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2023 CNDI Kritik
Alt › Framing › A2 Policy First

Policy simulations do not create solutions, but cement regimes of violence within debate.

Stypinska 22 [Diana Stypinska, Lecturer in Social Theory at University of Galway, Galway, Ireland, November 1, 2022, “Social Media, Truth and the Care of the Self”, Palgrave Macmillan, pgs. 83-92, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18108-5_5, JMH]

Ideology ‘corresponds to a corruption of reality through signs’, argues Jean Baudrillard, and, therefore, ‘the goal of the ideological analysis [is] to restore the objective process’ (2008: 27). Simulation, on the other hand, ‘corresponds to a short circuit of reality and to its duplication through signs’ (Baudrillard 2008: 27). As such, Baudrillard claims, ‘it is always a false problem to wish to restore the truth beneath the simulacrum’ (2008: 27). Indeed, as I have demonstrated in previous chapters, simulation produces its own peculiar duty of truth, which re-anchors its functionaries in the coordinates of the former. In line with this, I would like to posit that post-truth, in and of itself, is not ideological; it is simulational. Post-truth, that is to say, is not so much a symptom of a corruption of our reality, but, rather, that of its progressive substitution with the order of simulacrum. Crucially in this context, simulation should not be conceived as an external force—one that swooped down upon us, as it were, violently snatching us up and unconsensually entrapping us in its forceful grip. Contrariwise, it would be far more accurate to consider simulation as something that we actively welcomed—and continue to do so, in an utter disregard for, and ongoing denial of, the reasons behind, and the consequences of, this act. Here, let us briefly return to the origins of the term ‘post-truth’. According to Oxford Languages, the contemporary definition of ‘post-truth’ can be traced back to a 1992 essay by Steve Tesich published in The Nation magazine (see 2016). In it, Tesich offers some reflections on the ‘Watergate symptom’, a term coined in reference to the Watergate scandal as a means of designating a wider shift in the North American mentality (1992). As Tesich expounds, [e]ither because the Watergate revelations were so wrenching and followed on the heels of the war in Vietnam, which was replete with crimes and revelations of its own, or because Nixon was so quickly pardoned, we began to shy away from the truth. We came to equate truth with bad news and we didn’t want bad news anymore, no matter how true or vital to our health as a nation. We looked to our government to protect us from the truth. […] We would see only what our government wanted us to see, and we saw nothing wrong with that. We liked it that way. Our government was looking after us. (1992: 12, 13) Both Tesich and Boorstin presented a damning diagnosis of the American culture, warning of the dangers of the denial of reality. ‘We are rapidly becoming prototypes of a people that totalitarian monsters could only drool about in their dreams’, proclaimed Tesich (1992: 13). All the dictators up to now have had to work hard at suppressing the truth. We, by our actions, are saying that this is no longer necessary, that we have acquired a spiritual mechanism that can denude truth of any significance. In a very fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world. (1992: 13) As this shows, the problem of post-truth was never a question of epistemology. Contrariwise, the post-truth problematique is rooted in a desperate attempt to hold on to the capitalist ‘happy consciousness’—that is, ‘the belief that the real is rational and that the system delivers the goods’ (Marcuse 2007: 84)—by any means available. And by the late twentieth century, the only such means were those of the abandonment of reality. What Mark Fisher refers to as a ‘depressive hedonia’, namely, ‘an inability to do anything else except pursue pleasure’ (2009: 22) [author’s emphasis], is thus fundamentally co-extensive with our post-truth condition. It follows that our contemporary duty of truth is the expression of the imperative to constant, unimpeded flow of an unsublimated desire for gratification. Simulation enables us to eliminate the obstructions to this flow, as such, facilitating an increasing automatization of desire. Crucially, simulation does not shelter us from the physical world and our daily troubles. This, however, should come as no surprise. After all, the delusions that it affords us were, from the very onset, geared towards the preservation of the capitalist imaginary. In effect, by their very design, they are bent on the protection of the existence of the status quo, not us. By guaranteeing our entrapment within private subjective orbits (cf: Mills 2000), simulation operationalizes and sustains our deference to the logic of economicization; it does not have any purchase on the effects of the latter. So far this has largely translated itself into ‘reflexive impotence’ (Fisher 2009: 21). That is to say, we lived in the awareness that things were bad, but we believed that there was nothing that we could do about it (see Fisher 2009: 21). Nothing apart from, that is, attempting to obtain ‘at least some gratification through identification with the existent’ (Adorno 1991: 150). Today, however, the escalating libidinal frustrations are driving many to action. Temporary gratifications offered by the digital enactment of simulation-powered delusions, in short, are no longer enough. Indeed, it would appear that the days of reflexive impotence are numbered, soon to be replaced with widespread physical insurgencies of the impotent. As Luke Mogelson, the author of The Storm is Here, demonstrates, the 2021 attack on the US Capitol was but a sample of what is to come (see 2022). He argues that the Americans are in imminent danger of ‘more frequent and larger-scale eruptions of gun violence’ and, that with so many ‘people with considerable influence and power’ now calling for a civil war, its prospect is far from outlandish (quoted in Fox 2022; see also Orth 2022). Likewise, Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi warned us that if a radical change does not take place, the future of Europe will be that of ‘mass violence’ and ‘inter-ethnic civil war’ (see 2011: 122). With inflation in the eurozone at an all-time high (see Liboreiro 2022) and an intensifying energy crisis (see Horowitz 2022), there is no question that many are now alarmingly close to the boiling point. It is becoming blatantly clear that our unsublimated desires cannot be contained by the digital. To be sure, simulation no longer constitutes just an assault on the real; now it leads to real assaults. Such are its ‘true pleasures’: by automatizing our desires, by making ourselves neglectful of ourselves, others, and the world, we traded off our ability to meaningfully intervene into the present—all for an economic dreamworld that could never deliver on its promises. The perpetually accelerated play of simulation hence came to accelerate the demise of not only truth and politics, but that of our very existence. Let us make no mistake here: what we are losing today is more than critical agency; it is humanity.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Alt › Framing › Epistemology First

An epistemic shift is a prerequisite to the aff’s impacts

Stypinska 22 [Diana Stypinska, Lecturer in Social Theory at University of Galway, Galway, Ireland, November 1, 2022, “Social Media, Truth and the Care of the Self”, Palgrave Macmillan, pgs. 83-92, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-18108-5_5, JMH]

Farkas and Schou argue that what is presently needed is ‘another way of understanding both the democratic tradition as well as politics and the political’ (2020: 142). Clearly, this task is both conceptual and normative. It is conceptual insofar as it requires us to create other vocabularies than those currently structuring post-truth worlds. To grasp the dynamics of politics, we need to move beyond existing premises. Doing so is, however, also an imminently normative endeavor, on two accounts. First, because it asks us—as people currently inhabiting post-truth worlds—to think and act differently. We are prompted to rethink what we are doing. Second, proposing a shift in our existing ideas of politics and the political is also normative in the sense that it can pave the way for other modes of doing politics and democracy in the future. If we shift how we think through questions of politics, then we will also come to see that the status quo does not suffice. (Farkas and Schou 2020: 142) Their ardent call for ‘the formulation of proper alternatives’ (Farkas and Schou 2020: 157) seems to, however, overlook the fact that social theorists have been proposing such alternatives for a very long time. Indeed, one does not need to look hard to find a plethora of alternative visions of the future (see, for instance, Gorz 1983). Hence, as much as I endorse the sentiments underpinning Farkas and Schou’s stance, I nevertheless see it as necessary to question the viability of their proposals. Indeed, in light of my analysis, a certain naïveté can be situated at the core of the impassioned accounts such as theirs, namely, the one concerning the actuality of what has happened and what is happening. Indeed, what my analysis suggests is that our post-truth predicament is the consequence of the unyielding pursuit of economic rationality, rather than a symptom of ‘genuine demands for breaking with the status quo’ (Farkas and Schou 2020: 126). A patent case in point here is the fact that the anti-capitalist social movements—such as, for instance, Extinction Rebellion—do not tend to utilize the post-truth frame. To be sure, post-truth tactics are the remit of the establishmentarian agents and alt-right conspiracists: the likes of Donald Trump, Brexiteers, and white supremacists—to name but a few. An argument could be, of course, made that such tactics are a response to the threat of systemic change posed by the anti-capitalist groups. Approaching post-truth as a tool of counter-critique (cf: Stypinska 2020), however, barely scratches the surface of its problematique, overlooking the deeper issue of the libidinal economy of which it is an expression. From this perspective, the call to keep reinventing the non-capitalist wheel ad infinitum, at the very best, smacks of poor strategy. Indeed, the problem is not the lack of viable alternatives. Alas, it seems to lay in the fact that the societies we live in seem to be more interested in ‘influencing’ and ‘trolling’—on- and offline—than paying any heed to structural solutions. This is not to imply that we ought to resign ourselves to the current state of affairs. Rather, I would suggest, it is to affirm the necessity of being cautious of the urge to purposiveness (cf: Agamben 2018). Being, as we are, the products of the Western paradigm that places action, rather than being, as the place of ethics, we are inadvertently positioned ‘in debt with respect to [our] own end’ (see Agamben 2018: 63). According to Giorgio Agamben, praxis ‘is the place where this debt is settled and incessantly rekindled’ (Agamben 2018: 63). As such, purposiveness is yet another trap. Or, to put this differently, it is another expression of the paradigm of efficacy that culminates in sheer functionality (cf: Heron 2018). Agamben argues that the way out of this logic is the embrace of ‘impotentiality’: ‘not simply the potential to do this or that thing but potential to not-do, potential not to pass into actuality’ (1999: 180). This, he asserts, constitutes the ‘possibility of privation’ (Agamben 1999: 181) [author’s emphasis]. The key, in short, is to deactivate the economic apparatus, making it inoperative. As Agamben explains, inoperativity is not another action alongside and in addition to all other actions, not another work beyond all works: It is the space—provisional and at the same time non-temporal, localized and at the same time extra-territorial—that is opened when the apparatuses that link human actions in the connection of means and ends, of imputation and fault, of merit and demerit, are rendered inoperative. (2018: 85) Such a space can be opened by thinking. However, following Miguel de Beistegui, I contend that the thinking that we need is not simply ‘a natural disposition’, ‘one we can decide to activate (or not)’ (2022: 2). It emerges, and does so slowly, at times painfully, whether individually or historically. It struggles to come to life, and it struggles to survive. It is constantly fighting off demons that continue to haunt it, perpetually rising from the mud that lies at the bottom of its pond. It is an effort, and it needs all the help it can get to get off the ground. (Beistegui 2022: 2) Such thinking is a matter of care—care unencumbered by urgency or, indeed, expediency. Care that begins with introspection and aims at the development of ‘a full, perfect, and complete relationship of oneself to oneself’ (Foucault 2005: 320). It is a thinking that understands its own process and is capable of resisting the imperative to the perpetual actualization of praxis. Thinking, that is, whose purpose exceeds purposiveness. I appreciate that this is not exactly the ‘practical solution’ that so many of us are after, and that the picture I paint in this book is gloomy. To that, I respond with the words of Theodor Adorno: [w]ithin absolutized praxis, only reaction is possible and for this reason the reaction is false. Only thinking could offer an escape, and then only that thinking, the results of which are not prescribed—as is so frequently in those discussions in which it is predetermined who is right and which therefore do not advance the cause—but rather degenerate without fail into tactics. When the doors are barricaded, it is doubly important that thought not be interrupted. It is rather the task of thought to analyse the reasons behind this situation and to draw the consequences from these reasons. It is the responsibility of thought not to accept the situation as finite. If there is any chance of changing the situation, it is only through undiminished thought. (1991: 200, 201) The surrendering of one’s thinking to the solutionist imperative implies its instrumentalization. Hence, in sooth, it is an act of resignation—and of neglect. Recall the ancient philosophical practices of the care of the self and others that I keep returning to throughout this book: the Socratic endeavours to induce a constant perplexity, the Cynics’ embraces of re-evaluation as a driving principle of the mode of life. These were the actions irreducible to their immediate effects. They agitated the sensibilities to unsettle the dominant rationality. They did not prescribe; they were an imperative to ‘open thinking’ that ‘points beyond itself’ (cf: Adorno 1991: 202). Consider also the Foucauldian conception of subjectivity as a point of tension between the self and the world, as something irreducible to the existing expectations and desires. Digital simulations pixelate this tension, turning it, and therefore our very (dis)positions, to mere code. With the news that metaverse is on its way (see Anderson and Rainie 2022), we ought to seriously consider the automatizing implications of the digital technologies of the subject. Further simulation will not save us; it will only intensify the neglect of that which makes us human. To care, and to transform, we must learn how to think openly.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Alt › Alts › Biocommunism

Biocommunism breaks the cycle of serial policy failure towards and communal approach to power.

Dyer-Witheford 22

Nick Dyer-Witheford (associate professor @ University of Western Ontario, winner of Gertrude J. Robinson Book Prize from Canadian Communication Association), 5-25-2022, "Biocommie: Power and Catastrophe," Socialist Futures, https://projectpppr.org/populisms/biocommie-power-and-catastrophe //MLT

Independently, the philosopher Szymon Wróbel l (2020a; 2020b) has developed the concept of biocommunism as process of “population empowerment” in which “power over life is transformed into the power of life itself”, a “fold of being onto itself” (2020a). His exploration offers several plangent formulations resonating with this paper’s line of thought. There is, however, a major divergence between our two accounts of “biocommunism”. For Wróbel it remains a regulative ideal without, and indeed in refusal of, any institutional realization of “biopower”, a “dis-organizing principle”, whereas I consider biocommunism a practical political project in which such power is communized (see Højme 2022). Obviously both these versions of “biocommunism” stage an encounter between communist thought, pre-eminently Marx’s, with Michel Foucault’s (2007; 2008) proposition that “biopower”—the governance of “life itself“– is a defining feature of modernity, and with its subsequent spin-offs and variants in the work of thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben (1998) and Roberto Esposito (2008). The version I offer here is influenced by the work of Michal Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) and Tiziana Terranova (2009; 2015), for whom biopower exercised from above can be countered by an insurgent biopolitics arising from below, and of several subsequent developments of this line of thought. Of particular importance, given the centrality of planetary heating to the age of catastrophe, is the work of Emanuele Leonardi (2012) on the biopolitics of climate crisis, and—alongside several associates—on a new articulation of Marxism with “de-growth” ecology (Leonardi 2021; Barca 2020; Feltrin 2021 and 2022; Lassere 2020a and 2020b). Approaching the issue from a different angle is discussion arising from Frederic Jameson’s (2016) controversial vision of socialism as a “universal army of labour” (to which I will return later), and in particular from Alberto Toscano’s (2016; 2020) proposal of a “biopolitics from below”, and responses by Panagiotis Sotiris (2020) and Gareth Dale (2021) in a pandemic context. None of these sources, should, however, be held responsible for the use made of their ideas in the fabrication of biocommunism. As the issues of a climate emergency and other ecological disasters is central to the agenda of biocommunism, it can be objected that the term merely replicates the problematic of “eco-socialism”, already the topic of a large and important literature (Foster 2000; Moore 2015). If biocommunism seeks to rephrase the issue, it is in part to convey that ecological crisis has entered a new phase in which the time for averting disaster has expired, and battles are now fought out on already-catastrophized ground, demanding more urgent “measures taken” (Brecht 1929). It is also, however, to dispute the hyphen of eco-socialism, which, while critically important in bringing the ecological and social together in left thought, also continues to conceptually separate them.[1] This obscures the contemporary imbrications of politics with nature so apparent in the current polycrisis where, for example, future carbon dioxide concentrations in the planetary atmosphere for generations to come may depend on disruptions of energy sources arising from an horrific but (by historical standards) relatively small central European war. Biopower, biopolitics and hence biocommunism are terms proper to a moment where “ecological” and “governmental” processes relentlessly loop around in mutual reconfiguration.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Alt › Alts › Biocommunism

The alternative is biocommunism—only a society based on communal biopolitics can avoid the failure of past socialist regimes and end the capitalist mode of production.

