2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Turkey
Bechev ‘22 - nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also a research fellow at the Center of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the director of the European Policy Institute, a think-tank based in Sofia, Bulgaria (Dimitar, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, “A rival or an awkward partner? Turkey’s relationship with the West in the Balkans”, January 26, 2022, )//RG
Despite the considerable degree of divergence, Ankara acts in parallel but not necessarily against the EU and the United States. In the grand scheme of things, Turkey is tightly connected to the European economy, a fact highlighted by the ongoing recession, which puts at risk EU investors too. Turkish trade with EU members Romania, Greece and Bulgaria is by far more significant than with the Western Balkans, though Serbia is picking up too. On the security side, Turkey pursues a policy independently of NATO and has deepened ties to Russia. Yet, it remains part of the Alliance and contributes to its initiatives, including those aimed to deter Moscow. When it comes to the Balkans, Turkey has no alternative to offer to local countries to woo them away from Euro- Atlantic institutions. Its resources are limited, too, in comparison with the collective West. What is also important is that Balkan elites do not necessarily see a trade-off between ties to Western organizations and to Turkey. That is clearly visible in the policy of non-aligned Serbia, which has also been courting Russia, China and the Gulf while negotiating its membership in the EU. But it is also the case of Bulgaria which has emerged as a leading advocate of engagement with Turkey within the Union. The only country in Southeast Europe which has deep-seated concerns and fears about Turkish expansionism is Greece, which has long-standing territorial disputes with its neighbour only made worse by the looming conflict over offshore gas deposits in the proximity of Cyprus. But Greek policymakers have demonstrated the capacity to be flexible and deescalate tensions (Christofis in this issue). Turkey is embedded in the politics, economies and societies of the Balkans. It is an autonomous player, and the cult of Erdoğan has become central to its presence in the region, often with divisive effects. However, there is no evidence that its actions or policies are geared at replacing the West as the lynchpin of regional order. Rather, Turkey is pursuing a parallel policy, which at times overlaps with that of the EU, US and NATO.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Turkey
Beyoghlow ‘20 – adjunct professor of international security at the George Washington University’s Elliot School of International Affairs, where he teaches courses on Turkish politics and foreign policy (Kamal, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, “TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES ON THE BRINK: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO AND THE US-TURKISH STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PARTNERSHIP”, January 2020, )//RG
While the current standoff between Turkey and the United States appears to be moving from bad to worse, it has yet to reach a breaking point or a point of no return. Although tensions and policy differences continue to plague US-Turkish relations, efforts by well-meaning policymakers within the US government and Turkey’s civilian and military establishment point to perhaps better days to come, given the resilience and endurance of the ties that bind the two nations together. The US perspective on Turkey could be traced to many factors, starting with the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to allow US forces to transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq in 2003 and the slow Turkish support for the US-led coalition against ISIS. Turkey is also being put on notice by the United States for feuding against other NATO allies—namely, Germany, the Netherlands, Cyprus, France, and Greece. In the last case, tensions have been brewing in recent months over new border disputes in the Aegean and the refusal of Greece to extradite a group of Turkish officers allegedly involved in the failed coup. Although resolving the Cyprus issue remains high on the US agenda, tensions between Turkey and Cyprus over oil and gas exploration rights and access off the coast of Cyprus are forcing the United States and the European Union to side with Cyprus and even entertain sending US naval ships to protect Cypriot gas and oil tracks at sea. Despite these and other policy differences over Syria and other domestic problems facing Turkey, both sides seem reluctant to cause irreparable damage to their alliance. The United States, which has traditional ties with Turkey, does not want a military confrontation with the country over Syria. The most hopeful sign of addressing some of the protracted problems currently facing US-Turkish relations stems from the fact that Turkey is still seen by the United States as important to America’s national security interests, especially given Turkey’s geostrategic location and cultural familiarity with its volatile neighbors. Turkey is currently self-absorbed with its ambitions and Muslim neo-Ottoman nationalist revivalism, but its unique ballot-box democracy, albeit imperfect by Western standards, will work toward increasing harmonization toward the United States and its NATO allies in the long run. This can only happen through a sustained strategic dialogue. The idea is to keep Turkey and the United States engaged while trying to find solutions to the issues that separate them, because once the current tactical posturing is stripped away, the strategic alliance becomes more visible. There is indeed current evidence for better US-NATO-Turkish cross-cultural communication techniques to manage and resolve outstanding policy and strategic differences. In short, Turkey is not yet lost, but there are challenges facing America and its NATO partners in how to bridge the growing gap between them and Turkey. This challenge touches on a fundamental question: What kind of strategic relation- ship do the United States, NATO, and Turkey want or desire? Clearly, they are at a policy and strategic cross- road. The answer lies in the need for the United States to craft a new strategy toward Turkey and vice versa that takes into account the new realities of Turkish, NATO, and American domestic political dynamics, their changing nature and character, as well as Tur- key’s quest for regional influence and ambitions and its goal of becoming a great regional power. Turkey, NATO, and the United States share Western values, and these values, although not equal for all partners, are keys to better multicultural harmony if applied properly across the board.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Turkey
Got ‘20 – Author based in Europe and works on security and defense issues (Antoine, War on the Rocks, “TURKEY’S CRISIS WITH THE WEST: HOW A NEW LOW IN RELATIONS RISKS PARALYZING NATO”, November 19, 2020, )//RG
Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion. A Constructive Role for NATO As Turkey and the European Union ramp up their rhetorical joust, it is perhaps no surprise that NATO is better placed to act as a forum for the de-escalation of the crisis. It is indeed Turkey’s membership to NATO, and the daily staff-to-staff contacts which it generates, that makes the alliance able to work as a platform where their diplomats can negotiate, exchange information, and address issues of common strategic interest with European counterparts, thus helping to undermine the “us-versus-them” mentality which at times prevails across E.U. institutions. As the latter hardens its rhetoric, NATO can generate the much-needed safety valve where diplomatic efforts have a chance of succeeding. To this end, the alliance should capitalize on the consultative function of its institutions to allow for parties to sit together, express their views and concerns on national and collective security considerations, and improve mechanisms to reach a consensus on the means to address any perceived challenges. Consultations have indeed always been at the core of the alliance, and remain important vectors for addressing intermember disagreements. The recent announcement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg that a military de-confliction mechanism would be established between Greece and Turkey is but one example of the productive results that such diplomatic efforts can yield, and an encouraging sign that the two sides are not willing to see their relations deteriorate further. Yet a limited arrangement between Greece and Turkey is also unlikely to address the deep-seated causes of the political turmoil between Ankara and European allies, and NATO should find new and improved ways to act as a forum to discuss, and to act, where necessary, on issues affecting the security interests of its member states. This is key if the organization wants to remain flexible and relevant in the increasingly contested and fast-paced security environment of today.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Threat Perception
Cafiero ‘22 - CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project (Giorgio, Politics Today, “The Russian Threat Gives NATO New Purpose”, )//RG
It was not long ago when NATO’s divisions were running deep. Until recently, many in the West were questioning the security alliance’s purpose. As a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump said that if Baltic states weren’t “paying their bills” the U.S. shouldn’t necessarily protect them from Russia notwithstanding treaty obligations. In 2019, French President Emanuele Macron asserted that NATO was “becoming brain-dead”. The following year, tensions between Greece and Turkey led some experts to conclude that NATO was “paralyzed”. At that time, 70 percent of Turkey’s population saw the U.S., NATO’s dominant military force, as a threat to their country. Many voices in the West accused Germany of being a “shaky alliance partner” and “NATO’s biggest freeloader.” But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February was a geopolitical tsunami that fundamentally changed the strategic stakes for NATO members. Amid drastic changes in Europe’s security architecture, the Western alliance has regained a sense of purpose. Today NATO is more unified and cohesive than it ever has been since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. “Threat is the glue that binds together a security alliance,” explained John Feffer, the director of Foreign Policy In Focus, in an interview with Politics Today. “When the threat increases–and there is a consensus on the nature of the threat–the alliance necessarily becomes more cohesive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has served to smooth over a number of disagreements within the alliance.” The Ankara-based Foreign Policy Institute’s Dr Tarik Oguzlu wrote that “as we witness NATO’s European members awaking from their geopolitical hibernation, NATO is almost returning to its founding mission.” The war in Ukraine quickly led to a “revolution in German military affairs” with Berlin now committed to a hike in defense spending. The Germans put Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold. Berlin is also arming the Ukrainian resistance with lethal weapons despite previously opposing NATO’s militarization of Ukraine. For decades, a handful of Western countries accused Italy of being too Russia-friendly. But for the past two months, Italy has taken a strong stance against Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Now closely aligned with the Transatlantic alliance against Moscow, Rome has supported sanctioning Russia. As Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi put it, Italy responded to the President of Ukraine’s appeal for weapons because “it’s not possible to respond only with encouragement” when a democratic country comes under attack. Talk in western capitals about kicking Turkey out of NATO has basically come to a sudden end. There has been somewhat of a rebound in Ankara-Washington relations as Turkey arms Kiev with Baykar TB2 drones. Based on shared concerns about Moscow’s conduct in Ukraine, Greece and Turkey have found common cause since 24 February. NATO’s Baltic members have long been far more alarmist about the Russian threat than those in Western Europe. But such East-West divisions within NATO are going away. “Western politicians are now saying to us, you were right,” Arvydas Anušauskas, Lithuania’s Minister of National Defence, told Al Jazeera. Since 24 February, NATO members “have rallied together and acted quickly with new defence and deterrence measures such as activating the NATO defence plans, activating elements of the NATO Response Force, and approving the deployment of four new multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe,” Mihai Chihaia, a policy analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre, told Politics Today. “Reinforcing the Eastern flank has been a top priority and the Allies have shown a very high degree of solidarity. In addition, the strong commitment to Article 5 (mutual defense) has been constantly reiterated.” Expanding the Alliance NATO is not only becoming more unified because of a growing common threat perception of Russia. The security alliance might be on the verge of expanding its membership. Sweden and Finland appear close to abandoning their decades-old foreign policy tradition of neutrality and entering NATO. Finland doing so would add 810 miles to the border between Russia and NATO members. “If Sweden and Finland join, NATO’s presence and coordination in the Baltic Sea area, as well as more broadly in the Nordic and Arctic, will be strengthened, together with NATO’s defense and deterrence posture,” said Chihaia. “Their armed forces would be an asset to the alliance as both Sweden and Finland have been close partners for years, they have invested in modernizing their armed forces, and there is a high degree of interoperability and adherence to NATO standards.” This deeply alarms Moscow, which has been warning Stockholm and Helsinki about political and military consequences. “Russia has threatened to place nuclear weapons in its Kaliningrad enclave if Finland or Sweden join,” explained Feffer. “[Russia] has threatened to increase its military presence in the Baltic region to deal with NATO’s extended border with Russia if Finland joins. But I’m not sure that the security architecture will change that much. Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, but they have coordinated with the security alliance for some time. Russia, meanwhile, has reportedly already placed nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad (according to the Lithuanian government). But it does mean that the space for neutrality in Europe is shrinking,” Feffer added. The Orban and Le Pen Factors There are some limits to NATO’s unity, which brings us to Hungary. With Prime Minister Viktor Orban at the helm, Hungary is the Western alliance’s most Russia-friendly member. In the past, he has hailed Russia as a model for his “illiberal” country. Although Budapest did not veto EU sanctions on Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, Orban has vowed to block EU sanctions on oil and gas from Russia. The Hungarian leader has also opposed demands to halt the expansion of the Rosatom-financed Paks Nuclear Plant. As the leadership in Budapest sees it, Hungarian citizens should not be burdened by costlier bills because of energy sanctions against Russia. “Hungary is the problem child of Europe because of the ties [that Russia maintains with] the Orban government. As long as [Orban] is there, Budapest will be a problem,” Dr Theodore Karasik, the former Senior Political Scientist in the International Policy and Security Group at RAND Corporation, told Politics Today. Nonetheless, Budapest is not defending Russia’s violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. “It’s important to note that Orban is not siding with Russia here,” as Feffer pointed out. “He has condemned the invasion.” Orban believes that he has the diplomatic abilities to navigate good relations with Moscow. Yet escalating tensions between Hungary’s fellow NATO members and Russia is testing Orban’s doctrine of “strategic calmness” vis-à-vis the Kremlin. Depending on how the Russian-Ukrainian war pans out, Hungary could find itself increasingly isolated within Europe. There is also the question of what happens to NATO if Marine Le Pen wins the second-round runoff in France’s presidential elections. Her victory would constitute a major blow to the Western alliance, especially mindful of the fact that Le Pen has signaled her support for France leaving NATO’s integrated military command as well as a strategic rapprochement between the West and Moscow. Although this year Le Pen has condemned Russia’s violations of Ukraine’s territorial dignity, Feffer described her as “one of Putin’s greatest cheerleaders in Western Europe” who “would likely push to water down sanctions and reduce EU military support for Ukraine” if she defeats Macron. “Le Pen is Russia’s ace in the hole and [she] needs to be watched and understood very carefully” considering how her “connections to Moscow can stymie NATO policy actions by acting as a major distraction,” explained Dr Karasik. According to Chihaia, “if Le Pen wins, EU defense initiatives will be negatively impacted and there will be significant difficulties to move forward.” He emphasized that her victory could have major ramifications for Paris-Berlin relations. “The Franco-German joint defense projects might be stopped. The Franco-German ‘engine’ for developing European defense, essential in moving forward with strengthening European defense capabilities and structures, risks to be halted.” Boxing in the Bear Regardless of how Hungary and possibly France will serve to undermine NATO unity, there is no denying that drastic shifts have taken place within the security alliance since 24 February. NATO finds itself with a renewed purpose. This bodes negatively for Russia. Having viewed NATO’s eastward expansion as a growing threat, Moscow must contend with how conditions in Ukraine are tightening the Transatlantic alliance in truly remarkable ways which were difficult to imagine only a few months ago. Putin’s government is in no position to easily or quickly reverse this move toward much deeper coordination and solidarity among NATO’s members. In Dr Karasik’s words, “the mistakes by the Russians and the emergence of the Z campaign are helping to unite NATO in a way that’s going to box in Russia for decades.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Say “No” General
Shapiro ’19 — Daniel; former Ambassador of the United States of America to the State of Israel, previously was the senior director for the Middle East and North Africa on the United States National Security Council. Winter 2019; “Saving NATO”; Democracy Journal, Number 51; ; //CYang
American officials tend to play down the notion, but one can scarcely dispute that NATO is a U.S.-dominated construct. While unanimity within the alliance is required for major decisions, the United States has maintained a preeminence in alliance policies, as other members, even if at times fitfully, sublimated their national policies to American views. Tens of thousands of U.S. forces at bases across Europe have facilitated the projection of American power on the other side of the world in ways that would be unimaginable otherwise.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Say “No” General
Calmels ’20 — Christelle; PhD Student at Sciences Po’s Centre for International Studies. and Associate PhD Student at the Institute of Strategic Research of the Military School. July 22, 2020; “NATO’s 360-Degree Approach to Security: Alliance Cohesion and Adaptation After the Crimean Crisis”; European Security, Volume 29, Issue 4; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang
To answer this question, this article relies on the socio-psychologically rooted alliance cohesion literature (Liska 1962, Holsti et al. 1973, Stein 1976, Thompson and Rapkin 1981, Kupchan 1988, McCalla 1996, Weitsman 2003, 2004, Malici 2005, Kim 2008, Park and Moon 2014). According to Patricia Weitsman, cohesion is “the ability of states to agree on goals and strategies toward attaining those goals” (2003, p. 85). Following this definition, cohesion manifests itself through cooperative behaviour such as consultations, mutual concessions, and responsiveness towards each other’s needs generating collective gains.1 If that behaviour is typical and even expected within an alliance, the proponents of cohesion theory point out that conflicting strategic interests and threat perceptions may be detrimental to group cohesion (Liska 1962, pp. 97–129, Holsti et al. 1973, p. 17, Thompson and Rapkin 1981, p. 615, Malici 2005, p. 93). This article responds to their argument by hypothesising that consensus-based bargaining within the Atlantic Alliance allows for the bridging of divergent threat perceptions among allies and fosters a shared understanding of their respective issues. According to this hypothesis, the birth of the 360- degree concept and its implementation shall then embody this spirit of compromise. We further hypothesise that it is rendered possible by the very nature of NATO. Scholars no longer dispute the fact that NATO is a pluralist security community (Pouliot and Lachmann 2004). It means that it is composed of independent governments sharing “core values derived from common institutions, and mutual responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and loyalty, a sense of ‘we-ness,’” and determined to resolve their disputes peacefully (Adler and Barnett 1998, p. 7). NATO allies are then incentivised to talk and cooperate not only because of the consensus rule but also because they form an institutionalised “community of values” concerned by regional order (Risse-Kappen 1997, Park and Moon 2014).
