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2022 Michigan Negative
Case › Case Defense › AT: Escalation

No escalation and cyber deterrence is fake

Rovner 19. Joshua Rovner is the John Goodwin Tower Professor of International Politics and National Security at Southern Methodist University, where he also serves as Director of Studies at the Tower Center for Political Studies; “CYBER WAR AS AN INTELLIGENCE CONTEST”; September 16, 2019; War on the Rocks; //BY

The cyberspace competition is an intelligence contest in a technologically novel domain. It is a struggle to protect information, while corrupting and stealing information from rivals. Because it is not a test of overt military power, traditional strategic theories about force and war may not be our best guide.

Deterrence is mostly irrelevant in an intelligence contest. No combination of threats and promises will stop a rival intelligence service from collecting information. Nor is it easy to imagine what kind of signals would be strong enough to stop adversaries from influence activities such as those of Russia during the  in the United States. Covert action is inherently hard to deter if the responsible party remains hidden. And in other cases, states might tacitly tolerate one another’s covert campaigns as a  for war. Similarly, the coercive value of offensive cyber operations is likely to be modest at best. There is not much evidence that non-kinetic threats are enough to change anyone’s behavior.   suggests that the victims are surprisingly tolerant of cyber operations. Strategy is fundamentally about coercion, but cyberspace operations carry little coercive value.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › Case Defense › AT: Escalation

Escalation is wrong---most comprehensive studies prove

Borghard and Lonergan 19. Erica D. Borghard is an Adjunct Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science. She is also a senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Shawn W. Lonergan is a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. Shawn holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Shawn is also a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, where, from 2014-2017, he served as an Assistant Professor in the Academy’s Department of Social Sciences and Chief Research Scientist in the Army Cyber Institute.; “Cyber Operations as Imperfect Tools of Escalation”; Fall 2019; Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 3 (FALL 2019), pp. 122-145; //BY

There is a widespread view among practitioners and scholars that cyberspace is defined by an inherent potential for dangerous escalation dynamics between rivals.1 On the practitioner side, for example, senior US intelligence and military leaders expressed concerns about first-strike incentives leading to escalation in a 2017 joint statement to Congress, testifying that “adversaries equipped with [offensive cyber capabilities] could be prone to preemptive attack and rapid escalation in a future crisis, because both sides would have an incentive to strike first.”2 On the academic side, there is a palpable fear that cyberspace is an environment in which offense has advantages over defense and that this—coupled with factors such as problems of attribution, poor command and control, and the absence of meaningful thresholds or red lines—generates real risks of inadvertent escalation.3 Concerns about escalation grew even more passionate in the wake of the US Department of Defense’s release of its 2018 Cyber Strategy document, which articulates an operational concept of “defending forward” in which the DOD “disrupt[s] or halt[s] malicious cyber activity at its source.”4 However, there are important empirical reasons to suspect that the risks of cyber escalation may be exaggerated. Specifically, if cyberspace is in fact an environment that (perhaps even more so than others) generates severe escalation risks, why has cyber escalation not yet occurred? Most interactions between cyber rivals have been characterized by limited volleys that have not escalated beyond nuisance levels and have been largely contained below the use-of-force threshold.5 For example, in a survey of cyber incidents and responses between 2000 and 2014, Brandon Valeriano et al. find that “rivals tend to respond only to lower-level [cyber] incidents and the response tends to check the intrusion as opposed to seek escalation dominance. The majority of cyber escalation episodes are at a low severity threshold and are non-escalatory. These incidents are usually ‘tit-for-tat’ type responses within one step of the original incident.”6 Even in the two rare examples in which states employed kinetic force in response to adversary cyber operations—the US counter-ISIL drone campaign in 2015 and Israel’s airstrike against Hamas cyber operatives in 2019—the use of force was circumscribed and did not escalate the overall conflict (not to mention that force was used against nonstate adversaries with limited potential to meaningfully escalate in response to US or Israeli force).7 We posit that cyber escalation has not occurred because cyber operations are poor tools of escalation. In particular, we argue that this stems from key characteristics of offensive cyber capabilities that limit escalation through four mechanisms. First, retaliatory offensive cyber operations may not exist at the desired time of employment. Second, even under conditions where they may exist, their effects are uncertain and often relatively limited. Third, several attributes of offensive cyber operations generate important tradeoffs for decision-makers that may make them hesitant to employ capabilities in some circumstances. Finally, the alternative of cross-domain escalation—responding to a cyber incident with noncyber, kinetic instruments—is unlikely to be chosen except under rare circumstances, given the limited cost-generation potential of offensive cyber operations. In this article, we define cyber escalation and then explore the implications of the technical features and requirements for offensive cyber operations. We also consider potential alternative or critical responses to each of these logics. Finally, we evaluate the implications for US policy making.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › Zero-Days Bad---1NC

Sharing zero-days with allies causes use-it-or-lose-it pressure---accelerates conflict escalation

Smeets ’22 [Max; May 31; Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, co-founder and Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI.eu), an organization promoting the interdisciplinary study of cyber conflict and statecraft in Europe and beyond, also an Affiliate at Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation; CFR, “The Risks of Managing a Purchased Cyber Arsenal,” ]

We know that some government agencies are regular buyers on the market for zero-days, previously unknown vulnerabilities which vendors have not had time to prepare a patch for. Zero-days, and their use by threat actors, are a common topic, but how zero-day purchases complicate arsenal management decisions is rarely discussed. Not least, buying zero-day exploits, rather than developing them internally, increases the chances of early discovery due to potential non-exclusive sales (even if the exploit was supposed to be sold to only one buyer) which subsequently incentivizes the imprudent use of the exploits.

Types of exploits and their life span

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › OCOs Bad---2NC

Offensive operations are escalatory and fail.

