2022
Michigan
Counterplan
NEG › Res Good
Franke and Hofferberth 21 (Ulrich Franke and Matthias Hofferberth, *PhD in political science, **PhD, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Geography. 2021 ISA Annual Convention, "From Transatlantic Relations to World Order: Reconstructing Beliefs as Rules for Action", 4/6/2021, http://colfa.utsa.edu/polisci-geography/docs/Franke__Hofferberth_ISA_2021_final.pdf, accessed on 7/21/2022)//gideon
More specifically, past decades have produced a global power shift away from transatlantic relations as the product of Western, state-driven foreign policy in two respects. As to the first, whether or not one believes the assertion of the dissolution of the Soviet Union provided a unipolar moment for the United States in the early 1990s (Mearsheimer 2019, Ikenberry 2014), undoubtedly the most significant constituent and a sine qua non of any transatlantic relations, new powers have emerged in the meantime and affect these relations significantly. On a global level, in view of the massive increase in military spending, the People’s Republic of China is the first to be mentioned, but on a regional level, Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and, certainly in a different fashion but nevertheless relevant, the European Union, another important constituent part of the so-called West, have all expressed different perspectives on and visions of world order recently (Acharya 2017). Collectively, global power shifts in favor of non-Western states can certainly be considered a consensus within International Relations (IR). The same holds for the assumption that this is accompanied by a – relative – loss of importance of the West, specifically in light of President Trump’s disregard for multilateralism and the values of the liberal order as such. Second, power on the international scene understood as the capacity to have an impact on people’s lives whether they want it or not, is also shifted to and increasingly exerted by so-called non-state actors and within intergovernmental organizations (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). This includes advocacy groups claiming moral high grounds in global governance as well as multinational corporations, particularly to but not exclusively from the technology sector (Alphabet/Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft to name but a few). - 3 - Against this backdrop of a double power shift away from the West and away from states, we do not believe that the declining relative relevance of transatlantic relations as the internal relationship of the West diminishes its relevance as an object of IR research. Rather, assuming discursive importance as a reference object and as political practice, we assume actors in and of transatlantic relations respond to these challenges and thereby either reproduce or develop new aspects of said relations. For one thing, we do not assume a zero-sum approach to power. Under the condition of an understanding of power as the enforcement of rules, for instance, the relative loss of power of a political entity can go hand-in-hand with the entity striving to enforce a greater number of rules in absolute terms than before. What these rules-as-visions are about, then, remains important – regardless of the fact that others also (increasingly) have power and enforce (an even more growing number of) rules. Moreover, it can be observed that in case of positional differences between the governments of the U.S. on the one hand and (some) European states on the other hand, major crises and the end of transatlantic relations are always proclaimed very quickly (and alarmistically) – by politicians, journalists, but also by IR scholars. Crisis and catharsis, at least, seem to be recurrent narratives of transatlantic relations, often originating unreflectively within a hybrid discourse of practitioners and think tanks, often derived from the notion that a new U.S. president approaches transatlantic relations in a different light.1 The inherent presentism of think tank thinking and political practice aside, transatlantic relations are thus still a much-noticed object of public debate and consideration as they remain an issue quite affectively occupied and connected to normative assumptions, in the West as well as beyond. To examine transatlantic relations thus also seems promising from this point of view.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Digital Cyclops Aff › Debate Shapes Subjectivity
August 21 (Vincent August PhD - postdoctoral researcher in political and social theory at the Department of Social Sciences. He has been a visiting researcher at UC Berkeley, “Network concepts in social theory: Foucault and cybernetics”, European Journal of Social Theory, 17 February 2021, , MG)
Cyberneticians believed that this ‘old’ world view increasingly fails to grasp the growing complexity of the world. Therefore, they called for a new way of thinking, a ‘new world view’ (e.g. Ackoff, 1979, p. 96). The polemic call for a new mind-set that follows from the narrative of rising complexity survives in Foucault’s writings (e.g. Foucault, 1994, IV, p. 108) and in nowadays rhetoric of network theory and network governance (e.g. Eggers, 2008, p. 28; Raworth, 2017). To overcome the ‘old’, ‘insufficient’ models, early cybernetician W. Ross Ashby (1956, p. 1) already proclaimed a revolutionary shift towards an operational epistemology that disposes of the ontology inherent in humanism and mechanics by switching the attention from what to how and from essence to doing: ‘Cybernetics [ ... ] does not ask “what is this thing?” but “what does it do?”’ (original emphasis).
