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2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › centralization bad

Overcentralization will destroy military operations at the operational level

Rosario M. Simonetti 20, Lieutenant Colonel Rosario M. Simonett is an Italian Army Marine, “Automation and the Future of Command and Control The End of Auftragstaktik?,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, Vol. 11 No. 1, June 2020, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/796245/pdf//RA

The impact of new technologies and the increased tempo of the future battlespace may overcentralize command and control functions at the political or strategic level. Political and strategic leaders might pursue preemptive or preventive wars as a strategy to acquire asymmetric advantage over the enemy, not because they must but because they can. As a result, senior leaders may be encouraged to bypass the advisory role played by their qualified staff and undermine the autonomy of lower level commanders. The advancement of technological systems may end mission command, Auftragstaktik. Donald E. Vandergriff defines Auftragstaktik as a cultural philosophy of military professionalism:

The overall commander’s intent is for the member to strive for professionalism, in return, the individual will be given latitude in the accomplishment of their given missions. Strenuous, but proven and defensible standards will be used to identify those few capable of serving in the profession of arms. Once an individual has been accepted into the profession, a special bond forms with their comrades, which enables team work and the solving of complex tasks. This kind of command culture . . . must be integrated into all education and training from the very beginning of basic training.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › centralization bad

Centralized implementation causes uninformed decisions – fails to control for accidents, biases, data poisoning AND weakness – turns the case AND causes unintended technological outcomes

Michael Horowitz & Kahn 20, Lauren Kahn, Michael C. Horowitz is professor of political science and the interim director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. Lauren Kahn is a research fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania.1-14-2020, "The AI Literacy Gap Hobbling American Officialdom," War on the Rocks, , nihara

Because AI is a general-purpose technology, the corresponding adoption challenges may prove especially difficult. There is a great deal of emphasis at present on how the United States can more effectively recruit and retain AI talent to work for the national security community and the government as a whole. This is critical, but the people making decisions about the use of algorithms from the situation room to the battlefield will not necessarily be informed about current developments in AI, let alone be AI experts, but military leaders and policymakers. Thus, a vital challenge is familiarizing and educating government leaders and policymakers about AI. This is a different challenge than that of incentivizing those with AI expertise to work for the U.S. government. Instead, it is about AI education for the policy community.

AI education for the policy community, from military leaders to Hill staffers to senior government officials, needs to happen now, as cases outside of the national security sphere illustrate. For example, in December 2017, the New York City council unanimously passed a bill that required the Office of the Mayor to form a task force dedicated to increasing transparency and oversight of the algorithms used by the city. A local city council member characterized the bill as essential, saying of the algorithms, “I don’t know what it is. I don’t know how it works. I don’t know what factors go into it. As we advance into the 21st century, we must ensure our government is not ‘black boxed.’”

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › multidomain operations

MDOs solve NATO Euro-Atlantic deterrence – BUT, organizational decentralization is key to efficacy

Lt. Gen. Andreas Marlow 21, German Army Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., U.S. Army, Lt. Gen. Andreas Marlow, German Army, is the commander of the NATO Rapid Deployment Headquarters, 1 German-Netherlands Corps. He has commanded at every level in the German Army. Marlow deployed as the Chief of Staff of the German contingent within NATO’s Kosovo Force mission, Deputy Chief of Staff-Operations Regional Command North International Security Assistance Force, and as the Chief of Staff Headquarters Resolute Support in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the University of the Bundeswehr Hamburg, the German General Staff Officers Course, and the Command and Staff Course at the Canadian Forces College. Lt. Col. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., U.S. Army, is a strategist in the G-5 Plans of the 1 German-Netherlands Corps. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of Mississippi and a master’s degree in history from Eastern Michigan University. Blythe is a recipient of the Army Historical Foundation’s Distinguished Writing Award. His service includes deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. 10-4-2021, "Multi-Domain Warfighting in NATO," , nihara, [brackets in original]

