We argue that (American, mainstream) IR can be understood as an imperium that by its constitution excludes feminist work. This IR is a world that polices its boundaries, whatever they are. Each “debate” excludes its other as much as it constructs a conflict between its in-crowd. From a feminist perspective, its hard to see feminist work as within those boundaries. In fact, twenty five years after the establishment of a field of feminist IR, and fifteen years after Ann Tickner’s (1997) “You Just Don’t Understand,” there’s a sense that, maybe, the “mainstream” of IR just will never understand. In conversations with colleagues, there is no longer a consensus that trying to “mainstream” feminist IR is a worthwhile project. In fact, the project has become quite controversial. Should “we” talk to/with the 19 mainstream? If so, how? How do we do so while both getting “them” to listen and keep “our” intellectual integrity? Ann Tickner tells us that “the effect [of feminist IR] on the mainstream discipline, particularly in the United States, continues to be marginal” (1997, 611). It must be, then, something about the content of feminist IR compared to the content of “mainstream” IR that inhibits exchanges and leads to “awkward silences and miscommunications” (Tickner 1997, 612). Feminist IR and mainstream IR live in and constitute different worlds.5 Mainstream IR did not know the world of feminist IR – a world of contingency, subjectivity, emancipation, and empathy. As the two approaches got to know each other (and, by relating, themselves) in the late 1980s, it became clear that the place that feminist IR would like to have in IR was incompatible with the ways that mainstream IR saw (and valued) itself and feminism. Mainstream IR would like to compartmentalize feminist IR in the world that it created and has become accustomed to, while feminist IR would like to mainstream gender into IR scholarship, making gender-based analysis a crucial and core part of disciplinary inquiry. Early conversations about feminist IR expressed hope for this sort of relationship on both sides. Robert Keohane proclaimed that “feminist standpoint theory provides a particularly promising starting-point for the development of feminist international relations theory” (1989, 245). Fred Halliday noted that “the international relations can and should adjust to a set of issues that have, to date, received scant attention” (1988, 20 426). From the feminist side, Sandra Whitworth declared that “the next stage of international relations theory will not be one that is merely critical, but one which is critical and feminist” (1989, 270). Ann Tickner set upon a project to “de-gender” International Relations as a field (1992). Much early feminist IR work held the clear understanding that, though IR as a discipline and global politics as a field are deeply gendered, that gendering is correctable and can/will be corrected by feminist scholarship. The mainstream would read feminist scholarship, see the gendering of IR, and pursue their research programs with the knowledge of that gendering. Though women’s position in the field and the world was poor, it could be fixed with the mainstream’s recognition and acceptance. That acceptance, however, was not forthcoming, and was piecemeal when it happened. Instead, feminist IR demands to be taken seriously as a world-transforming force and treated with respect and dignity. As Ann Tickner explains, the limitations that the mainstream places on the role of feminist scholarship are “asking feminists to do more of the moving” and “give up epistemological positions which they believe are better suited to uncovering oppressive gender hierarchies” (Tickner 1998, 209). While mainstream IR demands that feminist IR have a static and defined identity that fits into the “condo across town” that it has provided feminist IR, feminist scholarship cannot and will not accept either a narrow and strict definition or a marginal role. As Marysia Zalewski notes, “the suggekstion that feminism is controversially undecidable sits uneasily with unremitting requests to confirm its attendant status. Yet, questions calculated to reify an inhibiting structural position hinge on a certain precision regarding 21 the character of contemporary feminism. Failure to secure this position occasions a tendency to impose it (2003, 291). Because feminist IR cannot and will not accept the space or definition that it has been allocated, feminist IR cannot be kept in its proper place in the predefined world of mainstream IR – it must inhabit a space outside IR rather than as inside it as a constitutive other. Even as feminist theorists try to look and act as if they fit in with the mainstream, as Ann Tickner laments, “feminist theorists have rarely achieved the serious engagement with other IR scholars for which they have frequently called. When they have occurred, conversations have often led to misunderstandings and other kinds of miscommunication” (1997, 628). She attributes these miscommunications of “lack of understanding and judgments” (Tickner 1997, 629). As Marysia Zalewski notes, “it is not uncommon to assume that theorizing about women lacks the depth and strength of other kinds of scholarly analyses, especially those favored by the mainstream” (2003, 292). In other words, some theorizing about women acts as a constitutive other to the mainstream IR orthodoxy. That theorizing appears to be close to feminist theorizing in IR, but it really serves as the constitutive other (inside) the mainstream of the discipline that serves as a condition of the