Dyer-Witheford 22

Nick Dyer-Witheford (associate professor @ University of Western Ontario, winner of Gertrude J. Robinson Book Prize from Canadian Communication Association), 5-25-2022, "Biocommie: Power and Catastrophe," Socialist Futures, https://projectpppr.org/populisms/biocommie-power-and-catastrophe //MLT

All biocommunist measures to remedy and repair the consequences of capitalism’s polycrisis require foresight and coordination, that is, planning. The current catastrophe sequence demonstrates the failure of the market as a viable global planning mechanism. It has elicited calls from varied positions on the left, from Leninist to social democratic, for governmental economic and ecological plans (Malm 2020; Brancaccio and Passarella 2022; Krahé 2022). The revival of socialist and communist planning traditions and the proposal of new solutions to their endemic problems, is a major topic of this conference. (Benanav 2022; Groos and Sorg 2022; Heyer 2022; O’Neill 2022). This paper only appends three biocommunist notes. First, in the era of global warming and the sixth extinction, “red plenty” planning models demand revision to reckon with ecological limits (see Sorg 2022). Biocommunism would be a combination of social and environmental levelling to create a social system positioning itself between a ceiling of environmental sustainability and a floor of equalized social development. The conceptual basis for such planning exists in the “boundary model” presented by green authors such as Kate Raworth (2017), who’s unfortunately named “doughnut economics”—also sometimes termed “arrival” economics (Trebeck and Williams 2019)—proposes humanity occupy a central zone of “fair and just” social development between two encircling dangers of ecological overshoot and economic shortfall. The problem with Raworth’s proposition is, however, its refusal to confront the incompatibility between its goals and capital’s accumulatory drive. In practice, “boundary models” have, since the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 been hijacked by corporate green-washers to legitimize ongoing economic extraction, preserving the “growth” imperative (Barca 2020). Biocommunist planning would therefore be a counter-version, weaponized to fight through to the abolition of capital, where the options offered to hominids by their shifting ecological and economic boundaries could be assessed without such presuppositions.[7] Second, biocommunist planning need not necessarily supply the highly variegated complex consumerism characteristic of advanced capitalist economies. Although digital, networked and algorithmic planning hold out possibilities for solving historically intractable “calculation problems” characteristic of such economies, it should not be presumed that such a consumption driven society would be the biocommunist summum bonum. A mode of production beyond capital could have different goals, trading off high consumerism for free time, environmental plenitude, social solidarity and species-survival. This essay has suggested that ecological and equalitarian constraints may together favor provision of a common “basket of goods”, and observance of “public luxury and private sufficiency” principles, with a subordinated market sector supplying a reduced range of consumer items. To the degree that social consensus is forged around such common goals, calculation problems are simplified. Struggle towards such a goal is truly radical but may come to seem pragmatic in the midst of vast market breakdowns, in which capital initiates its own spontaneous, barbaric “degrowth”. Third, as or more challenging than the “calculation problem”, is the “transmission problem”—that of ensuring a social coordination in which plans from above are engaged with proposals from below. This is a two- or rather many- sided flow vital in terms not just of accurate relay of information (though this is undoubtedly important), but also of counter-planning alteration, critique and counterproposal. The failure to instantiate a two-way transmission system in state socialism too often resulted in unilateral top-down governing processes that were not only massively uninformed and bureaucratically corrupt but ultimately murderously tyrannical. The tendency for bilateral efforts to degenerate into unilateral authoritarianism will doubtless make many, even (or especially) on the left, recoil from the idea of a communist biopower. Without making any pretense to solve what is probably the prime objection to a planned economy—an objection that that can only be answered by creating counter examples of such an economy’s conduct—I suggest that it is precisely around this transmission problem, which is also, of course, a democracy problem, that thinking about “biopolitics” is useful. Foucault’s concept of biopolitics is associated with his idea of governmentality—that is to say, government conceived not solely as state power but in a more capillary form, enacted through a range of institutions and organizations with varying relations to and degrees of autonomy from the centralized apparatuses of rulership, combining—in Deleuzian terms—both molar and molecular components, or, in Foucault’s own language, a “mesh of power” (Foucault 2012). The political valency of this “mesh” is ambivalent. It has the potential to be a creeping, insidious and implacable disciplinary mechanism, all the more deadly to the degree that it is diffuse and decentralized. But there is an inverse concept, where the disaggregated and distributed nature of power becomes the occasion to reverse or oscillate the directions of its biopolitical flows from heights to depths, peripheries to centres, hubs to spokes, persistently reconfiguring the architecture of power. The model of biocommunism discussed here would be a form of governmentality in which the unions of emergency workers and the councils of environmental proletarians, alongside other forms of communal power become interlocuters of state planning proposing and revising planning functions that are increasingly diffused out from the official apparatus into what Marx and Engel termed a “vast association”(1848). Wróbel (2020, 37) insightfully observes that the moment when populations cease to be the object of biopower, but become its subject is when “the people” emerge, but—contra his rejection of any possible institutional form for this emergence—I contend that in such a moment a “biopolitics from below” (Toscano 2016), a powerful, protagonistic biocommunism, becomes possible.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Impacts › Turns › Climate Change

Cruel Optimism Link: The aff’s representations of environmental protection perpetuate cruel optimism as a bottom-up social form of control —they don’t actually solve for climate, but their attempt to make you believe they do acts in defense of natural capital

Fletcher et. al 19 (Robert Fletcher, Sociology of Development and Change, Wageningen University, Wageningen, Netherlands; Wolfram H. Dressler, School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia; Zachary R. Anderson, Department of Geography and Planning,University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada; Bram Büsch. “Natural capital must be defended: green growth as neoliberal biopolitics,” THE JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES. 2019. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/03066150.2018.1428953?needAccess=true&role=button) @ehatt

The cruel optimism of defending natural capital A pattern emerges when comparing Palawan and Berau: a cruel optimism (Berlant2010) offered to local community members tasked with being the defenders of natural capital while at the same time being prohibited from practicing livelihoods strategies that they have engaged in for centuries. But this cruel optimism extends beyond the villages, and is not merely a case of NGO workers taking advantage of villagers in order to implement a project with the veneer of success. Local NGO workers also find themselves caught in the vise of pragmatism and an economy of expectations (Borup et al.2006), hoping for more but accepting less in the interest of making small steps toward protecting the forest and supporting communities. Local representatives of BINGOs, meanwhile, find themselves shaped by the structural constraints of environmental governance in situ just as local com-munity members do, with both groups giving, receiving and buying into a range of specu-lative, future-oriented promises that seldom come to fruition. Interventions in both areas include a PES scheme (a provincial project in Palawan, anational REDD+ program in East Kalimantan) established with support from NGOs, the state and bilateral donors. What is remarkably consistent across the cases is the speculat-ive anticipatory ‘end objective’ that NGOs promote to recruit local stakeholders (uplandfarmers in Palawan, district and state officials in East Kalimantan) with the seductive promise of new (financial) capital derived from the (natural) capital they supposedly already possess. In order to realize these benefits, farmers must change their behaviors and attitudes toward themselves, livelihoods and forest landscapes in ways that, we contend, exemplify a particularly neoliberal biopolitics promising ‘green growth’ as an incentive for this shift. In this way, swidden farmers are turned into forest stewards, honey hunters become centerfold sustainable harvesters and, in time, both forest stew-ards and sustainable harvesters become ‘showpieces’ for local forest conservation initiat-ives–exemplary warriors in defense of natural capital. In contrast to their common framing by conservationists, however, local people tend to be more realistic and opportunistic brokers than selfless ecological stewards. While they negotiate and enact their role as stewards and representations of NGO-led programs,they also deftly negotiate the socio-political networks of extractive capital in search of the most lucrative prospects. In so doing, they keep opportunities open for involvement in either endeavor by simply not closing these off. In some cases, locals will themselves refuse extractive industry in defense of natural capital–but usually only insofar as NGOs continue to invest time, labor, capital and rheto-ric in creating the anticipatory atmosphere of valuable opportunities to be realized in the future. But when these NGOs, along with state agents engaged in ‘public–private partner-ships’, abandon these ventures, as they often do, communities may splinter, with some availing themselves of the opportunities they have kept open for employment in extrac-tive activities such as oil palm.In other cases, such as Palawan, community members feel abandoned and desperate with respect to the intangible aspects of NGO promises and return to what they have always done: clear old growth forest for productive swidden yields so as to feed theirfamilies. In other instances, they maintain plots and forest harvests as they shift labortime to work in plantations that flank the forest uplands. In this way, NGOs often inadver-tently leave a legacy of frustration alongside the lingering notion of the continued neces-sity to improve oneself in pursuit of a chimerical development (Li2007).Conclusion Our analysis has explored how natural capital valuation in the interest of biodiversity con-servation has been promoted in similar ways in two sites in Southeast Asia. A common pattern emerged in which this promotion is intended to (directly or indirectly) enroll resource users as defenders of natural capital in exchange for the promise of payments to make this defense more profitable than the extractive opportunities forgone in the process. We have proposed that this exhibits a form of neoliberal biopower in terms of which the imperative to ‘make live’ is justified by both the role of biodiversity in sustaining life and the need to incentivize defense of natural capital through demonstrating the economic potential in harnessing capitalist markets as the basis of conservation payments.‘Green growth’ becomes the common metaphor for this logic, shorthand for the particular manner in which life is to be nurtured within a neoliberal biopolitical perspective. NCA is thus not merely a new version of a longstanding ICDP approach; rather, it espouses a new, overarching set of technologies, conditionalities and incentive structures hitherto foreign to rural frontier spaces (Büscher, Dressler, and Fletcher2014; Turnhout, Neves, and de Lijster2014). For this reason it is crucially important that peasant and agrarian change scholars attend to the implications of this trend for rural livelihoods. While we our cases demonstrate that the ideal neoliberal vision informing NCA is rarely if ever wholly realized in practice, its biopolitics clearly does circulate discursively and manifest materially, if only partially, in its influence on local (self-)perceptions and land use in the short term. Despite their limited success in improving conservation outcomes, moreover, NCA initiatives remain lucrative for some in funding program design and project delivery, infrastructure development, accounting and monitoring activities and so forth. Yet in the long term, the common misalignment between NCA interventions and local needs will likely merely precipitate intensification and degradation of frontier landscapes. As our cases demonstrate, most NCA interventions do not satisfy the benefit–cost ‘calculations’ of rural residents as these newer interventions are simply not tangible and lucrative enough to stop poor farmers, who simply want a better future, from entering into extractive ventures. While our analysis includes only two specific cases, anecdotal evidence from other sites suggests that the common dynamics we have identified are not limited to these. These are, we propose, inherent within NCA, which embodies an essential tension between the economic valuation it promotes and its persistent inability to actually generate the financial resources necessary to direct this valuation toward conservation. This is, quite simply, because resource extraction is almost always far more lucrative than conservation, which results from the fact that this extraction is able to externalize social and environ-mental costs in order to increase profits (Fletcher et al.2016). NCA, of course, is intended precisely to encourage the internalization of such costs in acknowledgment of this dynamic. Yet its market-based emphasis means that to do so entails eschewing the possi-bility of direct regulation in favor of the effort to generate more revenue from conservation than extraction in order to incentivize the former. Yet to accomplish this on a substantial scale is essentially impossible within neoliberal capitalist economies whose boundaries this strategy takes as given. To generate the profits necessary for this strategy to work would paradoxically require externalizing even more social and environmental costs else-where to generate the revenue needed for conservation offsets (Fletcher et al.2016).The fact that these daunting issues are rarely addressed in conservation planning is not necessarily a function of neglect or miscalculation on the part of planners. Our research demonstrates that such avoidance seems to stem not from naiveté but more commonly from a sense of paralysis in the face of overwhelming structural challenges. To really stop extractive expansion would be to call for a fundamental transformation in how both states and markets operate within a capitalist political economy predicated on continual expan-sion. Efforts to advance a conservation strategy that acknowledges this reality are under-way (Kothari2014; Büscher and Fletcher forthcoming). Short of that, the choice to use NCA initiatives and focus on local communities in order to try to protect some small piece of biodiversity is a pragmatic one. NCA for conservation, in sum, seems plagued by a fundamental contradiction in terms of its overarching aim to promote cost–benefit analysis in pursuitof conservation.In practice,aswe have shown, rather than producing the promised symbiosis the former actually tends to undermine the latter, encouraging valuation based on economic logic yet in failing toprovide sufficient revenue from conserved resources ensures that the cost–benefit equation will be resolved in favor of the very resource extraction it intends to counter. In this way, a neoliberal biopolitics is promoted even as it fails to defend the‘natural capital’it targets.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Impacts › Disposable Life › Structure Violence

Bio-power is the common driver of the otherization of others and the creation of any issues including racism, securitization, homophobia, which falls into which groups are the most otherized within capitalist society.

DEMİRBAŞ ‘19 ELİF DEMİRBAŞ, Bogazici University MS, Brandeis University PhD, University of Massachusetts, Lowell, 2019 https://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12622927/index.pdf

EDTo be more explicit, we can say that discipline is addressed to bodies (Foucault, 2003, p. 242). It aims to control and homogenize individuals, to fit them into their appropriate roles in the social hierarchy, and to exclude those who do not comply. Institutions such as schools or other mechanisms of power, such as the family or the police, exist in order to get individuals in line with the disciplinary society that they live in. And institutions such as the hospitals, asylums, and prisons take care of people who cannot or will not bow down. The major tool in disciplinary power’s disposal is surveillance (Foucault, 1980, p. 102). This is obvious when one thinks of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, which is the quintessential form of disciplinary power. What is not obvious, though, is its invisibility. Disciplinary power renders its subjects visible rather than itself (Foucault, 1984, p. 199). The subjects have to be under constant surveillance, or, to be more precise, they have to feel like they are under constant surveillance for disciplinary power to work. Subjects who think that they are under constant surveillance internalize disciplinary power so much so that they become their own inspectors (Altunok, 2007, p. 17). In other words, the “visibility [of subjects] assures the hold of the power that is exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his subjection” (Foucault, 1984, p. 199). Disciplinary power was pivotal in the establishment of market economy and the corresponding market society (Foucault, 2003, p. 36; Polanyi, 2001). In its formation, capitalism, or market economy in Polanyi’s words, required the commodification of land, labor and money, three fictitious commodities, which can never be fully commodified because human beings do not produce land – 63 land is provided to us by the Earth – they do not give birth to their children with the purpose of turning them into life-time laborers, and they did not invent money to sell it in the market, money is just a medium of exchange (Polanyi, 2001, pp. 75-76). These fictitious commodities, however, had to be commodified to ensure the completion of production chains that were essential to the capitalist mode of production. And for the commodification of labor, disciplinary power was essential as it gave the bourgeoisie the power to force the lower classes into working in factories. Disciplinary power is a compilation of strategies of power aimed to fulfill three criteria: to exercise power with the minimum amount of cost (not just economic, but political or even social as well), to receive maximum returns and keep the cycle of power running by continuously imposing disciplinary strategies in the institutions from which they receive their results, such as schools, armies, industries, and hospitals (Foucault, 1984, p. 207). “In short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system” (ibid, p. 207). As capitalist economy grew, disciplinary power relations spread from Europe to cover the face of the Earth, as they could be used in most diverse political regimes, apparatuses, or institutions (ibid, p. 211).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Impacts › Disposable Life › Generic

Biopolitics disposes of life once its “purpose” is deemed no longer “useful” by the state.