Since its formation in 1995 as a result of the merger of the Cold War-era 1 German Corps and 1 Dutch Corps, 1 German-Netherlands (GE/NL) Corps has repeatedly confirmed the commitment of its framework nations (Germany and Netherlands) to NATO, deploying to Afghanistan in 2003, 2009, and 2013. To continue this commitment, deter aggression, and defend the Euro-Atlantic area, 1 (GE/NL) Corps must demonstrate the ability to conduct large-scale combat operations as part of NATO against a peer enemy in an Article 5 scenario. The ability to conduct large-scale combat operations underpins the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrence and provides the basis for the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area in the event of conflict. This means that 1 (GE/NL) Corps must possess the ability to successfully perform the warfighting corps role, following its 2023 stand-by period as the NATO Response Force (NRF) Land Component Command (LCC).1

Execution of the warfighting corps role on the Euro-Atlantic multi-domain battlefields of today and tomorrow requires specific capabilities, in the required capacities, along with the expertise necessary to employ them in an Article 5 scenario against a peer enemy. As part of its transformation into a warfighting corps capable of multi-domain operations (MDO), 1 (GE/NL) Corps has conducted a campaign of learning consisting of academics, wargaming, and training and exercises. The results of this work are detailed below and specify the roles and responsibilities of a NATO warfighting corps within MDO, define the requirements and the structure for an MDO-capable warfighting corps, and describe the conduct of corps operations within the context of an Article 5 scenario.2

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › multidomain operations

Effective cross-domain strategies is key to deterrence of grey-zone strategies in land, air, sea, cyber, and space

Sweijs, T., Zilincik 21, S. 2021, The Essence of Cross-Domain Deterrence. In: Osinga, F., Sweijs, T. (eds) NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2020. NL ARMS. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. , nihara

Deterrence is about convincing adversaries to refrain from certain behaviour through the prospect of costs that outweigh the benefits.1 As related in the preface to this volume by Osinga and Sweijs, deterrence has been a central tenet of strategic practice throughout history,2 even if its logic was only clearly articulated in the aftermath of the Second World War. Deterrence scholarship has since then evolved in four consecutive waves. The first, second and third wave of the deterrence literature, which emerged during the Cold War, tended to almost exclusively focus on deterrence of high-intensity aggression including most importantly the possible use of nuclear weapons alongside large scale conventional invasion.3 Lower-intensity threats which were considered mere nuisances were largely left outside of the scope of investigation.4 However, these became more important in the 1990s with the demise of the Soviet Union and the emergence of non-traditional threats such as terrorism.5 This gave birth to the fourth wave of deterrence literature that focused on the question whether deterrence would work against such threats that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s.6 Over the past decade, a new body of ideas has been emerging concerning the application of deterrence in today’s strategic environment. An important characteristic of our age is the proliferation of ways and means by which hostile activities can be perpetrated. Accordingly, strategists have started to pay more attention to the application of deterrence in new domains and to cross domain deterrence (CDD), across both traditional and new domains. This chapter appraises the contribution of the emerging body of cross domain deterrence literature to deterrence theory and deterrence practice. It explains the context in which theories of cross domain deterrence have emerged and elaborates different conceptualisations of cross domain deterrence distinguishing between two different approaches. The conclusion summarises the findings and elaborates their implications for theory and practice.7

8.2 The Origins of Cross-Domain Deterrence

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › decentralization good

Centralization of AI development causes extensive oversight that destroys operability in contemporary battlefield environments AND multi-domain operations – BUT, institutionalization of decentralized approaches to tech development guarantees NATO primacy – CPs development approach is exported globally

-- VUCA = volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous

Col Mark C. Boone 21, Col Boone is currently serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Marine Forces Europe/ Africa and is a first-year PhD student at the University of Charleston, WV, where he studies executive leadership. November 2021, “Decentralized Decision Making: A paradigm-shift in thinking for NATO and future U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific region,” Marine Corps Gazette, , nihara

