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2022 Michigan Evidence

No NATO Entrapment

NATO entrapment’s wrong—no automatic involvement

Alley 20 (Joshua Keegan Alley-PhD. “Alliance Participation And Military Spending” , Dissertation, Texas A&M University Political Science, 2020 , online via KU libraries , date accessed 2/24/21)

*italics in original

2022 Michigan Evidence

Entrapment False—AT: Cred Theory

Cred theory is fake – allies prefer peaceful policy and minimal intervention

Iain D. Henry 20, (Lecturer at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Spring 2020, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 4)//EZAY

The events of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis illustrate the need to delineate between innate loyalty and observed reliability. Reliability is a broader and more useful concept that subsumes the idea of loyalty and reduces its unwarranted prominence. U.S. conduct was not judged against an objective standard of loyalty: allies desiring a confrontational posture, such as South Korea and the Philippines, invoked Quemoy and Matsu as symbols that required defending, and encouraged U.S. loyalty to the ROC. Most allies, however, were more concerned about the possibility of war, and so discouraged a U.S. defense of strategically unimportant territory. These allies did not mind that this would involve U.S. disloyalty to the ROC, but instead cared about whether Washington's policy goals were convergent with their own.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Entrapment False—AT: Reputational risk theory

Reputation alone is insufficient to trigger entrapment

Alexander Lanoszka 17 — (Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor at the University of Waterloo, Published: 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; Accessed: 7-4-2022; https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102)//Pen-SY

Scholars are divided about whether fighting for reputation is a rational motive for states and thus whether it creates perverse incentives for allies. Some claim that states calculate the credibility of an ally or an adversary on the basis of its willingness and ability to fulfill a threat or promise. Credibility thus does not depend on having a record of keeping pledges (Press, 2005). Accordingly, states cannot develop reputations for reliability among their own allies (Mercer, 1996; Tang, 2005). Fighting for reputation is irrational. However, some dispute the proposition that actions do not matter for building credibility since actions provide information as to the interests and resolve of a state. Moreover, a record of standing up to adversaries could generate credibility, which in turn helps develop a bargaining advantage (Weisiger & Yarhi-Milo, 2015). Whichever is the case, recent scholarship has cast doubt as to whether reputational concerns worsen entrapment risks. The Vietnam War is an oft-cited example of the entrapment of strong states by friendly states, but the evidence shows that American allies wished to restrain the United States because they feared that questionable wars of choice would divert resources away from them (Beckley, 2015, pp. 33–38, pp. 46–47). Another weakness of the reputational explanation for entrapment is its deceptively simple counterfactual. Simply stated, the counterfactual is that the defender does not care about its reputation. Yet the implications of this counterfactual are unclear. For example, does the defender not help the ally at all? And if it does assist the ally, is it doing so only because of reputational concerns? By offering an alliance commitment in the first place, the defender reveals that it has some common security interests with that ally (Walt, 1987; Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, & Cooper, 2016). A defender unconcerned with its reputation might still help that ally for various national security reasons, as its decision-makers understand them. Alternatively, a defender might even enhance its reputation by not assisting the ally in a militarized conflict that the very ally instigated. The defender could decide that following the reckless ally into an undesirable war will undermine its ability to protect other, less problematic allies. The defender could even limit the damage to its reputation by deflecting blame onto a misbehaving ally. These observations suggest that the ally might not necessarily want to wager that the defender would fight on its behalf simply because of reputational concerns. And so an ally that is willing to make this wager is the sort of state that might already be pre-disposed to risk-acceptant behavior. If war does break out because the ally made that gamble, then the war should not be attributed to the alliance per se but rather to the ally and its innate risk propensity.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Turn—Relations Solve Entrapment

Stronger relations cause NATO to restrain US aggression- solves entrapment

Anika Binnendijk 19 — (Anika Binnendijk; senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Published: 2019; "An Attack Against Them All? Drivers of Decisions to Contribute to NATO Collective Defense"; RAND Corporation; Accessed: 7-9-2022; https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1080712.pdf)//Pen-SY