Dillon ‘15 [Michael Dillon, is Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster, UK, “Biopolitics of Security,” Taylor & Francis, 1-29-2015, https://www.academia.edu/3893975/Biopolitics_of_Security] [A.G]

My expression for this is that the mode of biological being is now understood as ‘being-in-formation’. Securing the making of life live is comprised of an assemblage of techniques, discourses and now also institutions and practices that articulate, while they simultaneously also interrogate refine and further deploy, this truth of biological being. By and large, then, if you seek to secure a living thing prophylactically sealing it from its environment you will assuredly constrain that life, or kill it off. Life as species being thus poses a different problematisation of security for modern security. It turns them into biopolitical regulators of life. Here, biopolitically, security is less a matter of raison d’état than it is a life science. The very problematisation of security and the very mechanisms of security are thus radically transformed when their referent object becomes that of making life live. Foucault makes this point directly in the very early lectures of Security, Territory Population (2007). There he explores how the early empirical object of the biopliticised referent object of security becomes population and how population is characterised, among other features, by its radical contingency and by circulation (Dillon 2005; 2006). He also states quite baldly that biopolitics is a dispositif de sécurité designed to promote the multiple transactional freedoms which comprise biological existence, and that, therefore, ‘freedom’ – this transactional account of freedom - is nothing but “the correlative of the development of apparatuses of security” (2007). Security is secured through rather than against the transactional freedoms of species life. It is possible here, however, also to pursue the logic of biopolitical securitisation beyond Foucault. Or, at least, to schematise, in ways that he did not, this re-problematisation of the entire problem space of security – its manifold fields of intervention, points of application, fields of adversity and surfaces of friction. There is space to specify only a few salient points. First, biological being as being-in-formation exists in a permanent state of emergence. Emergence is however a dual process. It simultaneously entails destruction as well as production. Indeed, there is no novel production of new form, new modes of individuation, without the destruction of old ones. This permanent state of emergence is therefore also a permanent state of emergency; an emergency which differs significantly in its drivers and attributes from that which Agamben details in Homo Sacer (1998). That is how and why biopolitics hyperbolicises security. Making life live – biopolitics - simply is a security problematic, one moreover which operates through the freedoms of liberal biopolitics. Second, in the very process of its emergent adaptation and change there is no guaranteeing that life will not go acerbic and become a danger to itself. Life understood as being-in-formation is life understood to be continuously also becoming-dangerous. Third, then, whereas the project of making life live appears to be an unproblematically benign project, it is far from that. If life is to be promoted, life has to be rigorously assessed and sorted. Some life is good for life and some life is not. Biopolitics institutes a remorseless assay of living things subjecting them to the most intense evaluation of their biopolitical utility – the contribution they may make to the biopolitical project of making life live. Life that fails this test, or scores low on its many proliferating governmental metrics, is systematically demoted, devalued, cast aside and, if necessary, eliminated. Foucault conjugated this biopolitical strategic logic towards the end of Society Must be Defended (2003). There he detailed how race operates as one such metric, or sorting device, for determining which life is utile for making life live and which life is not. All three of these features therefore help explain how it is that biopolitics is a lethal security business. It is characterised, among other features, by racial discrimination (Dillon 2008b; Stoler 1995); necropolitics (Mmbembe 2003; Montag 2005); and, war whose warrant is killing to make life live (Dillon and Reid, 2009).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Advantage Links › Disease

The use of biopower to establish an effective governance paradigm during the Covid pandemic through biopolitical tactics of health terror holds larger implications for public policy that attempts to control and regulate the bodily autonomy of individuals.

Sfetcu 2022 [Nicolae, Researcher at The Romanian Academy, November 2022, , “Biopolitics and Geopolitics” IV Romanian Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Telework, https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics/]

It is always dangerous to entrust doctors and scientists with decisions that are ultimately ethical and political. (Dean 2020) In Medicine as Religion, Giorgio Agamben: states (Agamben 2020b) that in the modern West coexist three major belief systems: Christianity, capitalism and science, which sometimes intersect. The novelty consists in the fact that between science and the other two faiths, without noticing, an underground and relentless conflict was triggered, with successful results for science. In science, medicine occupies a special place, being characterized by does not need a special dogma, but is limited to borrowing its fundamental concepts from biology – there is a god or evil principle, namely disease, whose specific agents are bacteria and viruses, and a beneficent god or principle that is not health, but recovery, whose cultic agents are drugs and therapies the phenomenon has become permanent and ubiquitous – it is no longer about taking medication, doctor visits or surgery: all our lives we must worship this cult moment by moment, because the enemy, the virus, is always present and must be fought constantly the practice of worship is no longer free and voluntary – it becomes mandatory from a normative point of view the medical religion has unreservedly taken over the eschatological urgency from Christianity – the medical religion combines the perpetual crisis of capitalism with the Christian idea of an end time like capitalism and unlike Christianity, the medical religion does not offer the prospect of salvation and redemption – recovery is only temporary, as the evil God, the virus, cannot be eliminated once and for all. (Agamben 2020b) Patrick Zylberman described in 2013 the process by which health security becomes an essential part of state and international political strategies, (Flahault et al. 2016) by creating a kind of “health terror” as a tool for governance. Zylberman shows that the apparatus used by the WHO was articulated in three points: 1) the construction, based on a possible risk, of a fictitious scenario that would allow the governance of an extreme situation; 2) adopting the logic of the worst scenario as a regime of political rationality; 3) organizing all citizens in a way that strengthens government institutions, whereby the imposed obligations are presented as evidence of altruism and the citizen no longer has a right to health but is legally obligated to be healthy (biosecurity). Agamben considers, in Biosicurezza, Agamben 2020a) that the emergency situation can allow the design of a governance paradigm whose effectiveness will go beyond any normal form of governance. Thus, biosecurity has already proved capable of causing the absolute cessation of all political activities and all social relations as the maximum form of civic participation. “In question is a whole conception of the destinies of human society from a perspective that, in many respects, seems to have adopted the apocalyptic idea of the end of the world from the religions that are now at their west. After replacing politics with the economy, now, in order to ensure governance, even this must be integrated with the new paradigm of biosecurity, in front of which we will have to sacrifice all other requirements. It is legitimate to ask whether such a society can still be defined as human or whether the loss of sensitive relationships, face, friendship, love, can really be compensated by an abstract and supposedly completely fictitious health security.” (Agamben 2020a)

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Advantage Links › Disease

The government is using the “illness” of poverty to establish a state of emergency, using policy to reduce its citizens to a state of “bare life”

Sfetcu 2022 [Nicolae, Researcher at The Romanian Academy, November 2022, , “Biopolitics and Geopolitics” IV Romanian Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Telework, https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics/]

Giorgio Agamben is a well-known Italian philosopher who investigates the concepts of the state of emergency, the way of life (borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein) and the homo sacer. The concept of biopolitics (starting from the work of Michel Foucault) is found in many of his writings. Agamben says that what is manifesting in this pandemic is the growing tendency to use the state of emergency as a normal paradigm of government, through a militarization of those areas where there are people proven to be infected. Such a formula will allow the government to quickly extend the state of emergency to all regions. He lists a number of serious restrictions on freedom imposed by pandemic restrictions. These restrictions would be disproportionate to the real threat. Once terrorism is exhausted as a justification for exceptional measures, "epidemics could provide the ideal pretext for expanding these measures, beyond any limitation." (Agamben 2020d) Thus, "in a vicious circle, the restriction of freedom imposed by governments is accepted in the name of a desire for security, which was created by the same governments that now intervene to satisfy it." (Agamben 2020a) 5 Agamben notes that "the media and the authorities are doing everything possible to create a climate of panic, thus causing a true state of emergency, with severe limitations on movement and the suspension of daily life and work activities for entire regions": "Faced with the frantic, irrational and completely unfounded emergency measures adopted against an alleged epidemic ... why the media and the authorities are doing everything possible to spread a state of panic, thus causing a genuine state of emergency, with serious limitations to move and suspend daily life in entire regions?” (Agamben 2020c) Later, Agamben returns with some clarifications (Kotsko 2020a) introducing the concept of “naked life”: “The first thing that the panic wave, which paralyzed the country, clearly showed, is that our society believes in nothing but naked life.” People ”… are prepared to sacrifice practically everything – normal living conditions, social relations, work, even friendships and religious or political beliefs – to avoid the danger of falling ill. The naked life, and the fear of losing it, is not something that brings men and women together, but something that blinds and separates them. Other human beings, like those in the plague described by Manzoni, are now seen only as potential contaminators to be avoided at all costs or at least to keep at a distance of at least one metre. The dead – our dead – have no right to a funeral and it’s not clear what happens to the corpses of our loved ones. Our fellow humans have been erased and it’s odd that the Churches remain silent on this point. What will human relations become in a country that will be accustomed to living in this way for who knows how long? And what is a society with no other value other than survival?” "Men have become so used to living in conditions of permanent crisis and emergency that they don’t seem to notice that their lives have been reduced to a purely biological condition, one that has lost not only any social and political dimension, but even any compassionate and emotional one. A society that lives in a permanent state of emergency cannot be a free one. We effectively live in a society that has sacrificed freedom to so-called “security reasons” and as a consequence has condemned itself to living in a permanent state of fear and insecurity." (Kotsko 2020a) According to Agamben, we've come to talk about the virus in terms of war. A war against an invisible enemy. "The enemy isn’t somewhere outside, it’s inside us." (Kotsko 2020a) Followers of Michel Foucault's biopolitics argue that this is a new concept instrumental in "reconceptualizing the limits of sovereign power: not as fixed territorial boundaries at the outer edge of the territorial state, but infused through bodies and diffused into societies and everyday life". (Vaughan-Williams 2009, 9)

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Advantage Links › Democracy

Biopolitics subjugates populations through abusive regulatory practices, framing controlling policy under the guise of liberal democracy as a means of “fiscal optimization” through which to strengthen control societies.

Sfetcu 2022 [Nicolae, Researcher at The Romanian Academy, November 2022, , “Biopolitics and Geopolitics” IV Romanian Committee for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology Telework, https://www.telework.ro/en/biopolitics-and-geopolitics/]

Biopolitics and Geopolitics Biopower is a term coined by Michel Foucault, referring to the practice of modern nation states by "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations". (Foucault 1990, 140) Foucault used the term to refer specifically to public health practices, among other regulatory mechanisms. Biopower control people in large groups, through an anatomo-politics of the human body, and biopolitics of the population through social institutions of discipline. Power is codified in both social practices and human behavior, as the human subject gradually accepts subtle regulations and expectations of the social order, (Policante 2010) "an explosion of many and varied techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations": (Foucault 1990, 140) "By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called biopower." (Foucault et al. 2009, 1) A specific way of applying biopower is what Foucault calls “massifying”, (Foucault et al. 2009, 55–86) which uses scientific apparatus and equipment. This anatomo-politics of the human body correlates with the new knowledge of science and technology under the guise of a liberal democracy, where life itself becomes a deliberate political strategy and an economic, political and scientific problem, to which the nation state is coupled. (Foucault et al. 2009) Foucault argues that while the stated purpose of biopower is to maximize life, it also has a dark side: when the stakes are life itself, anything can be justified by the state, thus being able to easily eliminate groups identified as threatening the life of the nation, or of humanity. (Foucault 1990, 137) Foucault draws attention to what he calls the major political and social project, namely the "milieu intérieur" (inner environment), as a support for the truths uttered by the authorities. In the modern version, the government is thus presented to the population in the media as a means of efficiency, fiscal optimization, political responsibility and rigor, forming a public discourse of government solidarity and social consensus. (Foucault et al. 2009, 283) Biopolitics is a concept that takes into account the management of the life and populations of a governed region. According to Foucault, biopolitics is "to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order." (Foucault 1990) In political science, the term has two different meanings: a poststructuralist one identical to the meaning attributed by Michel Foucault (denoting social and political power over life), and another that refers to biological studies and political science. (Liesen and Walsh 2011) Foucault speaks of a style of government that regulates populations through "biopower" in all aspects of human life. (Foucault et al. 2009, 1)

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Advantage Links › Environment – Climate Change

Their narrative of conservation is rooted in biopolitical control that datafies extinction scenarios.

Biermann and Mansfield 14 (Christine Biermann and Becky Mansfield (ohio state university). “Biodiversity, Purity, and Death: Conservation Biology as Biopolitics,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 2014. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275321026_Biodiversity_Purity_and_Death_Conservation_Biology_as_Biopolitics ) [A.G] + @ehatt

