Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Not Key – China

China is already a green tech leader—the aff isn’t enough to beat them

Ladislaw and Tsafos 20 (Sarah Ladislaw is a senior vice president and director of the energy security and climate change program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Nikos Tsafos is a senior fellow in the energy security and climate change program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Beijing Is Winning the Clean Energy Race,” Foreign Policy. October 2 2020. https://archive.ph/aTs0c ) @ehatt

At the end of September, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his country’s intention to peak its emissions by 2030 and be carbon neutral before 2060. To meet this goal, China will have to expand its domestic market for clean energy technologies, many of which it produces. China is also hoping to spur other countries to be more aggressive in lowering emissions—calling for a “Green Revolution”—and these countries could also be a market for Chinese technologies. Thanks to initiatives like these, China is for now winning the global race to invent and manufacture the technologies that will allow a new low-carbon world. Europe, which has made its own commitment to become climate neutral by 2050, is not far behind. Given its robust high-tech sector and wealth of private investment, the United States is well positioned to compete, but it risks falling behind. For now, it is still resting on the energy boom that came with the shale oil revolution and relying on its traditional approach to energy innovation. This shortsightedness will hurt the country economically and geopolitically. To avoid the pain, the United States needs a clear strategy for leading in new energy markets and technologies. The world’s energy system is changing rapidly. The last decade has seen exponential growth in the use of wind and solar for electricity generation and in the deployment of electric vehicles. Some of the milestones of this transition are well known: in 2019, consumption from renewable energy sources surpassed coal use in the United States for the first time in more than 130 years. In the United Kingdom and Spain, coal-fired power generation is almost phased out, while renewable energy sources have surpassed nonrenewable ones in Germany’s power consumption. This transition is not yet universal, but it is happening quickly and in an ever increasing number of places. Only when compared with the immense challenge of dealing with climate change does this transition look slow. China has emerged as the lead supplier of this transition. In 2018, Chinese companies made up over a third of the world’s manufacturers of wind turbines.In 2018, Chinese companies made up over a third of the world’s manufacturers of wind turbines. In 2019, the country built over 70 percent of the world’s solar photovoltaics. In electric vehicles, China’s command is even greater: It holds almost three-fourths of the world’s manufacturing capacity for lithium ion battery cells, and it controls even more of the supply chain before the final assembly. Of the three big green energy technologies taking off around the world, then, two are largely made in China with a good portion of the third made there as well. Europe is also eyeing this growing market. European countries rely more on solar and wind than most other countries in the world, and European manufacturers are prominent in wind energy. The European Union has already unveiled a battery strategy to create a competitive manufacturing value chain in Europe for sustainable battery technologies, and its European Green Deal is explicitly seen as not just an environmental strategy but as an industrial strategy as well. Beyond decarbonizing the continent’s energy system, the Green Deal looks toward developing the industries necessary to do so, with a special focus on hydrogen, which is one of Europe’s big bets and an area where it hopes to lead. The implications of this picture should be obvious, at least when it comes to China. China will get good jobs and become the partner of choice for any country that wants to lower its greenhouse gas emissions. It is unlikely to care as much as about how materials are sourced or whether their extraction enriches local politicians in shady deals. The country will also exert control over supply chains, possibly tampering with them when politically convenient. In turn, it will be harder for the United States to lead if it does not build any of the nuts and bolts that the new world needs. For the United States, the green tech challenge is often framed as a need for more innovation—and it certainly is that. As a share of GDP, the United States spends less on research and development than competitors like Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The private sector, of course, has stepped in. But the shift of R&D money from government to individual companies also means a change in focus (narrower) and ambition (shorter term). In energy, U.S. R&D spending is still above average versus other advanced economies but only barely: Among the 27 countries for which the International Energy Agency (IEA) reports spending relative to GDP, the United States ranked 10th in 2018. (The IEA figures include deployment, so this ranking constitutes research, development, and deployment.) China already spends more, in absolute dollars, than the United States. In areas where the United States leads technologically—namely health care and defense—such spending is much greater: Federal R&D for health care is roughly 1 percent of total health expenditures, four times greater than the equivalent number in energy. A commitment to excellence requires more money. There’s also a problem with the targeting of U.S. spending. The country has a deep aversion toward “picking winners,” at least in theory (and usually when the winners are in someone else’s district). Avoiding heavy-handed government direction can be wise, but it can also lead to paralysis. We can already visualize what a low-carbon future looks like: It is more efficient and electrified, it relies on certain technologies that will provide storage and energy for sectors that are hard to electrify—industry, freight, shipping, aviation—and it involves removing carbon dioxide that is already in the atmosphere. Promoting the development of the technology needed to meet this future does not mean going all in on a few particular companies; a large country can afford to place multiple big bets even if they do not pay off (just as it is doing in the race to create a vaccine for COVID-19). The United States’ current innovation system is often geared to avoiding failure rather than supercharging success. It needs to flip that focus. Innovation alone, though, will not be enough—it needs to be paired with deployment and manufacturing. In 2009, the United States had twice as much wind capacity as China and five times as much solar capacity. By 2019, China had taken the lead and deployed twice as much wind and three times as much solar as the Unites States. In electric vehicles, the reversal has been faster: The United States had five times as many electric vehicles as China in 2013, but now China has twice as many as the United States, courtesy of generous state support. These trends reverberate into manufacturing: In the late 1990s, for instance, the United States had a 30 percent market share in solar photovoltaics manufacturing. Now it has just 1 percent. The toolkit for encouraging deployment is relatively straightforward—it is just a matter of choosing the level of ambition required. At one extreme are nudges: getting consumers to shift from one appliance to another, prompting them to cut individual energy use, and so on. In the middle are tax credits and firm mandates: support for purchases of electric vehicles or to retrofit a house, incentives to procure a certain amount of renewable energy or to build cars that meet a certain mileage standard, and so on. And on the other extreme are policies where the state takes a central role in creating a market—electrifying the region like the Tennessee Valley Authority did after the Great Depression or building highways that boost automobile use. This is largely a political challenge, not a policy or a technical one. Deployment, however, cannot be divorced from manufacturing. From a climate perspective, a solar panel is a solar panel no matter where it was produced. But from an economic and national security perspective, manufacturing matters. This is not about fighting China. Rather, it means caring about where things are built and asking tough questions about why companies tend to go overseas to do manufacturing. It means building supply chains across the world and ensuring that the United States is embedded in them. And it means a commitment to making things again, rather than merely consuming or financing them. Doubling down on R&D and encouraging deployment of green tech will mark a reversal from the United States’ policies of the past few years. The country has always struggled to operationalize a green energy strategy. But the Trump administration has gone further in doubling down on fossil fuels and prioritizing hydrocarbon exports, infrastructure, and consumption. When an oil or gas pipeline falters, the administration has plenty to say—but it lets permitting for an offshore wind project languish. It is trying to relax auto standards rather than working with Detroit to make the car of the future, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has made it harder to deploy renewable energy by casting doubt on a state’s right to support new industries. For an administration supposedly committed to not picking winners, this is not an approach that favors all energy sources equally. Looser regulations undermine the fuels and technologies that the administration seeks to support. Oil, natural gas, and coal will compete in a world with tighter environmental restrictions on their production and use. To not prepare traditional energy companies for that future puts them at a disadvantage worldwide. In some ways, the situation the United States has put itself in is understandable. For decades, Washington has assumed that being a big hydrocarbon producer would yield lasting economic and geopolitical advantage. Now that U.S. oil and gas production has risen to record levels, it is hard to look beyond the short term and into a future where the commanding heights of the energy system may lay elsewhere. But that future is coming soon, and other major countries are vying to become leaders in the technologies that will define that future. The United States need not abandon fossil fuels, of course, nor assume that they will disappear anytime soon. But it does need to look into the future, not just the past, and articulate a strategy to invent, manufacture, and deploy what the world will need over the next two decades. China and Europe certainly are.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Not Key – EU

US not key—EU fills in

Biedenkopf, Dupont, and Torney 22

Katja, Associate Professor of Sustainability Politics and the team leader of the Sustainable Futures research group at the University of Leuven, Belgium; Claire, Assistant Professor of European Governance at the Department of Public Governance and Management at Ghent University, Belgium; Diarmuid, Associate Professor in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University.“The European Union: A Green Great Power?” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 110-111. LJS

Despite its neglect by the great powers literature, the EU should be regarded as a green great power. Our analysis of two diverse domains of GEP, climate change and chemicals, shows that the EU possesses significant power, both negative and positive, and has deployed this power in different ways. Moreover, the EU has increasingly been recognized as a great power in GEP. Our discussion of global climate governance highlighted that the EU is a central actor. While its role has developed, it has accepted its responsibility for causing the climate problem and recognized its obligation to act. It has demonstrated its ability to take action both internally, by adopting a suite of policy measures and targets, and externally, by adapting its climate diplomacy efforts to respond to new contexts of turbulent global governance and its own diminishing negative power. It is a recognized actor and its recognition as a key player in global climate governance has increased, although gaps remain in terms of gaining followers. Given these characteristics, the EU can be regarded as a climate great power, even though it does not possess usual power sources assigned to nation states. In global chemicals governance, although the policy is more fragmented and of lower political profile, our analysis shows a similar pattern. The EU has increasingly developed internal regulations and shaped global chemicals governance, building particularly on its negative power of responsibility, along with positive power stemming from its economic clout. It is also recognized as a great power in this domain. There are also differences between the cases. Climate change has become a high politics issue, which figures much more prominently in the EU’s diplomacy. The EU projects its power through diplomatic means and on the basis of successive climate diplomacy action plans, including a strong diplomacy pillar under the European Green Deal. Much less strategic and high-level diplomacy is dedicated to the rather low-politics issue of chemicals. The EU’s external power projection relies to a larger extent in this case on the leverage of the internal market and the EU’s share of global chemicals trade. While there was some initial resistance, the EU’s role has been recognized externally. Using the leverage of the internal market has proven more challenging in climate change, which is a more complex issue affecting almost every economic sector and consumer. For example, the EU adopted a provision that included all flights departing and arriving in Europe in the ETS as from January 2012. This triggered substantial resistance by major players, including the US and China, which threatened to cancel an order of Airbus airplanes. In response, the EU backed down and only included EU-internal flights in the ETS. Under the 2019 European Green Deal, the European Commission has proposed revisiting the idea of a carbon border adjustment mechanism. Using market power in a high-politics area such as climate change has so far proven challenging for the EU, but it continues to try to innovate in this area. Expansive diplomacy and outreach in preparation for the use of market power to generate external support and recognition of the legitimacy of the action therefore seems crucial. However, both cases also highlighted a long-term trend of declining EU negative power, by virtue of the fact that the EU’s contribution to the issues of climate change and chemicals management, while historically significant, are declining and being overtaken by China in particular. This is partly the result of more successful and earlier action in the EU on climate and chemicals management, compared to other powers, and demonstrates the paradox of the EU’s role in GEP generally. Against this backdrop, the EU relies increasingly on its positive power and its ability to persuade, incentivize, and assist other partners through environmental diplomacy tools that may reap new rewards. It has had some success in making this shift in emphasis, and its future power and influence relies on a strengthening of its diplomatic efforts in this regard. As the chemicals case illustrates, diplomacy is not yet extensively used across all environmental policy areas. With the European Green Deal agenda, which also plays a significant role in the EU’s recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic (Dupont et al., 2020), we may see renewed attempts to increase the EU’s level of ambition on climate change and environmental regulation that go hand in hand with the external diplomacy efforts.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Not Key – General

