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2023 ENDI Counterplan
ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan › 1NC Shell - Interstate Compacts

Interstate compacts on fiscal redistribution work better than the federal government

Chris Edwards, 19. Kilts Family Chair in Fiscal Studies at the Cato Institute and is the editor of Down​siz​ing​Gov​ern​ment​.org. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. “Fiscal Federalism.” May 20, 2019. https://www.downsizinggovernment.org/fiscal-federalism

Economists who support federal aid point to two main advantages. They argue that aid may address externalities or spillovers that states may impose on one another and that redistribution is better carried out by the central government. See Wallace E. Oates, "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature 37, no. 3 (September 1999): 1120–49. But to properly address spillover effects, federal planners would need detailed local information that they usually do not have, and they would need to be guided by the public interest, not political pressures. Experience over the past century shows that aid programs are generally not created and designed to address spillovers. Also note that many actual spillovers, such as those relating to interstate water resources, can be handled by interstate compacts rather than federal programs. Regarding redistribution, aid programs do not redistribute resources to low-income states in many cases, even if that were a good idea. On these two theoretical advantages of aid, the ACIR concluded in a major 1981 study on federalism, "The record indicates that federal aid programs have never consistently transferred income to the poorest jurisdictions or individuals. Neither do most existing grants accord with the prescriptions of ‘externality theory.' " Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth," no. A-86, June 1981, p. 94. And see pp. 53, 54. Finally, note that any possible advantages of aid need to be balanced by the disadvantages, as discussed in this study. A thorough, cross-country examination of the pros and cons of aid is in Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah, Fiscal Federalism: Principles and Practice of Multiorder Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

2023 ENDI Counterplan
ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan › 1NC Shell - Devolve

The counterplan solves the case and avoids the federalism DA

Stephen Moore, 04. Senior Fellow, IPI Center for Economic Growth. “Putting Taxpayers First: A Federal Budget Plan to Benefit the Next Generation of American Taxpayers.” Institute for Policy Innovation, Policy Report 174, February 2004, https://www.ipi.org/docLib/PR174-PuttingTaxpayersFirst.pdf-OpenElement.pdf

Step 3. Devolve federal education, transportation and health and welfare programs to the states.

Our federalist system is based on the sound principle that states should be “laboratories of democracy” and that through competition, experimentation and innovation states would learn from one another and adopt best policy practices. This was the type of governmental system our founding fathers envisioned for the United States. The too-often forgotten and neglected 10th amendment of the U.S. Constitution grants all authority not specifically designated to the federal government to the “states and the people.” There are 3 areas in particular that the federal government ought to devolve down to the states: education, transportation, and welfare. Education U.S. education policy has been the primary responsibility of the states and localities for at least 150 years. In fact, the word “education” is nowhere to be found in the U.S. Constitution. School funding was never envisioned as a congressional responsibility. Institute for Policy Innovation: Policy Report #179 15 Since 1996 not a single federal program of any fiscal consequence has actually been eliminated. Not one. Efforts to end the federal role in education, which began on a widespread scale in the late 1970s, have been undermined by the left’s effective response that to cut federal education funding is an assault against America’s public schools and the children who attend them. But there is almost no factual basis for this attack. Federal funding of the schools has not had any measurable impact on student achievement. In fact, the evidence suggests that the school system in America produced better results before the federal government intervened into education policy. There are signs that the federal money is more of a hindrance than a help to improving schools. Despite the fact that the federal government still only accounts for about 10 percent of school funding, well over half of the most expensive regulations imposed on schools are generated in Washington, D.C., not at the state and local levels. In any case, Washington now spends $60 billion a year and there is little support in Congress for retreating from that level of support. In fact, the cost of these programs is expected to increase by another $11 billion over the next five years at the insistence of the Republicans in Congress. The best solution would be to abolish this spending, cut taxes commensurately, and let the states deal with the consequences. But realistically the best we could hope for is a policy alternative that is “pro-education” but at the same time returns much of the funding responsibility for the schools to the states, cities, and local school districts. Toward this end, Congress should end all federal education spending programs and divert $40 billion a year to funding a universal education tax credit. This $1,000 tax credit should be made available to all individuals. For families with school-aged children, the credit should be refundable, meaning that every family would be eligible. For families without children, the credit could be counted against donations to scholarship programs to allow lower income children to select better schools. These funds could be used for tuition, tutoring, and purchasing school supplies. The plan could be expanded to allow businesses to qualify for a $5,000 education tax credit. The credit would offset up to $5,000 of funds that the business donated to school scholarship programs. This approach would remove federal direct interference with schools, but would enhance the principle of increasing parental choice in education. There is compelling evidence that support for such an education tax credit system is far more popular with voters than a voucher program, which uses direct government money for private and even religious schools. A tax credit program incites few of those “separation of church and state” objections. The education tax credit is also generally consistent with the goals of tax reform. Any consumption based tax system must regard educational expenditures as at least part investment, which should be ideally exempt from tax. Transportation The original rationale for the U.S. Department of Transportation was to build the interstate highway system. That was a legitimate federal function, since all U.S. citizens benefit from a coordinated network of interstate highways. But the interstate highway system was completed almost 20 years ago. The vast majority of DOT funds are now spent on non-interstate highways, local roads, and urban transit systems. It makes no sense to collect the federal gasoline tax, send it to Washington, D.C., pass it through a federal bureaucratic maze at DOT with 50,000 workers, and then send it back to the states where the funds originated. In transportation policy, the federal government has become a costly and meddlesome middleman. Until 1996, states were forced to comply with a federal 55 mile an hour speed limit in order to get back their 16 Putting Taxpayers First A Federal Budget Plan To Benefit The Next Generation Of American Taxpayers The U.S. Department of Education’s funding over the past 25 years has actually been negatively associated with test scores and school performance. About half of all federal agencies cannot pass a basic audit that all businesses must undertake. gas tax revenues from Washington. It was the federal government that mandated airbags. Federal highway funds come with other federal strings that inflate construction costs: the Davis-Bacon Act (requiring union wages on federal highway projects); minority set-aside programs; and buy-America provisions. These add about 30 percent to the cost of federal construction projects and thus contribute to the decay of America’s public infrastructure. Moreover, increasingly Congress uses the DOT budget as a pot of money to deliver pork barrel projects that states would rarely fund if they were spending their taxpayers’ own money. No single bill exemplified this GOP infatuation with pork more than the 1998 highway bill. This six-year, $214 billion bill drafted by House Transportation Committee Chairman Bud Shuster was the most expensive public works bill in American history. To my knowledge, no bill in the history of Congress has contained so many special projects for members. The bill was crammed with some 1,500 white elephant transportation “demonstration” projects—for bicycle paths, bus museums, parking garages, university research grants, and even $16 million to pay for artwork in the Los Angeles subway. That was ten times more pork projects than in the Democrats’ highway bill that Ronald Reagan vetoed a decade ago. It passed overwhelmingly in both houses. Table 1 Earmarked Demonstration Projects in Highway Bills Year # of Projects Cost (Millions $) 1982 10 386 1987 152 1,300 1991 539 6,200 1998 1,500 9,000 Source: U.S. General Accounting Office data. Closing down the DOT and repealing the 18.4-cent federal gasoline tax could end all of this inefficiency and redundancy. States could then raise the gas tax themselves (as much as they wish) to pay for whatever road building and repair is needed. By eliminating the cost of the federal bureaucracy in Washington, construction and maintenance costs for highways, bridge and transit systems will fall. Many governors have endorsed this idea as consistent with federalism and the Tenth Amendment. If closing the DOT is not politically viable, another option would be to limit the DOT to financing only interstate transportation projects. This way, states would maintain the authority to implement these programs, eliminating a large amount of the bureaucratic waste in the current system. Welfare Reform – Finishing the Job Thirty-five years ago, when President Lyndon Johnson launched the “War on Poverty,” he declared: “the days of the dole are numbered.” We have now surpassed day 10,000. Over this period, some $5 trillion has been spent on this war—more in current dollars than the cost of fighting World War II. The federal government, along with the states and cities, spend an estimated $300 billion per year on anti-poverty programs. That is almost three times the amount that would be needed to lift every poor family to above the poverty level. Still, the poverty rate in the United States remains extremely high and is no lower than when the avalanche of spending to prevent it began. As Charles Murray of the American Enterprise Institute emphasizes, “The tragedy of the welfare state is not how much it costs, but how little it has bought.” The system does not work well for either the poor or the taxpayer. The welfare state is fundamentally flawed because it rewards bad behavior—illegitimacy and family break-up—and discourages good behavior—work, marriage, and individual responsibility. A 1996 Cato Institute study originated in Texas by David Hartman and James Coder and written by Michael Tanner Institute for Policy Innovation: Policy Report #179 17 and me shows that welfare benefits are so high for the non-working, and taxes are so high for the working poor, that a typical female-head of household on welfare and receiving public housing would have to find a job in most states that pays total benefits of $8.50 an hour to compensate for the loss of welfare benefits.22By not working, the poor are not lazy—they simply are responding to the monetary incentives that the welfare state has created. The 104th Congress enacted a major welfare reform bill that took several positive steps in ending the welfare state. The primary cash assistance program—Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), which used to be called AFDC – is now run by the states. The entitlement feature of the program has been ended in favor of an annual appropriated block grant. The bill also technically requires work after two years of assistance—but it remains to be seen whether the work requirements will be enforced and, more importantly, whether the new system will discourage illegitimacy and entry into the welfare system in the first place. Welfare caseloads have fallen by 57% in the states since the 1995 bill was enacted.23 Congress should finish the job by ending the TANF block grant and leaving the funding to the states and private sector as well. Congress must also recognize that TANF is just one small brick in the modern welfare empire. In Washington there are now more than 60 means tested programs to help the poor. Three of the most expensive “anti-poverty” programs are Medicaid, food stamps, and public housing. As with TANF, they should now be returned to the states and to the fullest extent possible, private charities. Devolving these remaining welfare programs to the states would be advantageous for several reasons. First, it would allow states full flexibility in serving as innovators and laboratories to devise welfare programs that provide a basic safety net without rewarding destructive behavior. State governments have already begun to experiment with promising reforms in welfare. The most ambitious of those experiments, designed to get people off welfare and into jobs, have been adopted in Wisconsin, under then-Governor Tommy Thompson, and in Michigan under John Engler. Devolution of welfare to the states would help quickly sort out approaches that work from those that do not. It would also end the federal government’s meddlesome middleman role in welfare. In many cases it stymies reform, as when Washington recently denied a waiver for the state of Texas to privatize welfare agencies. Second, interstate competition would force states to control bureaucratic costs, hold down benefit levels, and impose meaningful restrictions on eligibility—all things Washington has failed to do. Third, states are more likely to see the role of government as one of augmenting successful private charitable support systems, rather than supplanting them.