Valeriano & Jensen 19 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University, serves as Senior Advisor for the Cyber Solarium Commission; Associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar‐​in‐​residence at American University’s School of International Service

Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint,” The CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 862, January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint

New policy options proposed by Cyber Command and the Trump administration risk exacerbating fear in other countries and creating a self-reinforcing spiral of tit-for-tat escalations that risk war even though each actor feels he is acting defensively—or, as it is called in the scholarly literature, a security dilemma.52 As shown above, most cyber operations to date have not resulted in escalation. The cyber domain has been a world of spies collecting valuable information and engaging in limited disruptions that substitute for, as well as complement, more conventional options. Shifting to a policy of preemptive offensive cyber warfare risks provoking fear and overreaction in other states and possibly producing conflict spirals. Even limited-objective cyber offensive action defined as “defending forward” can be misinterpreted and lead to inadvertent escalation.53 As the historian Cathal Nolan puts it, “intrusions into a state’s strategically important networks pose serious risks and are therefore inherently threatening.”54

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › OCOs Bad---2NC

An offensive cyber posture fails and causes escalation.

Valeriano & Jensen 19 – Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, Bren Chair of Military Innovation at the Marine Corps University, serves as Senior Advisor for the Cyber Solarium Commission; Associate professor at the Marine Corps University and a scholar‐​in‐​residence at American University’s School of International Service

Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin Jensen, “The Myth of the Cyber Offense: The Case for Restraint,” The CATO Institute, Policy Analysis No. 862, January 2019, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/myth-cyber-offense-case-restraint

The Myth of the Offense

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › OCOs Bad---2NC

OCO’s cause escalation with Russia over Ukraine

Healey, 22 (Jason Healey, Healey is a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs, 3-9-2022, accessed on 6-19-2022, War on the Rocks, "Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After - War on the Rocks",

Second, Western offensive cyber operations might spark war. U.S. cyber espionage and operations against Putin, his cronies, or Russia’s military forces will appear far more ominous to Putin if he believes they are aimed at regime change. Could Putin turn the other cheek if the United States were to electronically raid the cryptocurrency wallets of Russia’s sanctions-avoiding kleptocrats? He might feel the need to escalate his own cyber operations as part of his own version of defending forward. Escalation could happen on the battlefield as well. , teams from U.S. Cyber Command are “in place to interfere with Russia’s digital attacks and communications.” Other teams are almost certainly collecting digital intelligence on the location and intent of Russian combat forces. The United States is sharing such intelligence with the Ukrainians but . That may change soon, as the United States seeks to alleviate intensifying attacks on civilians. And with his KGB-bred paranoia, Putin might already see the presence of U.S. defensive and intelligence teams operating on or against Russian military networks as evidence of direct U.S. involvement in the war. Confirming his apparent belief that Ukraine is just a NATO puppet, this might force a response, either inside or outside of cyberspace. Further, if Western governments have infiltrated Russia’s operational military networks, they may feel pressure to disrupt those networks to prevent civilian massacres. Because cyber capabilities are billed as non-lethal, reversible, and non-escalatory, tub-thumping newspapers may push decision-makers to take shots they might not otherwise: “We can’t create a no-fly zone but .” Some may succumb to this pressure, potentially causing a larger conflict. Future Risks Even if Russia and the West avoid direct conflict this time, they might not be so lucky the next. As relations worsen, future disruption of critical Western infrastructure by Russian intelligence, such as the and attacks, are less likely to be viewed as mere crimes. Repeated crises bordering on war may further erode the tacit agreements and relative restraint of quieter times. After repeated iterations of intensifying cyber operations, both Russia and the West may feel their backs to the wall with few options left other than military force when the next crisis — physical or cyber — emerges. Under extreme conditions, some of the same characteristics that lead cyber capabilities to be a pressure release might have the opposite effect, a mechanism that Bob Jervis and I have described as the . If Putin believes a direct conflict with NATO is likely and expects its adversaries to , he could conclude that the best possibility for success is to launch a massive preemptive cyber attack. Since the U.S. military may seem otherwise unbeatable, this Russia to “compensate with audacity in order to redress the balance.” The more the United States brags about its overwhelming offensive cyber advantage, but frets over weak defenses, the more any adversary might feel the need to .

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › OCOs Bad---2NC

Formalized US OCO policy triggers rapid-fire prolif of adversary OCOs---that triggers conflict and wrecks cyber norms, turns both advantages

Lin and Smeets 18. Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. Max Smeets is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, and author of “No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force”, published with Oxford University Press and Hurst in May 2022; “An Outcome-Based Analysis of U.S. Cyber Strategy of Persistence & Defend Forward”; November 28, 2018; Lawfare; //BY

One path towards escalation involves adversaries becoming more aggressive and conducting attacks that are highly disruptive to society—in other words, adversary activity leads to a less stable cyberspace. This could be the result of either an adversary’s increased willingness to conduct attacks using existing capacities or increased capacities of the adversary. Indeed, with respect to the latter, the U.S. vision—and associated changed course of action—may encourage other actors to grow their budgets to conduct offensive cyber operations. The proliferation literature on weapons of mass destruction has extensively covered the role of special interests in stimulating demand for weapon development. This makes it a strong possibility that the new U.S. vision can be used by those groups within a given country favoring a growing cyber command to justify and lobby for increased military spending.