Concerns about a mismatch of goals could be overcome if coalition participants are more confident in their ability to influence the coalition’s actions. Potential participants could have concerns about restraining any ally, but in a Baltic scenario, these concerns are likely to be most acute with respect to the most powerful and leading members of the coalition and the Baltic states. Typically, weaker states are thought to have less leverage in the alliance and, therefore, greater concerns about entrapment by a stronger ally like the United States.78 However, weaker allies do have some ways to restrain more-powerful allies. First, longstanding diplomatic and military relationships among NATO members mean that states might have insight into their allies’ decision making processes and the contacts needed to influence those processes.79 Second, allies also have some sources of leverage over a coalition leader, including the ability to withdraw participation or place limits on access to military bases or airspace.80 Such actions could restrain a coalition leader’s behavior by affecting its ability to carry out operations, raising the costs of a military action, or undermining the domestic or international legitimacy of the operation. To the extent that a coalition leader values the support of its allies in the longer term, threats of exit from the coalition or NATO itself could affect a coalition leader’s decisionmaking.81 There is evidence that NATO allies used NATO decisionmaking structures to restrain U.S. actions during the air war over Kosovo. Wesley Clark, who was NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, complained about the influence of NATO members on military decisions, including campaign phasing and individual targeting.82 In a now-famous incident at the Pristina airport, the British commander of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps was able to leverage his chain of command in London to thwart Clark’s plan to block the airport runway with helicopters—a move that the British commander believed could have triggered a security incident between NATO and Russia.83 Ultimately, concerns about constraints posed by NATO structures in Kosovo contributed to the U.S. decision to form a coalition of the willing for initial operations in Afghanistan in 2001.84 NATO members that do not participate could still face direct Russian retaliation or other consequences. Given that possibility, members who do not entirely support the aims of the operation might still participate in order to seek greater influence over operational decisions than they would have if they were on the outside.85 This logic appears to have influenced France’s decision to join NATO’s air war over Kosovo. French Secretary General for Defense and National Security Louis Gautier argued that French participation in the operation meant that France was “able in Kosovo to impose itself in the decisionmaking process and affect strategy.”86

2022 Michigan Evidence

Links to Politics

Burden sharing sparks acrimonious debate in congress

Eyal 22 (Jonathan Eyal is associate director at the Royal United Services Institute in London, “Yes, Nato has a new vitality. But its united front could collapse when it has to deal with Russia” 7/3/22 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jul/03/yes-nato-has-a-new-vitality-but-its-united-front-could-collapse-when-it-has-to-deal-with-russia)

Nato calculates that its members have promised to spend £172.6bn in additional defence expenditure on top of existing defence budgets, with Germany accounting for perhaps half this amount. But the question is how this will be spent and over what period. The easiest way to improve European capabilities would be to use this cash to buy US equipment off the shelf: this offers substantial economies of scale and time. Yet such an approach will go against European aspirations to boost their defence industries; French diplomats are warning that the Ukraine war must not end up as a bonanza for US arms manufacturers. Chances are high that Nato’s eternal “burden-sharing” debate will continue, even if more cash is available. Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump and his disciples are poised to argue – as “The Donald” did when he was in the White House – that Nato is a scam to fleece American taxpayers. Even if he does not stage a comeback, the idea that the US is spending far more than it should to defend fat, wealthy Europeans is likely to feature prominently when a new Congress is elected this November. The sheer audacity of the Russian aggression has allowed the Biden administration to get the cash it needed from Congress. Still, it is taken for granted in Washington that the $40bn package recently approved by Congress for security assistance to Ukraine is unlikely to be repeated. And a future Nato burden-sharing debate is bound to get more acrimonious when it is joined with a parallel discussion about paying for Ukraine’s postwar economic reconstruction, a project estimated at an eye-watering $500bn.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Links to Entrapment

CP links to entrapment or the da is terminally non-unique—ideological prejudices, lobbying, and issue spillage drive commitments.