For developing this operational approach, cyberneticians invented a range of concepts that are abstract enough to deal with any assembly of elements and to model how these elements may connect to do something (Beer, 1959, 1967, pp. 9–10). Presenting ‘connectivity’ as the core idea of cybernetics, Stafford Beer once advanced five models of connectivity in a single paragraph – machines, systems, networks, diagram and electric circuits:
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Digital Cyclops Aff › AT: Framework
Weinstein and Kroker 94 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Michael Weinstein – Professor of Political Philsophy at Purdue University, “Data Trash: The Theory of the Virtual Class”, New World Perspectives, Pages 14-19, 15 September 1994, MG)
“Public policy” is what goes on to get the flesh to adjust to the Net. The greater project is beyond policy, transcendent to it-that is the project of wiring bodies to the Net. That everyone will be wired to the information-highway machine is an historical inevitability that puts politics in its place as a local clean-up activity around the Net. This is technotopianism in its purest and most cynical form. Compare it to that other computer entrepreneur, the retro-fascist Ross Perot, who uses the wealth he has gained from the information industry to finance his appeal to a nationalistic policy. The technotopian has no such leanings, but with vicious naivete depends on liberal-fascist allies in government to protect the Net. Gates has identified himself with Technology, the greater power, the one that will finally be decisive. Through the silent seduction of the operating-system.
The Virtual Class and Capitalism
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Digital Cyclops Aff › AT: Framework
Weinstein and Kroker 94 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Michael Weinstein – Professor of Political Philsophy at Purdue University, “Data Trash: The Theory of the Virtual Class”, New World Perspectives, Pages 6-8, 15 September 1994, MG)
The virtual class has driven to global power along the digital superhighway. Representing perfectly the expansionary interests of the recombinant commodity-form, the virtual class has seized the imagination of contemporary culture by conceiving a techno-utopian high-speed cybernetic grid for travelling across the electronic frontier. In this mythology of the new technological frontier, contemporary society is either equipped for fast travel down the main arterial lanes of the information highway, or it simply ceases to exist as a functioning member of technotopia. As the CEO’s and the specialist consultants of the virtual class triumphantly proclaim: “Adapt or you’re toast.”
We now live in the age of dead information, dead (electronic) space, and dead (cybernetic) rhetoric. Dead information? That’s our cooptation as servomechanisms of the cybernetic grid (the digital superhighway) that swallows bodies, and even whole societies, into the dynamic momentum of its telematic logic. Always working on the basis of the illusion of enhanced interactivity, the digital superhighway is really about the full immersion of the flesh into its virtual double. As dead (electronic) space, the digital superhighway is a big real estate venture in cybernetic form, where competing claims to intellectual property rights in an array of multi-media technologies of communication are at stake. No longer capitalism under the doubled sign of consumer and production models, the digital superhighway represents the disappearance of capitalism into colonized virtual space, and dead (cybernetic) rhetoric? That’s the Internet’s subordination to the predatory business interests of a virtual class, which might pay virtual lip service to the growth of electronic communities on a global basis, but which is devoted in actuality to shutting down the anarchy of the Net in favor of virtualized (commercial) exchange. Like a mirror image, the digital superhighway always means its opposite: not an open telematic autoroute for fast circulation across the electronic galaxy, but an immensely seductive harvesting machine for delivering bodies, culture, and labor to virtualization. The information highway is paved with (our) flesh. So consequently, the theory of the virtual class: cultural accomodation to technotopia is its goal, political consolidation (around the aims of the virtual class) its method, multi-media nervous systems its relay, and (our) disappearance into pure virtualities its ecstatic destiny.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Digital Cyclops Aff › Thesis – “No”
Kroker 14 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “Exits to the Posthuman Future”, Polity Press, Pages 202-204, 2014, MG)
Refusing to secrete itself in those bureaucratic institutions that produce mechanisms of domination (the clinic, the prison, the school), cynical ideology thrives by making a continuous spectacle of its presence. It is a line of flight, an intensity that doubles and redoubles its effects. When power becomes image, cynical truth is volatilized by the image repertoire. It knows only media effects. It migrates across different media. It changes state as it seeks points of maximal intensity for communication with a humiliated public. It is without history because it leaves no fixed electronic trail. Its truth-value depends precisely on its articulation of perspectives that strengthen movements towards panic insecurity and redemptive violence. While power aligns itself with knowledge, not ideology, cynical ideology aligns itself with virtual truth, not power. Privileging sacrificial death over the life of power, cynical ideology represents truth in its last decadent phase as a concept-fiction.