A second possibility is that increased U.S. offensive cyber activity that operates below the threshold of armed attack activity reduces the value of cyber norms of behavior that support a more stable cyberspace. Even today, some observers believe that the high level of offensive activity in cyberspace today demonstrates quite forcefully that nations find value in conducting such activity, and that such activity points to the difficulty of establishing a more peaceful cyber norms regime. These observers argue that there is no reason to expect that increasing the U.S. contribution to such activity worldwide will make it easier to establish such a regime. Finally, a third possibility is that increased U.S. offensive cyber activity will complicate diplomatic relations with allies and other nations whose cyber infrastructures are used in support of such activity.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › OCOs Bad---2NC

NATO cyber-deterrence backfires---triggers conflict with adversaries through miscalc and wrecks alliance unity

Jacobson 21. Jeppe T. Jacobsen is the Cyber Coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinates Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. Jacobsen holds a master’s degree in International Politics from School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, a master’s degree in Political Science from the University of Aarhus, Denmark, and is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities Get access Arrow”; May 10, 2021; International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 3, May 2021, Pages 703–720; //BY

Deterring what? Much of the scholarly debate on NATO is preoccupied with the current strategic adaptation of the alliance and the renewed focus on deterring Russia.48 Only a few contributors to this debate have addressed the addition of offensive cyber capabilities in NATO force structure and response doctrine as an element in work to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence posture.49 Neither in these contributions nor among the former and current NATO employees who have publicly articulated this ambition is it clear what kind of activity the integration of cyber effects in NATO seeks to deter.50 Is it supposed to add to the classical deterrence (through the threat of punishment) of conventional Russian threats to the territorial integrity of eastern Europe? Or to the deterrence of hybrid activities—specifically cyber activities—against allied countries below the threshold of armed conflict? This section addresses each of these possibilities in turn. From Cold War deterrence and back NATO’s founding purpose was to maintain a sufficient military strength to deter aggression and attempts at coercion, to prepare for the eventuality of deterrence failing, and to ensure stability among European powers.51 During the Cold War, the debates over NATO deterrence posture largely centred on the role of nuclear weapons, and specifically whether the United States would retaliate with these weapons in the event of a Soviet conventional attack against allied states.52 In short, NATO deterrence was about credibly extending the US nuclear (as well as conventional force) deterrence to allies to discourage a Soviet military offensive into eastern Europe. While NATO and its member states adapted to the new security environment after the end of the Cold War by scaling down the military investments and presence in eastern Europe and by focusing more on crisis management,53 much of the Cold War deterrence language returned when the Russian–Ukrainian conflict broke out in 2014.54 What needs to be deterred today, much of the literature agrees, is not only a full-scale military invasion but to a larger extent the use and support of pro-Russian militant separatists who are willing to apply insurgency tactics in NATO’s post-Soviet member states.55 As a result, the allies’ military investments have been increasing again,56 a number of initiatives such as the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland have been introduced,57 and the discussions—and disagreements—on the nuclear deterrence (of non-nuclear threats) have re-emerged.58 Such responses are often presented as a renewed attempt by NATO to reassert its deterrence and assurance posture by signalling strength, preparedness and willingness to punish ‘bad’ behaviour.59 At first sight, the introduction of CYOC seems to add to these deterrence efforts. NATO added an offensive cyber option to reinforce its ability to impose costs sufficient to dissuade adversaries from acting aggressively. On closer examination, however, it is not self-evident that requesting member states’ delivery of offensive cyber effects in NATO operations constitutes a necessary or even a substantial addition to credibly signalling the ability and willingness to punish an adversary. NATO’s conventional capabilities are clearly already far superior to Russia’s—with or without fully integrated cyber effects. Thus, a deterrence failure, resulting for example in a scenario in one of the Baltic states similar to that which occurred in eastern Ukraine, will not be the result of NATO’s lack of available cyber tools in its military toolbox; rather, if the Russian leadership were to consider it in its interest to pursue such a scenario, it would mean that Russia’s decision-makers did not believe in the credibility of NATO’s article 5 or in NATO’s ability to mobilize its forces. The capacity to integrate cyber effects would do nothing to change that. Furthermore, if the establishment of CYOC is an attempt to signal defensive strength and unity in cyberspace, it remains difficult to imagine that such signaling would dissuade adversaries from trying to penetrate NATO and allied systems. CYOC does not change the fact that NATO is not tasked to govern and secure national IT systems. In an operational setting, states might connect to each other through so-called federated mission networking; 60 but there is no tradition of ceding control of the deployed national networks to NATO during military operations. Hence, CYOC can only realistically seek to become a hub for cyber-threat information-sharing and to support states’ coordination and synchronization of various national responses to these threats. In other words, CYOC is unlikely to become an active defender in cyberspace that causes doubt in the adversary’s evaluation of its own cyber capabilities. This also means that even if CYOC’s coordination and information-sharing efforts manage to contribute to the denial of intrusions into allied systems, an adversary’s military is unlikely to be deterred from trying to hack these systems. In fact, actively articulating that CYOC is supposed to deter (through denial) a perceived adversary such as Russia from hacking NATO and allied operational systems creates an incentive to do just that and thereby show that the alliance is incapable of doing what it says it seeks to do. However, the renewed concern about Russia’s intentions in NATO member states since 2014 is not confined to the need to deter hostile military invasions or paramilitary activity. It also encompasses a range of subversive, non-military activities that have become available and are often considered part of a broader Russian strategy of ‘hybrid warfare’.61 Can CYOC and the integration of cyber effects deter the non-military hybrid activities that have become possible with the new information and communication technologies? Deterring cyber activity below the threshold of collective defence ‘Hybrid’ has become a popular concept when describing the current threat environment. While discussions over the definition, novelty and usefulness of the concept continue, there seems to be agreement that, when used to qualify ‘threat’ or ‘warfare’, ‘hybrid’ refers to the blurring of the distinction between military and civilian, often in relation to the mixture of instruments used to obtain political objectives.62 NATO’s attempt to deter military and paramilitary instruments from being deployed has already been touched upon above. As a primarily military alliance, however, NATO is facing difficulty in addressing the instruments that are used deliberately to stay below the threshold of collective defence. NATO has not been able to deter the perpetration of random ransomware incidents, election interference and targeted propaganda campaigns through hacks and leaks, or industrial cyber espionage and intrusion into critical infrastructures. The alliance’s conventional capabilities are not credible (proportional) responses to such malicious cyber activity. Thus, it has responded only by ‘naming and shaming’, and by expressing encouragement to member states to enhance the resilience of their networks.63 These responses, however, have yet to prove effective in halting the malicious cyber activity conducted below the threshold of collective defence.64 And the introduction of SCEPVA is not likely to change that; the integration of cyber effects is tied to NATO military operations only. While NATO member states are already compelled to maintain a level of cooperation in collective defence (article 3), and to consult together whenever any of them feels that its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened (article 4), NATO—with or without integrated cyber effects—is not an alliance designed to deal with non-military threats from a peer competitor. The question then arises: does the lack of capacity to deter non-military hybrid cyber activities suggest that it is time for NATO to renegotiate the scope and substance of its collective defence clause?65 When it comes to cyberspace, the next section expresses scepticism about expanding NATO’s role. It addresses the escalation risk associated with having NATO, an organization that has refocused its attention on a more traditional military threat, become a more active player below the threshold of collective defence. It argues that a more active stance outside military confrontation risks undermining the intelligence norm that currently dominates in cyberspace—a norm whereby state activity in foreign networks is not considered escalatory. Escalation and the dominant intelligence norm The large overlap between intelligence collection and attack in cyberspace makes it difficult to send clear signals to adversaries, in terms of either capabilities or intentions. When a foreign entity is moving around in a network, is it then about to start a military operation? Is the activity part of a reconnaissance mission? Is it political or economic espionage? Is it active defence? The difficulty of answering these questions has created much nervousness among cyber-conflict experts. Ben Buchanan, for example, has shown how defensive hacking or intelligence-gathering in cyberspace is easily misinterpreted as aggressive behaviour.66 Why, then, have we not experienced serious misinterpretation and escalation in cyberspace? One way to explain this is through the existence and dominance of a largely unspoken but widely accepted norm. For decades, the predominant actors in cyberspace have been intelligence agencies; and the norms that characterize interactions between intelligence agencies are not primarily concerned with military concepts such as conflict escalation and deterrence.67 In the world of intelligence agencies, success is not about keeping a distance between oneself and the adversary by signalling one’s intentions and capabilities. It is about being able to outmanoeuvre adversaries in a space of constant contact.68 There are always risks, and the work usually takes place in legal grey zones where a clear distinction between war and peace is not the guiding principle. This is an arena where the opportunity to annoy, cheat and delay opponents is taken when it arises. In short, espionage and counter-espionage do not fit well with the thorough military operational planning that characterizes NATO operations. Intelligence operations, on the other hand, fit perfectly with a dynamic cyberspace where anonymity is easy to achieve and uncertainty a constant condition.69 The states that embrace cyberspace as a domain where the intelligence norm dominates are able to use a broader array of tools to pursue or respond to various foreign political objectives than only those that relate to military operations. In its 2018 ‘vision’, the US Cyber Command built implicitly on the dominant intelligence norm. Here, the objective is to become more agile and act as close to the adversary as possible (‘defend forward’).70 The United States considers ‘constant contact’ and ‘persistent engagement’ as the necessary guiding principles to achieve superiority in cyberspace and to take full advantage of the broader potential for pursuing its political objectives through cyberspace. During the 2018 US midterm elections, for example, the US Cyber Command worked closely with the NSA to disrupt servers operated by the Russian Internet Research Agency aiming to spread fake news and stir up tension in the United States.71 More recently, the US Cyber Command responded with various cyber effects against Iran after the Iranian Revolutionary Guards apparently placed mines on ships in the Strait of Hormuz.72 These practices illustrate that, for the United States, cyber effects provide political options when one does not want to escalate existing tensions into military confrontation. Defensive coordination between allies through CYOC supports such defensive use of cyber effects, increasing the possibility that US Cyber Command will be allowed to ‘defend forward’ and work persistently through allied networks.73 A more cyber-active NATO, however, risks being counterproductive to the ambition to ‘defend forward’ through allied networks. Unintended conflict escalation from ongoing cyber activity is mainly a risk if military analysts—in a strategic environment with heightened attention to military confrontation—ignore the dominant intelligence norm. If that happens, it becomes more likely that ‘persistent engagement’ and active cyber defence will be misinterpreted as military preparation, armament or the initial phase of an attack. If NATO, an organization that has publicly returned to its original raison d’être of deterrence and collective defence, becomes the entity that coordinates cyber effects below the threshold of armed conflict, then the likelihood increases that Russia misinterprets these effects as escalatory and acts accordingly. In other words, a more active NATO in the current strategic environment increases the risk that the existing intelligence norm will be undermined and replaced by a more militarized norm. This does not mean that states that face hostile hybrid activities below the threshold of armed conflict will be left alone. Intelligence cooperation between allied countries does exist, and threat information is occasionally shared. In addition to the current political collaboration facilitated by NATO to improve network security and resilience, the EU is engaging in similar civilian activities, as well as developing and implementing a cyber-diplomatic toolbox to create a common basis for responding to a variety of malicious activities against member states. Further strengthening the political partnership between the EU and NATO is thus the most appropriate way forward to avoid further militarization of cyberspace. Sustaining the intelligence norm as the dominant norm is not without potential problems. Openly embracing the fact that cyberspace is a domain in which intelligence agencies are constrained only by domestic laws, and where takedowns of servers in foreign countries are not necessarily perceived as serious breaches of sovereignty, is likely to lead to an increase in the exploitation of IT vulnerabilities in commercial software used in both enemy and allied networks. For smaller states, this could increase the risk of retaliation by larger adversaries, and it could increase the risk of divisions between allies—divisions that are not aligned with the United States’ political ambition to use cyber coordination in NATO as part of its attempt to ‘defend forward’.74 More exploitation could also ultimately make cyberspace less free, less open and less secure, rendering civilian populations susceptible to cybercrime, surveillance and disruptions of everyday services.75 This is why some states, NGOs and private corporations such as Microsoft continue to promote norms that emphasize restraint on the part of states’ intelligence agencies and militaries in cyberspace, and why other states promote more sovereign control of cyberspace.76 Conclusion This article has pointed to several challenges to the integration of military cyber effects in NATO operations, and has argued that even if the integration is successful, it will not add to the alliance’s deterrence posture. Importantly, the fact that CYOC does not send a strong signal to adversaries such as Russia does not mean that it is a waste of time. Far from it. As both conventional militaries and paramilitary groups are increasingly dependent on civilian networked technologies, the ability of NATO to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy enemy networks through sovereign cyber effects—even if these amount only to temporary annoyances—will become more relevant in the years to come. This, of course, does not mean that conventional kinetic or electromagnetic capabilities will become redundant. Rather, cyber effects offer a substitute in case the intended target cannot be reached with conventional capabilities, and a supplement that works alongside conventional operations as persistent annoyances of enemy networked devices. The latter, however, demands an agile CYOC that provides member states with broad initial mandates and facilitates quick decision-making and rapid approval when member states stand ready to deliver even minor cyber annoyances. Furthermore, the article has argued that NATO and its CYOC should not seek to coordinate additional offensive cyber efforts to deter hybrid activities below the threshold of armed conflict. If an organization that is perceived by its main adversary primarily as a military organization engages in active cyber-defence measures and persistent cyber engagements outside of military confrontation, then the risk of escalation increases. This is because every potential NATO-initiated cyber activity in foreign networks is likely to be perceived through a military lens and thus to be (mis-)interpreted as an attack in the making. In fact, active cyber-defence measures in foreign networks and use of cyber means below the threshold of armed conflict to pursue political interests internationally are part of our current reality. Intelligence agencies know this to be a fact, and they live by it every day.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › Defense Solves Deterrence---2NC

