Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Kritik
FRAMEWORK › IMPACT FRAMING › AT: Short TF/High Magnitude Impact Calc

Both the aff and the perm rely on the creation of a crisis which requires a masculine hero to urgently address the impact – reject the fantasy of 1AC solvency, as it pushes feminist criticism to the periphery

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in feminist review 109: 49-72, spp)

While globally it seems that ‘we are more or less permanently suspended in states of crisis’ (Otto, 2011: 76), crucially for feminist analyses, accounts that abstract moments of crisis as ‘exceptional’ events dislocate crisis from the nuanced thinking that would challenge the extreme measures that distort human rights and welfare (such as austerity measures and welfare cuts). Crises embody the power to shape our conceptions of world politics but also, crucially, have the capacity to construct and govern our most intimate and everyday practices. They are significant mechanisms of everyday, contemporary governance because they generate discourses of ‘emergency’, ‘speedy diagnosis’ and ‘robust response’, authorising ‘the operation of a more hegemonic legal order’ and reducing (but not eliminating) ‘the space for political contestation and critique’ (ibid.: 80). An alternative way of reading ‘crisis’ (and not something governance mechanisms and actors are likely to countenance) is, however, to concentrate on its fictive content, with ‘the crisis’ understood as a fictive imagining of everyday events that serves particular discursive purposes. Found in media and official portrayals that have represented the crisis in terms of shock, devastation, anxiety, fear, anger and shame (see, e.g., Widmaier, 2010), the neo-liberal governance of crisis has relied intensively on the language of trauma to generate ‘urgent’, wide-ranging but surreptitious social reforms, including the rewriting of institutional power arrangements and the dismantling of protective welfare systems. The reproduction of tropes of urgency, immediacy and muscularity (what we might call neo-liberalism’s ‘conventional’ responses to crisis), mobilised through metaphors of catastrophe and disaster, has, in particular, allowed for ‘a set of otherwise controversial “responses” to receive widespread legitimation’ (Brassett and Clarke, 2012: 5). The extent to which financial risk management has been cast over the course of the twentieth century as ‘a domain of technical expertise’, removed from public debate and placed firmly in the hands of an elite cadre of fiscal ‘experts’ (De Goede, 2004: 200–207), has rendered such decisive interventions yet more realisable. Despite interesting, and critical, engagements with the use of visuality and metaphor in dominant representations of the crisis, how the use of visual and narrative metaphors of enormity, shock and devastation, and the ensuing repetition of the need for robust, or ‘muscular’, interventions, has been gendered has been little discussed. Key financial publications, including, for example, The Financial Times, The Economist and Time magazine, have regularly deployed representational practices that discriminate actively and often between identifi- able and sexed bodies as symbolic of economic success, regulation and recovery in the global political economy. Men appear across these publications in power, holding the power, bearing the burden of responsibility for crisis and resolving crisis, reaffirming the meaning of the global financial system and its practices as symbolic of white, masculine corporate power (Griffin, 2015). This is particularly important with regard to feminism’s attention to governance in its everyday forms and practices, since, by immersing the financial crisis in images of masculinity, popular and policy sources provide a subtle, but thoroughly gendered, grounding for the ideas, methods and practices instituted by instruments of governance in response to the crisis (such as the measures of austerity considered below). The below analysis thus considers how, as everyday practices of global governance, ‘crisis management’ techniques have reproduced the dismissal of ill-fitting feminist critique and co-opted more sympathetic feminist knowledges. This, the paper argues, simply confirms the longevity of neo-liberal, capitalist, imperatives in the global political economy, entrenching the power of existing economic orders and constraining the possibilities, and space, for contestation and critique based on the masculinised reproduction of financial privilege. crisis governance discourse (1): the dismissal of feminism and the social costs of austerity[:] One way to read feminism’s position vis-a`-vis crisis is to note the damaging blow that contemporary governance reactions to ‘crisis’ have dealt feminism. Crises everywhere ‘are a particularly dangerous time for feminism, and indeed for all progressive ways of thinking’ (Otto, 2011: 78). The ‘emergency’ measures initiated by the announcement of ‘crisis’ represent a shift in power away from inclusive law and policy-making towards so-called ‘expertise’ in ‘crisis management’, ‘muscular’ law-making and the entrenchment of executive power, all of which effectively push feminism ‘off the map’ (ibid.: 76–79). Governments in the developed and developing world have further entrenched the reactionary, ‘hard’ law politics of crisis management, using the rhetoric of urgency to adopt far-reaching and increasingly invasive crisis management measures. Under the guise of ‘austerity’, the IMF has even been recalibrated as an institution of worldly fiscal expertise, a notable departure from the derided figure of cookie-cutter policy-making it struck in the aftermath of the Asian and Argentinean financial crises.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › AT: PERM › AT: Perm Double Bind

The permutation footnotes and crowds out feminism – only rejecting the aff for its “residual links” and voting for the alternative alone can solve the K

Sjoberg, 2012 (Laura Sjoberg, PhD in IR from USC and Professor at UF, and Christian Chessman, JD UC Berk, "The Biopower of Occupation: Insights for ‘Knowledge Exchange’in (Gender and) IR,” November 17, 2012 http://genderinglobalgovernancenet-work.net/events/critical-reflections-on-the-researcher-practitioner-relationship-2/attachment/sjoberg-and-chessman-biopower-of-occupation (rishi).

