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2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › Alt – Play

Play overcomes divisions – capital has failed at squashing play as a site of revolution, now is the time to utilize play to recognize the radical potentials of play and unite the oppressed

Simons 10 (Paul Z. Simons-Paul wrote with great eloquence and erudition on everything from theater to insurrectionary strategy, from play to hallucinogens. His historical writing ran the gamut from the anti-racist insurgency of John Brown to the English Revolution of 1645, all from an insurrectionary perspective. He reported firsthand from the front lines of riots in Athens, Greece, revolt in France, and reaction in Brazil, never hesitating to subject himself to great risk or set off on a romantic adventure in pursuit of his ideals and desires., 3/20/2010, Seven Theses on Play; ) - MP

Play is desire realized, it is the negation of domination. Play is unmediated activity that does not attempt to produce a specific emotion, indeed, any emotion at all. The result of play may be alternatively orgasm, terror, delight, even death. Play is ambivalent; any one of these conclusions or any multitude of others are possible (there may even be no conclusive result). Yet, each eventuality in its own context is correct because none are specifically elicited except in the content of the play-activity that produces it. In pre-agricultural societies play was common denominator of all activity, in much the same way that the gift was the characteristic mode of exchange. For the primitive, play was the activity that not only defined tribal and familial relationships, it also provided food, clothing and shelter. In the pre-agriculture era of abundance, the outcome of any given hunt was irrelevant. Necessity (and surplus) meant nothing in such societies, consequently food-generating activites were not driven by the alternative of starvation, rather they existed simply as diversion, play. Further, play was essential to the stability of pre-agricultural societies because of its tendency to exclude coercion, language, even time. The death of play was the triumph of civilization, of domination. Capital has sought to abolish play and replace it with leisure-time; a void that must be filled as opposed to fullfillment that negates the void. Leisure-time is capital’s valorization of play, another mediation in the infinite maelstorm of mediations. In capital’s dual role of pimp and prostitute it not only creates leisure-time, it produces commodities and spectacles with which to fill it. Such valorization demands passive, stupefied participation (the negation of play) and seeks to elicit a single response, enjoyment. Which is, of course, the pay-off for time/money invested in a specific commodity/spectacle. As a result, play (like language) reverts to its magic form and becomes something dangerous, unmanageable, ultimately lethal; and capital in order to disvourage play portrays it as such. Capital, even in its current manifestation of real domination, has been unable to eradicate play. The “discovery” of play occured repeatedly in this century, occasionally (though on exclusively) in the realm of the avant-garde. Alfred Jarry in the Ubu plays and his system of pataphysics (the science of imaginary solutions) definitively incinerated the continuum of retrograde representational form. In doing so he reintroduced play not as an anaesthetic, but as a wrecking ball. Dada continued the assault, but with the exception of the Berlin variant (and its most impressive non-member, Schwitters) the notion of play became ritualized, dead. The final recuperation of the avant-garde, achieved via the reaction of surrealism and the concomitant resurrection of the representational form, eliminated play as an element of rejection until the re-emergence of utopian currents after WWII. A number of post-war cultural movements, most notably Lettrisme, the Situationist International, Mail Art and Neoism all incorporated play into their experimentation. Each movement, however, failed to realize the revolutionary implications of play and in doing so allowed it once again to become formalized, rigid and as such recuperated as mediated activity. Play has become an integral part of revolutionary activity. Even Lenin, the idiot father of the authoritarian left, could (correctly) describe the Paris Commune 1871 as a “festival of the oppressed,” though he (like Marx) arrived at an erroneous conclusion concerning the failure of the uprising. There are a plethora of examples of the inclusion of play in the activity of the Communards, particularly of play in its destructive aspect. This is not surprising, given the Commune’s lack of resources, military contingencies and the fact that the entire rebellion lasted some 72 days. Still, the toppling of the column at the Place Vendome (a universally hated symbol of the Napoleonic victories), as well as the attempt by a few of the more extreme Communards to put Notre Dame to the torch can hardly be interpreted as anything but play. Such manifestations also crept into the behavior of individual Communards. Recall the story of the young rebel who confronted a suspect bourgeois on the street. The nervous capitalist protested that he had never had anything to do with politics, to which the Communard replied, “That’s precisely why I’m going to kill you.” Though the story ends here in historical accounts, it is not hard to imagine the young rebel flashing a fiendish grin at the shaken bourgeois and then walking off to take his place on the barricades...bon chance, Citoyen! Modern revolutionary eruption have also exhibited certain elements of play. The May-July events of 1968 in France immediately bring to mind the joyful, indignant posters produced by the students of the insurgent Ecole des Beaux-Arts. Further, through the blood, tear-gas and concussion grenades of the nights of barricade fighting (May 6-11th), there emerged numerous examples of play. Most observers concur on this point, Priaulx and Ungar describe the defiant students as “one big frantic family;” even the partisan Trotskyite account by Seale and McConville includes an anecdote about the leftbank café, Le Luxembourg. During one night of rioting the café had been invaded and transformed into a makeshift battlefield, after the insurgents and police moved off the manager was directed by a prefect to close his establishment, to which he replied, “tonight Le Luxembourg will not close its doors; it has none left!” More recently, during the suppression of Solidarity in Poland, a hand full of militants produced a mask with billed officer cap and dark glasses that affected a likeness in the wearer to General Jaruzelski. The twist was that the mask was designed to fit dogs. Evidently, during the last crackdown on Solidarity the police would spend their days breaking up demonstrations and nights chasing stray canines who were, for all intents and purposes, impersonating the General Secretary of the Communist Party. The very existence of “theses” that attempt to define and illuminate historical examples of play stands in some sad way as a testament to the alienation from the activity they seek to describe. The terminal malaise that has characterized revolutionary theory and culture for at least the past two decades must be interpreted as the triumph of formalized technique, the crushing baggage of intellectualism. Even the ultra-left communist and anarchist movements seem condemned to stumble the same squalid path traversed by social democracy almost a century ago. The “revolutionary” belief that the “liberation” of women, ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians or the Third World will take a significantly differant form than the “liberation” of the working class via better wages, open employment policies and “benefits” exists as an iron-clad example of the pervasive disintegrative consciousness, on the other hand, seems to currently reside in the refusal of all dominative forms, the permanent contestation of every assumption; in a word, play. If the new society gestates in the womb of the old, then its first duty is quite obviously matricide. Workers of the world, come out to play!

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › Alt – Withdrawal

The alt is a withdrawal from work – a critical and reconstructive process that both exits and creates spaces for social innovation based on potentials beyond the limits of the current imposed system of work

Weeks 11 Kathi Weeks is Professor of Gender, Sexuality and Feminist Studies at Duke University. She is also the author of The Problem with Work and a coeditor of The Jameson Reader. “THE PROBLEM WITH WORK Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries”, pg 99-100 https://caringlabor.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/the-problem-with-work_-feminism-marxism-kathi-weeks.pdf, 2011 //Isim

The refusal of work can be broken down, analytically if not practically, into two processes, one that is essentially critical in its ains and another that is more fundamentally reconstructive in its objectives. The first of these, the negative process, is what is most readily conveyed by the word "refusal" and includes the critique of and rebellion against the present system of work and its values. If the system of waged labor is a crucial cultural and institutional mechanism by which we are linked to the mode of production, then the refusal of work poses a potentially substantial challenge to this larger apparatus. But the refusal of work, as both activism and analysis, does not simply pose itself against the present organization of work; it should also be understood as a creative practice, one that seeks to reappropriate and reconfigure existing forms of production and reproduction (see Vercellone 1996, 84). This is the special twofold nature of the refusal of work upon which Negri insists (2005, MARXISM AND THE REFUSAL OF WORK 99 269-74). The word "refusal" may be unfortunate in the sense that it does not immediately convey the constructive element that is so central to autonomist thought. Negri describes the refusal of work as both a struggle against the capitalist organization of work and a process of self valorization, a form of "invention-power" (274). Rather than a goal in itself, "the refusal of work and authority, or really the refusal of voluntary servitude, is the beginning of liberatory politics" (Hardt and Negri 2000, 204; emphasis added). The refusal of work thus comprises at once a movement of exit and a process of invention. The refusal can make time and open spaces both physical and conceptual within which to construct alternatives. Rather than a simple act of disengagement that one completes, the refusal is, in this sense, a process, a theoretical and practical movement that aims to effect a separation through which we can pursue alternative practices and relationships. "Beyond the simple refusal, or as part of that refusal' Hardt and Negri argue, "we need also to construct a new mode of life and above all a new community" (204). Paolo Virno develops this same idea through the concepts of exodus and exit: "The 'exit' modifies the conditions within which the conflict takes place, rather than presupposes it as an irremovable horizon; it changes the context within which a problem arises, rather than deals with the problem by choosing one or another of the alternative solutions already on offer" (1996, 199). In this sense, refusal, like exodus or exit, is an "engaged withdrawal (or founding leave-taking)" (197), a creative practice as opposed to a merely defensive stance. The passage from the negative moment of refusal to its constructive moment of exit and invention marks the shift from a reactive gesture of retreat to an active affirmation of social innovation. According to this reading, the refusal of work serves not as a goal, but as a path a path of separation that creates the conditions for the construction of subjects whose needs and desires are no longer as consistent with the social mechanisms within which they are supposed to be mediated and contained. This is why, in contrast to both modernization and humanist Marxisms, Negri locates in the refusal of work not just the symptoms of exploitation and alienation, but a measure of freedom (2005, 273). The defection enacted through the refusal of work is not predicated upon what we lack or cannot do, it is not the path of those with nothing to lose but their chains; it is predicated instead on our "latent wealth, on an abundance of possibilities" (Virno 1996, 199).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › Alt – Ludic Life

The alt is ludic play – it solves.

Black 15 (Bob Black is an American anarchist with a degree in sociology from Georgetown. “Instead of Work,” LBC Books. January 1, 2015) @ehatt

. You may be wondering if I’m joking or serious. I’m joking and serious. To be ludic is not to be ludicrous. Play doesn’t have to be frivolous, although frivolity isn’t triviality: very often we ought to take frivolity seriously. I’d like life to be a game--but a game with high stakes. I want to play for keeps. The alternative to work isn’t just idleness. To be ludic is not to be quaaludic. As much as I treasure the pleasure of torpor, it’s never more rewarding than when it punctuates other pleasures and pastimes. Nor am I promoting the managed time-disciplined safety-valve called “leisure”; far from it. Leisure is nonwork for the sake of work. Leisure is the time spent recovering from work and in the frenzied but hopeless attempt to forget about work. Many people return from vacation so beat that thev look forward to returning to work so they can rest up. The main difference between work and leisure is that with work at least you get paid for your alienation and enervation. I am not playing definitional games with anybody. When I say I want to abolish work, I mean just what I say, but I want to say what I mean by defining my terms in non-idiosyncratic ways. My minimum definition of work is forced labor, that is, compulsory production. Both elements are essential. Work is production enforced by economic or political means, by the carrot or the stick. (The carrot is just the stick by other means.) But not all creation is work. Work is never done for its own sake, it’s done on account of some product or output that the worker (or, more often, somebody else) gets out of it. This is what work necessarily is. To define it is to despise it. But work is usually even worse than its definition decrees. The dynamic of domination intrinsic to work tends over time toward elaboration. In advanced work-riddled societies, including all industrial societies whether capitalist or “Communist,” work invariably acquires other attributes which accentuate its obnoxiousness. Usually--and this is even more true in “Communist” than capitalist countries, where the state is almost the only employer and everyone is an employee--work is employment, i. e, wage- labor, which means selling yourself on the install- ment plan. Thus 95% of Americans who work, work for somebody (or something) else. In the USSR or Cuba or the former Yugoslavia or any other alternative model which might be adduced, the corresponding figure approaches 100%. Only the embattled Third World peasant bastions-- Mexico, India, Brazil, Turkey--temporarily shelter significant concentrations of agricultur- ists who perpetuate the traditional arrangement of most laborers in the last several millenia, the payment of taxes (= ransom) to the state or rent to parasitic landlords in return for being otherwise left alone. Even this raw deal is beginning to look good. All industrial (and office) workers are em- ployees and under the sort of surveillance which ensures servility. But modem work has worse implications. People don’t just work, they have “jobs.” One person does one productive task all the time on an or-else basis. Even if the task has a quantum of intrinsic interest (as increasingly many jobs don’t) the monotony of its obligatory exclusivity drains its ludic potential. A “job” that might engage the energies of some people, for a reasonably limited time, for the fun of it, is just a burden on those who have to do it for forty hours a week with no say in how it should be done, for the profit of owners who contribute nothing to the project, and with no opportunity for sharing tasks or spreading the work among those who actually have to do it. This is the real world of work: a world of bureaucratic blundering, of sexual harassment and discrimination, of bonehead bosses exploiting and scapegoating their subordinates who--by any rational-technical criteria--should be calling the shots. But capitalism in the real world subordinates the rational maximization of productivity and profit to the exigencies of organizational control. The degradation which most workers expe- rience on the job is the sum of assorted indignities which can be denominated as “discipline.” Foucault has complexified this phenomenon but it is simple enough. Discipline consists of the totality of totalitarian controls at the workplace--surveillance, rotework, imposed work tempos, production quotas, punching -in and -out, etc. Discipline is what the factory and the office and the store share with the prison and the school and the mental hospital. It is something historically original and horrible. It was beyond the capacities of such de- monic dictators of yore as Nero and Genghis Khan and Ivan the Terrible. For all their bad intentions they just didn’t have the machinery to control their subjects as thoroughly as modern despots do. Discipline is the distinctively diabolical modern mode of control, it is an innovative intrusion which must be interdicted at the earliest opportunity. Such is “work.” Play is just the opposite. Play is always voluntary. What might otherwise be play is work if it’s forced. This is axiomatic. Bernie de Koven has defined play as the “suspension of consequences.” This is unacceptable if it implies that play is inconsequential. The point is not that play is without consequences. This is to demean play. The point is that the consequences, if any, are gratuitous. Playing and giving are closely related, they are the behavioral and transactional facets of the same impulse, the play-instinct. They share an aristocratic disdain for results. The player gets something out of playing; that’s why he plays. But the core reward is the experience of the activity itself (whatever it is). Some otherwise attentive students of play, like Johan Huizinga (Homo Ludens), define it as game-playing or following rules. I respect Huizinga’s erudition but emphatically reject his constraints. There are many good games (chess, baseball, Monopoly, bridge) which are rule-governed but there is much more to play than game-playing. Conversation, sex, dancing, travel--these practices aren’t rule- governed but they are surely play if anything is. And rules can be played with at least as readily as anything else.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › Alt – Ludic Life