2023 ENDI Counterplan
ENDI 2023 - States Counterplan › 1NC Shell - Basic

States are best suited to implement basic income.

Michael Tanner, 15. Tanner is a senior fellow with the Cato Institute and the author of numerous books, including The Poverty of Welfare: Helping Others in Civil Society. “The Pros and Cons of a Guaranteed National Income.” CATO Institute Policy Analysis, May 12, 2015. Number 773. https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa773.pdf

Any guaranteed income proposal would, of course, involve both coercion and redistribution. It would also represent a federally imposed one-size-fits-all approach. As such, it should be approached with caution and skepticism. In an ideal world, private charity would be the primary mechanism for assisting the poor. Certainly private charity has a much stronger track record of providing the type of assistance that offers a route out of poverty. And, because charity is voluntary, it comes without the moral questions inherent in any redistribution scheme. At the very least, welfare should be a function of state and/or local governments, not the federal government. States can, in Justice Brandeis’ words, “serve as a laboratory; and try novel and social experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”12 Putting states and localities in charge of welfare, as was the case for much of this country’s history, would allow greater experimentation and competition.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1NC – Impact – Economy

Economic decline = nuclear war

Dr. Mathew Maavak 21, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals.

Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2NC/1NR – Federalism solves war

Federalism prevents international secessionist wars---absent the American model they are destabilizing.

Erin Ryan, 17. Assistant Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School. “Secession and Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing Regional Conflict in a Pluralist Society.” Oregon Law Review 96: 123. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2775377.

Yet the impetus toward devolution also surfaces in conflicts between competing intra-national constituencies, cleaving along regional, cultural, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and ideological lines. In the dominant circles of international law, secession is disfavored— viewed as an extra-legal alternative that goes beyond the requirements of generally accepted principles of self-determination (at least absent gross violations, alien subjugation, international exploitation, or a colonial context).3 Nevertheless, recent calls for secession in Catalonia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Scotland, Québec, and South Sudan reveal multiple political contexts in which related questions are being raised about how best to balance competing claims for autonomy, interdependence, political voice, and exit.4

In the United States, a genuine secession movement by the Alaskan Independence Party was judicially quelled as recently as 2010, highlighting the durability of the issue even in the modern United States.5 And while calls for full secession are seldom given much credence in the American political context, calls to further devolve regulatory authority occupy hallowed positions in major American political party platforms.6 Devolution claims, often framed in terms of “States’ Rights,” have become customary on the political right—but in the wake of the 2016 Presidential Election, they are increasingly heard on the left as well.7 A group of California citizens seeking their own independence from the United States have organized a “Calexit” campaign, seeking a 2019 referendum on California’s exit from the American Union.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1NC – Impact – Global War

Federalism solves global war – best studies

Mahendra Lawoti, 09. Professor of Political Science at Western Michigan University. Federalism for Nepal. March 18, 2009. http://www.telegraphnepal.com/backup/telegraph/news_det.php?news_id=5041

Cross-national studies covering over 100 countries have shown that federalism minimizes violent conflicts whereas unitary structures are more apt to exacerbate ethnic conflicts. Frank S. Cohen (1997) analyzed ethnic conflicts and inter-governmental organizations over nine 5-year –periods (1945-1948 and 1985-1989) among 223 ethnic groups in 100 countries. He found that federalism generates increases in the incidence of protests (low-level ethnic conflicts) but stifles the development of rebellions (high-level conflicts). Increased access to institutional power provided by federalism leads to more low-level conflicts because local groups mobilize at the regional level to make demands on the regional governments. The perceptions that conflicts occur in federal structure is not entirely incorrect. But the conflicts are low-level and manageable ones. Often, these are desirable conflicts because they are expressions of disadvantaged groups and people for equality and justice, and part of a process that consolidates democracy. In addition, they also let off steam so that the protests do not turn into rebellions. As the demands at the regional levels are addressed, frustrations do not build up. It checks abrupt and severe outburst. That is why high levels of conflicts are found less in federal countries. On the other hand, Cohen found high levels of conflicts in unitary structures and centralized politics. According to Cohen (1997:624): Federalism moderates politics by expanding the opportunity for victory. The increase in opportunities for political gain comes from the fragmentation/dispersion of policy-making power… the compartmentalizing character of federalism also assures cultural distinctiveness by offering dissatisfied ethnic minorities proximity to public affairs. Such close contact provides a feeling of both control and security that an ethnic group gains regarding its own affairs. In general, such institutional proximity expands the opportunities for political participation, socialization, and consequently, democratic consolidation. Saidmeman, Lanoue, Campenini, and Stanton’s (2002: 118) findings also support Cohen’s analysis that federalism influences peace and violent dissent differently. They used Minority at Risk Phase III dataset and investigated 1264 ethnic groups. According to Saideman et al. (2002:118-120): Federalism reduces the level of ethnic violence. In a federal structure, groups at the local level can influence many of the issues that matter dearly to them- education, law enforcement, and the like. Moreover, federal arrangements reduce the chances that any group will realize its greatest nightmare: having its culture, political and educational institutions destroyed by a hostile national majority. These broad empirical studies support the earlier claims of Lijphart, Gurr, and Horowitz that power sharing and autonomy granting institutions can foster peaceful accommodation and prevent violent conflicts among different groups in culturally plural societies. Lijphart (1977:88), in his award winning book Democracy in Plural Societies, argues that "Clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility". This is not to argue for isolated or closed polities, which is almost impossible in a progressively globalizing world. The case is that when quite distinct and self-differentiating cultures come into contact, antagonism between them may increase. Compared to federal structure, unitary structure may bring distinct cultural groups into intense contact more rapidly because more group members may stay within their regions of traditional settlements under federal arrangements whereas unitary structure may foster population movement. Federalism reduces conflicts because it provides autonomy to groups. Disputants within federal structures or any mechanisms that provide autonomy are better able to work out agreements on more specific issues that surface repeatedly in the programs of communal movement (Gurr 1993:298-299). Autonomy agreements have helped dampen rebellions by Basques in Spain, the Moros in the Philippines, the Miskitos in Nicaragua, the people of Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts and the affairs of Ethiopia, among others (Gurr 1993:3190) The Indian experiences are also illustrative. Ghosh (1998) argues that India state managed many its violent ethnic conflicts by creating new states (Such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujurat, Punjab, Harayana, Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland) and autonomous councils (Such as Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council, Bodoland Autonomous Council, and Jharkhand Area autonomous Council, Leh Autonomous Hill Development Council). The basic idea, according to Ghosh (1998:61), was to devolve powers to make the ethnic/linguistic groups feel that their identity was being respected by the state. By providing autonomy, federalism also undermines militant appeals. Because effective autonomy provides resources and institutions through which groups can make significant progress toward their objectives, many ethnic activities and supporters of ethnic movements are engaged through such arrangements. Thus it builds long-term support for peaceful solutions and undermines appeals to militant action (Gurr 1993:303). Policies of regional devolution in France, Spain and Italy, on the other hand, demonstrate that establishing self-managing autonomous regions can be politically and economically less burdensome for central states than keeping resistant peoples in line by force: autonomy arrangements have transformed destructive conflicts in these societies into positive interregional competition". Federalism for Nepal Federalism is essential in plural countries like Nepal because it provides cultural autonomy to different cultural groups within a country. By allowing ethnic groups to govern themselves in cultural and developmental matters, it lessens their conflicts with the central state. Many of the conflicts of the identity movements are in cultural issues like religion, language, education and so on. Once regional governments are established, either the contesting parties from their own governments at the regional level, and decides in those matters, and/or influence the outcome because their proportional presence at the regional level is more than in the national level. Thus, many ethnic and linguistic groups can effectively put more pressure to the regional governments. Under unitary system, numerous regionally concentrated groups have not been able to put pressure on the central government because their population and voice are small at the central context. Even if they are not, their nature will become different. Some of the conflicts will be regionally focused. Hence, many of the conflicts will decrease in intensity and strength at the central level. The bureaucracy will also increasingly reflect the regional composition because the regional governments would hire local people in the administration. Bureaucrats with knowledge of local languages and specific local problems will be able to provide relatively more efficient administration. This will also reduce conflicts. Inclusion of more ethnic members into regional politics and administration will ensure more public politics directed toward regional needs, instead of irrelevant policies directed by the center. This will contribute to reducing conflicts arising out of mal-distribution of resources. If minorities want some form of autonomy to protect and promote their culture, develop their people and regions, and self-determine their future, they are likely to struggle for it unless some autonomy is provided. The struggle might take different form in different periods due to varying circumstances. Even if unfavorable circumstances may lead to non-actions during some periods, favorable conditions for mobilizations in other periods may lead to more activities, perhaps in violent ways. The growth of ethnic movements in Nepal after 1990 is an example. Thus, to address the conflicts arising out of issues of identity and cultural rights that are inherent human aspirations, autonomy is essential. Granting of federalism would in all likelihood bring an end to ethnic insurgencies like the Khambuwan Mukti Morcha because it meets their major demand. It will also prevent the possibilities of other ethnic insurgencies with demand for federalism. Territorial federalism can work for the benefit of large ethnic groups concentrated regionally but may not be able to address problems of the numerous low populated ethnic groups or groups that are not concentrated because they may not form majorities anywhere. For these groups, non-territorial federalism, as in Belgium, Austria etc. may address their needs. In non-territorial federalism, members of ethnic groups have rights to decide about their culture, education, language and so on by electing councils who have jurisdiction over cultural, social and developmental realms. The problems of the dalit and small ethnic groups can be addressed through non-territorial federalism. Federalism and its critics in Nepal The dominant group in Nepal often argues against federalism by raising the fear of secession. I have argued elsewhere that this fear is misplaced. In demanding only a few of the rights that mainly deal with cultural and social issues, the minority groups acknowledge that advantages of staying within the existing nation-state. On the other hand, devolution helps to avert separatism because granting of devolution meets substantial demand of the minorities. However, power has to be devolved in ways that make the state and minorities perceive benefit form it. Large numbers of ethnic groups with small population further minimize the secessionist possibilities in Nepal, if any. The lack of resources and difficult topography of settlement in may cases make the creation and sustenance of smaller independent nations difficult, more so when the groups are in a state of under development. On the other hand, experience elsewhere demonstrates that absence of autonomy may lead to secessionist movements. Federalism was considered "slippery" in the 60s in Sri Lanka when the Tamils demanded autonomy. Today, autonomy does not satisfy the demands of the movement that arouse out of its denial (Stepan 1999). Hence federalism, in fact, may contribute in keeping a country together by satisfying communities have power over themselves, there is less need to secede; hence, a federal structure can keep different communities united within a nation-state framework. Where cultural autonomy has not been provided, many countries have seceded or are undergoing civil war or violent ethnic conflicts. Many in Nepal ignorantly argue that a small country like Nepal does not need a federal structure. However, federal countries like Belgium, Switzerland, Israel, Papua New Guinea, Holland and Austria have less population than Nepal. This belies the widespread fallacy that ‘small’ country like Nepal does not require federalism. The difficult geographic terrain and the problems of transportation and communication, on the other hand, make Nepal effectively larger than its area and population indicates. The perception that Nepal is a small country is due to its sandwiched position between the world’s two most populous countries. In terms of real and effective population, geography and cultural diversity, Nepal is not a small country. In fact, it is the 40th populous country among 227 countries in the world as of 2002 (US Census Bureau 2002). Federalism in not only in the interests if the marginalized groups, however. It is also in the interests of the dominant community because it lessens the underlying reasons for conflicts. Conflicts are more costly to the privilege sections of the society; hence as a toll for lessening the conflicts, federalism can serve the interests of the dominant community as well. Excerpts from the book "Nepal Tomorrow: Voices and visions" edited by D.B. Gurung.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2NC/1NR – Federalism Solves Democracy