We argue that (American, mainstream) IR can be understood as an imperium that by its constitution excludes feminist work. This IR is a world that polices its boundaries, whatever they are. Each “debate” excludes its other as much as it constructs a conflict between its in-crowd. From a feminist perspective, its hard to see feminist work as within those boundaries. In fact, twenty five years after the establishment of a field of feminist IR, and fifteen years after Ann Tickner’s (1997) “You Just Don’t Understand,” there’s a sense that, maybe, the “mainstream” of IR just will never understand. In conversations with colleagues, there is no longer a consensus that trying to “mainstream” feminist IR is a worthwhile project. In fact, the project has become quite controversial. Should “we” talk to/with the 19 mainstream? If so, how? How do we do so while both getting “them” to listen and keep “our” intellectual integrity? Ann Tickner tells us that “the effect [of feminist IR] on the mainstream discipline, particularly in the United States, continues to be marginal” (1997, 611). It must be, then, something about the content of feminist IR compared to the content of “mainstream” IR that inhibits exchanges and leads to “awkward silences and miscommunications” (Tickner 1997, 612). Feminist IR and mainstream IR live in and constitute different worlds.5 Mainstream IR did not know the world of feminist IR – a world of contingency, subjectivity, emancipation, and empathy. As the two approaches got to know each other (and, by relating, themselves) in the late 1980s, it became clear that the place that feminist IR would like to have in IR was incompatible with the ways that mainstream IR saw (and valued) itself and feminism. Mainstream IR would like to compartmentalize feminist IR in the world that it created and has become accustomed to, while feminist IR would like to mainstream gender into IR scholarship, making gender-based analysis a crucial and core part of disciplinary inquiry. Early conversations about feminist IR expressed hope for this sort of relationship on both sides. Robert Keohane proclaimed that “feminist standpoint theory provides a particularly promising starting-point for the development of feminist international relations theory” (1989, 245). Fred Halliday noted that “the international relations can and should adjust to a set of issues that have, to date, received scant attention” (1988, 20 426). From the feminist side, Sandra Whitworth declared that “the next stage of international relations theory will not be one that is merely critical, but one which is critical and feminist” (1989, 270). Ann Tickner set upon a project to “de-gender” International Relations as a field (1992). Much early feminist IR work held the clear understanding that, though IR as a discipline and global politics as a field are deeply gendered, that gendering is correctable and can/will be corrected by feminist scholarship. The mainstream would read feminist scholarship, see the gendering of IR, and pursue their research programs with the knowledge of that gendering. Though women’s position in the field and the world was poor, it could be fixed with the mainstream’s recognition and acceptance. That acceptance, however, was not forthcoming, and was piecemeal when it happened. Instead, feminist IR demands to be taken seriously as a world-transforming force and treated with respect and dignity. As Ann Tickner explains, the limitations that the mainstream places on the role of feminist scholarship are “asking feminists to do more of the moving” and “give up epistemological positions which they believe are better suited to uncovering oppressive gender hierarchies” (Tickner 1998, 209). While mainstream IR demands that feminist IR have a static and defined identity that fits into the “condo across town” that it has provided feminist IR, feminist scholarship cannot and will not accept either a narrow and strict definition or a marginal role. As Marysia Zalewski notes, “the suggekstion that feminism is controversially undecidable sits uneasily with unremitting requests to confirm its attendant status. Yet, questions calculated to reify an inhibiting structural position hinge on a certain precision regarding 21 the character of contemporary feminism. Failure to secure this position occasions a tendency to impose it (2003, 291). Because feminist IR cannot and will not accept the space or definition that it has been allocated, feminist IR cannot be kept in its proper place in the predefined world of mainstream IR – it must inhabit a space outside IR rather than as inside it as a constitutive other. Even as feminist theorists try to look and act as if they fit in with the mainstream, as Ann Tickner laments, “feminist theorists have rarely achieved the serious engagement with other IR scholars for which they have frequently called. When they have occurred, conversations have often led to misunderstandings and other kinds of miscommunication” (1997, 628). She attributes these miscommunications of “lack of understanding and judgments” (Tickner 1997, 629). As Marysia Zalewski notes, “it is not uncommon to assume that theorizing about women lacks the depth and strength of other kinds of scholarly analyses, especially those favored by the mainstream” (2003, 292). In other words, some theorizing about women acts as a constitutive other to the mainstream IR orthodoxy. That theorizing appears to be close to feminist theorizing in IR, but it really serves as the constitutive other (inside) the mainstream of the discipline that serves as a condition of the possibility of outside-ness of feminist research. This makes feminist research (one of) IR’s uninhabitable space(s). Seeing IR as this sort of imperium vis a vis feminist theorizing brings up the question of what it would look like to “occupy” IR. What would it look like to physically inhabit the discipline of IR? To be an embodied disruption of the social order which makes inhabitation impossible? To occupy a space of protest? A space of otherness? A 22 space of liminality? What would it look to reside in but remain outside of the possible political space of IR? To use biopower to resist the orthoroxy and operationality of IR? Certainly, the question of the relationship between feminist IR and mainstream IR has been explored in the discipline in a number of ways (e.g., Sjoberg 2009). But the question of the materiality of occupation, we argue, might be a good way to think about feminisms and IR. Several ways of thinking about this might bear fruit. The first is the physical inhabitation of the discipline of IR. This is more complicated than it first appears, given that the discipline of IR is a political economy, where if one is able to be sustainably present, it is because one is in some sense included by/with the discipline as a paid member of a faculty, allowing one the time and resources to both eat and write. At the same time, the intersection of that political economy of being a faculty member and the political economy of knowledge production is not zero-sum, where tokenist inclusion in the political economy of being a faculty member can actually signify the creation of a constitutive other in the political economy of knowledge production. It is when it reaches this point that we argue that feminist IR might usefully benefit from thinking about and acting on occupying the discipline of IR. So far, such a strategy has not (explicitly or implicitly) been a part of how feminisms have dealt with IR. While some look to stand outside of IR (Brown 1988) or actively reconstruct IR without reference to the mainstream of the discipline (Squires and Weldes 2007), still others engage the discipline (Tickner 1992). These strategies, though, might be enhanced by applying some of the unique methods of occupation when we think about how to interact with the discipline. For feminist IR, physically inhabiting the discipline of 23 IR might be accomplished by going to the spaces that IR feels safe in its exclusion of feminisms – conference spaces, panel spaces, journal spaces, book spaces, university spaces – and occupying them – reading, writing, talking, interrupting. It might be accomplished by establishing a physical presence places where feminists and feminist work/ideas are usually not welcome – infiltrating social space to infiltrate intellectual space, coming uninvited, asking feminist questions of non-feminist work, and the like. An embodied disruption of the social order may be that sort of physical presence in unwelcome spaces or disruption of existing physical space – whether by speaking, attire, physical location, or engagement in/with/at the international relations imperium. It might be something as simple as wearing ‘marriage equality’ or ‘this is what a feminist looks like’ tshirts in the place of business suits at conferences, or something as complicated as a large-scale feminist presence intervening in a conference panel that ignores or surpreses gender concerns. Embodied disruptions can be in physical presence itself or in the ways in which physical presences react to, narrative, involve, or implicate a particular critique of the way that IR works. Occupying a space of protest, in “Occupy” movement terms, is to refuse to keep protest confined to the allowed spaces (feminist journals, feminist theory and gender studies panels, allocated chapter space in textbooks and syllabi) and instead to engage in interventionary protests in uninhabitable spaces. Spaces of protest can be as straightforward as full Gender/IR textbooks (e.g., Shepherd 2009) and as sideways as presenting a paper different than that announced in an impermissible space for feminisms/feminist research. Occupying a space of otherness requires transcending the 24 confined space of IR’s constitutive other (inclusiveness that allows and produces exclusiveness), to act simultaneously physically present in but conceptually outside of, against, and contrary to the orthodoxy and perfect operationality of IR. Finally, occupying a space of liminality for feminist IR might mean embracing both intellectual instability (there is not one feminist IR but many) and disciplinary instability (feminist IR is not homed in IR). Certainly, feminist IR must (and should) continue to live its life in the absence of the mainstream’s realization of the place that gender analysis should hold in the world of IR. Feminist IR should continue to live its life with its head held high, proud of what we do and how we do it, and careful, as Sarah Brown notes, to maintain our identity in terms of epistemology, ontology, and methodology. Still, a call to move beyond being marginal seems to call for ignoring the very forces that we critique in global politics as they are manifested in our own professional lives. If feminist work in IR pays attention to the gendered power disparities in the social and political arenas, feminists who do that work cannot ignore the gendered power disparities within our own discipline. If we critique the compartmentalization of women in global politics, we need to do so while understanding (not accepting, but understanding) the boundaries our discipline has given our work. In this context, liminality means embracing uncertainty and change, in the world, in the discipline, and in the research of the discipline. It is not marginality or mainstream, engagement or ignoring, occupying or complicity – it is both sides of each of those dichotomies at once. The occupation of liminal space is embracing the by nature unstable identity and practice of feminisms in IR. 25 Would an occupied IR look any different than a non-occupied IR? Perhaps, perhaps not. Would the intellectual relationship between feminist IR and mainstream IR look different for the occupation? Almost certainly. For our purposes now, it is the intellectual relationship that we are interested in – the idea that a feminist occupation of IR makes IR’s uninhabitable space inhabitable – fundamentally changing the borders/boundaries of the discipline and their functioning, in ways similar to the (intellectual) impacts of making the uninhabitable space of the other to the neoliberal imperium inhabitable fundamentally rippled the tenability of the neoliberal imperium. This is all the more true given the “Occupy” understanding of knowledge(/its political relations and interactions) as inherently non-hierarchical, coincident with the feminist/poststructuralist interest in critically reevaluating/deconstructing hierarchies in IR knowledges. Occupying Research All of that said, limiting the methodology of occupation to understanding disciplinary politics seems both unnecessarily limiting and a waste. The real questions that we are interested in asking are about what it would mean to use “Occupy” as a research method for IR, particularly in correspondence with feminist ontologies and epistemologies in the discipline. Thinking of what it might mean to “occupy” as a method of research requires a brief discussion of feminist research methods. Ann Tickner suggests four perspectives which guide much of the methodology of feminist research: “a deep concern with which research questions get asked and why; the goal of designing research that is 26 useful for women; a preoccupation with questions of reflexivity and the subjectivity of the researcher; and the commitment to knowledge as emancipation” (2005, 4). Feminist scholarship is at once research and politics; this dualism forces feminist consideration of what it means to know and how we construct knowledge. In this consideration, feminists in IR have constructed a strong critique of the hegemony of positivist science in the analysis of global political and social relations. ‘Objective’ is no more than the subjective knowledge of privileged voices disguised as neutral (Harding 1998; Keller 1985; Goetz 1991). Privileged voices’ knowledges, though, are incomplete – representing only their unrepresentative experience (Scheman 1993, 211-2; Harding 1998). Yet this unrepresentativeness hides behind culturally assumed objectivity, where the privileged are licensed to think for everyone so long as they do so objectively. Feminisms critique this purported objectivity, recognizing instead that knowledge is always in part about the relationship between the knower and the known (Scheman 1993, 214). As Cynthia Enloe observed, “the personal is international and the international is personal”(1990, 195). Therefore, feminists understand knowledge is necessarily both contingent and interested. Contingency, interest, perspective, and politics are dimensions that the traditional “scientific method” is ill-equipped to consider. Feminism is “fundamentally a political act of commitment to understanding the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated” (Brown 1988, 472). As such, feminisms’ research goals and the “Occupy” methodology might have common interests and goals in terms of the politics of knowledge production and knowledge consumption. 27 We particularly find two ways where we think the method of “Occupation” might dovetail with the work of (feminist) IR, which we briefly sketch here. The first idea is that researchers occupy the uninhabitable space of liminality, particularly, the liminality of our research “subjects.” Recently, feminists have been thinking about what it means for the researcher’s body to be at risk and experience trauma in the research process, particularly in field research.6 We argue that this could be pushed further, towards thinking of occupation of/experience of liminal/uninhabitable space inhabited by IR’s traditional “research subjects” as itself a research method, where sense and emotion are the product and producer of research experiences. Living the liminality that we often ignore even when we write about the situation is a research experience – a way to reside in but outside of the dominant narrative of history/politics, a way to transgress the boundaries between research subject/object and researcher, and a way to understand the fundamental interdependence of the occupier and the occupied in research terms. The combined uncertainty of the observer (what is that?) and uncertainty in the consumption of the observed (how is that experienced?) of living liminality potentially provides the ability to inhabit the uninhabitable space of researcher-positioned-as-researched, breaking down the researcher/subject divide and providing space for the use of biopower to break down IR’s (disciplinary and research) sovereignties. This could be leveraged in support of feminisms’ interests in critical political knowledge production, anti-hierarchical transgression, and the creation of space for both research and political practice outside of the IR/neoliberal imperium(s).

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › AT: PERM › AT: Reform Net Benefit

Reformism leads to cooption by the elite – must refuse to enter their arena

Weizman, 2011. (Eyal, professor of spatial and visual cultures at Goldsmiths University of London, founder of the collective Decolonizing Architecture Art Residency in Bethleham. The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza. Verso Publishers, Print copy, page 21-24, SPP)