Only refusal of work solves—other theoretical frameworks fall short and perpetuate work as a form of discipline and control

Black 15 (Bob Black is an American anarchist with a degree in sociology from Georgetown. “Instead of Work,” LBC Books. January 1, 2015) @ehatt

The ludic life is totally incompatible with existing reality. So much the worse for ”reality,” the gravity hole that sucks the vitality from the little in life that still distinguishes it from mere survival. Curiously--or maybe not--all the old ideologies are conservative because they believe in work. Some of them, like Marxism and most brands of anarchism, believe in work all the more fiercely because they believe in so little else. Liberals say we should end employment discrimination. I say we should end employment. Conservatives support right-to-work laws. Following Karl Marx’s wayward son-in-law Paul Lafargue, I support the right to be lazy. Leftists favor full employment. Like the surrealists--except that I’m not kidding--I favor full unemployment. Trotskyists agitate for permanent revolution. I agitate for permanent revelry. But if all the ideologues (as they do) advocate work--and not only because they plan to make other people do theirs--they are strangely reluctant to say so. They will carry on endlessly about wages, hours, working conditions, exploitation, productivity, profitability. They’ll gladly talk about anything but work itself. These experts who offer to do our thinking for us rarely share their conclusions about work, for all its saliency in the lives of all of us. Among themselves they quibble over the details. Unions and management agree that we ought to sell the time of our lives in exchange for survival, although they haggle over the price. Marxists think we should be bossed by bureaucrats. Libertarians think we should be bossed by businessmen. Feminists don’t care which form bossing takes so long as the bosses are women. Clearly these ideology-mongers have serious differences over how to divvy up the spoils of power. Just as clearly, none of them have any objection to power as such and all of them want to keep us working. You may be wondering if I’m joking or serious. I’m joking and serious. To be ludic is not to be ludicrous. Play doesn’t have to be frivolous, although frivolity isn’t triviality: very often we ought to take frivolity seriously. I’d like life to be a game--but a game with high stakes. I want to play for keeps. The alternative to work isn’t just idleness. To be ludic is not to be quaaludic. As much as I treasure the pleasure of torpor, it’s never more rewarding than when it punctuates other pleasures and pastimes. Nor am I promoting the managed time-disciplined safety-valve called “leisure”; far from it. Leisure is nonwork for the sake of work. Leisure is the time spent recovering from work and in the frenzied but hopeless attempt to forget about work. Many people return from vacation so beat that thev look forward to returning to work so they can rest up. The main difference between work and leisure is that with work at least you get paid for your alienation and enervation. I am not playing definitional games with anybody. When I say I want to abolish work, I mean just what I say, but I want to say what I mean by defining my terms in non-idiosyncratic ways. My minimum definition of work is forced labor, that is, compulsory production. Both elements are essential. Work is production enforced by economic or political means, by the carrot or the stick. (The carrot is just the stick by other means.) But not all creation is work. Work is never done for its own sake, it’s done on account of some product or output that the worker (or, more often, somebody else) gets out of it. This is what work necessarily is. To define it is to despise it. But work is usually even worse than its definition decrees. The dynamic of domination intrinsic to work tends over time toward elaboration. In advanced work-riddled societies, including all industrial societies whether capitalist or “Communist,” work invariably acquires other attributes which accentuate its obnoxiousness. Usually--and this is even more true in “Communist” than capitalist countries, where the state is almost the only employer and everyone is an employee--work is employment, i. e, wage- labor, which means selling yourself on the install- ment plan. Thus 95% of Americans who work, work for somebody (or something) else. In the USSR or Cuba or the former Yugoslavia or any other alternative model which might be adduced, the corresponding figure approaches 100%. Only the embattled Third World peasant bastions-- Mexico, India, Brazil, Turkey--temporarily shelter significant concentrations of agricultur- ists who perpetuate the traditional arrangement of most laborers in the last several millenia, the payment of taxes (= ransom) to the state or rent to parasitic landlords in return for being otherwise left alone. Even this raw deal is beginning to look good. All industrial (and office) workers are em- ployees and under the sort of surveillance which ensures servility. But modem work has worse implications. People don’t just work, they have “jobs.” One person does one productive task all the time on an or-else basis. Even if the task has a quantum of intrinsic interest (as increasingly many jobs don’t) the monotony of its obligatory exclusivity drains its ludic potential. A “job” that might engage the energies of some people, for a reasonably limited time, for the fun of it, is just a burden on those who have to do it for forty hours a week with no say in how it should be done, for the profit of owners who contribute nothing to the project, and with no opportunity for sharing tasks or spreading the work among those who actually have to do it. This is the real world of work: a world of bureaucratic blundering, of sexual harassment and discrimination, of bonehead bosses exploiting and scapegoating their subordinates who--by any rational-technical criteria--should be calling the shots. But capitalism in the real world subordinates the rational maximization of productivity and profit to the exigencies of organizational control. The degradation which most workers expe- rience on the job is the sum of assorted indignities which can be denominated as “discipline.” Foucault has complexified this phenomenon but it is simple enough. Discipline consists of the totality of totalitarian controls at the workplace--surveillance, rotework, imposed work tempos, production quotas, punching -in and -out, etc. Discipline is what the factory and the office and the store share with the prison and the school and the mental hospital. It is something historically original and horrible. It was beyond the capacities of such de- monic dictators of yore as Nero and Genghis Khan and Ivan the Terrible. For all their bad intentions they just didn’t have the machinery to control their subjects as thoroughly as modern despots do. Discipline is the distinctively diabolical modern mode of control, it is an innovative intrusion which must be interdicted at the earliest opportunity.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › Alt – Ludic Life

The alternative is to reject productivist values and embrace the ludic life –– by escaping the vortex of our drudgery we find new meaning in life, realizing the intrinsic value of humanity, and creating new ontologies around leisure – your ballot is an ethical commitment to how we should structure society

Black 16 Bob Black is an American anarchist. Bob Black graduated from the University of Michigan and Georgetown Law School. He holds two post graduate degrees–one in jurisprudence and social policy from the University of California, Berkeley and the second in Criminal justice from University Of New York, Albany.; 2016; Instead of Work; pg. 1-20. //[TMS—GK]

No one should ever work. Work is the source of nearly all the misery in the world. Almost any evil you'd care to name comes from working or from living in a world designed for work. In order to stop suffering, we have to stop working. That doesn't mean we have to stop doing things. It does mean creating a new way of life based on play; in other words, a Judie conviviality, commensality, and maybe even art. There is more to play than child's play, as worthy as that is. I call for a collective adventure in generalized joy and freely interdependent exuberance. Play isn't passive. Doubtless we all need a lot more time for sheer sloth and slack than we ever enjoy now, regardless of income or occupation, but once recovered from employment-induced exhaustion nearly all of us want to act. Oblomovism and Stakhanovism are two sides of the same debased coin. The ludic life is totally incompatible with existing reality. So much the worse for "reality," the gravity hole that sucks the vitality from the little in life that still distinguishes it from mere survival. Curiously---or maybe not-all the old ideologies are conservative because they believe in work. Some of them, like Marxism and most brands of anarchism, believe in work all the more fiercely because they believe in so little else. Liberals say we should end employment discrimination. I say we should end employment. Conservatives support right-to-work laws. Following Karl Marx's wayward son-in-law Paul Lafargue, I support the right to be lazy. Leftists favor full employment. Like the surrealists except that I'm not kidding-I favor full unemployment. Trotskyists agitate for permanent revolution. I agitate for permanent revelry. But if all the ideologues (as they do) advocate work and not only because they plan to make other people do theirs-they are strangely reluctant to say so. They will carry on endlessly about wages, hours, working conditions, exploitation, productivity, profitability. They'll gladly talk about anything but work itself. These experts who offer to do our thinking for us rarely share their conclusions about work, for all its saliency in the lives of all of us. Among themselves they quibble over the details. Unions and management agree that we ought to sell the time of our lives in exchange for survival, although they haggle over the price. Marxists think we should be bossed by bureaucrats. Libertarians think we should be bossed by businessmen. Feminists don't care which form bossing takes so long as the bosses are women. Clearly these ideology-mongers have serious differences over how to divvy up the spoils of power. Just as clearly, none of them have any objection to power as such and all of them want to keep us working. You may be wondering if I'm joking or serious. I'm joking and serious. To be ludic is not to be ludicrous. Play doesn't have to be frivolous, although frivolity isn't triviality: very often we ought to take frivolity seriously. I'd like life to be a game-but a game with high stakes. I want to play for keeps. The alternative to work isn't just idleness. To be ludic is not to be quaaludic. As much as I treasure the pleasure of torpor, it's never more rewarding than when it punctuates other pleasures and pastimes. Nor am I promoting the managed time-disciplined safety-valve called "leisure"; far from it. Leisure is nonwork for the sake of work. Leisure is the time spent recovering from work and in the frenzied but hopeless attempt to forget about work. Many people return from vacation so beat that they look forward to returning to work so they can rest up. The main difference between work and leisure is that with work at least you get paid for your alienation and enervation. I am not playing definitional games with anybody. When I say I want to abolish work, I mean just what I say, but I want to say what I mean by defining my terms in non-idiosyncratic ways. My minimum definition of work is forced labor, that is, compulsory production. Both elements are essential. Work is production enforced by economic or political means, by the carrot or the stick. (The carrot is just the stick by other means.) But not all creation is work. Work is never done for its own sake, it's done on account of some product or output that the worker (or, more often, somebody else) gets out of it. This is what work necessarily is. To define it is to despise it. But work is usually even worse than its definition decrees. The dynamic of domination intrinsic to work tends over time toward elaboration. In advanced work-riddled societies, including all industrial societies whether capitalist or "Communist," work invariably acquires other attributes which accentuate its obnoxiousness. Usually-and this is even more true in "Communist" than capitalist countries, where the state is almost the only employer and everyone is an employee--work is employment, i. e., wage labor, which means selling yourself on the installment plan. Thus 95% of Americans who work, work for somebody (or something) else. In the USSR or Cuba or the former Yugoslavia or any other alternative model which might be adduced, the corresponding figure approaches 100%. Only the embattled Third World peasant bastions Mexico, India, Brazil, Turkey-temporarily shelter significant concentrations of agriculturists who perpetuate the traditional arrangement of most laborers in the last several millenia, the payment of taxes (= ransom) to the state or rent to parasitic landlords in return for being otherwise left alone. Even this raw deal is beginning to look good. All industrial (and office) workers are employees and under the sort of surveillance which ensures servility. But modem work has worse implications. People don't just work, they have "jobs." One person does one productive task all the time on an or-else basis. Even if the task has a quantum of intrinsic interest (as increasingly many jobs don't) the monotony of its obligatory exclusivity drains its ludic potential. A "job" that might engage the energies of some people, for a reasonably limited time, for the fun of it, is just a burden on those who have to do it for forty hours a week with no say in how it should be done, for the profit of owners who contribute nothing to the project, and with no opportunity for sharing tasks or spreading the work among those who actually have to do it. This is the real world of work: a world of bureaucratic blundering, of sexual harassment and discrimination, of bonehead bosses exploiting and scapegoating their subordinates who-by any rational-technical criteria-should be calling the shots. But capitalism in the real world subordinates the rational maximization of productivity and profit to the exigencies of organizational control. The degradation which most workers experience on the job is the sum of assorted indignities which can be denominated as "discipline." Foucault has complexified this phenomenon but it is simple enough. Discipline consists of the totality of totalitarian controls at the workplace-surveillance, rotework, imposed work tempos, production quotas, punching -in and -out, etc. Discipline is what the factory and the office and the store share with the prison and the school and the mental hospital. It is something historically original and horrible. It was beyond the capacities of such demonic dictators of yore as Nero and Genghis Khan and Ivan the Terrible. For all their bad intentions they just didn't have the machinery to control their subjects as thoroughly as modern despots do. Discipline is the distinctively diabolical modern mode of control, it is an innovative intrusion which must be interdicted at the earliest opportunity. Such is "work." Play is just the opposite. Play is always voluntary. What might otherwise be play is work if it's forced. This is axiomatic. Bernie de Koven has defined play as the "suspension of consequences." This is unacceptable if it implies that play is inconsequential. The point is not that play is without consequences. This is to demean play. The point is that the consequences, if any, are gratuitous. Playing and giving are closely related, they are the behavioral and transactional facets of the same impulse, the play-instinct. They share an aristocratic disdain for results. The player gets something out of playing; that's why he plays. But the core reward is the experience of the activity itself (whatever it is). Some otherwise attentive students of play, like Johan Huizinga (Homo Ludens), define it as game-playing or following rules. I respect Huizinga's erudition but emphatically reject his constraints. There are many good games (chess, baseball, Monopoly, bridge) which are rule-governed but there is much more to play than game-playing. Conversation, sex, dancing, travel-these practices aren't rule governed but they are surely play if anything is. And rules can be played with at least as readily as anything else.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › Alt – Material

The alternative is to abolish work and embrace ludic life— this contributes to larger movements and can be expressed with different material activities – The devaluation of work eliminates the mandate of productivity and allows society to function through passion

Black 15 (Bob Black is an American anarchist with a degree in sociology from Georgetown. “Instead of Work,” LBC Books. January 1, 2015) @ehatt

