Conservation biology: the biopolitical science The emergence of conservation biology as a crisis-oriented discipline in the late 20th century marks a significant shift in the American relationship with ‘nature’. Today’s conservationists by and large aim to foster and protect the diversity of nonhuman life, taking as their object not individuals (eg, trees, charismatic animals, or geological formations) but populations, communities, and species. In colonial and early America, by contrast, nature was commonly viewed as something to be seized, possessed, and exploited (Nash, 2001). Landscapes of the New World were perceived as vast, dangerous, or, at best, useless, and settlers moved to conquer, tame, and improve them by clearing forests, hunting predators to near extinction, and forcing native people westward—all acts of seizure and sovereignty both over nonhuman nature and over those humans understood to be outside of the American body politic. We see in the moment of westward expansion the culmination of sovereign power in “the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it” (Foucault, 1990, page 136). By the late 19th century, as forests were cleared, prairies plowed, and Native American tribes defeated (in short, as there was less wilderness left to conquer), a new biopolitical desire to make nature live began to surface alongside sovereign control. In the emerging Romantic understanding, nature took on new salience, as a small but significant minority of Americans began to view it as sublime, sacred, and an essential part of American national identity (Nash, 2001; Runte, 1987). Acclaimed natural landscapes such as the Grand Canyon, Yosemite Valley, and the geyser basins of Yellowstone served as proof of American exceptionalism, and although their preservation paved the way for the modern environmental movement, the early logic of this movement was one of “monumentalism, not environmentalism” (Runte, 1987, page 29). At the same time, conservationists such as Gifford Pinchot advocated a utilitarian and consumption-based approach to managing and stewarding natural resources for national development (Knight and Bates, 1995). In these ways, the initial steps toward biopolitical environmentalism were not a departure from sovereign power but rather an expansion of it, exemplifying Bruce Braun’s claim that “the government of ‘life’ has revealed itself to be intimately related to the exercise and extension of sovereign power” (2007, page 8). By the mid-20th century, the overt justification for the protection of nature had shifted away from American exceptionalism and toward ecological health and integrity (eg, Leopold, 1949). Ecology as a science developed to focus on interactions between organisms and their environments; with concepts such as ecosystems and the balance of nature, it became the central science associated with environmentalism (Worster, 1994). Conservation biology grew out of this intertwining of ecology, as a science, and the American environmental movement. The ‘official’ formation of conservation biology as a discipline is cited as early evening on May 8, 1985, at the end of the Second Conference on Conservation Biology in Ann Arbor, Michigan. An informal motion established the Society for Conservation Biology along with a new academic journal Conservation Biology (Sarkar, 2009). Those instrumental in establishing the discipline sought to separate themselves from scientists who perceived the environment as a set of natural resources to be protected for human consumption (Sarkar, 2009; Soulé, 1985). Whereas scientists in the natural resources and forestry worlds generally sought to manage a small number of highly valuable species (such as high-yield timber species and wild fisheries), conservation biologists aimed to protect all species based on two somewhat conflicting ideas: the idea that nature has intrinsic value extending beyond its utility to human society, and the idea that nature’s diversity might someday be valuable to human society [eg, to adapt agricultural crops to climate change (Soulé, 1985)], even if not yet. Thus, the organizing principle is that it is not enough to know nature; one must also use that knowledge to effectively manage and even foster the diversity of life. While scientific knowledge is always shaped by social processes and dominant social metaphors (Law, 2004; Sismondo, 2010; Worster, 1994), conservation biology is distinct from many other fields in that practitioners aim not merely to uncover facts but also to develop recommendations and take action (Soulé, 1985). The “right of the sword” over nature has not been replaced per se but has been permeated by a new right to “make live and let die”, manifest as the right and duty to catalog life at the level of the species, organism, and genome, make nonhuman species live, and preserve certain visions of nature—all this while allowing abnormal or “debilitated” genes, individuals, and populations to die off (Soulé, 1985, page 731). Biopower has not come to replace sovereign power, and the biological materiality of nature remains firmly tied to its political and social dimensions (Braun, 2007). Indeed, intervention in biological processes has both complemented and complicated human—and particularly capitalist—exploitation of nature. Ultimately, however, the random element of life can never be fully brought into the realm of management, as the “complexities of matters [make] governance and rule frighteningly unpredictable” (Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008, page 1534). In other words, life—both human and nonhuman—constantly escapes control, and to promote and protect life means