Behind the present use of the term 'lesser evil' is a rich history and various intellectual trajectories. What may otherwise seem to be a perennial problem, endemic to ethics and political practice, a dilemma that recurs in different moments in time in the same shape and form, might in fact reveal something peculiar about each moment and situation. The various political, theological and philosophical uses of the lesser evil idiom may suggest that it meant different things to different people in different periods and situations. Every political tradition and form of political practice developed its own ways of engaging with the lesser evil argument - and much has subsequently been lost in translation. For example, unlike the tradition of liberal ethics that would invoke him centuries later, Augustine was never content with lesser evils. Indeed, a significant aspect of the idea of the lesser evil has been lost in its process of secularization from early Christian theology into the utilitarian foundations of liberal ethics. For the original Christian toleration of the lesser evil was understood in relation to the telos of redemption that is ultimately in excess of all calculations. For Augustine, the name for this state beyond calculations was 'the kingdom of heaven'. In contrast to the teachings of the Christian theologians that they invoked, and locked within a perpetual economy of immanence, liberal ethics can be interpreted as a drive for the 'optimization' of a system of government. But what is the sense in optimizing those regimes when they perpetuate intolerable injustice? Even those of us without much use for a 'kingdom of heaven' and without much patience for the systems of pastoral government that should guide us to it, can still see in Augustine's argument an important challenge: how to engage in political practice within the complex existing force-fields of the present in a way that also aims to break away from them? This challenge is particularly acute for those who operate within or in relation to situations they deem intolerable and want to fundamentally change rather than reform. The practices of human rights could be used as effective tools against close societies and tyrannies, and were indeed often used in struggles that ended up replacing those regimes, they lend themselves easily for manipulation in the context of liberal democracies. At different times, Marx, Lenin, Kautski, Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci grappled with the problem of the lesser evil in fighting for gains here and now, while also fighting for a different and better world on the other. At various points they advocated struggles for immediate gains - for example, proposing trade unions, whose function was to win a better deal for workers in an exploitative system. None of them, however, thought that trade unions were all that was possible, and none was satisfied with simply winning a better deal within an existing system. Unlike the revolutionary and militant communists who protested the drift towards a timid, reformist politics of choosing the lesser evil and of making compromises with capital, Marx thought that winning a ten-hour day was a considerable victory for the English proletariat. Marx's argument shifted the attention from the ten hours of work to the fourteen hours of non-work time. These he thought provided the opportunity to build an organizational platform, as well as the consciousness and experience needed to take over the means of production. To show that it is futile to object to all lesser evil compromises on principle, we could even enlist Lenin himself. In his attempt to explain the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that lead to Soviet Russia's exit from World War I in 1918 after making an agreement with the western powers, Lenin returned to a scene of a road robbery described by Augustine. 'To reject compromises "on principle", to reject the permissibility of compromises in general, no matter of what kind', said Lenin, 'is childishness ... One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and firearms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and firearms to bandits so as to share in the loot.'34 The deliberation of a political thought-practice must indeed insist on uncovering the force-field within which each of the dilemmas of the lesser evil exists, seeking to identify more extended and intricate political connections; looking further into the future, it should insist on political goals and the means of their achievement. At one end of the spectrum, in which the lesser evil argument occupies the middle ground, stand those who believe that every possible gain at present is insignificant in light of the essentially compromised state of the world. Part of the structure of this argument is found the principle of the politique du pire- the politics of making things worse. This line of thought believes in the redemptive potential of misery- or in its theological-political incarnation as dolorism: pain as a spiritual experience that allows people to see more clearly. Every form of improvement is necessarily seen as the normalization of exploitation or the pacification of injustice. Opting for the worst is, therefore, an attempt to undermine the field of alternatives of a pre-given choice and overcome its terms. But are the horrific spectacles of greater evils preferable to the incremental damage of lesser ones? Is the choice only between squabbling with power about the correct measure of its violence, helping to calibrate it and tend to its wounded, or on the other hand a call for its amplification in order to 'expose its contradictions' (contradictions seem only to sustain power's march) to shock a complacent population into rising up? Between refusal and tactical embrace the difficulty of the dilemma of the lesser evil is equally in practising and in avoiding it. The Greeks thought of the dilemma as one of the elements of tragedy. Each of the options that a tragic hero faces necessarily leads to different forms of horrific suffering: the dilemma was presented as a choice between the two horns of an angry bull. But the options must not only be about which of the horns to choose. Robert Pirsig has suggested several ways to subvert this complicity of the opposites: one can 'refuse to enter the arena', 'throw sand in the bull's eyes', or 'sing the bull to sleep' .35 The contemporary forms of power unpacked in this book are no longer so singular and unified. Rather than a bull, they may appear to take on the shape of a multiplicity, a diffuse field of forces simultaneously aggressive and benign. It is a form of power that not only charges forward; it surrounds, immerses and embeds. Political activists must constantly invent new forms of struggle that are recognisant of this paradigm of power, but which also evade and subvert its embrace, attempt to rewire its webs in order to escape its calculation. The characters that inhabit the chapters of this book have stepped right into the thick of this web of forces: their movement through them offer valuable examples and lessons. Some paths must be avoided at all costs; others illuminate possible courses of action within the intricate workings of the humanitarian present.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › AT: PERM › Ext – Mutually Exclusive

Bottom Up Feminist Peace Strategies are inconsistent with Top-Down Approaches to Security

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” Peacebuilding, 7:2, 146-159, spp)

Subaltern views of peace are important for local turn scholarship since subaltern actors possess everyday agency in either promoting peace or resisting top-down neoliberal peacebuilding attempts. The everyday is fundamental for this branch of thinking, as the ‘pursuit of everyday tasks may allow individuals and communities in villages, valleys and city neighborhoods to develop common bonds with members of other ethnic or religious groups, to demystify “the other” and to reconstruct contextual legitimacy’.16 Given the agency that the subaltern exercises, the local turn responds by focusing on everyday life and the forms of transversal solidarity and grassroots mobilisation that enable peacebuilding. In other words, the assumption is that a vibrant civil society and an everyday solidarity cutting across ethnic and religious affiliations is the guarantee of peace. The local turn argues that the promoters of liberal peace fail to recognise this type of agency and solidarity in their focus on elite-lead and top-down approaches to peacebuilding and thereby miss the opportunity for sustainable and local peace.17 Although the local turn functions as an important critique of neoliberal governance and peace, for my research agenda, where the aim is to capture the corporeality and eventness of mundane peace, the discussion and understanding of the everyday offered by local turn scholarship is limited. The everyday implies for me more than the resilience and resistant potential of the ‘local’ and of ‘ordinary people’ in the face of neo-liberal peacebuilding, as it is largely understood within local turn scholarship. From my perspective, the local turn’s interest in the everyday is too narrow, as it has not been translated into a sustained consideration of the productiveness of mundane practices. Where I most radically depart company from local turn scholarship is in its tendency to define the everyday with reference to the subaltern’s spatiality – namely, through the spatial location where the subaltern is assumed to reside and through the forms of everyday life that are thought to characterise her.18 In the local turn, the subaltern and her everyday life are projected to be somewhere ‘out there’: in a distant location of violent political conflict or far-away post-conflict zone. This is, in my view, a traditional Orientalist projection, in which the spatially projected ‘local’ world and its everyday are conceived of as radically different from our own.19 In this projection, the local and the subaltern are constructed as distant ‘others’, whose emancipatory potential the Western and male local turn scholar is concerned with. This is a reminder of the colonial condition, in which white men seek to save ‘brown women from brown men’.20 To avoid this, it is important to recognise that the everyday and the ordinary are constituted through enactments – that is, they are corporeal rather than spatial and not necessarily the ‘subaltern’ in the Orientalist sense, with its implication of non-Western populations. The focus on embodied enactments enables us to retain the local whilst distancing ourselves from the spatial hegemony of the distant ‘other’. Feminist peace and conflict studies As noted earlier, feminist theorising has a strong commitment to corporeality and the everyday (in a non-territorial sense) and therefore functions as a starting point for my agenda. Furthermore, this corpus of thinking establishes a strong connection between corporeal ontology and peace epistemology. Radical feminist scholarship is instrumental, in my view, when investigating the body, the ordinary and the everyday.21 There are multiple ontologies in feminist peace theory, but the concern for marginalization and the understanding of the corporeal and relational nature of human existence are the key contributions that enable a new take on the corporeality of peace.22

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › AT: PERM

Their crisis-driven performance of the permutation proves that their perm devolves to just doing the aff as a sufficient framing to check their own impacts

Griffin, 2015. (Penny, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Australia. “crisis, austerity and gendered governance: a feminist perspective,” in feminist review 109: 49-72, spp)

The widespread failure to engage with global finance as ‘everyday’ and the proliferation of conventional accounts of crisis, with their abstracted and dehumanised representations of global finance, have been significant in contributing to a ‘business as usual’ approach for neo-liberal actors and institutions with regard to financial reform. Such an approach has enabled not only an ongoing failure to reform key institutions, practices and mechanisms, but also the reification of global finance as the preserve of a privileged, neo-liberal and masculine elite. In understanding how ‘crisis’ has been harnessed and exploited to sediment power in the hands of an existent (male) neo-liberal elite, it is worth asking what the current state of the global financial industry is and whether anything has changed in financial services ‘after’ the crisis. As a 2009 report from the UN on international monetary and financial reform notes, little reform of the global financial architecture was undertaken at the time of the Asian financial crisis, then described by the IMF as ‘one of the worst financial crises in the postwar period’ (IMF, 1998). Nothing was done to reform international economic institutions, to ensure ‘greater transparency and accountability’, to assess ‘distributive impacts’, to avoid an increase in global imbalances and asymmetries or to ensure ‘intellectual diversity’ (UN, 2009). As for the current era, and despite the longevity of the global financial crisis, money from central banks continues to be extended at relatively cheap and easy levels and banking systems have succeeded in getting ‘risky assets off balance sheets’ and improving ‘tier-one capital ratios’ by simply moving assets around (Ryan, 2013). There is ‘little evidence of chastened behaviour on the part of financial institutions’, with ‘little repentance’ shown by the leaders of financial investment companies when called to testify and women ‘no more visible in finance than they were before the crisis’ (Prügl, 2012: 31). While the IMF claims that it is has become ‘more attuned to the social impact of its programs’, with, since the Asian financial crisis, ‘many of the economies that suffered from the crisis’ performing ‘remarkably well’ (IMF, 2013), it fails to note that economic crisis in Asia had a profound and enduring impact ‘on labour markets, household incomes, social services, work burden and human development’ across the region (Floro et al., 2009: 3). Women in South Korea lost their jobs at seven times the rate of men (Seguino, 2009: 3), while a global recession hit export- oriented sectors such as textiles and apparel in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean particularly badly, each of these being sectors that ‘have a highly feminised labour force’ (Floro et al., 2009: 16). Women’s position in the agricultural sector (as farmers and workers) remains vulnerable without the reduction or elimination of agricultural subsidies in industrialised countries and the presence of government services ‘to help increase output and productivity’ and ‘the impact of trade on the costs of inputs’ continues to be volatile (ibid.). Reading the global financial crisis and governance responses to it through a (feminist) discourse analysis involves examining how ‘crisis’ has been reproduced, and governance enabled, by ideas, assumptions and values that depend both on the positioning of bodies in certain gendered ways and the reproduction of gendered techniques of governance. This includes the prevalence, for example, of governance responses that centralise women’s ‘essential’ domesticity or fiscal prudence, prevailing representations of men as public figures of authority and responsibility, and techniques of governance that exploit these (such as gender quota systems, for example, that presume that the presence of women’s bodies balances out hypermasculine behaviour, or austerity measures that are instituted on the foundational assumption of women’s reproductive work as inferred but unpaid). For many feminists, this author included, the focus in crisis governance discourse on behavioural (human) flaws and institutional weaknesses has erased attention to the broader and fundamental structures of discrimination and elite privilege on which global finance has been built, while further entrenching the hierarchical gender and racial stereotypes of governance discourses. While it is possible for agents in the economy to behave autonomously, the social settings of economic discourse (i.e., the ways in which economic ‘units’ sustain and interact with each other) make it unlikely that agents will consistently do so, particularly in an industry as dependent on group confidence as the global financial industry. Financial services are dominated not just by men but by dominant models of behaviour that have become, over centuries of concentrating historical privilege in the hands of white men, associated with masculine subjectivities. Despite the introduction of quotas and active recruitment strategies aimed specifically at women, global finance remains ‘one of the few bastions of virtually uncontested masculine privilege remaining in the aftermath of feminism’ (Prügl, 2012: 22). A recent survey, for example, conducted by recruitment company eFinancialCareers found that ‘almost two thirds of Australian finance professionals believed gender discrimination was still apparent in the finance industry’, with 84 per cent of women sure that gender discrimination exists in financial services (Pokrajac and Moore, 2013). Women occupy less than 20 per cent of executive or senior level positions in the finance, insurance, securities and investment sectors and less than 30 per cent of senior-level positions in commercial banking. Australian men in finance earn 21 per cent more than women, British men 24 per cent.1 Women may be allowed into the game for as long as they accede to the mechanisms by which the structures of economic power generate capital, profit and expansion, mechanisms that have not changed in any meaningful way since the beginnings of the current crisis.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › AT: PERM