In the age of cynical ideology, everything has value only to the extent that it has “abuse value.” Heidegger recognized this. Understanding Nietzsche as the essential philosopher of completed nihilism, Heidegger drew the bitter ethical conclusions attendant upon the reduction of being to passive “standing reserve.” For Heidegger, the mood of completed nihilism will be the “malice of strife” that takes pleasure in the greater calculus of abuse value. Today, the theater of abuse value is ubiquitous: the rage of violence directed against the old, the poor, the young, the sick, the powerless, the disavowed, the unlivable. Political lying is itself a form of abuse value with the object of abuse being the rupturing of that deep connection between truth-saying and the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. When citizenship itself is made an object of abuse value (by manipulation of vote counts, by public lies, by panic fear), the essential ethical core of democracy is undermined. We're left finally with the terrorism of the image, a new form of nihilism suitable for the technological age in which ministrations of redemptive violence during the daylight hours are soothed away by the nighttime jokes of all the talk-show hosts. A moral equivalency of nothingness – organized state terrorism and diffuse media distraction as the basic political logic of a society of completed nihilism. This is not an image of Foucault's world of power. Nor is it Deleuze and Guattari's searing vision of lines of flight and points of intensity – becoming wolf-man, becoming maggot-man, becoming predator, becoming parasite. It is something new, still emergent, still articulating itself, still learning to speak, still growing in strength, still waiting to fully disclose itself – cynical ideology.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Digital Cyclops Aff › Thesis – Technical Knowledge
Hui 19 (Yuk Hui PhD - juror of the since 2020, and initiator of the since 2014, teaching in various institutes including Goldsmiths College, Leuphana University, Bauhaus University, Strelka Institute Moscow, Chinese Academy of Art, and City University of Hong Kong, “Recursivity and Contingency”, Rowman and Littlefield International, Pages 231-237, January 2019, MG)
The rejection of the notion of knowledge as reducible to science and calculation is an attempt to show that there is knowledge such as savoir faire, savoir vivre, and savoir-écouter that are beyond the realm of scientific knowledge. Stiegler seems to have gone a step further in this respect by showing that savoir faire is necessary for savoir vivre, and that therefore the deprivation of savoir faire is a form of proletarianization, which problematizes existence by undermining the means of subsistence. The shift in the sense of knowledge in the era of digital automation underlines a delegation of knowledge production and decision making to machines. Lyotard says that “the question of knowledge is now more than ever a question of government.” 26 The organic totality of the system that is based on recursivity is realized through different technological schemes (such as the smart city, the internet of things, etc.), which characterize a planetary computation. In chapter 4 we named the new faculty of the machine to anticipate tertiary protention. The preemption of the tertiary protention is possible only because of the computational hermeneutics, which is essentially recursive: It constantly evaluates the past in order to anticipate the future, which in turn determines the present. Human beings are reintegrated into the temporality of machines, not only as individuals but also as collectives and communities. This is precisely what is called algorithmic governmentality. 27 It seems to me that in order to intervene into this new temporal structure today, it is necessary (while we have to do it elsewhere) to redefine savoir faire—or, more precisely, savoir technique—in today’s system of knowledge production.
Besides theoretical discourse on the question of recursivity and social systems in the work of Niklas Luhmann and Heinz von Foerster, who also gives another name to recursion—“non-trivial machines” (ironically, Lyotard also calls cybernetic information theory trivial) 28—we have attempted to show that such discourses are gradually materialized through the implementation and distribution of smart objects, neuro-networks in urbanism, and the use of smart devices in order to access infrastructures. In this process of the totalization of the technological system, the immediate effect is the process of desymbolization through the establishment of inter-objective relations and resymbolization within the technical system, as Jacques Ellul pointed out in his Le système technicien. 29 When Ellul says that “on the one hand, man’s inherent power of symbolizing is excluded; on the other hand, all consumption is symbolic,” 30 he means that symbols that connect humans to nature and allow them to master nature in a nonviolent way slowly give way to technology, and finally lead to a resymbolization of the technical system in which symbols are no longer linked to nature but to commodities.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › 2AC – AT: Cohesion
Kasapoglu 17 [Can Kasapoglu is a Defense Analyst At The Centre For Economics And Foreign Policy Studies; "Judy Asks: Is Turkey Weakening NATO?"; Carnegie Europe; https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/73174]//AShah
However, it wouldn’t be fair to scapegoat Turkey for the alliance’s eroded cohesion. Since the annexation of Crimea, some important NATO members failed to show a determined posture against Moscow. Many members of the alliance still fall short of meeting the planned defense expenditure requirements. And many allies underestimated Ankara’s threat perceptions emanating from the PYD in Syria. In sum, we’re all weakening NATO as an alliance.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › 2AC – AT: Swinland
AP 7-5 [Associated Press "NATO Launches Ratification Process For Swedish, Finnish Membership"; 7-5-2022; RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty; https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-finland-sweden-ratification-launch/31929670.html; accessed on 7-23-2022]//AShah
The 30 NATO allies have signed off on the accession protocols for Sweden and Finland, sending the membership bids of the two countries to the alliance capitals for legislative approval, in a historic step brought on by Russia's unprovoked war in Ukraine.