US not key—other environmental great powers and regional powers fill in

Buzan & Falkner 22

Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS; Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. “Great Powers and Environmental Responsibilities: A Conceptual Framework.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 28-31. LJS

Some cases are fairly straightforward. The world’s most powerful nation, the US, is both a superpower in conventional terms and one of the world’s leading environmental powers. As the largest economy with a high per capita ecological footprint, the US is both deeply implicated in many global environmental problems and plays a critical role in most multilateral environmental negotiations. In the early days of modern environmental politics, it pioneered new forms of environmental regulation, which were widely copied around the world, and promoted the creation and expansion of the international environmental agenda from the 1970s onwards. The US continues to lead on environmental issues where it has a strong domestic policy mandate, though the administrations of George W. Bush (2001–2009) and Donald Trump (2017–2021) are noted for their assertive anti-regulatory stance. Over time, the US has thus moved away from its early role as international environmental leader and has, more often than not, come to exercise negative power by rejecting a special responsibility for the global environment (Falkner, 2005). The EU, initially a laggard on environmental issues in the 1970s and 1980s, has more recently pushed for international action on a wide range of environmental issues, most notably climate change (Wurzel and Connelly, 2010). Much like the US, the EU possesses considerable environmental power with global significance. Its economy, although more energy efficient and with a lower per capita ecological footprint than that of the US, is a major source of global environmental degradation. The EU’s claim to be an environmental leader has been widely noted, both as a demandeur in international negotiations and a ‘market power’ (Damro, 2015) that has the ability to raise global regulatory standards (Selin and VanDeveer, 2006), though questions persist about its ‘actorness’ (Vogler, 1999) and coherence (Barnes, 2010) as a power in international forums.3 Russia, once considered a superpower alongside the US, but merely an ‘honorary power’ during the 1990s, now falls more into the category of a declining great power in international affairs but is punching above its weight under President Putin. It is perhaps best thought of as a second-rank great power with mainly regional power resources but with some global aspirations remaining. Both its military and industrial strength have declined sharply since the end of the Cold War, with post-1991 deindustrialization also leading to a notable reduction in its global ecological footprint. Still, its considerable draw on natural resources, its substantial role as a fossil fuel producer, and its inefficient industrial system give it significant negative environmental power. What sets Russia apart from the US and EU is its relative weakness as a positive force in GEP. Having initially rejected the global environmental agenda as a Western, capitalist issue at the 1972 Stockholm Conference, the Soviet Union and later Russia has mostly taken a backseat role in international environmental negotiations, including in the climate negotiations. It rarely, if ever, aspires to play a positive, leading role in GEP. Given its large economic size, Japan surely ranks as a leading environmental power with a considerable ecological footprint. Foreign investment by Japanese multinationals and the need to import vast amounts of natural resources (energy, timber) have been noted in the past as the source of the country’s considerable ‘environmental shadow’ (Dauvergne, 1997; Hall, 2009). At the same time, Japan has at times taken on the role of a global environmental leader, promoting international cooperation on environmental management issues and exporting environmental technologies to developing countries (Maddock, 1994; Schreurs, 2004), even though this international role has come under growing domestic strain as the country’s economic woes have increased (Tiberghien and Schreurs, 2007). The rise of non-Western powers, most notably China and India, but also Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia, has attracted growing attention in international affairs generally as well as in GEP. As mentioned above, questions can be raised about categorizing developing countries as great powers. However, there can be little doubt that most rising powers have become formidable environmental powers, mainly because their combination of rapidly rising economic fortunes and large populations has led to a dramatic expansion of their ecological footprint. China is the standout case in this regard. Having grown at around 10% per annum for the last three decades, the Chinese economy, expected to become the world’s largest within a few years, has one of the highest consumption rates for many global resources. It is the world’s biggest importer of oil and largest consumer of coal, aluminium, nickel, zinc, copper, iron ore, and lead, among others (Armbrecht, 2015). China’s overall ecological footprint is said to have surpassed that of the US in the early 2000s (Global Footprint Network, n.d.), and in 2006 it overtook the US as the world’s largest emitter of GHGs. Other emerging economies, such as India, Brazil, and Indonesia, still lag behind China’s dramatic economic growth, but their ecological footprints are expanding rapidly as their large populations are joining the global middle class and are ramping up consumption of the world’s commodities. In many global environmental issue-areas, from climate change to air, water, and marine pollution, emerging economies have joined the leading great powers as major sources of global environmental degradation. Many of the larger developing countries also possess significant environmental power because they control environmental goods that are of vital importance to the health of the planet. Brazil holds c. one-third of the world’s rainforests and is the most biodiverse country on the planet, being home to at least 103,870 animal species and 43,020 plant species. Indonesia, one of the 17 ‘mega-diverse’ countries with large forested areas, contains 2 of the world’s 25 biodiversity ‘hotspots’ and ranks second in the world as the home to 12% of the world’s mammals. India, also a mega-diverse country, harbours an estimated 7–8% of the recorded species and contains a vast range of globally significant ecosystems and habitats, such as forests, grasslands, wetlands, deserts, and coastal as well as marine environments (Convention on Biological Diversity, n.d.). While emerging powers’ rising economic profile and control over environmentally sensitive ecosystems has given them significant veto power in international negotiations, they are only slowly beginning to match this with corresponding positive power, that is the desire and capability to positively shape the international environmental agenda and promote global environmental solutions. In the past, emerging powers were viewed primarily as reluctant partners in GEP, at best, and as veto powers exercising negative power over issues such as deforestation and global warming, at worst. The long-standing framing of global environmental politics around the North–South divide, with industrialized countries cast as the main environmental culprits yet also leading demandeurs for international environmental action, has reinforced a defensive posture by developing countries and a strategic focus on regulatory differentiation and financial compensation. More recently, some emerging powers have begun to be more serious about addressing the worst environmental excesses at home and are also playing a more nuanced and constructive role internationally. Brazil has received widespread international praise for its efforts to tackle Amazonian deforestation, though these achievements are now threatened by the environmental policy shifts introduced under the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro (2019– ). China has adopted a more proactive approach in the climate negotiations after having stepped up its efforts to curb rising GHG emissions at home (Green and Stern, 2017). Furthermore, the creation of the BASIC group in the UNFCCC negotiations, consisting of Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, signalled greater willingness among emerging powers with a large emissions profile to accept some regulatory differentiation from the rest of the developing countries (Hochstetler and Milkoreit, 2014).

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Not Key – General

Leadership not key—environmental powers are diffused amongst too many actors

Buzan & Falkner 22

Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS; Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. “Great Powers and Environmental Responsibilities: A Conceptual Framework.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 31-33. LJS

The question of what counts as a great power in GEP is complicated by two characteristics of the environmental policy field. For one, global environmental policymaking is highly fragmented, with hundreds of international environmental treaties and dozens of international organizations dealing with the wide array of environmental sectors that make up the international environmental agenda: from climate change to ozone layer and transboundary air pollution, and from biodiversity protection to deforestation, desertification, toxic waste, and marine pollution, each environmental issue has its own distinctive problem structure, which in turn results in a range of different power structures and institutional contexts. Despite overarching UN summits with universal participation and the United Nations Environmental Programme’s role as a facilitator of international policymaking, no central forum exists for dealing with all, or even most, environmental issues that are of global concern. With environmental power being so fragmented, it is unlikely that a fixed set of environmental great powers exists that are in a dominant position across all environmental subfields. The US, EU, and now China, appear to be major powers across a wide range of environmental issue-areas, while other countries are powerful only in specific subsets of the international environmental agenda. We can thus distinguish great powers in GEP according to whether they possess wide or narrow environmental power, which exists either across a wide range of sectors or is concentrated in just a small set of sectors. In this sense, GEP is an extreme case of the diffusion of capabilities and responsibilities that has marked great powers generally. Probably, any country with wide environmental power will be a candidate for great power status, but it seems doubtful that the label ‘great power’ should be applied to those with narrow power in just one or two environmental sectors. They would seem to fall more comfortably into the framing of Bukovansky et al.’s (2012) argument about the diffusion of special responsibilities. A further complicating characteristic of GEP is that the issues that make up the international environmental agenda exist at different scales of international politics and involve different constellations of countries. Only some, such as climate change and ozone layer depletion, are truly global political problems that require a global approach. Others are of a more regional nature, from desertification to transboundary air pollution and water management, while yet others require only bilateral or plurilateral cooperation beneath the regional level, such as the management of rivers and riparian zones. Yet other environmental issues are highly localized phenomena (e.g. deforestation, whaling) but have regional or even global implications (e.g. local forests acting as carbon sinks for the global climate; local whaling leading to global species loss). For this reason, environmental power, both in its negative and positive use, has distinctive spatial dimensions that affect our understanding of what counts as a great power in GEP. As noted above, great power interest and responsibility can exist at different spatial scales, from global through regional to local. In the environmental sector, great powers may operate at different levels, from the global down to the regional or other sub-global levels. Environmental regionalism has always played an important role, despite the global policy aspirations of the UN environment summits of 1972, 1992, 2002, and 2012. More recently, regional environmental cooperation has further gained in political significance as it offers opportunities for regulatory harmonization that meet both environmental and trade/investment policy objectives (Schreurs, 2013). Regionalism also appeals to environmental leaders as a more congenial forum in which environmental protection policies can be advanced, especially at a time when many multilateral efforts at the UN level appear to be deadlocked. We can thus distinguish between countries whose great power status in GEP is global in nature, while others may only be considered to be environmental great powers in a regional, or even subregional, context. When it comes to negative environmental power, the distinction between different scales of great power status is reflected in the spatial dimensions of the environmental resources that a country controls or of the environmental harm it can cause. Such spatial categorizations are subject to change over time, however, depending on how environmental problems are defined and impacts are understood. Deforestation, for example, was primarily seen as a local problem in the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, affecting mainly the country where it was occurring. By the late twentieth century, due to wider recognition of the importance of tropical rainforests for biodiversity and climate stability, deforestation had become a global environmental problem, as is evident from the repeated but failed efforts to create a global forest regime since the early 1990s (Humphreys, 2006). Similarly, positive environmental power comes with distinctive spatial characteristics. The US and the EU both have global policy ambitions in their engagement with the international environmental agenda and have provided international leadership on environmental issues that has had a lasting impact on the institutional and legal structure of GEP. At the same time, the US and EU also play distinctive regional roles in their respective neighbourhoods. The US has sought to shape environmental policies of neighbouring countries through regional initiative such as NAFTA and bilateral agreements with Latin America. The EU has developed a distinctly regional dimension to its external environmental role, using environmental conditionality in its negotiations with countries that want to join the Union (Andanova, 2003; Knill and Tosun, 2009). Of all emerging powers, China comes closest to playing a systematically global environmental role, mainly because of its rapidly growing environmental footprint and increasing global power ambition. China has also started to stake out an emerging (though widely contested) regional environmental leadership role, particularly in the context of regional investment and trading relationships (e.g. the Belt and Road Initiative). Armed with its own concept of sustainable development (‘ecological civilization’—see Goron, 2018), the country is increasingly trying to project an image, if not a reality, of environmental responsibility in these various regional partnerships. Other major environmental powers have seen their global policy ambition reduced in recent years, even if their status as a leading economy ensures that their environmental footprint remains global in nature. Japan, for example, was once assumed to have global environmental leadership ambition (Maddock, 1994; Dauvergne, 1998) but is perhaps better thought of as a regional, not global, environmental power (Graham, 2004), with much of its environmental aid efforts concentrated on the Asian region, and particularly Southeast Asia.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Leadership Impossible