Federalism key to democracy – covid proves

Dr. Robert E. Moffit & Jordan Lamb, 22. Moffit is a Senior Research Fellow, Center for Health and Welfare Policy. Lamb is a Summer 2022 Member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation. “COVID and Federalism: Rich Opportunities for Public Accountability.” August 22, 2022. https://www.heritage.org/political-process/commentary/covid-and-federalism-rich-opportunities-public-accountability

The COVID-19 crisis offered excellent lessons in the advantages of federalism, the division of power between the federal government and the states. Most COVID policies directly affecting Americans were made and enforced, not by Washington, but by state and local officials. Federalism enables citizens to hold these officials directly accountable for what they did or failed to do in responding to the pandemic. Liberal academics and policy analysts argued that federalism actually hampered an effective response. According to them, it resulted in fragmented and inconsistent policies, noncompliance with federal recommendations, inefficient utilization of resources, a worsening of social and economic inequities, and unequal medical outcomes, especially for minorities. Of course, the alternative to federalism would be a concentration of control in Washington. Critics on the left assert that a single point of decision making would develop and enforce a coherent national policy applicable to every state and locality. In practice, however, such unitary governance would guarantee failure on the ground. As former White House advisor Dr. Deborah Birx warned last month, “One size never fits all, and generic communication and generic guidance didn’t fit at all.” Some states were more successful than others. But one thing is indisputable: Washington failed. The biggest failures in America’s response to the pandemic, detailed by the Government Accountability Office and others, were the failures of federal officials. This list includes: a failure to effectively coordinate a full federal response to the pandemic using the powers legally available to the national government; the deadly delay in developing and deploying effective diagnostic testing; the inability to provide complete and consistent data to the states and the public; their neglect of the National Strategic Stockpile and the shortages of medical equipment and supplies; the confusing messaging on masks and mask mandates; the attempts to impose an unwise and illegal federal vaccine mandate on the private sector, while downplaying the vital role of natural immunity; the fumbled production and distribution of anti-viral therapeutics; the insistence on recommending educationally and emotionally damaging lockdowns that created even more health problems; the anti-intellectual response to legitimate scientific dissent; and the continuing failure to identify the origin and development of the coronavirus. In December 2021, President Joe Biden got it right when he said: “There is no federal solution. This gets solved at the state level.” This is correct, both as a matter of Constitutional law and as a practical matter. The states, not the feds, can exercise plenary police powers to protect public health and safety. As North Carolina University Professor Thomas Birkland and his colleagues observe, “The very foundation of federal emergency policy in general is the idea that state and local governments are best positioned to respond to emergencies.” As Heritage Foundation analysts predicted, success in combatting the coronavirus was determined by the effectiveness of public health measures on the ground—in states, counties, and localities. Policymakers would and should respond differently to the often radically differing local and state conditions. In practice, Democratic officials were more likely to impose lockdowns and stay at home orders, while Republicans were more likely to pursue public health initiatives that preserved personal freedom and, to the extent possible, allowed normal economic activity. This diversity of policy, reflecting genuine philosophical differences and the democratic diversity of the nation, is a feature, not a flaw, of the Founders’ federalist design. In his American Commonwealth (1888), British political scientist Lord James Bryce observed: Federalism enables a people to try experiments in legislation and administration which could not be safely tried in a large, centralized country. A comparatively small commonwealth like an American State easily makes and unmakes its laws; mistakes are not serious, for they are soon corrected; other States profit by the experience of a law or a method which has worked well or ill in the State that has tried it. The key COVID metrics were caseloads, hospitalizations and deaths. Initial comparative mortality data in 2021 did not show a clear “red” state versus “blue state" pattern. Unfortunately, the politicization of the pandemic mirrored the contagion of the virus itself, spreading rapidly from politicians to academia. Writing in the British Medical Journal, for example, researchers published a methodologically flawed study that associated county mortality with Republican voting patterns. In fact, rural counties often do vote Republican, but, as Dr. Birx told Congress, rural America is older, with more comorbidities, and had higher death rates “long before” the COVID-19 pandemic. Viral infections and mortality rates are affected by numerous factors beyond public health policy. Factors such as demographics, urbanization and population density vary greatly from region to region, state to state, and locality to locality—and they can make a huge difference. For example, a comprehensive report for the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) concluded that COVID mortality risk is mostly age-related; for those aged 85 and over, the risk was nearly 9,000 times higher than those aged 5-17. Or consider the experience of America’s four largest states. Adjusted for age, the NBER researchers found that California had a COVID death rate of 256.1 per 100,000 and Florida’s rate was 265.1. Mortality rates were significantly higher for New York (346.3) and Texas (390.2). In short, California and Florida, though pursuing different policies, had relatively similar mortality figures, while both New York and Texas, also pursuing different policies, experienced poor mortality outcomes. When accounting for pandemic-related mortality, however, the impact of certain government policy measures complicates the picture. Indeed, another major NBER research study shows that “shelter in place” policies generally increased “excess” mortality. Measuring the impact of state policies on total mortality is indeed a good way to evaluate the policy responses of state and local authorities. It accounts for the broader effects of pandemic lockdown policies on health and mortality, such as the impact of delayed routine medical care, the deleterious effects of isolation on mental health and suicide, and higher drug- and alcohol-related deaths. Considering these crucial and competing needs, a prudential policy would seek to balance the protection of public health with the need to preserve personal freedom and individuals’ livelihoods. Once again, California, Texas, Florida, and New York provide an excellent template for policy analysis since they represent large and diverse populations and the largest number of COVID cases. How did the approach of a “balanced” policy fare? Since the onset of the pandemic, California and New York adhered more closely to guidance from Washington (particularly CDC guidance), while Florida and Texas pursued more independent courses of action. In measuring the economic impact of the pandemic, Kerpen, Mulligan and Moore showed that these four states, with varying policies, secured very different results. Despite high COVID caseloads, Florida and Texas performed well in mitigating the damaging economic effects of the pandemic. Florida achieved an unemployment measure of 2.1%, in contrast to New York’s rate of 5.6%. California’s peak unemployment rate reached 10.2% while Texas capped unemployment at 7.7%. Florida and Texas took steps to curb the decline in their gross domestic product (GDP). New York, on the other hand, experienced the highest increase in unemployment and the deepest decline in GDP among the four largest states. With few and rare exceptions, children generally were never vulnerable to severe illness, hospitalization, or death from COVID-19. Nonetheless, many states and localities closed schools for extended periods of time or imposed severe restrictions on in-person education. The multiple costs of lost learning are no longer debatable, and the public officials responsible should be held accountable. Once again, among the four largest states, lost in-person learning for children was significantly greater in California and New York than Texas or Florida. Congress should initiate serious oversight hearings to assess the performance of the various federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). But equally important, state lawmakers should take a good look at how well they and their public health agencies performed. Federalism expands democratic freedom and accountability. Citizens should take advantage of it. The data are mounting. Let’s use this information to learn from this experience and to hold elected officials—at all levels of government—accountable.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1NC – Impact – Democracy

Effective democracy undergirds the international order – loss of it causes great power war

Adrian Basora & Kenneth Yalowitz 17. *Basora is the U.S. ambassador to the Czech Republic and is director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute Eurasia Program and Project on Democratic Transitions. *Yalowitz is the director of the Conflict Resolution Program at Georgetown University and a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, and was U.S. ambassador to Belarus and Georgia, "Democracy Promotion Is Smart Security Policy," National Interest, February 16, 2017. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/democracy-promotion-smart-security-policy-19469

