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2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Alt › 2NC --- Schizz

Let’s schizz this shit up! The process of schizzing is a commitment to the quality of sociality toward alter-economic postcapitalist futures. We’ll term this schizoeconomics. The schizz cuts subjectivity as we know it liberating the neurodiverse from the grips of capitalism.

Manning 20 [Erin Manning, she received her Ph. D in Political Philosophy from University of Hawaii in 2000. She currently teaches in the Concordia University Fine Arts Faculty, “For a Pragmatics of the Useless” (pgs 289-297) published in November 2020 by accessed on July 13, 2022 by AP]

Schizoanalysis is an alter-economic practice: its work is to unmoor the financialization of the individual as metric of preexisting value. The schizz cuts through the middle, neurodiverse in its call for the more-than. “No more normopaths!” it howls. How-else-with-and? The schizz of the schizoanalytic practice must never be reindividualized by setting up the figure of the lone schizophrenic, or any figure, as its cipher. Contrary to some interpretations of Anti-Oedipus, nowhere do Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari idealize psychosis or schizophrenia. As everywhere in their philosophy, the aim is not to moralize but to couple the pragmatic with the speculative, asking how processes unfold and what immanent valuations run through them. The differentiation they make between schizophrenia as process and schizophrenia as entity is vital in this regard. The schizophrenic entity “can only be defined in relation to the arrests, the continuations in the void, or the finalist illusions that repression imposes on the process itself” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 379). The schizophrenic process, or what they call the schizoid pole, refers to the manner in which desire invests itself in sociality. At the schizoid pole, knowledge schizophrenizes, passing beyond its own axiomatics, creating new operations. “Figureschizzes” are produced “that are no longer either figurative or structured” (371). These two operations, the schizophrenic entity and the schizophrenic process, are in continuous co-composition, the schizoid pole always also in proximity with the threat of the pathological. Desire schizzes, uncoupling pathology Cephalopod Dreams Finance at the Limit 8 290 Chapter 8 from process. Desire, the impersonal force that activates socialities in germ, is the revolutionary activity through which new lifeways are produced, schizzing all the while. What distinguishes the schizophrenic from the neurotic is psychosis. What is of interest to Deleuze and Guattari is that psychosis cannot be oedipalized. The neurotic is the one on whom the Oedipal imprints take, whereas the psychotic is the one incapable of being oedipalized, even and especially by psychoanalysis. The first task of the revolutionary . . . is to learn from the psychotic how to shake off the Oedipal yoke and the effects of power, in order to initiate a radical politics of desire freed from all beliefs. Such apolitics dissolves the mystifications of power through the kindling, on all levels, of anti-oedipal forces—the schizzes-flows-forces that escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions: orphans (no daddymommy-me), atheists (no beliefs), and nomads (no habits, no territories). (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi) The schizz must always be considered in terms of what it can do, not in terms of what it defines. It is from this vantage point that the figure of the schizophrenic must be understood in the account of capitalism and schizophrenia, with Oedipus always as the overdetermining pull to the neurotic replaying, in all pathologies, of what holds them to the narration of a preexisting structure. Oedipus should not be considered an actual formation, however. The Oedipus complex is a tendency in potentia: “it must be actualized in a neurotic formation as a derived effect of the actual factor” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 129). Psychosis schizzes Oedipus. This is why Freud disliked schizophrenics: “For we must not delude ourselves: Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t like their resistance to being oedipalized, and tends to treat them more or less as animals. They mistake words for things, he says. They are apathetic, narcissistic, cut off from reality, incapable of achieving transference; they resemble philosophers— ‘an undesirable resemblance’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 23).1 In schizzing the “neurotic territoriality of Oedipus,” psychosis produces new circuits (136). There is no promise attached to these circuits. They could just as well fold back on themselves, returning to all the forms of neuroticization that reduce psychotics to the apparently unmoored, disjointed paranoid figure psychiatric institutions lock up. “Perhaps there is only one illness, neurosis, the Oedipal decay against which all the pathogenic interruptions of the process should be measured” (319). In pushing up against what can be extracted from the schizophrenic experience that resists the neuroticization imposed on it, Deleuze and Guattari pursue the question that most troubled Jean Oury and was central to the work at Cephalopod Dreams 291 the La Borde clinic: “How does one avoid the institution’s re-forming an asylum structure, or constituting perverse and reformist artificial societies, or residual paternalistic or mothering pseudo families?” (319). What techniques can be put in place to schizz the institution’s penchant for all that retriangulates? Urgently necessary is the decoupling of experience from the pathological valuations of the deficit model. As in the wider field of neurodiversity, the aim is not cure but a commitment to the singular ways difference expresses itself and the qualities of desire, knowledge, and creation it produces. “A true politics of psychiatry, or antipsychiatry, would consist therefore in the following praxis: (1) undoing all the reterritorializations that transform madness into mental illness; (2) liberating the schizoid movement of deterritorialization in all the flows, in such a way that this characteristic can no longer qualify a particular residue as a flow of madness, but affects just as well the flows of labor and desire, of production, knowledge, and creation in their most profound tendency” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 321). Against normopathy, schizoanalysis never does its work from outside the event. Sensitive to the schizz, it moves with it, following its tendencies. “Foucault announced an age when madness would disappear, not because it would be lodged within the controlled space of mental illness (‘great tepid aquariums’), but on the contrary because the exterior limit designated by madness would be overcome by means of other flows escaping control on all sides, and carrying us along” (321). From this vantage point, schizophrenia shifts from entity to force, desiringproduction its motor. “Like love: there is no specifically schizophrenic phenomenon or entity; schizophrenia is the universe of productive and reproductive desiring-machines” (5). There is no longer “a specific, identifiable schizophrenic entity” (6). What there is instead is a practice of the schizz that attunes to the multiplicity of “I, Antonin Artaud, am my son, my father, my mother, and myself” (15). Multiplicity in differential, the schizoid pole explodes the great tepid aquariums of our pathological imaginations. Beyond pathology, there are no criteria. “It might be said that the schizophrenic passes from one code to the other, that he deliberately scrambles all the codes, by quickly shifting from one to another, according to the questions asked him, never giving the same explanation from one day to the next, never invoking the same genealogy, never recording the same event in the same way” (15). Is this madness? Or is the psychosis to be found in the imposed adherence of systems on worlds too differential, too multiple to tame? The schizophrenic is the limit case of existence that troubles our certainties as regards the stability of subjectivity. To repeat the mantra that drives chapter 5: “A schizoanalysis schizophrenizes in order to break the holds of power and 292 Chapter 8 institute research into a new collective subjectivity and a revolutionary healing of mankind. For we are sick, so sick, of our selves!” (Mark Seem, in Deleuze and Guattari 1983, xxi).2 Schizoanalysis is not a practice of the individual. It is not a practice of pathologization, of singling out the one whose neurology will invariably be considered a deficit. Schizoanalysis is a practice of the event where I, even schizo-I, is not yet. That the schizophrenic refutes the limited envelope of the individual is certainly part of the story. But the work of schizoanalysis is not done on the body (of the schizophrenic) per se. The work is done in the relation where the phonic leaves its resonant traces. The schizz, the effect of the schizophrenizing of experience, cuts subjectivity as we know it, subjectivity as the claim to the human (the category that excludes the neurodiverse, and all qualities and forces of life-yet-tobe-invented that threaten the I as white, colonial, neurotypical being. Capitalism breaks bodies, its devaluation of qualitative difference at the level of aesthetic sociality so complete that bodies barely hold up. Exhaustion, anxiety, depression, and all their offshoots are everywhere palpable. Capitalism breeds paranoia, the ground so uneven, our bearings so unsteady, that we fold into a selfpossession that leaves no room for what exceeds us. Limited by the hardening of our edges, we become more enclosed in our-selves, less turned to an outside that would revivify the more-than that courses through us. This is what Deleuze and Guattari are referring to when they talk about how capitalism produces the neurotic, and, at the extreme, the “sick schizo” (1983, 362). A schizoeconomics is committed to the schizzing of capitalism. Its challenge is to work in careful attunement to capital’s own infinite appetite for circulation and deviation.3 Flows, processes, detours are, after all, what capital is made of, its movements faster, more mad, and often more creative than we would like to admit. To compose with capital is to coincide with its movements to schizz the more-than that runs through them, connecting to the speculative share of its own decidedly more-than human process. The cutting edge of capitalism is in the financial markets, which have evolved forms of abstract capital so abstruse, contingent, and objectively undecidable that it is impossible to get an effective grip on them. They run according to their own process, and sometimes run away with themselves, periodically crashing and burning. The financialized economy is beyond the human pale: beyond full human comprehension and beyond effective Cephalopod Dreams 293 human control. It is a self-driving machine, operating more and more abstractly, with no one in particular at the steering wheel. It was created by the human, but not in its own image, emerging rather as a monstrous offspring that turns back to engulf its maker and drive away with it. (Massumi 2017c, 9) To schizz capitalism is to develop an account of quality that can discern the difference between cuts that breed the count of assets, and cuts that revalue value. In its infinite capacity for deviation, capital is a powerful adversary. The aim of finance at the limit is always alter-capitalist, but it in no way purports that there is an outside of capital as we know it. To schizz capital is to watch another limb begin to grow elsewhere. Alter-capitalist futures will be built of more than the schizzing of capital: they will be led by the development of practices that exert the force of other ways of living in a logic that refuses the tenets that undergird capitalism—the relentless drive to quantitative increase, inexorable growth and inequality, the capture of life intensities for profit. Practicing the schizz begins there, in the midst, asking what kinds of techniques can be crafted for those other logics, logics that sidle, in approximation of proximity, an aesthetic sociality of blackness, experimenting with the minor that runs through a sociality born in the being of relation. This is to say that the practice of the schizz is never structural, never aimed at a totality, as though something as stable as capital-as-structure existed and could directly be taken down. The practice is transversal, operating in the circulation of flows themselves. This modest aim may seem useless. Indeed, it is: an ethos of the pragmatics of the useless runs through it. It claims nothing as regards grand schemes of productivity. Its proposition: to practice the art of life-living at the differential of minor socialities in a livingloving that angles toward the instauration of new modes of (merest) existence. Schizoeconomies will not come into themselves once and for all. They will always need to be (re)invented, at every turn bringing with themselves new techniques for practice unlimited. Capital is crossed by lines of escape, and this is what finance at the limit exploits. “Capitalism is continually cutting off the circulation of flows, breaking them and deferring the break, but these same flows are continually overflowing, and intersecting one another according to schizzes that turn against capitalism and slash into it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 376). Cleaving capitalism from within, the schizz produces social fields that may operate only for an instant, but nonetheless provoke the seeding of a different mode of investment, and with it different operations of value. Paranoia will always be around the corner, counting its coins, but as Saidiya Hartman’s Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments 294 Chapter 8 demonstrates, minor practices of the art of life-living have always existed, even under the worst conditions: “The wild idea that animates this book is that young black women were radical thinkers who tirelessly imagined other ways to live and never failed to consider how the world might be otherwise” (2019, xv). “The revolutionary investment of desire” schizzes worlds into otherwise-living (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 378). Desiring-production is the force against which capitalism has no power: unquantifiable, in a logic of the relation of nonrelation, desire as force too impersonal to claim bends the pathways toward intensities for which no preexisting code, no count, exists. This is why the schizophrenic as conceptual persona is vital to the project of schizzing capital for Deleuze and Guattari: the schizoid pole is the pole of desiring-production and, as such, “is revolutionary, in the very sense that the paranoiac method is reactionary and fascist; and it is not these psychiatric categories, freed of all familialism, that will allow us to understand the politico-economic determinations, but exactly the opposite” (1983, 379–80). Revolutionary desire is a practice, not a tool. It does its work transversally, moving waywardly where we might least expect it. Writing of Mattie, a young laundress, Hartman culls from the anarchival force of the photographs that nourish her critical fabulation the force of what desire can do in the face of racial capital’s devaluations: Mattie has been credited with nothing, deemed unfit for every role except servility, condemned in advance of wrongdoing, and destined to be a minor figure even in her own verified history. To esteem her acts, to regard rather than vilify Mattie’s restive longing, is to embrace the anarchy—the complete program of disorder, the abiding desire to change the world, the tumult, upheaval, open rebellion—attributed to wayward girls. It is to attend to other forms of social life, which cannot be reduced to transgression or to nothing at all, and which emerge in the world marked by negation, but exceed it. (2019, 62) Mobilizing the schizz, inventing schizoanalytic techniques for practices of the event, requires diligence as regards capital’s (de)valuation of existence. Techniques must be invented to learn to attune to the difference between finance unlimited (neoliberal capital) and finance at the limit (schizoeconomy), to become sensitized to what sanctions the extreme deterritorialization of capital on one end of the spectrum and empowers the infrathin registering of the ineffable on the other. Deleuze and Guattari speak of capitalism’s process of production as unleashing “an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nonetheless contin- Cephalopod Dreams 295 ues to act as capitalism’s limit” (1983, 34). Capitalism is a movement that skirts the limit, continuously coming up against the dangers of crossing the threshold: “it continually seeks to avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit” (34). This is even more clearly the case today than when Deleuze and Guattari underscored it in the late 1960s. Neoliberal capital is the flow of all flows. As Brian Massumi writes: “The ‘capitalist process’ is how the capitalist system dips into its own immanent outside to draw out new potentials for its becoming, or continuing self-constitution” (2018, 11). How to invent platforms for schizoeconomic finance at the limit that do not simply facilitate capital’s seemingly infinite capacity to capitalize on process for monetary gain? Precapitalist marginal economies may give us a clue. For their operations, unlike those of capital, are rich with emergent sociality. The notion of the penultimate is vital to understanding how limit and threshold are mobilized to engender the being of relation in these early economies. “Take two abstract groups, one of which (A) gives seeds and receives axes, while the other (B) does the opposite. What is the collective evaluation of the objects based on? It is based on the idea of the last objects received, or rather receivable, on each side” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 437). The receivability of the objects in the account above refers not to the last object received but to “the penultimate, the next to the last, in other words, the last one before the apparent exchange loses its appeal for the exchangers, or forces them to modify their respective assemblages, to enter another assemblage” (437). The seriality refers to the cycle the exchange produces. “The last as the object of a collective evaluation determines the value of the entire series. It marks the exact point at which the assemblage must reproduce itself, begin a new operation period or a new cycle, lodge itself on another territory, and beyond which the assemblage could not continue as such. This is indeed a next-to-the-last, a penultimate, since it comes before the ultimate” (438). The ultimate changes the assemblage and, with that change, produces a new series. The limit is here understood as “marking a necessary rebeginning,” while the threshold marks “an inevitable change” (438). “What counts is the existence of a spontaneous marginal criteria and marginalist evaluation determining the value of the entire series” (438). In the marginal economy, exchange creates the conditions for an encounter that, each time anew, establishes an emergent valuation. “There is neither exchange value nor use value but rather an evaluation of the last by both parties (a calculation of the risk involved in crossing the limit), an anticipation-evaluation that takes into account the ritual character as well as the utilitarian, the serial character as well as the exchangist” (439). The immanent limit sets the stage for “a collective feeling out” that cannot be done in advance of the event (439). Both sides are altered not 296 Chapter 8 only by the actual exchange but by their collective retuning to the limit. What has been “exchanged” is more than an object. A sociality has been invented that accompanies the object, supplementing it with the allure of the event through which it came to value. The economic cannot be reduced to the exchange itself. It is a platform for relation that facilitates a process of collective feeling-out that intuitively responds to the intensifying approach of the penultimate. Deviations in the process will cause punctual redirection, but an immanent choreography is in place to assist the process in not tipping into a new assemblage. The potency of the penultimate is the sociality it carries through the system. Consider an argument between a couple. No matter how angry they are, the couple will argue with a collective feeling-out of a limit, intuitively aware that to cross the limit might very well untether the bonds that hold the relationship together. The argument might sidle that limit, but the couple will be careful not to allow the threshold to be breached. They will do this by holding back certain thoughts, by attuning to the texture not only of what is said but how it is said, listening for what might crack their collective carapace, exposing them to what they cannot bear to hear. If they do cross that limit, everything will be up for renegotiation, and their relationship might end. The penultimate is of course never precisely knowable in advance—it is best known in retrospect from the perspective of the ultimate (after the assemblage has tipped into a new one). Attending to the penultimate means being sensitive to the field of relation in composition. Holding the process to the internal texture of its schizz is a way of attuning to the quality of a limit, collectively composing the relation in relation. When the schizz does the work of attending to the penultimate, what it does is value the pulse of duration’s serial rhythm as minor sociality. An exchange happens but it is not here that the value is located. The value is operative in the collective feeling-out that attends to the event’s composition. This can look like nothing. It can look like a simple exchange between seeds and axes. But it’s much more than that: it is the staying-with of the complexity of a seriality lived not as a transaction but as a proposition for life-living itself. Practicing the schizz toward alter-economic postcapitalist futures is a commitment to the quality of sociality highlighted in Deleuze and Guattari’s account of marginalist economies and sidelined by contemporary capitalism’s way of tending toward the limit. For capital too, as mentioned above, flirts with the limit, pulling back before it goes over the threshold. The difference is that capitalism remakes itself through quantification, in the generation of profit. What is being collectively affirmed in the marginalist economies is a mode of existence. When there is a pull back from the limit, it reflects a collective desire to remain within a field of relation. In capitalism at the limit, quantification runs wild. Cephalopod Dreams 297 When there is a push to the limit, the qualitative stakes are masked by the quantitative drive. This has devastating effects whose runoffs create a deviation of limit conditions that become capital’s new field of creative potential, the limits reset within the bounds of its own domain. This can be seen in the cyclic crises through which capitalism lurches, catching itself each time before it tips over (up to now). Schizoeconomics attunes to the quality of sociality in the collective feelingout of aneconomic fields of relation where finance at the limit revalues value.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Alt › 2NC --- Global resistance