Conservation biology: the biopolitical science The emergence of conservation biology as a crisis-oriented discipline in the late 20th century marks a significant shift in the American relationship with ‘nature’. Today’s conservationists by and large aim to foster and protect the diversity of nonhuman life, taking as their object not individuals (eg, trees, charismatic animals, or geological formations) but populations, communities, and species. In colonial and early America, by contrast, nature was commonly viewed as something to be seized, possessed, and exploited (Nash, 2001). Landscapes of the New World were perceived as vast, dangerous, or, at best, useless, and settlers moved to conquer, tame, and improve them by clearing forests, hunting predators to near extinction, and forcing native people westward—all acts of seizure and sovereignty both over nonhuman nature and over those humans understood to be outside of the American body politic. We see in the moment of westward expansion the culmination of sovereign power in “the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it” (Foucault, 1990, page 136). By the late 19th century, as forests were cleared, prairies plowed, and Native American tribes defeated (in short, as there was less wilderness left to conquer), a new biopolitical desire to make nature live began to surface alongside sovereign control. In the emerging Romantic understanding, nature took on new salience, as a small but significant minority of Americans began to view it as sublime, sacred, and an essential part of American national identity (Nash, 2001; Runte, 1987). Acclaimed natural landscapes such as the Grand Canyon, Yosemite Valley, and the geyser basins of Yellowstone served as proof of American exceptionalism, and although their preservation paved the way for the modern environmental movement, the early logic of this movement was one of “monumentalism, not environmentalism” (Runte, 1987, page 29). At the same time, conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot advocated a utilitarian and consumption-based approach to managing and stewarding natural resources for national development (Knight and Bates, 1995). In these ways, the initial steps toward biopolitical environmentalism were not a departure from sovereign power but rather an expansion of it, exemplifying Bruce Braun’s claim that “the government of ‘life’ has revealed itself to be intimately related to the exercise and extension of sovereign power” (2007, page 8). By the mid-20th century, the overt justification for the protection of nature had shifted away from American exceptionalism and toward ecological health and integrity (eg, Leopold, 1949). Ecology as a science developed to focus on interactions between organisms and their environments; with concepts such as ecosystems and the balance of nature, it became the central science associated with environmentalism (Worster, 1994). Conservation biology grew out of this intertwining of ecology, as a science, and the American environmental movement. The ‘official’ formation of conservation biology as a discipline is cited as early evening on May 8, 1985, at the end of the Second Conference on Conservation Biology in Ann Arbor, Michigan. An informal motion established the Society for Conservation Biology along with a new academic journal Conservation Biology (Sarkar, 2009). Those instrumental in establishing the discipline sought to separate themselves from scientists who perceived the environment as a set of natural resources to be protected for human consumption (Sarkar, 2009; Soulé, 1985). Whereas scientists in the natural resources and forestry worlds generally sought to manage a small number of highly valuable species (such as high-yield timber species and wild fisheries), conservation biologists aimed to protect all species based on two somewhat conflicting ideas: the idea that nature has intrinsic value extending beyond its utility to human society, and the idea that nature’s diversity might someday be valuable to human society [eg, to adapt agricultural crops to climate change (Soulé, 1985)], even if not yet. Thus, the organizing principle is that it is not enough to know nature; one must also use that knowledge to effectively manage and even foster the diversity of life. While scientific knowledge is always shaped by social processes and dominant social metaphors (Law, 2004; Sismondo, 2010; Worster, 1994), conservation biology is distinct from many other fields in that practitioners aim not merely to uncover facts but also to develop recommendations and take action (Soulé, 1985). The “right of the sword” over nature has not been replaced per se but has been permeated by a new right to “make live and let die”, manifest as the right and duty to catalog life at the level of the species, organism, and genome, make nonhuman species live, and preserve certain visions of nature—all this while allowing abnormal or “debilitated” genes, individuals, and populations to die off (Soulé, 1985, page 731). Biopower has not come to replace sovereign power, and the biological materiality of nature remains firmly tied to its political and social dimensions (Braun, 2007). Indeed, intervention in biological processes has both complemented and complicated human—and particularly capitalist—exploitation of nature. Ultimately, however, the random element of life can never be fully brought into the realm of management, as the “complexities of matters [make] governance and rule frighteningly unpredictable” (Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008, page 1534). In other words, life—both human and nonhuman—constantly escapes control, and to promote and protect life means to acknowledge the dynamism and inherent unpredictability of biological processes. Hinchliffe and Bingham (2008) explain that the challenge of securing life is a “paradox, where the need for control is also the need for an absence of control” (page 1547). This paradox lies at the root of conservation biology and associated fields. Conservation biology’s core concepts Biodiversity: populations in crisis Conservation biology emerged in tandem with the now commonplace concept of biodiversity (Takacs, 1996). According to Michael Soulé, one of the field’s founders and most prominent practitioners, the purpose of conservation biology is to “provide principles and tools for preserving biological diversity” (1985, page 727). In this way conservation biology is a crisis-oriented discipline. The concept of biodiversity, and the idea that a biodiversity crisis was well underway, represents conservation biology’s first and arguably most central truth discourse about the ‘vital’ character of living beings, a key feature of biopower (Rabinow and Rose, 2006). Using an array of authorities, from photographs of tropical deforestation published in National Geographic (eg, O’Neill, 1993; White, 1983) to ecologists who had witnessed species declines firsthand at their field sites, conservation biology made legible and upheld the idea of biodiversity as simultaneously essential and imperiled. Framed as a matter of biopolitical urgency, this problematization of a biodiversity crisis is shot through with sovereign claims to truth and objectivity, as scientists become authorized not only to speak for nonhuman nature but also to identify and wage war against the actors and actions— both human and nonhuman—that threaten the future of life. For conservation biologists, the crisis of biodiversity loss does not refer to individual organisms, but to gene pools, populations, species, and ecosystems. Indeed, the welfare of organisms is considered to be far beyond the purview of the field, and intervening at the level of the individual is acceptable only when such intervention will benefit the population at large. “ It may seem logical to extend the aversion of anthropogenic extinction of populations to the suffering and untimely deaths of individuals because populations are composed of individuals. I do not believe this step is necessary or desirable for conservation biology. Although disease and suffering in animals are unpleasant and, perhaps, regrettable, biologists recognize that conservation is engaged in the protection of the integrity and continuity of natural processes, not the welfare of individuals … . Evolution, as it occurs in nature, could not proceed without the suffering inseparable from hunger, disease, and predation” (Soulé, 1985, page 731, emphasis added). This passage establishes the primacy of the population, a hallmark feature of biopolitics. Managing individual nonhuman lives is meaningless in responding to the crisis of biodiversity loss; individual lives acquire meaning only when they advance the long-term well-being of the broader population or are essential to sustaining key biological processes, especially evolution. Evolution: prescriptive futures Evolution represents a second main truth discourse of conservation biology in that it is considered the engine fueling biological differences. Without evolution, there is no biodiversity, there is no life. As Soulé writes, “Assuming that life itself is good, how can one maintain an ethical neutrality about evolution? Life itself owes its existence and present diversity to the evolutionary process. Evolution is the machine, and life is its product” (1985, page 731). But evolutionary processes occur at the scale of the population over many generations, reinforcing the idea that nature is best managed at the level of general phenomena. By classifying populations as evolutionarily significant units, for example, scientists give conservation priority to groups of organisms within a species that share a common evolutionary heritage, have unique adaptations, and may eventually diverge significantly from the remainder of the species (Crandall et al, 2000; Moritz, 1994; Ryder, 1986). In this way conservation biology is explicitly future-oriented and prescriptive: it seeks to make some ecological futures possible while precluding futures that are less lively and less diverse. Biopolitics, too, focuses on the possibilities of the future—both good and bad—in order to both prevent negative scenarios and formulate populations that can withstand and rebound from such scenarios. Foucault (2007) describes biopolitical strategies toward famine and resource scarcity issues as “basically focused on a possible event, an event that could take place, and which one tries to prevent before it becomes reality” (page 33). He exemplifies this point through the idea of a town plan: a town plan should not be developed to provide immediate and short-term perfection, but should “open onto a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable” (page 20). Key here is that in neither case does the recognition that the future is open, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous discourage intervention; rather, it is this openness that actually necessitates prediction, measurement, and control. This paradox lies at the heart of biopolitics and conservation science. By fostering biodiversity and encouraging evolution and natural selection, conservation biologists aim to protect and preserve the integrity of the nonhuman world. At the same time, however, conservationists are compelled to intervene in the dynamics of populations in order to maximize “evolutionary potential” (Soulé, 1985) and ensure the long-term viability of extant populations or species. In short, conservation science aims to control life—all the while drawing the line between biological threats and advantages—in order for life to proliferate freely. It is this delineation between evolution as threat and evolution as advantage that has proven particularly challenging for conservation biologists studying human-impacted ecosystems (Kinnison et al, 2007; Mace et al, 2003; Schlaepfer et al, 2005; Stockwell et al, 2003; Western, 2001). Despite Soulé’s insistence that evolution is good, conservation biologists continue to grapple with “the issue of whether the evolution of adaptations to disturbance and degraded habitats is sometimes beneficial or something to be rigorously avoided” (Ashley et al, 2003, page 115). When its habitat is fundamentally altered or a new species is introduced, a population might adapt rapidly to the changes through what has been termed contemporary evolution (Stockwell et al, 2003); conversely, these same selection pressures might also cause a genetic bottleneck, a decline in population, and potential extirpation (Schlaepfer et al, 2005; Western, 2001). The same agents that drive evolutionary change through selection can therefore also bring about extinction. It is one of the key tasks of conservation biology to determine when selection, and the subsequent loss of genetic variation, is beneficial and should therefore be encouraged, and when it is hazardous to populations and should be prevented (Kinnison et al, 2007). Extinction: death to improve life As the opposing force to evolution, extinction involves the reduction of biological diversity and the loss of populations, species, or taxa. Most conservation organizations, media outlets, and environmental activists frame extinction as entirely negative—even catastrophic—with an implicit recognition that it is caused by humans. Conservation biologists generally share this view of extinction as a crisis to be averted, but with one major caveat: on an evolutionary timescale, extinction is inevitable and can at times be neutral or even positive, if populations and gene pools that are poorly adapted to their environment are replaced by well-adapted populations and gene pools (Primack, 2010; Rolston, 1985; Soulé, 1985). Extinction destroys life but in doing so makes new life forms possible: “To the conservation biologist, there is little positive to be said about extinction. From an evolutionary perspective, however, extinction is a double-edged sword. By definition, extinction terminates lineages and thus removes unique genetic variation and adaptations. But over geological time scales, it can reshape the evolutionary landscape in more creative ways, via the differential survivorship of lineages and the evolutionary opportunities afforded by the demise of dominant groups and the postextinction sorting of survivors. The interplay between the destructive and generative aspects of extinction … remains a crucial but poorly understood component of the evolutionary process” (Jablonski, 2001, page 5393). This view of extinction is remarkably similar to the way death is conceptualized in modern biopolitical strategies and fields such as demography and public health (Bashford, 2006). Such fields have become so engrained in Western thought that it is now common sense that death is inevitable, that it is part of life, and that it cannot be prevented or fully controlled on an individual level. At the level of the population, however, death is transformed into mortality rates, disease infection rates, age class structures, and population pyramids. So it is with extinction—conservation scientists aim not to avoid extinction altogether but rather to account for it through statistics on extinction rates, speciation rates, species turnover, and minimum viable population sizes, among other means. The purpose is not to altogether avoid death and extinction, but rather to manage it at the level of the population: to ensure that untimely extinctions are minimized and to promote evolution and speciation to counterbalance extinctions. While background extinction events—which are considered normal and inevitable— represent an essential part of evolutionary history, mass extinctions are primarily of concern to conservation biologists. At present “the Tree of Life … is being pruned by extinction very much more rapidly than it is regrowing” (Mace et al, 2003, page 1708). Whole taxonomic groups are believed to be at risk of extinction due to human-related factors (such as habitat loss and species invasion). Conservationists increasingly recognize that saving all threatened species from extinction is impractical, and many have come to accept conservation triage as necessary (Bottrill et al, 2008; Wiens et al, 2012). Like in emergency medicine, conservation triage involves using criteria to assess priority and make life or death decisions, not about human beings but about the futures of entire species. There are disagreements about how to prioritize taxa: some conservationists support using evolutionary histories to “indicate which taxa and which places are currently most active in the growth of the Tree of Life, and which may therefore be particularly important to conserve” (Mace et al, 2003, page 1709), while others prefer that ecological functions guide decisions of life or death. Either way, the ongoing biodiversity crisis and finite conservation funding necessitate that some species be allowed to die so that others can have life. In the biopolitical logic of conservation science, triage is “just smart decision making” (Bottrill et al, 2008, page 649).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Advantage Links › Environment – Climate Change

Biopolitical nature of conservation spills over to control of other peoples

Biermann and Anderson ‘17

(Biermann, C. Associate Professor Geography and Environmental Studies Department at u colorado springs , & Anderson, R. M. Postdoctoral researcher at Boston university. Conservation, biopolitics, and the governance of life and death. Geography Compass, October 2017, 11(10), e12329. doi:10.1111/gec3.12329) //OC

Amidst radical changes in conservation, geographic scholarship has sought to make sense of how nature is known, protected, and produced. By contextualizing conservation within Foucauldian biopower and biopolitics, this work has emphasized that the imperative to “make live and let die” extends not only to the governance of human life but also to non‐humans as well. At its core, conservation affirms various kinds of life—endangered species, wildlife with the “right” genetics, forms of life that make more life—while diminishing others. But neither are efforts at calculation and management successful in controlling life nor are their effects confined to the particular bodies that they target. Even as conservation practices and discourses affirm particular lives, they also contribute, along with broader global economic and environmental changes, to the marginalization and “letting die” of some bodies and populations; the lives of rural people in the Global South, for example, have been often made more precarious through the establishment of protected areas. This occurs even as conservation is increasingly justified as a project of affirming human life by protecting nature for the benefit of people. Importantly, however, there is not a single conservation biopolitics but instead a multiplicity of competing and overlapping forms of power/knowledge. Whereas endangered species management tends to essentialize life as it currently exists, aiming to preserve the particular life present on earth today, rewilding focuses not on composition but on promoting processes that will generate new and diverse life in the future. And while protected areas and rewilding both focus on the landscape milieu, breeding and conservation genetics emphasize the strands of DNA that comprise the genetic species body. Each strategy involves different valuations of life and selections of which forms to foster and which to let die or kill. These biopolitical decisions are made through sets of scientific practices and discourses that work to bound life and render it knowable and thus governable. Consequently, a key contribution of the scholarship discussed here has been to track the rendering technical (Li, 2007) of conservation and to bring to light the assumptions, spatial practices, and value‐ laden judgments that constitute it. This notion that conservation is biopolitical—that its foundational understandings and assumptions produce valuations of life that foster some lives while diminishing others—is most effective as a starting point rather than an endpoint for research. The most significant questions that arise from this literature center not on if conservation is biopolitical, or even how, but rather on what the biopolitical stakes are of various conservation discourses and practices. At its best, the Foucauldian biopolitical approach we review here works to expand the possibilities of what conservation involves and who is authorized to take part in debates and decisions about what life should be protected, how, why, and for whom. We envision this potential expansion to be in line with calls from within science and technology studies to enact a science that actively acknowledges the limitations of expert‐led technical analytic frameworks that seek objective, value‐neutral knowledge to inform decision‐making (e.g., Jasanoff, 2007). Indeed, showing conservation to be a biopolitical endeavor may help to normalize debate and uncertainty in science, thus countering recent calls for the excision of values and norms from the ecological sciences (Davis et al., 2011).

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Conservation is a form of biopolitical control that reinforces the ability of the state to control the ability to live and die

Biermann and Anderson ‘17

(Biermann, C. Associate Professor Geography and Environmental Studies Department at u colorado springs , & Anderson, R. M. Postdoctoral researcher at Boston university. Conservation, biopolitics, and the governance of life and death. Geography Compass, October 2017, 11(10), e12329. doi:10.1111/gec3.12329) //OC

Recognizing that conservation as a set of discourses and techniques also extends far beyond the state and indeed stretches across the social body, recent scholarship has begun to interrogate how conservation is itself biopolitical, inasmuch as it is a project of governing both non‐human and human life. Although Foucault's original discussions of biopower and biopolitics center on the governance of human life, these ideas are now being marshalled to understand how non‐human individuals and populations are disciplined, aggregated, and optimized in conservation projects. While seeming self‐evident, conservation's drive to protect nature is the historical outcome of a shift in nature–society relations, in which expressions of sovereign control over nature have given way to relations of biopower. This shift is interpreted in multiple ways; for Braverman (2015), it is exemplified by the distinction between the protection of bounded territories of wilderness and more all‐encompassing investments in species (which “make” rather than merely “let” live). Elsewhere, it is more generally interpreted as the ostensible replacement of relations of human domination over the natural environment by a scientific culture in which the integrity of non‐human nature is explicitly promoted (Biermann & Mansfield, 2014). The differences in these interpretations notwithstanding, modern conservation can be understood as a biopolitical project involving “the administration of bodies and the calculated management of life” (Foucault, 1990: 140). In this line of thinking, conservation biopolitics encompasses the logics, spatial practices, and political economies through which material and discursive distinctions are drawn between those life forms (genes, populations, species, etc.) to be fostered (made to live) and those to be “let die.” Even as many conservation interventions are scientifically informed and technically derived, they are also value‐laden projects in which particular human subjects decide who or what is made to live and who or what is allowed to die. In short, conservation interventions derive from and reinforce the asymmetric valuation of life, in which certain life forms are marked more or less valuable and thus more or less killable (Haraway, 2008). Concepts of biopower and biopolitics, in particular, provide a way to consider the specific discourses and techniques by which these distinctions are made, upheld, and at times reformulated. But not only do humans attempt to order the non‐human world through biopolitical techniques; the management of human life is also transformed (and often intensified) in the process as these discourses and techniques are normalized and come to appear self‐evident. As Cavanagh (2014) explains, biopower simultaneously operates across multiple axes: between human and non‐human populations, among and between human populations, and between humans, non‐human nature, and biosecurity threats. Relationships among people and non‐humans are increasingly “politicized as a matter for state determination and control” (Barker, 2010: 350). For example, consider the proliferation of official policies and legislation regarding the circulation of non‐native species (e.g., the U.S. Alien Species Prevention and Enforcement Act of 1992, the U.S. Noxious Weed Control and Eradication Act of 2004, and the 2016 U.S. executive order on “Safeguarding the Nation from the Impacts of Invasive Species,” to name a few). Policies and discourses around invasive and non‐native species not only affect non‐human targets but also produce new social identities, communities of practice, and forms of citizenship as people grapple with the threat of invasive life and seek out new modes of control and/or coexistence (Atchison, 2015; Everts, 2015). In Foucauldian terms, conservation discourses, such as that of invasive threats, are sustained in part through “technologies of the self” (Foucault, 1988: 18) that produce environmentalist subjects and regulate the actions that individuals take on behalf of and upon non‐humans (Rutherford, 2007; Srinivasan, 2014). Yet conservation discourses and the values implicit in them are not fixed but are fluid and multiple. Thus, different conservation approaches produce both different forms of nature and kinds of human subjects. In the following sections, we detail how four broad types of conservation strategies rely upon and reinforce different discourses, assumptions, valuation criteria, and material practices. While scientists recognize three general levels of biodiversity (genetic, species, and ecosystem diversity), species‐ based approaches have tended to dominate conservation, under the foundational assumption that “it is life on the level of the (imperiled) species that must be saved” (Braverman, 2015: 228). At its heart, species‐based conservation is a “massifying” form of power that takes a population rather than individual organisms as its target. Individuals within a population are treated as roughly ecologically equivalent; their value is based on the species of which they are part. Yet managing a species and preventing its extinction also rely upon crucial distinctions between life forms. That is, the generalizing tendency of biopolitics is coupled with an impulse to differentiate, rank, and exclude—and to leave some forms of life “to contend with less livable conditions” (Braverman, 2015: 228). The very notion of endangered or threatened species entails first taxonomically sorting life into recognizable categories of distinct forms and then filtering out those forms perceived to be at risk of extinction. As a concept and category, species endangerment is produced through a series of biopolitical technologies that work to reinforce one another: taxonomic hierarchies, biodiversity censuses (Youatt, 2008), demographic models (Biermann & Mansfield, 2014; Braverman, 2014), and risk assessments (Braverman, 2015), among others. For example, a biodiversity census that aims to detail all of the different species found in an area draws on and reinforces the taxonomic classification system, treating it as taken for granted and even natural rather than an imperfect and socially derived way of ordering life. Through these and other techniques, non‐human life is made calculable and thus governable, enabling the formation of regulatory norms and legal systems for managing species endangerment—some of the most notable of which include the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, and the U.S. Endangered Species Act. Importantly, a biopolitical approach to endangered species management extends the focus beyond formal policies and regulatory norms to consider the specific calculative techniques and assumptions that first make endangerment visible and then summon forth solutions that appear both obvious and neutral. One important effect of the techniques that produce “species endangerment” is that conservation is reinforced as a technical pursuit in which decisions about non‐human life and death are made by highly trained experts. The counting, modeling, listing, and hierarchizing of species both draw on and consolidate the power of scientific expertise as the arbiter of what non‐humans should live or die (Youatt, 2008), presenting such processes as “rigorous and scientific” but often eliding that they are also “pragmatic, value laden, imperfect, and have some profound implications” (Pooley, 2015: 260). Further, the same biopolitical techniques and regulatory norms that safeguard some species also sanction or even compel the death of other populations. Here, it is the size of the population and/or habitat and the perceived level of peril that come together to bound what lives must be protected and what are allowed to die. For example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS, 2013) is legally compelled to protect declining populations of northern spotted owl (Strix occidentalis caurina), a species which is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In 2014, the USFWS initiated the experimental removal (killing) of barred owls (Strix varia), a species that is expanding its range into the Pacific Northwest and appears to be outcompeting the northern spotted owl. Through their designation as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, spotted owls are granted what Braverman (2015: 228) calls “political life,” while barred owls remain “biological life,” and are killable but seemingly ungrievable (Butler, 2009)

