The discourses of Africans and people of African descent, which ultimately helped bring about the end of formal empire in Africa and the Caribbean, took place during a particularly important moment in the formation of ‘the international.’ 62 While the first and second waves of decolonisation comprised similar dynamics of empire-colony relations, and the internal divergences within colonised societies, the third wave of decolonisation came as the result of a uniquely global discourse around the role of imperialism in the First World War, the threat this represented to ‘world civilisation’, and the new forms of international governance and social relations needed to address global conflict. During this moment, empire came to be seen as in need of reform by some, and inherently destructive and regressive by others. In each case, the emergence of more powerful and organised racial advocacy networks and the depreciating returns of white imperial legitimacy galvanised arguments for non-white inclusion in governance. Objection to white supremacy proliferated in various transnational advocacy organizations and through colonial and metropolitan print cultures. These ideas were facilitated by the synchronisation of racial grievance throughout colonised populations, but also by the ideological and organisational resources supplied by the COMINTERN and the United States. Black anti-imperialism is not reducible to Soviet communism or American liberalism, but its entanglements with other political movements often led to important consequences, such as the crackdown on its print materials and organising by colonial authorities.63 The focus on black internationalism also has a rationale related to the relative neglect of certain discourses and ideologies in the formation of the international/states system. While it would be possible to dig deeper into the anti-imperial politics of white metropolitan activists, the view that independence was gifted to the colonies by benevolent whites does not need further elaboration. The notion that white Western societies came around on their own to new moral positions on practices like colonialism already forms the bedrock for a plethora of liberal constructivist studies and popular histories.64 Analysis of the world political discourse of individuals like Marcus Garvey, Cyril Briggs, J.E. and Adelaide Casely Hayford, Paulette Nardal, George Padmore, among others, forms part of the unique contribution of this study. Although they usually referred to peasant and worker communities, the discourses I analyse here were relatively elite. However, there is more in the history of anti-imperial, intra-elite discourse than has been sometimes suggested by historians of the subaltern. Excluded socially and politically, but rich in cultural capital, sufficiently resourced to travel between colony and metropole, and tailored towards low level, white collar professions, many anti-imperial writers and leaders were acutely aware of the transnational pecking order, and occupied a position of relative subalternity. For the most part, these individuals fit Edward Said’s category of the ‘secular intellectual.’65 Said defines secular intellectuals by six axes of activity and thought: 1.) the ‘archival function’ of preserving and deploying ‘counterinformation’ which is hidden by the ‘prevailing consensus’; 2.) translating specialized knowledge and literature into forms accessible to broad groups of people; 3.) demystifying the language of authority which appeals to so-called pragmatic common-sense in order to highlight the underlying ethical or political implications; 4.) disrupting attempts to privatize knowledge by challenging the boundaries of specialized domains of practice; 5.) resisting a culture’s slide into total domination or trivialization; and 6.) insisting on the irreconcilability and irreducibility of oppositions.66 In Antonio Gramsci’s problematic and the European context, such figures would normally be considered intellectuals proper, the ‘organizers of culture’ contrasted with the ‘organic intellectuals’ who derive their ideology from the ‘essential task of economic production.’67 But the relative marginality of colonial anti-imperial activists created a unique position where the function of intellectual critique often needed to be exercised outside the realms of formal knowledge production—in the function rooms and public parks of metropolitan centres, through art and literature, and in transnational print media Through its empirics and approach this study seeks to contribute to the ‘(re)turn’ to empire and race in IR.69 A few scholars now recognise that analysis of contemporary international relations, whether it concerns Brexit; Russian, Chinese, and Western rivalry in Africa; NATO operations in the Middle East; Salafist movements; transnational protest movements like Black Lives Matter; or developments in organisations like CARICOM, the African Union, or ASEAN, is often poorer for not attending to legacies of empire and colonialism, as well as ongoing imperial relations. Critical histories of IR have pointed to IR as an academic discipline which got its start through the policy science of race development and imperial management70; which continues to advance self-flattering myths about Western exceptionalism; and which claims or assumes the universality of European history, institutions, and technologies. This can have the effect of whitewashing Euro-American world politics, or, more insidiously, continuing to normalise state-sanctioned violence and inequality. 