No US climate leadership—spotty record, prioritizing profits—their authors don’t understand how environmental leadership works

Eckersley 22

Robyn, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in the Discipline of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. “Great Expectations: The United States and the Global Environment.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 58-64. LJS

Clearly, the US has appeared to be much more willing to contribute to collective efforts to protect the global environment during the Cold War period than the post-Cold War period. This is consistent with the US’s greater relative commitment to multilateralism with its Western allies during the Cold War than the post-Cold War period. However, treaty ratification signals willingness to cooperate but is does not suffice as evidence of diplomatic leadership. Before assessing the evidence of US leadership in environmental diplomacy, a closer examination of the subject matter of MEAs reveals certain general patterns of enthusiasm and disinclination that are consistent across both periods, and which provide important clues to the US environmental proclivities and more general foreign policy priorities. First, the ratification record shows that the US has generally been an enthusiastic participant in MEAs dealing with biodiversity and habitat protection, especially in the marine environment. The US is a party to the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971), the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (1972), London Convention on Ocean Dumping (1972), World Heritage Convention (1972), Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (1980), and the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991). Moreover, at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the US was an enthusiastic supporter of the proposal for a moratorium on whaling under the International Conventions for the Regulation of Whaling (1946). The US’s concern for marine mammals is also reflected in US trade policy, where it has imposed a unilateral ban on the importation of tuna that is caught with driftnets due to the high incidental kill of dolphins, as well as a unilateral ban on the importation of shrimp caught with a high incidental kill of sea turtles. Both of these bans were the subject of a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute as unjustified restrictions on trade. Yet, unlike the European Union, the US has not otherwise been a major green demandeur in the environmental negotiations under the stalled Doha Development round of negotiations, although it has insisted on environmental clauses in its negotiation of preferential trade agreements. However, the US’s enthusiasm for the protection of biodiversity has noticeably waned when the treaties are not ‘pure and simple’ cases of species or habitat protection but rather entangled with rights of economic exploitation. This applies to the two most significant ‘omnibus treaties’ that seek to protect marine and terrestrial biodiversity: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; 1992). In both cases the US has not participated because the treaties were argued to be inconsistent with US commercial interests. The Reagan administration refused to sign UNCLOS III on the ground that the provision on the mining of deep seabed resources would require US corporations to share their seabed mining technology with other nations (Malone, 1983). The US preferred a regime that enabled the private commercial exploration and development of deep seabed minerals. The Bush senior administration welcomed the biodiversity protection provisions of the CBD but rejected the provisions relating to the sharing of biotechnology and the benefits gained from developing genetic resources because they were not seen to provide sufficient protection of the intellectual property rights of the US biotechnology industry (Downes, 1993; Blomquist, 2002). The US was also critical of the provisions on finance to developing countries, particularly Article 20(4), which makes the extent of implementation by developing countries dependent on receiving financial resources and the transfer of technologies. A concern to protect the commercial interests of the US biotechnology industry was also central to the US’s role as a leading member of the ‘Miami group’ of countries that opposed the ‘prior informed consent’ restrictions on the transboundary movement of ‘Living Modified Organisms’ (i.e. genetically modified (GM) organisms) under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000), negotiated under the under the CBD (Falkner, 2001). The US also succeeded in an action brought under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement against the EU for its moratorium on the importation of GM products pending revision of the relevant EU directives (Eckersley, 2007). The WTO rules provided a less demanding standard than the precautionary principle embodied in the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, which, as a party to the Protocol, had formed part of the basis of the EU’s defence before the WTO’s dispute settlement body. The WTO panel ruled in favour of the US, rejecting the relevance of the Biosafety Protocol in interpreting WTO rules, as the US was a party of the latter, but not the former. In the area of pesticides and hazardous pollution/waste management, the US has also been an outlier largely due to a reluctance to bring its domestic regulations into line with international standards, some of which could not be clearly known in advance. These concerns underpin its refusal to ratify the Basel Convention on Control of the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal (1989), the Rotterdam Convention on Pesticides and Industrial Chemicals (1998), and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001). Turning to climate change, the Byrd–Hagel resolution of the US Senate, issued in June 1997, six months prior to the final negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol, is emblematic of this general concern to protect domestic commercial interests. This resolution declared that the Senate would not ratify the protocol if it did not require developing countries to undertake commitments in the same time period as industrialized countries or would result in serious harm to the US economy. This was the basis of the second Bush administration’s repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and it has also formed a plank in the Trump administration’s rejection of the Paris Agreement. Looking for United States Leadership In Part One, it was argued that to establish environmental leadership (in the substantive rather than positional sense) in international diplomacy and multilateral negotiations it is necessary to find evidence of asymmetric influence by the leader in generating the terms of cooperation, building support and negotiating consent in accordance with recognized multilateral processes, and a commitment by the leader to the collective environmental purpose. Looking back over the period from 1970 to 1991, the US’s ozone diplomacy during the 1980s represents the greatest shining moment of US environmental leadership, not the early 1970s. To be sure, the US was certainly a national front runner in the early 1970s, most notably in establishing a national Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which many other states more or less copied, along with the Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ). But as Flippen (2008: 614) has argued, ‘the Nixon administration witnessed the birth of modern American environmental diplomacy’, but ‘it was a breech birth’. This was because the administration used the environment opportunistically as a means to other ends—to win approval and dampen opposition to the Vietnam War, at home and abroad, and as an avenue for GPM. It was no secret that President Nixon cared little for environmental issues, but he found himself presiding over an environmentally active and bipartisan Congress and a period of rising public support for environmental initiatives which he pragmatically recognized would earn him political capital (Soden and Steel, 1999: 347–348). Henry Kissinger, and Russel Train (chair of the CEQ and Nixon’s environmental envoy), saw environmental diplomacy as providing a potential avenue for détente with the Soviet Union, given strong public environmental concern in the US and serious environmental degradation in the Soviet Union (Flippen, 2008: 626). This resulted in the signing of the US–USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection in May 1972, which covered areas such as air and water pollution, animal conservation, and forestry (Flippen, 2008: 626). The Nixon administration also seized on the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment as an opportunity to win favour, and it took steps to ensure the participation of the People’s Republic of China, even though it was not then officially recognized (Flippen, 2008: 626). The primary evidence that is usually cited for US international leadership in the early 1970s is its support for the establishment of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) with a pledge to provide 40% of a $100 million fund to support the fledgling programme. Yet it is noteworthy that the US also objected to the idea of additional funding to support developing countries (Hopgood, 1998: 79), which represented an incipient form of special responsibilities. Moreover, the US’s environmental reputation was tarnished at Stockholm when the host, Olaf Palme, prime minister of Sweden, referred to the US’s use of the defoliant Agent Orange in the Vietnam War as ‘ecocide’ (Flippen, 2008: 631). The US’s strong support for the resolution recommending a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling is also treated as evidence of US leadership, but this resolution subsequently failed to muster a two-thirds majority in the International Whaling Commission. This does not constitute leadership because the US failed to attract the necessary followship. In all, the Nixon administration had the domestic support to do much more on the international stage but it lacked the commitment and it was soon overwhelmed by the Watergate scandal and the energy crisis. In contrast, the US’s ozone diplomacy stands out as the most successful case of diplomatic leadership in relation to the most successful MEA in the post-Second World War period. This was also a case where the US EPA was a clear cooperative front runner at the domestic level in the regulation of ozone-depleting substances and where the US chemical industry was a clear competitive front runner in developing technological substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). These two developments provided the impetus for the US’s energetic diplomatic leadership, which succeed in building support for the CFC phase-out while also preserving the competitive advantage of the US chemical industry. This treaty also pioneered the use of a multilateral fund to assist developing countries while also affording them a longer time period in which to conform to the phase-out, which provided an emergent form of special responsibilities for developed countries. But, unlike the climate negotiations, these responsibilities were uncontroversial since the vast bulk of ozone-depleting substances were manufactured by developed countries. Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA had phased out non-essential CFC aerosols in 1978, making the US a cooperative front runner in protecting the ozone later. Although US CFC producers had initially opposed the EPA’s unilateral domestic phase-out, they changed position once they had devised a technological substitute for CFCs, making the US industry a competitive front runner in the technological race to find alternatives to CFCs. These twin developments provided a strong domestic basis for the US executive to build international support for a phase-out, which would also enable the international ‘export’ or internationalization of its domestic ozone regulations (DeSombre, 2000: 93–94). As Benedick (1991: 55–67) notes, the US campaign utilized its embassies around the world to explain the US negotiating position and build support, beginning with like-minded countries and then reaching out to non-like-minded countries (Benedick, 1991: 55–67). It is no small irony that this leadership occurred under a president who was not known for his environmental sympathies. Indeed, President Reagan presided over a major rollback in domestic environmental regulation and expenditure. However, following the discovery of the ‘hole over Antarctica’ the US State Department, working closely with major CFC producers, such as Dupont and Allied Chemical, as well as the US EPA, mounted a concerted and successful diplomatic campaign to build international consensus for a complete phase out in the production and trade of ozone depleting under the Montreal Protocol 1987 (Benedick, 1991: 55–67; DeSombre, 2000: 93–94). The Reagan administration’s ozone diplomacy clearly qualifies as international environmental leadership because it intentionally and actively built an agreement to further a collective goal (ozone protection). However, when we turn to the US’s role in the development of the climate regime, which contains much more substantial and consequential special responsibilities than the ozone regime, we see significant oscillation. Over the period 1992–2020, the US’s involvement has swung from mere cooperation based on significant concessions (under President Bush senior), to frustrated leadership (under President Clinton), to defection (under President Bush junior), pragmatic leadership (under President Obama), spectacular defection (under President Trump), and, finally, a renewed and strengthened commitment to climate leadership (under President Biden). The Obama administration’s role in the negotiation of the Paris Agreement, which entailed the reinterpretation of CBDR-RC as part of a process of GPM, stands out as a much stronger example of leadership than the Nixon administration’s role at Stockholm and was much more significant and consequential than the diplomacy of the Clinton administration at Kyoto. However, unlike the Reagan administration, this was not a great shining moment, since the Obama administration faced significant domestic opposition and intense international disagreement, so its diplomacy was more constrained and pragmatic. But it clearly qualifies as leadership on the basis of the Obama administration’s expressed commitment to lead, clear evidence of asymmetric influence in shaping the mitigation architecture of the Paris Agreement, and success in building support in ways that were consistent with multilateral practices (unlike the Copenhagen negotiations). Climate change was a legacy issue for President Obama and his secretary of state, John Kerry, and the US provided the largest single contribution to the Green Climate Fund. The idea of nationally determined contributions and a hybrid treaty came from the US (US, 2013: 2), and these ideas were also central to the US’s bilateral diplomacy with China. This diplomacy yielded the crucial joint US–China statement in Beijing in November 2014, which declared both parties’ nationally determined contributions and their commitment to a successful treaty. Indeed, the formula ‘in light of national circumstances’ in the joint statement represented a significant rapprochement on the interpretation of CBDR-RC and found its way into the Paris treaty text. This was followed up with a second joint statement prior to the Paris meeting. The Obama administration’s diplomacy was pragmatic in improvising around domestic and international deadlock by promoting a new agreement that would provide considerable national flexibility to draw in the major emitters, especially China and India, while also including provisions for the deepening of commitment over time. This also required making concessions on the long-term temperature targets (including 1.5 degrees) to the High Ambition Coalition to win the support of the vulnerable states at Paris. However, unlike the ozone negotiations, the US was not a clear cooperative or competitive national front runner in climate performance (although some subnational jurisdictions such as California arguably qualify). Although the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan represented a significant step up from all previous national initiatives, the US’s targets were modest when set against the US’s environmental capabilities and carbon footprint (historical, aggregate, and per capita). Moreover, this plan bypassed a deeply polarized Congress and relied on the president’s existing executive powers to regulate CO2 emissions as a dangerous pollutant under the US Clean Air Act. This had the advantage of avoiding the need for the advice and consent of the Senate, but the strategy also rested on the hope that a future Senate might find the national flexibility of the Paris Agreement acceptable (Wirth, 2016). Finally, an understanding of the US’s climate diplomacy would be incomplete without a critical examination of US energy policy, which has been central to both the economic and security dimensions of US grand strategy. In the same year that the US repudiated the Kyoto Protocol, the Bush–Cheney National Energy Policy responded to shortages in oil and gas by stepping up domestic and international supply (rather than reducing domestic demand), by allowing drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and taking steps to enhance access to overseas supplies, including in the Persian Gulf, to keep oil prices low. Despite the Obama administration’s commitment to action on climate change, it supported an ‘all of the above’ energy strategy, which put no brakes on the steady climb in the domestic production of gas and oil enabled by the technological revolution in hydraulic fracturing. The Trump administration sought to accelerate domestic fossil fuel production, including attempts to revive coal production, which has been in general decline due to the falling price of gas. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the US overtook Russia as the world’s biggest producer of gas in 2011, and in 2018 it overtook Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest petroleum producer. The increase in production in 2018 was declared to be ‘one of the largest absolute petroleum and natural gas production increases from a single country in history’ (EIA, 2019). These developments are deeply inconsistent with the fundamental objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1992) and the temperature targets and long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Leadership Impossible

