault wrote that this type of income would raise people again to the level of the threshold and motivate them to live and to work. In case they don’t desire to work and rise above the threshold, this is not a problem since it is their rightful lifestyle choice, and they should be kept assisted with the minimum guaranteed income. We can conclude that "unconditionality" is one of the primary features of UBI that Foucault was in favor of. I believe that Foucault must be satisfied with Milton Friedman’s defense on the negative income tax. Berend (2005) summarizes Foucault's solution for unemployment, poverty, and crimes. Foucault proposes a solution of social security together with individual autonomy. UBI fits these two concepts.

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › 2AC --- State Good

Theorizing the state as a site of power and violence is key to resistance.

Feldman, 2002 – POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 30 No. 3 [Leonard C. Feldman Distinguished Professor & Vice President of Physical Sciences Partnerships, “Redistribution, Recognition, and the State: The Irreducibly Political Dimension of Injustice”] AKB

This difficulty, I believe, reflects some broader tensions in thinking about state and civil society as sites of injustice. Where liberal theory constructs a division between state and civil society in which the state is the locus of (legitimate, sovereign, controllable) power-as-coercion and civil society is a realm of (individual or associational) freedom, a long history of critics have exposed the power (and injustice) in civil society. From Marx’s equation of civil society with capitalist domination and exploitation to Foucault’s recast- ing of civil society as “the paradigmatic terrain for the disciplinary deploy- ments of power in modern society,”2 critical theory has sought to redirect attention away from the “obvious” sites of power to the places and practices of power, oppression, and injustice that are veiled by the pieties of individual- ism, limited government, voluntary association, and choice.3 But this refo- cusing of critique and political action has its costs: as Wendy Brown puts it, “domestic state power” becomes a “lost object of critique.”4 And further- more, when the state is lost as an object of critique, it is also found as an uncritically embraced, undertheorized instrument for confronting the injus- tices of civil society. I would suggest that state power becomes a kind of “blind spot” in the redistribution/recognition framework that, while decisively rejecting Marx’s reduction of civil society to capitalism, has maintained Marx’s prioritization of civil society over the state. The real power—the real injustice—develops in civil society, through economic relations of exploitation and cultural relations of stigmatization. While the state may be acknowledged as a player in these relations, what is missing in the redistribution/recognition framework is appreciation of the state as “a crucial source of oppression and hardship in itself.”5 The state and its specifically political dynamics of inclusion and exclusion need to be explicitly thematized in a theory of justice. First of all, this requires thematizing their absence in current discussions of recognition and redistri- bution. Thus, I examine the “displacement of politics”6 both in theoretical accounts (part 1) of the tensions that arise between redistribution and recog- nition and in a practical political discourse (part 2)—the asserted conflict between recognition for the homeless and redistribution for the homeless. I argue that state power is a blind spot in the theory of economic and cultural justice, and I show how this blind spot appears in a contemporary political argument about the proper response to the injustices of homelessness. Sec- ond, in order to incorporate an appreciation of state power into a theory of economic and cultural justice, I develop Fraser’s “bivalent” framework for analyzing injustices by expanding it. I argue in part 1 that Fraser’s theory of maldistribution and misrecognition should be expanded to incorporate an account of specifically political forms of injustice.7 Pragmatic, empirically grounded, and theoretically incisive analyses of contemporary forms of injustice of the sort that Fraser provides are best developed within a “triva- lent” framework that brings into view the interrelated yet analytically distin- guishable dynamics of maldistribution, misrecognition, and political exclu- sion. In part 2, I apply this trivalent framework to the issue of homelessness, showing how attention to the irreducibly political dimension of injustice can clarify what is at stake in homeless criminalization policies, constitutional litigation of these policies, and the politics of homeless encampments. Fraser diagnoses the problem with contemporary progressive politics as the “decoupling of cultural politics from social politics, and the relative eclipse of the latter by the former.”9 Fraser maintains an analytical separation between economic politics (redistribution) and cultural politics (recogni- tion), but this is not the same distinction as the old left’s account of legitimate class-based politics and illegitimate “identity” politics (of race, gender, sexu- ality, etc.). Fraser says, “In my diagnosis, . . . the split in the Left is not between class struggles, on the one hand, and gender, ‘race’, and sex strug- gles, on the other. Rather, it cuts across those movements, each of which is internally divided between cultural currents and social currents.”10 Collec- tivities such as those formed on the basis of gender and race classification and oppression face both economic injustice and cultural injustice. These “biva- lent collectivities” find themselves in a bind: the attempt to combat cultural injustice by, for instance, revaluing femininity, comes into conflict with the attempt to eliminate economic injustice by, for instance, eliminating the gendered division of labor. For bivalent collectivities, cultural politics often interfere with progressive economic restructuring. Not all recognition politics oriented towards the realm of culture impede progressive economic transformation, though. Indeed, Fraser complicates her model by delineating two forms of recognition politics and two forms of redistributive politics: in each domain, there is a surface politics of affirma- tion and a deeper politics of transformation. The liberal welfare state is the affirmative politics of distribution; its cultural counterpart is “mainstream multiculturalism” and its celebration of previously stigmatized identities. Socialism or some form of social democracy is the transformative politics of economic distribution; its cultural counterpart is deconstruction, which transforms cultural binary oppositions by destabilizing them. An example of such deconstruction is queer politics, which, rather than embracing and revaluing a substantive gay identity on the model of multiculturalism, under- mines the very stability of the hetero/homo binary opposition by bringing to light the “queer” elements that reside within dominant practices. Just as socialism undermines economic injustices by transforming control over pro- duction and the division of labor, deconstruction undermines cultural injus- tices by transforming unstable hierarchies of identity/difference. With this complication of the redistribution/recognition model, Fraser focuses her critique on affirmative remedies for both economic and cultural injustice. First of all, an affirmative politics of identity that celebrates and revalues a previously stigmatized identity, what Fraser terms “mainstream multiculturalism,” undercuts transformative efforts at economic redistribu- tion, which tend to eliminate the structured position of a group within the division of labor. Such forms of cultural politics as cultural feminism’s revaluing of the feminine, a celebration of black pride, and the construction of a gay identity on the ethnic group model of American pluralism do not combine well with a “social politics of equality.”11

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › 2AC --- Psychoanalysis Wrong

Psychoanalysis reduces individuals to behaviors determined by either subconscious or environment. This Essentialization renders individuals vulnerable to manipulation and denial of agency.