The alternative can make material change through a global resistance movement against ableist structures.

McRuer 18(McRuer, Robert. Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, “Crip Times: Disability, Globalization, and Resistance.” NYU Press, 2018. JSTOR, . Accessed 14 Jul. 2022. ) //RB

This chapter examines disability in relation to a keyword drawn from the subtitle to this book: resistance. In this section, I consider how crip/ queer theorists have attended to the theoretical vicissitudes of this keyword; I position their theorizing as itself a tactic of resistance. Resistance has arguably had an uneven history of late in critical cultural theory, perhaps especially in queer theory. For a time, a certain foundational strand of queer theory indebted to the work of philosopher Michel Foucault has emphasized a theory of necessary or inevitable resistance. “Where there is power, there is resistance,” Foucault famously wrote. “And it is doubtless the strategic codification of those points of resistance that makes a revolution possible” (History 95, 96). As something called queer theory was congealing in the 1990s, David Halperin, in his book Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography, was a key figure spelling out what Foucauldian (queer) resistance could mean. Detailing in particular the ways in which Foucault’s work makes possible an understanding of power not as always and everywhere repressive but as productive, Halperin insisted that “the aim of an oppositional politics is . . . not liberation but resistance” (18). For Foucault, in Halperin’s interpretation, dreams of “liberation” from “repression” posited or imagined spaces outside power and could not really grasp the insidious ways in which the very languages to which we are subjected (languages of “sexuality,” for example) materialize and secure specific ways of being and knowing and block inventiveness and creativity. “Does the expression ‘let us liberate our sexuality’ have a meaning?” Foucault asks. “Isn’t the problem rather to try to decide the practices of freedom through which we could determine what is sexual pleasure and what are our erotic, loving, passionate relationships with others?” (qtd. in Halperin 193– 194). The queer sociality that is Floyd’s topic would, in this understanding, not seek somehow to liberate an underlying essence or truth; it would, rather, inventively generate new (and resistant) forms of pleasure and relationality.

A focus on practices of freedom that generate inventive new forms of intimacy and indeed, “life” has likewise characterized disability studies work on resistance. The most foundational work in this vein, such as the essays collected in Shelley Tremain’s important edited collection Foucault and the Government of Disability, often pinpoints the ways in which the supposed “truth” of disabled lives is constituted diagnostically through the workings of what Foucault terms juridical power. Fixed with a diagnosis, disabled subjects are then reductively understood through, and always and everywhere made to speak the truth of, their pathology: this pathology and only this pathology, juridical power might say, is what disability looks like. Again, however, even as various forms of authority, especially medical authority, appear to be always and only negative or repressive, such encounters necessarily generate excessive subjects speaking otherwise. Tremain writes that “individuals and juridically constituted groups of individuals have responded to subjecting practices, which are connected in increasingly intimate and immediate ways to ‘life,’ by formulating needs and imperatives of that same ‘life’ as the basis for political counterdemands, that is, by turning them around into focuses of resistance” (7, emphasis in the original). Resistant practices of freedom echo across, or are made imperative in, virtually all the most famous slogans of disability movements globally. If juridically constituted groups of disabled individuals are objectified by medical authority, pitied by nondisabled others in and through that objectification, and perhaps even encouraged and assisted (in increasing numbers of locations) to end their own lives, those constituted as such respond collectively with assertions like “nothing about us without us,” “piss on pity,” and “assisted living, not assisted dying.” “This is what disability looks like” is here put forward as a resistant counterdemand, unfixing what would appear to be (in Tremain’s words) “that same ‘life.’

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Alt › 2NC --- Discrit

The alternative is an embracement the a framework of Discrit to rupture the line between ability and disability. Understanding race and disability on both a marco and micro scale is key to disrupt normative conceptions of ability.

Annamma et al 2012 (Annamma, Subini Ancy ; Connor, David ; Ferri, Beth. “Dis/Ability Critical Race Studies (DisCrit): Theorizing at the Intersections of Race and Dis/Ability.” Race, Ethnicity and Education, vol. 16, no. 1, 30 Oct 2012, United Kingdom: Routledge, pp. 1–31, doi:10.1080/13613324.2012.730511.) // RB

Rationale for DisCrit Scholars outside Dis/ability studies might see an article about dis/ability and think, ‘This is a special education issue so I do not have to concern myself.’ However, we believe that issues of perceived dis/ability constitute issues of equity that involve all people. Like Du Bois before them, many critical scholars outside the field of special education have recognized that the social construction of dis/ability depends heavily on race and can result in marginalization, particularly for people of color and those from non-dominant communities (Gutiérrez and Stone 1997; McDermott, Goldman, and Varenne 2006; Oakes 1995; Rubin and Noguera 2004). Given the racial gap in graduation, incidents of discipline, and incarceration rates, along with vast over-representation of students of color in special education and the lackluster achievement rates within many of these special education programs, we must critically examine why so many students labeled with a dis/ability, particularly students of color, are either experiencing failure or being perceived as failing and on what grounds.