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Vulnerability link—the aff’s framing of climate changes through a lens of responsibility extends the power to make live and let die

de Lucia 20

Vito, Professor, Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea, Faculty of Law, University of Tromsø. “Rethinking the Encounter Between Law and Nature in the Anthropocene: From Biopolitical Sovereignty to Wonder.” Law and Critique (2020) 31:329–349 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10978-020-09281-9 LJS

As the body of the Earth is marked and reshaped, however, so is our conception of it. From a hostile territory to be subjugated and exploited through sovereign commands—an exploitation rationalized through philosophical and legal constructions—the Earth is now reframed as a vulnerable domain in need of protection (Fussel 2007, p. 156; Grear 2011; Ippolito and Sánchez 2015; Shindel 2016; Kotzé 2019).8 Indeed, the Anthropocene ‘makes clear the vulnerability of the living order’ (Kotzé 2019, p. 63). Reframing the Earth as vulnerable also provides a novel conceptual framework that, through the emerging ensemble of vulnerability theories, is used to map philosophical and legal problematics and to look for solutions (Grear 2011, p. 23; Brama and Grisólia 2012; Harris 2015; Kotzé 2019, p. 63). This theoretical approach is considered capable of embracing vulnerable beings both human and non-human, as it can ofer a ‘vision’ aligned with the notion of ‘Earth system vulnerability’, that is the recognition that ‘all human and non-human entities’ but also the ‘components and processes making up the entire Earth system’ at every scale, ‘are vulnerable’ (Grear 2011; Kotzé 2019, p. 64). Indeed, the sum of all particular vulnerabilities—of humans, of non-human entities, of components and processes of the Earth system—makes up what has been also called ‘planetary vulnerability’ (Kotzé 2019, p. 70). Climate Change is perhaps the central reference with regards to planetary vulnerability,9 but other global ecological problems, such as global biodiversity loss or the signifcant degradation of oceanic environments and resources, as well as the very framework of planetary boundaries, help construct this new image of planetary vulnerability (Rockström et al. 2009; Cuomo 2011). This reframing of the Earth as a vulnerable body, in turn, opens conceptual and theoretical space for rethinking and reimagining, among other things, law (Grear 2011; Kotzé 2019). As the human subject is reimagined as vulnerable in the context of the Anthropocene, something becomes evident: the very modern categories of knowledge and of action, including forms and modalities of operation of power that underpin the Anthropocene, faced with the socio-ecological consequences of their ‘success’, are in a state of crisis (De Lucia 2017a). The subject is suddenly simultaneously sovereign and vulnerable. The Anthropocene then signals simultaneously a deep ecological crisis and a deep cultural crisis. The mode of sovereignty, which has accompanied human and legal history and practice during modernity and has underpinned its project of mastery, appears no longer useful, nor suitable to face the problems raised by planetary vulnerability. Vulnerability is, obviously, a complex concept, whose theoretical sophistication, as well as internal tensions, cannot be done justice to here.10 What is relevant however, for the purposes of this paper, is its role in the discursive reframing of the Earth and by consequence, its role in the shift in the psychology and practices of power and law. If the Earth is vulnerable in fact, its body can be materially and visibly marked by human activity—and that is what geological and stratigraphic analyses seem to be telling us. This also means that its resources are fnite and exhaustible, a recognition that challenges some of the foundational concepts of law, premised on an imaginary of inexhaustibility.11 What then of the primary modality of operation of power, and of law, that of sovereignty?12 A necessarily cursory look at the genealogy of sovereignty will readily show how its conceptual core13 is constructed on the model of dominium as it emerged at the birth of modernity, in the debates frst occasioned by the so-called dispute on poverty (Grossi 1972; Tierney 1997; Parisoli 2010); as it developed in the context of the Salamanca school (Grossi 1972); and as it further developed into modernity proper (Tuck 1998), albeit already disjointed in private appropriation and public sovereignty, by Hobbes and Locke (MacPherson 1962; Esposito 2008). This conceptual core refects the relation between the public and private dimensions of a singular concept, whose relation, even if not exhausting either dimension in a complete mutual assimilation, presents a common underlying feature, particularly as regards the mechanics of subjugation of nature which are of interest for this paper. As observed in relation to the colonial appropriation of the Americas, in fact, ‘absence of property signals absence of sovereignty’ (Kuehls 1998, p. 43). This connection between dominium and sovereignty is indeed widely recognized,14 and it has been observed how ‘sovereignty and property, as legal institutions, follow the same logic’ (Mattei 2013; Lee 2012, p. 81; Urueña 2006; Grotius 1625). This conceptual core also relates to what is usually identifed as the fundamental faw of the current paradigm: anthropocentrism (Grear 2011; Curry 2011; Grear 2015; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015; De Lucia 2017b). The core of this sovereign paradigm is premised on the centrality of the ‘invulnerable’ subject (Grear 2010; Fineman and Grear 2013; Kotzé 2019, p. 79), and on a framework of conceptual mastery and material domination over nature (Cannavò 2019) 15 which organizes the extraction and exploitation of natural resources according to a well ordained project underpinned by an appropriate legal framework (Merchant 1990; Sargent and Bacon 1999). Through sovereignty, the body of Earth has been materially and legally appropriated, has been distributed, and has been wounded. However, this sovereign mode of power, with its anthropocentric, extractive outlook, is no longer functional in the Anthropocene. It has rather become ‘counterproductive’ (Illich 1976).16 Law must refect this new situation by taking ‘anthropocenic responsibility’ (Cloutier de Repentigny 2020, p. 180) for the well-being of the vulnerable planet. As increasingly recognized and urged, in fact, ‘to ensure responsible human geological agency, law must be used strategically to destabilise the dominant paradigm and reform it in something that recognises our responsibility towards the oceans and the biosphere’ (ibid, pp. 180, 181). After Sovereignty: The Biopolitics of Earth‑Care As the Earth is reconfgured and re-imagined discursively as a vulnerable body, power and law must no longer focus, nor can they build their legitimacy, on appropriation and extraction. They must focus on care. In order to accommodate the need to transform the operations of law, from a modality of exploitation to one of care, sovereign power thus morphs into biopower, and more specifcally biopolitics. Biopolitics ofers in this respect an answer, as it shifts the focus of power, changes its modalities of interventions, and rearticulates its legitimacy on the idea of taking responsibility for the Earth, for nature. Biopolitics is one of two modes of operation of a new biological form of power (biopower) that seizes life under its purview (Foucault 1978, 2004). Biopower refects a shift in discursive and operative emphasis. While sovereign power entails the right to let live which is ultimately exercised through the power to kill (or, rather, through its restraint), biopower is a power to ‘make live and let die’ (Foucault 1978, p. 144). Unlike sovereign power, biopower qualifes, measures, appraises and hierarchizes, with the ultimate aim of fostering life. This is achieved at two levels. At the level of the individual body, through disciplinary interventions; and at the level of populations, through interventions aimed at controlling life as a set of biological processes. The goal of biopolitics is thus to foster life, insofar as it can be regularized and its processes predicted and optimized. With particular respect to the environment, nature is no longer simply an object of sovereign exploitation, but becomes subjected to a series of positive interventions that aim at its care, at fostering and optimizing its processes, and at the same time at the enhancement of its productive forces. Biopolitics enfolds nature in its logic in two distinct but complementary ways: frstly, as a set of processes central to human well-being, to the extent that human populations are afected in multiple ways by the environment they live in and by natural processes; secondly, as the immediate focus of concern. From this second perspective, biopolitics aims at the protection, regularization and optimization of nature itself (De Lucia 2019a). Furthermore, and in line with Foucault’s insight into the co-implicated relation between power and forms of knowledge, the expansion of biopolitical regimes to the natural environment is historically contingent on the development of a number of scientifc disciplines such as biology and ecology, on key conservation concepts such as biodiversity or sustainable development, as well as on a number of technologies and techniques that allow the continuous monitoring of ecosystem processes (De Lucia 2017a). Ecology in particular plays a crucial part, as it ‘provided the political technology for new forms of regulatory intervention in the management of the population and resources’ (Rutherford 2000, p. 4). Environmental law, from this perspective, becomes a crucial juncture where knowledge and power intersect and coalesce into a regulatory framework aimed precisely at classifying, protecting, regularizing and optimizing nature, particularly through the double goal of conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity (De Lucia 2017b, 2019a). Power governs no longer through sovereign command, but through technical norms and scientifc regimes of knowledge (though always through law!).17 Power, through biopolitics, becomes equivalent with Earth-care. Care and Subjugation: Biopolitical Sovereignty Yet, to achieve its purposes, biopolitics must engulf nature in its entirety under a conceptual and regulatory framework where care and subjugation, vulnerability and productivity, life and death are constantly entangled in a reciprocal and inevitable relation. Sovereignty thus returns inevitably as a key modality of biopolitical intervention, when nature is recalcitrant, wild, spontaneous, unpredictable, violent or dangerous. Biopolitics remains caught in an undecidable dilemma, where in order to care for and protect the Earth, it must subjugate it, thus determining simultaneously the displacement of sovereignty and its eternal return, in a continuous oscillation between a positive biopolitics and a negative thanatopolitics (that is, a politics of death) (Agamben 1998; Esposito 2008). This oscillatory, aporetic entanglement can be made immediately visible through two examples: ecosystem monitoring programs and the regulation of invasive alien species. With regards to ecosystem monitoring programs, for power to care proactively for the Earth through biopolitical interventions, it must frst know. To know, and to keep this knowledge up to date, it must enfold each ecosystem, each ecological and biological process with extensive, penetrating and comprehensive assessment, monitoring and mapping programs. These are indeed key tactics and methods of the relevant sciences such as conservation, biology and ecology. For example, the global biodiversity census proposed by famous conservation biologist Edward Wilson is a tactic that can be understood biopolitically as a form of Foucauldian ‘panopticism’ (Foucault 1977) aimed at subsuming life/nature under a comprehensive ‘modality of intervention’ (Rutherford 2000, p. 140). Through its processes of ‘identifcation, collection of specimens, and subsequent research’, the global biodiversity census aims at ‘neatly packaging’ nonhuman nature into a set of designations which, in turn, facilitate both ‘conservation and commodifcation’ (Youatt 2008). This panopticist program of biopolitical surveillance is operationalized through the intersection of knowledge and power, of science and law, whose collaborative efort gives rise and shape to an ecological regime of truth enacted precisely through such intense and comprehensive monitoring programs—including the International Biological Program,18 the Global Census of Marine Life19 and the Global Taxonomy Initiative (GTI).20 From the biopolitical perspective embodied in such tactics and practices, ‘nonhumans are [ultimately] regulated and rationalised in matrices of knowledge and science, through which they are readied as productive resources for capitalism and mined as repositories of genetic information’ (Youatt 2008, p. 394). These programs refect the key biopolitical goal of ‘planetary management’ enacted through the establishment of surveillance mechanisms aimed at monitoring ‘the vital signs of the planet’ so as to ‘aid humans in protecting its health’ and care for planetary vulnerability (WCED 1987, para 56; De Lucia 2015).21 With regards to the regulation of invasive alien species, this oscillation is a central operational logic, given that in the same gesture life is protected and destroyed, fostered and killed, as the conservation of biodiversity must be ensured through the eradication of invasive alien species which are, literally, killed (for example via snipers or through poisoned pellets) (De Lucia 2018). This is precisely a biopolitical command which not only classifes ‘life into species and populations’, as part of its taxonomic eforts, but also decides ‘who shall live and who shall die, what life-forms will be promoted and which will be terminated’ (Biermann and Mansfeld 2014, p. 261; see also Braverman 2018). This illustrates vividly how biopolitics is fully intertwined with sovereign power. Its interventions, enacted through legal regulation, create a seamless matrix of care and control that efectively rests on a biopolitical sovereignty. This in turn ofers a concrete example of the continuity between sovereignty and biopolitics that makes perhaps more explicit what has been described as a ‘hidden point of intersection’ (Agamben 1998, p. 11), or as a ‘secret and essential’ relation that signals a fundamental ‘logic of copresence’ between the two (Esposito 2008, pp. 39–40). In this respect, biopolitics remains utterly modern, or as argued by Roberto Esposito, modernity has always been biopolitical, insofar as modernity has emerged as a framework for the protection of life against life’s own excesses (Esposito 2008).

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Green Discipline link: The 1AC’s formation of environmental conservation as inextricably tied to concerns of economic growth is an example of the neoliberal state’s masking of disciplinary biopower

“Natural Capital” is used, under the façade of environmental protection, to turn rural areas into “the camp”

Environmental incentives are used to control the behavior of farmers as “rational actors,” squeeze productivity out of them and make them live bare life—their agency is controlled by the state controlling what their “self interest” is

Fletcher et. al 19 (Robert Fletcher, Sociology of Development and Change, Wageningen University, Wageningen, Netherlands; Wolfram H. Dressler, School of Geography, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia; Zachary R. Anderson, Department of Geography and Planning,University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada; Bram Büsch. “Natural capital must be defended: green growth as neoliberal biopolitics,” THE JOURNAL OF PEASANT STUDIES. 2019. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/03066150.2018.1428953?needAccess=true&role=button) @ehatt

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The 1AC is an instance of biosecurity that prioritizes absolute human survival creating the state of exception within debate rounds.