Bassiri and Senie 2020 - Department of Philosophy and Religion at American University [Cameron and Matthew “Sarta and the International Impact of Existentialism”, pgs. 349-351, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-38482-1]

The main element of existential philosophy that allows it to offer an alternative to Freudian psychoanalysis and behaviorism is its unique conception of the subject as a situated freedom responsible for itself, its values, and its relations to others, in a word, its non-essentialism. And in truth it is just this Sartrean concept of a subject without an essence that made possible a corresponding form of therapy which both complemented and challenged orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis and behaviorism so effectively. Both of the latter schools, though each in its own way, are defined by what we will term an “essentialization” of the individual. In fact, this view is shared by Rollo May. He writes: “In endeavoring to separate reality into its discrete parts and to formulate abstract laws for these parts, Western science has by and large been essentialist in character” (May 1969b, p. 12). In the case of Freud, the essentialization, or the fixing of the nature, “form,” or essence of the subject, was rooted in his natural-scientific and psychodynamic view of the individual as biologically determined by conflicting unconscious forces. While for Skinner, his essentialization comes in the form of his rejection of “autonomous man,” or any notion of subjectivity at all, and his replacement of it with an organism whose life is its behavior as it has been developed through operant conditioning and which can be understood purely through “a science of behavior.”1 Both schools, then, given their theoretical frameworks and their conceptions of human existence, are psychologies without a subject. As is well known, Freudian psychoanalytic theory conceives of the true individual as a reserve of hidden impulses and drives. Furthermore, to The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, James Strachey writes: “Moreover, there was another fundamental belief of Freud’s which could be convincingly supported by the examination of parapraxes—his belief in the universal application of determinism to mental events. This is the truth which he insists upon in the final chapter of the book: it should be possible in theory to discover the psychical determinants of every smallest detail of the processes of the mind” (Freud 1965, p. 8). The history of the individual, it follows, is determinative of its present, and when a patient enters therapy, it is precisely this history and this causal series that is of central importance. Thus, within the “psychoanalytic situation,” through an exclusive orientation to the past and personal history of the patient, the various psychosexual stages of development, and working through transference, resistance, and so on. psychoanalysis provides insight into the origin of the neurosis of the patient with the ultimate aim of “the translation of what is unconscious into what is conscious. Yes, that is it. By carrying what is unconscious on into what is conscious, we lift the repressions, we remove the preconditions for the formation of symptoms, we transform the pathogenic conflict into a normal one for which it must be possible somehow to find a solution” (Freud 1966, p. 541). This conception of the subject as determined by its unconscious and amenable to “analytic therapy” through the therapeutic apparatus involving free association, resistance, relieving repression, transference, and so on reduces the subject to an identifiable and yet modifiable essence (Arlow 2000; Freud 1966, p. 557, for the complete discussion pp. 557–576). Although an independent school of psychology, behaviorism falls into the same essentializing trap. Rather than plumbing the depths of the unconscious, it is fundamentally concerned with properly understanding and modifying the behavior of the patient. As Wilson has described it in general terms: Applied behavior analysis, derived directly from Skinner’s radical behaviorism, restricts itself to the study of overt behavior and environmental conditions that presumably regulate behavior. Covert, unobservable elements, such as needs, drives, motives, traits, and conflicts, are disregarded. Skinner’s analyses of behavior, for example, are couched in terms of conditioning processes, such as reinforcement, discrimination, and generalization. (Wilson 2000, p. 212) There is no hidden or inner life of the individual, no hermeneutic of associations or dreams designed to reach a cure. There is simply behavior, nothing more and nothing less. The therapist, it follows, attempts to understand the situation within which various behavior patterns were established, that is, the reinforcement achieved through reward and punishment, and then has the task of constructing a scenario to reinforce new behavior meant to replace the old. In this sense, it essentializes the patient by reducing it to behavior. Moreover, the clinical approach essentializes the patient by scientifically understanding it as an organism with behavior patterns which have been formed and can change without consciousness, choice, and, perhaps above all, freedom. Thus, in neither orthodox psychoanalysis nor behaviorism does the analyst empathically engage with the patient as a subject, but rather as a purely natural-scientific object with various symptoms, neuroses, or undesirable behavior patterns in need of modification. The therapist, therefore, observes the patient from the outside, evaluating the data “objectively.” Nevertheless, while there will invariably be nuances to each patient-therapist relationship, the formula for the interaction between the two remains constant, and the essence of the patient—unconscious forces or behavior—is preserved for the therapeutic work to be successful.

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › 2AC --- Democracy good

Democracy does not exert biopolitical control but rather collapsed governmental biopower. It CONFRONTS biopower through a temporary power structure that prevents a permanent, stable biopolitical order.

Prozorov 19 (Sergei, 2019, "Democratic Biopolitics : Popular Sovereignty and the Power of Life: EBSCOhost," No Publication, https://web-p-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/detail/detail?nobk=y&vid=3&sid=a1cad1b6-a0ef-4fc0-b5b7-79f855828d44@redis&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=2409338&db=e000xna)

Why is biopolitics a problem for democracy? As we have seen, critical theorists of biopolitics have argued that in its attempt to regulate forms of life in their concreteness, positivity and particularity, modern bio- politics goes further in its exercise of power than democracy, in which power is exercised on citizens as abstract legal subjects rather than as concrete living beings. Insofar as it seeks to govern life in accordance with specific modes of knowledge extending beyond the legal sphere – biology, economics, sociology and so on, biopower establishes a much stronger relationship to knowledge than sovereign power, including popular sovereignty. While competing political actors in a democracy certainly make claims to knowledge and truth in justifying their poli- cies, these claims remain without foundation simply because of the competitive character of the political process, which makes possible the complete reversal of the policy in question in the next election. Indeed, the competition at work in a democracy is not between the contending versions of the good and the true, but between candidates for temporary occupation of the seat of government. Unlike many ver- sions of aristocracy, democracy does not endow this occupant with any epistemic or moral privilege. The winner of democratic elections has not been proven the best in anything other than attracting votes and the transient majority it has secured only legitimizes its acts of government as such without endowing them with any ethical or epistemic privilege over the alternatives. All of this is basic to democracy, even though we sometimes for- get this in the routine if still fervent denunciations of the unethical and unknowledgeable character of today’s politics and politicians. Yet, what about biopolitics, which governs lives in all their specificity, concrete- ness and particularity, and claims a foundation for its policies in life sciences? While it is not very difficult to come to terms with the fact that the income tax rate, voting age or defense budget is without any ethical or epistemic foundation, it is admittedly much harder to do so with regard to the policies legitimized as somehow in accordance with the scientifically ascertained nature or interests of ‘life itself’. How can biopolitical government depend on the statistical accidents of electoral politics? The government of life seems far too serious a matter to be left to the contingencies of democracy, which explains why it must be entrusted to experts, whose authority is no longer conditioned by unstable electoral majorities. While we would be outraged at the sug- gestion that political scientists could or should instruct us how to vote ‘correctly’, we do not seem to mind experts in health care, psychology, pedagogy and economics instructing us in the art of living well: taking care of ourselves, bringing up children, making our living and so on. The pluralism and contestability that we have come to view as the key advantages of democracy are missing from the spheres that are at least as important to us as the spheres governed by the democratic process. In this familiar narrative of the inherent democratic deficit of biopoli- tics, the founded nature of biopower clashes with the contingency and indeterminacy that define modern democracy. In this chapter, we shall therefore rely on Claude Lefort’s concept of democracy, which empha- sizes precisely these two features, in order both to mark the gap between biopolitics and democracy and to attempt to bridge it. In Lefort’s influential reading, the symbolic order or mise-en-forme of democracy is conditioned by the dissolution of the theologico-political paradigm of monarchy, which articulated and embodied power, knowl- edge and ethics in the figure of the sovereign. With the disappearance of the absolute sovereignty of the monarch in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the European revolutions of the nineteenth century, the locus of power in society becomes void, no longer embodied by the transcendent figure of God or King. For Lefort, the ‘people’, which at first glance appears the natural successor to these sovereign figures, can never attain a positive presence in a democracy. At the very moment of the exercise of its sovereignty in an election, the people is dissolved into a plurality of particular groups. The Rousseauan generality is absent not only on the level of government (with which Rousseau would agree) but also on the level of the sovereign, whose general will never attains real presence. Any occupant of the place of power in a democracy does so only as a matter of contingency, its claim to power founded on nothing but a statistical majority. Whereas the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth cen- tury responded to this contingency by filling the empty place of power by ideological indoctrination, single-party domination and charismatic lead- ership, which sought to endow society with a ‘body’ once again, be it a racial or class body, modern democracy maintains and affirms the locus of power as open and unfigurable. This ontological void at the heart of democracy has profound epistemic and ethical implications, introducing a ‘fundamental indeterminacy as to the basis of power, law and knowledge at every level of social life’ (Lefort 1988: 19). As a result of this ‘dissolu- tion of the markers of certainty’, society appears ‘disembodied’, lacking a positive figure defined by its nature, essence, task or vocation: ‘The being of the social vanishes, [or rather] presents itself in the shape of an end- less series of questions’ (ibid.: 227). The first thing to be said about a democratically governed society is that it is never assured even of its own existence as demos, let alone its principles or values. Nonetheless, this indeterminacy is not a defect that destroys or paralyzes democracy but rather its very substance: a democratic society is nothing but an endless series of questions or acts of self-questioning, its ‘[existence] indicated only by incessant work of its enunciation’ (ibid.: 110). The sole condition of legitimacy in a democracy is the persistence of the ‘debate as to what is legitimate’ (ibid.: 39).