71 These critiques of IR as a Eurocentric discipline, historically bound up with white supremacy, have carried the discipline to a crossroads. Down one road, there is the possibility of attempting to address these omissions and biases with analysis based in liberal pluralist inclusion: adding a host of ‘non-Western’ categories and biases, which posit cultural and territorialised particularities. I argue that the likely outcome here is not an amelioration of Eurocentrism, but an extension of it. The West is still granted the terrain of the universal, with ‘the non-West’ granted tolerance to tack on a variety of cultural ‘differences’, as long as it largely continues to adhere to disciplinary shibboleths, such as order, sovereignty, and recognition. Another path – though not the only one -- is the relational-historical approach to empire and race I put forward in this study. This understands relations between former empires and colonies as asymmetrical and differentiated but connected, constituted through resistance and alliance as well as oppression, and interpretable through discourse, which often concerned bounded communities, but was usually also boundary-crossing.
Predictive analytics use a variety of techniques (e.g., statistical methods, machine learning algorithms) to make predictions about future events. Although predictive analytics have been used in many disciplines since the early 20th century (e.g., actuarial science, business intelligence, financial forecasting), increasingly, this computationally intensive technique has been employed by law enforcement and other government agencies to generate predictions about future criminal behavior. While the function of predictive analytics in policing appears to be well intentioned, upon a closer examination, one may find that the decisions generated by ‘black--box’ modeling techniques like supervised machine learning encourage a ‘blind faith’ in the mathematical process and in the ability of algorithms to produce meaningful and informative predictions. Thus, despite their widespread use, predictive policing tools are complex systems with many aspects that remain a mystery. In this paper, we critically examine the employment of predictive analytics in US criminal justice policy, with a particular focus on the ways in which these technological practices are reproducing and reinforcing structural relations of difference. We are specifically motivated by the following questions: In what ways do the algorithms become part of a larger sociotechnical apparatus of sociopolitical relations? How are the data that the algorithms inherit alwaysalready imbued with structural relations of difference? To what extent do algorithms predict or performatively enact differential patterns of sentencing decisions or recidivism? In what ways might bodies, spaces, and practices be materially formed and shaped from the performative acts of algorithmic legal reasoning? And, in what ways might the cloaking of algorithmic legal reasoning as objective, precise, and efficient enable the proliferation of racializing assemblages in the juridical field? Each of these motivating questions will be examined through a new materialist lens that posits algorithms as more--thanhuman ontologies and racializing assemblages. As argued by the first author elsewhere, we need to move beyond the dominant tendency to treat algorithms as mechanical operations that are contingent on human intervention or design and, as such, a prosthetic tool to human cognition. The concept of algo--ritmo reconceptualizes the algorithm as 1 2 3 4 D-- 3/41 engaging in more--than--human performative acts that are produced from the immanent forms of what Luciana Parisi refers to as the “soft” thought of algorithmic reasoning. As a concept, algo--ritmo not only accounts theoretically for how the more--than--human performative acts of algorithms function but also considers the ways in which those algorithmic acts are forming, shaping, hierarchizing, and differentiating bodies. Thus, algo--ritmo also refers to the ways in which algorithms become racializing assemblages. As articulated by Alex Weheliye, racializing assemblages are a system of sociopolitical relations that hierarchizes and differentiates bodies, designating bodies as human, notquite--human, and nonhuman; rendering certain bodies as exceptional and others as disposable. Algo--ritmo postulates that the bodily disciplining is both human and more--than--hum an. Thus, there are not just human bodies that are racialized but algorithms too. In other words, we argue that inside of the proverbial “black box” , algorithms become immanent agencies of racializing assemblages. By doing a close reading of policy documents and existing research literature, we critically examine the racializing assemblages of algorithmic law enforcement logic, policies and practices, followed by ethical and social policy considerations. We begin by discussing the literature on big data and the rise of predictive policing. Policing Crime & Predictive Analytics Big Data & The Rise of Predictive Policing In recent years, the private sector and government have focused their efforts on harnessing the power of big data to find meaningful patterns and make datadriven decisions. Private corporations such as Target and Walmart have analyzed their customer data to inform marketing strategies and product sales and placement. Government agencies are also leveraging big data and analytics to improve policy decision--making. Most notably, in 2012, the Obama Administration unveiled a Big Data Initiative, which sought to “improve the tools and techniques needed to access, organize, and glean discoveries from huge volumes of digital data.” Arguably, where there have been even more advancements on these fronts has been in local city governance and institutional practices. While many government institutions have turned to big data analytics to make more “intelligent” decisions, law enforcement and criminal justice have emerged as two of the most prevalent areas in which these techniques have been developed and applied. 