The 21st century has ushered in an era of intense technological advancement, changing the character of warfare. Hypersonic weapons, autonomous platforms, ubiquitous sensors, big data, quantum science, additive manufacturing, and artificial intelligence are but a few of the technological developments changing the landscape of the world and warfare as we know it. The conduct of warfare, from its fundamental principles to ethical framework, is being challenged.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Pilot PIC › 1nc – cp

The plan institutionalizes and exports the DoD’s AI bureaucracy internationally – preventing direct feedback loops and effective operationalization of AI for mission-critical requirements

Marc Losito & Anderson 21, John Anderson, Marc Losito is a first-year Master of Public Policy candidate at Duke University and an active-duty U.S. Army Warrant Officer, focusing on the intersection of technology and national security policy. Marc holds a degree from Norwich University and has served in the military and Special Operations Forces for 20 years specializing in counterterrorism, irregular warfare, and intelligence operations. John Anderson is a U.S. Army Reserve military officer focused on applying AI and machine learning to mission critical problems. He has served in the U.S. Army for nearly 20 years and previously worked in the financial industry as a senior research analyst at a value-oriented hedge fund and a mid-sized private equity firm. He holds degrees from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Columbia Business School. 5-10-2021, "The Department of Defense’s Looming AI Winter," War on the Rocks, , nihara

The Four Horsemen of the Department of Defense’s Looming AI Winter

The four horsemen of the forthcoming AI apocalypse, so to speak, are this time around human problems without technological scapegoats. They are a lack of AI expertise, too much AI bureaucracy, the challenge of democratizing AI to the user level, and an old-fashioned approach to AI integration.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2nc – nb – digital authoritarianism

Global digital authoritarianism greenlights Chinese and Russian aggression- turns the aff

Justin Sherman 2021 “Digital Authoritarianism and Implications for US National Security.” The Cyber Defense Review, vol. 6, no. 1, 2021, pp. 107–18. JSTOR, .//cpd

Private firms worldwide legally or illegally have long been selling dual-use digital technologies that can be used to monitor web traffic and to censor information. That there is a global market for digital surveillance tools is old news. Companies incorporated in democracies heavily export these dual-use technologies worldwide, including, in many documented cases, to despots.[12] Likewise, companies incorporated in autocracies sell dual-use technologies, including those that can be used for censorship and surveillance, to other authoritarian regimes.[13] Some studies suggest that democracies account for a far greater volume of surveillance technology exports, including to despots, despite attempts to restrict such exports.[14] The pursuit of digital authoritarianism to bolster state power magnifies incentives for some countries to acquire dual-use surveillance tools, and for others to encourage their spread. China’s state leadership, for instance, consistently has advocated a sovereign and controlled Internet governance model on the global stage, with practices like censorship and surveillance, as opposed to a global and open model supported by many liberal democracies.[15] In tandem with this global diplomatic messaging, the Chinese government has reportedly conducted trainings on new media or information management with representatives from dozens of countries, many on record as pursuing restrictive online practices.[16] This has coincided with countries targeted by the Belt and Road Initiative passing cybersecurity laws that sometimes mirror laws already enacted in China, such as Vietnam’s recent establishment of data localization requirements.[17] Causality remains unclear in this situation, and empirical questions remain to be answered about the underlying drivers of digital authoritarianism in different countries. Nonetheless, these patterns and events, coupled with exports of surveillance technologies from China, raise questions about Beijing’s intentions to spread digital authoritarianism globally, including through a greater focus on, and/or endorsement of, the sale of digital surveillance and control capabilities. This could amplify the aforementioned national security risks, should authoritarian countries acquire the tools and/or knowledge needed to bolster their power through digital surveillance. National security analysts have already flagged these potential risks across Africa. Many countries China has engaged with through its Belt and Road investments have acquired Chinese surveillance technology, potentially usable for oppressive purposes. For instance, Chinese company exports of surveillance technology to the Ethiopian government have occurred alongside Chinese government investments.[18] Given China’s history of spying on and suppressing political dissidents, this is hardly a benign fact, and Ethiopia is but one of several examples. Should China’s leadership be intent on spreading digital authoritarianism worldwide, to include diffusion of surveillance tools, this likely could include countries aligned with China’s national security and/or economic interests. Like China, Russia has long advocated for cyber sovereignty on the international stage,[19] with President Vladimir Putin repeatedly emphasizing the importance of information control within a country’s sovereign borders.[20] As noted above, Russian companies export surveillance and hacking technologies, especially to post-Soviet states.[21] Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan actually suggest that Russian surveillance technology exports to some of these countries are a better fit than Western-made surveillance applications, because Russian laws and procedures governing traffic interception are more compatible for these countries, and the technologies are tailored accordingly.[22] In either case, these surveillance technology exports need further study, and they clearly serve as tools of political influence in Russia’s near-abroad. As with China, the extent of the Russian government’s direct involvement in and support of such exports needs further study, because the Kremlin’s direct hand in these exports, while visible, is hardly transparent. The desire to spread digital authoritarianism may well incentivize the Kremlin to better spread its surveillance technologies, or to at least look the other way when they occur, and thereby consolidate power in the hands of Russian-aligned countries at the expense of US government interests. This also could threaten vulnerable democracies worldwide, and facilitate the so-called fracturing of the global Internet, as countries build out technical and legal regimes that filter the global and open Internet touching and running through their borders.[23] Again, the threat here is not only from governments in China and Russia. Companies incorporated in democracies also sell a high volume of dual-use surveillance technologies to despots, and this is something we are better able to monitor and correct. It is also important to reemphasize the existing incentives for countries to encourage or allow the spread of these capabilities to other countries (including the technologies and how to optimize them). But growing desires to spread digital authoritarianism globally not only undermine human rights and developing democracies; this also exposes US national security to increased risk.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2nc – turkey not k2 nato – sweden/finland