We introduce DisCrit as an exploratory conversation wherein we ask, ‘How might DisCrit further expand our knowledge (or understanding) of race and dis/ability?’ We seek to add important dimensions to CRT analysis by considering the ways race and dis/ability are co-constructed. Our goal is not to replace or replicate CRT, but to recognize what it both enables and constrains and then propose the necessity of considering ability within the framework. Indeed, we are indebted to CRT, LatCrit and Fem-Crit (as well as Feminist Legal Studies), along with Dis/abilities Studies theorists, for laying the groundwork and stimulating our thinking in this endeavor (Bell 1987; Berry 2010; Brantlinger, 1997; Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado Bernal 2002; Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Erevelles et al. 2006; Ladson-Billings and Tate 1995; MacKinnon 1998/2011; Reid and Valle 2004; Solórzano and Bernal 2001; Solórzano and Yosso 2001). We draw on many of these works, not to co-opt them, but rather to illustrate points of connection between and among dis/ability and the various social locations theorized by these scholars with the intent to further develop theory that will be of service in understanding the lived realities of people. DisCrit is an attempt to recognize a confluence between fields that are profoundly connected but are, for various reasons, often unable or unwilling to engage in joint thinking and efforts to solve issues faced by people of color. The aim of DisCrit is to push DS and CRT to academically and practically bridge commonalities utilizing the tensions between the theories as places for growth instead of resistance and separation. Ultimately we want to extend CRT and DS in ways that are useful and thoughtful to better understand how concepts of race and ability are intertwined. We believe, for instance, that racism and ableism are normalizing processes that are interconnected and collusive. In other words, racism and ableism often work in ways that are unspoken, yet racism validates and reinforces ableism, and ableism validates and reinforces racism. For students of color, race does not exist outside of ability and ability does not exist outside of race; each is being built upon the perception of the other (Crenshaw 1993). However, because racism and ableism are ‘so enmeshed in the fabric of our social order, [they] appear both normal and natural to people in this culture’ (Delgado and Stefancic 2001, 21). Our goals, then, align with Delgado and Stefancic’s (2001) desire to unmask and expose the normalizing processes of racism and ableism as they circulate in society.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Impacts › 2NC --- Eugenics

That culminates in the reinforcement of the logics of eugenics that threaten genetic engineering and other developing biotech.

UN 20’. “New eugenics: UN disability expert warns against ‘ableism’ in medical practice”. United Nations Human Rights Office, 2/28/20. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2020/02/new-eugenics-un-disability-expert-warns-against-ableism-medical-practice

GENEVA (28 February 2020) – "Current developments in medical research and practice may revive eugenic ideas if safeguards for those affected are not ensured," today said the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of persons with disabilities, Catalina Devandas, during the presentation of her to the UN Human Rights Council. The UN expert explained that developments in gene therapy, genetic engineering and prenatal screening experienced enormous growth, increasing our power to repair the body and prevent disease, but cautioned about "eliminating" human characteristics deemed undesirable. "People with disabilities are genuinely concerned that these developments could result in new eugenic practices and further undermine social acceptance and solidarity towards disability - and more broadly, towards human diversity," she said. In her report, Devandas also expressed her concerns on the impact of euthanasia and assisted suicide for persons with disabilities. "If assisted dying is made available for persons with health conditions or impairments, but who are not terminally ill, a social assumption could be made that it is better to be dead than to live with a disability," the expert warned. "People have the right to live and to die with dignity, but we cannot accept that people choose to end their lives because of social stigma, isolation or lack of access to personal assistance or disability-related services." Another major concern, Devandas stressed, is the absence of persons with disabilities in crucial debates on medical research and practice. "Without their experiences directly informing those debates, narratives suggesting that living with disabilities should be prevented become reinforced and socially validated."The Special Rapporteur explained that "ableism" is at the root of the problem. "If the life experiences of people with disabilities continue to be undervalued, no progress will be made." "What we need is a profound cultural transformation on the way society relates to the difference. That is a commitment to embrace disability as a positive aspect of human diversity. States must combat all forms of discrimination based on disability," the human rights expert concluded. Devandas also reported back to the Human Rights Council on her visits to , and . ENDS Ms Catalina Devandas (Costa Rica) was designated as the first in June 2014 by the UN Human Rights Council. She has worked extensively on the rights of persons with disabilities and inclusive development for the past 20 years, including with the World Bank, the United Nations, and international donor organizations. Her work priorities include socioeconomic inclusion, the promotion of full citizenship of persons with disabilities, and embracing diversity/understanding that persons with disabilities are part of human diversity. The Special Rapporteurs are part of what is known as the of the Human Rights Council. Special Procedures, the largest body of independent experts in the UN Human Rights system, is the general name of the Council's independent fact-finding and monitoring mechanisms that address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all parts of the world. Special Procedures experts work on a voluntary basis; they are not UN staff and do not receive a salary for their work. They are independent from any government or organisation and serve in their individual capacity.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Impacts › 2NC --- Invisibility

Disability is not solely a material codification but operates on invisible registers which doom its subjects to endless encounters with ableism.

Kattari et al. 18 – Shanna K. Kattari, PhD, is an associate professor at the, the Department of Women and Gender Studies, and Director of the . Their practice and community background is as a board certified sexologist, certified sexuality educator, and social justice advocate. Dr. Kattari’s focuses on understanding how power, privilege and oppression systematically marginalize, exclude, and discriminate against people regarding their identities/expressions through negative attitudes, policies reinforcing oppression, oppressive actions and isolation. (Shanna K. Kattari, Miranda Olzman, Michele D. Hanna, “‘You Look Fine!’: Ableist Experiences by People With Invisible Disabilities”, Sage, Journal of Women and Social Work, 2018, pgs. 1- 4, ) || PZ

In the literature on diversity, a significant amount of work has been undertaken on issues of racism, sexism, and more recently, heterosexism, and their corresponding privileges. However, despite discussion on disability being more than decades old, with the mainstream disability rights movement gaining momentum in the 1960s and 1970s (Wolbring, 2012), and the Americans with Disabilities Act having been enacted in 1990 (United States Code, 2008), notably less academic literature has addressed ableism, particularly within the field of social work. Even disability policy as an area of focus in the literature is relatively new, given the large number of disabled individuals in the United States (Schriner, 1990). This study examines whether and how the experiences of ableism by people with invisible disabilities (someone who might not be assumed to be disabled at first meeting, such as individuals with chronic pain, traumatic brain injury, multiple sclerosis, HIV, etc.) are disparate from those whose disabilities may be more evident to others. Although members of this community use both identity-first (disabled people) and person-first (people with disabilities [PWD]) language (Dunn & Andrews, 2015), this article will focus primarily on identity-first language, as this language comes from a self-determination paradigm in line with both social work and feminist values (Ladau, 2014; National Association of Social Workers, 2017). The United States Census Bureau (2012) reported that in the 2010 Census, 21.3% of those of age 15 years and older had a disability or impairment. From these statistics, it can be inferred that approximately one fifth of U.S. residents are currently living with a disability or impairment. Disability in and of itself is a community with blurred lines—people can acquire disabilities (both short term and long term) throughout their lives, making the concept of membership to the disabled community one that is frequently difficult for other marginalized groups to understand (Davis, 1999). Although individuals with “invisible” disabilities (those that are not always, or ever, apparent to others) may not receive as much overt or explicit social stigma as those with more apparent disabilities, they are still exposed to forms of rejection, ableism, and discrimination; in fact, they may even have more trouble accessing support services than their visibly disabled counterparts due to being expected to prove their disability (Davis, 2005). Disabled individuals with invisible disabilities may struggle with “passing” as nondisabled persons in many settings (Samuels, 2003). While passing may be seen as a privilege, it can also be a challenge for these individuals to find community and be validated by disabled people. The decision on whether to pass or not comes with not only personal implications of stigma and discrimination but also more societal and political implications of outing themselves as disabled (Brune & Wilson, 2013). They may also have issues in accessing the services, support structure, and even physical spaces that they need, given assumptions about what their bodies and minds are able to do, and whether those given the power to make the distinction decide whether they are “disabled enough” (Lightman, Vick, Herd, & Mitchell, 2009). Therefore, it is possible that members of this community experience ableism in different ways than those who have apparent disabilities. Ableism is the overarching act of prejudice and/or discrimination against disabled people and the devaluation of disability (Hehir, 2002) and corresponds with able-bodied/neurotypical privilege, the set of unearned privileges held by nondisabled individuals. They are both interconnected systems that maintain stratification around disability. Ableism values physical, emotional, and mental capital, following socially constructed expectations of ability (Loja, Costa, Hughes, & Menezes, 2013). Queer/disability theorist McRuer (2006) posits that like the ideal of compulsory heterosexuality, ableism results in a compulsory able-bodiedness, demanding that disabled individuals do whatever it takes to enact a nondisabled identity however possible. While sexism, racism, and other isms certainly are prevalent in all types of systems and interactions, Wolbring (2008) argues that ableism is one of the most accepted and widespread isms in society and works in conjunction with many other isms. Because of the lack of conversation around ableism and able-bodied/neurotypical privilege, prejudice against disabled people may at times be more prevalent and socially acceptable than many others types of prejudice (Ford, 2009). Although ableism is insidious and apparent in all aspects of society, little research has been conducted to understand the lived experiences of ableism by disabled individuals, nuanced disabled identities (such as those who have invisible/less obvious disabilities), and intersections of other marginalized identities with disability identities. Moreover, while there have been some publications in the field of social work around ableism, much of it focuses on policy (El-Lahib & Wehbi, 2012), sanism (discrimination around mental health) specifically (Poole et al., 2012), or the general need for better culture competency in social work practice and education regarding disabled populations (Carter, Hanes, & MacDonald, 2012; Dupre´, 2012). Disabled individuals also experience higher rates of poverty and chronic health issues than their nondisabled counterparts (Hehir, 2002; Roux et al., 2001; Storey, 2007), and there are few instances of social work around the experiences of disabled people of color, transgender disabled people, and the ways that other marginalized identities interplay with disability and ableism. Feminist disability scholars in particular have brought up the need for intersectional frameworks and connecting disability to conversations around diversity (Kafer, 2013; McRuer, 2002; Olkin, 2002). In Feminist, Queer, Crip, feminist disability studies, scholar Kafer (2013) explains that not only did feminist theory gave her the ability to critically examine notation of disability but also emphasizes the bridge between theory and practice, something incredibly relevant to the discussion of disability and ableism in social work. Microaggressions: Death by a Thousand Papercuts The concept of microaggressions is used to explain the phenomena of the implicit perpetuation of racism, sexism, heterocentrism, transphobia, anti-Semitism, and other forms of power and oppression in society (Sue, 2010). Microaggressions are everyday interactions that perpetuate inequalities and stereotypes against people who belong to marginalized communities (Solo´ rzano, Ceja, & Yosso, 2000; Sue, 2010). They are perpetuated against many individuals holding many different identities, including race, gender, sexual orientation, religion, and disability (Solo´ rzano et al., 2000; Sue, 2010). Frequent exposure to microaggressions, including ableist microaggressions, can result in higher incidence of negative mental health outcomes, feelings of being excluded, and lower positive outcomes including reduced academic performance (Khattari, 2017; Nadal, Griffin, Wong, Hamit, & Rasmus, 2014). Microaggressions are a common means of perpetuating ableism. These may include telling someone that they speak very well for a deaf person, telling someone they are lucky to get to bring their dog everywhere with them, asking a group of people to all stand for an activity (making the assumption that everyone can stand), or making a joke about how fast someone can go in their wheelchair (Storey, 2007). Many of these microaggressions are a result of assumptions about disabled people. Storey (2007) found that perpetuation of these microaggressions and assumptions result in disabled people feeling excluded or unwelcome in educational settings and produce outcomes including anger, frustration, and other feelings that can be harmful to an individual’s engagement with their community. Invisible Disabilities People with invisible disabilities or illness may be more likely to experience ableism indirectly, including through ableist microaggressions. For example, while someone might not use language like “lame” in front of someone they perceive to be mobility impaired, they may be less reticent to use such language in front of those they identify as nondisabled, whether or not those individuals actually are. Additionally, people with invisible disabilities may experience ableism when using adaptations for PWD, such as disability-designated parking spaces or elevators, when others view them as nondisabled individuals. It is possible that this is a result of unintentionally fulfilling the role of compulsory able-bodiedness suggested by McRuer (2006), simple by not having disabilities that might make themselves visibly distinct as disabled to outsiders. Disabled bodies are frequently othered and feared by society at large (Hirschmann, 2013), but there is little knowledge on how this may be experienced by those with invisible physical disabilities. Mad studies, a subset of disabilities focusing on mental health and sanism, have noted similarities in the “coming out and facing stigma/not being out and facing different marginalization” decision as faced by other individuals with sometimes invisible identities (Pilling, 2012). Therefore research is needed to help understand how disabled individuals who may not be read as disabled experience ableism in their lives. Bridging the theoretical understanding of ableism into the lived experiences of this community is a crucial move forward in creating more disability inclusive social work practice. This study explores the experiences of ableism specifically for individuals with invisible disabilities because, given that this invisibility often prevents these individual from being viewed as disabled, it is likely that their experiences may differ from disabled individuals with more apparent disabilities.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Impacts › 2NC --- Framing