5 6 7 8 9 10 D-- 4/41 Policing Bodies Numerically Before delving into the use of analytics in policing, it is important to understand the history of the use of statistics and numbers more broadly in criminal justice research. Prediction and forecasting have been used for nearly a century to study crime in the U.S. While much of this research has been focused on studying criminal behavior , other work has used forecasting methods to predict trends in crime and prison populations. That said, no matter the outcome, criminal justice researchers have long been obsessed with using data —and in particular quantitative data—to understand crime. One prevailing belief is that, culturally speaking, the predominance of quantitative methods in criminal justice research reflects a broader societal notion about what it means to do science, and in this context it should not be surprising that to do science requires the manipulation and calculation of numbers. The act of defining and explaining social phenomena using numbers or quantitative data is nothing new. In fact, this phenomenon has its roots in positivism. Positivism refers to the philosophical writings (circa 1830--1842) of Auguste Comte in which the scientific method—the standard procedure for gaining and producing knowledge in the natural sciences—was applied to the study of human behavior and social phenomena. According to Comte, there are three premises of positivism: 1. Universal truths exist for human behavior and social phenomena. 2. Empirical observation is the only rational means by which universal truths in the social world can be discovered. 3. Through the application of the scientific method, causal relationships among social phenomena can be established Imbued within positivist philosophy is the notion that truth cannot only be discovered but also replicated through (precise and certain) scientific measurement. It was through the application of positivism to the study of the human condition and social life that quantification and the scientific method become central features of social and behavioral science and the preferred ways of understanding populations. While the rise of positivism led to the growing use of quantitative methods in the human sciences, why were these methods so readily and widely accepted? 11 12 13 14 15 D-- 5/41 Theodore Porter in his seminal work Trust in Numbers historically traces the rise of objective empiricism and ubiquity of quantification in the modern world. To Porter, and largely society as a whole, we are drawn to numbers not only because they can be used to describe social phenomena, but also because a decision ‘made’ by numbers appears impartial and indisputable. This notion of numbers as ‘truth’ is rooted in the belief that mathematics is the language and logic of the natural world. When applied to the study of human and social life, however, in what ways and to what extent do numbers become political and reflect the normative assumptions about what is counted, how it is counted, and why it is counted? This critical question is at the heart of Porter’s work, and through the use of historical case studies he demonstrates that numbers are never void of subjectivity or judgment. Rather, numbers are “strategies of communication” that are used to legitimize one’s actions and “provide standards against which [to measure progress and compare information].” In this way, numbers become “an agency for acting on people [and] exercising power over them.” If we build off Porter’s claim about the nature of numbers and take seriously the proposition that numbers are capable of exerting power, then we must consider the possibility that numbers, which can describe the social world, can just as easily be used to control it. Michel Foucault takes up this subject in many of his works, and characterizes discipline as a mode of power that “separates, analyses, differentiates…measures…and hierarchizes in terms of value.” Importantly, for Foucault, while discipline is “exercised on the bodies of individuals…the individual is not the primary datum on which discipline is exercised.” Although this statement may seem paradoxical, it can be explained by examining Foucault’s two lecture series Security, Territory, and Population and Governmentality. In both works, Foucault provides a historical account of the evolution of government, and describes how society’s transition from feudalism to capitalism led government to be concerned with the population within its territory in order to successfully govern the territory over which it has control. Driving this concern was the desire to organize, optimize, and regulate state affairs. This, of course, required the collection of data from individuals, while privileging quantified population trends. Viewed through a Foucauldian lens, then, methods of quantification such as statistics are a means through which the state controls, categorizes, and classifies its citizens. The Rise of the Carceral State 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 D-- 6/41 If statistics and numbers have had historical significance in criminal justice research, then we must inquire about the role they have played