No US climate leadership—leadership requires attracting followers and working towards collective goals—the US does neither in the environmental arena

Eckersley 22

Robyn, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in the Discipline of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. “Great Expectations: The United States and the Global Environment.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 55-56. LJS

Here we can add one more source of variation for special responsibilities, namely, the degree to which they challenge the existing international order, including the hierarchy of states and the political and economic norms of the order. Historically, special responsibilities have been restricted to great powers and the purpose has been to maintain the peace and stability of the existing order, which entails preserving the status quo. In contrast, special environmental responsibilities seek to promote equitable sustainable development and environmental justice, which entails a degree of redistribution of capabilities and/or entitlements in favour of developing countries. In the climate regime, this is reflected in the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (hereafter CBDR-RC). Although these responsibilities are conferred on developed countries, the US has nonetheless been widely singled out politically by the G77/China and many environmental NGOs as having ‘extra-special responsibilities’ given its significant environmental capacity, its oversized ecological footprint, and especially its historical/cumulative emissions. This offends the US’s free market philosophy of a ‘level playing field’ and places more onerous duties on the US, relative to other developed countries, to take domestic action and assist other countries, which puts it at a relative economic disadvantage to rising powers such as China and India. Throughout the climate negotiations, the US has worked hard to uphold a more restrictive understanding of CBDR-RC by focusing on differences in capacity rather than historical responsibility, drawing attention to where future growth in emissions lies (rising powers, not the US), and generally encouraging a greater diffusion of responsibility that blurs the North–South divide. While the US executive (as distinct from the Senate) has more often than not accepted that developed countries should do more than poorer countries, it has baulked at the idea that they should also go first. Special Responsibilities and Environmental Leadership Distinguished Special Responsibilities did not provide a systematic analysis of the relationship between leadership and special responsibilities. Rather, we simply argued that they are conceptually distinct but may nonetheless sometimes be conjoined (Bukovansky et al., 2012: 60–61). But if special responsibilities and leadership both entail asymmetric roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis larger communities, how then might they be conceptually distinguished? This is no easy task given the wide variety of meanings attached to leadership, but necessary if we are to determine to what extent the US has played an international leadership role as a great power, or merely as developed state. Here I distinguish between two different types of leadership that are most relevant to global environmental governance (Eckersley, 2020). The first is the popular understanding of environmental leaders as those in the vanguard of a performance field. This includes national front runners that go first and/or do more in terms of their environmental ambition, advocacy, policy performance, and/or contributions to multilateral funds. This type of national environmental leadership is positional, judged in terms of the performance standards of the relevant MEA. It includes cooperative front runners who are seeking to induce international cooperation by setting a national example irrespective of whether they succeed in attracting followers. It also includes competitive front runners (such the pioneers in a green technology race) who seek to win at the expense of others but may nonetheless sometimes attract followers. However, as Liefferink and Wurzel have argued (2017: 953), pioneers of this kind are not leaders if they do not intend to attract followers. The second understanding of leadership is substantive rather than positional; it entails a relationship between leaders and followers, based on asymmetric roles and responsibilities, in the pursuit of a collective and shared purpose. It may be conceptualized as a process of interaction whereby one or more actors (the leaders) exercise asymmetric influence in attracting or negotiating the consent or acquiescence of other parties (the followers), either directly or indirectly, in ways that facilitate collective action towards the achievement of a common purpose in a given community. (Eckersley, 2020: 1179–1180) On this account, leadership may be understood as a form of legitimated authority that is marked off from domination or mere success in bargaining because it serves to facilitate and/or expand collective agency in the pursuit of collective goals. What counts as legitimate influence by the leaders and what counts as consent or acquiescence by followers depends on the social and institutional context. To establish leadership in the field of international diplomacy and multilateral negotiations it is necessary to find evidence of asymmetric influence, the building of support by others, the successful negotiation of agreement through recognized channels and a commitment to the collective purpose. This does not necessarily mean that leaders must be purely altruistic (they may fold their own goals into the collective goals), but nor can they be purely self-serving; rather, they must be recognized as committed to the negotiating community’s collective goals (Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, 2015: 449). It should be clear that this account of leadership is agential, not structural; that is, it is understood as an artful practice by the political executive of a state rather than a pre-given attribute of states based on superior capabilities relative to other states in a system or international society (Eckersley, 2020: 1180). While the possession of superior capabilities by a state, and environmental capacities in particular, certainly confers an advantage on their diplomats—and indeed, they raise expectations of diplomatic leadership—this only translates into leadership when the negotiating team is seen as genuinely committed to bringing all parties to an agreement to enable the pursuit of a collective purpose (Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, 2015).

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › US Leadership Impossible

Their authors don’t even understand what environmental leadership is—prefer our historical analysis

Eckersley 22

Robyn, Redmond Barry Distinguished Professor in the Discipline of Political Science, School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, and a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. “Great Expectations: The United States and the Global Environment” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 51-52. LJS

Most analyses of US environmental foreign policy and diplomacy have been organized around the frame of leadership rather than great power responsibility. These analyses generally converge around an overarching narrative of declining leadership, despite variation along the way (Buzan and Falkner, Chapter 2, this volume). Yet there is surprisingly little debate about what exactly constitutes leadership and how the US’s shifting leadership aspirations relate to shifting international expectations of the US’s environmental responsibilities as a great power. This chapter seeks to clarify these conceptual linkages and then revisit the history of US environmental diplomacy since 1970 through this new conceptual framework. Falkner and Buzan (2019: 132) have argued that environmental stewardship has evolved to the point where it is has become a primary institution of global international society (GIS), reflected in ‘a vast network of international environmental regimes and in state-level behavioural and constitutive changes’. However, most of these regimes provide a set of general environmental responsibilities for all states, and only a very small subset of regimes and instruments include special environmental responsibilities for certain states, and these fall along a North–South axis rather than the division between great powers and ‘the rest’ (e.g. Montreal Protocol; Kyoto Protocol; Paris Agreement; Rio Declaration, Principle 7; Sustainable Development Goals, Goal 3; Convention on Biological Diversity). Nonetheless, the US has played a pivotal role in the negotiations of the two most significant regimes that include special environmental responsibilities for developed countries: the ozone regime and the climate regime. These cases provide striking contrasts in the US’s approach, but this chapter argues that they are nonetheless consistent with the more general patterns that have emerged in the US’s relationship to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). One key pattern is that the US has shown considerable reluctance to lead and/or embrace special environmental responsibilities if the MEA obligations challenge the US’s relative economic advantage under the existing international order. Connecting the US’s role as a great power in global environmental governance with US grand strategy and its role in managing the (declining) liberal international order is therefore crucial to understanding the US’s approach to great power management (GPM) in the environmental domain.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Climate Leadership › Leadership is Dead

Leadership is a dead concept—deep pluralism

Buzan & Falkner 22

Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS; Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. “Great Powers and Environmental Responsibilities: A Conceptual Framework.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 19-23. LJS