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Opposition
Westfall & Tsui ‘6-22 — Sammy Westfall; Yale University, BA in history and political science. She is an assistant editor on The Washington Post's Foreign desk. Karina Tsui; New York University, BA; Columbia Journalism School, MS in Investigative Journalism. She is a reporting intern on The Washington Post’s Foreign desk. June 22, 2022; “Pew poll: Global views on NATO and U.S. rise; for Russia, a decline”; Washington Post; ; //CYang
In a time of crisis, the international image of the United States, NATO and Russia has shifted — with views on Russia plunging and views of the United States and NATO remaining positive, even increasing, a Pew study of 18 nations found.
In Poland, the shifts have been dramatic. Views on the United States, European Union and NATO have reached all-time highs — each hovering around 90 percent — since the question was first asked in 2007. And views on Russia dropped from one-third of Poles sharing a favorable view in 2019 to a measly 2 percent in 2022.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT No Cohesion
Boot 5-17 (Max, University of California at Berkeley, BA in history; Yale University, MA in history. Max Boot is a historian, best-selling author and foreign-policy analyst. “Thanks, Vladimir Putin, for greatly strengthening NATO”, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/05/17/thanks-vladimir-putin-nato-stronger-than-ever-sweden-finland-russia-ukraine/)
It turns out NATO is neither brain dead nor broken. The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine has given the alliance a new lease on life, making it more politically united and militarily formidable than at any time since the end of the Cold War. NATO stands as one against Russian barbarism in Ukraine. Even Germany is boosting its anemic defense spending and finally sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine. Other states are doing far more, with the United States, Poland, Canada and Britain leading the way in providing arms and ammunition. NATO is doubling the number of battalion-size “battlegroups” deployed to the front-line states of Eastern Europe, from four to eight, while the United States has increased its troop deployment in Europe from 80,000 to 100,000 personnel. With Sweden and Finland as members, NATO will hit the strategic jackpot. Admitting them to NATO isn’t an act of charity. They are formidable military powers in their own right that can substantially contribute to deterring further Russian aggression. NATO should continue to bolster front-line states with permanent, rather than rotational, troop deployments. The Baltic republics are particularly vulnerable because they are adjacent to Russia and have their own populations of Russian speakers, whose presence gives Putin a built-in excuse for aggression.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT No Cohesion
Also critical of anti NATO sc authors
Risso 21 (Linda, Senior Researcher at the Centre for Army Leadership, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Before joining the Ministry of Defence, Linda worked as a historian at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium. “A Forgotten Success”Linda Risso (2021) A Forgotten Success, The RUSI Journal, 166:6-7, 96-105, DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2022.2072764)LR
In August 2001, Operation Essential Harvest contributed significantly to the de-escalation of ethnic tensions in North Macedonia and prevented another conflict in the Western Balkans. Scholars have neglected to mention the operation in their analysis of NATO history.3 Security experts often forget about it even when the focus of their work is the evaluation of NATO’s crisis management capabilities.4 As argued elsewhere, this is mostly due to the traditional crisis-driven approach to NATO history where the attention of scholars keeps focusing on the same ‘turning points’ or ‘moments of crisis’ rather than on the long-term development of the Alliance.5 The first signs of increased ethnic tensions emerged in January 2001 in the town of Tearce, in the northwest of the country.9 In March 2001, fighting broke out along the North Macedonia–Kosovo border near the village of Tanuševci and it grew into a full-blown insurgency carried out by a previously unknown Albanian guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (NLA) led by Ali Ahmeti. The NLA soon controlled the area around Tetovo, North Macedonia’s second city. Ahmeti had fought in the Kosovo Liberation Army against Slobodan Milošević and was applying the same military strategies and tactics to the fight against North Macedonia’s security forces.10 Two attempts to solve the crisis failed in rapid succession: one by the OSCE’s envoy, US Ambassador Bob Frowick; and one by North Macedonia’s President Boris Trajkovski. Frowick brokered a negotiation agreement that officially included the NLA as one of the interlocutors and which was therefore received as a betrayal and rejected by the political parties in Skopje.13 On 14 June, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Javier Solana travelled to Skopje to support efforts for a political solution to the conflict. A couple of weeks later, Solana appointed François Léotard as the EU envoy to Skopje.15 Léotard worked with US Ambassador James W Pardew, who had been sent to North Macedonia by President George W Bush.16 NATO also sent a team led by Pieter Feith, a Dutch diplomat who was the head of the NATO Balkan Task Force. Feith was Lord Robertson’s personal representative and liaised with Mark Laity, who had also been sent by Robertson to work as Trajkovski’s special adviser.17 Lord Robertson used ‘personal representatives’ to avoid the formal involvement of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). At the time, opinion within the NAC was divided and several member countries were wary of further involvement in the Balkans as public opinion was critical of NATO’s involvement in Kosovo. The appointment of envoys as the Secretary General’s personal representatives did not require a vote, which was both faster and