in policing bodies in the U.S. In particular, we ask how have numbers shaped policing and legitimized mass incarceration? We contend that the origins of mass incarceration in the U.S. can be traced to the Johnson era’s War on Poverty. When Lyndon B. Johnson assumed the presidency, he not only vowed to enforce civil rights, but he also declared war on poverty. After a few years in office, however, what began as a commitment to nationwide anti--poverty programs quickly turned into something more sinister—namely, an agenda to target and punish urban, black communities across America. In 1965, Daniel Moynihan, a politician and sociologist, released a report titled The Negro Family: The Case for National Action. In the report, Moynihan used employment data to identify the causes of poverty and social--ill (e.g., crime, corruption) in the U.S. Often citing dire statistics to shock the reader (e.g. “Almost One--Fourth of Negro Families are Headed by Females”), Moynihan’s report largely painted the poverty problem in the U.S. as a “negro problem” rooted in the disintegration of the black nuclear family. Though President Johnson would come to distance himself from the blatantly racist report authored by Moynihan, by the end of his term in office, the damage had already been done. The carefully crafted communication strategy embedded within Moynihan’s report had legitimized the government’s desire to control the “negro problem,” and culminated in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Crime & Carceral State The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 signaled a profound shift in the government’s attitude and response to the root causes and correlates of crime. The Act enabled the federal government to provide financial assistance to local law enforcement agencies for the procurement of police equipment and laid the foundation for massive federal investments in crime control and prevention strategies. More importantly, however, the Act expanded the federal government’s (e.g., Department of Justice) role in local law enforcement and criminal justice matters, with the goal of creating an interconnected, coordinated system for the provision of justice and crime 24 25 26 27 28 D-- 7/41 prevention. Ultimately, the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act represented a major step by the government to federalize crime and codified the prioritization of law enforcement over welfare as a means to address social problems. Less than a decade after President Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act into Law, and after decades of stability in the rates of incarceration, the U.S. began to experience substantial growth in its prison population, a trend that has yet to be reversed. By the late 1960s, fear of rising urban crime and drug related activities, coupled with social and political unrest, fueled bilateral support for the United States’ punitive approach to law and order. This support translated into harsher punishments for minor offenses and mandatory minimum sentences and, ultimately, resulted in extraordinarily high rates of incarceration after 1970. According to estimates published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, approximately 500,000 people were incarcerated in 1980. By 2000, however, the total incarcerated population had exploded to more than 1.9 million. Though the shift towards tougher penal policies exerted a significant influence on national incarceration rates, time trends show that growth in incarceration in the U.S. has not been uniform across offenses or offenders. It is commonly recognized that the War on Drugs has contributed to the rise in incarceration rates over the last 40 years. Thus, it should come as no surprise that drug offenses over time have begun to comprise a disproportionate share of arrests and prison admissions. Figure 1 shows the time trends from 1980 to 2012 in the rate of arrests for select crimes. The most striking pattern revealed in the figure is the sharp increase in the rate of arrests for drug abuse violations compared to arrests for other criminal offenses. Specifically, over the 32 years for which we have data, arrests for drug related offenses rose from 255.65 per 100,000 persons in 1980 to just under 500 per 100,000 in 2012, peaking at 633.25 per 100,000 persons in 2006. An examination of incarceration rates over the same period shows a similar pattern, where in 1980 the incarceration rate for a drug related offense was 15 per 100,000 persons, but by 2000, that rate had increased over tenfold to more than 150 per 100,000. 29 30 31 32 33 D-- 8/41 Figure 1: Arrests per 100,000 persons by offense, 1980 to 2012. Other offenses include aggravated assault and sex offenses. SOURCE: Snyder, Howard N., and Joseph Mulako--Wangota. “Arrest in the United States, 1980--2012.” Bureau of Justice Statistics, FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program, September 2014. Accessed February 28, 2017. www.bjs.gov. On the surface, the movement toward punitive crime control in the U.S. appeared to be broad and far--reaching. When disaggregated by race, however, the data present a more troubling picture. Despite comprising less than 12% of the U.S. population in 1980, African Americans made up 44% of the total amount of state and federal inmates in the same year. By 2000, the population of African Americans in the U.S. had increased to 12.9%, and yet they accounted for 46% of all inmates in U.S. state and federal correctional facilities. In the end, the U.S.’ policy of mass incarceration not only led to an overrepresentation of African