What I’ve said so far ought not to be controversial. Many workers are fed up with work. There are high and rising rates of absenteeism, turnover, employee theft and sabotage, wildcat strikes, and overall goldbricking on the job. There may be some movement toward a conscious and not just visceral rejection of work. And yet the prevalent feeling, universal among bosses and their agents and also widespread among workers themselves is that work itself is inevitable and necessary. I disagree. It is now possible to abolish work and replace it, insofar as it serves useful purposes, with a multitude of new kinds of free activities. To abolish work requires going at it from two directions, quantitative and qualitative. On the one hand, on the quantitative side, we have to cut down massively on the amount of work being done. At present most work is useless or worse and we should simply get rid of it. On the other hand--and I think this is the crux of the matter and the revolutionary new departure--we have to take what useful work remains and transform it into a pleasing variety of game-like and craft-like pastimes, indistinguishable from other pleasurable pastimes, except that they happen to yield useful end-products. Surely that shouldn’t make them less enticing to do. Then all the artificial barriers of power and property could come down. Creation could become recreation. And we could all stop being afraid of each other. I don’t suggest that most work is salvageable in this way. But then most work isn’t worth trying to save. Only a small and diminishing fraction of work serves any useful purpose independent of the defense and reproduction of the work-system and its political and legal appendages. Twenty years ago, Paul and Percival Goodman estimated that just five percent of the work then being done--presumably the figure, if accurate, is lower now-- would satisfy our minimal needs for food, clothing, and shelter. Theirs was only an educated guess but the main point is quite clear: directly or indirectly, most work serves the unproductive purposes of commerce or social control. Right off the bat we can liberate tens of millions of salesmen, soldiers, managers, cops, stockbrokers, clergymen, bankers, lawyers, teachers, landlords, security guards, ad- men and everyone who works for them. There is a snowball effect since every time you idle some bigshot you liberate his flunkeys and underlings also. Thus the economy implodes. Forty percent of the workforce are white- collar workers, most of whom have some of the most tedious and idiotic jobs ever concocted. Entire industries, insurance and banking and real estate for instance, consist of nothing but useless paper-shuffling. It is no accident that the “tertiary sector,” the service sector, is growing while the “secondary sector” (industry) stagnates and the “primary sector” (agriculture) nearly disappears. Because work is unnecessary except to those whose power it secures, workers are shifted from Telatively useful to relatively useless occupations as a measure to assure public order. Anything is better than nothing. That’s why you can’t go home just because you finish early. They want your time, enough of it to make you theirs, even if they have no use for most of it. Otherwise why hasn’t the average work week gone down by more than a few minutes in the past fifty years? Next we can take a meat-cleaver to production work itself. No more war production, nuclear power, junk food, feminine hygiene deodorant--and above all, no more auto industry to speak of. An occasional Stanley Steamer or Model-T might be all right, but the auto-eroticism on which such pestholes as Detroit and Los Angeles depend is out of the question. Already, without even trying, we’ve virtually solved the energy crisis, the environmental crisis and assorted other insoluble social problems. Finally, we must do away with far and away the largest occupation, the one with the longest hours, the lowest pay and some of the most tedious tasks around. I refer to housewives doing housework and child-rearing. By abolishing wage-labor and achieving full unemployment we undermine the sexual division of labor. The nuclear family as we know it is an inevitable adaptation to the division of labor imposed by modern wage-work. Like it or not, as things have been for the last century or two it is economically rational for the man to bring home the bacon, for the woman to do the shitwork to provide him with a haven in a heartless world, and for the children to be marched off to youth concentration camps called “schools,” primarily to keep them out of Mom’s hair but still under control, but incidentally to acquire the habits of obedience and punctuality so necessary for workers. If you would be rid of patriarchy, get rid of the nuclear family whose unpaid ‚”shadow work,” as Ivan Illich says, makes possible the work-system that makes it necessary. Bound up with this no-nukes strategy is the abolition of childhood and the closing of the schools. There are more full-time students than full-time workers in this country. We need children as teachers, not students. They have a lot to contribute to the ludic revolution because they’re better at playing than grown- ups are. Adults and children are not identical but they will become equal through interdependence. Only play can bridge the generation gap. I haven’t as yet even mentioned the possibility of cutting way down on the little work that remains by automating and cybernizing it. All the scientists and engineers and technicians freed from bothering with war research and planned obsolescence would have a good time devising means to eliminate fatigue and tedium and danger from activities like mining. Undoubtedly they’ll find other projects to amuse themselves with. Perhaps they’ll set up world-wide all-inclusive multi-media communications systems or found space colonies. Perhaps. I myself am no gadget freak. I wouldn’t care to live in a pushbutton paradise. I don’t want robot slaves to do everything; I want to do things myself. There is, I think, a place for labor-saving technology, but a modest place. The historical and pre-historical record is not encouraging. When productive technology went from hunting-gathering to agriculture and on to industry, work increased while skills and self-determination diminished. The further evolution of industrialism has accentuated what Harry Braverman called the degradation of work. Intelligent observers have always been aware of this. John Stuart Mill wrote that all the labor- saving inventions ever devised haven’t saved a moment’s labor. Karl Marx wrote that “it would be possible to write a history of the inventions, made since 1830, for the sole purpose of supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working class.” The enthusiastic technophiles--Saint-Simon, Comte, Lenin, B. F. Skinner--have always been unabashed authoritarians also; which is to say, technocrats. We should be more than sceptical about the promises of the computer mystics. They work like dogs; chances are, if they have their way, so will the rest of us. But if they have any particularized contributions more readily subordinated to human purposes than the run of high tech, let’s give them a hearing. What I really want to see is work tured into play. A first step is to discard the notions of a “job” and an “occupation” Even activities that already have some ludic content lose most of it by being reduced to jobs which certain people, and only those people are forced to do to the exclusion of all else. Is it not odd that farm workers toil painfully in the fields while their air-conditioned masters go home every weekend and putter about in their gardens? Under a system of permanent revelry, we will witness the Golden Age of the dilettante which will put the Renaissance to shame. There won’t be any more jobs, just things to do and people to do them. The secret of turning work into play, as Charles Fourier demonstrated, is to arrange useful activities to take advantage of whatever it is that various people at various times in fact enjoy doing. To make it possible for some people to do the things they could enjoy it will be enough just to eradicate the irrationalities and distortions which afflict these activities when they are reduced to work. I, for instance, would enjoy doing some (not too much) teaching, but I don’t want coerced students and I don’t care to suck up to pathetic pedants for tenure. Second, there are some things that people like to do from time to time, but not for too long, and certainly not all the time. You might enjoy baby-sitting for a few hours in order to share the company of kids, but not as much as their parents do. The parents meanwhile, profoundly appreciate the time to themselves that you free up for them, although they’d get fretful if parted from their progeny for too long. These differences among individuals are what make a life of free play possible. The same principle applies to many other areas of activity, especially the primal ones. Thus many people enjoy cooking when they can practice it seriously at their leisure, but not when they’re just fueling up human bodies for work. Third--other things being equal--some things that are unsatisfying if done by yourself or in unpleasant surroundings or at the orders of an overlord are enjoyable, at least for a while, if these circumstances are changed. This is probably true, to some extent, of all work. People deploy their otherwise wasted ingenuity to make a game of the least inviting drudge-jobs as best they can. Activities that appeal to some people don’t always appeal to all others, but everyone at least potentially has a variety of interests and an interest in variety. As the saying goes, “anything once.” Fourier was the master at speculating how aberrant and perverse penchants could be put to use in post-civilized society, what he called Harmony. He thought the Emperor Nero would have turned out all right if as a child he could have indulged his taste for bloodshed by working in a slaughterhouse. Small children who notoriously relish wallowing in filth could be organized in “Little Hordes” to clean toilets and empty the garbage, with medals awarded to the outstanding. I am not arguing for these precise examples but for the underlying principle, which I think makes perfect sense as one dimension of an overall revolutionary transformation. Bear in mind that we don’t have to take today’s work just as we find it and match it up with the proper people, some of whom would have to be perverse indeed. If technology has a role in all this it is less to automate work out of existence than to open up new realms for re/ creation. To some extent we may want to return to handicrafts, which William Morris considered a probable and desirable upshot of communist revolution. Art would be taken back from the snobs and collectors, abolished as a specialized department catering to an elite audience, and its qualities of beauty and creation restored to integral life from which they were stolen by work. It’s a sobering thought that the grecian urns we write odes about and showcase in museums were used in their own time to store olive oil. I doubt our everyday artifacts will fare as well in the future, if there is one. The point is that there’s no such thing as progress in the world of work; if anything it’s just the opposite. We shouldn’t hesitate to pilfer the past for what it has to offer, the ancients lose nothing yet we are enriched. The reinvention of daily life means marching off the edge of our maps. There is, it is true, more suggestive speculation than most people suspect. Besides Fourier and Morris--and even a hint, here and there, in Marx--there are the writings of Kropotkin, the syndicalists Pataud and Pouget, anarcho-communists old (Berkman) and new (Bookchin). The Goodman brothers’ Communitas is exemplary for illustrating what forms follow from given functions (purposes), and there is something to be gleaned from the often hazy heralds of alternative/appropriate/intermediate/ convivial technology, like Schumacher and especially Illich, once you disconnect their fog machines. The situationists--as represented by Vaneigem’s Revolution of Daily Life and in the Situationist International Anthology--are so ruthlessly lucid as to be exhilarating, even if they never did quite square the endorsement of the Tule of the worker’s councils with the abolition of work, Better their incongruity, though, than any extant version of leftism, whose devotees look to be the last champions of work, for if there were no work there would be no workers, and without workers, who would the left have to organize? So the abolitionists would be largely on their own. No one can say what would result from unleashing the creative power stultified by work. Anything can happen. The tiresome debater’s problem of freedom vs. necessity, with its theological overtones, resolves itself practically once the production of use-values is coextensive with the consumption of delightful play-activity. Life will become a game, or rather many games, but not--as it is now—a zero/sum game. An optimal sexual encounter is the paradigm of productive play. The participants potentiate each other’s pleasures, nobody keeps score, and everybody wins. The more you give, the more you get. In the ludic life, the best of sex will diffuse into the better part of daily life. Generalized play leads to the libidinization of life. Sex, in turn, can become less urgent and desperate, more playful. If we play our cards right, we can all get more out of life than we put into it, but only if we play for keeps. No one should ever work. Workers of the world... relax!

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › AT: Work Inevitable

The inevitability of work is a internalized falsity – you only believe that because you’ve been convinced of it your whole life

Alliger 22 – (GEORGE M. ALLIGER has had over 60 articles published in journals such as Journal of Management, Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Psychological Science, and Times Higher Education. He is an editor of The Handbook of Work Analysis. A fellow of the Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology, Alliger is now a Consulting Psychologist in the Houston Area “Anti-Work: Phycological Investigations Into Its Truths, Problems, and Solutions” 2022) - MP

Anti-work theorists may use analogical thinking when they discuss work and will in order to present the limiting case on the other, stronger, end of things. For example, consider enslavement or human trafficking. In these cases, there is no doubt that goals ordinarily sought by human will are crushed. One reason that activities like enslaving or trafficking humans are wrong is because the person’s will, her desires – that which she wishes or would wish in free circumstances – are actively being ignored and overridden. This, we say, is criminal. And in fact, in these cases there is always some agent or agents who are causing this ignoring and active domination of a person’s will. These agents, we say, are criminals. Then, by analogy: what of employers who order people about no matter what those employees wish to do? There are many examples of the deformation of will within the work environment which fall in between being asked to smile at customers and outright, total bondage. An advertising designer is asked to exaggerate about a product’s good points to the extent of actual lying; a salesperson is required to “upsell” (e.g., unneeded warranties) to customers despite her recognition that this is asking the customer to cough up more money at a time when they are somewhat vulnerable (the retailer possessing the dominant status of presumably being “expert” in the product, including whether a warranty is really needed); an accountant is asked to be devious, to depart from ordinary practice in order to include certain items in revenue or exclude some from expenses; a research analyst is told to look at her data again and come up with more favorable results; plant supervisors ask workers to avoid mentioning or even hide certain problems from safety inspectors … the examples can be endlessly elaborated. Collusion, lying, glossing over known problems, bribery, slander, cheating, providing an unneeded or deceptively inferior product; these and many more may be asked of an employee. In each case the internal psychic impulse of an employee may be to resist, but such resistance could create any number of job-related problems for the employee, from a general chilling of management attention to dismissal. And so employees may choose to capitulate, to be submissive in the face of wrong requests. We’ll just note here what we discuss in more detail elsewhere, that it is not as if the employer and employee are on equal footing. The employer can apply sanctions; the employee has none in her repertoire, unless it be the truly significant step of whistle-blowing. An employee is often easily replaced, but another job may be hard to come by for the employee. Thus the suppression of an individual worker’s will in the world of work can occur via management requirements for actions on the part of the worker which she finds undesirable. This is of course a corrupting phenomenon, both for manager and employee. At the same time, the pure anti-work position goes farther; it is not only being asked to do something that goes against one’s grain that is problematic. Workers are entering a state of submission simply by entering any business at all where they are not the boss. Now, as Lordon states, “It is ultimately quite strange that people should so ‘accept’ to occupy themselves in the service of a desire that was not originally their own.”3 This puzzle of acceptance or consent to domination is one Lordon meditates extensively on. Any given worker may say precisely that they fully accept their choice to be a worker: their will is in not in any way undermined or contravened. To this Lordon suggests: The individual-subject imagines itself to be a free being, endowed with an autonomous will, whose actions are the effects of its sovereign volition: hence, had I wanted emancipation strongly enough, I would have been able to escape my condition of servitude; consequently, if I am in this condition, it must be the fault of my will, and my servitude has to be voluntary.4 Thus, Lordon maintains, because you are working, you will believe that you have chosen to work and that therefore the work itself, or capitalism, or big business or whatever cannot be to blame. The psychologist Leon Festinger, long before Lordon, pointed out that post-decision justification such as the kind Lordon imagines does in fact often happen; he called it “cognitive dissonance.” This idea posits that “if a person knows various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another, he will, in a variety of ways, try to make them more consistent.”5 Finding yourself working and in a “condition of servitude,” on the one hand, and believing you are in control of what you do, on the other, should create a dissonance. You are choosing your own situation, but you have chosen a bad one. To resolve the tension, you argue to yourself that the situation is in fact not bad. So, do we, can we, willingly choose to work? The most natural answer seems to be “Of course.” However, the statement “I work because I will to work, and that’s that” may discount the many forces outside ourselves that cause us to work, forces that are much bigger than ourselves and the bucking of which may be near impossible. From one point of view, it can be said that we discover ourselves working. This does not seem so far-fetched, when the usual path of life is rehearsed: you start out early childhood by going to kindergarten and elementary school. It is unlikely that most of us would look inside ourselves and declare that this had been a choice of ours. It may even be difficult to argue that it was the choice of our parent, parents, or guardian(s): what else were they to do but send us to school when the time arrived? Then at some point we started working, maybe after attempting college, maybe before. Was this a personal choice in a way that going to grade school was not? Or were the skids set in place and greased, so to speak, so that working was the only natural thing to do? Now it may be true that we exercise free will in choosing among available jobs at which to work. This exercise of choice may then lead us to feel that we are also freely working in general. Or it may be that we actually do will to work; that such a choice is in concert or aligned with what society expects need not undermine the sovereignty of that choice. But anti-work would, at the least, see that as true of only a sliver of the population of workers.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › AT: Work Inevitable

The affirmative accepts and legitimizes the work as a natural part of life while failing to realize its nature of domination, hierarchy, and inequality.