diplomatically convenient.18 Feeble as it might have been, the ceasefire opened a space for diplomatic talks. The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed on 13 August 2001 at the presidential holiday retreat near Lake Ohrid.31 According to the Agreement, the cessation of hostilities would be followed by the voluntary disarmament and disbandment of the NLA. It established a pathway for government devolution and the reform of minority political and cultural rights, which would require specific constitutional amendments (Annex A) and legislative modifications (Annex B). The Agreement included changes to how the country’s official languages were to be recognised: any language spoken by more than 20% of the population would become a co-official language along with the Macedonian language at the municipal level. At that point – and to this day – only the Albanian language, with approximately 25% of speakers, qualified as a co-official language. These provisions laid the basis for the inclusion of the Albanian minority in North Macedonia’s political and civil life and mapped a pathway to reform.32 Operation Essential Harvest was officially launched on 22 August 2001. Around 3,800 NATO troops were deployed.45 In their interviews, both White-Spunner, Chip Chapman (CO, 2 PARA) and Andrew Budd (military planner at SHAPE) stressed the role of special forces for liaison and intelligence purposes. 22 SAS, along with selected individuals from other allied countries, were sent to join TFH. Their task was to liaise with the Albanian rebels of Ali Ahmeti and to gather intelligence while at the same time building trust. The special forces reassured the NLA that it was NATO that was collecting the weapons and that it would proceed to destroy them as North Macedonia’s security forces were not involved in the operation.46 Operation Essential Harvest accomplished its mission within schedule and it officially concluded on 26 September 2001. NATO troops collected around 3,785 weapons over 30 days. This included 3,210 assault rifles, 483 machineguns, 161 support weapons such as mortars and anti-tank weapons, 17 air-defence systems, two tanks and two armoured personnel carriers. In addition, 397,625 items of mines, explosives and ammunition were collected.48 In one of the last press conferences, General Lange stressed that despite the lack of certainty about whether the NLA held more, ‘the turning in of 3,300 weapons is not just a gesture, it is a very real and substantial effort to remove the combat effectiveness of the so-call [sic.] NLA fighters’.49
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT No Cohesion
Gottemoeller ‘22 - nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution (Rose, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The Spectacular Rise of the “Bad Boys” of NATO During the Ukraine Crisis”, March 22, 2022, )//RG
I’ve been watching with amazement how Turkey, as one of the bad boys of NATO, has been playing these positive roles in this current invasion—not only providing the drones but also trying to facilitate some diplomacy. The Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers met [recently] in Turkey. It’s much different from when I was NATO deputy secretary general and Turkey had just bought the S-400 [missile defense system from Russia]. The United States and NATO were cutting Turkey out of the F-35 program as a result, and they seemed to be much in some senses closer to Moscow at that point than to NATO headquarters—at least that’s what a lot of people thought. Now it all seems to be healing. The United States apparently has offered Turkey upgraded F-16s in return for the better behavior. It’s no longer the bad boy it was, and we’ll see where it goes from here. I’ll end by noting that all the bad boys of NATO—Poland, Hungary, and Turkey—have been performing spectacularly in this horrible crisis. Hungary itself had terrible differences with Ukraine over the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, which again was the top issue for Hungary and Ukraine while I was at NATO. But all is forgiven now it seems.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Information Sharing Fails
***Federated Mission Network (FMN)
Hanna et al 17 (Michael Hanna – BA cum laude in International/Global Studies @University of Central Florida, MA in Security Policy Studies @ The George Washington University, Assistant Squad Leader; InstructorAssistant Squad Leader; Instructor United States Marine Corps, Researcher, Center for Technology and National Security PolicyResearcher, Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University, DoS -, David Granzow-military, Bjorn Bolte, and Andrew Alvarado. “David Granzow” )LR
Current global conflict trends are pulling NATO away from its traditional collective defense mission into stability and reconstruction (S&R) operations with greater frequency. S&R environments require NATO to collaborate with and support host nation governments, international organizations, and a range of non-governmental organizations to address security, political, and social challenges. However, NATO encounters difficulty with collecting and sharing intelligence and information in these environments. This inability to communicate compounds the already complex issues faced by all entities involved. This article identifies three policy options to help NATO improve its support to S&R operations by enhancing information-sharing mechanisms within NATO and with non-NATO stakeholders. These options are: 1) the completion of the Federated Mission Network that seeks to aggregate classified and unclassified information in a regulated virtual space; 2) the indoctrination of a Joint Information Fusion Cell to act as a physical clearinghouse for information; and 3) the development of Regional Coordination Centers and Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams to implement individual S&R projects. A packaged, distributable network that can be used simultaneously by NATO and its partners to share classified intelligence, and by IOs, NGOs, and NATO actors to share unclassified information in a common, minimally