possibility of outside-ness of feminist research. This makes feminist research (one of) IR’s uninhabitable space(s). Seeing IR as this sort of imperium vis a vis feminist theorizing brings up the question of what it would look like to “occupy” IR. What would it look like to physically inhabit the discipline of IR? To be an embodied disruption of the social order which makes inhabitation impossible? To occupy a space of protest? A space of otherness? A 22 space of liminality? What would it look to reside in but remain outside of the possible political space of IR? To use biopower to resist the orthoroxy and operationality of IR? Certainly, the question of the relationship between feminist IR and mainstream IR has been explored in the discipline in a number of ways (e.g., Sjoberg 2009). But the question of the materiality of occupation, we argue, might be a good way to think about feminisms and IR. Several ways of thinking about this might bear fruit. The first is the physical inhabitation of the discipline of IR. This is more complicated than it first appears, given that the discipline of IR is a political economy, where if one is able to be sustainably present, it is because one is in some sense included by/with the discipline as a paid member of a faculty, allowing one the time and resources to both eat and write. At the same time, the intersection of that political economy of being a faculty member and the political economy of knowledge production is not zero-sum, where tokenist inclusion in the political economy of being a faculty member can actually signify the creation of a constitutive other in the political economy of knowledge production. It is when it reaches this point that we argue that feminist IR might usefully benefit from thinking about and acting on occupying the discipline of IR. So far, such a strategy has not (explicitly or implicitly) been a part of how feminisms have dealt with IR. While some look to stand outside of IR (Brown 1988) or actively reconstruct IR without reference to the mainstream of the discipline (Squires and Weldes 2007), still others engage the discipline (Tickner 1992). These strategies, though, might be enhanced by applying some of the unique methods of occupation when we think about how to interact with the discipline. For feminist IR, physically inhabiting the discipline of 23 IR might be accomplished by going to the spaces that IR feels safe in its exclusion of feminisms – conference spaces, panel spaces, journal spaces, book spaces, university spaces – and occupying them – reading, writing, talking, interrupting. It might be accomplished by establishing a physical presence places where feminists and feminist work/ideas are usually not welcome – infiltrating social space to infiltrate intellectual space, coming uninvited, asking feminist questions of non-feminist work, and the like. An embodied disruption of the social order may be that sort of physical presence in unwelcome spaces or disruption of existing physical space – whether by speaking, attire, physical location, or engagement in/with/at the international relations imperium. It might be something as simple as wearing ‘marriage equality’ or ‘this is what a feminist looks like’ tshirts in the place of business suits at conferences, or something as complicated as a large-scale feminist presence intervening in a conference panel that ignores or surpreses gender concerns. Embodied disruptions can be in physical presence itself or in the ways in which physical presences react to, narrative, involve, or implicate a particular critique of the way that IR works. Occupying a space of protest, in “Occupy” movement terms, is to refuse to keep protest confined to the allowed spaces (feminist journals, feminist theory and gender studies panels, allocated chapter space in textbooks and syllabi) and instead to engage in interventionary protests in uninhabitable spaces. Spaces of protest can be as straightforward as full Gender/IR textbooks (e.g., Shepherd 2009) and as sideways as presenting a paper different than that announced in an impermissible space for feminisms/feminist research. Occupying a space of otherness requires transcending the 24 confined space of IR’s constitutive other (inclusiveness that allows and produces exclusiveness), to act simultaneously physically present in but conceptually outside of, against, and contrary to the orthodoxy and perfect operationality of IR. Finally, occupying a space of liminality for feminist IR might mean embracing both intellectual instability (there is not one feminist IR but many) and disciplinary instability (feminist IR is not homed in IR). Certainly, feminist IR must (and should) continue to live its life in the absence of the mainstream’s realization of the place that gender analysis should hold in the world of IR. Feminist IR should continue to live its life with its head held high, proud of what we do and how we do it, and careful, as Sarah Brown notes, to maintain our identity in terms of epistemology, ontology, and methodology. Still, a call to move beyond being marginal seems to call for ignoring the very forces that we critique in global politics as they are manifested in our own professional lives. If feminist work in IR pays attention to the gendered power disparities in the social and political arenas, feminists who do that work cannot ignore the gendered power disparities within our own discipline. If we critique the compartmentalization of women in global politics, we need to do so while understanding (not accepting, but understanding) the boundaries our discipline has