Weeks ’11 [Kathi, Associate Professor of Women's Studies at Duke University. “The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries.” Duke University Press. p. 12-14; JFan]

Why do we work so long and so hard? The mystery here is not that we are required to work or that we are expected to devote so much time and energy to its pursuit, but rather that there is not more active resistance to this state of affairs. The problems with work today—my focus will be on the United States—have to do with both its quantity and its quality and are not limited to the travails of any one group. Those problems include the low wages in most sectors of the economy; the unemployment, underemployment, and precarious employment suffered by many workers; and the overwork that often characterizes even the most privileged forms of employment—after all, even the best job is a problem when it monopolizes so much of life. To be sure, if we were only resigned to such conditions, there would be no puzzle. What is perplexing is less the acceptance of the present reality that one must work to live than the willingness to live for work. By the same token, it is easy to appreciate why work is held in such high esteem, but considerably less obvious why it seems to be valued more than other pastimes and practices.

That these questions are rarely posed within the field of political theory is also surprising. The lack of interest in representing the daily grind of work routines in various forms of popular culture is perhaps understandable,1 as is the tendency among cultural critics to focus on the animation and meaningfulness of commodities rather than the eclipse of laboring activity that Marx identifies as the source of their fetishization (Marx 1976, 164– 65). The preference for a level of abstraction that tends not to register either the qualitative dimensions or the hierarchical relations of work can also account for its relative neglect in the field of mainstream economics. But the lack of attention to the lived experience and political textures of work within political theory would seem to be another matter.2 Indeed, political theorists tend to be more interested in our lives as citizens and noncitizens, legal subjects and bearers of rights, consumers and spectators, religious devotees and family members, than in our daily lives as workers.3 And yet, to take a simple example, the amount of time alone that the average citizen is expected to devote to work—particularly when we include the time spent training, searching, and preparing for work, not to mention recovering from it—would suggest that the experience warrants more consideration. Work is crucial not only to those whose lives are centered around it, but also, in a society that expects people to work for wages, to those who are expelled or excluded from work and marginalized in relation to it. Perhaps more significantly, places of employment and spaces of work would seem to be supremely relevant to the very bread and butter of political science: as sites of decision making, they are structured by relations of power and authority; as hierarchical organizations, they raise issues of consent and obedience; as spaces of exclusion, they pose questions about membership and obligation. Although impersonal forces may compel us into work, once we enter the workplace we inevitably find ourselves enmeshed in the direct and personal relations of rulers and ruled. Indeed, the work site is where we often experience the most immediate, unambiguous, and tangible relations of power that most of us will encounter on a daily basis. As a fully political rather than a simply economic phenomenon, work would thus seem to be an especially rich object of inquiry.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Ableism

Work turns the living into dead objects to be sacrifices on the altar of competition. This is a totalitarian form of thanatopolitcs that erases freedom via its production of economically rational subjectivity. This produces a bankrupt understanding of wealth that denies freedom and joy.

Bifo 2009 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social history of communication at the Accademia di belle Arit in Milan and Founder of A/traverse, The Soul at Work, p. 188-191)

The introduction of pervasive technologies, the computerization of productive processes and of social communication enact a molecular domination upon the collective nervous network. This is the domain of the dead object, the commodity, which objectifies human activity reducing it to a cognitive automatism. In this sense we should speak of "thanato-politics" (from the Greek "thanatos," meaning death): the submission of intelligent life to the dead object; the domination of the dead over the living. Neo-Liberal theories reduce the concept of freedom to its formal, juridical dimension. But contemporary totalitarianism has forged' chains that are different from those of political absolutism: its instruments of domination have moved from the domain of politics to that of the technical production of subjectivity, from the realm of the juridical person to the animated body, to the soul. Neoliberalism aimed, on one side, at the elimination of all legal norms and social regulations that resulted in the limitation of competitive dynamics. On the other side, it wanted to transform every domain of social life (included health care, education, sexuality, affects, culture, etc) into an economic space where the only valid rule is that of supply and demand within an increasingly absolute privatization of services. Neoliberalism eliminated the ties that protected society from the economical dynamics of competition; therefore an effect of biopolitical branding was produced in the collective mind-body. "It means generalizing the `enterprise' from within the social body or social fabric; it means taking this social fabric and arranging things so that it can be broken down, subdivided, and reduced, not according to the grain of individuals, but according to the grain of enterprises. The individual life must be lodged [...] within the framework of a multiplicity of diverse enterprises connected up to and entangled with each other [...]. And finally, the individual's life itself—with his relationships to his private property, fox example, with his family, household, insurance, and retirement—must make him into a sort of permanent and multiple enterprise What is the function of this generalization of the `enterprise' form? On the one hand, of course, it involves extending the economic model of supply and demand and investmentcosts- profit so as to make it a model of social relations and of existence itself, a form of relationship of the individual to himself, time, those around him, the group, and the family [...]. The return to the enterprise is therefore at once an economic policy or a policy of the economization of the entire social field, but at the same time a policy which presents itself or seeks to be a kind of Vitalpolitik with the function of compensating for what is cold, impassive, calculating, rational, and mechanical in the strictly economic game of competition:'3 The reign of the enterprise is at once a political deregulation process and an epistemic process of a new segmentation of time, and cultural expectations. In this sense it is a Vitalpolitik, a politics of life, a biopolitics. On a political level, the neoliberal victory leads to the creation of what Foucault defines: "a sort of economic tribunal that claims to assess government action in strictly economic and market terms:'4 Every government choice, social initiative, form of culture, education, innovation, is judged according to a unique criterion: that of economic competition and profitability. Every discipline, knowledge, nuance of sensibility must conform to that criterion. Neoliberalism represents an attempt to build the homo oeconomicus: an anthropological model incapable of distinguishing between one's own good and economic interest. At the origins of the liberalist vision there is a reduction of human good (ethical and aesthetic good) to economic interest, and the reduction of the idea of wealth to that of ownership. The idea of wealth is separated from. the pleasure of free enjoyment and reduced to the accumulation of value.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Ableism

Thanatopolitics

Work is a rationale that makes every calculation subject to economic considerations, every social space becomes a space for the economy. This turns the living into dead objects to be sacrifices on the altar of competition. This is a totalitarian form of thanatopolitcs that erases freedom via its production of economically rational subjectivity. This produces a bankrupt understanding of wealth that denies freedom and joy. 

Bifo 2009 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social history of communication at the Accademia di belle Arit in Milan and Founder of A/traverse, The Soul at Work, p. 184-191)

Baudrillard remarks that the word liberation has been losing its meaning since power stopped being founded on the norm, on the disciplinary regulation of bodies and of social, linguistic and moral relations, that is to say since the world was submerged by generalized indeterminacy. In the Fordist era, the fluctuations of prices, salaries, and profits were founded on the relation between the time of socially necessary labor and the determination of value. With the introduction of micro-electronic technologies, and the consequent intellectualization of productive labor, the relationships between existing units of measure and the different productive forces entered a regime of indeterminacy. The deregulation launched by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan at the beginning of the 1980s is not the cause of such indeterminacy, but its political inscription. Neoliberalism registered the end of the rule of value, and made it into an economic policy. The decision that Richard Nixon made in 1971 to delink the dollar from gold gave American capitalism a pivotal role within the global economy, freeing it from the constitutional frame established in Bretton Woods in 1944. Since then, the American economy was no longer subject to the control of economic laws (if this control ever existed), and only relied on force. American debt could grow indefinitely, since the debtor was militarily stronger than the creditor. Since then, the USA has made the rest of the world. pay for the ramping up of their war machine, and uses its war machine to threaten the rest of the world and force it to pay. Far from being an objective science, economics revealed itself to be a modeling of social relations, an enterprise of violent coercion, whose task is the imposition of arbitrary rules on social activities: competition, maximum profit, unlimited growth. In Symbolic Exchange dnd Death, Baudrillard had an intuition about the general lines of the evolution characterizing the end of the millennium: "The reality principle corresponded to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation:" The entire system fell into indeterminacy, since the correspondences between referent and sign, simulation and event, value and time of labor were no longer guaranteed. The decision that inaugurated the end of the dollar's convertibility inaugurated an aleatory regime of fluctuating values. The rule of convertibility was dismissed according to an act of political will, while in those same 1970s, the entire technical and organizational system ruled by the mechanical paradigm, started to crumble. How is value established, then, within the aleatory regime of fluctuating values? Through violence, swindling and lies. Brute force is legitimated as the only effective source of law The aleatory regime of fluctuating values coincides with the domination of cynicism in public discourse and in the public soul. In order to understand the social effects of Neoliberal deregulation we have to understand the psychopathogenic effects that the precariousness of social relations produces on the individual and the collective soul. Beginning with the 1970s, deregulation assumed a central role in the ideology of power, upsetting not only the relations between the economy and society, but also the coordinates of critical discourse. The word deregulation is false. It looks as if it originated in the history of anti-systemic avant-gardes to bring a libertarian wind into the social sphere and heralding the end of every norm and constrictive rule. In reality, the deregulatory practices that accompany the victory of monetary neo-liberalism consist in clearing away all rules, so that only the rules of the economic dominate, uncontested. The only legitimate rule is now the strictest, the most violent, the most cynical, the most irrational of all the rules: the law of economic jungle. In the works that Foucault devoted to the genealogy of modern power formations, the key concept was discipline, understood as the modeling of the bodies in the Fordist context. In his early writings, where he studied the formation of the modern disciplinary structures— mental hospitals, clinics, prisons—Foucault built a theory of modern power that included a theory of subject formation. Now that the despotic regime of liberalist deregulation has fully developed itself, the discourse Foucault developed in his early writings needs to be updated. Foucault himself realized it, as we can see in The Birth of Biopolitics, the subsequently published form of his 1979 seminar at the College de France. Here Foucault retraces the post-Fordist transformation as an implosive insertion of the neoliberalist form within the animated social body. In his seminar, contemporary with the election of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and of Ronald Reagan in the USA, Foucault broadens the scope of his genealogical and biopolitical perspective in order to include the economic processes that in those years were only beginning to take shape. In his Course Summary, Foucault writes: "The theme was to have been `biopolitics,' by which I meant the attempt, starting from the eighteenth. century, to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race... We know the increasing importance of these problems since the nineteenth century, and the political and economic issues they have raised up to the present:'z With the word biopolitics, Foucault introduces the idea that the history of power is the story of the living body being modeled by deeply mutational institutions and practices, capable of introducing behaviors and expectations and indeed permanent modifications in the living. Biopolitics represents a morphogenetic modeling of the living operated by the habitat with which it is required to interact. Liberalism (or rather neo-liberalism, since we want to refer to the particularly aggressive variant of liberalism that was proposed throughout the 1970s by the Chicago School of economics and later adopted by American and British governments until it finally became, after 1989, the central dogma of global politics) is a political program whose purpose implies the inoculation of the enterprise principle to every space of human relations. Privatization and the fact that every fragment of the social sphere was reduced to the entrepreneurial model freed economic dynamics from any tie, be they political, social, ethical, juridical, unionist or environmental. In prior decades, these ties were able to shore up privatization, thanks to the public investment policies that had been stimulated by Keynes' reforms and the workers' organized action. But the more liberal deregulation eliminates any legal ties within production and the juridical person is freed from regulations, the more living social time is caught in linguistic, technological and psychological chains. Foucault explains that biopolitics is a process of internalization: economic chains are incorporated in the physical and linguistic sphere once society has been freed from any formal rule. In this sense the question of freedom today is a biopolitical problem. Let me indulge, now, in a Marxist digression. In his so-called "Unpublished Sixth Chapter" of Volume I of Capital, published in the 1960s, Marx talks about the passage from formal to real subsumption by capital. Formal subsumption is based on the juridical subjugation of the laborers, on the formal disciplining of the bodies. Real subsumption means instead that the workers' lifetimes have been captured by the capital flow, and the souls have been pervaded by techno-linguistic chains. The introduction of pervasive technologies, the computerization of productive processes and of social communication enact a molecular domination upon the collective nervous network. This is the domain of the dead object, the commodity, which objectifies human activity reducing it to a cognitive automatism. In this sense we should speak of "thanato-politics" (from the Greek "thanatos," meaning death): the submission of intelligent life to the dead object; the domination of the dead over the living. Neo-Liberal theories reduce the concept of freedom to its formal, juridical dimension. But contemporary totalitarianism has forged' chains that are different from those of political absolutism: its instruments o£ domination have moved from the domain of politics to that of the. technical production of subjectivity, from the realm of the juridical person to the animated body, to the soul. Neoliberalism aimed, on one side, at the elimination of all legal norms and social regulations that resulted in the limitation of competitive dynamics. On the other side, it wanted to transform every domain of social life (included health care, education, sexuality, affects, culture, etc) into an economic space where the only valid rule is that of supply and demand within an increasingly absolute privatization of services. Neoliberalism eliminated the ties that protected society from the economical dynamics of competition; therefore an effect of biopolitical branding was produced in the collective mind-body. "It means generalizing the `enterprise' from within the social body or social fabric; it means taking this social fabric and arranging things so that it can be broken down, subdivided, and reduced, not according to the grain of individuals, but according to the grain of enterprises. The individual life must be lodged [...] within the framework of a multiplicity of diverse enterprises connected up to and entangled with each other [...]. And finally, the individual's life itself—with his relationships to his private property, fox example, with his family, household, insurance, and retirement—must make him/her into a sort of permanent and multiple enterprise [...]. What is the function of this generalization of the `enterprise' form? On the one hand, of course, it involves extending the economic model of supply and demand and investmentcosts- profit so as to make it a model of social relations and of existence itself, a form of relationship of the individual to himself, time, those around him, the group, and the family [...]. The return to the enterprise is therefore at once an economic policy or a policy of the economization of the entire social field, but at the same time a policy which presents itself or seeks to be a kind of Vitalpolitik with the function of compensating for what is cold, impassive, calculating, rational, and mechanical in the strictly economic game of competition:'3 The reign of the enterprise is at once a political deregulation process and an epistemic process of a new segmentation of time, and cultural expectations. In this sense it is a Vitalpolitik, a politics of life, a biopolitics. On a political level, the neoliberal victory leads to the creation of what Foucault defines: "a sort of economic tribunal that claims to assess government action in strictly economic and market terms:'4 Every government choice, social initiative, form of culture, education, innovation, is judged according to a unique criterion: that of economic competition and profitability. Every discipline, knowledge, nuance of sensibility must conform to that criterion. Neoliberalism represents an attempt to build the homo oeconomicus: an anthropological model incapable of distinguishing between one's own good and economic interest. At the origins of the liberalist vision there is a reduction of human good (ethical and aesthetic good) to economic interest, and the reduction of the idea of wealth to that of ownership. The idea of wealth is separated from. the pleasure of free enjoyment and reduced to the accumulation of value.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Ableism