Lanoszka ’17 [Alexander Lanoszka; Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo; 12-18-2017; "Tangled up in rose? Theories of alliance entrapment and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War"; Taylor & Francis; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13523260.2017.1392102; Accessed 7-11-2022; AW]

Entrapment could also result from transnational ideological factors. Driscoll and Maliniak (2016) suggest that defenders like the United States get ensnared in conflicts “where their national interests are not implicated” for reasons of “issue slippage” (p. 593). This issue slippage occurs when the alliance takes on additional purposes, losing sight even of its original purpose. In the case of NATO, issue slippage ensued when the Soviet military threat no longer existed and the alliance became instead a political community based on liberal democratic values. Accordingly, an actual or potential ally can “position itself in the imagination of liberal idealists in the West” to maximize external support (Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 594). Similarly, Cooley and Nexon (2016, pp. 77–82) argue that foreign elites can forge bonds of trust and friendship with American officials and politicians, thereby eliciting more cooperation than what was strategically warranted. The common mechanism underlying these arguments is that the ally exploits some transnational connection via elite networks. This connection often has an ideological character since foreign elites play to the ideological prejudices of the defender by professionalizing the national bureaucracy, highlighting religious and political affinities with the West, contracting with lobbying firms in the defender’s capital city, and developing embassy connections (Cooley & Nexon, 2016, pp. 88–94; Driscoll & Maliniak, 2016, p. 601). Sometimes they might instead play on ethnic ties if those ties exist. The net effect is to make foreign policy-making in NATO capitals more amenable to a state’s particular interests. The mechanism resembles what Schimmelfennig (2003) calls rhetorical action, which refers to the “strategic use and exchange of arguments to persuade other actors to act according to one’s preferences” (p. 5). By appealing to the ideological sensibilities of the defender’s elites, the ally can co-opt that defender, thereby increasing the probability that the defender would assist the ally even if doing so is detrimental to its strategic interests.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—LIO Turn

Burden-sharing wrecks the LIO and decenters US dominance

McTague, 22 [Tom McTague, staff writer at the Atlantic, 3-24-2022, The Atlantic, ‘Biden Can’t Paper Over the West’s Disunity’, /alundy]

Ideological incoherence is the main threat to the Western alliance, but a close second can be found in the West’s imperial center—the U.S. And here, again, we return to Trump. The essence of his complaint about Europe was not simply that it was not contributing enough; it was that he didn’t really believe in the U.S.-led order itself. Trump believed the whole structure was unfair to the U.S.: Why should it shoulder most of the burden of policing the world? But the thing with orders—liberal, “rules-based,” or any other—is that they need ordering, and this is the job of the hegemon. Burdens can be better shared, and Europe can do more to free America for its contest with China, but ultimately the U.S. either guarantees European security or it doesn’t.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—Econ Turn—Europe K2 Global Econ

Yes collapse—small crises easily snowball into global economic crisis because of fundamental problems in European economics.

Collignon, 12 [Stefan Collignon, professor of political economy at Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, founder of the Asia Forum, and the London School of Economics, UK, taught at Harvard University and Hamburg University, Deputy Director General for Europe in the German Federal Ministry for Finance, 7-2012, ‘Europe’s Debt Crisis, Coordination Failure, and International Effects’, ADBI Institute, /alundy]