Investment solves attacker advantage

Alperovitch et al. 18. Dmitri Alperovitch is a computer security industry executive. He is co-founder and former chief technology officer of CrowdStrike; “Building a Defensible Cyberspace”; 2018; New York Cyber Task Force; //BY

In a little over 20 years, the percent of the global population with access to the Internet (and the larger cyberspace of connected devices and information, terms this report will use interchangeably) has gone from less than one to about 40, over 3.595 billion people.2 In the United States alone, the Internet sector makes up an estimated six percent of GDP; the “mobile internet and app services” subsector alone has a “contribution to the US GDP [of] approximately 3.11%, putting it at approximately the same size as the Automotive industry.”3 Yet, as the reach and benefits of the Internet have increased, so too have the economic costs. A 2015 study indicated that cybersecurity costs were likely to rise above $1.2 trillion by 2030 costing a total of roughly $20 trillion over those 15 years.4 The costs are high because attackers in cyberspace have for decades held fundamental advantages over defenders. The Internet was designed to be flexible and open, not secure. For years, nearly every device and piece of code added to cyberspace has reiterated this pattern: “minimum viable products” are rushed to market with security slapped on afterward as a band-aid, rather than built in. All this complexity has multiplied the costs and challenges of mounting a successful defense. Still, defense is possible. This report builds on an increasingly rich set of cybersecurity research on creating a “defense advantage” that raises costs to attackers and enables cost-effective risk management. Some of these ideas, such as to allow the least privileges or to failsafe in a secure manner, date back to the 1970s.5 Other work, especially in the business community, has centered on the return on investment of defensive innovations. Inspired by military tactics, others have sought to raise costs to attackers by making their task harder or actively disrupting their operations. The NY Cyber Task Force, through the experience of our members and interviews with other experts, has tried to combine these three perspectives. Our task force started by asking, “what technological, operational, and policy innovations have had the greatest impact in thwarting attackers?” We found that the highest-impact innovations shared two key traits: • Defense advantage: Any innovation by defenders must impose far greater costs on attackers. A “dollar of defense” (or hour or other measure of input) should yield not merely a “dollar of attack,” but should force attackers to spend considerably more to defeat it. • Hyperscale: The innovation must easily, even automatically, work across enterprises or cyberspace as a whole. The task force members and the colleagues we interviewed consistently agreed on the past innovations with the highest scale and leverage over attackers: strong encryption, software that updates automatically with little or no user intervention, and software that is secure because it was designed that way (rather than having security bolted on afterwards), among others. Importantly, the most transformative innovations have come not only from technology. Some of the greatest advances in defense advantage and hyperscale arose from improvements in organization, such as the creation of the first Computer Emergency Response Teams in the 1980s, and governance, such as the development of C-suite cybersecurity experts (e.g., Chief Information Security Officers) in the 1990s. Other successes have come from process innovations, like the “cyber kill chain” and “intelligence-driven operations.” And, better mapping and analysis of the way attackers intrude into systems has led to better strategies to keep them out. Policy actions, such as issuing legal indictments and threatening governmental sanctions, seem to have fostered bilateral norms and reduced the volume of espionage operations, particularly from China. In 2013, the White House set a new policy instructing   Building a Defensible Cyberspace: Report of the NY Cyber Task Force | 5 the US government to tell companies if it detects data breaches in their systems.6 Largely because of this policy (barely 200 words long), notification from law enforcement is now one of the most common ways companies learn of intruders. This public-private cooperation means faster responses, limiting the disruption attackers can cause.7 In each of these cases, the solution (while not necessarily cheap in hours or dollars invested) reaped benefits that significantly outweighed costs. This kind of leverage can make cyberspace more defensible for a company, a sector, a nation, and the world as a whole. Having carefully assessed a variety of innovations, we have concluded that defenders should adopt innovations that have the highest return. This, of course, requires that we assess each innovation for its benefits and costs, an analysis that seems obvious, but is not commonly employed today. The task force also identified several innovations with potentially large impact, such as reaching a consensus between policymakers and technology leaders to build a defensible cyberspace, promoting more secure cloudbased technologies, and improving authentication by finally dispensing with passwords. Certain innovations we assessed were controversial among the members of the task force, such as imposing regulations on network service providers and holding software and hardware makers liable for products with known but unpatched vulnerabilities. These and other approaches might deliver significant leverage, but would certainly be met with fierce resistance and potentially impose significant hurdles to innovation. Some solutions can be implemented easily; others will be more difficult because they create clear winners and losers. All members of the task force agree that the best solutions rely on leverage and are necessary now to avoid far more intrusive ones later. Text Box 1, below, summarizes the steps needed. Below we summarize certain of our key findings regarding steps needed. Taken together, these steps will help build a more defensible cyberspace