Work as a metric of value is inherently exclusionary of disabled bodies

Charlotte E. Blattner, 20 Jul 2020, (“Right to work or refusal to work: Disability rights at a crossroads, Disability & Society”, https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2020.1788511)

Work is often framed as a site of economic, social, and political emancipation where dreams are realized, goals accomplished, characters framed, and skills perfected. But this promise has remained unfulfilled for disabled persons, who are still at high risk of being unemployed and poor. Nations and societies that center a citizen’s right to work often assign responsibility for this ‘failure’ to the individual, instead of acknowledging broader exclusionary social and political structures. The disability movement has advocated for civil rights for people with disabilities, among others by demanding more access to and inclusion at work for people with a disability, and for equal treatment at work. A central belief underlying this call for a ‘right to work’ is that work is a lynchpin of income, rights, and social belonging, that the workplace, if carefully redesigned, can be accessible to all, and that work and the status, rights, and experiences it offers are central to liberation (Graby 2015, 140). In practice, however, and even after decades of advocacy, persons with disability are largely excluded from and within work, are still viewed as ‘welfare dependents’ and continue to be stigmatized. The argument that meaningful work is the pathway to full participation in society has been complicated by clear indications that jobs will grow much scarcer in late-stage capitalism, as robots and AI increasingly replace human workers. A growing movement for a post-work world is suggesting alternatives to centering the right to work, both for the general public, and for people with disabilities. It is questioning our society’s obsession with measuring the status and worthiness of ‘others’ through their work, asserting this 2 C. E. BLATTNER marginalizes those who do not exemplify the work ethic, whether they choose not to work or because they have a disability. Post-work scholars and advocates have argued that the work ethic has colonized ‘our lives by eco nomic demands—to work, to recover from work, to spend income, to cultivate employability’ (Frayne 2015, 9) and left a dwindling segment of life free for fulfilling and nourishing activities outside work. Here, I search for a way to move the discussion forward by critically examining right to work arguments from the perspectives of disability rights law, labor law, and post-work scholarship. I offer an overview of the promises made by right to work advocates and their manifestations in the law (2.). Then I examine the arguments and narratives disability rights activists deploy when they advocate for the right to work, and the political means they use to attain that right (3.). Using recent data on lack of access and equal treatment of people with disabilities at work, I demonstrate why the right to work has failed to materialize for people with disabilities and why it might never materialize even if society fully adopts to the social model of disability. There is thus a risk that the right to work will never deliver material security, meaningfully contribute to identity-building and self-realization, or guarantee social inclusion, especially for people with disabilities (4.). Work as it is now conceptualized results in harms like line-drawing, work-based measures of worthiness, the insistence on personal responsibility over systemic analysis, colonization of lives through work, pressure to consume, and devaluation of alternative ways of living and being (5.). I conclude by (6.) drawing on both post-work scholarship and critical disability rights theory to describe the most urgent changes needed to make the right to work work. These include addressing issues of time, valuing alternative ways of being, building social, economic, and political scaffolds to make visible people’s experiences at and expectations of work, and exercising a refusal to work. Before proceeding accordingly, a note on the limits of this article is due. This article examines the intersection of work and disability from a broader, theoretical angle, drawing on multiple disciplines and sub-fields. It offers examples of the problems this raises for persons with disabilities and sug gests changes that might solve them, but does not draw on interviews or analyze a specific case (for a more strictly practical approach, see, e.g. Yakas 2017, on work, purpose, and community in clubhouses).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Environment

Work can never solve the environment - true solutions lie in reestablishing a connection with the environment and embracing alternative forms of self-organization and resistance

The Invisible Committee 09 (The Invisible Committee is the nom de plume of an anonymous author or authors who have written French works of literature based on far-left politics and anarchism, The Coming Insurrection, 2009)-MP

Ecology is the discovery of the decade. For the last thirty years we've left it up to the environmentalists, joking about it on Sunday so that we can act concerned again on Monday. And now it's caught up to us, invading the airwaves like a hit song in summer time, because it's 68 degrees in December. One quarter of the fish species have disappeared from the ocean. The rest won't last much longer. Bird flu alert: we are given assurances that hun dreds of thousands of migrating birds will be shot from the sky. Mercury levels in human breast milk are ten times higher than the legal level for cows. And these lips which swell up after I bite the apple-but it came from the farmer's market. The simplest ges tures have become toxic. One dies at the age of 35 from "a prolonged illness" that's to be managed just like one manages everything else. We should've seen it coming before we got to this place, to ward B of the palliative care center. We have to admit it: this whole "catastrophe," which they so noisily inform us about, doesn't really touch us. At least not until we are hit by one of its foreseeable consequences. It may concern us, but it doesn't touch us. And that is the real catastrophe. There is no "environmental catastrophe." The catastrophe is the environment itself. The environment is what's left to man after he's lost everything. Those who live in a neighborhood, a street, a valley, a war zone, a workshop-they don't have an "environment;" they move through a world peopled by presences, dangers, friends, enemies, moments of life and death, all kinds of beings. Such a world has its own consistency, which varies according to the intensity and quality of the ties attaching us to all of these beings, to all of these places. It's only we, the children of the final dispossession, exiles of the final hour-who come into the world in concrete cubes, pick our fruits at the supermarket, and watch for an echo of the world on television-only we get to have an environment. And there's no one but us to witness our own annihilation, as if it were just a simple change of scenery, to get indignant about the latest progress of the disaster, to patiently compile its encyclopedia. What has congealed as an environment is a relation ship to the world based on management, which is to say, on estrangement. A relationship to the world wherein we're not made up just as much of the rustling trees, the smell of frying oil in the building, running water, the hubbub of schoolrooms, the mugginess of summer evenings. A relationship to the world where there is me and then my environment, surrounding me but never really constituting me. We have become neighbors in a planetary board meeting. It's difficult to imagine a more complete hell. No material habitat has ever deserved the name "environment," except perhaps the metropolis of today. The digitized voices making announcements, streetcars with such a 21st century whistle, bluish streetlamps shaped like giant matchsticks, pedestrians done up like failed fashion models, the silent rotation of a video surveillance camera, the lucid clicking of the subway turnstyles, supermarket checkouts, office time-clocks, the electronic ambiance of the cybercafe, the profusion of plasma screens, express lanes and latex. Never has a setting been so able to do without the souls traversing it. Never has a milieu been more automatic. Never has a context been so indifferent, and demanded in return-as the price of survival-such an equal indifference from us. Ultimately the environment is nothing more than the relationship to the world that is proper to the metropolis, and that projects itself onto everything that would escape it. The situation is like this: they hired our parents to destroy this world, and now they'd like to put us to work rebuilding it, and-to add insult to injury-at a profit.The morbid excitement that animates journalists and advertisers these days as they report each new proof of global warming reveals the steely smile of the new green capitalism, in the making since the '70s, which we expected at the turn of the century but which never came. Well, here it is! It's sustain ability! Alternative solutions, that's it too! The health of the planet demands it! No doubt about it any more, it's a green scene; the environment will be the pivot of the 21st century political economy. A new volley of "industrial solutions" comes with each new catastrophic possibility. The inventor of the H-bomb, Edward Teller, pro poses shooting millions of tons of metallic dust into the stratosphere to stop global warming. NASA, frustrated at having to shelve its idea of an anti missile shield in the museum of cold war horrors, suggests installing a gigantic mirror beyond the moon's orbit to protect us from the sun's now-fatal rays. Another vision of the future: a motorized humanity, driving on bio-ethanol from Sao Paulo to Stockholm; the dream of cereal growers the world over, for it only means converting all of the planet's arable lands into soy and sugar beet fields. Eco friendly cars, clean energy, and environmental consulting coexist painlessly with the latest Chanel ad in the pages of glossy magazines. We are told that the environment has the incom parable merit of being the first truly globalproblem presented to humanity. A globalproblem, which is to say a problem that only those who are organized on a global level will be able to solve. And we know who they are. These are the very same groups that for close to a century have been the vanguard of disaster, and certainly intend to remain so, for the small price of a change of logo. That EDpl had the impudence to trot out its nuclear program as the new solution to the global energy crisis goes to show how much the new solutions resemble the old problems. From Secretaries of State to the backrooms of alternative cafes, concerns are always expressed in the same words, the same as they've always been. We have to get mobilized. This time it's not to rebuild the country like in the post-war era, not for the Ethiopians like in the '80s, not for employment like in the '90s. No, this time it's for the environment. It thanks you for your participation. Al Gore and neg ative growth movement stand side by side with the eternal great souls of the Republic to do their part in reinvigorating the little people of the Left and the well-known idealism of youth. Voluntary austerity writ large on their banner, they work benevolently to get us ready for the "coming ecological state of emergency." The globular sticky mass of their guilt lands on our tired shoulders, pressuring us to cultivate our garden, sort out our trash, and eco-compost the leftovers of this macabre feast. Managing the phasing out of nuclear power, excess C02 in the atmosphere, melting glaciers, hurricanes, epidemics, global overpopulation, erosion of the soil, mass extinction of living species. .. this will be our burden. They tell us, "everyone must do their part," if we want to save our beautiful model of civilization. We have to consume a little less to be able to keep consuming. We have to produce organically to keepproducing. We have to control ourselves togo on controlling. This is the logic of a world straining to maintain itself while giving itself an air of historical rupture. This is how they would like to convince us to participate in the great industrial challenges of this century. And in our bewilderment we're ready to leap into the arms of the very same ones who presided over the devastation, in the hope that they will get us out of it. Ecology isn't simply the logic of a total economy; it's the new morality of capital. The system's internal state of crisis and the rigorous screening that's under way demand a new criterion in the name of which this screening and selection will be carried out. From one era to the next, the idea of virtue has never been anything but an invention of vice. Without ecology, how could we justifY the existence of two different diets, one "healthy and organic" for the rich and their children, and the other notoriously toxic for the plebes, whose offspring are damned to obesity. The planetary hyper-bourgeoisie wouldn't be able to make its normal lifestyle seem respectable if its latest whims weren't so scrupulously "respectful of the environment." Without ecology, nothing would have enough authority to gag every objection to the exorbitant progress of control. Tracking, transparency, certification, eco-taxes, environmental excellence, and the policing of water, all give us an idea of the coming state of ecological emergency. Everything is permitted to a power struc ture that bases its authority in Nature, in health and in well-being. "Once the new economic and behavioral culture has become common practice, coercive measures will doubtless fall into disuse of their own accord." You'd have to have all the ridiculous aplomb of a TV crusader to maintain such a frozen perspective and in the same breath incite us to feel sufficiently "sorry for the planet" to get mobilized, while remaining anesthetized enough to watch the whole thing with restraint and civility. The new green asceticism is precisely the self-control that is required of us all in order to negotiate a rescue operation where the system has taken itself hostage. Henceforth, it's in the name of ,environmentalism that we must all tighten our belts, just as we did yesterday in the name of the economy. The roads could certainly be transformed into bicycle paths, we ourselves could perhaps, to a certain degree, be grateful one day for a guaranteed income, but only at the price of an entirely therapeutic existence. Those who claim that generalized self-control will spare us from an environmental dictatorship are lying: the one will prepare the way for the other, and we'll end up with both. As long as there is Man and Environment, the police will be there between them. Everything about the environmentalists' discourse must be turned upside-down. Where they talk of "catastrophes" to label the present system's mismanagement of beings and things, we only see the catastrophe of its all too perfect operation. The greatest wave of famine ever known in the tropics (1876- 1879) coincided with a global drought, but more significantly, it also coincided with the apogee of colonization. The destruction of the peasant's world and of local alimentary practices meant the disappearance of the means for dealing with scarcity. More than the lack of water, it was the effect of the rapidly expanding colonial economy that littered the Tropics with millions of emaciated corpses. What is presented everywhere as an ecological catastrophe has never stopped being, above all, the manifestation of a disastrous relationship to the world. Inhabiting a nowhere makes us vulnerable to the slightest jolt in the system, to the slightest climactic risk. As the latest tsunami approached and the tourists continued to frolic in the waves, the islands' hunter-gatherers rushed away from the coast, following the birds. Environmentalism's present paradox is that under the pretext of saving the planet from desolation it merely saves the causes of its desolation. The normal functioning of the world serves to hide our state of truly catastrophic dispossession. What is called "catastrophe" is no more than the forced suspension of this state, one of those rare moments when we regain some sort of presence in the world. Let the petroleum reserves run out earlier than expected; let the international flows that regu late the tempo of the metropolis be interrupted; let us suffer some great social disruption and some great "return to savagery of the population," a "planetary threat," the "end of civilization!" Whatever. Any loss of control would be preferable to all the crisis management scenarios they envision. When this comes, the specialists in sustainable development won't be the ones with the best advice. It's within the mal function and short-circuits of the system that we find the elements of a response whose logic would be to abolish the problems themselves. Among the signatory nations to the Kyoto Protocol, the only countries that have fulfilled their commitments, in spite _of themselves, are Ukraine and Romania. Guess why. The most advanced experimentation with "organic" agriculture on a global level has taken place since 1989 on the island of Cuba. Guess why. And it's along the African highways, and nowhere else, that auto mechanics has been elevated to a form of popular art. Guess how. What makes the crisis desirable is that in the cri sis the environment ceases to be the environment. We are forced to reestablish contact, albeit a poten tially fatal one, with what's there, to rediscover the rhythms of reality. What surrounds us is no longer a landscape, a panorama, a theater, but something to inhabit, something we need to come to terms with, something we can learn from. We won't let ourselves be led astray by the ones who've brought about the the "catastrophe." Where the managers platonically discuss among themselves how they might decrease emissions "without breaking the bank," the only realistic option we can see is to "break the bank" as soon as possible and, in the meantime, take advan tage of every collapse in the system to increase our own strength. New Orleans, a few days after Hurricane Katrina. In this apocalyptic atmosphere, here and there, life is reorganizing itself. In the face of the inaction of the public authorities, who were too busy cleaning up the tourist areas of the French Quarter and protecting shops to help the poorer city dwellers, forgotten forms are reborn. In spite of occasionally strong armed attempts to evacuate the area, in spite of white supremacist lynch mobs, a lot of people refused to leave the terrain. For the latter, who refused to be deported like "environmental refugees" all over the country, and for those who came from all around to join them in solidarity, responding to a call from a former Black Panther, self-organization came back to the fore. In a few weeks time, the Common Ground Clinic was set Up.2 From the very first days, this veritable "country hospital" provided free and effective treatment to those who needed it, thanks to the constant influx of volunteers. For more than a year now, the clinic is still the base of a daily resistance to the clean-sweep operation of government bulldozers, which are trying to turn that part of the city into a pasture for property developers. Popular kitchens, supplies, street medicine, illegal takeovers, the con struction of emergency housing, all this practical knowledge accumulated here and there in the course of a life, has now found a space where it can be deployed. Far from the uniforms and sirens. Whoever knew the penniless joy of these New Orleans neighborhoods before the catastrophe, their defiance towards the state and the widespread practice of making do with what's available wouldn't be at all surprised by what became possible there. On the other hand, anyone trapped in the anemic and atomized everyday routine of our residential deserts might doubt that such determination could be found anywhere anymore. Reconnecting with such gestures, buried under years of normalized life, is the only practicable means of not sinking down with the world, while we dream of an age that is equal to our passions.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Alienation