given our work. In this context, liminality means embracing uncertainty and change, in the world, in the discipline, and in the research of the discipline. It is not marginality or mainstream, engagement or ignoring, occupying or complicity – it is both sides of each of those dichotomies at once. The occupation of liminal space is embracing the by nature unstable identity and practice of feminisms in IR. 25 Would an occupied IR look any different than a non-occupied IR? Perhaps, perhaps not. Would the intellectual relationship between feminist IR and mainstream IR look different for the occupation? Almost certainly. For our purposes now, it is the intellectual relationship that we are interested in – the idea that a feminist occupation of IR makes IR’s uninhabitable space inhabitable – fundamentally changing the borders/boundaries of the discipline and their functioning, in ways similar to the (intellectual) impacts of making the uninhabitable space of the other to the neoliberal imperium inhabitable fundamentally rippled the tenability of the neoliberal imperium. This is all the more true given the “Occupy” understanding of knowledge(/its political relations and interactions) as inherently non-hierarchical, coincident with the feminist/poststructuralist interest in critically reevaluating/deconstructing hierarchies in IR knowledges. Occupying Research All of that said, limiting the methodology of occupation to understanding disciplinary politics seems both unnecessarily limiting and a waste. The real questions that we are interested in asking are about what it would mean to use “Occupy” as a research method for IR, particularly in correspondence with feminist ontologies and epistemologies in the discipline. Thinking of what it might mean to “occupy” as a method of research requires a brief discussion of feminist research methods. Ann Tickner suggests four perspectives which guide much of the methodology of feminist research: “a deep concern with which research questions get asked and why; the goal of designing research that is 26 useful for women; a preoccupation with questions of reflexivity and the subjectivity of the researcher; and the commitment to knowledge as emancipation” (2005, 4). Feminist scholarship is at once research and politics; this dualism forces feminist consideration of what it means to know and how we construct knowledge. In this consideration, feminists in IR have constructed a strong critique of the hegemony of positivist science in the analysis of global political and social relations. ‘Objective’ is no more than the subjective knowledge of privileged voices disguised as neutral (Harding 1998; Keller 1985; Goetz 1991). Privileged voices’ knowledges, though, are incomplete – representing only their unrepresentative experience (Scheman 1993, 211-2; Harding 1998). Yet this unrepresentativeness hides behind culturally assumed objectivity, where the privileged are licensed to think for everyone so long as they do so objectively. Feminisms critique this purported objectivity, recognizing instead that knowledge is always in part about the relationship between the knower and the known (Scheman 1993, 214). As Cynthia Enloe observed, “the personal is international and the international is personal”(1990, 195). Therefore, feminists understand knowledge is necessarily both contingent and interested. Contingency, interest, perspective, and politics are dimensions that the traditional “scientific method” is ill-equipped to consider. Feminism is “fundamentally a political act of commitment to understanding the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated” (Brown 1988, 472). As such, feminisms’ research goals and the “Occupy” methodology might have common interests and goals in terms of the politics of knowledge production and knowledge consumption. 27 We particularly find two ways where we think the method of “Occupation” might dovetail with the work of (feminist) IR, which we briefly sketch here. The first idea is that researchers occupy the uninhabitable space of liminality, particularly, the liminality of our research “subjects.” Recently, feminists have been thinking about what it means for the researcher’s body to be at risk and experience trauma in the research process, particularly in field research.6 We argue that this could be pushed further, towards thinking of occupation of/experience of liminal/uninhabitable space inhabited by IR’s traditional “research subjects” as itself a research method, where sense and emotion are the product and producer of research experiences. Living the liminality that we often ignore even when we write about the situation is a research experience – a way to reside in but outside of the dominant narrative of history/politics, a way to transgress the boundaries between research subject/object and researcher, and a way to understand the fundamental interdependence of the occupier and the occupied in research terms. The combined uncertainty of the observer (what is that?) and uncertainty in the consumption of the observed (how is that experienced?) of living liminality potentially provides the ability to inhabit the uninhabitable space of researcher-positioned-as-researched, breaking down the researcher/subject divide and providing space for the use of biopower to break down IR’s (disciplinary and research) sovereignties. This could be leveraged in support of feminisms’ interests in critical political knowledge production, anti-hierarchical transgression, and the creation of space for both research and political practice outside of the IR/neoliberal imperium(s).