We cannot “make America great again” unless America is secure both at home and in its global position. But what does this have to do with democracy? During the first decade after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, President George H. W. Bush’s goal of “a Europe whole and free” and a wider world largely at peace seemed within reach. The deadly threats of the Cold War were gone, and the democratic revolutions that appeared to be sweeping through eastern Europe and elsewhere created optimism as to the continuing progress of a liberal international order. Now, two and a half decades later, that promising trend is being reversed. The authoritarian resurgence in Europe and elsewhere over the past decade has shaken our confidence that liberal democracy, free markets and peaceful borders will continue to dominate the post–Cold War international order. From our being the “sole superpower” in the 1990s, U.S. global influence and effective power are now challenged by China and Russia, the weakening of the European Union and the sharp domestic divisions revealed by the U.S. presidential campaign. The United States and Europe are threatened by radical terrorists, challenged by territorially expansionist autocracies, and targeted by covert action, massive disinformation and propaganda offensives. Russia and China, the world’s two principal autocratic powers, lead the way in consolidating their model domestically, but also in advocating internationally for an alternative authoritarian model based on strident nationalism, autocratic leadership, and repression of human rights and the rule of law. Russia, through its covert intervention in the U.S. election, military actions in Ukraine and support of right-wing populist forces in Europe, is working to undermine the system of liberal institutions, laws and behavioral norms that have bound Europe and the United States. Sadly, this alternative model is gaining ground in Europe and elsewhere. The list includes formerly promising new democracies such as Hungary, Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines—and now even Poland. What is the connection between America’s security and the state of democracy in the world? Democratic countries rarely, if ever, go to war with each other or prey on their neighbors. Democratic systems and free markets support each other and sustain individual and group freedoms. Also, the rule of law, which subsumes all, is best guaranteed by democratic systems. Protection of the democratic order, now under challenge, must therefore be one of the priorities weighed in our strategic decisionmaking analysis and policy process. And democracy promotion via a revised, realistic and targeted approach must remain a fundamental national-security objective for the United States and its allies. At a recent conference at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC on this subject, eleven experts of varying political and operational perspectives all concluded that the national-security interests of the United States and its allies not only permit, but require, America to support democracy abroad. Not to do so would ignore an existential threat to democracies, and to the international order that has allowed the United States to remain secure and prosper. The new administration will need a democracy-promotion strategy. We suggest a triage approach, which will concentrate on three categories of countries where external support is most likely to succeed. Excluded from these efforts will be countries like Russia and Uzbekistan, where the effort would be futile and/or discredit democracy promotion by validating regime propaganda that equates these programs with aggressive intrusion into domestic affairs. The most promising cases are found in countries where autocratic regimes have recently fallen or have agreed to a negotiated transition (e.g., Tunisia, Ukraine, Myanmar and Indonesia) or where semi-autocratic governments are visibly weak and opposed by broad-based indigenous movements (Venezuela). The second group is made up of countries undergoing democratic regression resulting from the aggressive nature and partial success of the authoritarian counteroffensive. Existing democracies such as Poland and Hungary must be helped from falling backwards. Emerging democracies such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia need assistance in fending off foreign attempts to subvert them. The third group is comprised of nondemocratic countries that fall in between regimes transitioning to democracy and consolidated dictatorships. This category includes autocratic countries such as Armenia, Thailand and Belarus, where the regimes have retained some democratic trappings such as controlled elections to maintain a degree of popular legitimacy. These openings may be used to lay the groundwork for democratic transition through carefully calibrated democracy promotion programs. Understandably, much of the focus of the new U.S. administration will be on countering terrorist threats and dampening the appeal of radical ideology to susceptible young people. Yet, we must pay attention to prospects for democratic transition and meet the authoritarian counteroffensive. At the same time, Americans must reaffirm their own democratic commitments and standards as they manage their economic divisions and challenges. If democracy is to continue to flourish, nothing is more important than being true to American values and principles and protecting them globally.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
1NC – Impact – Democracy

Federalism is key to a vibrant American democracy that checks fascism

David Tubbs & Daniel Hay, 17. Tubbs is a Fellow of the Witherspoon Institute and Associate Professor of Politics at The King’s College in New York City; Hay is a litigator in Washington, DC; “A Fascist in the White House? Federalism as an Antidote to Authoritarianism,” August 7, 2017.

This “tradition” of crying wolf presents problems for sober analysts now legitimately worried about the presidency of Donald Trump. Many Americans seem sincerely to believe that their nation is tottering on the brink of fascism. Since Election Day, the Amazon and New York Times bestseller lists have included titles such as George Orwell’s 1984, Hannah Arendt’s Origins of Totalitarianism, Sinclair Lewis’s It Can’t Happen Here, and Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny. Soon after Inauguration Day, the Washington Post coined a new motto for its mission: “Democracy Dies in Darkness.” And the New York Public Theater recently staged Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar while striving to give the actor who played Caesar a strong physical resemblance to our current president. Even if some of this is overwrought, many Americans seem genuinely worried. In this unusual political milieu, analysts on the left and in the political center have come to champion our nation’s commitment to representative democracy and the institutions that undergird it as bulwarks against oppressive national power. Consider the recent writings of David Frum, Timothy Snyder, and Jeffrey Rosen, three prominent center-left intellectuals. Their worries, taken collectively, include Trump’s use of controversial executive orders, the rhetoric of confrontation and violence at his campaign rallies last year, and a litany of extravagant promises, sometimes accompanied by a cool indifference to the accuracy of facts. This list is hardly exhaustive. As Frum pithily notes: “Civil unrest will not be a problem for the Trump presidency. It will be a resource.” Our representative democracy is well suited to prevent fascism from arising, but analysts who want to allay their worst fears about a Trump presidency must bear in mind the crucial role of federalism in checking the national government—and they must acknowledge the ways in which judicial supremacy and progressive centralizing tendencies have undermined federalism. Remedies? The perspectives of Frum, Snyder, and Rosen complement one another. Frum is an editor at The Atlantic and a former speechwriter for President George W. Bush; Snyder is a professor of European history at Yale; Rosen is a law professor who directs the National Constitution Center. Each assesses the prospect of fascism or authoritarianism from the standpoint of an American citizenry that could be either apathetic or engaged, with civic apathy being a great danger in this setting. In his March cover story for The Atlantic, Frum depicts the United States in 2020 soon after Trump’s reelection. The country has drifted toward illiberalism and kleptocracy, a chief trait of which is “less the power to persecute the innocent, more the power to protect the guilty.” Invoking Dickens’s “Ghost of Christmas Future,” Frum reveals a two-part strategy for preserving our republic: greater civic engagement among the people and greater reliance on federal judges and federal civil servants to keep the president and Congress in check. Because of Trump’s populist appeal, Frum argues that the current Republican Congress may be powerless to resist some of the president’s initiatives. Snyder’s widely acclaimed On Tyranny draws from his vast knowledge of twentieth-century European history, especially of Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union. Snyder tries to distill twenty lessons from those horrible years, “adapted to the circumstances of today.” Like Frum, Snyder praises and encourages civic engagement. Some of his lessons align with specific fears about the Trump administration, while others—“Defend institutions,” “Believe in truth,” “Be kind to our language,” “Do not obey in advance”—would seemingly apply at all times, regardless of who occupies the White House. Because both men are writing about the United States, it is curious that Frum and Snyder say almost nothing about American federalism. A twenty-first lesson would have been well placed in Snyder’s book: “Respect American federalism,” or more broadly, “Devolve power from central authorities.” The framers recognized that the authority of the several states would be a feature, not a bug, in inhibiting the growth of an oppressive central government like the one against which they rebelled. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison saw that the dispersal of power amongst a wider sphere and a broader array of factions would make it “less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.” Federalism and Our Fractious Republic In a long feature article published in the Wall Street Journal in late May, Rosen identifies American federalism as an essential tool to check an imperial or authoritarian presidency. His point of departure is a series of controversial executive orders issued by President Obama and President Trump, prompted by their inability to gain support for certain initiatives in Congress. Rosen does not invoke the specter of fascism, though our highly polarized electorate and the scope of executive authority trouble him. And unlike Frum and Snyder, Rosen sees the legislative authority of the states as a counterbalance to federal overreaching. Yet in several ways his analysis stops curiously short. He describes initiatives in three areas—education, immigration, and law enforcement—that allow for both federal laws and local variation. While Rosen rightly recognizes the potential of executive power to undermine representative democracy, he gives no account—not even the barest acknowledgment—of the ways in which representative democracy in the states has already been compromised by the Supreme Court through judicially invented rights. Some of these rights are more controversial than others, but they all involve federal judges removing certain topics from the political realm. Observers on the left and right agree that the Supreme Court has invented rights without grounding in the text, logic, or original meaning of the Constitution—even if they sometimes cannot agree which rights are invented. On the right, there is a healthy skepticism of the constitutional provenance of judicial decisions involving abortion and contraception, sexual freedom, the scope of racial and gender equality, and the imposition of various punishments, including capital punishment. On the left, commentators question the legitimacy of Supreme Court decisions that have, under federal law, broadened the rights of corporations, limited the ability to blunt the influence of moneyed interests in politics, and—in one instance—decided a presidential election. Our focus here is the Court’s invalidation of duly enacted laws passed by state legislatures. In arguing that the Court compromised representative democracy in the states through certain rulings, we withhold judgment here about the wisdom or desirability of the policies that it invalidated. Judicial review is constitutionally warranted in some circumstances, but even when properly exercised, judicial review of state legislation effectively nationalizes issues, leaving many Americans disaffected. Unlike when the Court leaves state laws in place, the losing side has no political recourse when the Court strikes down a popularly enacted law. Judicial review effectively ends debate, and with debate, the potential for meaningful persuasion and compromise. Thus, the grounds for disaffection are clear: invalidating state policies through judicially invented rights involves a form of condescension to those who backed the policies. An elite institution reproves or chastises a republican or demotic institution—a familiar story in our time. Given Americans’ sharp differences on these issues, it is fair to say that the Court’s rulings have helped to divide and polarize the nation. Moreover, judicial intervention has transformed several important policy debates into a winner-take-all enterprise, and sometimes with no discernible limits as we look ahead. It is no wonder, then, that judicial confirmation battles have bordered on all-out warfare. Frum, Snyder, and Rosen know that a highly polarized electorate presents problems for the functioning of representative democracy and increases the odds of an imperial presidency or something more ominous. Yet they seem unwilling to consider how much the Supreme Court has done to polarize our nation. Other observers, including David French and Angelo Codevilla, believe that our nation has become so polarized that the most worrisome scenario for the near future is not nationalist tyranny, but civil war. But one does not preclude the other. The two might be coterminous, and they might be accompanied by widespread violations of individual rights. As political theorist George Kateb argues, the most egregious human rights violations typically occur when a prominent faction in a political community has a strong sense of group identity and clings to a dualistic, “we-they” mentality. Such a mentality, alas, is seen in many places in the United States today. Federalism, Pluralism, and “Populist” Liberalism Any scholar or commentator who truly worries about the prospect of fascism, nationalist tyranny, or civil war should favor the restoration of a more robust American federalism, with more powers exercised by the states and fewer powers assigned to the national government. There are several reasons for this. First, the dispersion of power in our federal system should be regarded as a salutary way of avoiding the concentration of power in the national government. Those who support the judicially invented rights cited above have tended to assume that the Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution and that all states must accept its rulings as soon as they are handed down. But given the constitutionally dubious grounds of these rulings, states may in the future push back and defy the Supreme Court by ignoring a decision and leaving enforcement to Congress and the president. If one accepts a “departmentalist” view of constitutional interpretation, it is possible that those two branches of the federal government will not enforce it, but even if they do, relying on them to protect such dubious rights is problematic, even worrisome. Liberals could help to avoid such a situation and a possible constitutional crisis by reviewing and reaffirming the principles and practices of American federalism. Second, when state legislatures exercise their powers to promote public health, safety, and morals, they function, in the famous words of Justice Louis Brandeis, as “laboratories of democracy.” Different state policies in response to different questions—should the death penalty be used? should public schools in a state be required to provide gender-neutral bathrooms?—are to be expected, given the basic fact of American pluralism. By the “fact of pluralism,” we mean something akin to Isaiah Berlin’s statement on pluralism—namely, that there are many ways for human beings to lead fully human lives deserving of recognition from others, even if others remain strongly attached to their way of life. If appellate court judges and Supreme Court justices would honor the principles of American federalism, they would see that our federal system can accommodate the great religious, ideological, and cultural pluralism that exists in this land. A third reason for embracing a restoration of American federalism involves the trajectory of liberal thought in this century. A fascist state frightens people because it insists that all or nearly all pursuits in society must advance the aims of the state or at least be subservient to the state. In our time, however, some versions of liberalism make similar demands, and this development deserves the attention of those who worry about the authoritarian tendencies of our current president. In Two Faces of Liberalism, John Gray delineated two accounts of tolerance in liberal theory and distinguished a “modus vivendi” account of tolerance from an account that sees tolerance as a feature of a universal, liberal civilization. In the former, tolerance is a means to the end of civil peace, a precious good in all times. In the latter, tolerance is supposed to be both a principle and a mindset, integral to a universal liberal civilization that is now emerging. The role of tolerance in this emerging liberal civilization is theoretically intelligible, yet in recent years many American liberals have displayed different kinds of intolerance. This occurs because tolerance as a principle sometimes conflicts with other goods or principles that liberals and progressives deem more important, such as some vague notion of equality or the self-esteem of individuals, ethnic groups, and sexual minorities. The imposition of sundry “orthodoxies” in academic life and the use of violence in early 2017 at institutions like Berkeley and Middlebury attest to this. Events such as these should be construed as warnings about the future, especially if this kind of “populist” liberalism continues to spread. These events also tell us how we should think of tolerance in our republic. The modus vivendi account of tolerance helps those who seek to understand more fully the implications of American pluralism, especially the nation’s religious and cultural pluralism. The modus vivendi account also helps us to appreciate the virtues of a federal system in maintaining civil peace and avoiding authoritarian politics, regardless of whether the threat emerges from the left or the right.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2NC/1NR – Federalism Solves Warming