What do these general thoughts about great powers and GPM tell us about the condition of global international society now (in 2021) and how that will shape the global politics of climate change? Since the global financial crisis that broke in 2007–2008, the relative wealth, power, and cultural and ideological authority of the West, and of the US in particular, have been in decline. The leadership of the US and the UK has been further undermined by the votes for Trump and Brexit in 2016. At the same time, the relative wealth, power, and cultural and ideological authority of what were previously classed as developing countries, and are now talked of as emerging powers, particularly China, but also India and others, have been on the rise. This dual development looks to be pushing the international system/society into a new, and in some ways unprecedented, post-Western structure. It seems quite plausible that this structure will contain no superpowers, several great powers, and many regional powers. As wealth, power, and cultural and ideological authority increasingly diffuse to a wider circle of states and societies, it will become impossible for any country to either hold onto (the US) or acquire (China) the necessary preponderance of wealth and power to be a superpower. Trump burned the global social capital of the US at a prodigious rate, caring nothing for the effects of his policies on the alliances, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and trading arrangements that underpinned US leadership. Some of this damage will be unrecoverable given the uncertainty that now hangs over the polarized character of US domestic politics. In China, Xi Jinping has been pushing the country in a more authoritarian and aggressive direction that scares both its neighbours and many of the other great and regional powers. This argument is of course vulnerable to the ambiguity of these categories established above, but it seems likely that, while the US and China will be primus inter pares, they will not be in an entirely different class from India, the EU, and possibly Russia, Brazil, and Japan. They will be great powers in the sense that their influence extends beyond their own regions, and that they have to be taken into account at the global level, but the world will not be their region, and therefore neither will be a superpower. What is emerging will be novel in a number of respects. Increasingly, power, wealth, and cultural and ideological authority will be wielded by non-Western as well as Western actors (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: chapter 9; Acharya and Buzan, 2019: chapter 9). As the last superpower wanes and emerging powers rise, what is unfolding does not look like classical multipolarity. Certainly, there will be several centres of wealth, power, and cultural and ideological authority, and thus in a sense global international society (GIS) will be multipolar. But there will be many non-state actors in play in this GIS, some of which will wield significant amounts of wealth, power, and authority. States will probably remain the dominant form of actor, but will be much more entangled in webs of global governance than is implied in the term multipolarity. Even just thinking about states, the emerging GIS will still not be multipolar as classically understood because, lacking any superpowers or any aspiring to be superpowers, it will not feature a realist-type struggle for domination of the whole system. Although they are all embedded in a highly interdependent global economy, and a single planetary environment, none wants to, or can, lead or dominate GIS. The US is losing both the will and the legitimacy to do so, and neither Europe nor Japan can fill its shoes. The rising great powers China and India are still developing countries and have neither the capacity, the will, nor the legitimacy to play the hegemon. They still prioritize their own development over their global responsibilities. Indeed, it is an interesting question as to whether the very idea of hegemonic leadership, which has been closely associated with Western hegemony for more than two centuries, will be delegitimized in this emerging system. Various labels have already been put forward to capture the novelty and complexity of this emergent construction: plurilateralism (Cerny, 1993), heteropolarity (der Derian, 2003), no one’s world (Kupchan, 2012), multinodal (Womack, 2014), multiplex (Acharya, 2014), decentred globalism (Buzan, 2011), polymorphic globalism (Katzenstein, 2012), and multi-order world (Flockhart, 2016). Acharya and Buzan (2019: chapter 9) offer the concept of deep pluralism to capture what is now unfolding. They define deep pluralism to mean a diffuse distribution of power, wealth, and cultural and political authority, set within a strongly integrated and interdependent system in which there is a significant move towards a GIS in which both states and non-state actors play substantial roles. Non-state actors range across the spectrum from civil (e.g. Red Cross/Crescent, Médecins Sans Frontières) to uncivil (e.g. Islamic State), with many in between (e.g. Facebook). While power asymmetries remain, it describes a world not only without a global hegemon but in which the very idea of such a role is no longer legitimate. Such a world might feature different economic and political ideologies and systems, including the remnants of the liberal order. This will be a novel system, and not only because we have got used to living in a system with a high concentration of power dominated by superpowers. There has never been a system like the one now emerging in which the density and interdependence of the system is high and rising, but the distribution of wealth and power is relatively diffuse. Power was diffused during pre-modern times, but the density and interdependence of the system at that time was low. Deep pluralism describes where the current momentum of GIS is taking us whether we like it or not. But we also need terms to indicate whether that condition is understood and acted upon in a positive or negative light, and where the scope for agency and policy lie. Contested pluralism means that there is substantial resistance to the material and ideational reality of deep pluralism. This might take various forms: states resisting the roles and standing of non-state actors; formergreat powers and environmental responsibilities 21 superpowers (most obviously the US) refusing to give up their special rights and privileges; great powers refusing to recognize each other’s standing and playing against each other as rivals or enemies. Consensual pluralism means that the main players in GIS not only tolerate the material, cultural, ideological, and actor-type differences of deep pluralism, but also respect and even value them as the foundation for coexistence. Another way of seeing this is that consensual pluralism is about the preservation and/or cultivation of the political and cultural diversity and distinctness that are the legacy of human history, to be valued for its own sake in the same way as biodiversity (Jackson, 2000: 23). It is highly probable that deep pluralism in either form will see a sharp weakening of the homogenizing liberal teleology that has been both an implicit and explicit assumption in much Western thinking about the evolution of the global order. This raises the question of whether GIS will have sufficient cultural and ideological unity to foster deep cooperation on global challenges, such as environmental protection (Falkner and Buzan, 2019). Within this unfolding new structure of deep pluralism the rise of China, India, and other emerging non-Western powers is creating a growing interest in new great powers and their roles and responsibilities in international society (Gaskarth, 2015). A lot of the discussion here focuses on the so-called BRICS group of states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). While BRICS has some actor quality in terms of setting up its own institutions (the BRICS bank), it is otherwise an odd grouping. China is on the brink of being an emerged rather than an emergent power. India is on the borderline between being a big regional power and a small great power, with Brazil further behind on the same track. Russia is not emergent at all, but rather a fallen and declining superpower. South Africa is clearly only a regional power. China and India (and perhaps later Brazil and Indonesia) raise the question of whether countries still classified as ‘developing’ can also be classified as great powers? Since the nineteenth century, being at or near the leading edge of industrialization and modernity have been necessary conditions for great power status (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 240–270). If this condition is breaking down, what are the implications for how we understand both the qualifications for great power status and the rights and responsibilities associated with great power status? As noted, big developing countries such as China and India quite rightly give their own development first priority, and understandably argue that they should not be obliged to burden themselves with global managerial responsibilities. There has been a particular focus on rising China, which is pressured from without to become a more responsible great power and from within to balance the domestic political needs of the Chinese Communist Party with the necessity to engage in a Western-defined global economic order (Jones, 2014). More broadly, there has been interest in how rising powers gain the ‘legitimate’ great power status in ‘recognition games’ (Suzuki, 2008) and some discussions on the legitimacy of power (Reus-Smit, 2014).22 buzan and falkner The exercise of GPM responsibility under deep pluralism will be more diffuse and more complicated than under the relatively concentrated domination of the US over the last few decades. Ideological differentiations mattered during both the interwar and Cold War years, and they may well matter again under deep pluralism, where there will not only be a divide between authoritarians and democracies, but also one between the different civilizational values represented by the US, Europe, Russia, China, India, and the Islamic World. We might anticipate that under deep pluralism the extent and character of great power cooperation/conflict generally will depend on whether deep pluralism is more contested or more consensual. Within that, a great deal will depend on how the great powers respond to the various shared-fate threats, such as climate change and pandemics, that affect them all. Such threats stand outside ideological and cultural framings to a much greater extent than do questions of global economic management or human rights. This ideological neutrality opens a path to the possibility of GPM on a shared-threat functional issue such as climate change, even if deep pluralism, as seems increasingly likely, unfolds in contested form. Diffusion of Capabilities An entirely different complication for great power responsibility and management is raised by the diffusion of some capabilities away from great powers and towards both lesser states and non-state actors. Increasingly, as Cui and Buzan (2016: 207–210) argue, great power responsibility and global governance now overlap, and might even be thought of as merging. In specific issue areas, the ambiguity about what constitutes a ‘great power’ becomes a major problem. Saudi Arabia might be a ‘great power’ in oil and religion, but in general terms only a regional power. Once we get down to energy, disease control, cybersecurity, climate change, and suchlike, the criteria for defining not only great powers but also great power responsibilities may need to be tailored to the specifics of the issue. As we discuss below, the same applies to the field of global environmental protection. And as the convergence of great power responsibility and global governance suggests, in some issue-areas special responsibilities are diffusing not only to actors other than great powers, but to actors other than states. The diffusion of capability and responsibility away from great powers is a very complicated issue. Since it has been set out in detail by Bukovansky et al. (2012), it does not require detailed elaboration here. Great powers have often been ‘great irresponsibles’, making themselves more part of the problem of world order than part of the solution. This paralysis at the top has opened up space for more bottom up forms of global governance involving lesser powers, IGOs, and non-state actors. Great power capabilities might well have been decisive in relation to the classical high politics agenda, but as an ever-wider array of functional, non-military issues great powers and environmental responsibilities 23 has come onto the security agenda, the capabilities of other kinds of actors have become more relevant. In these functionally specific issue-areas, even the capabilities of quite small actors might count as ‘great’. The Ebola crisis of 2014 is an interesting case involving not only great powers but also non-state actors such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and drug companies, whose specialized capabilities made them an essential part of the response to the medical emergency, and IGOs that were important to legitimation and coordination (Cui and Buzan, 2016). This opens the pathway to a quite radical reinterpretation of special responsibilities, which are becoming more widely diffused to a range of actors able to deploy special capabilities in relation to specific issue-areas of global order. This development does not remove great powers from the equation, but it does open up a much more diverse and complicated picture of the relationship between capabilities on the one hand, and special rights and responsibilities on the other.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › REMS Turn Ext

Chinese control over rare earths jeopardizes US hegemony – all military equipment relies on these minerals

Ahmed ’22 [Sayeed; 09/09/2022; Ph.D. in Environmental Management and Internet-based Collaborative Modelling from University of Strathclyde, MEng in Civil Engineering from Asian Institute of Technology, CEO of Bayside Analytix; "US controls advanced chips, but China has another card," Daily Star, https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/us-controls-advanced-chips-china-has-another-card-3115316 //The St. Mark’s School of Texas, Anish Guddati–Class of 2024]

US defence giant Lockheed Martin's highly successful fighter jet F-35 made its maiden flight in 2006. This sleek flying machine is still in operation with variations such as the F-35A (2015), B (2016) and C (2019). Each such jet contains 417kg of "rare earths," an essential material without which its intricate electronics and weaponry would not exist. But it is the US' foremost strategic rival, China, who controls the rare earths' supply. Beijing realised the importance of rare earths as early as in 1992, when Deng Xiaoping said, "The Middle East has oil; China has rare earths."