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › 2AC --- Biopower Good

The 1AC is an instance of positive biopolitics that uses institutions to build collective social responsibility against emerging threats.

Bratton 21 [Benjamin Bratton, Professor of Philosophy of Technology and Speculative Design at the University of California, San Diego, July 28, 2021, “Agamben WTF, or How Philosophy Failed the Pandemic”, Verso, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/news/5125-agamben-wtf-or-how-philosophy-failed-the-pandemic, JMH]

In my book, The Revenge of The Real: Politics for a Post-Pandemic World, I consider the origins and doomed future of Agamben’s brand of negative biopolitics. “While Agamben’s own worldview is classically Europeanist, dripping with lurid Heideggerian theology, his influence on the Humanities is much wider and deeper” and so the reckoning due goes well beyond revised syllabi. “The question is how much of the philosophical traditions to which Agamben has been attached over the last decades will also need to be shelved. What then to do with the artifacts of Agamben’s life work? It is a traditionalist, culturalist, locally embedded doctrinal edifice, protecting the ritual meaningfulness of things against the explicit nudity of their reality: like the defiant monologues of a Southern preacher, his sad, solemn theory is undeniably beautiful as a gothic political literature, and should probably be read only as such” Even so, the reckoning with legacies of his and other related projects is long overdue. His mode of biopolitical critique blithely ventures that science, data, observation and modeling are intrinsically and ultimately forms of domination and games of power relations. Numbers are unjust, words are beautiful. To accept that real, underlying processes of biochemistry are accessible, and generative of both reason and intervention, is presumed naive. It's a disposition also found in different tones and hues in the work of Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, and especially Ivan Illich, who died from a facial tumor he refused to treat as doctors recommended. Even here at University of California, San Diego, a hub of interdisciplinary biotechnology research, many colleagues insist that the “digitalization of Nature” is “an impossible fantasy”, even as they accept an mRNA vaccine based on a prototype bioprinted from a computational model of the virus’ genome uploaded from China before the actual virus even made it to North America. As I have suggested elsewhere, this orientation is exemplary of the drawn-out influence of Boomer Theory. The baby boomers have tyrannised the Left's imagination - bequeathing tremendous capacities to deconstruct and critique authority but feeble capacities to construct and compose. Perhaps the ‘68 generation’s last revenge upon those who inherit their messes, is the intellectual axiom that structure is always more suspicious than its dismantling and composition more problematic than resistance, not just as political strategies but as metaphysical norms. Their project was and remains the horizontal multiplication of conditional viewpoints as both means and ends, via the imaginary dismantling of public reason, decision and structuration. This is how they can at once fetishize “the Political” while refusing “governmentality.” I grew up in this tradition, but the world works very differently than the one imagined by soixante-huitards and their secretaries. I hope that philosophy will not continue to fail those who must create, compose and give enforceable structure to another world than this one. Agamben’s pandemic outbursts are extreme but also exemplary of this wider failure. Philosophy and the Humanities failed the pandemic because they are bound too tightly to an untenable set of formulas, reflexively suspicious of purposeful quantification, and unable to account for the epidemiological reality of mutual contagion or to articulate an ethics of an immunological commons. Why? Partially because the available language of ethics is monopolized by emphasis on subjective moral intentionality and a self-regarding protagonism for which “I” am the piloting moral agent of outcomes. The pandemic forced another kind of ethics. The Idealist distinction between zoē and bios as modes of “life” around which Agamben builds his biopolitical critique is a conceit that snaps like a twig in the face of the epidemiological view of society. Why did we wear masks? Because of a sense that our inner thoughts would manifest externally and protect us? Or was it because we recognize ourselves as biological organisms among others capable of harming and being harmed as such? The difference is profound. As we pass by a stranger, how do the ethics shift from subjective intention of harm or endearment to the objective biological circumstance of contagion? What is then the ethics of being an object? We will find out. But when presented with the need for intensive sensing and modeling in the service of highly granular provision of social services to those in need, many public intellectuals choked, only able to offer hollow truisms about “surveillance”. At stake is not just some obscure academic quarrel, but rather our ability to articulate what it means to be human, that is to be all together homo sapiens, in connection with all the fraught histories of that question. I argue that we need instead a positive biopolitics based on a new rationality of inclusion, care, transformation and prevention, and we need a philosophy and a humanities to help articulate it. Fortunately, in many ways we already do. A short and very incomplete list of such might include Sylvia Wynter’s mapping of “who counts” as Human in Colonial Modernity in ways that open the category to reclamation: “We” have been defined by exclusion. It includes those studying the microbiome including the role of microbial life inside of human bodies to keep us alive: The human is already inclusive of the non-human. It includes those studying Anthropogeny and common evolutionary origins of the human species and planetary future: The human is continuous, migratory and changing. It includes those studying experimental Astronautics and the limit conditions of survival in a fragile artificial environment: At thresholds of survivability the human is like a fish discovering water. It includes those studying CRISPR and other re-weaving technologies for genetic therapy: The human can recompose itself at the deepest levels. The affirmation or negation of what the human is also plays out through what humans can be. This animates the cultural controversies over gender reassignment therapies and techniques. The human is also a contingent, complex and pluralistic assemblage available to self-fashioning so that one may finally feel at home in their own skin. But the general availability of synthetic androgens, estrogens and progesterone draws on Modern laboratory biotechnology that Agamben’s biopolitics sees as invasive and unnatural. If Philosophy and the Humanities are to claim due legitimacy for present and future challenges, the collective conception of another positive biopolitics –based in the reality of our shared technical and biological circumstances–is absolutely essential. Toward that, I conclude with another passage from The Revenge of The Real: “A laissez-faire vitalism for which “life will find a way” is not an option; it is a fairy tale of a comfortable class who don’t live with the daily agency of sewage landscapes and exposed corpses…” Instead, “(This positive) biopolitics is inclusive, materialist, restorative, rationalist, based on a demystified image of the human species, anticipating a future different from the one prescribed by many cultural traditions. It accepts the evolutionary entanglement of mammals and viruses. It accepts death as part of life. It therefore accepts the responsibilities of medical knowledge to prevent and mitigate unjust deaths and misery as something quite different from the nativist immunization of one population of people from another. This includes not just rights to individual privacy but also social obligations to participate in an active, planetary biological commons. It is, adamantly, a biopolitics in a positive and projective sense.” The pandemic is, potentially, a wake-up call that the new normal cannot be just the new old normal. This means a shift in how human societies —which are always planetary in reach and influence— make sense of themselves, model themselves and compose themselves. This is a project that is as philosophical as it is political. Failure is not an option.