to acknowledge the dynamism and inherent unpredictability of biological processes. Hinchliffe and Bingham (2008) explain that the challenge of securing life is a “paradox, where the need for control is also the need for an absence of control” (page 1547). This paradox lies at the root of conservation biology and associated fields. Conservation biology’s core concepts Biodiversity: populations in crisis Conservation biology emerged in tandem with the now commonplace concept of biodiversity (Takacs, 1996). According to Michael Soulé, one of the field’s founders and most prominent practitioners, the purpose of conservation biology is to “provide principles and tools for preserving biological diversity” (1985, page 727). In this way conservation biology is a crisis-oriented discipline. The concept of biodiversity, and the idea that a biodiversity crisis was well underway, represents conservation biology’s first and arguably most central truth discourse about the ‘vital’ character of living beings, a key feature of biopower (Rabinow and Rose, 2006). Using an array of authorities, from photographs of tropical deforestation published in National Geographic (eg, O’Neill, 1993; White, 1983) to ecologists who had witnessed species declines firsthand at their field sites, conservation biology made legible and upheld the idea of biodiversity as simultaneously essential and imperiled. Framed as a matter of biopolitical urgency, this problematization of a biodiversity crisis is shot through with sovereign claims to truth and objectivity, as scientists become authorized not only to speak for nonhuman nature but also to identify and wage war against the actors and actions— both human and nonhuman—that threaten the future of life. For conservation biologists, the crisis of biodiversity loss does not refer to individual organisms, but to gene pools, populations, species, and ecosystems. Indeed, the welfare of organisms is considered to be far beyond the purview of the field, and intervening at the level of the individual is acceptable only when such intervention will benefit the population at large. “ It may seem logical to extend the aversion of anthropogenic extinction of populations to the suffering and untimely deaths of individuals because populations are composed of individuals. I do not believe this step is necessary or desirable for conservation biology. Although disease and suffering in animals are unpleasant and, perhaps, regrettable, biologists recognize that conservation is engaged in the protection of the integrity and continuity of natural processes, not the welfare of individuals … . Evolution, as it occurs in nature, could not proceed without the suffering inseparable from hunger, disease, and predation” (Soulé, 1985, page 731, emphasis added). This passage establishes the primacy of the population, a hallmark feature of biopolitics. Managing individual nonhuman lives is meaningless in responding to the crisis of biodiversity loss; individual lives acquire meaning only when they advance the long-term well-being of the broader population or are essential to sustaining key biological processes, especially evolution. Evolution: prescriptive futures Evolution represents a second main truth discourse of conservation biology in that it is considered the engine fueling biological differences. Without evolution, there is no biodiversity, there is no life. As Soulé writes, “Assuming that life itself is good, how can one maintain an ethical neutrality about evolution? Life itself owes its existence and present diversity to the evolutionary process. Evolution is the machine, and life is its product” (1985, page 731). But evolutionary processes occur at the scale of the population over many generations, reinforcing the idea that nature is best managed at the level of general phenomena. By classifying populations as evolutionarily significant units, for example, scientists give conservation priority to groups of organisms within a species that share a common evolutionary heritage, have unique adaptations, and may eventually diverge significantly from the remainder of the species (Crandall et al, 2000; Moritz, 1994; Ryder, 1986). In this way conservation biology is explicitly future-oriented and prescriptive: it seeks to make some ecological futures possible while precluding futures that are less lively and less diverse. Biopolitics, too, focuses on the possibilities of the future—both good and bad—in order to both prevent negative scenarios and formulate populations that can withstand and rebound from such scenarios. Foucault (2007) describes biopolitical strategies toward famine and resource scarcity issues as “basically focused on a possible event, an event that could take place, and which one tries to prevent before it becomes reality” (page 33). He exemplifies this point through the idea of a town plan: a town plan should not be developed to provide immediate and short-term perfection, but should “open onto a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable” (page 20). Key here is that in neither case does the recognition that the future is open, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous discourage intervention; rather, it is this openness that actually necessitates prediction, measurement, and control. This paradox lies at the heart of biopolitics and conservation science. By fostering biodiversity and encouraging evolution and natural selection, conservation biologists aim to protect and preserve the integrity of the nonhuman world. At the same time, however, conservationists are compelled to intervene in the dynamics of populations in order to maximize “evolutionary