"This is a good day for Finland and Sweden and a good day for NATO," alliance chief Jens Stoltenberg told reporters in a joint press statement with the Swedish and Finnish foreign ministers on July 5.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › 2AC – Kickout Bad – Russia
21 [Gönül Tol is the founding director of the Middle East Institute’s and a senior fellow for the . She is also an adjunct professor at George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies. She was also an adjunct professor at the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University. She has taught courses on Islamist movements in Western Europe, Turkey, world politics, and the Middle East. She has written extensively on Turkey-U.S. relations, Turkish domestic politics, and foreign policy and the Kurdish issue. She is a frequent media commentator. "Turkey-NATO ties are problematic, but there is one bright spot"; 2-16-2021; Middle East Institute; https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-nato-ties-are-problematic-there-one-bright-spot; accessed on 7-23-2022]//AShah
America’s presence in the Black Sea is important to check Russian expansionism, but a more effective strategy calls for a coordinated response from regional allies such as Turkey. Turkey’s relationship with NATO and the U.S. in particular has been rocky of late. Ignoring warnings from NATO and the threat of sanctions from the U..S, Turkey went ahead with its purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system, taking delivery of the first shipment in mid-2019. But despite its growing defense partnership with Moscow, Ankara is equally uneasy about the growing Russian military presence in a region where Turkey once had the edge. In a 2016 plea to Turkey’s NATO allies, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the Black Sea had become a “Russian lake” and called for a greater NATO presence, reversing a decades-old Turkish policy of keeping the alliance out.
Turkey has developed a multi-pronged strategy to counter Russian influence in the Black Sea. One important leg of that strategy is on the home front, where Turkey is strengthening its navy. A project called MILGEM, a contraction of the Turkish for “national ship” (milli gemi), was launched to design and construct naval vessels in-country, including ADA class corvettes. In 2018, the to acquire four of these ships from Turkey’s state-run defense contractor ASFAT, the first successful export of these vessels. Turkey has also been building up its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to counter Russia’s growing A2/AD assets in the Black Sea by ordering four new frigates, called both Istanbul and MILGEM II. The frigates are based on the ADA class corvette design but extended by 14 meters to enable the inclusion of a vertical launching system for surface to air missiles. The naval version of the army’s low-altitude air defense system, Gökdeniz, will be added to the inventory for the first time with the frigate. The national anti-ship missile will also be integrated into the first unit of the class, TCG Istanbul, which is forecast for entry into service later this year.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › 1AR – Kickout Bad – Radars – AT: Erdogan Removes Now
Bahri Kosar 19, non-resident fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG, 12/26/2019, "Who should worry first, if the BMD radar in Turkey is to be shut down?," , RMax
Although Site K is crucial for NATO BMD, it is not indispensable or irreplaceable at all. As it is a mobile platform, TPY-2 radar could easily be deployed to another place, albeit with less effectivity. On the other hand, U.S Navy is currently working on a new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), also designated as SPY-6(V)1, which is allegedly at least 100 times more sensitive than the current SPY-1 radar.[5] This radar is expected to be deployed in Aegis destroyers in about 2023. Besides, the latest version of SM-3, Blok IIA missiles are significantly faster and have more range than their predecessors.[6] Thus, these developments would compensate for the deficiencies emanating from a possible TPY-2 replacement. Nevertheless, such a decision from a Turkish government would more be a waiver from its own defence than a deficiency in European missile defence. I am not sure if Turkey would squeeze its own feet but I think this statement from Erdoğan was only a ‘butter’ for domestic politics and not based on a rational reason.
Despite Turkey’s axis shift toward Russia and the rising ‘Euroasianist’ tendencies among the security and government officials, I still think that Erdoğan’s advisors would try to discourage him from taking such a decision, which would otherwise basically tear off Turkey from NATO. Or at least I hope they would do that. Hope never dies!
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › 2AC – Kickout Bad – Radars – Israel-Iran War
Sean Durns 22, Senior Research Analyst at Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, 6/22/2022, "Deal or No Deal, Iran-Israel War Is Coming to the Middle East," National Interest, , RMax
Iran, Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett warned on June 12, “is dangerously close to getting their hands on a nuclear weapon.” In an interview with The Telegraph, the premier pointed out that “Iran is enriching uranium at an unprecedented rate.” Bennett added: “Iran’s nuclear program won’t stop until it’s stopped.”