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › 2AC --- Agemben Wrong

Agamben’s theories of biopolitics distort history and overlook ethical and political dimensions.

Guenther 2012 - Queen's National Scholar in Political Philosophy and Critical Prison Studies [Lisa Guenther, Philosophy and Social Criticism “Resisting Agamben: The biopolitics of shame and humiliation” IV]

In his book, Remnants of Auschwitz (hereafter cited as RA), Giorgio Agamben argues that the hidden structure of subjectivity is shame. In shame, I am bound to something I can neither escape nor assume – be it language, physiological life, or even death – such that the very thing that makes me a subject also forces me to witness the limits, or even the dissolution, of my own subjectivity. For Agamben, ‘shame is truly something like the hidden structure of all subjectivity and consciousness. Insofar as it consists solely in the event of enunciation, consciousness constitutively has the form of something that cannot be assumed. To be conscious means: to be consigned to something that cannot be assumed’ (RA: 128). Rather than grounding his account of shame in a theory of the emotions or social norms, Agamben approaches shame as an ontological question concerning the subject’s relation to its own being or non-being. His method of analysis works through association to draw out parallel structures in Holocaust testimonies (Levi, Bettelheim, Antelme), philosophical accounts of shame (early Levinas, Heidegger, Benjamin and Kerenyi), sadomasochistic desire, Kantian auto-affection, Spinozist self-reflexivity, the poetics of Keats, Bachmann and Rimbaud, the linguistics of Benveniste and Pessoa, the psycho-biology of Binswanger, and the psycho-ontology of Bin. What connects these widely divergent authors and texts is the common structure of shame, understood as the ‘absolute concomitance of subjectification and desubjectification, self-loss and self-possession, servitude and sovereignty’ (ibid.: 107). This analysis of shame emerges in the context of Agamben’s broader account of subjectivity as an impossible negotiation of bios and zoe, or biographical life and biological life. In texts such as Homo Sacer (1998; hereafter cited as HS), State of Exception (2005b) and The Open (2004), Agamben criticizes biopower for exploiting the gap between bios and zoe in order to produce sovereign power, which is invested with an exclusive authority to kill or let live, and ‘bare life’, which has been stripped of its bios and reduced to a ‘life exposed to death’ (HS: 88; see also RA: 156). Bare life is no longer recognizable as specifically human, nor has it simply become animal; rather, it functions as a politicized form of disposable life, life that can be killed without murder or sacrifice. As such, it provides sovereign power with its ultimate object. In Homo Sacer, Agamben argues that sovereign power and bare life are not simply opposites; rather, they occupy a ‘zone of indistinction in which they can no longer be told apart’ (HS: 96). In contemporary forms of biopower, this zone of indistinction is radically expanded, such that ‘we are all virtually homines sacri’, all exposed to a radical splitting from our own personal, biographical, specifically human life (ibid.: 115). In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben extends his analysis of bare life to include as its privileged example the Muselmann: the death camp prisoner whose existence has been reduced to a kind of living death, or inhuman humanity (RA: 44, 48). Here, as in Homo Sacer, Agamben argues that the Muselmann, as a figure of bare life, enters a zone of indistinction or ‘gray zone’ with his own torturer: a zone where it becomes impossible to separate the torturers from the tortured. Here, too, Agamben argues that the Muselmann is not merely an extreme possibility of radical political exploitation; rather, we are all (virtually) Muselmanner, precisely because the structure of subjectivity is shame, or the double movement of subjectification and desubjectification. Some readers have criticized Agamben for blurring political, historical and ethical distinctions to the point where it becomes nearly impossible to explain meaningful differences between prisoners within the camps, many of whose experiences differed significantly from that of the Muselmann, or between death camps and work camps, or between prisoners and other biopolitical subjects, or even between prisoners and their torturers.1 Building on these critiques, I analyse the specific role that shame plays in Agamben’s account of biopower, arguing that his ontological approach to shame effaces a crucial distinction between shame as a feeling of collective ethical responsibility, and humiliation as an instrument of political domination. It is one thing to be ‘constitutionally divided on account of having become speaking beings’ (ibid.: 129), and another thing to be humiliated as part of a project of extermination, to have this constitutive disjunction between life and 60 Philosophy and Social Criticism 38(1) language split apart and exploited. And it is yet another thing to feel an ethical shame – what Primo Levi calls the shame of the ‘just man’ (cited ibid.: 87) – that such humiliations occur, whether or not they are inflicted upon oneself or by oneself. In what follows, I distinguish between shame and humiliation, where the latter is not merely a more intense version of the former, but involves a fundamentally different structure. Humiliation works by singling out this or that person as deviant, out of place, abnormal, or bad, and displaying them before real or imagined others. Humiliation individuates; it isolates someone from all the others, not as a subject with agency and voice but as an object of scrutiny, scorn and possible violence. But this is an empty individuation; for even as it singles one out, humiliation negates one’s singularity as this subject, distinct from everyone else but still within a social relation. The mechanism of individuation in humiliation singles one out as that rather than this; it marks one as that which does not belong, as that which must be expelled in order for the community to feel better. In this sense, humiliation works both to isolate the one who does not belong and to build a sense of unity and common identity among those who remain within the fold. The humiliated one is singled out as no one or nothing – but as a nothing which is visible, exposed for everyone to see, put on display as nothing of value – so that the humiliating subject can be someone. When humiliation is accomplished by marking someone’s body, clothing, or dwelling, it stamps one with a visible and more or less permanent sign of this isolated, expelled identity, leaving no avenues of escape or return, no possibilities for becoming otherwise. The scarlet letter, the tattoo, the yellow star – all attest to an identification of the subject with his or her isolated fault. You are an adulteress, a criminal, a Jew: frozen in time, fixed in a position on the margins of social life where everyone can see you but no one will hear you, where you can neither leave nor stay, condemned to a living death. Humiliation dehumanizes; it severs relations between one person or group and a larger community. But shame is not the same as humiliation. Shame also individuates the subject, but in a different way: not by singling one out for negation or exclusion, but by intensifying the ambiguity of an indissoluble relation to others. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick puts it, shame makes a ‘double movement ... toward painful individuation, toward uncontrollable relationality’ (2003: 37). What is unassumable in the feeling of shame is not an aspect of one’s own being, but rather the relation to an other to whose gaze I am exposed, but whose view of myself I cannot control. The classic phenomenological analysis of shame comes from Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. I am crouched at a keyhole, positioned as pure spectator, when suddenly I hear footsteps behind me in the hallway, and I feel myself exposed to the gaze of another. It matters little if this other is empirically there or not; the feeling of exposure introduces something irrevocable into my existence, a being-for-others that triangulates my self-relation and contests my position of mastery. Suddenly, I have an outside, an appearance which is mine but which nevertheless escapes my own grasp, a skin which is more immediately accessible to others than to myself. Sartre articulates the structure of shame not as a double movement of subjectification and desubjectification, but rather as a double relation to oneself and the Other: ‘I am ashamed of myself before the Other’ (2003: 296). Unlike humiliation, which simultaneously subjectifies and desubjectifies through an empty individuation which singles one out for annihilation, shame intersubjectifies; it attests to an irreducible Guenther 61 relation to others in the midst of one’s own self-relation. However painful shame may be, it confirms this relationality of the subject, and could not arise without it. As I will argue, even humiliation attests to relationality, if only indirectly, by addressing the one it seeks to annihilate, and by exploiting the relationality which makes this address possible. In this article, I offer a reading of Agamben’s account of shame in Remnants of Auschwitz alongside several of his own sources: Primo Levi, Robert Antelme and Maurice Blanchot.2 My aim is to show that Agamben’s ontological account of shame is inadequate, primarily because it equates the structure of shame with the structure of humiliation, while overlooking the ethical and political dimensions of shame as an irreducible relation to the other. Rather than accepting Agamben’s claim that shame is structured through a double movement of subjectification and desubjectification, I argue that shame highlights the structure of intersubjectivity, and ultimately of a collective responsibility that is more fundamental than the subject itself. By reading Levi, Antelme and Blanchot with and against Agamben, I sketch the preliminary outline of a biopolitics of resistance rooted in an ethics of alterity. This biopolitical resistance is disclosed in feelings of shame, and it is even indirectly or negatively disclosed in the experience of humiliation; but shame alone does not accomplish resistance. It provides only the starting point for a solidarity that traverses the distinction between bios and zoe towards a community of embodied, speaking subjects who have nothing in common but their irreducible relation to alterity.