Esposito 22 [Bianca Maria Esposito, PhD Student in Cultures and Society of Contemporary Europe at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa (Italy), April 16, 2022, “Immunity and Biosecurity: Reading the Pandemic as a Mutual Relation Between Protection and Obedience”, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, Political Theology Volume 24, NO. 4, pgs. 367-383, https://doi.org/10.1080/1462317X.2022.2064094, JMH]

Agamben opens his book Where are we now? The Epidemic as Politics–a book written in parts and chapters like the posts he published on his online blog during the first Italianlockdown12–quoting Saint Jerome: “The ship is sinking, and we are debating its cargo. Jerome, Hier.Epist.123.15.1.”13Thefirst thing that Agamben seems to willingly exclude from his discourse is the economy, basically the “cargo on our ship. “Everything, the fundamental architectural problem, the very structure of our Western world, came into light with this pandemic “as our houses and cities started to burn,” Agamben writes.14 That’s why we need to analyze the great political and ethical transformation which resulted from the declaration of a state of exception that suspended all our individual liberties, like the freedom of movement or cult, in order to preserve our biological life. Every other dis-course that doesn’t concern the way the sovereign power is deciding over our bodies and liberties is useless. It is as if the “shipwrecked claimed to govern their own shipwreck.” In fact, what Agamben wants to analyze in both his last books–Where are we now? and Quando la casa brucei[Eng. When the house is burning]–is the way in which political powers adapted to the pandemic by overtaking the democratic system and its constitutional rights in order to give form to a new governmental strategy that Agamben calls the “great transformation.”16Agamben speaks predominantly about the Italian situation between March and April 2020, when Italian citizens experienced the temporary suspension of their constitutional rights in the name of health and common security, which was unparalleled since World War II. The question that Agamben asked himself in such a situation is: how is it possible that with the “excuse” or the “invention” of an epidemic,17contemporary powers abandoned “the paradigm of bourgeois democracy–with its rights, its parliaments, and its constitutions–and replaced it with new apparatuses whose contours we can barely glimpse”18? Moreover how did they justify the suspension of all constitutional warranties in such a situation? Agamben’s answer is: through the declaration of a “state of exception” that is based on the introduction of a “sanitation terror” and a new religion of health, that is founded on fear and that turned a citizen’s right–namely, the right to health–into a judicial obligation. This new political disposit if that works through the conjunction of a religious approach to medicine and the sovereign use of the state of exception, is what Agamben calls “biosecurity.” A new technique of government that is only possible because the technologies that sustain our social and physical distancing were already there to bring us to a new structure of human relations that became almost immaterial through the use of technologies like the internet.19But what makes biosecurity–this whole new system of power–really dangerous, is its capacity of convincing people to accept, maybe for the first time in human history, all sorts of limitations of individual liberty in the name of a health threat as if it were a war enemy:“ just as it was asserted in the face of terrorism that freedom should be abolished in order to defend freedom, now we are told that life has to be suspended in order to protectlife.”20The Italian reaction to the pandemic was from this point of view truly interesting, Agamben claims. The first Western country that was facing this emergency in 2020 reacted like China21: both closed up its citizens in their apartments and granted them the only freedom to leave the house for urgency or “necessity.” All citizens had to carry a self-certification form that justified their movements in case of a police investigation. Agamben’s critique of this new “governing technique” has given rise to much criticism from behalf of Italian jurists and intellectuals.22When the Italian government declared the “state of emergency”23 facing a situation of contagion that was clearly out of control, Agamben spoke about a state of exception, yet making no distinction between “state of exception” and “state of emergency,” as some jurists argued.24Moreover the declaration of this state of emergency was compared by Agamben to Hitler’s declaration of the state of exception in 1933 when the Constitution of Weimer was not abolished but formally preserved, suspended and weakened by the ideological construction of a totalitarian government that wasn’t illegal, but that brought about a totalitarian regime.25Thiscomparison, as well as his remarks on the“ invention of an epidemic,”26whereby he indirectly criticized the obligation of mask-wearing as a dehumanizing practice in a world where human beings are gradually reduced to becoming faceless, numbers anddigits,27aroused a lot of criticism among Italian intellectuals.28This controversy led Agamben to clarify and explain his use of the term “invention” referring to Foucault’s philosophy: “Invention” in the political sphere should not be understood in a purely subjective sense. Historians know that there are, so to speak, objective conspiracies that seem to function as such without being directed by an identifiable subject. As Foucault showed before me, governments that deploy the security paradigm do not necessarily produce the state of exception, but they exploit and direct it once it occurs. Hence, what we have to consider as the most important aspect of Agamben’s perspective is not his ambiguity–an ambiguity that risks to transform his philosophical thought into a sort of conspiracy theory–, but rather his attention towards the historical transformations of politics and the way the political power claims to govern human life in its biological aspects. Without agreeing with the radical statements he made in some chapters–i.e., when he disputes the seriousness of the epidemic, relativizing the number of deaths–, we cannot ignore the fact that Agamben described exactly what happened during the first lockdown in Italy. Millions of people accepted a sovereign “decision” because of their fear of death and their feeling of insecurity. The fact that a democratic government was taking an almost military control over its citizens in order to protect their health, or rather their “bare life,” seemed justified, reason able and legitimate. If we read Agamben’s texts situating them more broadly within his previous works–like Homo sacer I: Sovereign Power and Bare Life30andState of Exception31–we can understand why the Italian philosopher speaks about the epidemic as the realization of a political strategy that separates the political, cultural and social “forms of life” from the simple biological survival. Just as he spoke about terrorism and its military reaction as a political response to fear that permitted to introduce some new laws in the name of protection and security, enforcing the national security state, he views the epidemic as an opportunity for the biopower of the state to be enforced. The latter would satisfy a wide-spread desire for safety that was induced through the media which in turn managed to amplify “sanitation terror.” As we know from his various works, Agamben reads biopolitics negatively, anchoring it to the Schmittian sovereign declaration of the “state ofexception”32 that separates the “bare life”–Walter Benjamin’s bloßes Leben, the biological “nude life”(gr.zōé)–from the political existence–the so-called “form of life”(gr.bíos)–which is the proper human way of living. This juridical and sovereign separation between zōé and bios excludes some individuals from the political life, allowing the sovereign power to reduce their existence to a biological survival that can turn into death or extermination. This is the case for example of the exiles, the refugees, the prisoners of war and others, who the states actively exclude from political participation and full humanity. But what happens if the separation between zōé and bios is applied not only to a part of the population, but to all citizens of a state, Agamben seems to ask? What does it mean to turn the end of politics–namely the higher good of a community, like it was for Aristotle(Foucault, 1976)33–into the mere biological survival of the individuals? And how was it possible to accept to live in this temporal suspension of the state of law as if it were anormal condition? Referring to the Italian situation, Agamben writes: Earis revealing many of the things that we pretended not to see. The first is that our society believes in nothing beyond bare life. It is clear that Italians are ready to sacrifice practically everything–their normal life conditions, their social relationships, their work, even friend-ships, as well as their religious and political convictions–when faced with the danger of getting sick. But bare life is not something that unites people: it blinds and separates them.34The contemporary world has accepted the political recourse to the “state of exception” as normal, accepting to live in a perpetual crisis where freedom has been sacrificed for security reasons because it was already accustomed to think about biological life as its highest value. One could summarize what Agamben means by “biosecurity” in the following terms: the disposition of individuals to accept the juridical obligation to sacrifice all aspects of life in the name of security and health. Modern politics–Agamben writes–is from top to bottom, biopolitics: what is at stake is ,ultimately, biological life as such. The new element is that health is becoming a juridical obligation that has to be fulfilled at all costs The major problem in this situation is, Agamben claims, that when biological preservation becomes the political priority over all common living, every social relationship is abandoned. Bare life and the fear to lose it, is something that separates individuals, not something that brings them together. Fear has made us think about our neighbor as a potential infector. In this situation even the dead were abandoned and their bodies cremated without ceremonies. For security reasons all forms of sociality have been sacrificed, funerals and marriages have been suspended and public spaces, like schools or universities, have been abolished and replaced by technologies that allow us to work remotely from home. Agamben accuses also the catholic Church and Christians to have abandoned their true message: to visit the sick and not to sacrifice everything to the immanent life.36This transformation in our relationship to every “other”–Agamben claims–will have ethical and political consequences that we cannot now foresee. What does it mean to live in a society that believes only in individual survival? And is it possible to live a “political life” in a democracy that forces us to “social distancing”? Asking those questions, Agamben speaks against the manipulation of fear and the sacralization of science. He wants to warn us about the dangers of setting our liberal-democratic rights aside preferring a technological-sanitary despotism that reduces the intensity of our life and its need for political recognition to a simple question of governing the biological survival of a population.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Links › Topic Links › Welfare

“We threw you a bone, now shut up and obey!” The guise of poverty reduction policies absolves the nation state of responsibility for its global and domestic violence while increasing disciplinary power and preventing radical change

Tan 11 ( Celine Tan is a lecturer in law, Birmingham Law School , University of Birmingham , UK. “The New Biopower: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the obfuscation of international collective responsibility,” Third World Quarterly. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2011.584720 ) @ehatt