Bennett isn’t alone in expressing concern.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › 2AC – Kickout Bad – Radars – US-Iran War
Alex Ward 20, former associate director in the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Vox reporter covering the White House, 7/8/2019, ""A nasty, brutal fight": what a US-Iran war would look like," Vox, , RMax
A deadly opening attack. Nearly untraceable, ruthless proxies spreading chaos on multiple continents. Costly miscalculations. And thousands — perhaps hundreds of thousands — killed in a conflict that would dwarf the war in Iraq.
Welcome to the US-Iran war, which has the potential to be one of the worst conflicts in history.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › 2AC – Kickout Bad – Radars
Bahri Kosar 19, non-resident fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG, 12/26/2019, "Who should worry first, if the BMD radar in Turkey is to be shut down?," , RMax
The matter of the possible ‘closure’ of the Incirlik base, which has always been on the agenda in every turbulent period in Turkish-American relations, has come up once again in the previous days. This time, the new turbulent period started with the Turkish acquisition of Russian S-400 systems and resulted in expelling Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. At a time where it is not still clear whether the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) would be imposed to Turkey, President Erdoğan stated in his speech in a live TV broadcast two weeks ago that, both Incirlik Air Base and the Kürecik ballistic missile radar site would be subject to closure if the USA imposes sanctions against Turkey.[1] Is this statement however a ploy for domestic politics or is Turkey considering this option as a trump card for international relations?
Unlike the Incirlik Base, which has lost its strategic importance for many years, the missile defense early warning radar in Kürecik serves indeed a very important role in NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Mission. Therefore, Erdoğan’s wish to use this radar as a trump card may seem logical to his strategy. But is that really the case?
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: Turkey PIC › 2AC – Kickout Bad – Radars
Ali Murat Alhas 19, reporter for Anadolu Agency, 12/29/2021, "Despite issues, Turkish military bases still key for US," , RMax
Kurecik, a radar station located in the Malatya province, was used for three decades until the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union for NATO to counter ballistic missiles. What makes it vital for NATO -- which Turkey has been a member of for nearly 70 years -- is that the AN/TPY-2 radar (Army/Navy Transportable Surveillance) deployed in Kurecik can shield ballistic missiles fired from Russia and Iran as well as protect NATO members.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Affirmative Answers
Scott Hamilton 18, professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, UK, “Securing ourselves from ourselves? The paradox of “entanglement” in the Anthropocene,” rime Law Soc Change 68, 579–595 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9704-4
Although the basics of quantum physics also depends upon statistics and a type of quantum causality to make predictions, “quantum mechanics is incompatible with the view that physical observables possess pre-existing values independent of the measurement context” ([37], p. 259). Nature might be manifested in certain phenomena in the macro world, but conceived through entanglement, these manifestations would be so incommensurable to everyday neo-Newtonian thought that they would be “irreducibly beyond anything we can experience or beyond anything we can possibly conceive of” ([38], p. 1653). In other words, quantum uncertainty rules entanglement in a mind-boggling way, while classical certainty (i.e., causality) rules Newtonian metaphysics so uniformly that today we barely even notice it. Declaring classical sciences and renderings of nature to be “entangled”, therefore, does not actually make them so. It actually masks the certainty of a classical Newtonian causality still working beneath the Anthropocene’s discursive surface. One cannot overcome Western metaphysics simply by reading about how to overcome Western metaphysics, and then asserting it to be so. This only intensifies the underlying conceptual foundations that treat quantum entanglement itself as a concept, tool, or object that can be causally applied to a human subject and its world.
For example, following Maslin, take the concept best framing the effect of humanity upon the Earth system: planetary boundaries ([9], p. 2). These are discrete and quantitative boundaries, units, or limits, within which humanity should operate to achieve a safe space for human development. Notions of quantified “safe” spaces obviously retain the classical Newtonian epistemologies of calculating secure, bounded limits for the “future” of humanity; a predictive orderly security, designed to reduce uncertainty within discrete limits, to ensure survival from chaos outside these spatiotemoporal limits. Indeed, humanity must respect the limits of these linear thresholds as “Earth’s ‘rules of the game’ or, as it were,. .. the ‘planetary playing field’ for the human enterprise” (Röckstrom et al., 2009). The point here is that ESS and its planetary boundaries model replicates a Western secular cosmology that works by explicitly measuring the distance between an “objective” nature and humanity. Nature is once again placed into a structural numerical box as the background context from which humanity is contrasted in order to make itself secure [34]. As Fagan [6] has noted, an implicit human/nature dualism results from this. Any relation of the environment and security supposedly erasing the boundaries between humanity and nature becomes itself a violent act [6]. In this case, entanglement becomes, therefore, an analogy masking a neo-Newtonian ordering of subject to object that is actually inherent to the ESS, and thus to conceptualizing the Anthropocene. If we were actually entangled, not only should there be no boundaries, but it would be impossible to detect them. This new metaphysical orientation would have to replace or transcend thinkable subject/object binaries, rather than focus on or assert their interdependence or interconnection, which we still see in IR’s security discourses today.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Affirmative Answers
Michael D. Ward 16, Michael was a Professor of Political Science @ Duke University, “Can We Predict Politics? Toward What End?”, Journal of Global Security Studies, Volume 1, Issue 1, 02/10/2016,
What Are the Pros and Cons of a Predictive Approach to Social Science?
