Barry, Professor Emeritus at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS; Robert, Associate Professor of International Relations and Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment at the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK. “Great Powers and Environmental Responsibilities: A Conceptual Framework.” Great Powers, Climate Change, and Global Environmental Responsibilities. Pg 19-23. LJS
What do these general thoughts about great powers and GPM tell us about the condition of global international society now (in 2021) and how that will shape the global politics of climate change? Since the global financial crisis that broke in 2007–2008, the relative wealth, power, and cultural and ideological authority of the West, and of the US in particular, have been in decline. The leadership of the US and the UK has been further undermined by the votes for Trump and Brexit in 2016. At the same time, the relative wealth, power, and cultural and ideological authority of what were previously classed as developing countries, and are now talked of as emerging powers, particularly China, but also India and others, have been on the rise. This dual development looks to be pushing the international system/society into a new, and in some ways unprecedented, post-Western structure. It seems quite plausible that this structure will contain no superpowers, several great powers, and many regional powers. As wealth, power, and cultural and ideological authority increasingly diffuse to a wider circle of states and societies, it will become impossible for any country to either hold onto (the US) or acquire (China) the necessary preponderance of wealth and power to be a superpower. Trump burned the global social capital of the US at a prodigious rate, caring nothing for the effects of his policies on the alliances, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and trading arrangements that underpinned US leadership. Some of this damage will be unrecoverable given the uncertainty that now hangs over the polarized character of US domestic politics. In China, Xi Jinping has been pushing the country in a more authoritarian and aggressive direction that scares both its neighbours and many of the other great and regional powers. This argument is of course vulnerable to the ambiguity of these categories established above, but it seems likely that, while the US and China will be primus inter pares, they will not be in an entirely different class from India, the EU, and possibly Russia, Brazil, and Japan. They will be great powers in the sense that their influence extends beyond their own regions, and that they have to be taken into account at the global level, but the world will not be their region, and therefore neither will be a superpower. What is emerging will be novel in a number of respects. Increasingly, power, wealth, and cultural and ideological authority will be wielded by non-Western as well as Western actors (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: chapter 9; Acharya and Buzan, 2019: chapter 9). As the last superpower wanes and emerging powers rise, what is unfolding does not look like classical multipolarity. Certainly, there will be several centres of wealth, power, and cultural and ideological authority, and thus in a sense global international society (GIS) will be multipolar. But there will be many non-state actors in play in this GIS, some of which will wield significant amounts of wealth, power, and authority. States will probably remain the dominant form of actor, but will be much more entangled in webs of global governance than is implied in the term multipolarity. Even just thinking about states, the emerging GIS will still not be multipolar as classically understood because, lacking any superpowers or any aspiring to be superpowers, it will not feature a realist-type struggle for domination of the whole system. Although they are all embedded in a highly interdependent global economy, and a single planetary environment, none wants to, or can, lead or dominate GIS. The US is losing both the will and the legitimacy to do so, and neither Europe nor Japan can fill its shoes. The rising great powers China and India are still developing countries and have neither the capacity, the will, nor the legitimacy to play the hegemon. They still prioritize their own development over their global responsibilities. Indeed, it is an interesting question as to whether the very idea of hegemonic leadership, which has been closely associated with Western hegemony for more than two centuries, will be delegitimized in this emerging system. Various labels have already been put forward to capture the novelty and complexity of this emergent construction: plurilateralism (Cerny, 1993), heteropolarity (der Derian, 2003), no one’s world (Kupchan, 2012), multinodal (Womack, 2014), multiplex (Acharya, 2014), decentred globalism (Buzan, 2011), polymorphic globalism (Katzenstein, 2012), and multi-order world (Flockhart, 2016). Acharya and Buzan (2019: chapter 9) offer the concept of deep pluralism to capture what is now unfolding. They define deep pluralism to mean a diffuse distribution of power, wealth, and cultural and political authority, set within a strongly integrated and interdependent system in which there is a significant move towards a GIS in which both states and non-state actors play substantial roles. Non-state actors range across the spectrum from civil (e.g. Red Cross/Crescent, Médecins Sans Frontières) to uncivil (e.g. Islamic State), with many in between (e.g. Facebook). While power asymmetries remain, it describes a world not only without a global hegemon but in which the very idea of such a role is no longer legitimate. Such a world might feature different economic and political ideologies and systems, including the remnants of the liberal order. This will be a novel system, and not only because we have got used to living in a system with a high concentration of power dominated by superpowers. There has never been a system like the one now emerging in which the density and interdependence of the system is high and rising, but the distribution of wealth and power is relatively diffuse. Power was diffused during pre-modern times, but the density and interdependence of the system at that time was low. Deep pluralism describes where the current momentum of GIS is taking us whether we like it or not. But we also need terms to indicate whether that condition is understood and acted upon in a positive or negative light, and where the scope for agency and policy lie. Contested pluralism means that there is substantial resistance to the material and ideational reality of deep pluralism. This might take various forms: states resisting the roles and standing of non-state actors; formergreat powers and environmental responsibilities 21 superpowers (most obviously the US) refusing to give up their special rights and privileges; great powers refusing to recognize each other’s standing and playing against each other as rivals or enemies. Consensual pluralism means that the main players in GIS not only tolerate the