Indirect emissions controls mean states solve – experimentation, modeling, tech innovation, local adaptability, and influencing industry behavior – federal preemption threatens it.

Carol Rose, 08. Lohse Chair in Water and Natural Resources at the University of Arizona College of Law, J.D. from UChicago. “FEDERALISM AND CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN A FUTURE FEDERAL REGIME-AN INTRODUCTION,” Arizona Law Review 50, 01/01/08, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2769&context=fss_papers

Climate change seems far too vast a subject to engage state and local actors in any significant way. Global warming and greenhouse gas control, sea level alterations and polar ice melts-as a practical matter, all these climate-related issues have international repercussions on a scale that state and local actors seldom address. As a legal matter, there are other impediments: the Constitution charges the federal government, rather than the states and localities, with managing our relations with other countries. No doubt this pattern exists because in international matters, the federal government is expected to present a unified national position, unimpeded by the fragmentation that would arise from provincial state and local interference. Nevertheless, in the current absence of the federal government's participation in international climate change efforts, states and local governments have begun to fill the void. The pieces in this Symposium examine these efforts by states and local actors. While the authors address diverse issues and take widely differing approaches, many touch on three common themes, and it is upon those themes that I wish to dwell briefly in this Introduction. The first theme asks whether state and local actors-the entities that Richard Stewart calls "sub-national actors," or SNAs-will actually have any impact on global climate change. The answers given here are mixed. The consensus among the authors is that SNA efforts are unlikely to have any major direct impact on climate change, particularly on emissions reductions. The largest and most active of the state actors is California, with an economy that would be eighth in the world if California were an independent nation.2 Yet, as Kirsten Engel and David Adelman point out, California's proposed emission standards would reduce global carbon dioxide production less than 1%.3 If even big, powerful California could make only a paltry contribution to greenhouse gas cutbacks, it might seem that other SNAs would be equally ineffective in reducing global warming through direct emission controls, even in the aggregate. On the other hand, SNA measures may well have a substantial impact when it comes to indirect measures to control climate change. Several articles take up these indirect measures. Holly Doremus and Michael Hanemann argue that SNA regulations are particularly adept at influencing behavior, and through such behavioral effects the states and localities can indirectly bring about greenhouse gas reduction.4 Just as important, as Richard Stewart's contribution observes, in the absence of federal action, the states can exhibit leadership and set a good example. State and local actors can nudge the laggards, including not only other SNAs but also the federal government itself.5 Even the much-decried "patchwork" of SNA regulation can have an impact on moving emission controls forward. Uneven regulatory patterns may induce industry to lobby for a more comprehensive approach, as occurred over a century ago when differing state railroad regulations drove the industry to demand a single federal Interstate Commerce Commission.6 Closely related to the first theme of effectiveness vel non, a second major theme is the issue of practical constraints that might limit SNA effectiveness in dealing with climate change. In this Symposium, however, controversy swirls around the issues of constraints, and several of the pieces dispute the arguments that SNA activity is necessarily hemmed in by purported practical limitations. David Adelman and Kirsten Engel discuss one such supposedly constraining factor, the pattern that has acquired the unlovely name of "leakage" among the countries currently attempting to curtail greenhouse gas emissions. "Leakage" emerges from competition among the large number of governmental entities that are implicated in an issue of common concern. Internationally, the leakage phenomenon occurs when Country A limits greenhouse gas emissions, but then the producing factories move or "leak" over into unregulated Country B, thereby undercutting the global effectiveness of Country A's regulations as well as putting Country A at a competitive disadvantage. If leakage is already a problem on the international front, one could certainly imagine that it would equally be a problem, if on a smaller scale, as between Arizona and Nevada, Vermont and New Hampshire, or Kansas City and Omaha. Nevertheless, Adelman and Engel argue that leakage takes many forms and may ultimately be less significant than others think.7 Stewart joins them, arguing that a variety of factors may induce SNAs to continue their activities even in the face of the interstate competition underlying the leakage phenomenon. 8 Another potential practical constraint on SNAs could be their limited technical capacity for dealing with the enormous complexity of climate change. In earlier debates about federalism and environmental law, some commentators argued that the federal level might be the most efficient locus for scientific inquiry into environmental concerns, because national agencies could take advantage of scale economies in research and could act as central clearing houses for information.9 One might certainly expect to hear this same argument with respect to climate change, a subject that involves vast areas of scientific uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Symposium authors are remarkably sanguine about the possibilities for SNAs to contribute relevant and useful knowledge. Lisa Heinzerling stresses the very considerable air pollution control expertise that already exists in California's environmental agencies.10 Doremus and Hanemann extend Heinzerling's argument to other states, while also noting the ability of the states to adapt general policies to specific local and regional circumstances." Barry Rabe thinks that SNA initiatives can generate substantial advances in knowledge, and that their decentralized activities might even have an advantage over centralized control, insofar as states and localities can experiment with different approaches. 2 Adelman and Engel focus on the ways in which SNAs can foster technological innovation to cope with climate change. But like the scaleeconomy argument that favors federal control, all these points add up to a classic counterargument in federalism debates: together, they defend the states and even localities as "experimental laboratories" for various kinds of regulatory agendas. The third major theme of the Symposium revolves around normative and legal limitations to SNA climate change initiatives. The prospect of federal preemption looms like a dark cloud over SNA activities. With respect to any particular legal problem, the underlying rationale for federal preemption is that state and local interventions can confuse and complicate issues that require a unified national approach. The preemption argument frequently surfaces in the area of foreign policy. As Dan Farber notes, foreign relations are often thought to require a single national policy, and for that reason, the preemption issue could have serious negative consequences for SNA programs relating to climate change.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2NC/1NR – Federalism Solves Warming

Flexibility and innovation of states mean they solve best, fill in federal gaps, and spill up

Richard B. Stewart, 08. Professor of Law at NYU, Director of the Frank J. Guarini Center on Environmental, Energy, and Land Use Law, LL.B. from Harvard Law School. “States (and Cities) as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architecture,” Conference on Global Federalism, University of Arizona School of Law, 2/11/08, http://www.rehnquistcenter.org/StewartGlobalFederalismPaper.pdf