The European debt crisis started as a small local policy shock in Greece, but it has come to threaten the survival of the euro with potentially far reaching consequences for the world economy. Since December 2011 financial markets have stabilized somewhat, but fundamental issues remain unsolved. This crisis is due partly to fundamental economic developments, such as growth and competitiveness, and partly to uncooperative behavior between the main policy makers in Europe. One of the paradoxes of this crisis is that, despite all its problems, the euro has remained relatively firm in its internal (inflation) and external value (exchange rate). Financial markets may be concerned with some parts of the euro area, mainly in the south, but they still see the euro as a major currency in the world. However, the euro will only maintain this role if European governments can get the sovereign debt crisis under control. Whatever the ultimate conclusion of the drama, the experience has shown that Europe needs a much tighter form of economic governance if it wants to live up to the ambition of providing the world's alternative reserve currency. While a series of events has progressively deepened the European debt crisis, it is important to distinguish between sudden shocks and underlying fundamental problems in Europe’s economic governance. Their interaction has been the specific flavor of this crisis. There are two views to the European debt crisis. For the “fundamentalists”, the debt crisis is caused by the lack of discipline in sticking to the principles of “a sound and competitive macroeconomic base and solid public finance” (Weidmann 2001). Hence, the remedy is to implement “painful reforms” and consolidate budgets, which would rebuild trust and confidence in financial markets (Issing 2009). For the “monetarists”, the European debt crisis is a liquidity crisis. A small local liquidity shock causes a sudden deterioration in a specific class of asset values, can cause a global systemic financial crisis when the need for liquidity spills over to banks that then get distressed because the deteriorating asset prices put their balance sheets into difficulties and reduce bank capital (Chacko et al. 2011). In this case, a crisis can be stopped by a lender of last resort that provides the necessary liquidity and stops the crisis from turning into a default avalanche.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—Econ Turn—Kills Growth

Military spending decks economic growth.

Muhammad Azam 20, Department of Economics, Faculty of Business & Economics, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, 12/28/2020, “Does military spending stifle economic growth? The empirical evidence from non-OECD countries,” Heliyon, 6(12), , RH

Undeniably, peace and long-term sustainable economic development are the prime agenda of all countries. This study aims to empirically evaluate the impact of military spending on economic growth for a panel of 35 non-OECD countries over 1988–2019. A multivariate regression model based on the augmented production function is used to achieve the objective of the study. The panel autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)/pooled mean group (PMG) technique is employed, while, in addition the robust least squares and fixed-effect estimators are implemented for the robustness of the results. This study found a clear negative effect of military spending on economic growth. The pairwise Dumitrescu Hurlin panel causality test results exhibit bi-directional causality between military expenses and economic growth. Overall, these estimates provide strong support that military expenditure is not beneficial rather detrimental to economic growth. The empirical findings of this study suggest that policymakers need to redesign the military budget to stimulate economic growth and improve social welfare.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—Populism Turn—Populism Low

Opposition parties are uniting to remove populist leaders.

Meyer ’22 [Brett; 6 Jan; Research Fellow; Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, “A Playbook Against Populism? Populist Leadership in Decline in 2021,” https://institute.global/policy/playbook-against-populism-populist-leadership-decline-2021]

In our annual update to our Populists in Power database, we find that the number of populist leaders in power at the beginning of 2022 is down from 17 at the beginning of 2021 to 13 – the lowest since 2004. Three of the four populist leaders who lost power were less ideological anti-establishment populists, meaning that the remaining populists are almost all culturally right wing.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—Populism Turn—Burden Sharing Causes Populsim

More military spending directly contributes to populism across Europe by undermining the political power of centrist and establishment parties

Edoardo Saravalle 17, a Researcher at the Center for a New American Security, “NATO Funding Frustration Could Cause Friction in Europe”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-funding-frustration-could-cause-friction-europe-20216

Second, increased burden sharing may actively hurt the cause of EU stability. Military buildup in Europe would sap the political capital and limit the nondefense spending options of establishment pro-American leaders confronting the gravest threat to the EU and U.S. power on the continent, the insurgent populist movement.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—Populism Turn—2AC

European Defense spending causes populism spread

Fay 17, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies @ Niskan (Matthew, also cites Andrea Gilli, a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “THE PROBLEM WITH EUROPE PAYING ITS DEFENSE BILLS,” Niskan Center, )