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › Defense Solves Deterrence---2NC

The CP makes cyber-defense viable

Alperovitch et al. 18. Dmitri Alperovitch is a computer security industry executive. He is co-founder and former chief technology officer of CrowdStrike; “Building a Defensible Cyberspace”; 2018; New York Cyber Task Force; //BY

A more defensible Internet is within reach. New game-changing technologies, such as the secure architectures permitted by cloud technologies, can radically alter cyberspace with advantage and scale in favor of defenders. But so too can operational and policy innovations, which are often overlooked or discounted. When presented with new proposals, decision makers should ask a few simple questions: Does this new policy, process, or technology clearly bring leverage? If the mechanism for creating leverage is not clear, then the innovation is probably at best an incremental improvement. Incremental improvements, while useful, should be treated as temporary band-aids and cannot (as information sharing legislation demonstrates) be the last word. For any given problem, where will leverage deliver the most impact? Leverage can be applied to many existing, low-payoff solutions. For example, leverage has been applied to reinvigorating cyber awareness education, the often mundane set of tasks that discourages users from clicking on links. A quarterly awareness video that provides less than one dollar of additional security for each dollar spent certainly doesn’t suffice. Many firms now conduct their own phishing campaigns as an educational exercise, targeting those who click on suspicious links for follow-up online training. This report has argued for a new approach to cyber defense, one that can break the stalemate of the past five decades, so that defenders finally have the high ground, to fight with the advantage. This approach does not have to be a highly complex, government-run “Moon Shot.” It certainly should not be a “Cyber Manhattan Project;” the Internet is a boon to individuals and societies, not a weapon. If anything, the world needs a cyber equivalent of Silent Spring to reveal to us how precious the Internet is and how our actions are destroying it, and energize stakeholders to make some hard tradeoffs. The NY Cyber Task Force has tried to bring new, pragmatic approaches to cybersecurity. Some of our solutions can be implemented with relative ease now that we’ve identified the lessons of success. Others will be far more difficult, as they create clear winners and losers. All task force members agree that smaller interventions are necessary now to avoid even harder decisions as the situation worsens. Defense is possible, but only through leverage, and the sooner the better.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › Defense Solves Deterrence---2NC

Only a strictly defensive posture solves---traditional deterrence fails in the cyber realm

Schneider 18. Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Her research focuses on the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cybersecurity, unmanned technologies, and Northeast Asia; “Cyber and Cross Domain Deterrence: Deterring Within and From Cyberspace”; 2018; //BY

III. Cross-Domain Deterrence of Cyberspace Operations. Cross-domain deterrence of cyberspace operations involves the use of punishment and denial across domains of warfighting and foreign policy in order to deter adversaries from utilizing cyberspace operations to create virtual or physical effects. In general, the major underlying debate for all arguments about cyberspace and deterrence is whether or not cyberspace is unique to conventional and nuclear models of deterrence. Advocates of cyberspace’s unique characteristics (Libicki 2009, Philbin 2013, Jensen 2012, Elliott 2011, Sterner 2011) argue that the technical qualities of cyberspace affect attribution, signaling, capabilities, and actors in a way that fundamentally negates how we traditionally view successful deterrence. These authors argue that it is uniquely difficult to attribute in a timely fashion, to signal capabilities overtly, to anticipate cyberspace effects, to use cyberspace weapons repeatedly, and to limit the amount of actors you need to deter. Taken in conjunction with the unique interdependence of military and civilian cyber infrastructures, the perceived asymmetries in vulnerabilities between the U.S. and its enemies, and the lack of existing norms, these critics argue that the U.S. cannot rely on retaliatory deterrence strategies or mutually assured vulnerability for effective deterrence of cyberspace operations. Advocates of cyberspace’s unique qualities recommend policies that are strategically ambiguous, focused on defense and resiliency, and that invest in attribution technologies over retaliatory measures.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › Trust Turn---1NC

Allies say no to OCO’s and countries with OCO’s don’t want to integrate because of free-riding

Veenendaal et al 16 (Matthijs Veenendaal has been working for the Netherlands Ministry of Defence since 2006 in various policy positions. He is currently stationed as a researcher at the Strategy Branch of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia. Kadri Kaska is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. MAJ Pascal Brangetto is a supply officer in the French Army. “Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence?” June 2016 https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/NATO-CCD-COE-policy-paper.pdf)

Given modern armed forces’ dependency on digital technology, it is legitimate to expect that NATO would adapt to this new reality. Since 2002, NATO has invested significantly in improving the defence of its networks. However, NATO has shown little inclination to move away from its current purely defensive posture in cyber defence. At the political level, Allies remain reticent when it comes to discussing the options of using military (offensive) capabilities within a NATO setting. For most of them, cyber operations are generally still uncharted territory in which confusion abounds. Moreover, Allies that have invested heavily in cyber capabilities worry that others might benefit without making a similar investment themselves. Allies therefore remain reluctant to engage in any meaningful discussion on the position and role of cyber capabilities in military operations within the Alliance.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › Trust Turn---1NC

The plan destroys trust --- NATO hates the idea of OCO’s, and even the discussion creates backlash --- The plans forced disclosure also causes backlash to US surveillance