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › 2AC --- Agamben Bad

Agamben’s theory of bare life and sovereign power is inherently flawed and has come under increased criticism with his over-simplifications and gross distortions of the Covid pandemic

Prozorov 21 Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä [Sergei Prozorov, Law Critique November 26 “A Farewell to Homo Sacer? Sovereign Power and Bare Life in Agamben’s Coronavirus Commentary” IV] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8625667/

The 2020 coronavirus pandemic quickly became the object of commentary by philosophers and social theorists. Giorgio Agamben has offered highly controversial comments on the subject in a series of short vignettes at the Quodlibet blog, most of which were subsequently collected into a book, entitled Where Are We Now? The Epidemic as Politics (Agamben ). Agamben is best known for his theory of biopolitics, developed in the multi-volume Homo Sacer series, which traced the subjection of life to sovereign power in the Western political tradition from the antiquity onwards. It is therefore hardly surprising that Agamben would address the Covid-19 pandemic as the paradigmatic case of biopolitical governance, which in the argument of his theory proceeds through the inclusive exclusion of bare life in the state of exception, where it ends up exposed to the pure force of the law (Agamben , ). Yet, most of his readers were hardly prepared for the virulence of his criticism of the governmental efforts to stop the spread of the pandemic.

Agamben began by questioning the very existence of the pandemic, downplaying the seriousness of the coronavirus infection and presenting it as a pretext for the expansion and the intensification of the state of exception: ‘Once terrorism ceased to exist as a cause for measures of exception, the invention of an epidemic offers the ideal pretext for widening them beyond all known limits’ (Agamben , p. 13). In a subsequent text ‘Clarifications’, Agamben proceeded to infer from the alleged panic about the virus the fact that ‘[our] society no longer believes in nothing more than bare life. It is now obvious that Italians are ready to sacrifice practically everything—their life conditions, their social relationships, their work, even their friendships, as well as their religious and political convictions—to the danger of getting sick’ (, p. 17). This willingness of the society to suspend its interactions and relationships for the sake of survival enables the proliferation of exceptional governmental interventions that make the state of exception the ‘new normal’: ‘[People] have been so used to living in conditions of perennial crisis and emergency that they seem not to realize that their life has been reduced to a purely biological state. A society that exists in a constant state of emergency cannot be free’ (, p. 18). In later comments Agamben continued with this dual line of criticism, addressing various ways, in which the fear of the coronavirus reduces our social lives to the preoccupation with bare life, which in turn legitimizes the emergency measures undertaken by governments. He also issued damning invectives against the church, which allegedly betrayed its mission ‘to keep watch over human dignity’, the lawyers who remained silent in the face of the proliferation of states of exception, and, finally, medicine itself, which he accused of having become a new religion (Agamben , p. 34–37; p. 49–54). Agamben’s invectives have been received critically by numerous interlocutors, including such fellow philosophers as Jean-Luc Nancy () and Roberto Esposito (). Critics have noted the uncanny proximity of Agamben’s position to that of Covid denialists or skeptics, from Bolsonaro to Trump, and questioned the conspiratorial tone of his claims about the ‘invention’ of the epidemic (see Christiaens ; van den Berge ). While we are largely in agreement with this line of criticism, our objective in this article goes beyond the adjudication of Agamben’s writings on the coronavirus as to their veracity or political correctness. We are more interested in analyzing these writings in order to illuminate some fundamental issues with Agamben’s political thought that might have otherwise remained obscure. It is important to stress that we do not intend to infer from Agamben’s opinion pieces a disqualification of Agamben’s philosophical approach, as if a philosopher must be correct in their every opinion for their philosophy to merit any consideration. And yet, it would also be incorrect to try to rigorously separate these opinion pieces from Agamben’s political philosophy, if only because in the former he applies and refines the concepts developed in the latter. While Where Are We Now? might understandably lack the methodological rigour of Agamben’s more academic works, it nonetheless offers a powerful exemplar or paradigm of Agamben’s reasoning and is therefore a legitimate object of critical analysis.The focus of this article is on the relation between two fundamental concepts in Agamben’s political thought that he continued to rely on in his coronavirus writings: sovereign power, exercised in the form of the state of exception, and bare life included in this state only as negated or excluded. His claims above about the pandemic reducing our social life to bare life and enabling governance by exceptional measures are not merely empirical observations that could be refuted by pointing to contrary examples—e.g. of altruist and solidarist behaviours observable throughout the pandemic, or the hurried lifting of many of the restrictions that, Agamben argued, would be maintained even after the pandemic ends. These claims rather recall much earlier theoretical theses about the relation of sovereign power to life that date back to Agamben’s articles from the 1990s and the first volume of the Homo Sacer series that preceded and, some might say, prophesied the rise of exceptional or emergency governance measures worldwide (Agamben , ). Similarly, the response to Agamben’s coronavirus statements as overly exaggerated only brings to mind a similarly incredulous reception of the claims in Homo Sacer about us all being ‘virtually homines sacri’ and the camp as the ‘nomos of the modern’ (Agamben , p. 155; 166), which led to Agamben being accused of ‘jarringly disconcerting claims’ (La Capra , p. 133), ‘wild statements’ (Laclau , p. 22) and ‘unregulated decisions’ (Norris , p. 273). It would thus be incorrect to read Agamben’s coronavirus statements as polemical exaggerations at odds with the measured tone of his more academic writings. Polemical exaggerations were abundant in the latter writings as well, which permits us to raise the question of whether this tendency towards hyperbole and exaggeration might not be an individual idiosyncrasy, but instead arises from the conceptual logic at work in Agamben’s political theory, particularly the relation between sovereign power and bare life. In this article we shall therefore venture a critical reconstruction of this logic, drawing on both Agamben’s theoretical texts and his coronavirus commentary, in order to point out its problematic features and outline a pathway of the resolution of these problems from within the framework of the theory itself. We shall neither attempt to insulate Agamben’s political theory from his incidental commentary on current affairs nor infer from the problematic nature of this commentary the need to discard this theory as a whole, but rather use this commentary as an occasion for immanent criticism of the central tenets of the theory. Thus, while we shall argue that Agamben’s articulation of the relation of sovereign power and bare life in Homo Sacer 1 is fundamentally flawed, we shall also demonstrate how these flaws may be remedied with the help of Agamben’s own theoretical logic, particularly the idea of non-relation, which first appeared in Homo Sacer 1 but is most fully elaborated in The Use of Bodies, the final volume of the Homo Sacer series.Homo Sacer famously begins with a forceful assertion of the relation between sovereign power and bare life: ‘The inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power’ (Agamben , p. 6). By suspending the law in the state of exception, sovereign power is able to access and capture not merely some particular form of life but life as such. The entire trajectory of Western politics consists in the encounter of power devoid of all normative content with life devoid of its form. This is why for Agamben the paradigmatic space of modern politics, in which this trajectory culminates, is the camp: ‘Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation.’ (, pp. 170–171) This conceptual structure forms the basis of Agamben’s critical response to the governance of the coronavirus pandemic. The pandemic is problematic insofar as it brings sovereign power and bare life ever closer together. On the one hand, the introduction of the state of emergency in Italy and many other European countries has reduced the exercise of power to its pure form of sovereignty, revealing the dependence of the law on its apparent opposite: We have been accustomed for some time to the ill-advised use of emergency degrees through which executive power effectively replaces legislative power, abolishing the separation-of-powers principle that democracy is defined by. In this case, however, all limits have been overstepped: it seems that the words pronounced by the Prime Minister and by the head of the Civil Protection Department have the immediate validity of law (as was once said of the words of the Führer. (Agamben , p. 36) On the other hand, the ascent of the coronavirus to the top of the political agenda has reduced political life to mere ‘survival’ (Agamben , pp. 132–135), as good life has been sacrificed for the protection of the bare life that sustains it. ‘[Bare] life, and the fear of losing it, is not something that unites people; rather, it blinds and separates them. What are human relationships becoming in a country that has resigned itself to the idea of living like this for the foreseeable future? And what is a society that values nothing more than survival?’ (Agamben , p. 18). It is as if Agamben’s theory, initially developed in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, has finally been fully vindicated: what we observe globally is the reduction of politics to exceptional sovereign government of life stripped of its form and reduced to bare survival. From this perspective, even relatively innocuous measures, from compulsory face masks in public places to the shift to online education, exemplify the far more ominous tendency towards the articulation of the law devoid of content with the life devoid of form, whose paradigmatic site is the camp and whose exemplary figure is homo sacer. This is why Agamben is able to argue that a ‘country that decides to renounce its face, to cover with masks the faces of its citizens everywhere’ has ‘purged itself of any political dimension’ (, p. 87) or that ‘[professors] who agree to subject themselves to the new online dictatorship and to hold all their classes remotely are the exact equivalent of those university professors who, in 1931, swore allegiance to the Fascist regime’ (2001, p. 74).

2023 MNDI Kritik
AFF › 2AC --- Agamben Bad

Reject Agamben’s theory of the state of exception- he’s an anti-vaxxer whose scholarship gets coopted by the alt right.

Bratton 21 [Benjamin Bratton, Professor of Philosophy of Technology and Speculative Design at the University of California, San Diego, July 28, 2021, “Agamben WTF, or How Philosophy Failed the Pandemic”, Verso, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/news/5125-agamben-wtf-or-how-philosophy-failed-the-pandemic, JMH]

As yet another wave of infection blooms and the bitter assignment of vaccine passes becomes a reality, societies are being held hostage by a sadly familiar coalition of the uninformed, the misinformed, the misguided, and the misanthropic. They are making vaccine passports, which no one wants, a likely necessity. Without their noise and narcissism, vaccination rates would be high enough that the passes would not be needed. But it is not simply the “rabble” who make this sad mess, but also some voices from the upper echelons of the academy. During the pandemic, when society desperately needed to make sense of the big picture, Philosophy failed the moment, sometimes through ignorance or incoherence, sometimes outright intellectual fraud. The lesson of Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, in part tells us why. Famous for critiques of “biopolitics” that have helped to shape the Humanities’ perspectives on biology, society, science and politics, Agamben spent the pandemic publishing over a dozen editorials denouncing the situation in ways that closely parallel right-wing (and left-wing) conspiracy theories. Over the past two decades, the soft power influence of his key concepts in the Humanities - homo sacer, zoē /bios, the state of exception, etc. - has been considerable. This has also helped to cement in a stale orthodoxy suspicious of any artificial governing intervention in the biological condition of human society as implicitly totalitarian. In the name of being “critical”, the default approach to any biotechnology is often to cast it as a coercive manipulation of the sovereignty of the body and lived experience. If one were to imagine Alex Jones not as a Texas good ol’ boy, but rather as a Heideggerian seminary student, this would give a sense of how Agamben himself approached the requests for public comment on the COVID-19 pandemic. Beginning in February 2020, with “The Invention of an Epidemic”, he called the virus a hoax and the belated lockdowns in Italy a “techno-medical despotism”. In “Requiem for the Students”, he denounced Zoom seminars as acquiescence to a Silicon Valley concentration camp condition (his words). In “The face and death”, he derided the use of masks as sacrificing the ritual humanity of the naked face. Each short essay was more absurd and strident than the last. Upon publication of the earliest of these, Agamben’s friend, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, warned us to ignore him, and that if he himself had followed Agamben’s medical advice discouraging a heart transplant that saved his life, that he would be dead. Earlier this month, Agamben went all in, directly and explicitly comparing vaccine passes to Nazi ‘Juden’ stars. In a short piece called, “Second class citizens”, he connects the fates of those who refuse vaccination to that of Jews under fascism and concludes that “The ‘green card’ (Italy’s vaccine pass) constitutes those who do not have it in bearers of a virtual yellow star.” After picking up my jaw, I cannot help but compare Agamben’s analysis to that of QAnon-influenced United States congressperson, Marjorie Taylor Greene, who beat him to the punch when she tweeted back in May that “Vaccinated employees get a vaccination logo just like the Nazi's forced Jewish people to wear a gold star.” In this ongoing performance, Agamben explicitly rejects all pandemic-mitigation measures on behalf of an ‘embrace tradition, refuse modernity’ conviction which denies the relevance of a biology that is real regardless of the words used to name it. Something seems to have recently cracked open for him, and yet at the same time, re-reading his foundational texts in the light of the pandemic pieces is illuminating. His position has not suddenly changed. It was there all along. Romanticism has been a permanent passenger on the flights of Western Modernity, and its mourning for ‘lost objects’ always just-out-of-reach vacillates between melancholia and revolt. Romanticism’s aesthetic disgust with rationality and technology finally has less to do with their effects than with what they reveal about how differently the world really works from how it appears to myth. Its true enemy is less alienation than demystification, and so it will always accept collaboration with Traditionalists. It is not surprising then that Agamben earned the thanks of both Lega Nord and the anti-masker/vaccine movements. His conclusions are also similar to those of the Brazilian populist president Jair Bolsonaro, who sees the virus as an over-blown plot by techno-medical globalists to undermine traditional authority and natural bodily and communitarian coherency. What is the lost object? Agamben’s contributions are, at their core, an elaborate defense of a pre-Darwinian concept of the human and the mystical attachments it provided. Ultimately, he is not defending life, he is refusing it. As of today, Agamben’s biggest online supporters are not his many long time readers but rather a squad of new fans, primarily a Based coalition of wounded contrarian man-childs. From vitalist Reactionaries quoting Julius Evola and Alexander Dugin to the anti-vaxxer roommate who puts energy drinks in his bong, these and other lonely anti-heroes are doomed by their burden to see clearly through the hypocrisies of our Matrix reality. For them, Agamben’s principled stand unites them with the legacy of Romanticist glorious and occult refusals. At work is perhaps less a horseshoe theory of Red-Brown alliance, than the tender bond between outcasts and idiots.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gender Kritik › FJG – AT Gender K