Turkey makes political issues conditional – Sweden proves

Associated Pres, 5-25-2022, "Turkey Demands 'Concrete Steps' to Back Nordics' NATO Bids," US News & World Report, https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2022-05-25/sweden-finland-delegations-in-turkey-for-nato-talks, accessed 6-24-2022//cpd

Kalin said Turkey’s proposal to lift arms export limits was met with a “positive attitude” by the Swedish and Finnish delegations. He added that talks would continue once the Nordic governments had responded to Turkey’s demands. Turkey also expects the extradition of 28 “terrorism” suspects from Sweden and 12 from Finland, Kalin said, adding that there was “no legal or judicial basis” not to extradite them. Turkish state media had previously said Turkey demanded the extradition of 33 suspects from the two countries. Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson said following a meeting with European Council President Charles Michel in Stockholm that her country wanted to “clarify” claims that have been floating around during discussions with Turkey. “We do not send money or weapons to terrorist organizations,” Andersson said. During a news conference with the Estonian prime minister later Wednesday, Andersson said that “in these times, it is important to strengthen our security.” She said Sweden has “a constructive dialogue” with Turkey and that Stockholm was “eager to sort out issues and misunderstandings and questions.” Michel, who is scheduled to head to Helsinki from Stockholm, said it was “a pivotal moment for Sweden" and “we fully support your choices.” Turkey this week listed five “concrete assurances” it was demanding from Sweden, including what it said was “termination of political support for terrorism,” an “elimination of the source of terrorism financing,” and the “cessation of arms support” to the banned PKK and a Syrian Kurdish militia group affiliated with it. The demands also called for the lifting of arms sanctions against Turkey and global cooperation against terrorism. Turkey said that it has requested the extradition of Kurdish militants and other suspects since 2017 but hasn’t received a positive response from Stockholm. The Turkish government claimed Sweden had decided to provide $376 million to support the Kurdish militants in 2023 and that it had provided them with military equipment, including anti-tank weapons and drones. Finland has received nine extradition requests from Turkey in a recent period covering over three years, Finnish news agency STT said Wednesday, citing data from the Finnish justice ministry. Two people were extradited while six of the requests were rejected. A decision was pending regarding one other case.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2nc – turkey not k2 nato – general

Turkey’s NATO participation does more harm than good

Antoine Got, 11-19-2020, "Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/, accessed 6-23-2022//cpd

NATO’s most important challenge today may not come from Russia, but from within. With the number of disputes between Turkey and several European allies yet again on the rise, the two parties’ souring relations have begun undermining the organization’s cohesion and ability to make timely collective decisions. If left unaddressed, these tensions could cause serious damage to the world’s most powerful alliance.