Work is absolute submission – branded into us at an early age, it degrades and contradicts human nature

Alliger 22 – (GEORGE M. ALLIGER has had over 60 articles published in journals such as Journal of Management, Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Psychological Science, and Times Higher Education. He is an editor of The Handbook of Work Analysis. A fellow of the Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology, Alliger is now a Consulting Psychologist in the Houston Area “Anti-Work: Phycological Investigations Into Its Truths, Problems, and Solutions” 2022) - MP

The central anti-work concept of worker submission is critically examined from several angles. One of the most important tenets of anti-work relates to the human will.1 Work, it is argued, requires submission to an organization. That central fount and mark of our human being-in-the-world, volition, is put under pressure and distorted by employment. It is significant that the motto of the Haymarket demonstrators in 1886 was “Eight hours for work, eight hours for rest, eight hours for what we will.” That is, when working, whatever it is that we are doing, we are not doing our will – what we choose. And if we accept that what is willed, or negatively, submission, is at the center of how humans experience meaning, work can quickly be seen as problematic. Consider that work often requires a person to do that which they would not wish to do in free circumstances, and also do not wish to do in the circumstances of the job. This can be as apparently harmless as a directive to a hotel clerk or salesperson to smile at customers. Perhaps even most of the time, most employees would smile whether asked or not; but there are times they do not wish to smile. They are thus in those particular times placed in a quandary. If they do not smile, they may be reprimanded or even “let go” should they be perceived as excessively serious or cool toward customers on too many occasions. If on the other hand they accede to instruction and smile, they may feel that they are carrying out a kind of degrading emotional labor. And why in the world would this be degrading? Because, due to the complex net of authorities into which they are immediately placed upon employment, from the influences of their co-workers to the expectations of the customers to the raw power of the supervisor, they are now in effect forced to act against the choices they would make in a constraint-less situation. Of course, it can be argued that there are few if any fully constraintless situations, so that for example a person may at times feel a kind of requirement to smile at a partner or friend when they would rather not. However, that is a personal affair and a marriage or friendship is not – at least are not necessarily in its very nature – a systematic applier of force against human will. Employment is. Oddly, perhaps, it can be understood that workers have been prepared for this kind of submission from early life onward (thinkers like Frédéric Lordon, Pierre Bourdieu, and Daniel Markovits strenuously argue for this). My own grade school principal would remind us students each morning over the intercom (and the message was probably for faculty too) that it takes fewer muscles to smile than to frown. And then too “smile for the camera” is one of the earliest injunctions we encounter. Thereafter, we are exposed to all kinds of regulations and requirements at home and school. Perhaps most of these do not involve smiling per se, but many children will internalize what is presented as a basic rule of human functioning: “It is important to please.” But why is it important for children to please? Presumably because (a) one may seem more likeable to others when acting agreeable, so heading off or reducing tension; (b) it is easier for parents when children comply; and perhaps (c) it will be instrumentally useful to children as they grow and, eventually, enter the workplace. Succeeding may involve smiling. Of course, it cannot be true that smiling is always a good gambit in particular situations. It may well be that gravitas will serve better in many cases. But society, I think, does not inculcate this awareness as much as it usefully might. Smiling is a kind of limiting case on the soft end of things, and could be considered unimportant in the context of will, for how hard is it to smile, whatever you are feeling? But it is, after all, an example of “emotional labor.” Such labor has real psychological costs – there can be a kind of internal dissonance that is wearing, which over time can even lead to that constellation of negative symptoms that we call job burnout. This is true particularly if not offset by intrinsic job rewards, as in the case of those teachers who feel the need to “fake” enthusiasm in jobs that they do not particularly enjoy.2 We should not underestimate the bitter and humiliating nature of having to act, speak, and even appear in ways that do not conform to our own most natural motivations

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Alienation

Work is the inherent contradiction its very roots are what makes us feel the never-ending alienation

Carmichael ’19 (Patrick Carmichael, Managing Director of Camtree: The Cambridge Teacher Research Exchange. Camtree is creating a global platform for educators who wish to reflect on their practice and conduct research to improve learning in their classrooms and institution, “Refusal of Work, Liberation of Time and the Convivial University”, Education and Technological Unemployment, 30 April 2019, ) //OC

In one of their early works, subsequently published as part of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx and Engels write of the essential tension facing the worker under capitalism: The less you eat, drink and buy books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorise, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save, the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor rust will devour: your capital. The less you are, the less you express your own life, the more you have, the greater is your alienated life, the greater is the store of your estranged being. (Marx and Engels 1959: xv) This alienation can be overcome, and human self-realization and free activity achieved only through the replacement of capitalist relations and specifically by the ‘abolition of labour’. Labour, in the sense that Marx and Engels define it, is so intrinsically bound up with capitalist mode of production, with the definition of the proletariat, and what of it is to be a worker, that liberation must be ‘directed against the hitherto existing mode of activity, does away with labour (die Arbeit beseitigt) (Marx and Engels 1968: 80); elsewhere they argue that labour is already ‘free’ under capitalism, and revolutionary struggle is not a matter of freeing labour but rather of abolishing it (sie aufzuheben) (1968: 80). As Marcuse says, according to Marx, ‘liberation of the individual is at once the negation of labour’, and the aim is the creation of a society ‘wherein the material process of production no longer determines the entire pattern of human life’ (1999: 293–294). The abolition of labour for Marx is not an encouragement to idleness, despite Lafargue’s spirited critique of demands for the ‘right to work’ in his 1883 polemic The Right to be Lazy (Lafargue 1989). Rather, it allows the development of new modes of productive activity which Marx variously refers to as ‘free activity,’ (Selbsttiitigkeit) or ‘self-activity’ (Selbstbetiitigung), and, in later writings, ‘self-purpose’ (Selbstzweck) as distinguished from ‘purposeful activity’ (zweckmäßige Tatigkeit) which is performed in order to achieve a purpose outside itself (Zilbersheid 2004: 119–120). A number of authors have attempted to trace the history of the concept of the abolition of labour, most of whom identify some form of retreat from the idea, either on the part of Marx himself or of subsequent leftist theorists. Probably the best known of these is Marcuse’s (1999) Reason and Revolution; while Thoburn (2003) discusses the associations between abolition of labour and the work of, amongst others, Negri, Virno, Guattari, and Deleuze. Franco Berardi in his The Soul at Work: from alienation to autonomy (2009) also offers a distinctive reading of Marx on alienation and the political praxis that might be developed in response to it. Zilbersheid discusses what he calls the ‘viscissitudes’ of the idea of the abolition of labour, and explores how, despite its importance in visions of future communist society, it came to be neglected, or even negated, both in leftist political programmes and theoretical analyses. He writes of its central role: At the core of the highest phase of communist society, as described in Marx’s early writings, is the abolition of labour. The more famous abolition of private property, the well-known abolition of the state, and the lesser- known abolition of the division of labour are all conditional upon the abolition of labour itself. (Zilbersheid 2004: 117)

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Capitalism

Refusal of labor is key to solve cap—anything else terminally fails to dismantle the logic of private property—Marx agrees

Hardt and Negri 17 (Michael Hardt is a renowned intellectual and a former solar panel installer. Antonio Negri is an acclaimed critical theorist and a former Italian communist militant. “Assembly,” Oxford University Press. 2017 ) @ehatt