Overcorrect for disability – epistemic exclusion of disables subjects creates an internalization of ableism in both abled and disabled bodies

Katta Spiel et al 20 [Katta Spiel, Os Keyes, Rua M. Williams, Judith Good, Eva Hornecker, Cynthia L. Bennett, April 25-30th, 2020, “I am just terrified of my future” – Epistemic Violence in Disability Related Technology Research, accessed 7/11/22, -ekh-]

As disabled scholars, we find strength in community and share deep bonds with each other. Within these communities, there is fierce loyalty. There is a strength within that seems dangerous to the outside. We are unruly bodies, classified by society into a plethora of interlocking sets of dysfunction and disorder – because our neurology and our physiology cannot be contained into normative expressions by medicine, by discipline, nor even by our own shame. Though, when it comes to academia, we see a lack of representation [7] and a lack of conditions enabling us in taking part in scholarship with self-determination [24].

As disabled scholars researching, our experiences, particularly when researching technologies within the context of our own conditions, share peculiar commonalities. Be it around physical, sensory, cognitive, or psychological conditions, we find ourselves represented in the literature as objects of inquiry – systematically belittled, disregarded, ignored and dehumanized. Despite several calls for the inclusion of disabled people in technology research about them [30, 48, 54], work that claims inclusive methods continues to distance disabled people from the shared construction of knowledge through tokenistic forms of “voice” that fail to redistribute power and agency to disabled people [4]. Instead, disabled people are often persistently excluded from making meaning about technologies presumably for them [50]. Such epistemic exclusion allows the circulation of implicit bias against disabled subjects as producers of knowledge. Privileging, for example, neurotypical perspectives on neurodivergent needs [49], demarcating the space for technologies almost exclusively to domains of cure, therapy and intervention – all of which are tied to rhetorics removing the intricacies of disabled lives from the range of human experiences [11, 52].

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Links › Link --- IR

Disability metaphors are used to naturalize nations positions as inferior to the United States

McRuer 10 (Robert McRuer is an American theorist who has contributed to fields in transnational queer and disability studies, “Reflections on Disability in Haiti”, , January 2010, Barneys)

Illness and contagion are only part of the story of Haiti's metaphorization, however. Even the quickest survey of global headlines following the disaster reveals (with predictable frequency) reports that the earthquake had 'crippled' the nation, the city, the infrastructure, the agricultural or tourist industries, or humanitarian efforts. Hospital and emergency responses had been, in these reports, 'paralyzed' and the government, according to no less than former U.S. president Bill Clinton (tapped by President Barack Obama to assist in the crisis), had been, "first of all, disabled." "When this emergency passes," Clinton insisted, "then we know Haiti is going to have to get back on its feet again. And we want to be a part of that" (qtd. in Fabian).

These readily available metaphors of both disability and able-bodiedness (Clinton's comments obviously invoking a Haiti-to-come that is nondisabled, healthy, robust, standing on two feet) are in part simply journalistic stock-in-trade following  but are, I am arguing, also particularly entrenched in relation to Haiti. Long before the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's position in the global economy had been conceptualized through disability metaphors--after "two hundred years of crippling debt," the already "feeble" economy has been "knocked flat" by repeated disasters (Flaherty; Dougherty and Shwiff). This terminology has had the dual effect of naturalizing Haiti's position as the poorest country in the western hemisphere and disallowing--as in other cultural locations where banal disability metaphors circulate readily--other ways of imagining embodiment in general and disability in particular in this location.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Links › Link --- Data

AI data is being leaked and used to discriminate against people with disability

Marks 19 (Mason Marks, Harvard Law School; Yale Law School; University of New Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law; Leiden Law School, Center for Law and Digital Technologies Date Written: February 19, 2019 I. Glenn Cohen et al., eds., Disability, Health, Law and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2020)

Many people with disabilities rely on technology to communicate, socialize, and navigate physical and virtual environments. For example, people with vision impairments use assistive devices to identify objects while walking.6 People with mobility impairments use voice-recognition software to access the Internet and draft emails.7 Tom Gruber, a cocreator of Apple’s AI-powered personal assistant Siri, claims his invention helps disabled people engage with society in ways that nondisabled people take for granted.8 These assistive technologies can increase the abilities of people with physical and mental impairments. However, they also serve as continuous sources of EMD, putting people with disabilities at increased risk for discrimination. Imagine an individual named John who is paraplegic and uses a wheelchair. John may never have disclosed his disability publicly. Yet algorithms can infer his disability through his digital traces. After profiling John and sorting him into the category “wheelchair user,” marketing algorithms may serve him targeted ads designed to appeal to people in that category, such as ads for wheelchairs and related accessories. This example seems benign, yet there is a darker side to this type of categorization. On August 13, 2018, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development filed a formal complaint alleging that Facebook engaged in discrimination against people with disabilities, in violation of the FHA, by allowing advertisers to exclude people with disabilities from receiving housing-related advertisements.9 According to the complaint, Facebook enabled advertisers to prevent users from seeing ads if the users had been sorted into categories such as interested in “assistance dog” and interested in “deaf culture.”10 Similarly, John’s categorization as a wheelchair user could be used to exclude him from receiving ads for employment, housing, and other resources. In addition to violating antidiscrimination laws such as the FHA, excluding people with disabilities from receiving these ads strips them of agency and excludes them from participating fully in society. Targeted advertising can also harm people with disabilities more directly. Consider an individual with an eating disorder such as anorexia. Profiling this consumer and serving him customized ads for products such as weight loss pills, laxatives, and stimulants can exacerbate his condition and increase his degree of disability. Targeting ads to consumers based on their unique susceptibilities is called vulnerability-based marketing.11 It exploits people’s physical or mental sensitivities and reinforces patterns of unhealthy behavior. Other examples of vulnerability-based targeted advertising include identifying people with chronic pain or substance use disorders and targeting them with ads for illegal opioids.12 Disability-related EMD is also used in a growing industry called “people analytics” that scores and ranks individuals. Scores are used in a variety of sectors including employment, lending, insurance, education, and public administration. The Chinese government is implementing a social credit system that incorporates data from all spheres of people’s lives. It is intended to reflect people’s trustworthiness, and it governs access to housing, employment, healthcare, transportation, and other resources including potential romantic partners.13 Though the Chinese system may seem shocking to Western societies, elements of the system have already been implemented by American companies.14 Hewlett-Packard pioneered a score called “flight risk” to predict when new or existing employees will quit.15 The score incorporates data on divorce, serious illness, and the frequency and pattern of sick days used. If an employee becomes disabled and uses an increasing number of sick days for medical treatment, the trend will be incorporated into the employee’s flight risk score and could result in early termination. In a second example from human resources, Fortune 500 companies increasingly rely on AI-driven interview tools to rank job applicants. One company called HireVue provides software that analyzes applicants’ facial expressions, tone of voice, and word choice to compare them against the “ideal candidate” in various fields.16 If people with mobility or communication impairments are interviewed by these automated systems, their impairments may negatively impact their rankings compared to other applicants. Disabled job candidates could be screened out of the application process before their materials reach human reviewers.

The above examples may violate the ADA. Title I of the Act prohibits employers from discriminating based on disabilities. However, it puts the burden on employees to identify instances of disability discrimination and report them to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). An employee cannot file a lawsuit against an employer unless the EEOC has had a chance to investigate the claim. Yet instances of algorithmic disability discrimination may be difficult for employees and job applicants to detect. They are often unaware that their performance on the job or in an interview is being analyzed by algorithms. Moreover, the algorithms used to mine EMD and rank employees and job applicants are often maintained as trade secrets, the confidential intellectual property of the companies that develop and use them. Even if the code of these algorithms was released to the public, their logic is often opaque and may be inscrutable even to the engineers who design them. Because automated employment and hiring-related decisions are hidden from employees and job applicants, yet Title I requires them to identify instances of discrimination, Title I is inadequate to prevent algorithmic disability discrimination. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people with disabilities in places of public accommodation, which include private businesses that are generally open to the public. Title III lists twelve categories of businesses that provide public accommodations under the ADA such as hotels, restaurants, and movie theaters. Title III could be used to prevent algorithmic disability discrimination against people using social media platforms and other websites. However, it is unclear whether these companies qualify as places of public accommodation because the categories listed in Title III do not include online companies, and historically, places of public accommodation were brick-and-mortar business. Many online businesses do not fit that mold, and courts have been divided on whether they qualify.17 In National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., 18 an internet-based document repository was deemed a place of public accommodation. The US District Court for the District of Vermont reasoned it would not make sense for people to be treated differently by the law if they bought an insurance plan from a brick-and-mortar store or bought the same plan from an online vendor.19 However, in Cullen v. Netflix,20 the US District Court for the Northern District of California disagreed, finding that because Netflix’s services are not connected to any “actual physical place,” Netflix is not subject to the ADA.21 In National Association of the Deaf v. Netflix, 22 the US District Court of the District of Massachusetts reached the opposite conclusion.23 The court said excluding companies that deliver services online from the definition of places of public accommodation would frustrate Congress’s intent that people with disabilities “fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general public.”24 Until the debate over whether internet businesses provide public accommodations is resolved, companies that operate within this legal grey area may lack sufficient incentives to abstain from algorithmic disability discrimination. Like the ADA, HIPAA has limitations when it comes to preventing algorithmic discrimination. It applies only to disability-related information held by traditional healthcare entities and their business associates.25 It does not apply to the growing variety of smartphone apps and websites that collect our digital traces or the algorithms that transform them into disability-related information.26 The legislative history of HIPAA suggests its primary purpose is to protect people’s rights by controlling the inappropriate use of their health information.27 It includes quotes by jurists, writers, and philosophers on the importance of maintaining privacy. According to Janna Malamud Smith, “If we continually, gratuitously, reveal other people’s privacies, we harm them and ourselves, we undermine the richness of the personal life, and we fuel a social atmosphere of mutual exploitation.”28 The ability to mine EMD undermines assumptions on which HIPAA was based and expands the types of entities that have access to medical information. Before making recommendations to regulate algorithmic disability discrimination, I will explain why it is important to protect the privacy and autonomy of people with disabilities by restricting the flow of their personal data.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Links › Link --- Data