Americans in jails and prisons, but it also reflects a clear policy choice to inscribe race into the criminal justice system. Perhaps John Ehrlichman, a former Nixon domestic policy chief, best expresses these sentiments: 34 35 D-- 9/41 “You want to know what this was really all about…The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying. We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.” Policing in the Information Age Today, across the U.S., dozens of police departments, from Boston to Los Angeles, have turned to sophisticated data analytics to address criminal justice practices. Although the use of quantitative data to address crime is not novel, newer technologies fueled by algorithms, artificial intelligence, and machine learning enable law enforcement agencies to harness the power of big data to predict criminal behavior. This strategy is often referred to as predictive policing. We adopt our definition of predictive policing from the RAND Corporation and National Institute of Justice. They define predictive policing as the “the application of analytical techniques—particularly quantitative techniques—to identify likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crimes by making statistical predictions.” Predictive policing and its tools permit law enforcement to use data to predict where crime is most likely to happen; assess who is most likely to (re)offend or be victimized; and form typologies of offenders. While the goals of predictive policing may be clear, what remains muddied is what they are doing to accomplish these goals. However, before we can examine what predictive policing tools are doing, we must have a better understanding of some of the keywords that are often used when discussing the subject, namely, artificial intelligence, supervised machine learning, and algorithm. Artificial intelligence is an umbrella term used to describe the science and engineering of creating machines and/or software with the ability to achieve a goal. , Nested within AI is supervised machine learning. Supervised machine learning, as a branch of AI, is concerned with using historical information (i.e., a dataset that includes known input (x) and output (y) data) to train a model that can be used to predict future events (or 36 37 38 39 40 41 D-- 10/41 behavior). An algorithm, on the other hand, can be defined as a list of instructions for a step--by--step execution of a specific task. Supervised machine learning algorithms, then, are computer programs that not only try to achieve a specific goal (e.g., predict the likelihood of crime in location Y) but also are capable of improving (or maintaining) their performance in service to that goal when fed new input data As Foster and colleagues note: “One key distinction in [supervised] machine learning is that the goal is not just to find the best function F that can predict Y for observed outcomes (known Ys) but to find one that best generalizes to new, unseen data.” Machine learning algorithms have been applied to a variety of criminal justice contexts. These algorithms can be used at all stages of the criminal justice process, from determining where to deploy police officers for maximum impact , to informing bail decisions (also known as pretrial risk assessment) , to assessing risk for recidivating among parolees and probationers. Police departments and other branches of the criminal justice system in cities around the country have adopted these tools, drawing on both researchers and university--based partnerships, as well as proprietary software, to develop and implement the desired algorithmic tools. One widely known proprietary tool, PredPol, is the product of a research partnership between UCLA, UC Santa Barbara, and the Los Angeles Police Department. According to their website, “PredPol’s mission is to provide a crime prevention platform to keep communities safer. Our…technology places public safety officers at the right time and location to give them the best chance of preventing crime.” Using machine learning techniques, PredPol claims to be able to predict where crime is most likely to occur using only three data points: “crime type, crime location, and crime date and time.” Another example is the COMPAS tool produced by Northpointe, which applies machine learning algorithms to risk assessment at the levels of policing and case management, promising users both a “prospective” and “retrospective look at risk and needs factors.” Yet despite widespread use of these algorithms, touted as powerful and technologically advanced methods for improving public safety, their propensity to disproportionately target individuals from lower--class neighborhoods and communities of color remains starkly understudied and underreported outside of popular news media. 