For the reasons discussed in Part II.A. the SNAs most likely to initiate significant independent climate regulation measures – the leader SNAs --are those that will enjoy relatively high benefits (including psychic benefits) from climate protection and face relatively low costs in reducing emissions; gain significant economic or environmental co-benefits from such measures; enjoy market/regulatory leverage in relevant product and service markets; and win market opportunities for local firms from stimulating a regulatory “race to the top.” Several of these factors may operate in give jurisdictions, and may be mutually reinforcing. Domestic and international climate regulatory initiatives by these “leader” SNAs are likely to produce climate protection benefits through a variety of mechanisms that include the following: Reducing emissions in leader SNAs. The direct effect of independent SNA regulatory initiatives will reduce emissions in the jurisdictions that adopt them.44 Cooperative agreements, whether domestic or transnational, among SNAs to adopt common regulatory measures will increase the amount of reductions achieved and ameliorate leakage. Fostering adoption of stronger climate regulation by other SNAs and the federal government. The indirect effects on regulatory policies at the national and international levels and in other SNAs may be more powerful than the direct effects. Successful SNA regulatory measures will demonstrate that it is feasible to reduce emissions at acceptable or even negative cost. They may also demonstrate that jurisdictions that initiate such measures may reap competitive advantages or other co-benefits. This demonstration effect can stimulate stronger climate regulation in other SNAs and at the federal level by helping to build public awareness of and support for their adoption, perhaps lessen industry or other opposition, and provide templates for initiative by political or governmental policy entrepreneurs. These “radiator” effects may help build a foundation for successive rounds of regulatory initiatives by leader SNAs. Even where strong federal measures are adopted, the structural political barriers discussed above will mean that they will almost inevitably be inadequate. Accordingly, the prod and stimulus of regulatory initiative by leader SNAs will continue to be needed. Stronger national regulations by the U.S. are likely to lead in turn to strengthened global regulation. Filling regulatory gaps and extending the operation of trading systems. Because of the characteristics of national and international climate political processes and of centralized regulation, gaps in federal regulation are inevitable. These will include large gaps in the coverage of trading programs. SNA measures can fill those gaps, including by extending the operation of trading through offset and credit systems, providing models and experience to inform subsequent extensions of federal regulation. Regulatory innovation and experimentation. While there may be economies of scale in research and analysis and other aspects climate regulation design and implementation, regulation at the national or international level can also involve greater difficulties in reaching agreement on new measures, mobilizing national or international bureaucracies, and the like. SNA regulation can be more nimble and often more innovative. Also, decentralized regulation allows for many more different measures and policies to be tried out. Experience with a diversity of approaches can advance knowledge about the best regulatory approaches. A single federal or global experiment, however thoughtfully designed, may turn out to be costly failure. Benchmarking and comparative learning. The adoption of different climate regulatory measures in different SNAs facilitate mutual learning by providing a foundation for horizontal mutual learning and sharing of best practices. The comparative performance of different measures in similar jurisdictions allows benchmarks to be established and to evaluate and improve regulatory approaches. Regulatory comparative advantage. Important parts of the regulatory and institutional reform initiatives needed for effective climate regulation can be better designed and implemented by SNAs. These include energy regulation, building energy efficiency transportation infrastructure and development patterns. Generic regulatory measures adopted at the national level, including emissions trading systems, must be carefully linked with functionally related local regulatory programs (e.g., building codes, state electric utility regulation) and institutional arrangements. These linkages can not be designed in a wholly top down fashion; there must be room for local initiative and learning, which can feed back iteratively with regulatory design at higher levels.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2NC/1NR – Federalism Solves Warming

State-led emissions regulations solve best

Barry Rabe, 14. Professor of Public Policy & Environmental Policy at the University of Michigan, Director of Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy, Nonresident Senior Fellow in Governance Studies @ Brookings Institute, Ph.D. Political Science from UChicago. “The New Era of Climate Federalism,” Brookings Institute, June 2, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/06/02-new-epa-climate-federalism-rabe

The new era of American climate federalism is, in many respects, a regulatory blast-from-the-past. And that may actually be a promising development, particularly for its placement of states at center stage in policy design and implementation. The Environmental Protection Agency’s unveiling of long-anticipated carbon emission regulations for power plants dashes more than a decade of expectations that the federal government would enact some version of a cap-and-trade program for carbon. Remember McCain-Lieberman, Boxer-Lieberman-Warner, and Waxman-Markey, among dozens of others. All failed to gain Congressional embrace and all struggled to figure out what to do with the wide range of pre-existing state policies. Indeed, Waxman-Markey proposed putting all 23 states that had some form of cap-and-trade at that point into a five-year climate purgatory, frozen from further action but potential candidates for a later thaw. The new EPA proposal lacks the market razzle-dazzle of cap-and-trade but reverts to a well-established model that has worked quite well for generations under the remarkably durable Clean Air Act: The federal government sets emission-reduction standards but gives states considerable latitude to design their own approach to reach them under state implementation plans (or SIPs). In this case, Section 111(d) will be used in seeking a 25% emissions reduction from 2005 levels by 2025 and then aiming for a 30% cut by 2030. This plan reflects the fact that states not only have substantial regulatory oversight of their power sector but that many have long been pursuing home-tailored strategies to reduce emissions. This has contributed, along with declining demand for electricity linked to the recession and the surge of natural gas replacing coal via hydraulic fracturing, to significant emission reduction in this sector since the baseline year of 2005. So states get to build on recent experience rather than start from Square One. Three Reasons to be Optimistic About the EPA Proposal First, states now have the opportunity to enter into serious negotiations with EPA about how to design these policies and take advantage of experience they have gained in recent years. In the case of the Northeast, for example, nine states have already been pursuing their own version of cap-and-trade in the power sector for several years. And they recently tightened their emissions cap. Their experience now presumably goes into the intergovernmental negotiation process of SIPs. Even states that have been vehemently opposed to this new EPA approach have their own clean electricity stories to bring forward. Think Texas and its remarkable surge of wind energy under a state renewables mandate embraced by Governors George W. Bush and Rick Perry. Second, EPA has decades of experience in working with states on these matters and even some prior expertise on carbon given the earlier focus on permits for newly-proposed power plants. Some states have responded to this with litigation and bombast. But others have used this opportunity to begin to think through longer-term strategies that might prove applicable to this new area of engagement.

2023 ENDI Disadvantage
2NC/1NR – Federalism Solves Warming

State experimentation and independence is key to effective climate policies – federal gridlock and bureaucratic over-complications empirically deck them

Barry Rabe & Christopher Borick, 11. *Rabe is a Professor of Public Policy & Environmental Policy at the University of Michigan, Director of Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy, Nonresident Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institute, Ph.D. Political Science from UChicago. *Christopher P. Borick is an Associate Professor of political science and director of the Institute of Public Opinion at Muhlenberg College, Ph.D. Public Policy Analysis from SUNY Binghamton. “American Federalism and Climate Change: Policy Options and Public Opinion,” in Climate Change and Land Policies, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, p. 389-406, 2011, https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/2046_1368_LP2010-ch15-American-Federalism-and-Climate-Change-Policy-Options.pdf

The inauguration of the 44th president of the United States and the beginning of the 111th Congress in early 2009 appeared to present a unique opportunity for the federal government to expand its role in climate change mitigation by drawing lessons from an expansive body of state and local policy experience generated over the past decade. This moment also opened a possibility for an intergovernmental partnership that might sort out respective functions and consider ways to either share governance responsibilities across government levels or concentrate select responsibilities within specific levels. Indeed, there is ample precedent in American government whereby state experimentation sets the stage for a more blended system, including a number of areas relevant to environmental protection. Yet by the time the 111th Congress adjourned in December 2010, it appeared highly doubtful that such a process would occur in the near future. Moreover, it seemed increasingly likely that no comprehensive federal legislation would be enacted in the next Congress, although some provisions related to alternative energy development and energy research and development may still move ahead. The American Clean Energy and Security Act, passed by a 219–212 vote in the House of Representatives in June 2009, was later withdrawn from serious consideration. Its 1,482-page text included a dizzying array of policy provisions, far short of a coherent approach to sorting out intergovernmental responsibilities or building federal law on the basis of actual state and local experience in climate policy implementation. In its place, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency continues to attempt to apply provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments to major industrial sources of greenhouse gases (GHGs). In addition, federal agencies have begun to implement a renewable fuel mandate approved in 2007 and an agreement to increase corporate average fuel efficiency brokered in early 2009. In May 2010, the American Power Act was introduced in the Senate. Seen as the possible last chance to enact far-reaching energy legislation, it was withdrawn from review well before the November 2010 elections. As the books closed on the 111th Congress, there had been little movement on climate change policy. This development only serves to sustain the extant American governance approach to climate change, which is largely a combination of state, regional, and local initiatives. Many of these have been put into operation during the past decade, as subfederal governments have proved unexpectedly active in developing a diverse set of climate-related policies (Selin and VanDeveer 2009). In many instances, these policies were developed with the expectation of an expanded future federal role. But they will in all likelihood constitute the core of American climate policy, at least for the near future, and possibly for a good deal longer, given the considerable partisan and institutional constraints at the federal level on moving comprehensive legislation that addresses topics such as climate change, energy, and the environment. Ironically, the biggest single step taken to reduce GHG emissions in the United States during the past two decades had nothing to do with climate policy, but rather with the “great recession” of 2008–2010. It is estimated that national GHG emissions decreased by as much as 8 percent between 2005 and 2010, consistent with the experience of other nations that have faced severe economic contraction. Declines have been particularly steep in states such as Michigan that have experienced the greatest economic disruption. This underscores the challenge of developing future climate mitigation policy that does not have to rely on widespread unemployment and economic inactivity. This chapter surveys the intergovernmental landscape and the evolving national context. It begins with a brief review of policy proposals introduced in the 111th Congress, with particular attention to the intergovernmental dimensions of these initiatives. It examines the evolution of state and regional initiatives, demonstrating their broad scope and considerable overlap with many of the policies that were under consideration in the 111th Congress. This review is not intended to be encyclopedic, but rather to highlight the most salient policies and offer an early assessment of their implementation to date. The chapter provides a unique perspective on public views on the roles of various levels of government in climate policy, drawing on the 2008 and 2009 versions of the National Survey of American Public Opinion on Climate Change. These surveys confirmed the findings of other analyses that there has been a steep decline in recent years in the percentage of Americans who believe that global temperatures are increasing and that human activity is the cause. The surveys focused in particular on policy, not only exploring public support for various policy options, but also asking respondents to weigh in on whether they see climate policy as the responsibility of one or more levels of government or as something no American government should adopt. In this regard, we rely most heavily on the 2009 survey, conducted during October and November, which expanded the previous exploration of this issue and found a significant body of public support for sustaining a multilevel approach to climate change, albeit with some variance between government levels and policy tools. We believe that this constitutes the first attempt to use survey analysis to examine multilevel climate governance options in the United States in such depth and focus on the key findings later in the chapter. Lessons from the 111th Congress Between 1975 and the end of 2009, at least 479 congressional hearings on climate change were held. The majority of them examined scientific considerations, but a growing number of them considered policy options. Remarkably, however, few of the policy-focused hearings even acknowledged the existence of state, regional, and local policies, much less attempted to distill lessons from them or consider ways to devise a long-term plan for American climate governance (Rabe 2010b). Consequently, the array of proposals introduced in the 111th Congress reflects a hodgepodge of approaches to possible federal government engagement in areas where substantial subfederal involvement is already evident. A number of the proposals that included some form of a carbon cap-and-trade strategy called for full preemption of existing state and regional policies. These featured little specific discussion of how early state implementation experience might be used to guide federal policy development or how states and regions might be rewarded for early actions or demonstrable emissions reductions related to their policy steps. The American Clean Energy and Security Act introduced a compromise approach relatively late in the deliberations, putting all existing state and regional cap-and-trade programs into a five-year freeze. This meant that these subfederal programs would be halted from 2012 to 2017, assuming that the federal government had its own program operational by January 2012. The act kept open the possibility that these programs might begin to return to operation in January 2017. It was widely anticipated, however, that the Senate might move toward a total-preemption model, reflecting proposals from the 109th and 110th Congresses. Early hints of the contents of the proposed Senate bill emerging from months of deliberations led by Senators Lindsey Graham, John Kerry, and Joseph Lieberman further suggested that any cap-and-trade provision would likely be narrow in scope, but would eviscerate related state and regional programs through full preemption. Although Graham and other Senate Republicans backed away from active involvement, Kerry and Lieberman introduced a 987-page bill, the American Power Act, in May 2010. This bill proposed a wide range of strategies that might reduce GHG emissions, including a narrow cap-and-trade provision that would preempt existing subfederal programs but offer participating states some form of compensation. In turn, the legislation included a long list of assistance for a wide range of energy sources, including an expanded provision for offshore oil and gas drilling that would allow individual states to opt out in order to protect their coastal areas. The Kerry-Lieberman bill faced considerable opposition and was ultimately withdrawn from serious review. Not only does the continuing federal experience suggest considerable difficulty in enacting any climate legislation, but it also shows the absence of any coherent model for engaging states, regions, and localities in a constructive partnership across government levels. Scholars have begun to turn to this issue in recent years, considering models for allocating policy responsibility across government, although much of this work is quite new and no singular view has emerged (Engel and Saleska 2005; Posner 2010; Rabe 2008; Selin and VanDeveer 2009). Back to the States While Congress has continued to fiddle, subfederal governments have continued to move forward with policy development and implementation. This movement has accelerated in recent years, albeit under a cloud resulting from the realization by states, regions, and localities that their policies may be altered, or even eliminated, by the federal government. This has only been exacerbated by the fact that subfederal governments are facing the worst fiscal crisis in half a century, complicating their ability to sustain programs through advanced stages of implementation. This section is not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of subfederal policy, but rather to focus on two climate policies that have been widely adopted by states and have received frequent consideration in Congress.