In capitalist society the possession of private property is legitimated (at least, in principle) by labor. If one were to follow the logic of capitalist ideology, then, contemporary forms of production should undermine private property. As labor and economic production are increasingly socialized, following this logic, the individual nature of ownership should gradually be undermined. The social nature of production should imply an equally social scope of the use of, access to, and decision-making over wealth. Capitalist legal structures do not follow this path, of course, but the transformations of labor create a constant tension and provide a resource for change, pointing toward the common. John Locke expresses the argument for the legitimation of property based on labor in its classic and perhaps clearest form: what was common becomes private when individuals add their labor to it: “The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.” One key precondition for this claim is that in the state of nature individuals encounter vacant lands (terra nullius---devoid of sovereignty) that are open for ownership. Locke regarded the Americas with a colonialist im- aginary, for instance, as being in such a state. The second assumption is that all (or, at least, all free male citizens) own their own bodies and, specifically, their own laboring capacity. Ownership of one’s own labor is the building block. When it engages with and mixes with the common, then the common too becomes property through a logic of contagion. Labor sets in motion expan- sive waves of possession and property. The logic of property based on labor undergoes a series of modifications and qualifications (already in subsequent passages of Locke’s treatise and then through the ensuing centuries of capital- ist thought), but it remains a basic element of capitalist common sense. If you build a house, then it should be yours. Consider, for example, how labor logic also continues to animate portions of property law: one is eligible to apply for patents when one invents or discovers a new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.'? Intellectual labor, at least in princi- ple or rather at the level of ideology, legitimates intellectual property. Despite the enduring capitalist ideology of individual property based on labor, capitalist property does not, of course, belong to those who produce it. Karl Marx was fond of remarking, especially in light of the propaganda that communism would take away what rightly belongs to people, that capital in its industrial form has already negated “individual private property, as founded on the labor of its proprietor.” Capitalist property accrues not to those who produce but to those who own the means of production. He takes seriously and adopts the equation between labor and property pro- moted by capitalist ideology, in other words, to show that capital undermines its own assumptions. We should note in passing that whereas one could imagine on the basis of this recognition seeking to establish, beyond the limits of capital, the real foundation of property in labor, Marx moves in the opposite direction: the abolition of private property requires also the refusal of work. “Labour” is the living basis of private property, it is private property as the creative source of itself. Private property is nothing but objectified labour. If it is desired to strike a mortal blow at private property, one must attack it not only as a material state of affairs, but also as activity, as labour. It is one of the greatest misapprehensions to speak of free, human, social labour, of labour without private property. “Labour” by its very nature is unfree, unhuman, unsocial activity, determined by private property and creating private property. Hence the abolition of private property will become a reality only when it is conceived as the abolition of “labour” (an abolition which, of course, has become possible only as a result of labour itself, that is to say, has become possible as a result of the material activity of society and which should on no account be conceived as the replacement of one category by another) The equation between private property and labor, in Marx’s vision, eftec- tively doubles the challenge: we must imagine and invent not only social bonds and social cohesion without property but also systems of cooperative social activity and creativity beyond work, that is, beyond the regime of waged labor. Today, however, the nature and conditions of labor have changed radically from the industrial forms that Marx analyzed and even more so from the agricultural and colonial imagination of Locke. In order to investigate con- temporary property relations we need first to look to today’s forms of social production and reproduction. For now let us mention only two primary as- pects. First, people work in ever more flexible, mobile, and precarious ar- rangements. Even Wall Street bankers have to be ready every day to clean out their desks by 5 p.m., but more important the vast majority work under the constant threat of unemployment and poverty. Second, labor is increasingly social and based on cooperation with others, embedded in a world of com- municative networks and digital connections, which run throughout indus- trial arrangements, agricultural systems, and all other economic forms. Capital is valorized through cooperative flows in which language, affects, code, and images are subsumed in the material processes of production. The fact that production in contemporary capitalist society is ever more cooperative and socialized strains to the breaking point the link between in- dividual labor and private property promoted by capitalist ideology. It no longer makes sense to isolate the one whose labor created some thing or, as patent law imagines, some idea. The one never produces. We only produce together, socially. Wealth continues to be produced by labor, in other words, in increasingly social networks of laboring cooperation, but the concept of private property based on labor becomes merely an ideological remnant---and the modern conceptions of property (along with, in part, Marx’s own) become obsolete. This rupture leads to two radically different developments. First, as prop- erty seems to be “freed” from any even ideological grounding in labor, the logic of private property becomes all the more absolute, a power of pure command. We will analyze in part III the ways in which finance and money have come to redefine property and how, in the era of neoliberalism, private property in its financial and monetary forms rules ever more completely over production and society as a whole. But even at such extreme points, capitalist property and value still carry the sign of labor like a birthmark. Jean-Marie Harribey, in his dialogue with André Orléan, is right to insist that even when value no longer appears in substantial, material form it is not merely a fantasy of accounting. It is the sign of a productive social network, mystified but effective, that is continually developed more intensively and extensively. Second, the ever more cooperative and socialized nature of production opens toward an understanding of the common. Rather than speaking of the social function of property, which seems to have flowed toward capital to the point of residing completely in finance, it would be better to speak of the social properties of labor. We are immersed in the common, cooperative circuits of production and reproduction that are both sustaining and chaotic. Try a thought experiment to follow the Lockean strain of capitalist ideology that bases property rights in production to its conclusion: if wealth today tends to be produced not by individuals but only in expansive cooperative social net- works, then the results should be the property of the productive network as a whole, the entire society, which is to say the property of no one; that is, prop- erty should become nonproperty and wealth must become common. We arrive at the same point--of the need today for a notion of right rooted in the common--if we go back and trace the developments of labor rights with respect to the state. It is sometimes difficult to remember today, when labor organizing is so brutally attacked in countries throughout the world, that in the twentieth century institutionalized labor movements, espe- cially in the dominant countries, played a central role in stabilizing the func- tioning of capital and the state. The first article of Italy’s 1948 Constitution declares, for example, “Italy is a democratic republic founded on labor.” Labor is “constitutionalized‚” and made into a pillar of support. The creation and constitution of welfare policies not only served to tame markets and over- come the exclusive normative power of private property and contracts but also sought to domesticate radical labor militancy. The welfare state aimed to treat the causes of crisis, both the objective (economic) and subjective (worker). Wages thus came to be supplemented by various “indirect” incomes provided by the welfare system, including pensions, healthcare, and various other social programs. State action, especially monetary action, had to maintain “effective demand,” and economic development depended significantly on the devel- opment of the needs of workers and citizens. From these threads of public actions and social services through the course of the twentieth century was knit a tightly woven biopolitical fabric. In recent decades, however, neoliberalism has violently attacked the social conditions of labor, reimposing the norms of the market and negating the notion that labor can have any autonomous right as the basis of the public regulation of economic development. Public law is thus ever more explicitly subordinated to private law, pulverized into thousands of subjective rights. And, similarly, all fiscal and social legislation is swept into the whirlpool of privatization, where instruments of progressive taxation are drowned; the sav- aging of public services becomes the rule, virtually prohibiting acts of solidar- ity among social groups; and the public functions of the state are subordinated to the market. The “rights of labor,” which in the welfare state were raised up to the dignity of “public rights,” with labor union bargaining supported and recognized by the state, are now degraded and translated once again into pri- vate and patrimonial law. In response to the depredations of neoliberalism, several European legal scholars have engaged in pragmatic efforts to tether private property to the public interest and public needs. Stefano Rodota and Ugo Mattei, for ex- ample, seek tirelessly, in different ways, to use the means provided by the Italian Constitution and the Italian legal tradition to protect natural resources (such as the national water supply) against privatization and to defend popular occupations that seek to prevent national heritage sites, such as Teatro Valle in Rome, being handed over to private interests. Their primary aim is not just to reassert the powers of public law for the benefit of social solidarity, afirm- ing the “social functions” and general interests of law, and thus posing a defi- nition of the “common” that is really a form of the “public.” Their aim is also to promote, from within private law, a proliferation of subjective, socially pro- tected rights, wresting them away from a strict definition of property rights and casting them instead in the direction of social interests. Stefano Rodota, for example, has spearheaded the promotion of the “right to have rights,” and Ugo Mattei has insisted on the other aspect of the crisis of private law, devel- oping the social functions of the private toward a conception of “common goods,” conceived as new categories of the “right to the common.” These pragmatic legal projects are especially urgent as a line of defense in the context of global neoliberalism with its general ideological celebration of the rule of private property and the erosion of the powers of states. But those same conditions transform the conceptual and practical possibilities of these strategies. As the powers of states fade, in other words, efforts to pluralize and socialize the rights of property must look beyond the public to other means of support. In fact, when left legal theorists appeal to the public and state power as the centerpiece of strategies to combat the excessive rule of private property--when Rodota, for example, speaks of “making the public public again‚” (ripubblicizzazione del pubblico)--this sounds to us, in contemporary conditions, neither feasible nor desirable. Such state responses are even more prevalent in France and Germany, where the “institutionalist” line is still pre- eminent and the promotion of the “rights of the common” is generally con- ceived as an expansion and deepening of public law. Unfortunately, this spuri- ous demand remains foundational for large segments of the socialist Left in Europe, whose imagination is fixed on state action and state power as the sole plausible defender of society. his may be an instance, however, in which capitalist elites (or, really, their collective unconscious) have a more lucid analysis than “progressive” theo- rists. Above we noted that as part of the neoliberal project the institutional- ized social rights and labor rights that supported capitalist rule throughout the twentieth century have been dramatically undermined. It is as if the cap- italist political class, in its paranoia, were to have mistaken these “reasonable” rights, which in the past have protected it against crises, for a much more threatening right, the right of the common. This is something like the moment after the failed 1848 revolution when the French bourgeoisie saw in the rather tame calls for a “social republic” the specter of communism and went running in the opposite direction to embrace the empire of Louis Bonaparte. Perhaps today’s capitalist elites--in their hysteria--also divine the truth. The extravagant, excessive violence of the privatization of the welfare state, despite the dangers of crisis it risks, betrays the fact that, beyond the claims to restore the hegemony of the market and the primacy of private law, it is fundamen- tally driven by the fear that social rights are a slope that inevitably leads to an affirmation of the common. That is the possibility that capital must destroy! In short, the social properties of labor, on one side, unmask the illegitimate rights of individual property, affirming the social, shared right to socially pro- duced wealth, and, on the other, they illicit the terror of propertied classes, financial elites, and neoliberal governments because behind the assertion of social rights they perceive (correctly) the emergence of a right of the common.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Capitalism

The imposition of neoliberal values leads to the hardening of the soul which kills freedom by creating subjects whose value lies only in time and productivity.

Bifo 2009 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social history of communication at the Accademia di belle Arit in Milan and Founder of A/traverse, The Soul at Work, p. 192)

Ever since Fordist discipline was dissolved, individuals find themselves in a condition of apparent freedom. Nobody forces them to endure subjection and dependency. Coercion is instead embedded in the technicalities of social relations, and control is exerted through, the voluntary yet inevitable submission to a chain of automatisms. In the U.S.A., the great majority of students need to obtain a loan in order to pay their courses and obtain a university degree. The cost of tuition is so high that this loan becomes a burden from which students can't free themselves for decades. In this way, the conditions for a new form of dependence are produced in the lives of the new generations. The neoliberal values presented in the 1980s and 1990s as vectors of independence and self-entrepreneurship, revealed themselves to be manifestations of a new form of slavery producing social insecurity and most of all a psychological catastrophe. The soul, once wandering and unpredictable, must now follow functional paths in order to become compatible with the system of operative exchanges structuring the productive ensemble. The soul hardens, and loses its tenderness and malleability. Industrial factories used the body, forcing it to leave the soul outside of the assembly line, so that the worker looked like a soulless body. The immaterial factory ~ asks instead to place our very souls at its disposal: intelligence, sensibility, creativity and language. The useless body lies flabbily at the borders of the game field: to take care of it and entertain it, we put it through the commercial circuits of fitness and sex. When we move into the sphere of info-labor, Capital no longer recruits people, it buys packets of time, separated from their interchangeable and contingent bearers. De-personalized time is now the real agent of the process of valorization, and de-personalized time has no rights.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Capitalism

The aff only upholds the workist notion of needing productivity and continues the neoliberal notion of the never-ending work for the purpose of work

Mumby ‘19

(Dennis K, Dennis K. Mumby is the Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Communication at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA, Work: What is it good for? (Absolutely nothing)—a critical theorist’s perspective, Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 30 October 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dennis-Mumby/publication/338177026_Work_What_is_it_good_for_Absolutely_nothing-a_critical_theorist%27s_perspective/links/5e5bd8d892851cefa1d489bc/Work-What-is-it-good-for-Absolutely-nothing-a-critical-theorists-perspective.pdf)

Zuboff’s quote above rather pithily captures the argument I have been trying to make in this essay, framed through the lens of critical conceptions of work and organization. Work is the place where the rubber hits the road for capitalism, but in the course of the 20th and 21st centuries what counts as work—and thus its relationship to the capitalist accumulation process—has been transformed. For all of its problems, one of the principal virtues of Fordist capitalism and the Keynesian economic model that underwrote it was the creation of a system of social democracy that mitigated the worst excesses of capitalism. As I discuss above, Fordism and Keynesianism “cooked” capitalism by creating a WATT system of individual and collective autonomy within a social democratic welfare model. This included a social contract between workers and employers that enabled stable employment, relatively distinct spheres of work and life, and a high degree of individual and collective security through defined benefit plans, social security, and so forth. Neoliberal, post-Fordist capitalism put in place a YOYO system that invokes the market as a guide to all human activity, makes insecure, precarious employment the norm, and insists that we all view ourselves as individual, separate units of human capital, defined by our ability to create economic value. Everyone is expected to be “venture labor” (Neff, 2012), and any failure to add to the value of one’s human capital is framed as an individual shortcoming. In this sense, capitalism is, indeed, antisocial. As management scholar Peter Fleming has suggested, “Neoliberal capitalism wants you to be alone. Undocumented sociality is its enemy” (Fleming, 2019, p. 39) and, I would add, unprofitable. However, this sense of isolation and the attendant structural insecurity promoted by neoliberalism is accompanied by a contradictory injunction to love the work we do. Work “gurus” like Gary Vaynerchuk promote the idea that work should be a passion that consumes us, and if we’re not“killing it” while loving what we’re doing, it’s our own fault (Vaynerchuk 2008). Our students are continually told that they must find their passion (or better yet, monetize a passion that they already have), and if they do what they love, they will never work a day in their lives. Finding such a passion must be accompanied by an incessant self-branding process. If we are not working, then we must be working at working. Who needs a tyrannical manager telling us to work harder, when we have our own internal manager demanding more and more from ourselves? As Byung-Chul Han states, “The subject of today’s world is an entrepreneur of the self practising self-exploitation—and, by the same token, self-surveillance. The auto-exploiting subject carries around its own labour camp; here, it is perpetrator and victim at one and the same time” (2017, p. 61). In one of his most important works—written in the mid-20th century—economist and social theorist Joseph Schumpeter argued that, “The capitalist process, not by coincidence but by virtue of its mechanisms, progressively raises the standard of life of the masses” (2008, p. 68). An important mechanism within capitalism, he argued, was the process of “creative destruction” that resulted in mutations within capitalism. One such mutation occurred in the early 20th century with the shift from the “gilded age” of robber barons and mass inequalities between rich and poor, to a system characterized by employment security and fair labor practices (a product, in good part, of labor movement struggle). In the last 40 years we have experienced another period of creative destruction, but this mutation has reintroduced many of the inequalities of that earlier 20th century period, threatening to undermine Schumpeter’s claim that capitalism “progressively raises the standard of life of the masses.” Today, insecurity and precarity have again been normalized (even used as an explicit instrument of government), and capitalism has remade itself by expanding the possibilities for the creation of surplus value. The “social factory” has broken down the traditional barriers between work and life, as capitalism seeks to mediate (and hence monetize) every dimension of human experience, every form of sociality, including our friendships. In this latest neoliberal mutation, capitalism has systematically undermined the institutional forms that, over the course of the 20th century, were developed to protect us from its worst excesses. We are now, for all intents and purposes, eating capitalism raw.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Capitalism

Work is part of the system of neoliberal punishment and forces us to submit to the necropolitics of capitalism

Mumby ‘19

(Dennis K, Dennis K. Mumby is the Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Communication at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA, Work: What is it good for? (Absolutely nothing)—a critical theorist’s perspective, Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 30 October 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dennis-Mumby/publication/338177026_Work_What_is_it_good_for_Absolutely_nothing-a_critical_theorist%27s_perspective/links/5e5bd8d892851cefa1d489bc/Work-What-is-it-good-for-Absolutely-nothing-a-critical-theorists-perspective.pdf)

For most of recorded human history, work was an activity in which only slaves, serfs, cloistered monks, or prisoners engaged. It was, as De Botton indicates above, viewed largely as punishment or penance. Work was performed out of necessity, or through coercion, but (almost) never as a matter of choice and rarely with alacrity. Indeed, early industrial capitalism’s biggest (and most difficult) task was to transform the human orientation to work rooted in the organic rhythms of the seasons to one rooted in the temporal discipline of the factory regime. Andrew Ure (one of the earliest chroniclers of the factory system in industrial capitalism) argued that Richard Arkwright’s “most noble achievement” was not the invention of a machine capable of mass-producing cotton but rather “training human beings to renounce their desultory habits of work, and to identify themselves with the unvarying regularity of the complex automaton. To devise and administer a successful code of factory discipline, suited to the necessities of factory diligence” (Ure, 1835, p. 15). If Richard Arkwright was, for all intents and purposes, the first manager of workers under industrial capitalism (his first cotton mill was built in 1771 in Cromford, Derbyshire, England), it is perhaps not too hyperbolic to argue that the entire history of management thought since then has involved efforts to develop increasingly effective and sophisticated ways to train humans to “denounce their desultory habits” and submit to the rhythms of work. From the coercive practices of 19th century factories and the 20th century Fordist assembly line, through the motivational efforts of the human relations school, to the identity management practices of the corporate culture movement and beyond, management efforts have focused on reconciling individuals with work. The success of this reconciliation effort is reflected in the degree to which—today—the definition of a fulfilling life is closely tied to one’s work. How, then, did we get to this point? How did we go from seeing work as a marginal, rather distasteful activity not discussed in polite society to something intrinsic to our self-definition as fully rounded human beings? I will address this question from the perspective of a critical organizational communication scholar (more on that below) who has spent the last 35 years writing about how work organizations, communication processes, power, and capitalism intersect. In the remainder of this focal article, I will do the following: (a) lay out what it means to examine work and organizations from a critical communication perspective; (b) provide an overview of two of the major theoretical and philosophical traditions that underpin this critical approach to work; and (c) discuss some of the contemporary issues on which critical research focuses, particularly those pertaining to the emergence of post-Fordist work under neoliberalism

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › No VTL

The structure of the workplace most closely resembles a cult – its benign control is what diffuses opposition and enables itself to wrap around every aspect of our lives