The latest flashpoint came from Turkey’s open backing of Azerbaijan’s war effort in the small landlocked enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which ended abruptly in early November thanks to a Russian-brokered deal. Reports of military assistance and alleged Syrian mercenaries sent by Turkey placed Ankara at loggerheads with its NATO allies’ calls for a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the conflict. The deal, which foresees Baku reacquiring sizeable portions of the disputed enclave, has made Turkey one of the obvious winners of the recent flare-up, while its Western allies remain on the sidelines. For some, this could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, adding to a long list of complaints they have recently leveled against their NATO ally.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2nc – democracy backsliding

The rise in illiberalism within NATO is leading to democratic backsliding

David Deulofeu AntúNez 18, David Deulofeu Antúnez is a first-year M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs "NATO’s Trojan Horse: How Democratic Deconsolidation and Populism are Weakening the Alliance — THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW," INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW, 11-28-2018 https://www.iar-gwu.org/blog/2018/11/29/natos-trojan-horse-how-democratic-deconsolidation-and-populism-are-weakening-the-alliance, accessed 6-21-2022//cpd

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is facing an internal problem that could permanently weaken the Alliance. In recent years, we have seen the rise of a nationalist-populist wave in Europe and the United States: Viktor Orbán of Hungary, the Kaczynski in Poland, and President Donald Trump in America. This rise in illiberal world leaders has led to significant democratic backsliding in NATO countries, which pose a grave threat to NATO’s strength in the face of an aggressive and revisionist Russia.

How is Democratic Backsliding Affecting the Alliance?

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2nc – democracy backsliding

Turkey’s anti-democratic government decks NATO credibility and risks US security

Michael Poznansky, 10-13-2016, "NATO members are supposed to be democratic. What happens when Turkey isn’t?," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/13/nato-members-are-supposed-to-be-democratic-what-happens-when-turkey-isnt/, accessed 6-25-2022//cpd

A core principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is that member states adhere to democratic values. So what happens now that Turkey, a longtime NATO member, has suspended a number of legal protections in the weeks and months following the July 15 coup attempt?

Immediately after part of the military tried to overthrow his government, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan retaliated with a widespread purge of large numbers of police officers, judges and soldiers. By late July, the Turkish government’s crackdown had extended to the private financial sector, as well as the country’s universities. The government detained as many as 50,000 in what one news report called “the biggest purge in Turkey’s modern history.”

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2nc – hungary ai bad

Hungary’s digital authoritarianism creates positive feedback loops of democratic backsliding

Fatma Timucin 07-08- 21, “8-BIT IRON FIST: DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: THE CASES OF TURKEY AND HUNGARY”, 8 July 21, https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/42417/1/10337574.pdf//cpd