Must completely eschew the logic of securitization – means the perm can’t solve OR it severs the aff – voting issue for stable negative ground

Neocleous 8 [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encom passing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told – never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politicaly, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › AT: PERM

The aff and the neg have mutually exclusive conceptions of peacemaking

Väyrynen, 2019 (Tarja Väyrynen is a professor of Peace and Conflict Research and a director of Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI). Her research interests include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, feminist theory and post-colonial theory. “Mundane peace and the politics of vulnerability: a nonsolid feminist research agenda,” Peacebuilding, 7:2, 146-159, spp)

In this article, I draw on critical feminist theorising of the body, relatedness, vulnerability and the everyday to offer an alternative framing of peace and suggest a new research agenda. Furthermore, I provide a novel construct of eventness by which I center peace in the lives of ordinary people. I also introduce the concept of choreography to grasp the richness and fluidity of the everyday techniques of interaction that are relevant for peace. Ultimately, I propose a critical research agenda whose ambition is to re-theorise peace by locating it within social and political contexts and examining the practices and eventness of mundane peace, thereby defying the dominant non-situated and abstract conceptions of peace. This proposal is a critical response to the abstract and ontologically solid nature of peace approaches in general, as well as to the limited way in which critical peace approaches seek to theorise the local as an antidote to abstractions. My aim is to demonstrate that the microsociology of corporeality, vulnerability and relatedness enables a renewed grasp of the study of peace. The research agenda I suggest departs radically company from the mainstream – in which peace is conceptualised as abstract, solid or the ‘opposite of violence’ – by locating the substantial and situated nature of peace within social and political life. Ultimately, the agenda seeks to cultivate – in the spirit of non-representational theory, which goes beyond representation and focuses on embodied experience – an affinity for the analysis of ‘events, practices, assemblages, structures of feeling, and the backgrounds of everyday life against which relations unfold in their myriad potentials’.1 To accomplish this, I introduce a phenomenological register that moves away from totalising perspectives towards microsociological approaches and an examination of the mundane practices where lived experience offers a rich fabric of corporeal presence, relationality and affect. I argue that the radical and transformative aspects of everyday life can be examined by exposing the extraordinary in the seemingly ordinary and there with the transformative potential embedded in the everyday.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt Solves Environment

The AFF embrace of paternalistic societal structural must be rejected in favor of a gender-focused perspective

Detraz, 2010. (Nicole, Assistant Professor in political science at U Memphis, “the genders of environmental security,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 108-111; spp)

Towards a feminist environmental security perspective: The above discussion has demonstrated that there remains a high degree of debate over the best way to conceptualize the link between the environment and security, and that all three perspectives securitizing the environment have uneasy relationships with feminist approaches to security. The addition of gender to the environmental conflict perspective would be a transformative force. The environmental security perspective is more compatible with feminist scholars' understandings of the referents of and threats to security, but still neglects gender. While the ecological security approach has an overlap with various feminisms, it is ecocentric where feminists are fundamentally concerned with gender subordination. This chapter argues that a feminist approach is an appropriate alternative discourse. Based on the analysis of the intersections between the current approaches to security and the environment and various feminisms, I assert that environmental security perspectives that incorporate gender analysis and build on elements of the existing debate will be a fruitful addition to international environmental politics and International Relations in general. Perspectives securitizing the environment might be the right entry vehicle for feminist approaches, and feminist approaches might clarify debates between perspectives about the environment and security. As there are multiple approaches to the environment and security, there are also multiple feminisms, each of which would have different contributions to perspectives of the environment and security.26 Here, rather than setting up a debate between different feminisms, I offer some suggestions about how some of the various feminist traditions can be used to inform the environmental security debate and what a gender-focused environmental security perspective might look like. The gender-focused environmental security approach that I envision will in some respects look similar to current approaches to security and the environment, particularly the environmental security approach and the ecological security approach, however, there will be important differences between the approaches as well . A gender-focused environmental security perspective will begin with a multi-level analysis of security and the environment, paying particular attention to individuals and groups in society who face insecurities. These insecurities can take various forms and are best conceptualized as incidents that increase one's likelihood of experiencing danger, injury, or a decline in personal well-being. Examining these insecurities will involve valuing the contributions of local knowledge as well as other forms of knowledge such as scientific ones. Likewise, the notion of the environment that this approach uses is one that includes human and non-human nature as well as attention to the places where people live. To think of the environment as some distant external entity masks the close relationships that exist between humans and non-human nature as well as the severity that many environmental issues have for the livelihoods of much of the world's population, including both women and men. Conflict stemming from environmental change must be examined from a gender-focused environmental security perspective, but with specific attention paid to contextual and historic factors that contribute to violence and the impacts that violence has for members of the population in question. Rather than assume that scarcity is an unproblematic notion, it must be examined in order to determine how assessments of scarcity and plenty are arrived at, and for the benefit of whom. Power dynamics must be assessed if one is to fully understand the potential for conflict as well as all of the implications involved. Additionally, scarcity must not be thought of only in terms of a lack of access to a resource for human consumption. The needs of the environment to function productively must also be taken into account in order to determine scarcity in a given case. This reflects the fact that humans and nonhuman nature are inextricably linked and the insecurity of one has implications for the insecurity of the other. A detailed examination of scarcity will also bring to light the dominant relationship that humans most often claim over nature, which has links to other dominant relationships in society: North/South, elite/non-elite, and most importantly for this analysis. men/women. This can provoke the questioning of the "normalcy" of these relationships and hopefully invite alternative understandings of the relationships. This brings us to the issue of the potential causes of environmental insecurity. It must be acknowledged that by pointing to a factor as causing environmental insecurity, that factor also becomes the subject of proposed solutions. These factors must therefore be examined with specific attention being given to the gender differences embedded within them. Issues of increased consumption often associated with accelerating globalization, growing population, and migrating populations are all cited as phenomena contributing to environmental degradation by scholars concerned with the environment. What must be realized is that while these factors might in fact produce environmental insecurities, they must not be taken as straightforward targets for solutions if these solutions do not examine any potential imbalanced impacts that they may have for segments of the population-women in particular. Thus far, none of the perspectives on security and the environment have engaged in determining the particular impacts that solutions targeting the above-mentioned issues may have on women. This is a necessary task for gender-focused environmental security perspectives. An environmental security perspective that includes gender will also be amenable to solutions that reject the dominant institutional or societal structures. While sustainable development and environmental peacemaking may provide increased security for both the environment and some individuals in society, they do nothing to challenge the patriarchal structures that allow for the continuation of valuing male-ness over female-ness, thus they cannot be the final solution to insecurity. Through the analysis of environmental issues that directly impact people's lives, feminist environmental security scholars can both determine particular gender-differentiated impacts, responses and contributions to environmental degradation as well as call attention to the gendered assumptions in society through which these issues are typically understood. In sum, some of the issues that are brought to light when gender is included as a fundamental aspect of environmental security are as follows: • Multilevel analysis of security and the environment are essential. • Broad and critical conceptualizations or' security, environment, and scarcity are necessary. • Particular attention must be paid to the unique security situations of women. • A close relationship between humans and non-human nature must be acknowledged. • What happens during times of conflict as well as their causes must be examined. • The impacts of militarization on both the environment and human beings must be examined. • The causes of environmental insecurity must be critically assessed as well as their potential impacts for segments of the population. • Attention must be given to multiple sources of knowledge. • Potential solutions that reject the dominant institutional or societal structures must be entertained. An environmental security perspective with a gender focus can use these issues to build on the existing debate over security and the environment and to revise some aspects and add gender analysis.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt = Prereq to Reform Agendas

Only our deconstructive critique can broaden the scope of analysis sufficiently to support activism outside the narrow confines of liberal reform projects

Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco 14 (Jin Haritaworn is Assistant Professor of Gender, Race and Environment at York University in Toronto. Adi Kuntsman is Simon Research Fellow at the University of Manchester. Adi’s research interests include queer politics in Israel-Palestine; war and violence in digital media; and affect and emotions. Silvia Posocco is Lecturer, Department of Psychosocial Studies, Birkbeck College, University of London. Introduction: Queer Necropolitics. Pp19-21)