material, cultural, ideological, and actor-type differences of deep pluralism, but also respect and even value them as the foundation for coexistence. Another way of seeing this is that consensual pluralism is about the preservation and/or cultivation of the political and cultural diversity and distinctness that are the legacy of human history, to be valued for its own sake in the same way as biodiversity (Jackson, 2000: 23). It is highly probable that deep pluralism in either form will see a sharp weakening of the homogenizing liberal teleology that has been both an implicit and explicit assumption in much Western thinking about the evolution of the global order. This raises the question of whether GIS will have sufficient cultural and ideological unity to foster deep cooperation on global challenges, such as environmental protection (Falkner and Buzan, 2019). Within this unfolding new structure of deep pluralism the rise of China, India, and other emerging non-Western powers is creating a growing interest in new great powers and their roles and responsibilities in international society (Gaskarth, 2015). A lot of the discussion here focuses on the so-called BRICS group of states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). While BRICS has some actor quality in terms of setting up its own institutions (the BRICS bank), it is otherwise an odd grouping. China is on the brink of being an emerged rather than an emergent power. India is on the borderline between being a big regional power and a small great power, with Brazil further behind on the same track. Russia is not emergent at all, but rather a fallen and declining superpower. South Africa is clearly only a regional power. China and India (and perhaps later Brazil and Indonesia) raise the question of whether countries still classified as ‘developing’ can also be classified as great powers? Since the nineteenth century, being at or near the leading edge of industrialization and modernity have been necessary conditions for great power status (Buzan and Lawson, 2015: 240–270). If this condition is breaking down, what are the implications for how we understand both the qualifications for great power status and the rights and responsibilities associated with great power status? As noted, big developing countries such as China and India quite rightly give their own development first priority, and understandably argue that they should not be obliged to burden themselves with global managerial responsibilities. There has been a particular focus on rising China, which is pressured from without to become a more responsible great power and from within to balance the domestic political needs of the Chinese Communist Party with the necessity to engage in a Western-defined global economic order (Jones, 2014). More broadly, there has been interest in how rising powers gain the ‘legitimate’ great power status in ‘recognition games’ (Suzuki, 2008) and some discussions on the legitimacy of power (Reus-Smit, 2014).22 buzan and falkner The exercise of GPM responsibility under deep pluralism will be more diffuse and more complicated than under the relatively concentrated domination of the US over the last few decades. Ideological differentiations mattered during both the interwar and Cold War years, and they may well matter again under deep pluralism, where there will not only be a divide between authoritarians and democracies, but also one between the different civilizational values represented by the US, Europe, Russia, China, India, and the Islamic World. We might anticipate that under deep pluralism the extent and character of great power cooperation/conflict generally will depend on whether deep pluralism is more contested or more consensual. Within that, a great deal will depend on how the great powers respond to the various shared-fate threats, such as climate change and pandemics, that affect them all. Such threats stand outside ideological and cultural framings to a much greater extent than do questions of global economic management or human rights. This ideological neutrality opens a path to the possibility of GPM on a shared-threat functional issue such as climate change, even if deep pluralism, as seems increasingly likely, unfolds in contested form. Diffusion of Capabilities An entirely different complication for great power responsibility and management is raised by the diffusion of some capabilities away from great powers and towards both lesser states and non-state actors. Increasingly, as Cui and Buzan (2016: 207–210) argue, great power responsibility and global governance now overlap, and might even be thought of as merging. In specific issue areas, the ambiguity about what constitutes a ‘great power’ becomes a major problem. Saudi Arabia might be a ‘great power’ in oil and religion, but in general terms only a regional power. Once we get down to energy, disease control, cybersecurity, climate change, and suchlike, the criteria for defining not only great powers but also great power responsibilities may need to be tailored to the specifics of the issue. As we discuss below, the same applies to the field of global environmental protection. And as the convergence of great power responsibility and global governance suggests, in some issue-areas special responsibilities are diffusing not only to actors other than great powers, but to actors other than states. The diffusion of capability and responsibility away from great powers is a very complicated issue. Since it has been set out in detail by Bukovansky et al. (2012), it does not require detailed elaboration here. Great powers have often been ‘great irresponsibles’, making themselves more part of the problem of world order than part of the solution. This paralysis at the top has opened up space for more bottom up forms of global governance involving lesser powers, IGOs, and non-state actors. Great power capabilities might well have been decisive in relation to the classical high politics agenda, but as an ever-wider array of functional, non-military issues great powers and environmental responsibilities 23 has come onto the security agenda, the capabilities of other kinds of actors have become more relevant. In these functionally specific issue-areas, even the capabilities of quite small actors might count as ‘great’. The Ebola crisis of 2014 is an interesting case involving not only great powers but also non-state actors such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and drug companies, whose specialized capabilities made them an essential part of the response to the medical emergency, and IGOs that were important to legitimation and coordination (Cui and Buzan, 2016). This opens the pathway to a quite radical reinterpretation of special responsibilities, which are becoming more widely diffused to a range of actors able to deploy special capabilities in relation to specific issue-areas of global order. This development does not remove great powers from the equation, but it does open up a much more diverse and complicated picture of the relationship between capabilities on the one hand, and special rights and responsibilities on the other.