Fidler ’13 [David, Richard Pregent, and Alex Vandurme; Fall; James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law and Senior Fellow, Indiana University Center on Applied Cybersecurity Research; Legal Advisor, NATO Allied Command Counterintelligence; Head, Technical Center Engineering, NATO Computer Incident Response Capability; St. John’s Journal of International & Comparative Law, “NATO, Cyber Defense, and International Law,” 4:1, https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1672]

Concerning the three categories and the potential policy shifting described above, NATO finds itself in a difficult situation that, under current NATO practices, will be hard to escape. In terms of the cyber threat, defense, and technology approaches, NATO reflects behavior that puts the Alliance at a disadvantage. NATO tends to be conservative in terms of legal issues, meaning that the Alliance does not promise to be a fruitful forum for adapting or revising legacy rules to reflect the particular challenges cyber poses. Similarly, with NATO operating on the basis of consensus, the Alliance’s decision-making processes might have difficulty handling governance questions created by the cyber defense approach, such as how “active” should NATO cyber defense be. Operationally, NATO cyber defense appears more static and reactive than active in orientation—a situation that could lead NATO cyber defense to become a cyber “Maginot line” rather than an effective defensive strategy. It is not clear whether NATO members could reach consensus on what more active cyber defense activities would be permissible under international legal principles on sovereignty and non-intervention. As noted earlier, NATO functions with the capabilities its members make available to it, meaning that NATO’s technological capabilities in cyber might not reach cutting-edge status, leaving NATO cyber defense behind the global technological curve in cyberspace. This problem is exacerbated if policy makers in leading powers, such as the United States and China, are placing more reliance on developing, deploying, and using full-spectrum cyber technological capabilities because of the perceived pitfalls of other approaches and the mounting geopolitical competition now affecting cyberspace. NATO members are also extraordinarily sensitive to the Alliance having any offensive cyber capabilities or even discussing the need to think about the value of cyber capabilities and operations in missions NATO might undertake (as NATO has done with other technological developments affecting its military missions).44 The North Atlantic Council has not discussed, let alone authorized, the development of offensive capabilities, doctrine, or rules of engagement in the cyber realm.45 Whether NATO members could agree on what offensive cyber operations international law would permit is also not clear, especially in light of difficulties cyber presents to the international law on armed conflict revealed by the Tallinn Manual and other analyses.46 Events outside the specific context of NATO cyber defense might also adversely affect NATO cooperation. For example, in June 2013, negative European reactions to the disclosure of a secret U.S. surveillance program targeting cyber activities of foreign nationals, code-named PRISM, reflected new transAtlantic tensions on government surveillance in cyberspace, its implications for privacy and other civil liberties, and the potential for European-American cooperation on cybersecurity. The Washington Post reported that “[t]he discontent from Europe pointed to the breadth of fallout from the affair and to the potential for fresh strains between the United States and allies wary of American intrusiveness.”47 Whatever the long-term impact of this political fallout, the short-term consequences will likely not create more willingness among NATO members to become more ambitious with NATO cyber defense.

2022 Michigan Negative
Case › OCO’s Bad › Trust Turn---1NC

Cross-alliance intelligence-sharing collapses NATO cohesion and cyber operations

APRA, 20 (Association for Political Risk Analysis, “The Looming NATO Offensive Cyber Policy’s Challenges of Harmonizing Deterrence and Decision-making”, APRA, Sep 27, 2020, https://www.aprascpo.org/post/the-looming-nato-offensive-cyber-policy-s-challenges-of-harmonizing-deterrence-and-decision-making)

Testing Alliance Consensus and Decision-making The Alliance’s decision-making principle of consensus further complicates the negotiations and agreement of a NATO offensive cyber policy. The above-mentioned nuclear example almost exclusively concerns kinetic and state-level physical destruction of massive proportions. The dire consequences of the extremity of possible nuclear proliferation are enough to establish credibility, deterrence, and is a comparatively simpler way in getting its 30 member states on board, especially in the context of Cold War bipolarity. Cyberspace as a domain of war contains a myriad of vested technical issues including the difficulty of attributing attacks to specific adversaries. Even though this is one the most prominent difficulties according to a variety of research in cybersecurity, more recent analyses published by NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence have suggested that the attribution gap is gradually decreasing in size due to heavy research and development investment into web tracing and identification designs largely spearheaded by the US (Burton 11). A dynamic understanding of deterrence in cyberspace as formerly suggested by taking into consideration social and historical context will also alleviate the traditionally ‘impossible’ problem of attribution. While such technical capabilities play a crucial role in swaying the allies’ considerations and decisions, the political and strategic issues of simply conceptualizing an offensive cyber policy are examined in closer detail here. Trust and Transparency The transparency and capability-sharing quality of NATO may give way for disagreement amongst allies. Although the Alliance’s communication on a strategic and policy level is transparent, it still possesses enough opaque room to maneuver on an operational and tactical level. Furthermore, the problem of American supremacy in cyber capabilities and NATO’s reliance on its critical perspective may displease EU member states like France in their pursuit of strategic autonomy aside from its prevailing aversion to today's American leadership. A new demand for cross-alliance intelligence-sharing on offensive cyber capabilities can also exacerbate internal trust issues with the US. The global surveillance disclosures from 2013 onwards revealed allied surveillance and spying activities which damaged confidence in NATO (Smeets; 2018). Discussion of further integrated intelligence-sharing strategy under an offensive cyber policy can create tension between Five Eyes states (Canada, the US, and the UK) and other NATO allies. Doctrine Diversity Another overarching aspect with the potential to determine allies’ reception and leniency towards an offensive cyber strategy is the diversity of threat perception among NATO allies. The diversity across allied standards in defining the parameters of cyberattacks and the lack of overarching offensive cyber policy could result in strategic ambiguity and discourage retaliation (Arts 2). These differences stem from varied threat perceptions and cyber norms. Nationally, both threat perception and cyber norms are influenced by the state’s experience with malicious cyberattacks and its media and public opinion; and externally, the state’s engagement in bilateral and multilateral engagements are the most effective ways in which threat perception and cyber norms are shaped (Lewis 575). This hints at the political interest of near-Russia states like Estonia and Finland to possess well-rounded cyber norms and threat perception. Conversely, policy engagements on offensive capabilities would also shape NATO allies’ understanding as a whole. Without multilateral definitions, allies like Luxembourg and Iceland who have not experienced similar events do not benefit from harmonized knowledge and may not find justification to prioritize the strengthening of cyber capabilities when allocating funds from the common NATO budget. Not to mention the financial commitment issue affects trust in the Alliance overall as well.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Internal › Internal---AT: Still Cooperate---2NC

Splitting shoves the NSA back into its shell, severing cooperation.