Through the concept-metaphor of queer necropolitics, the contributors to this book broaden our perception of life, death, violence and survival by attending to different sites, such as the borderzone, the warzone, the prison and the gentrifying area. These Mbembian ‘topographies of cruelty’ are by no means an exclusive map of necropolitical spatialities. More work is needed in order to make sense of the queer vitalities that have proliferated across various sites – including institutions of punishment alongside institutions of ‘care’, such as schools, psychiatric units and youth work, as well as the informal spaces and connectivities – the queer ‘scene’, the queer ‘neighbourhood’, the globalizing LGBT movement – that increasingly follow similar punitive and pathologizing logics. While queer necropolitics is not the only tool through which such work is possible, we have offered it up as an insurgent vocabulary that can help us make sense of the many forms of death that accompany and condition queer claims to life, visibility and protection. Its attraction lies precisely in its ability to capture seemingly unrelated phenomena simultaneously, and to bring back into a shared plane of intelligibility struggles that we are often told are mutually exclusive. It may help us, for example, to understand figures such as the ‘welfare queen’ (Cohen 1997; Roberts 1997), the ‘monster-terrorist-fag’ (Puar and Rai 2002), the ‘drunk Indian’ (Razack 2012), the ‘black rioter’ (Breggin 1995) and the ‘hateful Muslim youth’ (Haritaworn 2013), as related not only to one another but also to the figure of the ‘queer lover’, whose ascendancy from degeneracy occurs in shared environments shaped by the same murderous processes. What would it mean to enter into kinship with these pathologized figures? How might we – from our various positionalities – explore gender and sexuality beyond these necropolitical moulds? One way to think crucially and responsibly about queer politics in these times is to refuse the call to become what we call ‘happy queers’ (or, indeed, nostalgic queers) whose recruitment for sexual celebration serves to euphemize and accelerate the death of Others – who for some of us indeed include our own. Instead, we must attend to the forces that prepare queer and indeed non-queer bodies for premature death (see also Cohen 2011). Yet our motivation must be to go much further, to foster the survival of those who were ‘meant to perish’ but are not disposable, to repeat Che Gossett’s moving words (2011: n.p.). What would a politics, queer or otherwise, that is serious about such a resistant and allied task look like? How can we engage in unalienated politics, where safer spaces are not won by reproducing cannibalistic, criminalizing and pathologizing regimes or by inserting ourselves into militarizing and security logics, and where the violence of the most powerful (such as the racist and neo/colonial state, the market, the prison and the hospital) is scandalized at least as loudly as the acts of those thus subjugated? We see the necropolitical as one in a range of possible tools to explore the possibilities of such a politics, since it helps us make sense of the symbiotic copresence of life and death, manifested ever more clearly in the cleavages between rich and poor, citizens and non-citizens (and those who can be stripped of citizenship at any moment); the culturally, morally, economically valuable and the pathological; queer subjects invited into life and queerly abjected populations marked for death. Yet this book is in conversation not just with those interested in testing the promises and limits of a specifically necropolitical framework, but also with other trajectories of decolonizing gender and sexuality. More generally, it responds to the new hunger for queerly theorizing about structural violence and injustice, from tightening borders, mass incarceration, and the wars without end, to the everyday, banal workings of the market. On an activist level, this is reflected in the growth of feminist, queer and trans movements that radically refigure that which counts as a ‘queer and trans issue’, by moving away from narrow liberal and identitarian notions of protection, tolerance, victimhood and visibility and towards careful mappings of the bigger picture (Bassichis, Lee and Spade 2011). We are especially encouraged to witness, through international collaborations such as this, the growth of a radical queer and trans activism which, stepping into the footsteps of a re-radicalized anti-racist feminism, seeks to fight oppression in all its intersections and manifestations, including the normalized, the banal, and the systemic (Decolonize Queer 2011; Gender Just 2011; Incite! – Critical Resistance 2001; Incite! 2006; Khalass We’re Vex 2013; SUSPECT 2010; Sylvia Rivera Law Project et al. 2009). If this has so far largely remained parochial to the North American context, we hope that projects such as Queer Necropolitics will help us catch up with the moves of capital and ideology, so that resistant knowledges, too, may begin to cross borders and ‘unmap’ (Razack 2002) the geopolitics of violence, abandonment, and death. We hope that this book will be a stepping stone for forging a transnational lens that is adequate to this task.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › Alt = Prereq to ethical IR

Epistemological and ontological revisionism essential to disrupting toxic masculinity in IR – the alternative is a prerequisite to any ethical FIAT in the international arena

Youngs 04 (Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in*, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80, JKS)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › 2NC/1NR Alt Ext – Vulnerability

The inward confrontation of vulnerability is essential to cut off the violent outward expression of chivalric masculinity

Zolkos, 2011 (Magdalena Zolkos, Research Fellow in Political Theory in the Centre for Citizenship and Public Policy at the University of Western Sydney, “Can there be Costless War? Violent Exposures and (In)Vulnerable Selves in Benjamin Percy’s ‘Refresh, Refresh’” Critical Horizons 12.2 2011 251-269 (mjb).

For Butler, operative in post-9/11 American war is the “denial of vulnerability”, which is being institutionalized in various “fantasies of mastery”.18 In turn, Jabri writes about the distinctively late-modern elimination of the demand for self-sacrifice in warfare as an “aspiration for war in the absence of injury to the self”, so that “the infliction of injury [on the other] may take place in the near absence of harm to those perpetrating the act”, also known as “risk-transfer warfare”, or, in different political discourses, “humanitarian warfare”.19 The problematic of war has been closely linked with questions of political violence. Elaine Scarry has famously argued that war bridges two domains of human experience: the domain of contest and the domain of harm-doing to the bodies and properties of others.20 Jabri has argued for an understanding of war as “injurious”, both in corporeal and societal terms.21 For Jabri, the violence of war cannot be seen as consisting of “extra-social elements”, but, on the contrary, as “located in a society”, a “product of that society”, and a significant factor in the “formation and transformation of that society”. War is thus “constitutively social” and its violence is manifest in areas of public and private life that far exceed the military domains, including “the everyday, […] the routine, [and] the mundane order of things”. The violence of war, therefore, is political not only in (a) being motivated by politically contingent aims of invasion, conquest, and expansion, and (b) in its dependence on the development of different techniques and strategies of “injurious impingement”,22 but also (c) in so far as it preys on the social and psycho-somatic vulnerability of human body. In its emphasis on the intersubjective dimension of violence, the feminist critique of war has recognized that the subject herself/himself becomes affected and permeated, or, to but in Butler’s terms, that the subject comes “undone”, by/in the violent act against the other. Drawing on the critical theorizing of war in the writings of Butler and Jabri, I turn to the unsettling literary depictions of violence by Benjamin Percy in his collection Refresh, Refresh (and in particular to the opening story under the same title). I trace how the allegedly “removed”, “sterile” or “costless” acts of injury in war that are undertaken away from home and in the name of the protection of home, return and haunt the subject at home. As a contribution to the critique of war violence, my reading points at the auto-immunitary logic, which has been at work in the costless war fantasy, specifically, but not exclusively, in the context of America’s invasion on Iraq. Within the parameters of the auto-immunitary logic, the US government, which seeks to pre-empt and eradicate specific modality of (“terrorist”) violence through invasive military action, paradoxically, regenerates violence through radicalization and militarization of those whom it targets. I argue that auto-immunity operated also in Percy’s story (though in less causally obvious or direct way) insofar as America’s war engenders violence also among those whom it claims to protect, and whose identification and loyalty it demands. In “Refresh, Refresh” it is a generation of young male adolescents who have been “abandoned” by their working-class fathers in the military. They are “abandoned” not only in the sense that they live without parental supervision and with the unfulfilled acute desire for the father’s presence, but also in the sense of being the “invisible subjects” (until the moment when they are recognized as ready for military conscription) – in other words, they are “larval subjects”,23 unfolding from their juvenile and incubated forms into a state of “readiness”. At the background of the critical discussions that point out how the figure of the Iraqi, Afghani or the Arab Other becomes subject to de-humanizing tactics, my reading might appear not only provisional, but also precarious, as it risks re-investing in the category of the already all-too-visible American subject. The intention is not to distract from the cataclysmic consequences of the US post-9/11 wars for the Iraqi and Afghani people. The aim is not to re-invest in the privileged subjective categories, but to re-figure the (alleged) subjects of invulnerable politics, which moves away from the fantasies of mastery and towards ethical consideration of war violence through the prism of relational and inter-subjective vulnerability. From the perspective of Levinasian ethics of alterity, Dave Lightener’s face interpellates the Tumalo boys both to violence and to non-violence. It at once invokes the “temptation to kill and an interdiction against killing”, locating Josh and Gordon in that “mixed and conflicted position of a subject who is injured, rageful, disposed to violent retribution”.44 Butler, drawing on Levinas, locates the emergence of subjectivity in the tension between the “fear of undergoing violence and the fear of inflicting violence”.45 Importantly, the tension of that position is not located in the subject since she/ he [they]cannot, in both chronological and constitutive sense, pre-exist that primary tension of being both the agent and an object of violence. Rather, it is located in that prior inability to “move away and break from” (the address of) the Other, which operates in the text of “Refresh, Refresh” as the shameful affect that renders the subject “naked” (uncovered, unguarded, vulnerable) in the face of the Other. In the quoted final part of the story it is crucial that Lightener never declares the father dead. Lightener’s only verbalization in that passage is a plea for mercy – an expression of unconditional capitulation vis-à-vis the uncontrolled eruption of violence. The spontaneous act of overpowering and silencing Lightener is the boys’ desperate attempt to stage resistance to the formulaic utterance of condolences, which postulates grief as a patriotic response and seeks to contain and transform it into a platform of further military-masculine mobilization. The shared vulnerabilities that Dave Lightener and Josh embody in that concluding scene mean that, momentarily, they are constituted vis-à-vis one another through, on the one hand, their capacity for violence (the capacity to injure the other) and, on the other hand, also through their susceptibility to violence and the injurious action of the other. The representations of the physical precariousness of the body form in Percy’s story intricate connections with socio-political modes of “injury” – dispossession, exploitation, and privation. While in “Refresh, Refresh” the synergic capacity to inflict harm and to remain susceptible to harm is depicted with a narrative specificity characteristic of literary representations, I suggest that it demonstrates a larger point about human vulnerability and the reciprocal workings of violence. It precisely that “truth” about violence and vulnerability, which is being obliterated in the imageries of the costless war, and in the politics of invulnerability that they animate. The reciprocities and returns of violence leave no one in the story unharmed; neither those exposed to it, nor those complicit with it. In arguing that war violence is irreducible to the situations of the battlefield or to the military domain more generally (be it remote and “virtual” or proximate and “real”), I have sought to use Percy’s striking short-story to illuminate the location of violence at the cross-roads of inter-subjectivity, politics and ethics. Benjamin Percy’s depiction of the “abandoned” Tumalo boys as larval subjects shows how violence permeates across socio-political boundaries and across human bodies, and how it strikes at the heart of what (in the official military discourses) one has sought to protect through war: the peaceful, i.e. non-violent, American home. In contrast, the mastery discourses of the costless war fantasy build on the normative assumption that war violence can be compartmentalized, controlled and unidirectional (always working away from the subject). Perhaps, what is at stake in these repudiations of vulnerability is nothing short of a question of what it means to be human if, within these literary representations and the critical theoretical voices about war, different modes of humanity are so tightly linked to the recognition of the reciprocal workings of violence. It remains to be asked how, within that conjunction of violence and vulnerability, one could think non-violence – not as the demarcation of the domain of invulnerable self, but, rather, as an inquiry into the significance of the singular moment when one refrains from violence. In this alternative imaginary setting, non-violence is not the inactive or passive binary opposite of violence, but an ethical, and possibly political, action. Could sparing Dave Lightener’s life by the Tumalo boys be thought of as an act of non-violence? Perhaps not, since its significance is subsequently obliterated by their submission to the military masculine subject positions, into which they have been interpellated. Their own conscription into the military shares common grammar with their earlier self-injurious and self-destructive actions. However, the narrative also suggests that any act of political non-violence must emerge from within the recognition of vulnerability as affirmation of the violent exposure of the self to the Other. I conclude with a passage quotation from a final story in the collection Refresh, Refresh, “When the Bear Came”, where in my opinion Percy comes closest to imagining such violent encounter between the self and Other.46 My suggestion is that “When the Bear Came” gestures towards the ethics of relational and communicative potentialities that arise from shared vulnerability. Notably, it is a story about an encounter between a human and a non-human Other – a bear whom the narrator (also an adolescent man from Tumalo) obsessively seeks to find, catch and violently pacify. When the encounter finally occurs, and the desire to kill the bear becomes a real possibility, the man facing the bear finds himself affected and “undone” by the encounter, beyond his control and calculation: I was just out of its reach, but not so far that I couldn’t feel the air move, displaced by its claws. It wrestled with the rope a moment, like a dog bothered by a leash, then returned its attention to me. A low growl rumbled from deep its throat. I could feel its eyes, like two heavy weights, on me. It was hungry. And I imagined what its jaws would feel like working around my skull, or through my belly, my flesh sinking into the dark oblivion of its stomach. We stayed like this for a time, looking at each other, each afraid and hateful. Minutes passed and the stars wheeled above us and I slowly brought my shotgun down from my shoulder and held it before me. ‘I should kill you’, I said, a gentle sort of loathing in my voice, ‘You son of a bitch, I should kill you dead’. I could feel the blood pounding through my heart and I could hear the air filling and emptying its lungs. I tried to breathe with the bear and soon our breathing fell into a rhythm where our lungs worked in perfect time with the wind, with the shifting of the branches and shadows. It was as if a rhythm had been beating all along, the rhythm of the land, and finally I had found it, here in the peace of the dark woods, with only one slug and twenty feet of rope between me and absolution.47