The aff use of empirical and “unbias” data -- Big data is undermined with racist and ableist assumptions

Gillborn et al 18 (David Gillborn, Paul Warmington & Sean Demack (2018) QuantCrit: education, policy, ‘Big Data’ and principles for a critical race theory of statistics, Race Ethnicity and Education, 21:2, 158-179, DOI: 10.1080/13613324.2017.1377417, ) // RB

Policy-makers, the media, and many academics treat quantitative material as if it is fundamentally different and superior to qualitative data. Numbers are assumed to report ‘the facts’; they are seen as authoritative, neutral, dispassionate, and objective. Indeed, governments do not use numbers merely to describe the world, they increasingly use statistics as an essential part of the technology by which they seek to re/shape educational systems. In this way, numbers play a key role in how inequality is shaped, legitimized, and protected. This has been called ‘policy as numbers’ (Rose 1999; Ozga and Lingard 2007; Rizvi and Lingard 2010): neo-liberalism has enhanced the significance of numbers and statistics as technologies of governance, as central to what Power (1997) calls the rise of the ‘audit society’ and what Neave (1998) has called ‘the evaluative state’. (Lingard 2011, 359)1 Numbers are increasingly used to justify policy priorities and to label teachers, schools, districts, and even entire countries, as educational successes and failures. National testing programs, such as the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) reforms in the US and the use of school performance tables in England, have popularized the idea that numbers can be used to expose (and change) failing schools (Gillborn and Youdell 2000; Darling-Hammond 2007; Barber 2012). For example, across the globe politicians and pressure-groups frequently try to make their case by quoting results from PISA (Program of International Student Assessment) – which is run by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Prominent examples exist in the States, the UK and Australia (see Lingard, Creagh, and Vass 2012). Countries’ positions in the PISA tables are often cited as if they unambiguously and accurately represent the relative quality of schooling in different nations (despite their very different populations and education systems). And yet the commentaries rarely include any detail about the relatively small samples (less than 200 schools in all but one of the US returns since 2000)(NCES n.d.); the selective curricular coverage of the tests (in reading, math, and science); nor the fact that students in different countries sometimes take different assessments or miss certain assessments altogether (Stewart 2013). Despite these severe limitations, the UK government frequently cites PISA results as evidence of the need for change (cf. Department for Education (DfE) 2015, 8) and has stated that it will ‘measure the increased performance of the school system as a whole by reference to international tables of student attainment, such as PISA’ (quoted in Scott 2016). Compare the confident use of PISA (below), by the then-Secretary of State for Education Michael Gove, and the more circumspect view offered by an academic critic: Since the 1990s our performance in these league tables has been at best, stagnant, at worst declining. In the latest results we are 21st amongst 65 participants in the world for science, 23rd for reading and 26th for mathematics. For all the well-intentioned efforts of past governments we are still falling further behind the best-performing school systems in the world. (Gove 2013) ‘There are very few things you can summarise with a number and yet Pisa claims to be able to capture a country’s entire education system in just three of them. It can’t be possible.’ Dr Hugh Morrison, Queen’s University Belfast (quoted in Stewart 2013).

Numbers and accountability On both sides of the Atlantic, policy-makers have argued that statistics will allow greater ‘accountability’ in education. But the thinking behind such claims is flawed in numerous ways. As Linda Darling-Hammond (2007) has noted, for example, under NCLB the numerous wider structural inequities that shape educational outcomes are ignored by focusing attention at the school level: … the wealthiest US public schools spend at least 10 times more than the poorest schools … Although the Act orders schools to ensure that 100% of students test at levels identified as ‘proficient’ … the small per-pupil dollar allocation the law makes to schools serving low-income students is well under 10% of schools’ total spending, far too little to correct these conditions (247–8) Additionally, the use of quantitative measures as a form of accountability assumes that the measures are valid, that is, that the recorded data bear some relevance to the issue/s that lie behind the targets. But there is often scope for cheating and some high-profile cases have emerged. In England, for example, documented cases include teachers altering students’ work and a school that removed low-attaining students from its official roll in advance of high-stakes testing, thereby artificially raising the proportion of students deemed ‘successful’ (Harding 2015). In the US, David Hursh notes that gaming the system can produce considerable rewards: Rodney Paige, as superintendent of the Houston Independent School District (and later chosen to be President [GW] Bush’s first Secretary of Education) … [ordered] principals to not list a student as dropping out but as having left for another school or some reason other than dropping out. Such creative book-keeping resulted in the district claiming a greatly reduced dropout rate of 1.5% in 2001–02 and winning a national award for excellence (Hursh 2007, 302) Numbers and equity In the UK, government policy puts numbers at the heart of its proclaimed strategy to create a fairer society. The Conservative Party, which formed the dominant partner in the Coalition Government (2010–2015), went into the 2010 general election with arguments about ‘transparency’ threaded throughout their Party Manifesto. This included the promise, emphasized as a bold subheading, to ‘Publish data so the public can hold government to account’ (Conservative Conservative Party 2010, 69). Subsequently, the rhetoric was translated into a policy that envisaged ‘the public’ using statistics to understand, challenge and then change the behavior of public authorities, including the Government itself: ‘Our proposals,’ the Government Equalities Office (GEO) has said, ‘use the power of transparency to help public bodies to fulfil the aims of the Equality Duty to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between different groups. This means that public bodies will be judged by citizens on the basis of clear information about the equality results they achieve … Public authorities will have flexibility in deciding what information to publish, and will be held to account by the people they serve.’ (quoted by Instead Consultancy 2011) This approach embodies a series of assumptions that imbue numbers with an almost magical status and power. First, it is assumed that relevant and useful data will be made available (despite the selection being in the gift of the very authorities that ‘the public’ are expected to challenge). Second, this model of transparent data and active citizenship assumes that the citizenry has the time, resources, and expertise to access the data and then analyze it. Finally, the approach takes for granted that public bodies will automatically change their behavior if the data reveal poor ‘equality results’. Unfortunately, in the real world, none of these assumptions is true.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Links › Link --- Cybersecurity

Disability metaphors are used to naturalize nations positions as inferior to the United States

McRuer 10 (Robert McRuer is an American theorist who has contributed to fields in transnational queer and disability studies, “Reflections on Disability in Haiti”, , January 2010, Barneys)

Illness and contagion are only part of the story of Haiti's metaphorization, however. Even the quickest survey of global headlines following the disaster reveals (with predictable frequency) reports that the earthquake had 'crippled' the nation, the city, the infrastructure, the agricultural or tourist industries, or humanitarian efforts. Hospital and emergency responses had been, in these reports, 'paralyzed' and the government, according to no less than former U.S. president Bill Clinton (tapped by President Barack Obama to assist in the crisis), had been, "first of all, disabled." "When this emergency passes," Clinton insisted, "then we know Haiti is going to have to get back on its feet again. And we want to be a part of that" (qtd. in Fabian).

These readily available metaphors of both disability and able-bodiedness (Clinton's comments obviously invoking a Haiti-to-come that is nondisabled, healthy, robust, standing on two feet) are in part simply journalistic stock-in-trade following  but are, I am arguing, also particularly entrenched in relation to Haiti. Long before the 2010 earthquake, Haiti's position in the global economy had been conceptualized through disability metaphors--after "two hundred years of crippling debt," the already "feeble" economy has been "knocked flat" by repeated disasters (Flaherty; Dougherty and Shwiff). This terminology has had the dual effect of naturalizing Haiti's position as the poorest country in the western hemisphere and disallowing--as in other cultural locations where banal disability metaphors circulate readily--other ways of imagining embodiment in general and disability in particular in this location.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Links › Link --- Cybersecurity

The 1acs rhetoric of “crippling” nations infrastructure re entrenches ableism

Rajkumar 20 (Shruti Rajkumar is a journalist and recent graduate of Emerson College, Ableist discourse hurts the disabled community, , 2/11/20, Barney)

In 2009, Spread the Word gained traction in the public school system of Colchester, Connecticut, my hometown, as well as in schools across the country. The campaign spread awareness about the derogatory and negative connotations that the “R-word” holds towards people with cognitive disabilities, and it encouraged people to sign a pledge to stop using it. By 2020, the global campaign gained over 800,000 online pledges, according to its . The impact of the campaign is undeniable, but what about all of the other ableist slurs that remain embedded within our everyday language and culture? Over the past decade, the use of the “R-word” decreased, however ableist slurs such as “crippling,” “handicap,” “differently-abled” and “wheelchair-bound” remain normalized in our language with complete disregard for the negative connotations they hold toward disabled people, and this needs to be addressed by society. As a member of the disabled community, I’ve always felt uncomfortable seeing these slurs used in conversations, written in books and being thrown around as playful insults between my peers, but because they were so widely used, it was difficult for me to pinpoint why it made me uncomfortable. Unfortunately, this normalization remains because of the lack of awareness surrounding the trauma disabled people face in relation to these slurs. I first became aware of the slur “cripple” in elementary school while watching the 2009 movie adaptation of A Christmas Carol. The original book, published in 1843 by Charles Dickens, refers to Bob Cratchit’s son, nicknamed “Tiny Tim,” as a cripple. During the 19th century, slurs with a variation of the word “cripple” were even more normalized than they are today. However, in the modern age of movie adaptations, the characters still refer to him as a cripple, even though it is an outdated term. Whenever I watched the movie, I got the sense that calling the character a cripple portrayed him as inferior, stemming from an able-centric place of pity, a reflection of how all abled people view disabled people. Consequently, I felt as though I was also viewed this way by those around me. When I hear the word “handicap” used in conversations, it’s usually in reference to the reserved parking spots or to refer to a specific disability. Most people, however, don’t understand the negative implication surrounding this word. On Feb. 5, 2020, former Vice President Joe Biden reflected on his struggle with a stutter throughout his childhood at the CNN Presidential town hall. “You know, stuttering, when you think about it, is the only handicap that people still laugh about,” Biden said. Putting aside the inaccuracy of his statement, he should have avoided the term “handicap” because “disabled” is the preferred and politically correct term. When I hear people using ableist slurs, they’re usually not in a hateful context. With the word “crippling,” I normally hear it used in conversations to describe mental illnesses, such as anxiety or depression, as a way of emphasizing the intensity of their illness. However, people can describe their mental illnesses without offending other communities. For example, instead of saying “crippling anxiety,” they can say “overwhelming anxiety.” Similarly, ableist slurs can simply be replaced by more politically correct terms. “Accessible” should replace “handicap,” “disabled” should replace “differently-abled” and “wheelchair-user” should replace “wheelchair-bound.” Even if the use of ableist slurs isn’t always used as an attack on disabled people, the lack of awareness about them further permits their normalization in our culture and language. Consequently, they act as a microaggression that ultimately adds to the ableism faced by an already marginalized community. Today, society is making strides in omitting the slurs and outdated terms that have a history of offending marginalized communities. The disabled community deserves that same respect.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Links › Link --- Biotech