regulated space. NATO established the Afghan Mission Network (AMN) in 2010. It provided a federated, classified network that allowed all NATO member states contributing forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission to exchange data and intelligence. Certain non-NATO states were then read on to the AMN using bilateral security agreements. However, ISAF partners continued to struggle with sharing information with non-NATO actors providing much-needed services in Afghanistan. Efforts to use unclassified interfaces, including the All Partners Access Network (APAN), Civil-Military Fusion Center (CFC), Protected Information Exchange (PIX), and RONNA-HarmonieWeb, did not resolve recurring issues of structural obstacles or lack of buy-in.19 NATO has since endeavored to develop a hybrid network, known as the Federated Mission Network (FMN), to hold both classified and unclassified material on a single network.20 As the FMN is still under development, this paper will outline what functions and considerations should be taken into account for the final product: • A labeling scheme allowing registered users to submit information across the classification spectrum, and an access management scheme to limit information by clearance level • A layered archive and search function to store classified intelligence at the NATO Top Secret, NATO Secret, NATO unclassified, and open source levels, respectively • A user-generated, Wiki-type database for unclassified information, with an open edit function regulated by a NATO administration team21 • Chat functions across the classification spectrum to provide for direct communication between users • A fillable-forms portal allowing NATO and non-NATO entities to submit requests for information (RFIs) in both directions, and • A financial trust fund management function for tracking donations, pairing needs with resources using an open proposal scheme. The resulting network would take the form of a distributable, off-the-shelf product that NATO could deploy to areas of instability and be used by NATO and non-NATO entities simultaneously. Firstly, the FMN brings multiple actors onto a common network and provides different levels of access to vetted users. Through the RFI function, the FMN provides an open line of communication, albeit indirectly, for requesting specific information from NATO and vice-versa. Admittedly, not all requests will be approved, especially when the sources and methods used to obtain the information requested are particularly sensitive. Further, the Wiki function establishes a one-stop clearinghouse for open-source and unclassified information, opening new channels for information exchange. Secondly, the donations management function, modeled after the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, will improve the efficiency of resource allocation and will limit cases of fraud.22 This mechanism holds all registered monetary donations in a common account managed by the overarching political lead in a S&R context, be it the host nation government, a UN support mission, or another entity. Because all entities supporting the overall S&R operation will have access to the information contained in this element, the opportunity for graft, embezzlement, and misallocation is greatly reduced. The Request for Proposal (RFP) function allows local and foreign actors to post needs, ranging from reconstruction projects to training seminars, and for NGOs to compete for resource awards designed to fulfill specific, widely identified needs. Finally, by developing a packaged, distributable network, NATO will be able to deploy the FMN alongside the initial contingent of NATO personnel sent to a S&R environment. From the first day of an operation, the FMN can be installed, activated, and have all dysfunctional elements worked out as the full scope of the mission is being developed. The FMN can be set up in multiple locations at once, using dedicated communications systems to manage operations separately. In this way, NATO can support multiple S&R, disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and other operations simultaneously.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Credibility Low
last line — credibility irrelevant for allied decision-making — if relevant — green
Walt ’22 — Stephen; a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. January 29, 2022; “America Has an Unhealthy Obsession With Credibility”; Foreign Policy; ; //CYang
This rather self-centered view of world affairs conveniently ignores those episodes where it was the United States that acted to disrupt “international peace and stability,” but never mind that for now. If the credibility of U.S. promises is the key to world peace, one wonders why the world didn’t come unglued after the United States lost in Vietnam, after North Korea got away with seizing the USS Pueblo and holding its crew prisoner for almost a year, after the Shah of Iran fell and the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was captured, after the Reagan administration’s hasty withdrawal from Lebanon in 1984, after the Black Hawk Down debacle in Somalia, or after former U.S. President Bill Clinton opted not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide. Maybe U.S. credibility is neither as fragile nor as essential as hard-liners think.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac Catch-All
change what is highlighted in green for what the aff does
Skaluba & Rodihan ’22 — Christopher Skaluba is the director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served as principal director for European and NATO policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Conor Rodihan is the associate director in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Transatlantic Security Initiative. January 18, 2022; "No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective."; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/no-consensus-no-problem-why-nato-is-still-effective/; //CYang
[TITLE]: “No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective”
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Burden-Sharing Disputes