2022 Michigan Kritik
ALTERNATIVE › 2NC/1NR Alt Ext – Vulnerability

Embrace the 1% risk – vulnerability is an inevitable component of life – securitizing against it doesn’t solve and backfires

Enloe 2004 - Cynthia Enloe, Professor of Women’s Studies at Clark University, The Curious Feminist, 2004, pp. 265-266 (SPP).

CC: But I think the problem is more than the sense of being vulnerable. It is the refusal to acknowledge the inevitability of our vulnerability. After all, vulnerability is a fact of human and political life. The attempt to deny its inevitability is what has led to the development of weapons of mass destruction "as deterrents," to massive investments in "national missile defense" and other baroque weapons technology, while we refuse to make serious investments in dealing with the worldwide HIV epidemic, or starvation, or poverty around the world. It has led to U.S. partnerships with oppressive regimes and multiple military attacks on other nations - Iraq, Iran, North Korea - even as we speak! And all of these, of course, are part of what creates the desperation and anger that are the seeds of terrorism. My fantasy is that if we acknowledged the impossibility of making ourselves invulnerable, of constructing Reagan's Plexiglas shield, we would have to have policies that fostered and strengthened goodwill and interdependence, that invested in making the planet a livable place for people in all countries, that aimed at disarmament instead of weapons "advancement" and proliferation. And my fear is that we won't acknowledge it, because these assumptions about strength and weakness, and vulnerability, are simultaneously engaged at the very personal, identity level but also built right into beliefs about national security and into national security doctrine - as though they reflected "objective reality" and in no way stemmed from deeply felt and held identities. So stopping to try to disentangle emotions and assumptions about violence and its efficacy was the starting place for me. Ultimately, I want to ask what it will take to change the discourse, to alter the meanings of strength and justice in the international political arena.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › AT: Gender not the root cause of war

Our K is about how discursive constructions of the male power fantasy are utilized by policy makers in order to justify imperial violence. We don’t deny there are other factors that legitimate wars, but we will win a big impact to the K

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 78 (SPP).

Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › Impact - Queer Necropolitics

Structural patriarchy is a form of necropolitical management which is genocidal of queer, feminine, and minority bodies

Lamble 13 (Dr. Sara –Senior Lecturer in Law at University of London at Birkbeck, 8-4-13, “Queer Necropolitics and the Expanding Carceral State: Interrogating Sexual Investments in Punishment”, https://www.academia.edu/4438801/Queer_Necropolitics_and_the_Expanding_Carceral_State_Interrogating_Sexual_Investments_in_Punishment)