The European Union is also unlikely to force member states into a cooperation arrangement, according to Gilli. Given the rise of nationalist populist parties across Europe, any such assertion of power from Brussels will likely create a greater backlash. The two reasons Gilli notes for the inability of European states to increase defense spending also raise another question: should the United States want European states to do so? Writing at the end of the Cold War, political scientist John Mearsheimer warned that a Europe free from superpower domination would return to its recurrent patterns of interstate warfare. Europe’s major states would be forced to pay for their own defense absent American and Soviet security guarantees. To convince domestic populations to support investment in military capabilities—likely at the expense of welfare spending—state leaders would likely lean on nationalist rhetoric and policies. According to Mearsheimer, the reason they have not had to do so was because the American “pacifier” has remained in place even after the superpower standoff in Europe ended. An American withdrawal as an effort to induce greater defense spending in Europe might lead to the empowerment of the very nationalist populist parties that would like to see the European Union dismantled. The disintegration of Europe—coupled with increased spending on military capabilities by its largest states—could lead to the return of security competition and the dilemmas inherent in it. Meanwhile, smaller states—Estonia just being one example—unable to invest sufficiently in their own defense will be subject to manipulation and domination by the continent’s major powers. So the question of whether the Trump administration should consider withholding defense of America’s European to encourage them to “pay their bills” hinges on two things: whether they can, and if so, whether doing so is worth potentially undermining the peaceful integration of Europe.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—Asia Pivot Bad—Russia

U.S Asia Pivot Signals European Weakness

Erlanger ’21 (Steven Erlanger, Chief Diplomat correspondent in Europe for the NY Times, “The Sharp U.S. Pivot to Asia Is Throwing Europe Off Balance” ) //sethlee

BRUSSELS — Until this week, the so-called “pivot to Asia” by the United States had been more of a threat than a reality for Europe. But that changed when the Biden administration announced a new defense alliance against China that has left Europe facing an implicit question:

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails—ASEAN Solves

Asia pivot fails – ASEAN is handling China’s conduct and is excluding the U.S.

Tuazon 21, Bobby M. Tuazon is the Director for Policy Studies and an analyst at the Center for People Empowerment in Governance and former head of the Political Science Committee at the University of the Philippines, “Biden’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ at a dead end,” September 28th 2021, ChinaDaily, From the Press, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202109/28/WS6152da6aa310cdd39bc6c2cf.html

Biden's attempt to win over ASEAN to its side against China is doomed to fail. Not only is China the region's major trading partner, but the economic future of the US is tied to a harmonious relationship with the Asian giant. For years, ASEAN countries have refused to be dragged into any feud between the two major powers as they pin their future on an environment of peace and neutrality. To emphasize this point, ASEAN in 1995 signed the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, where the member countries committed to keeping nuclear weapons out of the region. The treaty has been supported by China. In effect, the regional organization, not the US, provides the stability in this part of the world, parrying any destabilizing pressure from the current superpower, which is not part of Asia. Pursuing this role, ASEAN is in continuing talks with China for the Code of Conduct for the SCS. Both parties have agreed that the talks should continue without any interference by a non-ASEAN country. Nowhere is ASEAN's rejection of the US's gambit diplomacy more revealing than in their reactions to the recent formation of the new trilateral military alliance AUKUS (Australia, the UK and the US) and the reactivation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) of the US, Australia, India and Japan. This month, the Indo-Pacific AUKUS pact forged an arms deal to equip the Royal Australian Navy with multibillion-dollar worth nuclear-powered submarines. Majority of ASEAN countries, led by Indonesia and Malaysia, warned about the destabilizing effect of AUKUS and the threat of an arms race. Influential former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad rebuked Australia: "You have escalated the threat. This will elicit a response from China.″ Kuala Lumpur immediately announced that it will send a ministerial-level delegation to China to discuss the issue. In the QUAD summit he hosted, Biden argued for a "free and open Indo-Pacific," open navigation and an end to "Chinese military expansion" in the SCS. For years, the US has been cajoling India into playing an active role in the Indo-Pacific but New Delhi officials are reminded of their neutral foreign policy lest India slides into the dangerous orbit of the US As a key member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, India is engaged in active talks with Russia and Iran and is expected to receive $5.4 billion worth of Russian surface-to-air missiles in the coming months, which could anger the US With all these misfortunes, Biden's "Pivot to Asia" and containment strategy against China appear to be at a dead end.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails—Econ