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Climate change can’t fit within conventional risk management and is ignored by social values – guarantees extinction

Ian Dunlop & David Spratt, 17. Dunlop has an MA (Mechanical Sciences) degree from the University of Cambridge, is a Fellow of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, the Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, and the Energy Institute (UK), and a Member of the Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME (USA). *David Spratt is a Research Director for Breakthrough and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action (Scribe 2008). “A Failure of Imagination on Climate Risks.” July 26, 2017. www.resilience.org/stories/2017-07-26/a-failure-of-imagination-on-climate-risks/

Climate change is an existential risk that could abruptly end human civilisation because of a catastrophic “failure of imagination” by global leaders to understand and act on the science and evidence before them.

At the London School of Economics in 2008, Queen Elizabeth questioned: “Why did no one foresee the timing, extent and severity of the Global Financial Crisis?” The British Academy answered a year later: “A psychology of denial gripped the financial and corporate world… [it was] the failure of the collective imagination of many bright people… to understand the risks to the system as a whole”.

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Warming causes extinction – a confluence of nonlinear and unpredictable effects will make human and natural systems inhospitable while increasing escalatory conflicts

Michelle Melton, 19. 3rd year Law student at Harvard Law School. Before law school, she was an associate fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she focused on climate policy. “Climate Change and National Security, Part II: How Big a Threat is the Climate?” January 7, 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-ii-how-big-threat-climate

At least until 2050, and possibly for decades after, climate change will remain a creeping threat that will exacerbate and amplify existing, structural global inequalities. While the developed world will be negatively affected by climate change through 2050, the consequences of climate change will be felt most acutely in the developing world. The national security threats posed by climate change to 2050 are likely to differ in degree, not kind, from the kinds of threats already posed by climate change. For the next few decades, climate change will exacerbate humanitarian crises—some of which will result in the deployment of military personnel, as well as material and financial assistance. It will also aggravate natural resource constraints, potentially contributing to political and economic conflict over water, food and energy.

The question for the next 30 years is not “can humanity survive as a species with 1.5°C or 2°C of warming,” but, “how much will the existing disparities between the developed and developing world widen, and how long (and how successfully) can these widening political/economic disparities be sustained?” The urgency of the climate threat in the next few decades will depend, to a large degree, on whether and how much the U.S. government perceives a widening of these global inequities as a threat to U.S. national security.

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Federalism solves warming – regulation, innovation

William W. Buzbee, 18. Professor of Law at Georgetown, “FEDERALISM HEDGING, ENTRENCHMENT, AND THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE,” Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 2017, No. 6 (2018): 1037-1113. https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2350/

INTRODUCTION Advocating a new body of regulation with the explicit concession of likely error and risks of regulatory derailment may seem self-defeating. Nevertheless, effective regulatory design, like effective investment strategies, must be designed for success yet anticipate unfavorable developments and error risks.1 And in the United States, due to our constitutional structures and linked political norms, any major regulatory choice must include decisions about how to utilize the regulatory roles demarked by federalism. What roles should be allocated to or preserved for federal, state, and local actors, or perhaps a combination of them all? Climate change policy choices remain the subject of partisan and rancorous contestation, including disputes over the right federalism choice. By leavening idealized policy solutions with attention to political and legal discord and regulation-market linkages, this Article illuminates the effects and dynamics of federalism hedging, a largely overlooked value of federalism structures retaining concurrent and often interacting federal and state roles. Federalism hedging refers to the regulatory choice to retain overlapping, interacting, and often intertwined federal and state roles even in a setting where the apparently ideal regulatory regime would rely on exclusive federal regulation that would preempt state roles. This Article argues that both federalism discourse and climate change policy debates have failed to analyze adequately how choices about federal and state roles can serve to hedge and even reduce risks of regulatory reversal and implementation failure. This Article’s analysis of federalism hedging operates at three levels. First, it introduces federalism hedging as a theory, explaining the attributes and dynamics of federalism hedging and situating it within recent scholarly and policy debates about the values and functioning of federalism. Second, it then illuminates federalism hedging with analysis of the regulatory challenges posed by climate change and the history of climate and clean energy progress and contestation. And, third, drawing on this theoretical and historical analysis, the Article makes a normative and prescriptive claim that retaining latitude for state and federal overlap can provide an array of benefits and, especially, reduce risks of disruptive policy reversals that could, in turn, undercut linked markets and regulatory progress. Such a hedging role is of especial importance where a body of regulation provides a crucial underpinning of a market and that market is itself essential to regulatory success. Retaining latitude for both federal and state roles also can serve in a valuable precautionary role conducive both to innovation and pragmatic adjustment in regulatory settings characterized by rapid change in business models and technology.2 This Article, like much federalism discourse, is actually not about what is constitutionally required. Instead, the Article builds on an increasingly robust body of scholarship analyzing how federal and state roles recognized by the Constitution should be utilized to further particular regulatory policy goals or political ends.3 Although federalism scholars often mention the benefits of federalism “redundancy” in risk regulation and benefits of dynamic interjurisdictional learning, little of this pro-overlap and interaction federalism literature devotes attention to the regulation-business link, regulatory risks of error, implementation failures, and political reversal risks.4 Another strain of federalism scholarship documents and analyzes the logic and legality of state and local climate and clean energy initiatives undertaken without a broader national agreement. Before comprehensive federal climate legislative proposals went down to defeat in 2009 and 2010, they spurred an important but truncated debate over what roles should be retained by states if the nation enacted a climate-focused federal cap-and-trade bill.6 Prominent scholars and stakeholders argued that because climate regulation addresses a global ill and logically must embrace market-based regulatory tools—most likely cap-and-trade-based regulation or use of pollution taxes—regulation should be structured to draw on the largest markets possible in order to facilitate the business search for costeffective means to reduce emissions.7 They often championed preemption of state climate roles. Final (but unsuccessful) bills, however, rejected such calls.8 And a recent 2017 proposal by leading Republican conservatives advocated enactment of a carbon tax regime, but coupled that proposal with a call for the elimination of other similarly targeted federal or state laws.9 In the absence of a tailored federal climate law, states nonetheless have made climate and clean energy regulatory progress and, as litigants, prompted a series of federal regulatory actions to address climate risks under the Clean Air Act and federal energy laws. And those federal regulatory interventions, especially the Clean Power Plan (CPP) targeting existing power plants’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, were shaped by state experiences, sought to harness state regulatory capacity and creativity, and preserved state authority to do more.10 The role of federalism overlap and interaction as a hedge, especially in the climate regulation arena, is a subject of more than just theoretical interest. As this Article goes to press, the new administration of President Donald Trump has overtly declared plans to revisit and roll back climate progress.11 The extent to which this new administration can do so is substantially shaped by federal, state and business climate and clean energy progress, and past statutory federalism choices. This Article agrees that the ideal answer to a global challenge like climate change would be regulation at the largest scale possible, with minimized regulatory overlap. Nonetheless, mandating such authority allocations would be the wrong answer. The effects and political economic dynamics of federalism hedging analyzed in this Article reveal why. The value of federalism hedging links to likely regulatory implementation failures, regulatory reversal risks, and risks of unsettling linked markets. Responses to regulation will inevitably be ongoing and dynamic; whatever regulatory instruments and design are chosen will shape and change the political and market terrain, and vice versa.12 All policy reforms are “at risk,” facing post-enactment threats and a dynamic environment.13 The challenges of climate change make such regulatory derailment risks especially likely to be persistent threats. Federal harnessing of state roles, or at least preservation of the possibility of state regulation alongside federal regulation,14 can be part of an effective and durable regulatory design due to three effects linked to federalism hedging: heightened stakeholder incentives to commit to the federal regime; policy diffusion dynamics; and gradual entrenchment of supportive coalitions through a process of path dependence dynamics that result in “increasing returns” and “costs of exit.”15 Relatedly, tested regulatory and market accomplishments create a body of experience and record that can provide a bulwark against ungrounded claims of regulatory hardship, change coalitional political dynamics, and provide a fact-based foundation for future regulation.16 For market actors supplying goods and services to meet a regulatory goal, a web of regulation resulting from multiple regulators, or at least potential regulators, is far more resilient and resistant to wholesale derailment than would be complete dependence on a single federal regulatory scheme. Retaining that state authority, even if just a regulatory hedging strategy, fosters overall stability, creates room for regulatory innovation, and thereby creates conditions conducive to private investment to meet regulatory goals. Legal durability is always important, especially where the regulatory infrastructure is a critical underpinning of linked investments and markets. This is especially true in the setting of climate regulation.17 Always underlying climate politics and linked markets is fear of all governments, citizens, and market actors that their jurisdiction will act, but others will not. Such inaction or regulatory reversals of others can disadvantage the climate-regulating jurisdiction, lay waste to investors in related businesses and markets, and leave GHG levels still on the rise.18 The climate and clean energy regulatory infrastructure is already built on laws and regulations benefitted by federalism hedging.19 Concerted federal efforts to reverse course on climate change—a constant in all climate regulation battles and an even more certain scenario under the Trump administration—will surely slow and might even halt federally led climate progress. The existence of federalism hedging strategies, however, will likely reduce the scale of such reversals and also set the stage for future progress.