potential” (Soulé, 1985) and ensure the long-term viability of extant populations or species. In short, conservation science aims to control life—all the while drawing the line between biological threats and advantages—in order for life to proliferate freely. It is this delineation between evolution as threat and evolution as advantage that has proven particularly challenging for conservation biologists studying human-impacted ecosystems (Kinnison et al, 2007; Mace et al, 2003; Schlaepfer et al, 2005; Stockwell et al, 2003; Western, 2001). Despite Soulé’s insistence that evolution is good, conservation biologists continue to grapple with “the issue of whether the evolution of adaptations to disturbance and degraded habitats is sometimes beneficial or something to be rigorously avoided” (Ashley et al, 2003, page 115). When its habitat is fundamentally altered or a new species is introduced, a population might adapt rapidly to the changes through what has been termed contemporary evolution (Stockwell et al, 2003); conversely, these same selection pressures might also cause a genetic bottleneck, a decline in population, and potential extirpation (Schlaepfer et al, 2005; Western, 2001). The same agents that drive evolutionary change through selection can therefore also bring about extinction. It is one of the key tasks of conservation biology to determine when selection, and the subsequent loss of genetic variation, is beneficial and should therefore be encouraged, and when it is hazardous to populations and should be prevented (Kinnison et al, 2007). Extinction: death to improve life As the opposing force to evolution, extinction involves the reduction of biological diversity and the loss of populations, species, or taxa. Most conservation organizations, media outlets, and environmental activists frame extinction as entirely negative—even catastrophic—with an implicit recognition that it is caused by humans. Conservation biologists generally share this view of extinction as a crisis to be averted, but with one major caveat: on an evolutionary timescale, extinction is inevitable and can at times be neutral or even positive, if populations and gene pools that are poorly adapted to their environment are replaced by well-adapted populations and gene pools (Primack, 2010; Rolston, 1985; Soulé, 1985). Extinction destroys life but in doing so makes new life forms possible: “To the conservation biologist, there is little positive to be said about extinction. From an evolutionary perspective, however, extinction is a double-edged sword. By definition, extinction terminates lineages and thus removes unique genetic variation and adaptations. But over geological time scales, it can reshape the evolutionary landscape in more creative ways, via the differential survivorship of lineages and the evolutionary opportunities afforded by the demise of dominant groups and the postextinction sorting of survivors. The interplay between the destructive and generative aspects of extinction … remains a crucial but poorly understood component of the evolutionary process” (Jablonski, 2001, page 5393). This view of extinction is remarkably similar to the way death is conceptualized in modern biopolitical strategies and fields such as demography and public health (Bashford, 2006). Such fields have become so engrained in Western thought that it is now common sense that death is inevitable, that it is part of life, and that it cannot be prevented or fully controlled on an individual level. At the level of the population, however, death is transformed into mortality rates, disease infection rates, age class structures, and population pyramids. So it is with extinction—conservation scientists aim not to avoid extinction altogether but rather to account for it through statistics on extinction rates, speciation rates, species turnover, and minimum viable population sizes, among other means. The purpose is not to altogether avoid death and extinction, but rather to manage it at the level of the population: to ensure that untimely extinctions are minimized and to promote evolution and speciation to counterbalance extinctions. While background extinction events—which are considered normal and inevitable— represent an essential part of evolutionary history, mass extinctions are primarily of concern to conservation biologists. At present “the Tree of Life … is being pruned by extinction very much more rapidly than it is regrowing” (Mace et al, 2003, page 1708). Whole taxonomic groups are believed to be at risk of extinction due to human-related factors (such as habitat loss and species invasion). Conservationists increasingly recognize that saving all threatened species from extinction is impractical, and many have come to accept conservation triage as necessary (Bottrill et al, 2008; Wiens et al, 2012). Like in emergency medicine, conservation triage involves using criteria to assess priority and make life or death decisions, not about human beings but about the futures of entire species. There are disagreements about how to prioritize taxa: some conservationists support using evolutionary histories to “indicate which taxa and which places are currently most active in the growth of the Tree of Life, and which may therefore be particularly important to conserve” (Mace et al, 2003, page 1709), while others prefer that ecological functions guide decisions of life or death. Either way, the ongoing biodiversity crisis and finite conservation funding necessitate that some species be allowed to die so that others can have life. In the biopolitical logic of conservation science, triage is “just smart decision making” (Bottrill et al, 2008, page 649).