What are rare earths, exactly? These are 17 nearly indistinguishable lustrous silvery-white soft heavy metals in the Periodic Table, a scientific tabulation of Earth's chemical elements) such as dysprosium, praseodymium and ytterbium. From jets or weaponry, smartphones, hard drives, electric vehicles and LED lights, to wind turbines and petroleum processing – everything depends on these "touchstones." Rare earths provide the magical touch to all these products that power today's advanced economies and cutting-edge technology.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › REMS Turn Ext

Expanded mining and construction to meet Green New Deal goals will cause significant environment devastation

Benson, 20 --- policy analyst in the Government Relations Department at The Heartland Institute (April 14, 2020, Tim Benson, “Mining Expansion Necessary for Green New Deal Would Devastate the Global Environment,” https://heartland.org/opinion/mining-expansion-necessary-for-green-new-deal-would-devastate-the-global-environment/, JMP))

A new Heartland Institute Policy Brief details how the expansion of mining operations for the rare earth minerals needed to scale up “renewable” energy sources to meet the goals of the “Green New Deal” (GND) would cause significant global environmental devastation. In “How the Green New Deal’s Renewable Energy Mining Would Harm Humans and the Environment,” author Paul Driessen explains how if the GND were enacted, an attempt would be made to replace all electricity generation in the United States from fossil fuel and nuclear sources with that generated from wind or solar sources. To replace all these sources, Driessen makes a “conservative” estimate that almost 19 billion solar panels would need to be constructed and installed, covering an area roughly the size of New York and Vermont combined. He also cites a study from researchers at Harvard University that estimates the amount of land needed to power the country by wind energy would be equal to roughly a third of the continental United States. To dramatically ramp up wind and solar electricity generation to this extent would “necessitate an unprecedented worldwide expansion in mining,” says Driessen. “And those mining operations would rely primarily on fossil-fuel-powered heavy equipment, since battery-powered equipment for enormous industrial operations does not exist.” These mining operations would also involve “removing and crushing hundreds of billions of tons of rock and ore, causing major habitat losses and widespread pollution,” according to Driessen. “It would also create serious human health impacts, especially in countries that do not have modern equipment and health and safety protections.” Among these mining operation would be those for rare earth elements (REE) such as dysprosium, indium, neodymium, and tellurium, which are necessary to produce wind turbines or photovoltaic solar panels. However, mining a single ton of these REEs, according to Driessen, produces up to 420,000 cubic feet of toxic gases, 2,600 cubic feet of acidic wastewater, and a ton of radioactive waste. More than 70 percent of the world’s REEs are either mined in China, a totalitarian communist dictatorship with a dismal environmental and human rights record, or by companies under the control of the Chinese Communist Party. Other materials needed to be mined to produce solar panels and wind turbines, as well as to produce the anticipated battery backups systems for these “renewable” sources, include lithium, cobalt, and copper. To store a week’s worth of electricity for the entire country when wind and solar aren’t generating it, Driessen estimates would require “two billion half-ton battery packs similar to those used in Tesla automobiles.” Each of these batteries would require at least 26 pounds of lithium. The cobalt needed for these batteries is mostly mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where more than 40,000 children currently labor in mining operations for pittance wages in unsafe and unhealthy conditions. Copper mining would also have to be dramatically expanded to meet this new GND demand, even though it takes roughly 125,000 pounds of mined, crushed, and refined ore to produce 1,000 pounds of finished copper. Although the United States has proven reserves of these commodities, environmental policy at both the state and federal level have closed off most of these deposits from mining. Therefore, Driessen argues, enacting the GND would increase our dependence for these minerals on China and “other countries that regularly disregard workplace safety, child labor concerns, land reclamation, and pollution controls.” “Wind and sunshine are certainly clean and renewable energy sources but,” Driessen concludes, “the technologies required to harness these intermittent, weather-dependent energies to benefit humanity require raw materials and mining operations that are anything but clean, ‘green,’ renewable, sustainable, or ethical. This fundamental reality can no longer be ignored. GND technologies rely heavily on mineral extraction in someone else’s backyard, often in less-developed countries, where other people and their children do the dirty, dangerous work of providing essential raw materials while suffering from environmental and human degradation.”

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › REMS Turn Ext

The plan would force greater dependence on China AND trigger tradeoffs with military weapons development that rely on rare earth elements

Ernst, 22 --- U.S. Senator from Iowa (5-4-2022, Joni, “DEMOCRATS' GREEN AGENDA RISKS NATIONAL SECURITY,” https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/democrats-green-agenda-risks-national-security, SRB)

Democrats have spent the past year pursuing their radical Green New Deal energy agenda. Now the left is using Russia’s war in Ukraine to try to justify a massive transition to electric vehicles and renewable energy. If enacted, this would significantly increase our dependence on China for certain “critical minerals” and other materials needed for these energy sources. If the left successfully implements its flawed agenda without strengthening supply chains, the United States could become significantly dependent on China for its energy needs. China could use its commanding influence over green energy technology to get its way in the future, just as Russia used its energy to influence Europe not to act prior to the invasion of Ukraine. GROWING DEMAND FOR CRITICAL MINERALS Critical minerals are specific substances identified as being vital to a range of industries including energy, electronics, and the military. Electric vehicles and renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind, require significant amounts of critical minerals. One analysis by several professors from the United Kingdom found that to swap the UK’s 32 million cars with EVs would demand about double the world’s annual output of cobalt, almost all the neodymium, and 75% of the lithium. Comparatively, about eight times as much would be required to convert the entire U.S. fleet of 260 million cars. A 2021 report by the International Energy Agency found that by 2040, anticipated global green energy commitments could increase demand for “rare earth elements,” a subset of critical minerals, by as much as 700%. Demand for nickel could grow by 1,900%, cobalt by 2,100%, and lithium by a staggering 4,200%. These minerals are needed for the development of wind turbines and solar panels, as well as for electric vehicles. These substances also play a key part in our national defense. Construction of each F-35 combat aircraft requires more than 900 pounds of critical minerals. Copper, lead, cobalt, uranium, and a significant amount of other minerals are needed for munitions, armor, and communications gear. Ships, vehicles, and aircraft will continue to require these materials to keep up with advanced technological needs. The problem is acute; the DoD is facing a critical shortage of munitions and the defense industry is having trouble meeting the demand for more advanced weapons. The U.S. military’s stockpile of critical minerals is already shrinking and increased demand will continue to stress those reserves. If we add to the demand for these minerals to make more electric vehicles and solar panels, while not increasing domestic production, we would only make it tougher to meet the need for military applications. In a recent Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing, one defense industry executive discussed how competition from other products has affected his ability to get parts needed to make advanced weapon systems. DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN MINERAL SUPPLIES The problem is not just that Democrats’ plans will increase the demand for these elements. It is also a question of where the materials come from. The pandemic made us all aware of how dependent we are on the global supply chain and what happens in one link of that chain breaks. The supply of critical minerals is no different. The batteries for a typical electric car require 19.6 pounds of lithium, and 58% of the world’s lithium is processed in China. Batteries also require high-quality nickel; almost 20% of global supply is produced by Russia. Russia’s actions in Ukraine demonstrate what can happen when one country controls a large share of the global energy market. European countries have grown dependent on the Russians for much of their oil, natural gas, coal, and other energy supplies. Now they are scrambling to find alternative sources of fuel to heat their homes and fuel their economies. For many of these countries, their dependence was fueled by radical climate policies such as phasing out nuclear power and limiting fracking. Democrats, through their anti-fossil-fuel agenda, have been trying to eliminate America’s ability to produce domestic oil and gas that could help us respond to this kind of shock to the energy markets. Furthermore, the Biden administration’s sanctions provide loopholes to allow for energy transactions until June 24. Democrats have a way to relieve the pressure Russia places on energy markets, mainly by increasing domestic production, but so far they have seemed more interested in pursuing a progressive campaign against energy. Instead of learning a lesson about the danger of depending on other, often antagonistic, countries for critical materials, the Biden administration and Democrats in Congress are pushing an agenda to make things worse. Democrats are actually trying to use Russia’s war in Ukraine to justify their climate goals, while disregarding the fact that we do not have enough of the raw materials necessary to support their pipe dreams and will therefore be forced to rely more on China. Just as the Russians have used energy to influence Europe, the Chinese have already used their command over the critical minerals market to advance their political agenda. In 2010, the Chinese government temporarily stopped all exports of critical minerals to Japan over a diplomatic dispute around a collision at sea, foreshadowing what is to come if the world depends on China for the majority of its energy-related mineral needs.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › REMS Turn- 1NC

US tech leadershop solves every existential risk.

Ash Jain 19, senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he oversees the Atlantic Council’s Democratic Order Initiative and D10 Strategy Forum; and Matthew Kroenig, deputy director for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and associate professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, 10/30/19, “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adapting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System,” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Present-at-the-Recreation.pdf

The system must also be adapted to deal with new issues that were not envisioned when the existing order was designed. Foremost among these issues is emerging and disruptive technology, including AI, additive manufacturing (or 3D printing), quantum computing, genetic engineering, robotics, directed energy, the Internet of things (IOT), 5G, space, cyber, and many others. Like other disruptive technologies before them, these innovations promise great benefits, but also carry serious downside risks. For example, AI is already resulting in massive efficiencies and cost savings in the private sector. Routine tasks and other more complicated jobs, such as radiology, are already being automated. In the future, autonomous weapons systems may go to war against each other as human soldiers remain out of harm’s way.

Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction. The other technologies on this lisgt similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › REMS Turn- 1NC

Renewables deck REMs---collapses U.S. tech leadership.