Alliger 22 – (GEORGE M. ALLIGER has had over 60 articles published in journals such as Journal of Management, Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Psychological Science, and Times Higher Education. He is an editor of The Handbook of Work Analysis. A fellow of the Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology, Alliger is now a Consulting Psychologist in the Houston Area “Anti-Work: Phycological Investigations Into Its Truths, Problems, and Solutions” 2022) - MP

When we once begin to imagine the work organizations that we encounter on a daily basis as captors, it is not a far jump to conceive them as cults. Cults are known for exerting strong psychological control over their members, whose wills are submerged as a consequence. Might there then be serious similarities between work organizations and actual cults, such as that known as Jonestown? We should preface the immediately following thoughts with a general note on the nature of a “cult.” First, cults are everywhere, are for the most part benign, and are simply profoundly human expressions of admiration and/or religiosity. A cult can be holding a person or persons in such high regard that it can be almost be considered a devotion; this would be an informal cult, as in the “cult of Elvis.” It can be a more formal devotion, sometimes but not always religious, as in the “cult of St. Anthony,” the “cult of Krishna,” but also the “cult of Stalin” as it existed in the erstwhile Soviet Union. Often, however, we use “cult” in the sense of a group of adherents with specific leader(s) and beliefs, but with the additional wash or tint of danger and damage. The most unsafe cults, for example, try to separate members from society and family, requiring virtually total obedience. It is in this final sense that we look at cults and work; in the following, for the word “cult,” the phrase “dangerous cult” could be used without loss of the desired connotations. There are presumably a number of ways to think about work and cults in the sense we are using the word. Two briefly addressed below are (a) how does work figure within cults, and (b) are at least some traditional, mainstream organizations like cults, and if so, how? A cult begins with a single person or a small group of people who form the core of its identity. A desire to extend its beliefs, plus a concomitant desire of the founder(s) for power, leads the group to recruit others into the cult; these latter members are not part of the inner group, though they might possibly attain this with sufficient zeal and obedience. This inner/outer membership of course leads to competition among the out-members for the attention and approval of the inner circle. The promise of potentially advanced status, dependent upon loyalty and performance, is virtually universal and often overt. Many cults require members to accept as fact things that seem unlikely on the surface (e.g., deity of the founder, utter uniqueness of the group, availability of supernatural powers to the most advanced initiates). Specific beliefs can be quite unusual, such as salvation by UFOs, or personal possession by aliens. These kinds of ideas can be attractive to initiates, but they are fragile in the sense that they can appear absurd when exposed to mainstream thought. Hence the cult needs to control the information available to members, as well as occupying their minds and time. So members need to be controlled: isolated and kept busy. One way to keep them busy is work. The “O” (“The Organization”) was a Communist-inspired group that had its origins among the cooperative markets that sprung up in the 1970s in the Minneapolis–St. Paul region and was remarkably successful in being secretive. Constructed in cells, communication within it was so controlled that members might live on the same block without being aware of each other. Dictates often came in the form of memos, and some members never met the leader Theophilus Smith. Members worked at one of the group businesses (for example a bakery or a grocery), as well as at day jobs not associated with the group. Long and difficult work hours meant little sleep and living in a kind of continuous haze. Regardless of the site of work, communication regarding the group was prohibited. One member after ten years (and a memo-commanded marriage with another member) began to finally question her membership. One important growing doubt related to how it was that the revolution was being served by comrades all earning minimum wage at “O” businesses.3 In some cases, work in a cult serves a double purpose – not only keeping members busy and distracted, but to actually provide money to cult leaders. Traduzindo o Verbo in Brazil required followers first to donate all possessions, then to work in “slavery-like conditions” in businesses associated with the organization, wages going to group leaders. Interestingly, during a mammoth government raid in 2018, over 500 members were identified to be living in deplorable circumstances; none asked to be rescued by the government agents, so strong was their group identification (and perhaps fear of the outer world).4 Work, then, is often central to cults; it is one method of control. It not only keeps members busy and trains them in submission, but psychologically unifies them in a setting where they are pulling together in the same direction. Further, it can serve to create an usagainst-the-world identity. Work serves cults’ purposes of entraining and control. It can be risky for cults to allow their members to work in jobs outside the cult. The stories, which are legion, of members gradually becoming aware of, and painfully beginning to credit, the possible falseness of a cult’s beliefs often are centered on initial tentative forbidden communications with those within and without the organization. Sometimes these communications occur with nonmembers in a work environment “on the outside.” * * * It is one thing to understand how work is used by cults; it is much more difficult to see the typical organization as a cult. But, if we think of some of the dimensions that define cults, we can ask whether modern organizations share them. Let’s focus on just four common characteristics of cults: isolation, emotional abuse, control, and charismatic (and dogmatic) leadership. ISOLATION Cults often wish to cut members off from family and other social connections, since these “others” do not share the beliefs of the cult nor acknowledge its leader. The others are dangerous, threatening to absorb member time, energy, and resources due the group, and potentially actively countering the information the group is inculcating in its members. Business organizations typically only isolate via contracted demands on workers’ time, and this time is often communication-permeable, so that (for example) texting a friend or family member during work time may easily be possible. Still, the taking of time that might otherwise be available for family, friends, or other associations can greatly exceed what might be expected. If to the contracted-for hours we add time for commutes and preparation for and completion of work done during off-hours, whether in the office or at home, the sum can be quite large. So although workers are not “isolated” for the controlling reasons motivating cult leaders, a loss of communion may be a real effect of job demands. The “salaryman” who emerged in 20th-century Japan is one of the most famous figures symbolizing the work-bred isolation from family life. But no one could successfully mold themselves to Jack Ma’s vision of 996 (see Chapter 1) without limiting outside engagements typically considered normal. Enron, which some have argued had strong cultic qualities, hired mostly young people from whom it could demand massive amounts of work, perhaps up to 80 hours a week.5 If a person needs to hold two or even three jobs to make ends meet, no one of the organizations for which she works needs to be an isolator in themselves. The jobs cooperate, so to speak, to minimize free time and associations. EMOTIONAL ABUSE The cutoff on defining emotional abuse versus standard guidance on jobs and job performance provided to workers is perhaps a fine line. Micromanaging can drain all flavor of autonomy from a job, which is unpleasant but does not seem exactly emotionally abusive. If accompanied with sufficient condescension and/or actual bullying then the picture quickly changes. And, of course, micromanagement or no, requiring an employee to do something they do not think is morally right might be abusive if the employee does not feel free to refuse the order. One might even question whether “motivating” people to work harder might be abusive if it entails setting up a work climate that might be damaging in the long run. For example, some management researchers recommend that leaders try to attain a work atmosphere that can be characterized by the “optimal range of distress” – this can lead workers to be adaptive in how they approach their tasks: If the [distress] level is too low, people will be inclined to complacently maintain their current way of working, but if it is too high, people are likely to be overwhelmed and may start to panic or engage in severe forms of work avoidance, like scapegoating or assassination [that is, blaming lack of achievement on co-workers].6 Now, while distress here might simply conjure up a motivational tension between goals and performance and thus be considered to act purely via cognitive perceptions and judgments rather than emotions, if it can drive active undercutting of co-workers, then its emotional force must be admitted. Some researchers have examined bullying at work and found that while classic interpersonal bullying may be rare, organizational bullying is not. When asked, employees may say something like this: If your overtime’s cut because your manager’s got to make his [payroll] targets, they say, you know, 10 per cent reduction in overtime. So he’s telling you there’s no overtime but your customers are saying, ‘I need this and need it now.’ You’re then getting – effectively getting bullied in two directions.7 CONTROL As mentioned earlier, company-as-family is a current trope for organizations. It is also perhaps an increasingly prevalent one. As organizations seek to organize in ever flatter ways and to treat their employees to elaborate benefits in the workplace, as owners and the highest executives try to realize their desires to be liked, the family metaphor may prove irresistible to leaders. It is irresistible, perhaps, precisely because of the desire on the part of some owners and executives not only to be liked but to avoid the feeling that they are in any way taking advantage of their workers. The “we’re all in this together” atmosphere is a comfortable one, where power tends to be less visible. Teams prevail, collaboration is intense. So, from the owner/executive point of view, this seems ideal because productivity is high and bad feeling throughout the organization is minimized. In a case like this, the fact that I as CEO am getting a (perhaps much) higher salary than the average employee doesn’t bother so much, and justifying or ignoring that differential is easier. However, one of the dangers in nurturing this family metaphor is developing a cult-like atmosphere. Hard boundaries that perhaps allowed workers to keep their jobs compartmentalized from their emotional life are now fuzzy. Are they now, in addition to working well, supposed to like working? Are they under some obligation to like co-workers, even like the boss? It can be strongly argued that a clear-cut job situation, where one works under clear-cut, nonemotional rules and expectations is more easily handled than one that begins to subtly require family feelings and obligations. We discuss later how unions may provide this kind of non-emotional clarity. Of course, it is likely that in company-as-family bad feelings are being controlled and marginalized rather than actually minimized. Examples are common of modern companies squelching chatrooms and other venues for open employee comments on the state of the company. CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP Cults don’t exist without leaders. In the business world, charismatic but narcissistic leaders may create an organizational “vision” that is touted as unique from all other such visions. They may use a carrotand-stick approach to developing employees that makes those employees feel part of a very special group indeed, while at the same time wary of expressing any dissent or disagreement for fear of running into the ever-threatening shoals of disapproval. The argument has been cogently made that the Enron débâcle was due in part to a cult-like empowerment of manipulative, charismatic leaders. As in many true cults, in this abusive and controlling environment common norms (such as those in accounting) were ignored or twisted, with eventual catastrophic effects.8 * * * Enron is one of those exceptions that prove the rule. In general, modern organizations do not make the cutoff for being considered cults. In some of these normal cases particular managers may create local emotionally abusive atmospheres. This is a problem, but does not justify any full-blown narrative of organizations as cults. It is true, though, that anti-work thinkers suggest that something dark and potentially damaging is going on in every organization. Most centrally, as we have seen, this relates to the required submission of the will and attendant depredations on the human spirit. But most organizations would not recognize themselves in this depiction; the organization’s sense of identity, as it were, is one of guiltlessness. This I would say is the ordinary state of affairs. This unexamined sense of organizational harmlessness and even virtuousness is met with some disbelief by anti-work thinkers. Lordon, for example, indicates his surprise at the extent to which organizational training videos are straightforward and devoid of any sense of awareness of a problem. They seem to reflect a “perfectly innocent good conscience, whose source is management’s own straightforward assent to what they do – unaware of any blatant affective instrumentalisation or mental manipulation, thus seeing no reason to dissimulate.”9 One unappreciated value of a workplace may be precisely its normality. People who have been indoctrinated into a cult sometimes experience dissonance between the cult’s statements on how dangerous and unenlightened life is outside the cult, on the one hand, and the general sensibleness that they encounter in their outside-the-cult working lives. Indeed, research has found that highly performing organizations, in contradistinction to cults, are more transparent, accountable, and feature much more dialog among employees.10 Some people may even find such a “normal” corporate atmosphere to be absolutely therapeutic. We can think of someone who comes from a home where she experiences belittlement, while at work she thrives in the respect of her co-workers.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › No VTL

Work results in a form of Stockholm Syndrome where the employee believes that submission the employer is beneficial

Alliger 22 – (GEORGE M. ALLIGER has had over 60 articles published in journals such as Journal of Management, Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, Psychological Science, and Times Higher Education. He is an editor of The Handbook of Work Analysis. A fellow of the Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology, Alliger is now a Consulting Psychologist in the Houston Area “Anti-Work: Phycological Investigations Into Its Truths, Problems, and Solutions” 2022) - MP

Lordon also does not mention the well-known Stockholm Syndrome, but the alignment of the wills of the workers with that of the employer that he depicts is reminiscent of it. In fact, posts about the so-called Corporate Stockholm Syndrome can easily be found online. The implication seems to be that at a least a quorum of employees themselves have felt, or know others who have felt, the conflicting emotions that define this syndrome: fundamentally, a sense of loyalty and submission to a boss or bosses or to a larger impersonal organization which they simultaneously perceive as actively mistreating them. This sense of identifying with and desiring to please a superior and highly controlling force may actually be somewhat common across human domains: family and relatives, friends, romantic relationships – why not the domain of work too? In this syndrome is encapsulated or demonstrated the fundamental character of many power relations. We initially desire a relation and sink much cost and effort into it, but when it turns out that there are downsides, we hesitate to believe that the costs do not remain worth it. In fact, for work as for other domains, it is a difficult calculus, for in many cases the sum of constraints and humiliations may be judged acceptable. Acceptable because the insults we experience as employees are relatively rare or mild; because we need to continue earning money for our family (what Lordon terms a “basal need”); because the job gives us a status with friends and family difficult to attain otherwise; because we believe the situation is temporary (for example, this boss will transfer somewhere else and a new, better boss will appear); because we can see that really the depredations are impersonal and/or random and affect many more employees than just ourselves; because we have co-worker support that diffuses if not truly ameliorates those transgressions that seem directed against us personally. Still, an important part of the force of the analogical application of this syndrome to the world of work is its central idea of being a captive, and not only a captive, but one who, in a seemingly irrational act of empathy, cooperates with the captor. This is at least part of what Lordon was trying to limn in his book’s title, that we are captives, but compliant. Not that employees are actually captives, of course, or even that all experience their jobs in a fundamentally negative way. About this latter point Lordon is rather cynical, writing as he does of “psyches of individuals who perform at times staggering feats of compartmentalisation”1 – that is, capable of mental separation from and non-attention to sometimes egregious shocks to freedom and self-esteem. Such extreme compartmentalization would seem maladaptive, and indeed some psychological research suggests that a compartmentalized personality may be committed to feeling positive; this comes at the cost of being possibly somewhat less stable than a more integrated self that permits frequent negatively as well as positively charged thoughts and perceptions.2 Thus it would seem on the surface that an employee who sees both positive qualities in her job while at the same time recognizing that it is requiring some subjection of the will may be more “balanced.” The “cost” of such balance might be too great for some – perhaps the compartmentalized individual who does not allow herself to perceive her subjugation is avoiding exactly that perception which would be psychically fatal to her, resulting as it might in self-loathing or worse.