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US federalism gets modeled globally

Jorg Broschek, 16. Associate Professor at Laurier, Research Chair in Comparative Federalism and Multilevel Governance. “Federalism in Europe, America, and Africa: A Comparative Analysis. Federalism and Decentralization,” 2016. https://www.academia.edu/23565028/Federalism_in_Europe_America_and_Africa_A_Comparative_Analysis

Federalization in the United States has had multifaceted repercussions on other state-building processes. Nowhere, however, was American federalism simply emulated. The diffusion of ideas was processed against the historical background of individual settler societies and shaped deliberations in constitutional assemblies in various ways. In South America and Mexico, ideas gleaned from the United States experience were blended with ideational currents derived from the Spanish colonial legacy, while in Canada the federal idea had to be reconciled with the British legacy of Westminster-style democracy. Federalism advocates had to defend the federal idea against other viable institutional solutions, most notably confederal arrangements or a unitary state. Debates revolving around the question of sovereignty represent one important manifestation of this problem. The question of whether or not sovereignty is something that could be divided and, if so, with what implications for the nature of authority relationships between the federal level and constituent units, often remained contested.

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Multiple empirics prove modelling

Mark C. Rahdert, 07. Professor of Law at Temple University. “Comparative Constitutional Advocacy,” January 30, 2007. American University Law Review, Volume 56, Issue 3.

The past fifty years have changed all of that in remarkable ways, most notably through the enactment of new constitutions and the development of tribunals for authoritative constitutional interpretation and application in democratic systems around the world.45 With direct U.S. encouragement, elements of American-style constitutionalism were transplanted into the new post-war constitutional structures adopted in Japan and West Germany.46 Some leading Western European nations contemporaneously adopted new constitutional systems complete with formal constitutional courts.47 English-speaking constitutional legal systems with judicial review powers emerged in several British Commonwealth nations including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.48 New supranational constitutional systems with authoritative judicial structures, most notably the European Court of Human Rights and the courts of the European Union, developed.49 Constitutions and constitutional courts were installed in some of the nations that emerged from crumbling colonial empires in Africa, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.50 More recently, systems of constitutional law and adjudication in constitutional courts were adopted in several Eastern European republics that were organized (sometimes with U.S. technical assistance) after the disintegration of the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union.51 Indeed, if one were to create a list of the fifteen or twenty leading world constitutional systems today, the overwhelming majority either did not exist or were in their infancy fifty years ago. 2. Similarity of issues Many of the world’s leading constitutional systems have been in business long enough to develop significant and relatively mature law on constitutional questions that resonate with issues in the United States. There is, for example, a robust transnational jurisprudence on such issues as reproductive freedom,52 freedom of speech,53 freedom of religion,54 racial and ethnic equality,55 language rights of minorities,56 gender equality,57 sexual orientation equality,58 privacy,59 constitutional limits on punishment,60 the right to counsel for the indigent,61 and the rights of the accused.62 An international jurisprudence is also developing on such structural issues as separation of powers and the rulemaking authority of government agencies,63 war and emergency executive powers,64 and even (to a limited degree) federalism. Exploring the jurisprudence of other nations on these and other similar constitutional questions, one is struck by the similarity to U.S. constitutional law. This similarity has at least two sources: a commitment to common constitutional norms, and the need to apply them to comparable cultural, social, political, and economic developments.66 While the various world constitutional systems reflect important differences in language, structure, and history, they are often committed to the same basic principles as the U.S. Constitution. This is especially true in the field of human rights67 because the U.S. Constitution has served as a model for human rights guarantees around the world.68 While more modern constitutions elsewhere have often expanded beyond the U.S. Constitution, including explicit guarantees that the U.S. Constitution lacks,69 many have looked (often explicitly) to the U.S. Constitution for guidance when crafting their own Constitutions.70 Because their constitutional law embraces comparable basic human rights, it encounters similar constitutional questions. While reliance on the U.S. model for structural issues has been less direct, other democracies also share some common structural ground, particularly in the delineation of separate spheres for legislative, executive/administrative, and judicial functions.71 Like the U.S. Constitution, many foreign constitutions delineate legislative and executive powers and functions, and their legal systems face instances of potential horizontal and vertical conflict among internal governmental structures.72

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Countries still model American federalism

Ronald Rolunda et al 13. Ronald Rolunda, Doy and Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence at Chapman University. *Mila Versteeg, professor of law at the University of Virginia. *Dr. István Stumpf, Vice President of National Council of the Patriotic People's Front from 1989 to 1990. “The U.S. Constitution Had on the Recently Adopted Constitutions of Other Nations?” May 29, 2013.

The basic notions of rule of law, separation of powers, natural law, judicial review, and human rights came to life thanks to the example of the United States in the last 225 years, which in turn has influenced the entirety of Western civilization, including Hungary. The theoretical foundations of American constitutionalism, the works of American legal scholars, and the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court are valuable resources and strong points of reference for lawyers in Hungary and all over the world. I am confident that it is for the benefit of the American academia to study from time to time how the concepts and institutions of American constitutionalism flourish or face difficulties in other countries. It is an honor for me to be here and take part in this conversation. As Hungary sets out to solidify its commitment to truths that are self-evident, to the protection of unalienable rights, to a limited but effective government, and to a renewed constitutionalism, I am convinced that we may in the future inspire one another. Let me close with this thought: There is much talk about a post-American era and American decline. As a young scholar visiting America since the 1980s, I got to know this country through road trips across the heartland as well as Ivy League university lecture halls, and I can tell you that the ideals of the Founding Fathers, the principles of the U.S. Constitution, and the Declaration of Independence were not and are not in decline. On the contrary, democracies around the world, old and new, need them now more than ever.

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American federalism is modeled globally

Ronald Krotoszynski, 10. Director of Faculty Research, and Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. “The Shot (Not) Heard 'Round the World: Reconsidering the Perplexing U.S. Preoccupation with the Separation of Executive and Legislative Powers,” Boston College Law Review 51:1 http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3103&context=bclr&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fstart%3D20%26q%3Damerican%2Bmodel%2Bjudicial%2Breview%2Bexecutive%2Binternational%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%2C18%26as_ylo%3D2009#search=%22american%20model%20judicial%20review%20executive%20international%22

The United States has been both an importer and an exporter of constitutional structure since at least the Federal Convention in 1787, at which the Framers considered a variety of foreign constitutional models, including both contemporary and ancient, when fashioning the Constitution.' Although Great Britain's unwritten constitution pro- vided the most obvious template, it was by no means the only available model.2 By 1787, most states had extensive experience with constitu- tional design.3 The adoption of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 led to a spate of new constitution-making at the state level, as the newly independent former colonies felt it necessary to establish new constitutions for their independent republics.4 The Articles of Confed- eration, drafted in 1776-1777, ratified in 1781, and now largely forgot- ten, also served as the first blueprint for federal governance.5 Thus, as Professor Paul (Harrington correctly states, "[w]hile the idea of a written constitution enforced by national courts was an American novelty, it was less novel than many may suppose."6 Of course, the Framers did not completely abandon the British model of constitutional structure.7 Congress, a bicameral institution, is loosely modeled on the British Parliament, which was—and still is— comprised of two chambers, the House of Commons and the House of Lords.8 Although the manner of selection and underlying purposes differ, the adoption of a bicameral legislature plainly reflects an hom- age to the British model.9 Similarly, specific provisions of the U.S. Con- stitution reflect longstanding British constitutional practices such as the Speech and Debate Clause10 and the Jury Trial Clause." To be sure, the Framers departed from the British model and did so in significant ways.12 The Framers' major structural innovations in- clude a written constitution (as opposed to the unwritten, or only par- tially written, British Constitution), a judiciary vested with the power to review legislative and executive acts for consistency with the Constitu- tion, federalism featuring shared sovereignty between the states and the national government, and the separation of powers between the legisla- tive, executive, and judicial branches of government.13 To this list one could add, by way of amendments quickly adopted by the first Congress and ratified by the states shortly thereafter, a written Bill of Rights.14 Most of these innovations in constitutional design have become commonplace; when other nations turn to the task of drafting a new constitution, the resulting product more often than not includes one or more of these elements.15 The Spanish Constitution, for example, adopted a federalist principle in order to overcome persistent difficul- ties with the status of Catalunya and the Basque Region.16 The South African (Constitution vests the judiciary with a power of judicial review and a duty to enforce entrenched human rights against the more de- mocratically accountable branches of government.17 Moreover, even common law jurisdictions that long maintained the principle of par- liamentary supremacy have moved closer to the U.S. model of en- trenched, judicially enforceable human rights.18 Canada, for example, adopted its (Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, and vested the Canadian judiciary with a qualified power of judicial review.19 Even in the United Kingdom itself, adoption of the Human Rights Act of 1998 reflects a decision to adopt a junior varsity version of the U.S. model of entrenched, judicially enforceable human rights.20 Thus, the U.S. Constitution has provided a persuasive model for other nations engaged in the task of writing a constitution. Judicial re- view and entrenched human rights are, if not a universal aspect of con- stitutions adopted after World War II, quite nearly so.21 As Robert Badinter, former President of the French Conseil Constituuonnel, and Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme (Court Stephen Breyer have apdy observed, "[t]oday almost all Western democracies have come to be- lieve that independent judiciaries can help to protect fundamental human rights through judicial interpretation and application of written documents containing guarantees of individual freedom."22 Thus, the U.S. constitutional model has proven to be a very successful legal export in many important respects.23 In two significant respects, however, the U.S. template has not garnered many takers: separation of legisla- tive and executive powers, and strict judicial definition and enforce- ment of the boundaries between legislative and executive power.24