Grier 18 [Peter Grier, a Washington, D.C., editor for The Christian Science Monitor, is a longtime contributor to Air Force Magazine. His most recent article, “Misplaced Nukes,” appeared in the August 2017 issue. Citing USAF Lt. Col. Justin C. Davey in a 2011 Air War College report, February; "Rare-Earth Uncertainty;" Air Force Magazine; http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2018/February%202018/Rare-Earth-Uncertainty.aspx]

Their names sound as if they are part of some science fiction universe: yttrium, dysprosium, samarium, neodymium. They are rare-earth elements (REEs)—little-known but crucial ingredients in much modern US military aerospace technology. Take lasers. Lockheed Martin is working on a small, high-power laser weapon that the Air Force Research Laboratory wants to test in a tactical fighter aircraft by 2021. Its active gain medium is a flexible optical fiber infused with a rare-earth element such as erbium or neodymium. Rare-earth elements are widely used in strong, permanent magnets impervious to temperature extremes. They are used in fin actuators, in missile guidance, and control systems; disk drive motors installed in aircraft and tanks; satellite communications; and radar and sonar systems. As might be expected given their importance to national security, these elements used to come from the United States. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the US was the global leader in rare-earth mining and production. That is no longer the case. In recent decades China has become the source of 90 to 95 percent of world rare-earth oxides and the producer of a majority of the globe’s strongest rare-earth magnets. Many US officials and lawmakers view this situation with apprehension. They are pushing for solutions that range from stockpiling critical minerals to the development of substitutes and the reopening of key domestic mines. “It’s a very real concern, and it obviously depends on the elements. But we use them for important technologies to keep us all safe,” said CIA Director Mike Pompeo, in response to an inquiry at a May 2017 Senate Intelligence Committee hearing on worldwide threats to the US. The rare-earth element group consists of 17 minerals. Fifteen are from a chemical group known as the lanthanides; scandium and yttrium are the other two. All share similar geochemical characteristics, generally resembling the chemical makeup of aluminum. Their slight differences in atomic structure give them different optical, electrical, metallurgic, and magnetic qualities. That makes them useful for a wide array of industrial applications. Despite their name, rare-earth elements are relatively widespread in the earth’s crust. They are about as abundant as some major metals, such as copper and chrome. Even rare REEs are more common than gold. Their “rarity” stems from that fact that they are found in low concentrations, up to a few hundred parts per million by weight, at most. That makes it difficult and thus expensive to separate them from surrounding substances into useful products. Development and construction of large-scale rare-earth element recovery infrastructure can take a decade or longer. While unfamiliar to most Americans, REEs are vital components for a wide array of industries. Their unusual physical and chemical properties produce valuable effects when small amounts are combined with other minerals. According to a US Geological Survey, yttrium, europium, and terbium are used to make phosphors—substances that emit luminescence—for the flat panel display screens that are ubiquitous in modern electronics. The glass industry is a large user of rare earths for polishing and to provide color and special optical qualities to finished products. Digital camera lenses can be up to 50 percent lanthanum. REEs are used as catalysts in the production of petroleum and in automotive catalytic converters. They help make lighter flints and fluorescent light bulbs. But their fastest-growing use, and the one arguably most important for US national security, is in lightweight, strong, durable magnets. “Exceptionally notable is how REE alloys revolutionized the magnet trade and subsequently enhanced the products of all other businesses relying on that industry,” wrote USAF Lt. Col. Justin C. Davey in a 2011 Air War College report. The magnets, and by extension the elements, are now common in consumer electronics and indispensable for many defense applications. Samarium-cobalt magnets are more resistant to demagnetization than those made from any other material. This quality—called high coercivity—means high temperatures do not make them lose magnetic strength. That makes them the best choice for many military applications, according to Davey. In contrast, neodymium-iron-boron magnets are incredibly strong and light. By weight they are almost 10 times more powerful than traditional ferrite magnets. That makes them ideal for use in the tiny electronic components such as disk drives that have helped make possible decades of computer-driven innovation. The world’s push for renewable energy sources may only increase the demand for non-renewable REE magnets. A Toyota Prius, for example, uses about two pounds of neodymium in its hybrid power system. Wind turbines need lots of neodymium—new models use up to two tons of neodymium magnets. The Department of Defense is not a major user of rare-earth elements, relatively speaking. Defense accounts for about five percent of US consumption, according to a Congressional Research Service background report on the subject. But REEs are integral to a vast array of Pentagon weapons and general equipment. Flat screens and hard drives are pervasive in the military, from office computers to combat aircraft, ships, and vehicles. Missile guidance and control motors and actuators depend on small, powerful rare-earth magnets. If it were not for them, precision-guided weapons such as the satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition would require much bulkier and more expensive hydraulic systems. The generators that produce electrical power for aircraft all contain samarium-cobalt magnets. The stealth technology that produces white noise to help conceal the sound of helicopter rotor blades uses such magnets as well. F-22 tail fins and rudders move due to motors with powerful, miniature REE magnets. Electronic warfare jamming devices use rare-earth materials, as do laser targeting systems and nascent laser weapons. Each stealthy F-35 strike fighter requires 920 pounds of rare-earth material, according to DOD. Each Arleigh Burke DDG-51 destroyer requires 5,200 pounds. An SSN-774 Virginia-class submarine needs 9,200 pounds. The ability of US contractors to quickly make use of technological innovations and translate them into high-quality military systems is a pillar of the nation’s defense. Given that, the Pentagon is likely to become even more dependent in the coming years on high-tech magnets, motors, lasers, computers, and electric-drive systems that use rare-earth materials.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › Renewables Turn – Biomass

Biodiversity loss collapses ecosystems and civilization – extinction

Plumer ‘19

(Brad Plumer, Brad Plumer is a climate reporter specializing in policy and technology efforts to cut carbon dioxide emissions. He has also covered international climate talks and the changing energy landscape in the United States, “Humans Are Speeding Extinction and Altering the Natural World at an ‘Unprecedented’ Pace”, New York Times, May 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/climate/humans-are-speeding-extinction-and-altering-the-natural-world-at-an-unprecedented-pace.html) OC

Humans are transforming Earth’s natural landscapes so dramatically that as many as one million plant and animal species are now at risk of extinction, posing a dire threat to ecosystems that people all over the world depend on for their survival, a sweeping new United Nations assessment has concluded. The 1,500-page report, compiled by hundreds of international experts and based on thousands of scientific studies, is the most exhaustive look yet at the decline in biodiversity across the globe and the dangers that creates for human civilization. A summary of its findings, which was approved by representatives from the United States and 131 other countries, was released Monday in Paris. The full report is set to be published this year. Its conclusions are stark. In most major land habitats, from the savannas of Africa to the rain forests of South America, the average abundance of native plant and animal life has fallen by 20 percent or more, mainly over the past century. With the human population passing 7 billion, activities like farming, logging, poaching, fishing and mining are altering the natural world at a rate “unprecedented in human history.” At the same time, a new threat has emerged: Global warming has become a major driver of wildlife decline, the assessment found, by shifting or shrinking the local climates that many mammals, birds, insects, fish and plants evolved to survive in. When combined with the other ways humans are damaging the environment, climate change is now pushing a growing number of species, such as the Bengal tiger, closer to extinction. As a result, biodiversity loss is projected to accelerate through 2050, particularly in the tropics, unless countries drastically step up their conservation efforts. The report is not the first to paint a grim portrait of Earth’s ecosystems. But it goes further by detailing how closely human well-being is intertwined with the fate of other species. “For a long time, people just thought of biodiversity as saving nature for its own sake,” said Robert Watson, chair of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, which conducted the assessment at the request of national governments. “But this report makes clear the links between biodiversity and nature and things like food security and clean water in both rich and poor countries.”

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › Renewables Turn – Biomass

Turn: The Plan causes a shift to biomass, exacerbating the climate crisis

Michael Grunwald ’21- a senior staff writer for POLITICO Magazine and editor-at-large of The Agenda.

"The ‘Green Energy’ That Might Be Ruining the Planet," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/03/26/biomass-carbon-climate-politics-477620 - MG

Nevertheless, the global transition away from fossil fuels has sparked a boom in the U.S. wood-pellet industry, which has built 23 mills throughout the South over the past decade, and is relentlessly trying to brand itself as a 21st-century green energy business. Its basic argument is that the carbon released while trees are burning shouldn’t count because it’s eventually offset by the carbon absorbed while other trees are growing. That is also currently the official position of the U.S. government, along with many other governments around the world. In documentaries, lawsuits and the teenage activist Greta Thunberg’s spirited Twitter feed, critics of the industry have suggested an alternative climate strategy: Let trees grow and absorb carbon, then don’t burn them. Deforestation is a major driver of climate change, and the United Nations climate panel has warned that the world needs to end it worldwide to meet the ambitious Paris emissions targets for 2050. In February, more than 500 scientists and economists wrote to President Joe Biden and other leaders to warn that converting wood into power is a carbon disaster, a forest destroyer and an absurdly inefficient way to generate energy. Supplying just 2 percent more global energy from biomass, they estimated, would require doubling total global wood harvests. The letter made it clear that any governments that encourage biomass electricity will be ravaging biodiverse forests and damaging humanity’s chances to avert the worst climate catastrophes. “Trees are more valuable alive than dead,” the letter said. The Trump administration’s industry-friendly Environmental Protection Agency declared biomass power inherently carbon neutral, although it never finalized a rule to that effect. Congress passed a similar decree in an unrelated 2020 budget bill. It’s not yet clear whether Biden will maintain the status quo, or whether he’ll deem biomass power inconsistent with his larger climate push. Biden’s top climate advisor, Gina McCarthy, was the head of President Barack Obama’s EPA when it flirted with endorsing the industry’s claims of carbon neutrality. But the agency ultimately took no action, and sources close to McCarthy believe her later experience running the anti-biomass Natural Resources Defense Council made her anti-biomass as well. However, Biden’s Agriculture secretary, Tom Vilsack, strongly endorsed biomass power while serving in the same job under Obama, and his deputy chief of staff, Robert Bonnie, recently co-authored an op-ed defending it as a climate solution. The key player may be Biden’s EPA administrator, Michael Regan, who ran North Carolina’s Department of Environmental Quality when it approved multiple permits for pellet mills, including an expansion of a sprawling facility here in Northampton County that ships wood to the world’s largest biomass plant, in England. But Regan has also suggested that he’s personally skeptical of biomass power; he helped craft a bold clean energy plan for North Carolina that excluded biomass despite aggressive lobbying by industry interests. A Biden spokesman declined comment, saying the administration isn’t ready to take a position yet. Unlike wind, solar or energy efficiency, biomass has not been touted as a core element of the president’s vision for a zero-emissions power sector by 2035. Still, the European experience shows that general policies to promote renewables can spark a massive shift to wood-burning if biomass isn’t specifically excluded. Things can change fast.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › Renewables Turn – Class

The Push for renewables is immoral – It neglects the poor in America and abroad who rely on Oil and gas for their energy needs, taking that away would mean mass death, especially in the global South

Clemente 19 Jude Clemente - I am Principal at JTC Energy Research Associates, LLC. I hold a B.A. in International Relations from Penn State University, with a minor in Statistical Analysis. I got my M.S. in Homeland Security from San Diego State University, with a focus on Energy Security, and an MBA from St. Francis University, with a focus on Energy Economics. “Five Practical Problems For The 'Green New Deal,” Forbes, Apr 29, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2019/04/29/five-practical-problems-for-the-green-new-deal/?sh=6acfb9f3e8a1 ///Mgal