Koivula ‘21 – Assistant professor at the Department of Warfare, the Finnish National Defence University (Tommi, Defense & Security Analysis, 37:2, 145-163, “Carry that weight: assessing continuity and change in NATO’s burden-sharing disputes”, May 12, 2021, )//RG
The “arrow” of this course of developments suggests that the scope and diversity of NATO burden-sharing disputes is growing and likely to grow further in the near future. In effect, the burden-sharing discourse is in the process of spilling over from its traditional domains. In terms of forecasting, this course of development suggests that this expansion will take at least three forms in the next few years: First, domestic politics within members seem to count more and more in the development of burden-sharing disputes. This dimension is not new, as the age-old guns vs butter predicament has always loomed large among NATO members, and as the US Congress has often been the venue for such arguments. Still, in most NATO countries, questions of security policy have traditionally been left outside of day-to-day domestic political quibbles. However, the advent of the rise of populism, non-liberal political forces in several NATO countries, and the overall increasingly transactional approach to international relations, are likely to shape the domestic willingness in several member countries to engage in multi- lateral security co-operation. Second, whilst the “classical” debate on military expenditure is likely to remain, or even dominate NATO agenda, the transatlantic discourse on burden-sharing is increasingly likely to cover non-military domains such as comprehensive security, resilience, security co-operation, and diplomacy. Instead of closed-door interstate bargaining, the political space of NATO seems to be more and more dominated by a bidding race both on NATO and domestic fora of what is one’s contribution to common good. Third, burden-sharing disputes are likely to extend beyond the level of NATO itself as partner countries are also likely to be dragged into these disputes and into the discourse of burden-sharing. Be it defence co-operation, joint exercises, or participation in peace operations, partners are likely to face an environment emphasising demands of good partner- ship, reputational resources, constructive approach, and other forms of contribution from the involved countries. These developments notwithstanding, the intensity of burden-sharing disputes is not likely to endanger the existence of the Alliance. During its 70 years’ existence, NATO has proved its ability to withstand internal strains. Even though many contributions, such as Richter and Driver have regarded unequal burden-sharing as a threat for NATO60; and this article started by noting the inherent dangers caused by burden-sharing disputes, the overall picture seems to be more multi-dimensional. After all, in many respects the Alliance indeed faces change and progress though argument. Debate may be one of NATO’s defining characteristics. It may also be necessary in order to define and redefine its strategic purpose. In this regard, disputes related to burden-sharing can also be seen as a manifestation of the Alliance’s ability to withstand and accommodate internal disagreement, sometimes for protracted periods of time.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Burden-Sharing Disputes
Koivula and Ossa ‘22 - Tommi Koivula (Ph.D.) works as professor of strategic and defense studies at the Finnish National Defence University; Heljä Ossa is a researcher and doctoral student at the Department of Warfare in the Finnish National Defence University (Palgrave Macmillan, “NATO’s Burden-Sharing Disputes”, )//RG
NATO’s ability to incorporate a large number of member countries and to broaden the agenda according to the current security context are some of the Alliance’s most significant advantages and strengths. On the other side of the coin there is, however, the risk of over-expansion of membership and tasks. The growing and diversifying membership along with the ever-growing task list are closely linked to the burden-sharing debate as the Alliance needs to allocate scarce resources to accommodate the needs of more allies and to manage tasks that range from territo- rial defence to human emergencies, such as the Covid-19 pandemic. The ultimate issue is thus not that the allies’ contributions are imbalanced but that the amount of demands for NATO is growing. It is possible, even likely, that the burden-sharing debate will intensify in the future. It is, however, important not to look at the burden-sharing debate from too narrow a perspective, which might lead us into the conclusion that the debate endangers the existence of the whole Alliance. As we have pointed out, burden-sharing should not be considered as a separate discussion but as an economic, political and social phenomenon that is formed of a complex set of interlinked factors. Considering this and the reasons behind organisational termination and survival, it is premature to claim that burden-sharing disputes alone could lead to NATO’s crumbling. The debate is closely linked to other problems, such as trust issues among allies and diverse threat perceptions, which can severely damage NATO’s ability to survive future crisis. On the other hand, NATO’s strengths discussed above balance these weaknesses and speak against the possibility of termination of NATO even when facing severe crisis.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT No Cred – Afghanistan
Walt ’21 — Stephen; a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. August 21, 2021; "Afghanistan Hasn’t Damaged U.S. Credibility"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/21/afghanistan-hasnt-damaged-u-s-credibility/; //CYang & sg <33
Stephens is probably beyond redemption at this point, and the Global Times is a propaganda rag whose views should be discounted, but everyone else needs to take a deep breath and relax. In fact, there are ample reasons to believe that the tragic outcome in Afghanistan will not affect U.S. credibility very much and maybe not at all.