Patrick Tucker 21, technology editor for Defense One, 3/08/2021, “Splitting NSA, CyberCom Now Could Reduce Military Access to Intelligence, Milley Says,” , cc

As Michael Sulmeyer, currently the senior director for cyber with the National Security Council, wrote in 2017: “When Cyber Command needs NSA support, the fact that it’s the same person in charge of both organizations can break what might otherwise be a log-jam. Splitting the dual-hat could result in the NSA isolating itself and refocusing on its own core missions (the collection of signals intelligence and providing information assurance) while minimizing its support to Cyber Command.” (Sulmeyer was serving as the Cyber Project director for Harvard’s Belfer Center at the time of the writing.)

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Internal › Internal---Personnel---2NC

Ending the dual-hat arrangement cleaves personnel in half, undermining security.

James Di Pane 19, Policy Analyst, Defense Policy, Center for National Defense, 5/02/2019, “Should Cyber Command and the NSA Have Separate Leadership? How to Decide,” , cc

NSA and Cyber Command Pull from the Same Talent Pool. The NSA and Cyber Command operate jointly in many instances. Not only do they both hire the same type of employee, but a number of employees work for both organizations simultaneously, changing fluidly depending on the situation. Ending the dual-hat arrangement could result in personnel being forced to choose to work for either Cyber Command or the NSA, leading to personnel issues within both. Cyber Command still relies on NSA personnel for its command staff, even though it now operates independently of Strategic Command.

This would be challenging under most circumstances, but is especially a problem given the challenges that the NSA and Cyber Command have with attracting and retaining top tech talent. Additionally, cyber talent takes years to cultivate, meaning that the recruits filling the ranks would be less capable than their more experienced counterparts. Lieutenant General Stephen Fogarty, Commander of Army Cyber Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittees on Cybersecurity and Personnel that the average operator can spend fully half of his or her six-year enlistment in training.29

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Link › Link---AT: Plan is NSA---2NC

Plan can’t be the NSA. Security cooperation must be authorized under Title 10 or 22.

DSCU 21, Defense Security Cooperation University, May 2021, “SECURITY COOPERATION MANAGEMENT,” Edition 41 of the Greenbook, , cc

Security Cooperation (SC). Any Department of Defense program, activity, or interaction with foreign security establishments designed to 1) build security relationships that promote U.S. interests; 2) develop allied or other partner national military and security capabilities for self-defense or participation in U.S.-sanctioned multinational operations; or 3) provide U.S. forces with peacetime/contingency access to allied and partner nations. Security cooperation may be authorized under Title 10 or Title 22 of the United States Code, or under temporary (non-codified) U.S. laws.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Link › Link---AT: UQ Overwhelms---2NC

Splitting apart the dual hat is possible---the plan drops the guillotine.

Erica Borghard 21, Adjunct Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, “Time to end the dual hat?,” , cc

That said, the Biden administration will have significant discretion to shape the timing and sequencing of what is likely an inevitable split of the dual hat. While the law does stipulate six conditions that would need to be met to precipitate the dual hat’s separation, Congress did not provide much guidance in terms of metrics corresponding to those conditions. In other words, the type of evidence that would confirm or deny Cyber Command’s operational maturity remains underspecified, giving considerable latitude to the executive branch to shape the timing and conditions under which certification would occur.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Link › Link---Tech---2NC

The plan disrupts the NSA’s complete control over weapons tech security.

Morgan Dwyer 20, fellow in the International Security Program and deputy director for policy analysis in the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., 1/22/2020, “An Alternative to the Defense Department’s New, Technology-Focused Organizations,” , cc

National Security Agency (NSA) engineers similarly benefit from their agency’s end-to-end approach to technology management. By controlling all technology that contributes to its signals intelligence mission, NSA can develop a “coherent architecture” that optimally integrates collection, processing, exploitation, and analysis technologies. Because NSA manages all technologies that contribute to its mission, it empowers its engineers to design holistic architectures to optimally execute that mission.

By creating new organizations that focus on high-priority technology, today’s policymakers constructed institutional barriers to the type of end-to-end, mission-focused architecture development that exists in NRO and NSA. Even today’s new, technology-focused combatant commands may disrupt architecture development by complicating command-and-control relationships amongst the various components in an end-to-end architecture. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether these new organizations—all of which separate technologies from the missions they support—will overcome institutional barriers and allow missions to drive the demand for and design of new technology.

2022 Michigan Negative
NSA/Splitting DA › Link › Link---Autonomy---2NC

CYBERCOM’s demonstration of independence allows it to break off from the NSA.

Fabio Vanorio 18, Executive Officer of the Italian Government at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation at the Presidency of the Council of the Ministers, May 2018, “Breaking Up The Dual-Hat Leadership Of National Security Agency And United States Cyber Command The Central Debate In The United States Cyber Community,” , cc

Taking a corporate view as an example, the strategy of breaking up NSA and USCYBERCOM is like a spin off. Until the benefits of a combined organizational structure justify the negative cost of duplicative management structures and synergies costs, the structure allows USCYBERCOM to take advantage of synergy opportunities. As soon as synergies and economies of scale diminish or disappear, NSA can split off part of its operations into USCYBERCOM.