Developing Nations Howard Schultz is right, the Green New Deal is “immoral,” but for more than he offered The most telling part of “the value of fossil fuels” is that they supply over 80% of the energy used in the richest nations on Earth with the healthiest people. It’s statistically proven: those nations using the most fossil fuels are more educated, make more money, and live much longer than those using the least. This can’t be stressed enough: it's the countries that DON’T use many fossil fuels that are the poorest and the least healthy. It never gets mentioned that 6 in every 7 humans alive today live in undeveloped nations, lacking proper access to the reliable and affordable energy needed to growth their economies. The sad unintended consequence of the focus only on climate is that it has made life-shortening “energy poverty” a forgotten calamity. Half of the world or more doesn’t have proper access to electricity, the foundation of a modern society. Nearly 17,300 children die each day from preventable causes, enabled by a lack of energy. Tragically, all of this has now become an afterthought. As opposed to some grand “Koch conspiracy,” there are both cost and physical explanations for why wind and solar account for only 3% of global energy supply. The World Bank, International Energy Agency, and other leaders have stood opposed to the unfairness of blocking fossil fuels from poor nations, which is why they strongly support major investments in carbon capture. Sinking Other Investments Oil and gas supply 60% of the world’s energy, and their ongoing importance is obvious: hundreds of billions of dollars each year are being invested in producing and transporting them. These are some of the leading companies in the world, surely not foolish enough to be investing so heavily in energy development that won’t be needed. Case in point came this past week when Occidental Petroleum’s $57 billion counteroffer to Chevron’s $52 billion bid to buy Anadarko Petroleum. Mutual funds are full of oil and gas companies because they are good investments: “Public pension funds must not divest from reality.” Oil and gas are not stranded but required assets. Our own DOE has them still supplying over half of U.S. energy through at least 2050. Thus, trying to sink investment in domestic supply will only serve the rest of the nation like it has California (reliance on OPEC oil) and New England (reliance on Russian gas). Not to mention the jobs and huge tax revenues provided for states. The U.S. oil and gas business, for instance, supports 10.3 million jobs: “Support Your Local Oil and Natural Gas Company.” Fossil Fuel Inputs It’s truly the ultimate irony of the anti-fossil fuel push. Oil, gas, and coal are so entrenched in our immense energy complex that when you are doing pretty much anything, you are relying on them. To illustrate, petro-chemicals are the building blocks of our clothing, plastics, and thousands of other products that we use every day, ensuring that we will need oil for as far as the eye can see. Even electric cars, which are only selling a few hundred thousand a year (as compared to a U.S. oil-based fleet of 250 million), require lots more gas and coal.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › Renewables Turn – Class

Renewables expensive and cause temporary job losses – prefer timeframe

Bernhard 22 – [Adrienne, freelance writer, "How limitless green energy would change the world," BBC, 10/06/2022, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20221006-what-would-happen-if-we-had-limitless-green-energy] /jsam

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), electricity demand is set to grow by 40-60% in some regions in the next 10 years. Researchers predict that mounting prosperity in both the developed and the developing world will continue to drive increased consumer demand for key resources up to at least 2040. At the same time, constraints in energy, water and other natural resources will bring about new and difficult-to-manage instabilities. Current electricity generation – primarily by fossil fuels – is the single biggest contributor to climate change, responsible for 30% of all greenhouse gas emissions. Green energy could thus represent a radical deviation from business-as-usual, promising a path towards zero-carbon emissions and international energy independence. Without the concerted efforts of policymakers, investors and citizens, however, limitless green energy could also lead to a world of increased waste and shortages. "Green energy may be limitless, but certainly not limitless without cost," says Victor B Flatt, professor of environmental law and head of the Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Legal Center at the University of Houston. From the enormous capital outlay required to build renewable power plants – or convert existing ones – to the marketing investments needed to incentivise its use to the emissions-emitting extraction processes needed for new infrastructure, free green energy comes at a high price. There are no perfect answers. What will be required in the years ahead is a diverse and flexible mix of energy solutions – what Bill Gates calls a "Swiss army knife of energy tools." Carbon-free energy certainly promises tantalising benefits: total electrification of transport, emissions-free heating and cooling systems to power our homes and businesses, greener fertiliser for our farmlands. If we can manage to produce it, we might also need to use supplementary sources of fusion power. Developing efficient and sustainable methods of burning biomass, and converting methane from crops and sewage, would help to increase our green fuel supply, but we would also need to reduce our total energy and explore ways to turn climate policy into concrete, enforceable action. As parts of the world begin to wean off fossil fuels, our current fuel supply would become cheaper and cheaper, says Flatt. Oil-rich countries, eager to sell their last barrels to developing nations, would drive the price down further, slowly eliminating liquid-fuel economies. "If green energy is more competitive than fossil fuels, people will move in that direction," says Flatt. "But real-world constraints will start to take over." Traditional power plants will play a smaller role as decarbonisation objectives and national mandates require their reduced use. Simultaneously, a robust infrastructure of variable renewables plants will become absolutely crucial. These plants will need to be built over a large geographical area in order to ensure minimal power interruption – if it's a grey, windless day in Dublin, electricity might need to be channeled from as far away as Oslo, for example. This boom in manufacturing will likely lead to stable, long-term job creation – a net positive – but could also mean temporary job losses in other sectors, such as coal.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › Renewables Fail

Renewables bad – environmental degradation and fossil fuel emissions

Bernhard 22 – [Adrienne, freelance writer, "How limitless green energy would change the world," BBC, 10/06/2022, ] /jsam

If corporations make the switch to carbon-neutral energy, however, they will also put indirect pressure on land already scarce from competing uses, urbanisation and industrial development, because more renewables plants will need to be built to satisfy demand. This, in turn, will put added stress on the planet: many renewable energy forms or their manufacturing processes emit greenhouse gases such as CO2 or methane into the air, because they rely on minerals (cobalt, lithium, and other rare-earth metals) that can currently only be extracted or built with the aid of fossil fuels. Extraction also has significant potential to irreparably destroy native animal and plant life habitats. In other words, limitless green energy could actually be harmful to the environment in the short-term. Yet renewables ultimately have the power to reduce or reverse our carbon output and eliminate millions of deaths caused by pollution each year, making the decision to switch one of the most pressing issues of our time.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › Renewables Fail

Renewables unreliable and expensive

Bernhard 22 – [Adrienne, freelance writer, "How limitless green energy would change the world," BBC, 10/06/2022, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20221006-what-would-happen-if-we-had-limitless-green-energy] /jsam

Another formidable constraint is that green energy is notoriously unreliable. Hydropower requires enough rain to propel a constant supply of flowing water and can wreak havoc on native aquatic species and their ecosystems. Solar photovoltaic panels need clear skies and sunshine to harness photons of light required to generate electricity. Variable renewables are power generators that depend on the availability of intermittent resources; they therefore require complementary technologies to ensure that the balance between supply and demand is maintained at all times – even during seasonal changes or worst-case scenarios. Limitless green energy would almost certainly give rise to innovative methods to use and store energy cheaply and efficiently, but creating a permanent surplus of power may not be economical at scale. "There will be times when we will have more energy than we actually need in particular places," says Richard Green, professor of sustainable energy business at Imperial College Business School in London. "Finding ways to use that extra energy at those times is a great idea, but not predictable enough for people to plan their lives around." As such, traditional modes of power could still be needed in limited supply, so that if we are short of green electricity there's a stopgap measure. Increasing shares of variable renewable energy mean that power systems will likely become more flexible. Of course, demand needs to be flexible as well. "Either people are paying a subscription – a bit like a phone plan where you get free energy up to a certain amount," explains Green, "or it's a pay-as-you go model." Uber's surge pricing might look comparatively generous. "The price would have to go through the roof part of the year, whenever there is a shortage of wind or sunlight." The question of green energy demand won't be limited to households, of course, but would extend to businesses and corporations, particularly tech companies – some of the biggest consumers of electricity. Data centres at leading tech giants such as Amazon, Google, Facebook and Microsoft already require dozens of terawatt hours (a unit equal to one billion kilo-watt hours of electricity) a year to keep their servers cool. As the rise of artificial intelligence and machine learning exacts more computing power, that figure will only increase. Private investments could further accelerate new technologies and change the economics for large companies to deploy them.

2023 CNDI Negative
Neg – Climate Change Adv › At: Renewables Key › Renewables Fail

Renewables empirically fail – too much space, inefficient, inconsistent, and outpaced by natural gas in every way

Clemente 19 Jude Clemente - I am Principal at JTC Energy Research Associates, LLC. I hold a B.A. in International Relations from Penn State University, with a minor in Statistical Analysis. I got my M.S. in Homeland Security from San Diego State University, with a focus on Energy Security, and an MBA from St. Francis University, with a focus on Energy Economics. “Five Practical Problems For The 'Green New Deal,” Forbes, Apr 29, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2019/04/29/five-practical-problems-for-the-green-new-deal/?sh=6acfb9f3e8a1 ///Mgal

Spacing Modern wind and solar farms require huge swaths of land. Giant windmills, for instance, get spaced a half-mile apart or more. Since “density is green,” this lowers their “green credentials,” while making compact modern natural gas plants, for instance, more environmentally sound. The 550 MW Topaz Solar Farm in California occupies 4,600 football fields worth of land. In contrast, the state’s 850 MW gas-powered Delta Energy Center takes up about 15 football fields (20 acres). These unintended consequences of renewables can’t be ignored. Harvard study: “Wide-scale US wind power could cause significant warming.” This spacing issue for wind and solar coincides with their underreported “sweet spot problem.” Not all locations have the same prospects for renewables, justifying why wind-deprived southeastern states haven't installed Renewable Portfolio Standards. The Midwest, for instance, is great for wind but building the hundreds of miles of high-voltage power lines to connect distant consuming areas has proven as difficult and costly as it sounds. Ultimately, the number of places to put a big wind and solar farm is finite, which is why the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) actually projects that gas will add nearly 10 times more generation capacity than wind and 34% more than solar additions in the decades ahead. With prospects based on geography, it’s as obvious as you think: wind and solar builds will be forced to flatten out at some point. Intermittency The reality is that wind and solar power are usually only available some 30% of the time, as DOE shows. California’s giant Alta Wind Energy Center, for instance, has an average capacity factor of just 24%, meaning that 76% of the time it is not producing the electricity that it could be. It is typically a peaking natural gas plant that compensates for the intermittency of Mother Nature. In fact, this gas backup is an added practical cost (from both a money and environmental perspective) for wind and solar that usually doesn’t get factored into their cost analysis, making them appear cheaper in studies than reality ultimately proves out. Now we know that storage batteries are advancing to help this intermittency problem for wind and solar, but large-scale batteries have been promised to us for decades. MIT Technology Review puts it bluntly: batteries are “far too expensive to play a major role.” And remember that wind and solar are strictly sources of electricity, meaning that they only compete in ~40% of our total energy demand market.