A FJG could help women gain respect for their caregiving labor and can be designed to provide easier access to jobs while supporting cargiving.

Karcher, 2018 – winner Best Undergraduate Paper in Labor Studies from the Bridges Center for Labor Studies at the Univ of Washington [Kathryn, Mar 4, 2018-2019 “Pursuing Social Justice: How Might a Universal Basic Income or Federal Jobs Guarantee Help Women? ] EP

FJG’s effectiveness at undermining cultural imperialism largely depends upon the type of jobs guarantee implemented. On one end of the spectrum, a jobs guarantee which provides services in areas of child, elder, and health care would help gain respect for traditionally feminine caregiving labor. Indeed, “true full employment would require an expansive view of worthy labor” beyond “white men employed in steel mills and coal mines.” A gender-inclusive jobs guarantee could pay women a salary and benefits to stay home with their children, although this blurs the line between a jobs guarantee and a caregiver income. On the other end of the spectrum we can imagine a jobs guarantee that is inaccessible for many women because it requires full-time work without providing child care, or because it needlessly prevents them from staying home with their children due to their financial limitations. The gender-inclusive jobs guarantee may undermine cultural imperialism by legitimizing caregiving labor. This would enable men and women to caregive freely, fulfilling their duties to others and allowing them to raise their families. But another type of jobs guarantee would perpetuate cultural imperialism because all Americans would be required to conform to men’s life patterns as full-time workers and would reinforce the idea that formal employment is the only labor that deserves acknowledgment through pay. The underlying logic of a jobs guarantee, however, does not inherently undermine or reinforce cultural imperialism, so it would do a fair job of undermining cultural imperialism.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gender Kritik › --Extend – Social Security Links

Social Security was built on a racist foundation

Bhattacharya 2019 - director of programs and strategy at the Insight Center for Community Economic Development [Jhumpa “Exploring Guaranteed Income through a Racial and Gendered Justice Lens” . . Accessed 23 June 2023 EO]

The exclusions baked into the New Deal reinforced the inequities we see today. In 1935, the Social Security Act was created, but the early exclusions prevented many workers of color from receiving retirement benefits, even though they paid into it. This played a significant role in preventing workers of color from using their income to generate wealth and assets. In 1937, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) became the first federal agency to openly advocate and support segregation between races, openly refusing loans to people of color, which curtail these communities’ ability to buy homes and restricted the neighborhoods in which they could live—all barriers to home ownership, which has been one of the most significant mechanisms for building wealth in the United States. In the 1940s, the largest federal public benefits program in history came about in the form of the GI Bill, a program that paid college tuition and gave low-interest home mortgages to returning veterans, ultimately providing a low-cost route to wealth creation. However, discrimination in college admissions and housing markets prevented most soldiers of color from using the GI Bill, which thus prevented an accumulation and transfer of wealth to future generations.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gender Kritik › --Extend – Social Security Links

Previous New Deal policies have made wealth inequality worse for people of color and women

Bhattacharya 2019 - director of programs and strategy at the Insight Center for Community Economic Development [Jhumpa “Exploring Guaranteed Income through a Racial and Gendered Justice Lens” . . Accessed 23 June 2023 EO]

In the past, bold economic policies—such as those enshrined in President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal—have paved a pathway to economic security for white families and individuals while creating barriers to well-being for people of color and women. Given that history, and the extent to which recent economic rules have reinforced historical inequities, we must ask a key question of any economic policy put forth today: How would this effort rectify historical, racially exclusionary policies and increase access to wealth, economic stability, and freedom for women and people of color?

2023 MNDI Negative
Gender Kritik › 1NC - Social Security Link

UBI protects women better than social security which is tied to employer contributions and exclude caregiving in the home as work

Williams, 2021 -- Writer for Research and Data Section for UN Women. [Loui. April 21, Policy Brief No. 22 “Universal basic income: Potential and limitations from a gender perspective” https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2021/Policy-brief-Universal-basic-income-en.pdf UP]

For the purposes of this brief, UBI is defined as a cash transfer that is (a) individual, in that it goes directly to each person rather than to a household; (b) continuous, in that it is provided on an ongoing basis; (c) unconditional, in that it does not depend on labour market participation or the fulfilment of conditions; and (d) universal, in that it is paid to all. These features distinguish UBI from most existing protection systems, although the relationship between UBI and social protection continues to be debated. UBI is noncontributory, meaning eligibility and benefit levels do not depend upon prior contributions. This makes it different to (contributory) social insurance systems, which tend to benefit those who are employed in the formal economy across their lifetime, and which feminists have long critiqued for being entrenched in male-breadwinner models and heteronormative bias, as well as for providing lesser protection to those who do not participate in full-time formal employment due to employment discrimination or caregiving responsibilities. UBI is also different to the majority of non-contributory social protection programmes, including cash transfers, which are often narrowly targeted to poor households and have been criticized by feminists for imposing cumbersome conditionalities on women recipients (such as ensuring children’s attendance at school or health clinics) and excluding families with lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex or queer (LGBTIQ+) members. UBI is distinct from a social protection floor, which refers to nationally defined access to essential health care and income security for all across the life course. However, some argue that UBI could form an essential part of a social protection floor.