The main pro is that the predictive enterprise helps us evaluate how well we are doing so that we can improve our understanding of the world. It is the gold standard of a scientific approach. We do not yet have an experimental framework for many important subjects. As a result, it is important to make sure we can get the same kind of results with new information that we got with the data we began investigating. That means we have to either save some data back (a great idea), use the future to see how well our modeled understandings perform, or preferably both. There are only nascent traditions of this in the social sciences at present. Keeping track of your success is not collecting significant coefficients. Keeping track matters. One consequence is that we cannot just keep using the same data over and over. And over. One reason that many hate predictions is that talking heads make many predictions in the media, but few of them ever keep track of how well they are doing. Their goal is somewhat akin to a venture capitalist’s make enough bets that eventually one of them is correct enough that you get to make a lot more bets. Ascher (1979) long ago showed that the talking heads were most often wrong. This is still true. You would think that they would get better over time, but there is little evidence that this is the case.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Affirmative Answers
Scott Hamilton 18, professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London, UK, “Securing ourselves from ourselves? The paradox of “entanglement” in the Anthropocene,” rime Law Soc Change 68, 579–595 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9704-4
This article argues that an epoch defined by and through the action of anthropos, the human, does not represent an entanglement of humanity with things, nature, or the Earth. Instead, the Anthropocene illustrates and intensifies a profound separation or dis-entanglement of humanity from nature. It replaces what was once the primary and objective concern of security – i.e., survival, or avoiding death – with anthropos, the human being, as a new geological and spatiotemporal force to be problematized and secured in both the present and the future. Rather than protecting itself from physical threats in an external world, humanity now subsumes that world by making itself the simultaneous subject/object of security; an Archimedean point. With the catastrophic prognoses for the Anthropocene’s future making humanity’s temporal, ontological, and epistemological essence uncertain, a paradox forms: an existential discontinuity, in which humanity must secure itself in the future from itself in the present.
This “Paradox of the Anthropocene” forms an ontological insecurity that is evinced through the concept of “entanglement” now borrowed from quantum physics and applied to human/nature relations. As noted above, entanglement is commonly used as an expression emphasizing humanity’s enmeshment with, and hence its ethical responsibility towards, non-human forms of life and matter. However, although its complex understanding of space, time, and the nature of reality offers a quantum rejoinder to neo-Newtonian or “classical” understandings of physics, upon closer inspection ‘entanglement’ is found to replicate and exacerbate these same classical dynamics within Anthropocene discourses. The atomic scale and nature of “quantum” is so complex that any observation of nature in-itself is impossible, in that any knowledge of quantum always already presupposes human interference and involvement in nature [7]. This implies that security or morality in the Anthropocene cannot be derived from, nor based upon, the mathematical principles of entanglement alone. Rather, it is from humanity’s dis-entanglement – the gap or distance between our mathematical knowledge of entangled phenomena and the social world within which we as humans reside – from which ethics, norms, and values are derived. The danger lies not in promoting and demanding humanity’s ethical responsibility towards nature and Earth – a noble and essential task indeed – but in attributing these ethics to entanglement, thereby forgetting how it is only through a social and human world that forms of security and responsibility are made practicable and thinkable.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
Affirmative Answers
Sebastiaan Laurens Metselaar 18, Graduate School of Seoul National University, International Cooperation, “A study on how modern nationalism can prevent imperialism from re-emerging,” February 2018, Seoul National University, https://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/141693/1/000000151525.pdf
Though we do live in the most peaceful era of our time, we tend to forget how much more violent the world has used to be. These days, more people die of car crashes than being killed by wars or terrorism. We commemorate the wars and celebrate our independence, to continue the realization of what happened and to what extend we are capable of committing inhumane crimes. Whether internal state conflicts have been decreased since the end of World War II is debatable, but that clashes between states have decreased is undeniable. The succession of the League of Nations by the United Nations, provides one of the most powerful resistance to pull factors in keeping nations in check with regards to imperial ambitions. Obviously there were tensions during for example the Cold War and conflicts did break out between states, but in light of the historic time frame, it has never been this peaceful as it is today. No Roman or Ottoman empire can start a conquest, in fact, ever since the end of the last great war no country recognized by the United Nations has been conquered or wiped of the map. Even the superpowers today who have all the means for starting their imperial conquest have to take into account that such conquest are too costly to undertake (e.g. Russia and Crimea, China and Tibet). And despite that conflicts are still present; the United Nations does not only have the tools to interfere military wise (i.e. peacekeeping operations), but also the capabilities to sanction perpetrators. The United Nations might be far from perfect as power struggles within the system exist, causing nations among each other to differentiate in meaning and action. However, as long as it is in place, nations will rethink once more their behavior.