Lack of U.S. economy strategy and diverted defense resources prevent success in the Asia pivot

Green & Medeiros 22, Michael J. Green is the Director of the Asian Studies Program at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, the Senior Vice President for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and served as the Special Assistant to President Biden for National Security Affairs; Evan S. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, served as the Special Assistant to President Biden, and was the Senior Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council under the Obama administration, “Can America Rebuild Its Power in Asia?: Biden Started Strong, But Progress Is Halting,” January 31st 2022, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2022-01-31/can-america-rebuild-its-power-asia#author-info

MIXED MESSAGES But these same polls illustrate that Biden’s gains are limited, if not tenuous. The 2021 ISEAS survey showed respondents believe U.S. economic influence in Southeast Asia has decreased since Biden took office. The survey also found almost half of respondents think China has greater regional political sway than the United States. The Lowy Asia Power Index may have found that the Biden administration restored the United States’ diplomatic influence, but it docked Washington more than ten points (from 61.7 to 51.1) on economic sway. The index also found the U.S. military’s relative lead over China shrank in 2021—and that was before Beijing conducted its alarming hypersonic missile tests. For the United States, both these challenges will intensify. On the economic front, China is expanding its financial footprint across the Indo-Pacific. U.S. allies such as Australia and Japan have privately pledged to help keep Beijing out of the CPTPP and to hold a place in the trade agreement for Washington. But the Biden administration has said it has no plan to return to the CPTPP, and officials in Canberra and Tokyo warn they cannot hold off China for more than a few years without some positive signals from the United States. Meanwhile, in addition to trying to join the CPTPP, China has also asked to join the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore—yet another economic group with no U.S. seat at the table. The Biden administration has promised “the development of an Indo-Pacific economic framework” focused on a patchwork of issues—trade facilitation, digital trade, supply chain resiliency, clean energy, infrastructure, and worker standards. But at best, the United States’ closest Asian partners see the framework as a save-the-date card for what they hope will be the day when Washington decides to join the CPTPP or a comparable agreement. The announcement on January 21 of a new U.S.-Japanese economic dialogue helps, but most Asian policymakers and business leaders view the vagueness of the Indo-Pacific economic framework as indicative of a lack of focus and commitment to deep economic engagement. The relative strength of the U.S. economy continues to drive the region’s investment and trade with the United States, but as things stand, Washington is losing influence over the rules that will govern trade, investment, supply chains, and ultimately, geopolitics in Asia. The administration has no long-term economic strategy toward Beijing. The United States’ vague economic policies extend to its goals with Beijing. The Biden administration has rightly sought to limit sensitive technology transfers—particularly of semiconductor- and -related technology—to China. But the administration has no long-term economic strategy toward Beijing beyond seeking more Chinese agricultural and energy exports under the 2020 Phase One trade deal negotiated by the Trump administration to end the trade war the White House started in 2018. U.S. businesses cannot get a clear answer about whether the administration will promote trade and investment with China in non-sensitive sectors, such as retail and automobiles. (Washington originally championed the TPP to gain leverage in economic negotiations with China, but this tool is now missing.) U.S. defense policy faces different but equally formidable challenges. The Biden administration has clearly made gains at by strengthening its alliances, but it has been less purposeful about the types of military capabilities it deploys in Asia—and where it puts them. The Defense Department’s signature Global Posture Review resulted in almost no significant additions to U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific beyond what the Trump White House already had planned. The administration and Congress have failed to properly fund the new Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), legislation that was designed to improve the composition of the military’s funding for much needed capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theater. Although many experts expect Congress to increase defense spending next year, the crisis in Ukraine could drain resources to the continuing detriment of the Indo-Pacific theater.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—China—Asia Pivot Fails

Asia Pivot Fails - NATO and U.S pivot against China is both unnecessary and causes conflict

Shankar ’22 (Priyanka Shankar, Independent Journalist based in the Brussels, “Nato leaders say China is a ‘systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security” ) //sethlee

It accused Beijing of employing “a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up”.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—No Impact—US increase spending

Independent of what Europe does, the US will just increase spending for strategic and nuclear dominance.