Necropolitics of Imprisonment Each of the above examples involves the direct or indirect mobilisation of discursive, financial or labour-related resources towards state practices of imprisonment and punishment. Given the ongoing colonial legacies of the carceral state, the disproportionate number of people of colour in prison and the widespread abuses within carceral institutions, these queer investments in punishment are, by their very nature, investments in state racism and violence. In this way, such investments are symptomatic of what Jasbir Puar, drawing from Achilles Mbembe’s work, describes as queer necropolitics. Necropolitics can be understood as technologies of power that (re)produce social relations of living and dying, such that some populations are ushered into the worlds of life and vitality, while others are funnelled into what Mbembe calls death-worlds—worlds of slow living death, and dead living (Mbembe 2003). Death here includes literal physical death, but also social, political and civil death—the social relations of death, decay and dying that emerge from prolonged exposure to violence, neglect, deprivation and suffering. Offering a corrective to Michel Foucault’s work on biopolitics, Mbembe puts forward the notion of necropolitics and necropower to account for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of the maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring up on them the status of living dead (2003, p. 40). In other words, while biopolitical powers work to manage, order and foster life for citizens worthy of protection, such powers work in tandem with necropolitical powers that produce death for those destined to abandonment, violence and neglect. Taking up this concept within contemporary queer politics, Puar draws attention to the ways in which the folding into life of some queers is predicated on the folding out of life of others (Puar 2007, p. 36). On one level, as Braidotti (2007) notes, ‘Bio-power and necro-politics are two sides of the same coin’; the relationship between the governance of life and death cannot be separated. Indeed, Foucault notes the inherent tension within the classical theory of sovereignty in the right of power over life and death. Because the sovereign has no capacity to create life, the ‘right of life and death is always exercised in an unbalanced way: the balance is always tipped in favour of death’ (Foucault 1976/2003, p. 240). Hence the ‘very essence of the right of life and death is actually the right to kill; it is at the moment when the sovereign can kill that he exercises his right over life’ (Foucault 1976/2003, p. 240). Yet the emergence of biopower, argues Foucault, marks a shift in this balance, from the right to take life or let live, to the power to make live and let die. Biopower intervenes in the conditions of life at the level of populations to improve, prolong, extend living; it is a technique of governance aimed at maximising, optimising and fostering life.25 Yet the tension between the exercise of power over life and death remains. For if biopower seeks to maximise life, what justifies its continued exercise of death? It is here, Foucault argues, that racism intervenes, as ‘the precondition that makes killing acceptable’ (1976/2003, p. 256). For the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race…Once the State functions in biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State (Foucault 1976/2003, p. 256). Racism is therefore not an aberration within the exercise of biopower, but a key premise in determining which populations will be made to live and left to die. Taking this analysis further, Mbembe asks whether biopolitics can fully account for specific conditions, processes and techniques in which contemporary forms of life are subjugated by the power of death: Is the notion of biopower sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political, under the guise of war, of resistance, or of the fight against terror, makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute objective?… What place is given to life, death and the human body (in particular the wounded or slain body)? How are they inscribed in the order of power?’ (Mbembe 2003, p. 12). Mapping out the ways in which the politics of death are central to contemporary modes of governance and warfare, Mbembe suggests the creation of deathwords is not merely a by-product of biopower, but a primary aim of its counterpart, necropower. Indeed, the administering of life is increasingly contingent upon, and supplemented by, new forms of sovereign power that are deployed in the administration of mass death and destruction.While Mbembe’s analysis focuses primarily on situations of military occupation, colonialism and war, the modern prison arguably constitutes another key instantiation of necropower. For the prison is a site that produces the conditions of living death; it is a place where bodies are subject to regimes of slow death and dying. Not only are deprivation, abuse and neglect regular features of incarceration but the monotonous regime of caged life—the experience of ‘doing time’—involves the slow wearing away of human vitality and the reduction of human experience to a bleak existence (Scraton and McQulloch 2009; Taylor 2000). This is especially true within regimes of solitary confinement, particularly in ‘supermax’ or ‘special housing units’ in the USA where prisoners are locked up for 23 hours a day, only permitted an hour of exercise in pens the size of dog cages, subjected to windowless cells and deprived of virtually any human contact—not only for days, but for years—with devastating mental health consequences (Haney 2003). In these ways, the prison serves as a site of mass warehousing of bodies in conditions that often resemble the death-worlds that Mbembe describes. While the modern prison was designed as an institution which aimed in part to train prisoners as productive workers, obedient citizens and docile subjects—a strategy that used disciplinary power in the broader service of biopolitical power (Foucault 1978/1995)—contemporary prisons are little more than mass warehouses for poor, racialised and otherwise disenfranchised populations (Gilmore 2007). As prison populations continue to grow to unprecedented levels, many states are abandoning even the pretence of rehabilitation, by dramatically reducing the hours that prisoners spend out of their cells, slashing funding for educational and other programmes and increasingly leaving prisoners to spend their days in monotonous isolation. These conditions, coupled with overcrowding, lack of adequate medical care and disconnection from family and friends, mean that prisoners experience high risks of self-harm, psychological abuse, trauma and suicide, both during imprisonment and post-release (Collins 2008; Taylor 2000; Kupers 2006). A criminal record also means that employment and housing are difficult to secure postrelease, family and community relationships are difficult to re-establish, and problems of poverty, mental illness and addiction persist—such that the consequences of imprisonment extend well beyond the duration of one’s sentence. The added combination of intensive surveillance and disciplinary probation regimes on the one hand, and limited post-release supports on the other, also mean that a high portion of prisoners experience repeated cycles of capture and release in the ‘revolving door’ of imprisonment. The prison thus plays a significant role in altering the ‘distribution of life chances’ or what Gilmore (2007, p. 247) describes as ‘group differentiated vulnerability to premature death’. In one sense, the after-effects of imprisonment can be understood as unfortunate but inevitable ‘challenges’ that prisoners face in recuperating from their sentences. But on another level, these ‘collateral consequences’ constitute a form of legally sanctioned social abandonment. Because ex-prisoners can be legally discriminated against with respect to housing, employment, education, jury duty, volunteer service and social assistance access, a criminal conviction becomes a ‘negative credential’ that functions as a ‘unique mechanism of state-sponsored stratification’ (Alexander 2010, p. 148). Voting restrictions—including the disenfranchisement of prisoners while serving sentences in Britain, and the permanent disenfranchisement of felons in some US states—marks another mode of exclusion from the polis (Manza and Uggen 2006). But perhaps more importantly, the social stigma and shame of a criminal conviction casts a long shadow on the future prospects of the (ex)prisoner. Marked as permanently failed, perpetually dangerous, and always suspicious, prisoners do not simply serve their time and move on; they pay the debt over and over in the form of stigma, shame and exclusion. A prison sentence thus becomes one of the most powerful ways that working class, black, migrant, disabled and other over-criminalised populations, are legally subjected to social, civil, and political death. To argue that the prison is an institution of necropolitical power and that prisoners are resigned to slow death, is not to deny the resilience and agency of those who survive prison on a daily basis. It is instead to underscore how the conditions of captivity govern life in ways that are akin to slow and prolonged death, thus severely restricting the possibilities for resistance and survival. Ironically, and perhaps most devastatingly, it is through the act of potentially reclaiming death that prisoners exercise a desperate form of agency. As Mbembe argues, in the realms of the living dead, death offers a brutal moment of power. ‘For death is precisely that from and over which I have power. But it is also that space where freedom and negation operate’ (Mbembe 2003, p. 39). Hence it should be no surprise that the hunger strike—the exercise of threat of the living to authorise their own death—persists as a last resort of collective power in prison. As the recent prisoner hunger strikes in California, Italy, England, Palestine, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere have demonstrated—alongside other less visible forms of collective organising inside—there is persistent resilience among prisoners to resist and survive the brutal conditions of their captivity.26 Arguably, what makes the prison an example of necropolitics, and not just an instance of ruthless state brutality, is that the imposition of death and suffering on some populations is explicitly legitimised and authorised in the name of fostering and protecting the life of others. In other words, the enhancement and protection of life for some is predicated on the violent sequestering of others. There are parallels here to what Nikolas Rose (2000) describes as circuits of security and circuits of insecurity—contemporary forms of governance that work by moving some subjects into modes of security and others into abandonment—as well as to what Judith Butler (2004) describes as the politics of ‘precarious life’ or what Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) refers to ‘economies of abandonment’. Necropolitics, however, draws more explicit attention to the deathly logic of these modes of governance, foregrounding the exercise of sovereign power (both within and beyond the state) to authorise and legitimate the politics of death and killing in the name of vitality and living. Examining these queer investments in punishment and necropolitics, we can identify several recurring patterns.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › Impact – Militarism/Ongoing War

Gendered discourses create militarism and ongoing wars

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 77-78, SPP)

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modem great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] erases the distinction between security and expansion," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes. Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › Impact – Interstate War

Hegemonic masculinity makes interstate conflict inevitable

Sjoberg 13 (Laura, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), online book, CMR)

Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-benefit analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out significant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing fields. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conflict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conflictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › Impact – Nuclear War

Masculine posturing makes nuclear war more likely

Betty A. Reardon, Director of the Peace Education Program at Teacher’s College Columbia University, 1993, Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security, p. 30-2

In an article entitled “Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us toward War” (1983), Charlene Spretnak focused on some of the fundamental cultural factors that deeply influence ways of thinking about security. She argues that patriarchy encourages militarist tendencies. Since a major war now could easily bring on massive annihilation of almost unthinkable proportions, why are discussions in our national forums addressing the madness of the nuclear arms race limited to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive analysis is badly needed . . . A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to “strut their stuff” as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bay—all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used. (Spretnak 1983) These cultural tendencies have produced our current crisis of a highly militarized, violent world that in spite of the decline of the cold war and the slowing of the military race between the superpowers is still staring into the abyss of nuclear disaster, as described by a leading feminist in an address to the Community Aid Abroad State Convention, Melbourne, Australia: These then are the outward signs of militarism across the world today: weapons-building and trading in them; spheres of influence derived from their supply; intervention—both overt and covert; torture; training of military personnel, and supply of hardware to, and training of police; the positioning of military bases on foreign soil; the despoilation of the planet; ‘intelligence’ networks; the rise in the number of national security states; more and more countries coming under direct military rule; 13 the militarization of diplomacy, and the interlocking and the international nature of the military order which even defines the major rifts in world politics. (Shelly 1983)

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › Turns Case- Nuclear War

The AFFs utilitarian justifications for expanding international protection apparatuses like the US military and NATO make them complicit with mass gendered violence in the name of harm reduction – and makes the aff impact inevitable

Acheson, 2018 ("Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical Will. She provides analysis, research, and advocacy across a range of disarmament and arms control issues. Ray leads WILPF’s work on stigmatising war and violence, including by campaigning for a nuclear weapon ban treaty and challenging the arms trade and the use of explosive weapons and armed drones. Ray is also on the Board of Directors of the Los Alamos Study Group and represents WILPF on several coalition steering groups, including the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). She has an Honours BA in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Toronto and an MA in Politics from The New School for Social Research. A feminist critique of the atomic bomb," Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, October 2018, //EH)

Feminist scholar Carol Cohn wrote a story about her experience working with nuclear war strategists in the 1980s. In this story, a white male physicist, working on modelling nuclear counterforce attacks, exclaims to a group of other white male physicists about the cavalier way they are talking about civilian casualties. “Only thirty million!” he bursts out. “Only thirty million human beings killed instantly?” The room went silent. He felt ashamed. This is an important story about nuclear weapons—or rather, about the ways in which those who think they benefit from nuclear weapons maintain their dominance over how we think and talk about these weapons. We are supposed to think about nuclear weapons as “deterrents”. Their advocates argue that the mere possession of nuclear weapons deters and prevents conflict. In the right hands, they are good for humanity, the argument goes. Nuclear weapons are to be talked about in the abstract, as magical tools that keep us safe and main stability in the world. “War is peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength.” So goes the slogan of The Party in George Orwell’s novel 1984. Weapons prevent war. So goes the “realist” discourse about nuclear weapons. But, when it comes to nuclear weapons, who is really being unrealistic? Those who assume that we can exist in this world, with all its tensions and conflicts and fears and instabilities, and not see the use of nuclear weapons? Those who believe that a theory called “nuclear deterrence,” cooked up by nuclear war strategists, is infallible? Or is it those of us who are see the inherent dangers in the atomic bomb and seek its abolition? Who believe that security cannot credibly be based on threatening to commit genocide, or to destroy the entire world? If we are willing to admit there may be some flaws in the discourse of deterrence, we should ask how has it survived and thrived? How has it usurped and held onto the mantle of “realism” for so long? A feminist analysis is very useful to answer this question. It can help us understand how nuclear weapons are a patriarchal tool, and how it benefits the patriarchy to advocate for their continued existence in the arsenals of a select few governments. The patriarchy is a social order dominated by men—in particular, men performing a certain brand of militarised masculinity that associates weapons and war with power. This form of masculinity influences the possession, proliferation, and use of everything from nuclear weapons to small arms. This is a masculinity in which ideas like strength, courage, and protection are equated with violence. It is a masculinity in which the capacity and willingness to use weapons, engage in combat, and kill other human beings is seen as essential to being “a real man”. This type of violent, militarised masculinity harms everyone. It harms everyone who does not perform that gender norm—women, LGBTQIA-identified people, non-normative men. It requires oppression of those deemed “weaker” on the basis of gender norms. It results in domestic violence. It results in violence against women. It results in violence against gay and trans people. But this kind of masculinity also means violence against other men performing violent masculinities. Men mostly kill each other, inside and outside of conflict. Violent masculinities make male bodies more expendable. Women and children, obnoxiously lumped together in countless UN resolutions and media reports, are more likely be deemed “innocent civilians,” while men are more likely be to be considered militants or combatants. Often, in conflict, civilian men are targeted—or counted in casualty recordings—as militants only because they are men of a certain age. But militarised masculinity is not just about death. It is also a major impediment to disarmament, peace, and gender equality. It makes disarmament seem weak. It makes peace seem utopian. It makes protection without weapons seem absurd. The concept of nuclear deterrence is a product of the patriarchy. It is designed to justify outrageous behaviour by those with power and privilege—the behaviour of spending billions of dollars on weapons that risk the world’s total destruction—in order to maintain that power and privilege. And those espousing this theory have managed to maintain their dominance over the nuclear weapon debate by employing the tools of the patriarchy, such as gaslighting and victim blaming. The term gaslighting comes from a play written in 1938, in which a woman’s husband slowly manipulates her into believing she is going insane. We can see the technique employed broadly in politics, particularly right now in the United States over issues of economic injustice, racism, and sexual violence. It is the denial of the lived reality of marginalised populations; the assertion that, “there is nothing to see here, everything is fine.” “MY BUTTON IS BIGGER THAN YOURS” A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE NUCLEAR BOMB Gaslighting in the realm of nuclear weapons has been practiced since the beginning of the atomic age. The discourse of deterrence denies the lived reality of those who have experienced the intergenerational harms of nuclear weapons use and testing. It makes it a thoughtcrime, à la 1984, to consider the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. One of the ways it does this is to “feminise” anyone who tries to raise these issues. That physicist in Carol Cohn’s story confessed to her, after his outburst to the room of other male physicists, “Nobody said a word. They didn’t even look at me. It was awful. I felt like a woman.” The association of caring about the murder of thirty million people with “being a woman” is all about seeing women as being weak. Being a woman means caring about wrong things; letting your “emotions” get the better of you; focusing on human beings when you should be focused on “strategy”. This means that caring about the humanitarian and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons is feminine. It is not relevant to the job that “real men” have to do to “protect” their countries. It not only suggests that caring about the use of nuclear weapons is spineless and silly, but also makes the pursuit of disarmament seem to be an unrealistic, irrational objective. This is not just an issue of the 1980s. This happens now.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › Turns Case - Security