The aff is an impossible move to deploy biotech to fix disability that inevitably entrenches ableism

Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, , 4/19/16, Buck)

Despite the common analysis of online media as opportunities for self-exploration or identity experimentation, cyborg hoaxes present disability as a fixed element of identity that may, in turn, be “fixed” by technology that extends an individual beyond their (limited) capacities. In the first place, cyborg hoaxes reproduce stereotypical representations of disability as a fixed element of identity with predictable restrictions. Second, any promise of technology “fixing” disability implies that disability ought to be fixed and reflects an ableist ideology. Disability is presented as a fixed, static, identity marker in cyborg hoaxes. The very use of disability as an excuse, as described above, is indicative of an assumption that disability produces predictable symptoms. The presentation of disability as a static identity marker, with unchanging consequences, reflects assumptions of a dualist and ableist culture, in which ability is contrasted with disability and gradations are largely invisible. Cyborg hoaxes cling tightly to a narrow narrative of disability and limitation, while (as will be discussed later) people with disabilities online exhibit a range of changeable relationships to society, technology, and sexuality. Insofar as technology offers to “fix” disability, it does so through invisibility, enabling people with disabilities to take on non-disabled representations of self. Yet, as media scholars Katie Ellis and Mike Kent (2010) caution, “if people with disability in this sense become invisible in virtual worlds, this could have implications for the visibility of people with disability in broader society” (p. 123). There are strong tendencies to assume the whiteness and maleness of online participants in the absence of complex representations of alternative identities (Nakamura, 2002). An able-bodied perspective is similarly dominant and reinforced by the invisibility of disability online. Kafer (2013) argues that culture often imagines technologically enabled futures as spaces without disability, meaning that “the value of a future that includes disabled people goes unrecognized, while the value of a disability-free future is seen as self-evident” (p. 3). Technology may also “fix” disability by offering access to a social life that is portrayed as otherwise impossible due to disability. Rheingold (1994), for example, wrote that “Joan’s mentor had given her a computer, modem, and a subscription to CompuServe, where Joan instantly blossomed” (p. 165). This statement privileges technology as a means to overcome stigma or isolation, but it relies upon an ignorance of how technologies can reinforce oppression through features that cannot be used by people with disabilities.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Links › Link --- Biotech

Biotech fails to empower disabled folk.

Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, , 4/19/16, Buck)

In the many formulations of digital media, Internet, or new media studies, “critical cyberculture studies” is notable for its attempt to put “cultural difference—human elements of race and ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, and disability … front and center, informing our research questions, frameworks, and findings” (Silver, 2006: 8). Despite such rhetoric, disability was marginalized by cyberculture studies and other strands of Internet studies in their first decade, either through its use as metaphor or through its invisibility. In much of these literatures, disability has been a concretizing metaphor, used to illustrate abstract theories and not interrogated for its own political baggage and relation to lived experiences and identities. This recalls what literary and disability scholars David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder (2001) have argued about the use of disability in fiction, where it serves as a “narrative prosthesis,” a motivating malady that drives further storytelling. In both cases, disability is abstracted and used to advance other ideas. The clearest example of such metaphorical use of disability lies in cyborg theory, where it appeared “only as example, not as critical category” (Kafer, 2013: 105). As described in Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto,” the cyborg represented the increasingly blurred boundaries between human and animal, human and machine, in postmodernity. Haraway (1991) invoked disability to describe the pleasures of blending the human and the other, suggesting that “perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and sometimes do) have the most intense experiences of complex hybridization with other communication devices,” and that “machines can be prosthetic devices, intimate components, friendly selves” (p. 154). Similarly, Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (1991) opened their anthology by suggesting that “the highly developed technoculture of the handicapped” would be important for the development of cyborg theory (p. xvi); this possibility was, however, unrealized in their anthology. Incorporation of actual experiences with prosthetics could have offered depth to these speculative cyborg futures, but it could also have troubled them, as lived experiences of disability and assistive technology are often frustrating, painful, or stigmatizing rather than politically liberating. In the few cases in which scholars considered experiences of disability in concert with cyborg theory, their findings were mixed. For instance, d/Deaf individuals who received cochlear implants did not experience this as an empowering cyborg identity but as a troubling of their community identity and sense of self (Cherney, 1999). The invisibility of disability in Internet studies is evident when we turn a critical eye to the case of Joan. Although numerous scholars took up this case in relation to gender, sexuality, postmodern identity, and online disembodiment, analysis through the lens of disability was sorely lacking. Turkle focused on the boundaries between identity play as a healthy form of experimentation and identity deception as betrayal. Howard Rheingold invoked this story as part of a larger discussion of online communities’ experiences of trust and deception. O’Brien used the story to argue the importance of gender in organizing interpersonal interactions online and offline. For Mark Poster, as well, the case was one of gender deception, demonstrating how gender could be reinscribed online. In Roseanne Allucquère Stone’s chapter, “The Cross-Dressing Psychiatrist,” she presented this story as an illustration of the flexibility of postmodern identity, an argument that both renders disability invisible as a lived phenomenon and treats it metaphorically. Such appearances—but analytic irrelevance—of disability in Internet studies led Gerard Goggin and Christopher Newell (2003) to suggest that Internet studies and related fields retained a conceptualization of disability as deficiency that obscured its function as identity and experience (p. 115). In their analysis of Joan, and related literature in cyberculture studies, Goggin and Newell provided a rare illustration of what disability studies could offer to scholars of Internet and new media culture. They wrote that Stone, in particular, “fails to identify the way in which [a medical discourse of disability] fundamentally shapes her own analysis and taken-for-granted views of … the disabled body” (Goggin and Newell, 2003: 113). While scholars readily explored the diverse personas adopted by online users in various contexts, Goggin and Newell (2003) noted reliance on a “fixed, reified identity position” (p. 114) regarding disability, an assumption that disability could only be performed in a limited fashion. The postmodern fluidity of cyberculture studies did not extend to disability, and the lived experiences of disability online were rarely analyzed, with metaphorical uses and uninterrogated anecdotes serving as the basis for theory. Goggin and Newell’s Digital Disability offered serious study of uses of the Internet by people with disabilities, the limitations of technology regarding disability access, and the formation of disability cultures online. It laid the groundwork for future studies of disability online, many of which have addressed both online cultures and the offline structures of power that shape technologies (Adam and Kreps, 2009; Ellcessor, 2016; Ellis and Kent, 2010; Goggin and Noonan, 2006; Jaeger, 2011; Moser, 2006). Although this literature has grown, its insights regarding the interplay of bodies, technologies, and cultural hierarchies of identity have not been widely incorporated into studies of online culture more broadly.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › Links › Link --- AI

AI development homogenizes disability and labels disabled bodies as “Burdens”

Shew 20 - (Ashley Shew 20 ; Ashley Shew is an Associate Professor in Science, Technology, and Society at Virginia Tech, where she participates in the STS PhD program, the Medicine & Society minor, the Disability Studies minor, the Bioethics graduate certificate, and Integrative Graduate Education Program on Regenerative Medicine. Published: Mar 1, 2020 ; Ableism, Technoableism, and Future AI. Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10165545. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 39.1 Web. doi:10.1109/MTS.2020.2967492.) Dōgen+Barney)

The latest set of technological solutions to the perceived problems of disabled people is Artificial Intelligence and machine learning. But like other technologies discussed in this essay, Artificial Intelligence research and AIs currently under development contain several inscriptions of technoableism that I want to warn against. I also want to gesture to an emerging frame for considering appropriate disability technology, called Crip Technoscience [16]. The current mood is one of optimism about machine learning and Artificial Intelligence for disability applications. Headlines scream about it: “How AI Could Transform the Lives of Disabled People” [10], “How Artificial Intelligence Can Help With Disabilities” [19], and “Artificial Intelligence Poised to Improve Lives of People with Disabilities” [46]. Sometimes these headlines acknowledge AI’s potential for helping people as they age (correctly assuming that older folks are more likely to have disabilities), hyping the potential for robot caregivers and AI emotional support “animals” — AI that can take the place of human carers or friends, often at a lower financial cost: “Artificial Intelligence Could Improve How We Age” [29], “Can China Win the Artificial Intelligence Race by Serving the Elderly?” [18], and “Robot Caregivers are Saving the Elderly from Lives of Loneliness” [43]. These breathless headlines make clear the assumptions that ground the articles that follow them — assumptions about what it is to be disabled and what it is to age. (These articles tend to lump disability and aging together, and I therefore examine the two together, but there are important differences between these demographic groups in terms of stigma, access, convenience, societal narrative, and consideration.) Like earlier technological interventions on disabled lives, these technologies rely on assumptions about the disabled and aging individual rather than the environment. For example, ideas about the importance of independence factor heavily into coverage of AI for disabled and older folks, and are particularly clear in discussions around autonomous vehicles, companion robots (like Paro), home-based applications (like Alexa), and caretaking robots. All of these technologies emphasize aging and disability as problems for individual consumers, rather than problems for society.12 Why should the lack of accessible transport for people who cannot drive be a problem for the non-driver rather than for society? Why should the loneliness and isolation experienced by people who cannot easily leave their homes be solved by in-home robots rather than by better planning and infrastructure within our communities? AI designers are clearly focused on changing the individual to fit the environment rather than the other way around. For example, many of the “conveniences” offered by AI applications are mostly conveniences for the benefit of the user’s family, rather than the users themselves. These technologies are framed as unburdening families from worry by enabling them to remotely monitor or check in on their loved one’s condition; as reducing the financial costs of hiring human caretakers; and as combating the user’s isolation and loneliness, thus requiring fewer visits from family members. When AI technology is framed as helping the family, it positions disabled and old people as recipients of care rather than as agents in their own lives, and it decenters them and their experiences, instead moving the nondisabled family members into the center of the story (which also fails to recognize that disabled people can have disabled family members and can be caregivers themselves).