2023 MNDI Negative
Gender Kritik › --Extend – Job Guarantee Links

A jobs guarantee in a patriarchal society will exclude or expel women due to social and gender norms

Lu, 2021 - professor of Law at NYU [Lynn “From Stigma to Dignity? Transforming Workfare with Universal Basic Income and a Federal Job Guarantee,” UP]

Considering these seemingly intractable problems, how could a truly universal UBI program survive without a work requirement, and how could a JG program avoid becoming a make-work, low-wage failure? Further, how could such programs avoid the evils of re-entrenching racial and gender disparities into society? Some limited programs—Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefes de Hogares job program, the Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration (SEED) basic income program, and New York City’s increasingly flexible workfare program—show how meaningful reforms can be effectively implemented even under difficult constraints. If a JG were accompanied by meaningful benefits and labor protections, including the minimum social protection of UBI, it could offer dignified choices—for example, allowing individuals to combine wage work with caregiving or higher education. Argentina’s Plan Jefes y Jefes de Hogares (in effect from 2002 to 2004) is a rare example with lessons for future program design. But the program included many features that distinguish it from a truly universal and permanent JG. Federally funded but locally administered, the voluntary program targeted low-income families with dependent children, was limited to one participant per household, and paid well below a living wage. Participants “worked primarily in community projects and were directed to training programs, including finishing basic education”; some participants started microenterprises to make toys, clothing, and artisan wares. Based on qualitative surveys, economist Pavlina Tcherneva concluded, “although the official poverty rate was not considerably reduced due to the low pay . . . there were other tangible ways in which the program improved the lives of the poor.” After only a few years, the program was terminated and replaced with a family welfare grant containing no work requirement. The program’s gendered features proved to be both its strongest unintended impact and its ultimate demise, as the government witnessed more female household heads participating than expected and then, as the economy recovered, pushed them out of the program and back into to the home as unpaid caregivers and domestic laborers. Unsurprisingly, one of the program’s main consequences was participants’ reported feelings of empowerment in contributing value to their 100. 19 communities, which both raised the floor for wages and increased their bargaining power in the domestic sphere. Researchers note that “[s]o long as these public-sector jobs have a gender-informed design, they will be able to incorporate the care economy in the public sphere and help redefine the meaning of work away from strict market utility toward social usefulness.”107 But that condition is a tall order given entrenched ideologies about work and compensation in the United States, as in Argentina, where “the major obstacles to [women’s] participation in the program were not their childcare responsibilities or poverty, but the social mores of [policy makers] regarding what was considered ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ work and who should be regarded as ‘employable’ and ‘unemployable.’” As Tcherneva observes, “[t]hose citizens who participate and successfully invest in the market are perceived as undertaking valuable and productive activities, while those who are less successful or who operate outside the market are seen as unproductive and even lazy.” This divisive dichotomy, which pits market participation against nonmarket labor, “has worked to the particular disadvantage of women and people of color who are found in lowincome positions and often spend a significant amount of time outside the formal market economy.” As the recent Tax Cuts and Jobs Act shows, U.S. policy makers cling to the retrograde ideal of one unpaid homemaker in every wealthy married family and single out this family model for the largest tax breaks. Regardless of the model’s value, not everyone has the same opportunity or choice to attain that model. To test a UBI program, in 2019 SEED—under the leadership of Stockton, California’s then-Mayor Michael Tubbs—leveraged private philanthropy to pay 125 residents earning below the median income $500 per month for eighteen months (extended during the pandemic by six months) without (“The tax law has long favored families with two parents, one breadwinner, and children living in the same home . . . . The traditional family, in this paradigm, is increasingly affluent and white” (footnote omitted)); Staudt, supra note 109, at 653 (1996) (revealing the forgotten and ignored purpose of Simon’s income definition, “to limit income inequality,” by defining what is income and determining whether subject to income tax or not). We cannot agree what constitutes fair apportionment of the cost of public goods, such as to low-income individuals and to women of color caring for children. After the first six months, several recipients spoke to journalist Bliss Broyard, expressing plans to use the additional funds to enroll in classes for higher salary potential, invest in small businesses (e.g., buying and selling used cars), and make consumer purchases they would not have otherwise made (e.g., travel, clothing, and pet care), in addition to paying more basic housing or healthcare costs. The goal of the demonstration was not to determine whether recipients made the right kind of purchases or reduced their hours of work, although researchers have collected such data; rather, then-Mayor Tubbs remained hopeful that the pilot would reduce the stigma of receiving cash assistance such that “people begin to see themselves, their neighbors, and the people they have warm feelings for.” According to the plan, the program would ideally “lead to reductions in monthly income volatility and provide greater income sufficiency, which [would] in turn lead to reduced psychological stress and improved physical functioning.” During the pilot, SEED participants would be assessed for increased “feelings of hope and mattering.” At the six month mark, after profiling several individual participants, Broyard reported: “My own experience has been that the money doesn’t change the recipients’ behavior—if anything, it serves as an accelerant for whatever path they were already on—but it is changing their lives by making them less stressful.” “The money can be transformative, yes, but it also seems to make them more themselves.”

2023 MNDI Negative
Gender Kritik › --Extend – Job Guarantee Links

A FJG would re-entrench sexism because it reinforces the importance of employment to freedom and ignores the gendered roles assigned by employment and care work.

Karcher, 2018 – winner Best Undergraduate Paper in Labor Studies from the Bridges Center for Labor Studies at the Univ of Washington [Kathryn, Mar 4, 2018-2019 “Pursuing Social Justice: How Might a Universal Basic Income or Federal Jobs Guarantee Help Women? EO]

Like advocates of UBI who argue for basic income as a democratic right, Helen Ginsburg insists that employment is a right. Recognizing that fact would require us to break from the neoliberal tradition that dominates current policy and redistribute power from big business to the middle- and working-class, as well as the working and non-working poor.14 Mathew Forstater also argues that an FJG is a crucial step in the fight for equal citizenship among different races. Many advocates, including civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr., support FJG for this purpose due to the exceptionally high rates of unemployment in Black communities. If our goal is an inclusive economy that combats racial poverty, Black Americans need jobs.15 Pateman and Weeks are concerned about any policy that may reinforce the link between employment and income. Unlike other UBI advocates who see the potential in both FJG and UBI, the theoretical premises that underlie FJG directly contradict Pateman’s and Weeks’ arguments. Pateman and Weeks believe that to achieve gender equity, we need to break the link between income and employment. Uncoupling people’s income and standard of living from employment would challenge the mutually-reinforcing institutions of marriage, employment, and citizenship which subordinate women. These structures make “wives’ standing as citizens” problematic because our social insurance system is based on the assumption that wives are both economic dependents and “lesser citizens whose entitlement to benefits depend[ ] on their private status instead of on their citizenship.”16 Meanwhile, only paid employment has been considered work, while feminized caregiving tasks have been seen as irrelevant to citizenship.17 Thus, we need to look critically at the moral hazard of institutions that give incentives to men to avoid their fair share of the unpaid labor of caring for others; the connections between income and employment; marriage, employment, and citizenship; caring work and other work; and the meaning of work itself.18