The first reason is simple logic. Deciding not to continue a futile war for less-than-vital interests tells you absolutely nothing about whether a great power would fight if more serious interests were at stake. No one would conclude that withdrawing from Afghanistan after 20 years, 2,500 Americans dead, and more than $1 trillion spent implies that the United States would not fight fiercely to defend Alaska, Hawaii, or Florida. Nor should any serious person conclude the United States would not fight to prevent China from establishing hegemony in Asia or to thwart a (highly unlikely) Russian assault on NATO. The reason is simple: In each of these instances, we are talking about vital interests that could affect U.S. security in profoundly significant ways.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Security Cooperation › 2ac at coop fails – privacy
Xirui Li 22 - pursuing doctoral studies at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore. She is also a non-resident research fellow at the Intellisia Institute in Guangzhou, China. (“BEHIND THE US CONCESSIONS TO THE EU ON TRANSATLANTIC DATA TRANSFERS,” AsiaGlobal Online, 04/13/2022, ) PJW
While the US and European Union announced agreement in principle on a new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework, the fundamental differences between the approaches of the two sides to data governance remain, writes Li Xirui of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
During US President Joe Biden’s March visit to Europe, the European Commission and the United States announced that they had agreed in principle on a new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework (TADPF). It is a breakthrough between the two parties on data transfers after the Privacy Shield was invalidated by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in 2020 due to concerns about the shortcomings in US laws that impede the protection of personal data and are in conflict with Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
2022
Michigan
Negative
Mechanics › AT Plan Says “SC”
Fenell 11, Captain, US Marine Corps, MA in International Studies @ U San-Fran (Nathan, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined,”
Words have meaning and the unique ideas that are transmitted through the use of military vocabulary demand that the author and the orator communicate with specificity and clarity. In the case of security cooperation, my research indicates that military professionals, government officials, and academics appear to be equally guilty of failing to limit their use of the term to its correct context. Most egregiously, the term is being improperly used as an important element that describes the United States exit strategy from Afghanistan.21 An example of the recent comments made by the Secretary of State as she described the current state of affairs in Washington, D.C. and Afghanistan, that the State Department convened an interagency team, including DOD, USAID, and the NSC and held discussions that resulted in an agreement that included strong commitments on economic/social development, democratic institution-building, human rights, anticorruption, and other important long-term reforms. Mrs. Secretary follows up on this statement by saying; “Ambassador Crocker and General Allen are still working through some of the security cooperation issues with President Karzai”.22 To place these comments into context, the Honorable Mrs. Clinton was incorrectly describing the peace process in Afghanistan and the withdraw of U.S. forces as security cooperation.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Mechanics › AT Plan Says “SC”
Fenell 11, Captain, US Marine Corps, MA in International Studies @ U San-Fran (Nathan, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined,” https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1020&context=thes)//BB
A lack of foreign policy that properly defines a strategy of security cooperation has led to its inappropriate use. If SC is going to achieve any measure of substantial success the practitioners of foreign policy at all levels must clearly and precisely articulate the policy that would lead to the proper use of SC as a strategy. Author Colin Gray illustrates the point that strategy and policy are not synonyms in one of his monographs. Strategy and policy are not synonymous. However, a sustainable strategy can serve only a sustainable policy. If the latter oscillates, the former becomes impractical. This monograph targets primarily the national, or grand, strategic level of analysis, but it cannot ignore the challenge of ascertaining and sustaining a coherent national security policy. Carelessly or for stylistic variety, many politicians, analysts, and commentators employ the terms policy and strategy interchangeably. This malpractice does not scar these pages. The distinction matters crucially and needs to be maintained rigorously. Policy sets goals, indeed may well change goals, while strategy is always instrumental. In the absence of a reasonably stable policy, strategy becomes literally meaningless; it must lack political direction.132
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › Soft Law › 1nc Fails Vague
Beard, 07 (Jack M Beard, 1-11-2007, "Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities," University of Nebraska - Lincoln, , LASA-CSK)
One important soft law design choice in constructing many international instruments is the decision to employ vague, imprecise, ambiguous or otherwise indeterminate language. Indeterminate language may be a satisfactory design feature for some areas of international cooperation, but it is a dangerous choice for arms control regimes. The requirements typically associated with arms control regimes are well known, and one is that they “must define cheating quite explicitly.”104 There are fundamental reasons for this requirement. A state contemplating foregoing the development and deployment of new weapon systems in favor of pursuing international cooperation will be reluctant to do so if adversary states are not part of a collaborative regime with a degree of formalization. Such a collaborative regime “must specify what constitutes cooperation and what constitutes cheating, and each actor must be assured of its ability to spot immediately others’ cheating.”105 The dilemma of common interests in this scenario, against the backdrop of perceived security threats, is often modeled in game theory as a prisoners’ dilemma in which each state actor’s dominant strategy is to cheat (even if all actors would actually prefer arms control or disarmament over a spiraling arms race).106 It is in this context that game theorists and other writers argue that the obligations in an arms control regime must be sufficiently precise to ensure that actors can recognize defection.107 Elaborate monitoring, policing and compliance verification structures in such a regime have little value without clear obligations and the ability to recognize cheating. Precision in individual commitments, as well as coherence between those commitments and broader legal principles, framed by “accepted modes of legal discourse and argument,” also assist by discouraging states from engaging in “auto-interpretation” and other opportunistic behavior regarding their obligations.108 The lack of precision in individual commitments, which gives rise to indeterminate normative standards, thus makes it harder for states to know what conformity is expected and also makes it easier for states to justify noncompliance.109 Conversely, the lack of precision may also result in uncertainty and tension as some states attempt to assert highly restrictive interpretations of ambiguous terms. To avoid these problems, especially in the area of arms control, a nation is likely to “seek to describe the performance expected of the other nation as clearly and precisely as possible in the agreement.”110 Thus, in pursuing major arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, the United States “opted for increasingly detailed agreements, on the ground that they reduce interpretative leeway.”