Thus, no country has attempted to conquer another nation ever since the end of the decolonization period. The rise of the nation has a causal relationship to the decline in interstate violence. Moreover, the nationalists in a country do not want to start an imperial conquest and make colonies, instead, they want the colonials out of their country. The nationstate as we know it today is deeper rooted in the emotions of the masses than any other previous political organization has achieved before. In order for nationalism to develop and for sovereignty to be claimed by the populace, a complete revision of the status quo was required.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K — Quantum › 2NC---Holography Solves
Chengxin Pan 22, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2022, “Chapter 10: China’s Rise as Holographic Transition: A Relational Challenge to International Relations’ Newtonian Ontology,” China’s Rise and Rethinking International Relations Theory
A China that holographically emerges out of the contemporary globalized world cannot be adequately understood by theories that are still based on the Newtonian ontology, which treats states like China as ontologically separate and distinct. In opening up a new ontological perspective, this chapter now turns to a brief examination of why mainstream IR theories, particularly realism and liberalism, need to be rethought. First, realism, and power transition theory in particular (Tammen and Kugler, 2006; Lai, 2011), have almost completely overlooked China’s contemporary holographic transition. Analysts from those perspectives routinely see in China the rise of a Nazi Germany-like great power, but the world in which China has been rising has largely moved on from the one in which Nazi Germany emerged. The current international system is more ‘regime-intensive’ than the period during which Europe and the United States came into prominence (Lanteigne, 2005: 32). Western theorists may have good reason to draw upon past European and American experiences to fear the prospect of China adopting its own ‘Monroe Doctrine’ or falling into the ‘Thucydides Trap’ (Allison, 2017). What they fail to adequately appreciate is that the whole from which China has emerged has now become quite different (Wang, 2013). The holographic relational perspective does not necessarily mean that China’s rise or ‘Chinese’ relationality will be peaceful (Shih, 2016: 687). Hard power still matters in contemporary world politics, and realism remains part and parcel of China’s strategic thinking. Hence, despite the existence of a holographic world, if Chinese leaders behave as if they live in a Newtonian world of mechanistic relations, then the earlier-mentioned fears of China may be warranted. In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, rising antiglobalization sentiment and increasing global trade tensions, the shift to more emphasis on domestic circulation in China’s ‘dual circulation’ economic strategy seems to signal the winding back of its holographic engagement with the world. Nevertheless, a couple of points are worth noting here. One is that there is some Chinese recognition, at both scholarly and official levels, of the world as a cosmopolitan whole (for example in terms of ‘the community of common destiny’), and of the holographic entanglement that there is something of each in the other (ni zhong you wo, wo zhong you ni) (Xi, 2015). Whether Chinese foreign policy (for example the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)) will live up to such rhetoric remains to be seen, but at least such understanding could help underpin a consistent policy of opening up. Another point is that China’s holographic relational being/becoming is by definition relational and reciprocal. Given that how its significant ‘Others’ behave constitutes part of China’s holographic whole, the dominance of a zero-sum, non-holographic way of understanding and dealing with China from the ‘outside’ world is likely to produce a China that is similarly uncompromising and assertive. As China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was quoted as saying during his discussion with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, ‘China will consider how to engage with the U.S. side based on the U.S. attitude towards China’ (Reuters, 2021). Second, while liberal scholars do pay close attention to China’s transformation and socialization (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999; Johnston, 2008), they also fail to recognize that its transformation/socialization is fundamentally holographic and multidirectional, rather than linear or unidirectional. Some liberal thinkers are right that it would be illogical and extremely difficult for today’s China to overturn the international capitalist order (Ikenberry, 2008); after all, China is already a holographic part of that order and so turning against that order would mean turning against itself. Still, many tend to misconstrue its holographic transition as reducible to Westernization or democratization in the Western image (Gilley, 2004; Hutton, 2006; Kristof, 2013), while forgetting that the sources of holographic influence on China are global, rather than merely ‘Western’. The global whole in which China exists and evolves includes also the ‘nonWestern’ world as well as ‘Chinese’ history and tradition (or what Wang Jisi calls ‘historical China’, see Chapter 6). To ignore those connections and their complex impact on China is to miss a significant aspect of