This same centering of ability is produced by the narratives’ focus on independence as the main goal of disability design. Indeed, the nearly obsessive focus on independence is another “tell” for ableism. As Elliott Kukla writes: We are born needing care and die needing care, and I am no exception. At brief moments in the middle of life, we hold the illusion of independence, but we are always driving on roads we did not build, eating foods we did not pick or raise. Allowing the illusion of my own independence to drop away unmasked a fundamental truth of being human [24]. This sentiment echoes throughout current disability studies: we are all interdependent, and independence has always already been an illusion.13 But disabled and old people have often needed to advocate for independence, because they have historically been the subject of laws, de facto rules, and public norms that deny them full citizenship, access, and opportunity to participate in public life. For example, early disability activism of the 1970s and 1980s produced a movement called the independent living movement. The name — independent living — indicates a reaction to the historical framing of disabled people as completely dependent, as objects to be moved around by nondisabled people. Despite the name, this movement was not about independence in the sense of isolation, total responsibility for one’s own needs, and total avoidance of inconvenience to nondisabled people — the values that underpin current narratives about AI. Instead, the movement was about the right to a public life, a life outside of institutions — an interdependent life. It demanded community living (the slogan “Our Homes, Not Nursing Homes!”), access to education and to public spaces (schools, grocery stores, shops, etc.), vocational services (to enable people to work), and assistive technologies (to help people move and remain outside of institutionalized and segregated care). The independent living movement demanded only that disabled people have the same autonomy, rights, and freedoms that nondisabled people enjoy. Interdependence (neither isolationist independence nor dependence) is a central value in the Crip Technoscience Manifesto. It is the second item on the list: “Crip technoscience is committed to interdependence as a political technology” [17, p. 12], and the Manifesto itself, which is “premised on interdependence,” was written to describe the “core values” of crip technoscience. According to Hamraie and Fritsch [16, 17], crip technoscience blends critical disability studies with approaches from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). It anticipates a world in which disabled people are seen as experts about their experiences and the materiality and context of their bodies. Crip technoscience anticipates accessible futures that work not toward cure or normalization but toward freedom. AI as a disability technology also presents particular problems of data privacy, especially given the long and ongoing history of the policing of disabled bodies. For example, the recently deployed Electronic Visit Verification (EVV) technologies enable personal care attendants (PCAs) to clock in and out of their home health visits. Under EVV, these personal care attendants, who provide physical support for disabled people to accomplish daily tasks (toileting, prepping food, getting in a wheelchair), are issued mobile phones to track their time on the job. But disability activists express worry about the scope of the monitoring enabled by this technology. As disability activist and filmmaker Dominick Evans tweeted: It is a pure violation of the civil liberties and personal freedom of disabled people across the United States. Our PCAs are now being equipped with something equivalent to an ankle bracelet by the US government! They are giving [sic] phones that have cameras in the front and the back so they can track exactly what all of us who need homecare are doing. They could record any conversation. These devices have to stay in our homes, at all times. We’ll never know when they are recording, and we don’t know who has access to them beyond the monitoring company, and government agencies. It’s a huge threat to the personal safety of disabled people who require home care [12] The use of EVV technology is a huge invasion of privacy — an invasion that would not be permitted for many segments of society.14 Can you imagine if any nondisabled, noncriminal citizen was required by the government to allow a device with the potential to monitor them in their homes at all times? This is precisely what some of the proposed AI technologies will do. And disabled people — especially disabled people who are multiply minoritized, whose identities are more carefully scrutinized by others — are rightfully concerned. Our society does not value the privacy of older people and disabled people,15 and many of the AIs in development sacrifice this privacy in favor of the peace of mind of presumably nondisabled caretakers — an assumption that disabled and old people are not agents in their own right.

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › 1NC › 1NC --- Shell

The alt is a centering of disabled perspectives through crip technoscience

Hamraie and Fritsch 19 (Aimi Hamraie is an Associate Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society at Vanderbilt University, Kelly Fritsch works in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Carleton University, , Crip Technoscience Manifesto, https://catalystjournal.org/index.php/catalyst/article/view/29607, 4/1/19)

Disabled people are experts and designers of everyday life. But we also harness technoscience for political action, refusing to comply with demands to cure, fix, or eliminate disability. Attentive to the intersectional workings of power and privilege, we agitate against independence and productivity as requirements for existence. Building upon earlier work defining crip technoscience as politicized design activism (Hamraie, 2015, 2017), we articulate four political commitments of crip technoscience as a field of critical scholarship, practice, and activism.2In framing crip technoscience as such, we follow feminist technoscience studies by describing both a realm of practice and a field of knowing that has emerged from it. Crip technoscience braids together two provocative concepts: “crip,” the non-compliant, anti-assimilationist position that disability is a desirable part of the world, and “technoscience,” the co-production of science, technology, and political life (Jasanoff, 2004; Murphy, 2012). Crip theory centers disability as a locus of resistance against “compulsory ablebodiedness” (McRuer, 2006)and “ablenationalism” (Mitchell & Snyder, 2015), agitating against liberal assimilation and inclusion practices bymarkingdisability as a desirably generativeand creativerelational practice (Fritsch, 2015a).We seek to bring crip theory and feminist technoscience into closer contact, exploring their generative frictions. In some respects, the field of

disability studies has been entangled with science and technology studies (STS)—and feminist STS in particular—since its origins, especially through its critiques of biomedicine and militarism and in its embrace of situated epistemologies.In naming crip technoscience, we invoke long histories of feminist, queer, anti-racist, and disability collaborative praxis, such as in technoscience projects engaging Universal Design, sensory engineering, reproductive justice, and HIV/AIDS activism.2However, to date, criptheorists have had limited engagement with the criticalconcept of technoscience, particularly as it is used in feminist STS to mean the productive and non-innocent entanglement of scientific knowing and technological making.3This limited engagement has yielded an ahistorical position that science, technology, and medicine are anathema to crip world-remaking, ignoring disabled peoples’ ongoing, creative, and open-ended appropriations of science, technology,and medicine,particularlyinacts of protest and “epistemic activism” (Hamraie, 2012, 2017, p. 132). Crip technoscience thus calls forth Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha’s concept of “crip science” (2018, p. 69)to highlight the skills, wisdom, resources, and hacks disabled people utilize for navigating and altering inaccessible worlds. In pushing crip technoscience as a field of research and a practice of critical “knowing-making” (Hamraie,2017, p. 99), we conjure frictional practices of access production, acknowledging that science and technology can be used to both produce and dismantle injustice. As a field of study, crip technoscience begins from the feminist politics of technoscientific “non-innocence”(Haraway, 1991), acknowledging that many of the technologies that have enabled disabled people to gain access to the social world have been produced through military-industrial research and development, imperial and colonial relations, and ecological destruction, all of which contribute to the uneven debilitation of human and non-human life (Erevelles, 2011; Fritsch, 2015b; Kafer, 2013; Puar, 2017). Nevertheless, we contend that technoscience can be a transformative tool for disability justice.We contrast crip technosciencewith mainstream “disability technoscience” as a field of traditional expertrelations andpractices concerned with designingfordisabledpeople rather than withor bydisabled people. In mainstream disability technoscience, such fixes are understood as de facto goods, services for (supposedly) unfortunate disabled people, and ultimately depoliticized. Disability technoscience positions enhancement and capacitation as progressive moves to overcome disability. “Hackathons” led by charity organizations embody innovation-for-innovation’s sake and definedisability as a problemin search of a solution (Wong, 2015a,2015b). Disabled people are often treated purely as clients or users. For example, the organization Tikkun Olam Makers (TOM) describes disabled people as “need knowers” and non-disabled designers and engineers as “solution experts.” Riffing on the term special needs, which associates disabled people with minority interests outside of majority norms, these designations reinforce the division between disabled people as passive recipients of access or assistive technologies and non-disabled designers, developers, and technologists as experts. Disability technoscience reinforces the sense that disabled people are not already making, hacking, and tinkering with existing material arrangements. Disability is cast as an object of innovation discourse, rather than as a driver of technological change. Melanie Yergeau (2014) historicizes mainstream disability “hacktivism,” arguing that hackathons have become the “new telethon” in that they frame “disability as pitiable and in need of remediation.”4In response, Yergeau invokes “criptastic hacking”as a “disability-led movement, rather than a series of apps and patches and fixes designed by non-disabled people who cannot even be bothered to talk with disabled people.” Criptastic hacking highlights crip technoscience asa field of relations, knowledges, and practices that enables the flourishing of crip ways of producing and engaging the material world

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › 1NC › 1NC --- Shell

The impact is techno caste system ordering those who have modified their bodies and those who have not

Fahn 20 (Chia Wei Fahn is an Assistant Professor in the Masters of Occupational Therapy Program, Perfecting Bodies: Who Are the Disabled in Andrew Niccol’s Gattaca?, , 4/1/20)

The social model of disability identifies systemic barriers and social exclusion as the main contributing factors in disabling people [18,34,35]. Gattaca depicts a new social model of disability, displacing the role of current physical norms in a “cascading series of replacements reminiscent of Derrida’s ideas of deferral or deferring—one replacement replacing another” [9] (p. 78). A social model of disability is employed here to show disability as a socially constructed identity. Niccol brings to public attention a provocative discourse on the issues that arise with the blind acceptance of genetic determinism and disabling the able-bodied. The disabled are genetically stigmatized, offspring of “those parents who, for moral or, more likely economic reasons, refrain from tampering with their offspring’s genetic makeup or who fail to abort a deprived fetus” that “condemn their children to a life of routine discrimination” [23] (p. 12). What began as a means to rid society of inheritable diseases has become a way to “design your offspring—the line between health and enhancement blurred forever” [23] (p. 36). The possibility of genetic manipulation extends the scope of ableism, and things we now accept as “normal”, such as myopia, obesity, and addiction, all present opportunities to perfect the species. Thinking back to the day of his birth, Vincent nostalgically remarks that “not so long ago, I would have been considered a perfectly normal, healthy baby. Ten fingers, ten toes. That was all that used to matter” [23] (p. 13). In a world where genetic screening is prerequisite to procreating, however, he is categorized as “[o]ficially [as] ‘In-Valids,’ also known as ‘godchildren’ . . . ‘deficients’, ‘defectives’, ‘geno-junk’ . . . ‘the fucked-up people’” [23] (p. 13). Average physical and intellectual normality is no longer the social ideal with the widespread administration of genomic treatments, causing normal and able bodies by today’s definition to gradually become part of the disabled and disenfranchised. Genetic editing extends the boundaries of ableist ideology to view all unaltered bodies as disabled, potentially opening an oppressive social caste that is more exclusive than the present disability dichotomy. Johnson Cheu’s essay, “De-gene-erates, Replicants and Other Aliens: (Re)defining Disability in Futuristic Film”, addresses future shifts in the social model of disability, arguing “if disability, as a social construction, exists on more than a theoretical plane, disability should be present as a social stigma in the future . . . which occupy a social stigma of being unfit, sub-human, inferior, that shows the very existence of disability as a social construction” [36] (p. 202). Disability in Gattaca remains a fixed category which humanity cannot transcend, “an atavism representing the remainder of normal at the end of normal” [9] (p. 14). Regarding genomics’ impact on the social political as well as economic class structures, Gattaca subverts the belief that genetic engineering betters lives for those who live with disabilities with an emphasis on the dissonance between promised potential and social reality. Unscreened births are categorized as “the ‘healthy ill’. They don’t actually have anything yet—they may never. But since few of the pre-conditions can be cured or reversed, it is easier to treat them as if they were already sick” [23] (p. 37). Genetic editing led to an amplified expression of ableism in human society, by decreeing those we deem normal by today’s standards the healthy disabled, “an unfinished and inherently malfunctioning organism” [8] (p. 260). Niccol predicts a future when our entire population is presumed to be in need of a cure. An “error free” biological profile becomes the sole determinant of ableism, an eradication of the “norm” we are accustomed to leads to further polarization of social and economic classes. Vincent’s self-perception is severely influenced by those surrounding him, a continuous undermining of his efforts in life while “from an early age I came to think of myself as others thought of me—chronically ill. Every skinned knee and runny nose treated as if it were life-threatening” [23] (p. 13). Niccol articulates genetic technology’s impact on society, examining how fundamentals in labor, class, and disability are redefined through the rise of genomics to form “a relation of power and substitution continuing from the social to the genetic” [9] (p. 81). For better or worse, genetic manipulation pushes the boundaries of what is previously considered as the human norm; all bodies are seen as “limited, defective and in need of constant improvement beyond species-typical boundaries” [37] (p. 254).

2022 Michigan Kritik
K --- Disability --- K Lab › 1NC › 1NC --- Shell

Ableist rhetoric feeds the project of the war machine as we march towards the horizon of a new Able-bodied world order. Rejecting attempts at “rehabilitation” is key to understanding debility as inherent to all bodies and deconstructing the project of the war machine.