41 43 41 41 46 47 48 49 50 51 D-- 11/41 Algorithmic Reasoning as Racializing Assemblages Machine learning algorithms are being employed in many sectors of US society including in the practices of predictive policing and criminal justice. Yet, we know less about the ways in which the algorithms may become part of a larger sociotechnical apparatus of sociopolitical relations. In order to examine this, we put the concept of algo--ritmo to work in analyzing the algorithmic legal reasoning of predictive policing. Algo--ritmo seeks to account for both the immanent agencies of algorithmic acts and the ways in which those acts become racializing assemblages. In conceptually developing an understanding of how algorithms may become racializing assemblages, the first author has argued that it is through the data that the algorithms inherit sociopolitical relations of society. Data are not pure, objective extractions of the world but rather are assemblages that are produced from a multiplicity of entwined and mutating apparatuses. The apparatuses of data assemblages include political economy, forms of knowledge, practices, governmentalities and legalities, and subjectivities and communities, among others. As assemblages, they are both materially and discursively produced from forces of human and more--than--human ontologies. Among the multiplicity of forces that make up data assemblages include sociopolitical relations that consist of forces that differentiate and hierarchize bodies. Thus, all assemblages of data are always--already imbued with varying degrees of sociopolitical relations and, as such, become part of the (re)programmed architectures of algorithmic reasoning. For algo--ritmo, algorithmic reasoning is not understood to be mechanical operations that are contingent on human intervention or design. It is postulated that the systematic operations of algorithms are not simply humanly designed and modeled or the prosthetic tool to human cognition. In accordance with Parisi, algorithms are understood to be actual entities that consist of finite operations of calculation as well as incomputable data sequences. As actual entities, they are sociotechnical ontologies that are always in process of becoming in relation with sociopolitical systems, legal practices, programmed inputs, and data assemblages. These are not simply humanly designed technologies, but rather as algorithms process and are trained on data assemblages they become more--than--human ontologies. For Parisi, it is the 52 53 54 D-- 12/41 actuality of incomputabilities that provide instantiation of the immanent forms of algorithmic cognition. That is to say, operating between the space of finite algorithmic operations and the incomputability of the world’s infinite complexity (i.e., information) are forms of speculative reason that are immanent to computation. If machine learning algorithms consist of immanent forms of reasoning, then the iterability of predictions or speech acts are more--than--human performative acts. Performative acts, or intra--actions, are relational acts within entangled entities that produce ongoing material (re)configurings of the world. Building on Barad’s diffractive reading of Foucault’s discursive theory and Butler’s theory of performativity via Bohr’s conception of matter, algo--ritmo engages in morethan--human performative acts, in which materiality is discursive and the discursive is always--already material. It is via the iterable intra--actions with other relational ontologies that materially reconfigures the world. Thus, algoritmos matter through their iterable intra--actions with other ontologies, whereby they enact, form, shape, and produce both human and more--thanhuman bodies. As agencies that inherit sociopolitical relations via data assemblages, the immanent forms of reasoning and more--than--human performative acts of algorithms become racializing assemblages. The theory of racializing assemblages seeks to more adequately account for the processes of power and racializations of the body/flesh. As argued by Weheliye, racialization is not to be reduced to race or racism but is the process of differentiation and hierarchization that produces the assemblages of race, gender, class, sexuality, and dis/ability among other structural relations of “difference”. The sociopolitical relations of racialization are perpetuated via technologies and sciences (among other things) and require “the barring of nonwhite subjects from the category of the human.” Thus, the data and code of algorithms inherit the sociopolitical relations of “difference” becoming a performative force of the relational and connected forces of racializing assemblages. As a way of drawing a distinction between the legal constitution of the body and the social designations of the flesh, Weheliye also calls upon Hortense Spillers’ (2003) theorizing of the flesh. As Spillers nsightfully states “before the ‘body’ there is ‘flesh,’ that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse or the reflexes of iconography…” Prior to the legal constitution of the body is the formation of the flesh, a formation that is bound by the markings or traces of political violence designating a hierarchy of humanity. The traces of political violence of the flesh are what Spillers refers to as “hieroglyphics of the flesh” that are produced from the instruments or acts of violence such as whips, police brutality, mass shootings, or more subtly from the silence in speech acts. The data and code of algorithmic acts inherit the sociopolitical forces and “hieroglyphics of the flesh” of racializing assemblages from the iterability of algorithmic intra--actions. In this article, we examine the ways in which algorithmic legal reasoning, as materialized in practices of predictive policing, becomes racializing assemblages. As will be discussed below, sociopolitical relations of racializations become part of the algorithmic architecture in at least two ways. First is by way of the rationalities behind the metrics that operationalize and constitute the criterion of prediction. The second is more posthumanist via the algorithmic intra--action with data assemblages and through this process (re)configuring the architecture of the algorithm to becoming racializing assemblages. By putting the concept algo--ritmo to work in a close reading of the existing research and policy literature, we illuminate these sociopolitical processes.