China’s rise that does not fit well with the liberal narrative. Furthermore, even as China has absorbed many ‘Western’ influences (bearing in mind that there is nothing purely Western to begin with, as Hobson [2004] points out), such outside influences, once transmitted into China, may undergo further local holographic transition of their own by taking on some ‘Chinese’ characteristics (Pan, 2012: 116–17). Also, as China’s power grows and its relations further expand (such as through the BRI), it is certain to once again become a major source of holographic transition for other countries, just as it once was, particularly through its tributary system, in which the participation of the ‘barbarians’ was in part to ‘come and be transformed’ (lai-hua) (Fairbank, 1942: 132). Thus, China’s rise is both an object and an agent of holographic transition. To sum up, both the ‘identity’ of China and its implications for the world are inherently complex, dynamic and indeterminate. As a case of holographic transition, China’s rise defies the binary scenarios of either a hegemonic challenge to the Western-dominant order or a linear integration into it (see also Chapter 9). With China unable to meet the liberal expectation, there has now been growing disillusionment with, and renewed realist fear of, it in recent years (Pan, 2012: Chapter 7; Campbell and Ratner, 2018). China’s rise does pose many profound challenges, whether economically, politically, normatively or environmentally. But such challenges, despite their apparent ‘Chinese’ symptoms, often have their holographic origins in the world. Thus, without denying Chinese responsibility or agency, to effectively deal with those challenges requires us to see them also as global and holographic challenges that cannot be reduced to, let alone solved as, uniquely Chinese problems. Global problems demand global public policy and cooperative solutions. As such, the United States’ focus on ‘Chinese’ imports, for instance, as the cause of its job-loss problem misses the point. Similarly, attempts to contain China are unlikely to be effective given that China’s very being has been embodied and embedded in holographic relations with the global whole, with which we are all inextricably entangled and implicated.
2022
Michigan
Kritik
K — Quantum › 2NC---Root Cause
Chengxin Pan 20, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, Australia, 2020, “Enfolding wholes in parts: quantum holography and International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2020, Vol. 26(S1) 14–38
This article situates itself between the relational turn in IR and the quantum turn in the social sciences (and lately in IR as well). Between the two turns, there has been a mutual neglect at the expense of a better defined and more operationalizable relational approach to IR. To address the gap, this article has outlined a quantum holographic ontology, which stipulates that parts are more than just parts in the conventional sense of the word, but are specifically enfolded wholes. Drawing on Bohm’s insights into wholeness and the implicate order, the article has introduced a set of new conceptual tools to IR in general and to the relational debate in particular, such as whole-part duality, enfoldment, unfoldment, implicate order, and explicate order. These tools help us rethink IR and many dominant IR concepts in some ontologically innovative ways, including the need to take wholeness in IR more seriously, a new emphasis on the holographic nature of the state, and the promises of this approach for explaining and mitigating difference and conflict in IR theory and practice. By way of conclusion, the article now briefly considers two ethical implications of quantum holography for IR. First, the holographic being/becoming for “parts” is immensely empowering, because it reveals that the parts, or previously assumed individual “selves,” are never alone in a frightening state of nature; rather, they are inescapably linked to and sustained by the whole/world: indeed, their holographicity means that they are the whole/world, merely on smaller scales. This should transform the way we think about our identity, interest, and security in a fundamentally relational and positive way, because in a holographically related world, there can be no inherent “Others” or “external” threats out there unless we consciously or subconsciously divide the world in binary terms and act accordingly. Second, holographic being/becoming entails holographic responsibility, which is an ethical commitment to the notion and practice of responsibility for all. By all we mean the whole and its various “parts,” including the smallest “components,” such as corals and insects. To the extent that they all ultimately share the same whole, all parts, large or small, are real or potential enfoldments of the whole. Their well-being, as an indicator of the well-being of the whole, matters to the whole and to each of its parts. Thus, responsibility for all means “care for all and do no harm.” In a holographically connected world, harm to “others” (even the smallest “others”) means inevitably harm to the whole, including the “self,” who necessarily enfolds the whole: here the example of the microplastics problem comes to mind. Cosmopolitanism has long held the idea that “harm to individuals [is] a moral problem for the world as a whole” (Linklater, 2002: 320), and quantum holography can enrich the relational ontology of cosmopolitanism and at the same time help it move beyond its narrow humanist focus.