Heathcote 18 – (Gina Heathcote is a feminist scholar working in the Centre for Gender Studies and the School of Law at SOAS, University of London, as well as a member at the Centre for Human Rights Law; War’s Perpetuity: Gina Heathcote (2018) War’s Perpetuity: Disabled Bodies of War and the Exoskeleton of Equality, Australian Feminist Law Journal, 44:1, 71-91,; Published online: 01 Aug 2018. ) Dōgen

“[B]etween fixing and forgetting … [s]uccessful rehabilitation permitted the ‘formerly’ disabled body to be reintegrated into the nation’s significant social structures, such as work and family. Made ‘ordinary’ again, ‘identical’ to ‘normal’ citizens, the disabled would ‘disappear’”. 57 Jennifer James’ account of the relationship between the disabled body, black bodies in the US, and soldier/citizenship draws out the complicated structural history of soldier/citizens in the US. She argues for recognition of the history of blackness in the US to be understood as ‘synonymous with disability’ as ‘black men have envisaged military participation as an avenue toward liberation and citizenship, heeding the call for “able-bodied” men needed to fill military ranks’. 58 Through an analysis of the literary texts of Gwendolyn Brooks, James argues for the need for representation, rather than repression, of the injured and maimed black body returned from war. As such, James demonstrates the relationship between legal subjectivity, citizenship, and soldiering in the US. In arguing that military service might ‘undo’ the othering of the black male body in the US, James in effect acknowledges the white, masculine subject of law who need not act to gain full subjectivity. However, James also challenges the accuracy of ‘“ableists’” representations’ for ‘the act of representation, no matter how “authentic,” aids in this estrangement precisely because the disabled are mediated’. 59 The military mindset to repair and restore the returned soldier through assistive technologies likewise reproduces the expectation that the maimed body is not quite a full subject and that the restoring of the body is necessary to be a full citizen. This approach, argues James, ignores the constructed nature of the debility produced through warfare and thus reifies the notion that the body must always be restored from debility. Drawing on the work of Henri-Jacques Stiker,60 James writes: This cosmetic fix allows the inequalities created by political, social and ideological practices that relegate certain bodies to economic, gender, sex and physical (racial) alterity to conveniently recede from view … through ‘naturalizing’ socially produced disability, naming all difference ‘disability’ and claiming all ‘disabled’ capable of ‘rehabilitation,’ preventative measures are judged unnecessary.61 James’ argument recognises not only the socially constructed nature of disability resultant from armed conflict, but also the social construction of ‘the poor to the unemployed’ as Other and in need of rehabilitative interventions by the state, rather than recognition of any need to transform structural inequalities. However, James’ approach also highlights the ‘socially constructed’ nature of disability which, I argue, might have two meanings.62 First, as James writes, drawing on Stiker, a host of differences become marked as ‘disabled’ in a manner that requires individual interventions over structural change. Second, thinking through the disabled body returning from combat, the body is twice constructed as damaged, initially through the risk contained in a political decision to send armed forces to combat situations which is, in essence, a constructed risk and then through the need to ‘restore’ the body of the soldier, rather than care or accept differences associated with disability. For individuals who are thus framed as disabled, whether as the consequence of political decisions, political apathy, or from chronic, genetic, or other medical conditions, the focus remains on the rehabilitation to become ablebodied rather than a recognition that all bodies carry debilities, risk debility, and are debilitated. Likewise, there is a failure to see how compulsory ablebodiedness is attributed to the imagined subject of law. The shift to honouring, accepting, and seeing debility as integral to subjectivity thus frames subjectivity differently and, potentially, accepts the interface of technology with any body as an aspect of subjectivity just as the entwined relationships with humanness and matter, environment and nonhuman animals have the potential to radically alter legal constructions and engagements with subjectivity. James goes on to remind us that the dismembered female form has a long history in Western iconography from the Venus de Milo to the cropped female body of contemporary Hollywood films: if women are reduced to ‘parts’, black women are split even further as they are asked to pry the signs of blackness from their bodies and as blackness is ripped from their bodies and reshaped into a myriad of cultural signifiers.63 The maimed body of war must therefore be restored in a way that female and black bodies can never be restored/completed, reinscribing white masculine histories into the project of assistive military technologies for returned soldiers. For Yasmin Gunaratnam, ‘[r]ace and gender, in other words, complicate the cultural presence of disability’. 64 Thinking forward, through these re-readings of the material and discursive effects of subject formation, borne through the experience of citizenship and its various dislocations, and invisibly carried through legal categorisation, demands new modes of understanding and representing subjectivity. An alternative framing of subjectivity might thus begin with the notion of debility and the body, acknowledging thus the interrelated othering of racial and gendered others in the construction of legal subjectivity endured by modern man. Debility thus frames the future interface with technology as not rehabilitative, or restorative, but rather akin to the already-interface between technology and humans: a process that has a history as old as human invention. The technology of fire, for example, fundamentally altered human existence, changed her needs, patterns, and consumptions. Moreover, the contemporary use of technology has starkly changed the understanding of humanness, how humans live, interact, survive. At the same time both technology and humans impact on the livelihoods of nonhuman animals and of earth. To shift toward the notion of intertwined existence – or subjectivities – the exoskeleton has inspired me to see the human body as body-never-whole-never-complete and as ordinary in its dependencies on others, including nonhuman animals, matter, and technologies. Thus, drawing on Donna Reeves, it is necessary to recognise: For people with impairments, the hybridisation of machine/human or animal/human is often synonymous with lived experience, particularly for those with physical or sensory impairments … Potential cyborg figures can be seen in the wheelchair user, the person with a cochlear implant, artificial leg or pacemaker, someone who uses an assistance dog.65 While Reeve acknowledges the differential cultural readings of different technologies, their gendered meanings, the economic privileges required for access, the dependencies, and the increased means of medical surveillance technologies invoked must also be heeded. Reeve argues, ‘[r]ather than seeing technology as “fixing” impaired people in normative ways (and therefore to be rejected), it is more productive to see the new ways of being in the world that emerge from living as cyborg’. 66 Thus, to see the debilitated body67 as motif for reimagining subjectivity requires recognition of the ways the conceptualisation of modernist man has always rendered the non-male, non-heterosexual/heteronormative body as not only othered but debilitated. Feminist theorising on subjectivity and feminist legal projects might thus take the othered body as the conceptual lens to engage the nonhuman, matter, and technology. Viva la Frida!

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Advantage CPs › AT: REM/REE

$140 million from the infrastructure bill went to domestic supply chains– proves investment alone is not enough

DOE ‘2/14 ( US Department of Energy, federal government agency that manages the United States' nuclear infrastructure and administers the country's energy policy and funds scientific research, published 2/14/22 by the DOE, accessed 7/19/22, “DOE Launches $140 Million Program to Develop America’s First-of-a-Kind Critical Minerals Refinery”, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-launches-140-million-program-develop-americas-first-kind-critical-minerals-refinery)//mw

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) today released a on the design, construction and operation of a new facility to demonstrate the commercial feasibility of a full-scale rare earth element (REE) and critical minerals (CM) extraction and separation refinery using unconventional resources. When built, this first-of-a-kind facility, supported by $140 million investment from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, will support American manufacturing jobs, and help build a strong domestic supply chain for the next generation of clean energy technologies vital to reaching President Biden’s goal of a net-zero emissions future. “Applying next-generation technology to convert legacy fossil fuel waste into a domestic source of critical minerals needed to strengthen our supply chains is a win-win — delivering a healthier environment and driving us forward to our clean energy goals,” said U.S. Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm. “With the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law’s investment in the build out of this first-of-its kind critical minerals refinery, we are moving ideas from the lab to the commercial stage and demonstrating how America can compete for the global supply chain to meet the growing demand for clean energy technology.” Across the United States, there are billions of tons of coal waste and ash, acid mine drainage, and produced water. The legacy wastes left behind by coal mining and related activities all contain a wide variety of valuable minerals and materials. Each of them offers an untapped resource for producing a wealth of critical minerals. REEs and CMs are essential materials that are used in a broad range of technologies that are significant to national security and energy, such as advanced aircraft, wind turbines, electric vehicles, semiconductors, and hydrogen fuel cells. Currently, even when REEs are being mined within the U.S., they are shipped overseas for processing, before being sold back to the U.S. in more expensive products.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Advantage CPs › AT: REM/REE

Biden already invested $35 million

Hirneisen ‘2/22 (Madison, a staff reporter covering California for The Center Square, published 2/22/22 by The Center Square, accessed 7/19/22, “Biden, Newsom announce $35 million investment in rare-earth mineral mining”, https://www.thecentersquare.com/national/biden-newsom-announce-35-million-investment-in-rare-earth-mineral-mining/article_8d1060e6-9434-11ec-a9cf-6f20234b1569.html)//lexmw

Biden a $35 million investment for Mountain Pass Materials on Tuesday, the only rare-earth mining and processing site in the United States. Biden said the funds will help create a "fully domestic supply chain" for the magnets that power technology like wind turbines and electric vehicle motors. The new multi-million dollar investment announced on Tuesday comes on top of $700 million that Mountain Pass Materials plans to invest by 2024 to create a rare earth supply chain in the U.S. "These new investments are going to do more than create good paying jobs, they are also going to set America up to lead the world and build a clean energy economy and the clean energy future," Biden said on Tuesday. Mountain Pass Materials, which is based in California, was started five years ago and has since become the second-largest producer in the world of rare earth materials, James Litinsky, CEO of Mountain Pass Materials, said during Tuesday's news conference. The company rare earth elements used to power digital technologies, electric vehicles, clean energy, and even certain military control systems. The company estimates that through a partnership with General Motors, it will be able to produce enough magnets for 500,000 electric vehicles per year with the materials it recovers at its facility. Biden noted on Tuesday that investments in these kinds of processes and operations would help the U.S. compete with China, which currently controls most of the global market for these minerals. "We can't build a future that's made in America if we ourselves are dependent on China for the materials, the power [and] the products of today and tomorrow," Biden said.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Advantage CPs › AT: REM/REE

Environmental costs cause backlash

Subin, BA, ‘21(Samantha, associate reporter for CNBC Pro and CNBC.com and has a BA in in multiplatform journalism and general business from the University of Maryland, Published 4/17/22 by CNBC, accessed 7/19/22, “The new U.S. plan to rival China and end cornering of market in rare earth metals”, )//mw

While companies like Lynas and MP Materials are eager to ramp up the domestic supply chains, extracting rare earths is a difficult process due to a combination of environmental, technical and political factors. Many regions, including the European Union, have an abundance of these resources but lack the expertise that other countries like China have in the processing and magnet production, Nakano said. The rare earths industry has come under fire for environmental concerns. Many rare earth elements reside among mineral deposits with radioactive materials that can leach into the water table. Mining, processing and disposal can also contribute to ecosystem disruption and release hazardous byproducts into the atmosphere. Although the U.S. is making strides to advance the rare earths supply chain and develop alternatives to mining rare earths, environmental regulations are often more stringent than inside China. In recent years, Lynas came under scrutiny from activists and the Malaysian government for radioactive waste that it produces as part of its enrichment process. Lynas has said that the low-levels of radioactive waste were not dangerous and the Malaysian government ultimately and for a permanent disposal and waste treatment facility in August 2020.