Thimm, 18 [Johannes Thimm, Head of Research Division “The Americas” at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 4-09-2018, ‘NATO: US Strategic Dominance and Unequal Burden-Sharing Are Two Sides of the Same Coin’, /alundy]

US defense policy is made strictly on US terms.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails—European Disfunction

Increased defense spending fails—European disfunction thumps burden sharing effectiveness

Bergmann 21 -- Max Bergmann, a senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, official at the U.S. State Department from 2011 to 2017. [The EU Is the Military Ally the United States Needs: Take the Pressure Off of NATO States and Embrace the Union’s Defense, 1-6-21, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2021-01-06/eu-military-ally-united-states-needs]

Insisting that European states hit two percent by 2024 is setting up the alliance to fail. Not only are these states unlikely to hit the target, but even if they did, the results would likely be underwhelming. The two percent metric is, after all, arbitrary, as it is not tied to specific defense requirements, and is moreover subject to broader economic fluctuations. Greece, for instance, hit two percent only because its GDP contracted so dramatically, increasing its military’s share of the shrinking budget. Indeed, marginal increases in any single country’s defense spending won’t automatically help improve the European pillar of NATO, which is plagued with inefficiencies. EU member states in total spend roughly $200 billion annually on defense, on a par with China. But Europe struggles to deploy forces; it runs out of munitions when it fights; and its forces are seldom prepared to fight.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—Burden Sharing Fails

No deterrence impact—burden sharing fails and gets circumvented.

Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, /alundy]

Regarding Libya and Afghanistan, it would appear as though NATO allies were contributing to a more balanced and fair system of burden sharing, but this is in fact not the case. In Afghanistan, alliance cooperation and burden sharing were on more equal footing with the initial invocation of Article 5. Countries were attempting to provide military assistance to the operations despite the limitations their economies and populations imposed upon them. However, there were only a few countries that provided enough force in any truly effective sense. While major allies such as Canada did indeed provide a great deal for the alliance in the beginning, support tapered off overtime. Several other capable countries did not dedicate as much as they could have, and even when they did, their support provided little strategic significance. Instead, U.S. forces were providing for the bulk of the operation while its allies were hampered by inefficient forces and a reluctance to give in to U.S. unilateralism. In addition, the restraints placed on rules of engagement and other factors significantly reduced the effectiveness of their combat roles. This forced the U.S. to pick up the slack, as it had done during the Cold War, with its deterrence abilities. The eventual decline in alliance involvement also indicates support for collective action theory as allies began to outweigh the costs to the benefits of participating in combat operations with the U.S. In Libya, on the other hand, the U.S. attempted to reduce its role in combat operations while NATO allies shouldered the burden of putting their forces in potential danger. While the U.S. was dedicating its budget to strategic command, its allies were making up for their lack of defense spending by taking more responsibility through both material and non-material variables. The involvement of more subtle factors completely changes the implications of collective action. However, the statistics indicated that the U.S. was still forced to engage in taking on a larger share of the burden than it had anticipated or even wanted. The other allies did in fact break through domestic constraints by putting their forces in harm’s way. But Hasebrouck’s work showed that such constraints were not as prominent because Libya was considered an easier operation, and the U.S. still took on a greater role. Furthermore, the implications of increased U.S. involvement show in a concrete way that free riding is occurring. The inability of European forces to deal with the realities of modern combat forced them to rely on the U.S. even though they were trying to take more of a leadership role in the operation.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—European Defense High—Ukraine

NATO members have increased their defense budget after Ukraine War

Mackenzie ’22 (Christina Mackenzie, ““ ) //sethlee

PARIS: The war in Ukraine has been a strong wake-up call for a number of European countries who’d been basking in post-Cold War comfort thinking that armed conflict was relegated to history and that spending on defense could be minimal.