THE NATION AS A SITE OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION It follows from the problematising of the state in economic development under the PRSP approach that the national sphere has also been constituted as the primary site for any contestation over the resource allocation and redistribution and the state correspondingly ascribed with the primary duty to discharge the social and economic challenges ascribed collectively, such as the MDGs. The institution of a mandatory participatory policymaking process under the PRSP framework, while enabling a degree of domestic political franchise by opening up hitherto inaccessible spaces for citizenry engagement in national decision-making processes, diverts collective struggle away from the international towards the national. Discontent resulting from the social and economic dislocations of structural adjustment and integration into an uneven international trade and finance playing field by individual countries is now refocused on the state and not the community of states. 14 The emphasis in the PRSP framework of ‘priority public actions’ and the linking of state economic resources to clear, targeted and accountable public expenditure in social sectors such as health and education may result in more transparent resource allocation but it also places the responsibility of providing public goods onto national governments. This diffuses dissent to the inequality of current global economic structures and the injustices of global policy decisions by refocusing the debate away from the resource constraints third world states face as a result of external pressures towards one centred around how best states can allocate limited resources to meet developmental challenges. Furthermore, the access to political structures and limited possibilities for engagement in national strategic planning via participatory processes in individual countries have the effect of fracturing globalised resistance, either in the form of mass citizenry mobilisations or global civil society cooperation. Within the PRSP framework, struggles over resource allocation and modes of economic governance affecting individuals and communities are directed at the state apparatus through the reorganisation of political representative structures mediated by the IFIs and other external financiers. The reconstruction of the state in PRSP countries through the participatory process, therefore aids the rehabilitation of the regulative capacity of the state at the same time as it constrains the state by subjecting it to an internal process of accountability and external scrutiny of these accountability mechanisms. This reconfiguration of the political space in PRSP countries legitimises the process of the PRSP framework, through the restructuring of social relations between state and non-state actors and external financiers, as well as conferring credibility on the substantive content of the resultant social and economic policies, even as it fails to reform the existing policy and practice of development financing. Confinement of emancipatory politics within the territorial boundaries of a nation state, and within it, the geographical boundaries of the district and the villages, not only problematises the state – the ‘inefficient’, ‘predatory’ state – but also creates a cartography of impoverishment which localises poverty to create a disempowering counter-discourse. Reducing economic marginalisation and social inequity to the lowest territorial denominator not only distorts the magnitude of the problem, it localises the 15 politics of poverty by suggesting that this is where the dislocations are most acute and where interventions should be targeted. At the same time, the process legitimises these policy interventions inasmuch as they legitimise the institutional presence of the World Bank, the IMF and bilateral financiers in third world states. The PRSP process subjects the state to greater external scrutiny, not only just of its economic policies but of its practice of governance itself, hence increasing its exposure to greater external remedial action, through interventions of the ‘donor’ states seeking to mediate in the development of domestic political franchise. This has created a culture of upward rather than downward accountability, contrary to the stated objectives of the PRSP project itself. Recipient states remain highly accountable to the international financial institutions and donors but rarely vice-versa, and donors, not domestic constituents, remain the primary consumers of financial information and government performance review under this new regime31. This increases external oversight of government policies and expenditures but does not necessarily improve accountability for public decisions. SUBVERTING THE ‘RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT’ The assignment of responsibility for addressing developmental challenges to individual nation states is not exclusive to the PRSP framework. It reflects the conceptual framework that has consistently guided official aid flows from northern to southern states in the postcolonial period which have sought to resist the incorporation of any language of redistribution or universal collective responsibility in the area of social and economic cooperation in bilateral and multilateral financing relationships. The circumscription of the role of the international community, particularly that of the northern states and northern capital which represent the principal beneficiaries of the current international economic order, in any normative framework for international development has been a significant feature of all international negotiations in the area of trade, finance and development cooperation since the collapse of the third world movement for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)32 in the 1970s and 1980s and the gradual erosion of the UNCTAD mandate in the structural adjustment era. 16 The refusal of western states to acknowledge collective responsibility for the condition of third world states and to accept complicity in their social and economic marginalisation from the international economic order was evidenced by the north-south split33 in the voting patterns for the UN Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986. The Declaration, championed by the Group of 77 developing states stressed ‘the collective obligation of all states to create a just and equitable international environment for the realisation of the right to development’ and emphasised ‘a collective duty of all states to eliminate barriers, such as unfair trade rules and the debt burden’.34 The most heavily contested elements of the declaration involved questions on the nature of the right to development, specifically the assignment of rights and duties, and the balance between the national and international characteristics of these rights and duties. For southern governments, the ‘right to development’ is international in character and the responsibility for realising such a right ‘cannot remain at the national level’ as ‘globalisation, international trade, foreign domestic economic policies, foreign debt and intellectual property rights constrain national development efforts’. The ‘right to development’ therefore encompasses a revision of the rules of international trade and finance to enable greater participation and control of developing countries in the global economy, including but not exclusive to the establishment of international mechanisms to implement the principles of the 1986 Declaration. Specifically, the southern states have argued that this right ‘cannot be reduced to international development assistance, nor to national eradication programmes’.35 In contrast, contemporary interpretations of the ‘right to development’ by northern states are based on the ‘partnership’ model which underpins the PRSP framework – ‘one based on shared responsibilities and mutual commitments between developed and developing countries and international organisations’.36 In particular, northern governments do not recognise the provisions of the 1986 Declaration as forming part of customary human rights law nor forming a normative basis for their aid financing, external trade and foreign policies vis-à-vis developing states. Instead, these governments have generally interpreted the ‘right to development’ as a right of individuals against states, notably the right of citizens in developing countries 17 against their own states, and not a right exercised by states against other states. While recognising the international dimension of the’ right to development’, northern governments have argued that it is states which ‘have primary responsibility for the realising of the [right to development]’37 and that such ‘assistance is based on a moral – not legal – obligation to alleviate poverty’. 38 Consequently, all subsequent international negotiations on social and economic cooperation have been couched along the lines of the new language of ‘partnership’ and ‘poverty reduction’ in contrast to the call for international cooperation and redistributive justice that underpinned southern calls for a NIEO. The Monterrey Consensus, adopted at the 2002 UN Financing for Development (FFD) Conference, for example declared that achieving such targets ‘demands a new partnership between developed and developing countries’ including the commitment to ‘sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law’.39 The PRSP framework not only provides the operational mechanism for such a partnership but it also ensures that discussions for external resources and redressing social and economic exclusion of countries remain at the level of the state and at the level of individual financing arrangements with official creditors, whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis. By establishing the parameters for negotiation within a small cartel of donors and creditors, the discourse created by the PRSP approach limits the capacity for PRSP countries’ to form collective demands for equity at the international level. Moreover, the emphasis on ‘poverty reduction’ as priority governmental action subverts the principle of ‘development’ encompassing calls for fairer rules in the international economic order to facilitate such growth. It does not address the asymmetries which prevent countries’ attainment of fuller economic and social objectives, for example, the redress of declining terms of trade for commodity-dependent states in the south as a result of continuing depreciation of prices for primary commodities, the tariff escalation rules in multilateral trade law and the intransigence of northern policies on agricultural subsidies40 . The core of the PRSP framework thus reflects an effort to ‘manage’ world poverty rather than to resolve it. A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 18 The PRSP framework signals a larger paradigmatic shift in the cartography of aid and, consequently, in the constitution of north-south relations. However, the operational efficacy of this wholesale revision of the modalities of countries’ engagement with the international community exemplifies the current international legal order in which third world states remain objects of international law rather than its subjects. The characterisation of PRSP countries as legitimate sites for remedial interventions – social, economic and political – not only resonates with the aforementioned ‘civilising mission’ and technologies of colonial management but also demonstrates the way in which the ‘colonial encounter’ continues to shape third world engagement with international law. The extensive intrusions of the PRSP framework into the body politic of the structurally adjusted state could only be made possible where the initial sovereignty of states were circumscribed by their entry into the postcolonial international legal order and where such political sovereignty and state autonomy over natural resources and over external state relations and state access to global institutions of governance have been progressively eroded by interventions of the postcolonial global regulatory instruments. Thus, this paper argues, in a similar vein to Anghie’s analysis of the ‘good governance’ project which preceded the PRSP framework, that the insertion of the PRSP framework into sovereign lending operations masks ‘the imperial character’ of international law ‘even when it is being reproduced in a way that powerfully shapes contemporary international relations’.41 The recognition of third world states and the legitimacy of third world claims under international law thus becomes premised on: a) their capacity to demonstrate adherence to norms established by the ‘international’ legal order; and b) in their failure to demonstrate the former, their willingness to be rehabilitated and acceptance of interventions for reform so that they may be restructured into compliance. At the heart of the PRSP reforms is therefore the validation of clientelist relationship between the north and the south and the logic of dependence and universalisation which underpin these relationships. For Badie, this relationship of dependence necessitates the constitutional and juridical imitation of the patron state by the client state for continued access by the dependent client state to external resource mobilisation.42 In the case of PRSP states, the mimicry assumes the form of adopting public expenditure management 19 systems, national strategic planning and political orders of the west. This, in turn, mirrors the reforms that third world states have had to adopt in other areas of international economic law, such as trade, intellectual property rights, finance and investment, which have necessitated the embedding of imported legal rules and institutions for the purpose of attracting foreign capital and facilitating external trade. The historical reading of the PRSP framework; its situation within a continuum of political events and policy narratives in the period preceding its inception and its contextualisation within the legacy of postcolonial economic relations enables us to ascribe the framework with a wider economic, geo-political and legal significance beyond its immediacy as an instrument for regulating aid disbursement. In this manner, the PRSP project establishes a new regulatory framework which restructures third world state engagement with the global economy and the international legal instruments which support it. This new configuration of politics brought about by the principle of ‘ownership’ in conditionality has not extinguished the politics of adjustment nor the power relations inherent in conditions of donor dependency, but has rather resulted in a situation where external intervention is exercised not through coercive financing terms ‘but also to a significant degree though closer involvement in state institutions and the employment of incentive finance’, a situation Harrison terms as the ‘post-conditionality’ regime.43 Again, in the monograph from which this paper is drawn, I argue that the PRSP framework constitutes a new form of discipline of third world states in the current postcolonial period, representing both a continuation and an extension of old mechanisms of imperial and neo-imperial control.44 This transition may be framed as the beginnings of a transition from Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’ to a ‘society of control’ vis-a-vis the governance of third world states. This new regulatory regime relies less on ‘disciplinary power’ and the ‘technologies of domination’– the establishment of normative frameworks for behaviour and the exclusion and penalisation for departures from such norms – but on ‘bio-political power’ and the ‘technologies of self’ – in which objects of power reproduce the dominant norms and seek to insert themselves into the very relationships of power. 45 Thus, the agenda for norm brokerage and rule-making in the international political economy and the international economic law which supports it 20 depends less on the establishment of coercive rules and principles for engagement and more on the discretionary application of ‘voluntary’ accession to the discipline of the ‘development’ financiers. At the same time, the concepts that are problematised by the PRSP project, namely poverty reduction, participation and national ownership, are constituted as new areas of regulation through dynamics of power and influence that underlie the formulation of this initiative. In this respect, the implications of the PRSP project reverberate beyond the policy and institutional incorporation of resistance to encompass a much wider range of cause and effect and include the production and dissemination of discourses on ‘development’ and constructions of ‘poverty’. The language of the PRSP framework has important resonance in movements for social and economic justice but equally, and somewhat conversely, it also shapes the debate about the nature of international economic relations and represents the narratives that have gained currency in the context of these relationships due to the hegemony of the actors who underwrite their emergence. This ancillary process of knowledge production has, once again, created a universal framework through which knowledge about heterogeneous cultures, and sociopolitical and economic organisation has been collected, filtered and disseminated, establishing a frame of reference which disciplines through marginalisation and exclusion of those which fall outside these received identities. The implications of this on the wider global regulatory structures and networks are significant. As discussed previously, the emphasis on developing and fulfilling priorities established in conformity with the parameters set by the PRSP framework – and within the qualified notions of ‘poverty reduction’, ‘participation’ and ‘ownership’ – thus shifts the debate away from the international arena and places the burden of meeting the challenge of social and economic developmental objectives on national governments. It is the nation state – the structurally adjusted, indebted, aid dependant state – that now bears the primary responsibility for ensuring that the communally-ascribed Millennium Development Goals are met through a further programme of structural adjustment (now renamed ‘development policy’ operations), foreclosing debate on issues of international economic justice, redistribution and communal responsibility for the provision and protection of public goods. 21 CONCLUSION In this paper, I have tried to situate the inception of PRSP project within a specific temporal and geo-political context in order to demonstrate the impact of the framework on current developments in the global economic arena, particularly in relation to the revision of existing rules of international economic law and/or the development of new international instruments to combat the excesses of neoliberal globalisation. Specifically, this paper argues that the PRSP project’s focus on individual state responsibility rather than a collective responsibility fractures resistance through forcing countries to compete with each other for economic resources disbursed on the terms established by the financier states rather than a focus on redistributive justice. This is achieved through: a) the discounting of the role of the ‘international’ in the resolution of social and economic exclusion within states, particularly developing states in the south subject to the torrents of globalised neoliberalism and b) rupturing communal struggles to the forces of international impoverishment calling for a revisiting and revisioning of the rules of the international economy through the incentive of individual engagement. The nation state that is reconstituted under this framework is therefore one that is facilitative of the project of global neoliberalism and northern corporatism, rehabilitated through a series of institutional interventions of the PRSP framework. Such an assignment of responsibility, predicated upon the unquestioning acceptance of the status quo of economic globalisation processes, obfuscates the role of the international community in securing economic justice for economically marginalised nation states and their impoverished constituencies. Conceptualising ‘poverty reduction’ as a priority policy intervention and ‘ownership’ as a political project forecloses negotiations for the reform of the rules of international trade and finance facilitating the exploitative relationships that underlie the impoverishment and suffering of communities in PRSP countries. While the PRSP framework infuses a purpose of political franchise - through participatory policymaking and notional conferment of policy ownership – into the dynamic of the financing relationships between countries and their external financiers and inscribes a social contractual relationship between governments and their citizens, the project does not address the 22 fundamental iniquities within the international order which necessitates the existence of such financing and debt relief. Consequently, the danger of the PRSP project is that the discourse and methods of resistance against the injustices of the international order have been appropriated to distil such dissent through qualified operationalising of contestable notions of ‘participation, ‘ownership’, ‘partnership’ and ‘poverty reduction’ and the translation of these notions into the norms and principles regulating third world engagement with the exterior. The PRSP framework thus serves a disciplinary and legitimising function vis-à-vis the asymmetries that continue to characterise the postcolonial economy and exemplifies the shifting nature of power at the international level necessary to maintain these asymmetries and manifested in the international legal order which sustains it.

2023 CNDI Kritik
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The state seeks to preserve itself through the use of tax, police, and social policies

Rosembuj 23 (Tulio Rosembuj, University of Barcelona, Department of Public Economy, Political Economy and Spanish Economy, 4-29-2023, "Foucault and Fiscal Governmentality," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4433233, 1-3) @HA?

The reason of State establishes that military defense and public order are necessary for the existence of the State and its preservation. The institutional attribution of exorbitant powers is legitimate to ensure its external protection and internal public order. The reason of State, ratio status, ragione di Stato, was conceived in Europe between the 16th and 17th centuries and supposes the convergence of already existing institutions –military force, police force, taxes, administration, and others that make up the economy, the social life– around the unique concept of State, which articulates them. The art of governing the population, from the 18th century, is a new form of (artificial) political rationality far from principles and values other than those that corresponded to the very ends of the monarchy of the Prince. It is not a divine government but exquisitely human and secularized. The State embodies the rational form on which the art of government is designed. "The reason of State is what allows the State to be kept in good condition." (Foucault). The population is the recipient of the reason of State. The apparatus directed to put it into practice is the police that puts the reason of State into operation. The police have the necessary means to increase the forces of the State from within, and it is their responsibility to maintain public order in society.1 The security of the State is the factor that feeds political rationality, and the military and police devices and the tax serve precisely that purpose. M. Foucault's doctrine illustrates and completes the thesis of N. Elias by studying the newly created public subject. The creation of the State comes from the conjunction of diplomacy and military force and the police and fiscal monopoly. The reason of State identifies the new power, which is alien to any other concern than the conservation and growth of its power.2 The art of government, says Foucault, is intimately linked to the development of statistics or arithmetics: the knowledge of one's forces and that of the different States. The reason of State is government according to the power of the State.3 The reason of State initiates the journey of the Police State under the protection of its strengthening and as a way of satisfying the population's life. The object of the police, says Foucault, is the management of public power and is almost infinite and unlimited. From the middle of the 18th century, the self-limitation of the reason for government stands out due to the political economy. The principle of political rationality of liberalism limits the primary reason of State in a determining way: it is not the police, but the political economy as the foundation of government and its consequence of minimal or frugal government : "the art of governing as little as possible, between a maximum and a minimum, choosing the minimum over the maximum."4 The transformation of the administrative State of police into a State of political rationality does not prevent, on the contrary, the conservation of the historical bases of the public monopolies of physical and fiscal violence. The conflict will break out between the private trusts and the competition within the market to occupy and take advantage of the public security devices that are maintained and increased: general expenses and taxation, and debt. The political economy collects the existing institutions, administration, justice, and tax. Statistics is the new axis of knowledge. The statistical bureaucracy determines classifications each person occupies, illustrating what they can or cannot do, introducing surveillance and control instruments in the 19th century.

2023 CNDI Kritik
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The welfare state is an extension of biopower that is critical to allowing the state to exercise control over the social

Garrett ‘18

(Paul Michael Garrett, Senior Lecturer Dept. of Pol. Science & Soc. Galway University Affiliation, 9-17-2018, "Revisiting ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’: Foucault's Account of Neoliberalism and the Remaking of Social Policy," Cambridge Core, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-social-policy/article/abs/revisiting-the-birth-of-biopolitics-foucaults-account-of-neoliberalism-and-the-remaking-of-social-policy/7DF99E21282AA855D0541D470A02B46D, accessed 7-12-2023) //OC