Hegemonic IR makes the aff impact self-fulfilling prophecy – its try or die for the alt

Wilcox, 2010 (Lauren Wilcox, Lecturer in Gender Studies and the Deputy Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge, whose work is located at the intersections of international relations, political theory, and feminist theory in investigating the consequences of thinking about bodies and embodiment in the study of international practices of violence and security. “Gendering the Cult of the Offensive,” in Gender and International Security edited by Laura Sjoberg, p. 77-78 (SPP).

One of the conclusions of the offense-defense literature is that states perceive themselves to be much more insecure than they really are. Van Evera writes, "The prime threat to the security of modern great powers is ... themselves. Their greatest menace lies in their own tendency to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.” While states have been more or less been secure, these feelings of insecurity have led to great insecurity for people worldwide. Tens to hundreds of millions of people were killed in wars in the twentieth century alone, to say nothing of those who were injured, lost loved ones, or had their lives disrupted by war. Van Evera goes on to write, "The causes of this syndrome pose a large question for students of international relations." Feminists have much to offer in regard to this question. Focusing on how gender discourses and gender identities provide a necessary condition under which many of the factors of the offense-defense balance can thrive, feminists offer a way to think about many of the issues related to the causes of war that have been neglected by most scholars of Security Studies. For scholars interested in the offense-defense balance as a way of explaining why wars occur, feminist analysis can contribute to both defensive realists who consider wars to begin because of the perceptions of the offense-defense balance, as well as scholars who support the offensive realist position that states start wars regardless of their calculations of the offense-defense balance. Thus, despite the recent debate between Lieber and Snyder about whether or not a cult of the offensive was the key factor in Germany's offensive war plans, feminist analysis of nationalism and the protection racket provides insights into the underlying conditions that make preventative or pre-emptive wars possible in terms of anxieties over gender and racial identities and gendered discourses of military strength and the benefits of war. Feminists argue that offensive wars are based on similar concerns over gender relations and the nation, making offensive wars appear to be legitimately "defensive." As Snyder argues, "The belief in the feasibility and necessity of offensive strategy entices both fearful and greedy aggressors to attack [and] erases the distinction between security and expansion," the gendered constitution of the cult of the offensive applies to states acting out of fear or expansion. The feminist analyses of the role gender plays in constituting the perception of technology, the gendered ideologies of nationalism, and the gendered "defensive" logic of the protection racket support this view of the erasure of the distinction between security and expansion. A feminist analysis would understand gendered ideologies and identities to be at the root of both strategies, with their particular historical manifestations leading to variation in the specific forms that militarism takes. Far from being only concerned with the status of women, feminists use the concept of gender to analyze the workings of power through gendered discourses and identities. Gender matters in the ways in which technologies are perceived and used, as well as in formulating offensive military strategies. Gendered perceptions of technology, gendered discourses of nationalism, and the "protection racket" are three related ways in which offensive wars are legitimated, and thus enabled. By explaining the impact gender has on issues related to the perception of offense-defense balance, feminist analysis shows how gender discourses and the production of gender identities are not confined to individuals and the private realm, but rather are a pervasive fact of social life on an international scale. International Relations theorists concerned with determining the causes of war would do well to consider the ways in which gender can shape the conditions under which wars occur.

2022 Michigan Kritik
IMPACTS › Turns Case - China War

Gendered posturing is a stronger internal link to US/China war than the plan

Sjoberg, 2010. (Laura, Assistant Professor of Political Science at U Florida, PhD in IR and Gender Studies and a law degree specializing in IR. “Gendering Power Transition Theory,” in Gender and International Security edited by Sjoberg, p. 95-97 - spp)

Analyzing the Chinese “overtaking” through gendered lenses: These feminist reformulations of PTT’s key hypotheses provide both alternative understandings of the potential for conflict between the US and China and alternative futures. PTT suggests that the question of whether or not that rising will cause conflict between the two states depends on China's satisfaction or dissatisfaction as it approaches parity with the US. A feminist approach suggests that a good deal of the possibility for conflict between the US and China might be explained by gender-related variables. The patriarchal nature of the international system provides an incentive for the US to attempt to maintain dominance. Such a system also gives China a motivation to seek not parity but supremacy. In addition, the cultural salience of masculinity in each society is manifested in each state's desire to compete with the other. This alternative explanation for the potential competition between the US and China suggests alternative solutions. Realists like Mearsheimer suggest a combined strategy of economic containment and military presence, and power transition theorists suggest attempts to co-opt China into satisfaction with the existing order. Some International Relations scholars outside of the realist paradigm have suggested strategies like GRIT (graduated reciprocation of tension reduction) in order to establish trust between the US and China. If gendered competition and international system patriarchy underlie the competition between the two states, however, none of these strategies will be successful. Mearsheimer's containment strategy will incite more competition; power transition theorists' co-optation strategy is misdirected since dissatisfaction is endemic and would not be China's main motive for making war; and trust-building solutions without the deconstruction of the masculine competition for superiority would just be read as weakness. Seeing gender-as-power both helps explain the potential for conflict between the US and China and provides a theoretical and practical alternative to that competition in recasting the genderings of the state and the international system. Some feminists prescribe the strong need to unilaterally deconstruct the cycle of violence and masculinized competition between great powers in the international arena. States would need to recognize conflict’s basis in competition, posturing, and subordination under patriarchy and deconstruct that in order to head off violence. Feminist theorists suggest that the US and China could come to terms with the gendered nature of their competition by dealing with each other in empathy and in dialogue to try to find a deeper sense of understanding if not common ground. The path to an empathetic reconstruction of the relationship between the US and China could begin with the rejection of PTT's claim that hegemonic domination is empirically and normatively valuable. Domination and the resulting subordination, at the international level as well as at the personal level, are normatively problematic. Therefore, even if hegemonic dominance did decrease great power warfare, a feminist approach asks if that would be a sort of peace that the international arena would truly thrive under. Feminist work has consistently read more content into "peace" than the cessation of great power hot wars. As discussed above, a feminist approach to the rise of China recognizes the contingencies of the entities of the US and China and the limits of focusing on those two states where "others" outnumber them several times over and where their competition makes people within their borders insecure even as the state becomes more secure. A feminist perspective therefore suggests that the US and China (along with. other actors traditionally marginalized in global politics) engage in dialogue about what a peaceful and just international system might be, and that the US begin to reshape the international arena not to co-opt China but to decrease the pressure of consolidated power in the international arena on those least powerful against it. In doing so, the US and China would need to come to understand themselves and each other as imperfect, non-omnipotent, gendered actors in an imperfect, gendered world-without more right to decide than anyone else simply because they have more power-over. If the gendered concept of power-over was replaced both in theory and in practice with a more inclusive understanding of power including power-to and power-with, different resources could be drawn upon both in the comparative measuring of state power and in redressing the consequences of international hierarchy and subordination at the political margins. A feminist engagement with PTT suggests that great states, small states, and non-states look for places in the complicated scaffolding of international power where non-zero sum, anti-systemic, and even emancipatory uses of power could benefit those at the margins of global politics. Employing a feminist understanding of security could lead the way to creative solutions of resistance and empowerment in the face of a competitive and hierarchical international system. Feminist complex and multilayered understandings of power could not only provide explanatory leverage for great power conflicts, but also for conflicts that defy the logic of PTT. Conclusion: Feminist theory critiques of PTT's concept of power, its focus on great states, and its omission of gender-based variables inspire reformulations of the hypotheses of the power transition research program which provide alternative accounts of the empirical phenomena that that power transition theorists observe and normative critiques of the exclusionary nature of their original critiques. By suggesting alternative causal mechanisms and constitutive factors, a feminist reinterpretation of PTT presents a unique explanation of great power conflict alongside a convincing case that these conflicts should not be the exclusive focus of international security analyses. With its alternative explanatory framework, a feminist approach suggests both that conflict between the US and China is not inevitable and that, if it comes, it will be on different terms and for different reasons than suggested by PTT. As such, a feminist approach to the Chinese “overtaking” of the US both produces a new set of policy recommendations and envisions alternative futures – making a distinct contribution not only to the power transition research program but to international security theory as a whole.