Perhaps what also drew Foucault toward the neoliberals is a shared ‘suspicion of the state’ (Behrent, 2016: 29). In France, he gravitated toward those organisations and individuals intent on ‘reforming’ the Parti socialiste (PS) [the French Socialist Party] from around 1977. More specifically, that current within the party and associated media and think-tank niches connected to the ‘very social-liberal “Second Left”’ (Zamora, 2016a: 3). Michel Rocard and his non-Marxist Socialist Unity Party (PSU) faction within the PS were significant, as was the non-communist CFDT trade union, in terms of these efforts to theoretically re-map the role and functions of the state (Christofferson, 2014). Here, a key intellectual figure was the historian and social policy expert Pierre Rosanvallon (Amable, 2011; see also Rosanvallon, 2000; 2011). Unlike more dominant tendencies within the PS, this minority faction wanted to abandon a centralist conception of radical social transformation and the core political ideas circulated around autogesti´on,workers’ self-management (Behrent, 2016). Despite his ‘flirt’ with neoliberalism (Hansen, 2015), Foucault’s interest in economic liberalism was prompted more by these social-democratic ‘alternatives to “social statism” than by overt sympathy for Thatcher, Reagan or Barre’ (Behrent, 2016:39). Moreover, his social-policy-related comments might arguably resemble, in sketchy and pre-figurative form, those subsequently associated with the ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1994; 2001; see also Donzelot and Gordon, 2008; Garrett, 2008). In this context, an interview Foucault gave to Robert Bono, the general secretary of the CFDT in 1983, becomes a particularly interesting coda to the lecture series. Here Foucault’s concern was with the ‘perverse effects’ attached to the system of ‘social guarantees’ then available in France. This ‘system is now reaching its limits, as it comes up against the political, economic, and social rationality of modern societies’ (Foucault, 1988: 160). The phrase ‘modern societies’ is a peculiarly bland, lazy and decidedly untypical formulation by Foucault. However, he then moves on to focus on the problem with the social security system: namely, ‘on the one hand, more security is being given to people and, on the other hand, they are being made increasingly dependent’ (Foucault, 1988: 160). This security-dependence nexus is, in fact, the ‘infernal coupling’ (Foucault, 1988: 160). Here, Foucault’s thinking appears to slide into the orbit of the US neoliberals he lectured on at the College de France. The keyword is, of course, ‘dependency’ which became such a lightening-rod for the galvanising politics of the US New Right (Gustafson, 2011; Garrett, 2018b). Alighting on the idea that the current social security system is anachronistic, Foucault (1988: 166) asserts that we ‘are still bound up with an outlook that was formed between 1920 and 1940, mainly under the influence of Beveridge, a man who was born a hundred years ago’. He also airs his frustration at the lack of progress that is taking place. Possibly referring to the oil crisis, which began in October 1973, Foucault (1988: 167) asserts that ‘the crisis that we are going through and which will soon be ten years old has given rise to nothing interesting or new . . . . It would seem that a sort of sterilization has taken place . . . no significant invention seems to have emerged’. The unions – and he probably has in mind Bono’s own CFDT – could, he suggests, ‘open up a space for invention’ (Foucault, 1988: 167). In terms of the ‘problems of health’, he maintains, ‘one is entering an order of values that gives rise to an absolute, infinite demand. The problem raised is, therefore, that of a relationship between an infinite demand and a finite system’ (Foucault, 1988: 173). This framing, markedly neoliberal in its implied concession regarding the need for welfare retrenchment, leads Foucault (1988: 173) to suggest that ‘we must find a solution in technical terms’. He assures Bono that he is ‘not advocating . . . any kind of wild liberalism that would lead to individual coverage for those with means and an absence of cover for the rest’ (Foucault, 1988: 175). The exchange then ends in a somewhat odd fashion with Foucault (1988: 176) raising the question of ‘what life is worth and the way in which one can confront death’. Discussions, involving relevant individuals and organisations, might result in a ‘recognized right for everybody to kill himself when he wishes in decent conditions’ (Foucault, 1988: 176). However, in the context of the foregoing conversation, this question, treated with a certain levity by Foucault, also appears as a possible way of dealing with finite resources and the escalating costs borne by the social state. Foucault does not address the issue of the economic inequalities which compel some to have recourse to social security. Poverty is rendered somewhat passe in his body of theorisation. Hence, ‘poverty and inequality were essentially ´ a nineteenth-century problem. While he readily conceded that these issues were not entirely resolved, they no longer need to be addressed [he maintains in June 1978] “with the same urgency” ’ (Zamora, 2016b: 68). A more significant problem was the more ‘diffuse systems of domination’ (Foucault in Zamora, 2016b: 68). Intermeshed problems of extreme wealth existing alongside poverty and other forms of material hardship became, for Foucault, replaced by a more central and abstract concern: pervasive and ‘excessive power’ (Zamora, 2016b: 68). Furthermore, conceptually, the welfare state is rendered problematic because it furnishes an example of ‘biopower’ and social security is conceived as a ‘tool that standardizes conduct and individuals’ (Zamora, 2016b: 69). According to Foucault’s associate Francois Ewald, the welfare state actually fulfils the ‘dream of biopower’ (Zamora, 2016b: 69). Relatedly, in the ‘biopolitics’ lectures, we get no real sense that people resist the imposition of neoliberalism. Aside from Foucault’s brief reference to the general strike in the FRG opposing the neoliberal economic reconfiguration after the Second World War, there is hardly any mention of how people collectively organise or devise counter-hegemonic strategies. People are apt to ‘find ways of surviving, negotiating, accommodating, refusing and resisting’ (Clarke, 2005: 159). Yet, in Foucault’s analysis, there are ‘few social forces from below’ or ‘shared struggles for freedom’. Such absences, in fact, are a ‘perennial limitation’ of his work (Brown, 2015: 73–74). In contrast, a good deal of current analysis within the field of social policy explores such forces of resistance (Dukelow and Kennett, 2018; Gruegel and Riggirozzi, 2018; Ishkanian and Glasius, 2018; Papadopoulous and Roumpakis, 2018; Schram and Pavlovskaya, 2017). Despite these substantial problems with Foucault’s own stance, his analysis seems to ‘predict crucial aspects of the marketization of social relations’ that subsequently occurred (McNay, 2009: 56). Indeed, his articulation of neoliberalism predates its hegemonic consolidation. In this context, two aspects of Foucault’s insights merit amplification. First, how the European Union (EU) is, perhaps, shaping the conduct of macro-level economic and social policy in line with ordoliberal principles. Second, how facets of social policy are being shaped in line with Foucault’s account of neoliberalism According to the ordoliberals, social policy is ‘no longer a means for countering the economic, but a means for sustaining the logic of competition’ (Donzelot, 2008: 124). This dimension has become magnified in recent years with more coercive and punitive forms of social security provision – recoded as ‘welfare’ – becoming embedded (Fletcher and Flint, 2018; see also Garrett, 2007; 2015a). Harsher regimes have contributed to processes of ‘deproletarianization’ similar to those promoted by Ropke (see also Bonefeld, ¨ 2012). For him, welfare policy had to be ‘equivalent to a policy of eliminating the proletariat’ (Ropke, ¨ 1950: 225). That is to say, welfare must seek to prevent employed and unemployed workers from collectivising their interests and from meaningfully forging bonds of solidarity which would potentially culminate in the formation of a collective class consciousness. As Foucault observed, the ordoliberals were committed to crafting policies and practices preventing the working class from coalescing as a potential dual power. Subsequently, policy has continued to function in this way. Relatedly, across Europe and elsewhere, a range of anti-trade union laws has endeavoured to undergird this project (Ishkanian and Glasius, 2018). As Foucault highlights, according to the ordoliberals, alternative ways had to be found to cultivate non-threatening forms of collective consciousness, group identity and social cohesion. For Ropke ( ¨ 1957), religious morality might serve as the glue holding together societies perpetually at risk of dissolving because of market competition. In his support of the Apartheid regime in South Africa, he also implicitly recognised the advantages of exclusionary and racialised forms of attachment and solidarity (Slobodian, 2014). Perhaps the interest in promoting ‘social inclusion’ hints at a similar concern, amongst contemporary elites, that competition might result in a ‘social explosion’ if the state fails to calibrate its interventions to counter such inherent tendencies (Ropke, ¨ 1950: 181). Since Foucault gave his lectures, social inclusion talk has become ‘diffused through international policy networks’ particularly within the EU (Beland, ´ 2014:143).Here, the ‘inverse of exclusion is thus “integration” and the process of attaining it, “insertion”’ (Silver,1994:542). In the UK, by the mid-1990s, social inclusion had, of course, become central to New Labour’s approach to social justice issues (Commission on Social Justice, 1994; Winslow and Hall, 2013). This and similar discourses potentially inject a ‘warmth’ into the cold, calculative logic of competition and seek to rhetorically ensure that all ‘players’ are kept within the neoliberal ‘game’ (Donzelot, 2008: 131). The aim is to generate social policy as a ‘struggle against exclusion on condition . . . that it is not aiming to reduce inequalities’ (Donzelot, 2008: 131). This perspective is not, therefore, rooted in a ‘disavowal’ or dismantling of the ‘social’, as some commentators suggest (Brown, 2018); rather it is one which tries to reconstitute the ‘social’ in line with the imperatives of unrelenting market competition. As we have seen, Foucault emphasises that ‘morals play a central role’ in the establishment and maintenance of a neoliberal society and social policy plays a role in operationalising the values of such a society (Amable, 2011: 4). In terms of social protection and housing, this dimension was to the fore in the Blairite mantra of ‘no rights without responsibilities’ (Swanson, 2000). Ropke ( ¨ 1950: 181) had called for a ‘high standard of business ethics’ amongst elites, viewing this as a vital element within the ordoliberal vision. Post-crash, this discursive preoccupation has also been reflected in a new rhetorical attentiveness to nurturing ‘inclusive capitalism’ (Brading, 212; Carney, 2014; Lagarde, 2014). Similar motivations are integral to failed political projects pivoting on social policy keywords such as the ‘big society’ (Cabinet Office, 2010) and the promotion of ‘happiness’ (Seligman, 2015). Ordoliberal preoccupations with the ‘social’ were also to the fore in Theresa May’s faltering project to chart a ‘new centre ground’ in post-Brexit British politics (May, 2016a; 2016b). None of this implies that everyone should be included or that everyone should, for example, have their happiness guaranteed. As recognised by Foucault, some groups and individuals – encountering a ‘hostile environment’ (Davies, 2018) – are to be purposely prevented from entering the circle of inclusivity whilst some are expelled (Rose, 2000). In a contemporary context, mechanisms of neoliberal exclusion are also likely to take racialised and nationalistic forms and are bound up with new patterns of surveillance, containment and incarceration (Lazzarato, 2009; Wacquant, 2009; see also Garrett, 2015b). The incessant, key aspiration is to constitute the ‘social’ in such a way as to try to ensure that forms of working-class solidarity are inhibited and blocked. Fundamentally, therefore ‘market behaviour’ needs to be embedded into the ‘psycho-moral forces’ which a competitive society is able to strategically draw on and deploy (Ropke in Bonefield, ¨ 2012: 641). Furthermore, as Lazzarato (2009) suggests, fear, insecurity, racism and war are increasingly functioning as ways to create toxic forms of social cohesion and integration within hyper-competitive societies (see also Fekete, 2018).

2023 CNDI Kritik
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Welfare is the panopticon—informational networks within social program organizations entrenches the fear of the social worker as the guard—expanding social security expands the specter of surveillance and cements the state’s control over life in poverty

Van Haute et. al 18 ( Dorien Van Haute, Griet Roets, Maarit Alasuutari, Michel Vandenbroeck. ‘Managing the flow of private information on children and parents in poverty situations: Creating a panoptic eye in interorganizational networks?’ Child and Family Social Work. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1111/cfs.12433 ) @ehatt

Influenced by broader historical developments and contemporary pressures, child and family social work is often organized in categorical and fragmented ways at the interorganizational and policy levels (Rochford, Doherty, & Owens, 2014; Statham, 2011). The well‐intended idea of providing a differentiated supply of social services for families (Mkandawire, 2005), however, implies that welfare recipients often encounter substantial obstacles or thresholds at the supply side of welfare provision, preventing them from benefiting from high‐quality social services (Roets, Roose, Schiettecat, & Vandenbroeck, 2016. Moreover, welfare recipients increasingly seem to suffer from “the complex and multidimensional character of social problems in contemporary Western welfare states” (De Corte, Verschuere, Roets, & Bouverne‐De Bie, 2016: 4). In research, this phenomenon is referred to as “wicked issues,” “which cut across a diversity of service areas and policy domains and are too complex to be dealt with by single welfare organisations” (De Corte et al., 2016: 4). In recent decades, many countries have therefore initiated a countermovement of interorganizational networking to fill the gaps in social work service provision and to overcome deficiencies in the institutional division and distribution of welfare knowledge (Allen, 2003; Provan, 1997; Vandenbroeck & Lazzari, 2014). Also in the field of child and family social work, many efforts have been made to create interorganizational networks that involve a wide range of locally embedded social work actors (see Roets et al., 2016; Allen, 2003; De Corte et al., 2016; Frost, 2005; Garrett, 2008). In this development, interorganizational collaboration and the integration of services are perceived as systemic and sustainable solutions for the current and historical fragmentation of services (Allen, 2003; Anthony, King, & Austin, 2011). It is argued that interorganizational networking across many different actors in service provision may generate and cluster the necessary knowledge and resources to provide a productive and progressive response to better meet the multiple needs of children and families (Hood, 2014; Provan & Kenis, 2008). In this article, we explore insights emerging from a research project on interorganizational networking, which is perceived by policy‐makers as a productive strategy for tackling the wicked issue of child poverty in Belgium. Given that an extensive body of international research shows that child poverty has remained a stubborn, complex, and multidimensional problem in most Western societies (Platt, 2005), policy‐makers in Belgium and beyond believe that the struggle against child poverty may benefit from the creation of interorganizational networks between a wide range of local social work services targeting children and families (INCh‐project, 2014). In the international realm, it is important to note that although families are supposed to make use of social services provided by these interorganizational networks on a voluntary basis, our research project reveals that some of the child and family social work services being involved in the networks tend to acquire an orientation being rooted within a child protection discourse rather than in a child welfare discourse (see Parton, 2008b; Roose, Roets, Van Houte, Vandenhole, & Reynaert, 2013; Spratt, 2001). In this context, we focus more in particular on the increasing pressure that emerges in these interorganizational networks to document and share information about parents and children among public services (6, Raab, & Bellamy, 2005; Bellamy, Raab, Warren, & Heeney, 2008; Richardson & Asthana, 2006). Concerning the sharing of information, the network members depend on their own organizational rules, protocols, and background, so the local network and the families it serves are confronted with different approaches and regulations. There is currently no shared governmental policy on information‐sharing practices in the networks in Belgium (see Parton, 2008b, for a critical analysis of how the relationship between parents, children, professionals, and the state have changed in children's services in the UK, e.g., due to priority given to the accumulation, monitoring, and exchange of electronic information) and by consequence no standardized way of working between the services. In what follows, we therefore explore the complexities, dilemmas, and side effects that emerge in interorganizational networks of child and family social work services when they are handling the gathering, sharing, and (mis)use of information about children and families in poverty. More specifically, we focus on the major field of tension between supporting and controlling families in these information‐sharing practices. Frost (2005: 19) raises this matter when he argues that interorganizational networks may be “formed as practices that can ‘see everything’, ‘know everything’ and ‘do anything’, and thus they produce a ‘holistic power’ to discipline and control every aspect of welfare recipients' lives,” particularly in the case of documentation and information sharing. In this contribution, we theorize this issue inspired by Foucault's (1975, 1993, 2001) notions of the panopticon and pastoral power. In the article, this tension between support and control serves as an analytical framework to analyse our empirical data. 2 | INTERORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKING AND THE INTEGRATION OF SERVICES: A NEED FOR SHARING INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTATION In the configuration of interorganizational networks, the sharing of information and documentation has been noted as an essential aspect (Parton, 2008a; Reamer, 2005). Much attention has been devoted to the improvement of communication and to the sharing of information to enhance the continuity of service delivery (Allen, 2003; Anthony et al., 2011; Statham, 2011) and to avoid striking gaps and overlaps in service provision for families (McKeown, Haase, & Pratschke, 2014; Warin, 2007). The pressure on sharing information also derives from a protection logic and the need for a higher control of children at risk (Lees, 2017; Thompson, 2013). It has been argued that sharing information and documentation prevents the receipt of conflicting information, which often produces frustration on the side of social service providers because it results in a duplication of their efforts (Provan, 1997). Many professionals are expected to keep extensive data sets on clients to facilitate the development of multi‐agency interventions that engage the full range of their needs (6 et al., 2005; Parton, 2008a). Nevertheless, documentation‐ and information‐sharing practices may provoke challenges and raise pertinent questions about how the flow of information between services is managed in the formation of a network, because “in more integrated services information is likely to flow more freely” (Provan, 1997: 21). The manner in which information and documentation are shared is an important issue to consider, given that the flux of information can be difficult to control, particularly in a movement towards the interorganizational networking in the field of child and family social work. Moreover, making sense of information “is complex, with the needs of children and families often shifting” over time (Thompson, 2013: 191). In this context, we observe a major field of tension appear between controlling versus supporting families in the documentation‐ and information‐sharing practices of social workers. The assumption that children and families inherently benefit from documentation‐ and information‐sharing practices is questionable because these child and family social work practices may also have undesirable side effects and downsides. Support and control, however, often appear together and operate in a field of tension. 2.1 | Practices of documentation and sharing information: Creating a panoptic eye? Documentation and sharing information can lead to a reduction in freedom and an extension of surveillance over parents and children (Jeffs & Smith, 2002) and may interfere with their autonomy and right to privacy. When documentation and information sharing results in a narrow monitoring of clients, it can create renewed family policing and practices of surveillance. We can deepen this discussion by considering the notion of the panopticon. In its architectural form, the panopticon was designed by Bentham as a more efficient form of prison. With its central watchtower and its translucent cells, one guardian could overlook all of the cells. However, the panopticon, as Foucault (1975), Foucault (2001) analysed it, lies in the idea that each of the inmates can be watched all of the time, not in the question of whether he or she actually is. This is the disciplining power of the panopticon: the knowledge that one can be watched. It is achieved by the constant presence of light in the cells, in contrast to the dark in the central watchtower. It is the lack of reciprocity in the perspective of the guardian and the prisoners, however, that exercises the disciplinary power of the panopticon in which the guardian can see everything without being seen. Here, the question emerges of the extent to which an interorganizational network of welfare services may also create the effect of a panopticon. In its metaphorical meaning, the panopticon can be used for its relevance in grasping that continuous observation and supervision are possible in a network at all times. This is made possible by an increased flow of information: Documentation and information sharing in social work is a possible instrument of control and surveillance and a medium through which professionals can exercise power in the practice of assessing, judging, and documenting, particularly when they are brought together in a network (Roets et al., 2016; Roets, Roose, De Wilde, et al., 2017). The permanent visibility and observation lead to the automatic functioning of the disciplinary power. Supervision is exercised by individual professionals and social workers; however, it is not situated and individualized within one person but, rather, in a structure that makes it more anonymous and independent of those exercising control. In this sense, it is not clear who is watching what at what time; thus, children and families remain unaware of the precise nature of their visibility. Therefore, the surveillance is based on a system of permanent observation and registration in which documentation and information sharing may function as a method of exercising power, as “the documentation somehow detaches the statements from the people who have made them and transforms them into external or objective ‘facts’. In other words, the written word seems to give special weight and authority to the statement” (Alasuutari, Markström, & Vallberg‐ Roth, 2014: 99). 2.2 | Practices of documentation and information sharing: Creating supportive features in child and family social work? Interorganizational networks are, however, primarily installed to create supportive effects for children and parents in poverty situations. A supportive intention is clearly not necessarily in contrast to a controlling effect. This is perfectly illustrated by the concept of pastoral power proposed by Foucault. This concept implies a beneficial power, using the metaphor of the shepherd and his flock of sheep (Foucault, 1993; Golder, 2007; Vandenbroeck & Bouverne‐De Bie, 2006). For the shepherd to fulfil his duty, he must protect and care for each individual sheep to lead it to salvation. To be able to account for and guide the sheep and protect them from misfortune, the shepherd must know all of the information about each sheep. For him to know about each of the sheep's situations, Foucault (1993) argues, each individual must examine, verbalize, and publicly “confess” his or her behaviour and thoughts. This illustrates that the caring and protecting intention and the controlling effect appear together; moreover, disciplining power is used in somewhat implicit ways as the effect of care, rather than of mistrust and explicitly controlling intentions. This raises the question of the extent to which the relationship between networks of child and family social work services and children and families in poverty situations can be considered a form of pastoral power.