The case of Hungary has garnered recent scholarly attention regarding its democratic trajectory in the latest years. As 2021 marks Victor Orbán’s eleventh year holding the position of Prime Minister, Hungary has turned increasingly authoritarian. The country has accomplished an unfortunate first, as it is the only non-democratic member of the EU since 2020 (Repucci 2020). In turn, several NGOs, international organizations, and member countries have issued demands of political sanctions on Hungary in an attempt to reverse the democratic backsliding it is facing. Orbán’s regime can be characterized by populism and national conservatism. As a distinguishing quality, Orbán openly advocates for an ‘illiberal state’ in advancing national conservatism. His shift to right-wing became apparent in his first term in office between 1998-2002. Following two elections favored the Socialist Party, resulting in a drastic change in the government. However, Orbán’s Fidesz managed to keep its popularity in later years, and coupled with the Socialist’s decreasing voter support, won the election by a landslide in 2010. The subsequent decade has solidified Orbán’s grip on power as Fidesz constituted the majority in the parliament after his coalition with Christian Democrats. This allowed Orbán to pass several constitutional and legislative reforms. The consequences of said reforms spell out a perfect example of the “executive aggrandizement” (Bermeo 2016) pointed out in democratic backsliding literature. Simultaneously, Orbán expanded his influence, blurred the boundaries of executive decision-making, and grasped the popular vote. His maintaining of popular support is linked to several causes in the literature, such as the weak democratic tradition as a result of the post-soviet context (Krygier 2019), deepening of social cleavages (Palonen 2009), and rising Euro-scepticism resulting from a clash of values (Furedi 2017). An overlooked factor of Orbán’s success lies in his gradual capture of the media network, resulting in an enormous asymmetry in pro-government and opposition narratives. Although recent scholarly work aimed to fill the gap in the literature (Fabry 2020; Serdült 2020; Zgut et al. 2020), the issue was raised only after Hungary became a competitive authoritarian regime. 41 An extensive recollection of Orbán’s attitude towards media is hard to come by. In contrast, with many of his populist counterparts, Victor Orbán openly targeted free media since he assumed office. Independent media outlets shrank in numbers and the variety of content they can offer over time. In his crusade against opposition voices, Orbán instrumentalized takeovers as well as restriction and persecution of journalists. One of the last remaining independent media outlets, Index.hu, was met with a change of staff on the grounds of political motivation (Index 2020) in Fall 2020. Calls for the EU to intervene and protect freedom of speech through political pressure were made (IPI 2020), although there is no action taken insofar. In building control over the media, the case of Hungary was specifically successful for its implementation of all three strategies at once: legislative action, financial manipulation, and political pressure (Altena 2017); and the organizational grasp of Fidesz and Orbán resulted in perpetual democratic backsliding where linkage and leverage to EU fell short (Sandoval 2018). The following chapter offers a breakdown of the building and practice of Victor Orbán’s strategies of digital authoritarianism. The case of Orbán’s digital authoritarianism is a valuable contribution to literature in showing the solidification of an increasingly aggressive pro-government media landscape. Systematic violation of freedom of speech aids populist leaders like Orbán in spreading and legitimizing their rhetoric as the one and only ‘truth.’ Diminishing opportunities in accessing alternative sources of information further contributes to democratic backsliding and creates a positive feedback loop, which is why it is worthy of scholarly attention with regards to both digital authoritarianism and populism literatures.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 2nc – turkey ai bad

Turkey expanding digital authoritarianism into AI greenlights further human rights abuses and anti-democratic control

Fatma Timucin 21, “8-BIT IRON FIST: DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: THE CASES OF TURKEY AND HUNGARY”, 8 July 21, https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/42417/1/10337574.pdf//cpd

Unfortunately, in the last decade, Turkey has garnered international attention with its violation of free media. As stated in the literature (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020), her track record in media freedom has been far from perfect since the 1990s. Governments have displayed consistent patterns of restriction and punishment for opposition outlets as well as apparent favoritism towards pro-government ones. The remaining content opted for appealing to the relatively stable opposition voter base. The electoral success of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi - AKP) back in 2002 failed to signal a deviation from this path in its early years. As 2021 marks their 19th consecutive year in government, we can observe a steady increase in media pressure over AKP’s time at the helm of parliament. The key argument of high political and societal polarization stands (Çarkoğlu, Baruh, and Yıldırım 2014). In addition, another process we must observe is the democratic backsliding Turkey has experienced over the last two decades (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020). Indubitably, consequences of the accelerating authoritarianism are evident, with Turkey now being dubbed as “the largest prison for journalists” (Eski 2019). Turkey, especially the “New Turkey” Erdoğan declared after the 2011 legislative election victory, paints an illustrative example of media violations. Admittedly, Turkey’s shortcomings in media freedom precede Erdoğan and his party. The media has, notoriously, stayed in line with a multitude of governments and changed its discourse in accordance. Sensitive topics relating to ethnic and religious minorities were unanimously avoided. 1980 coup provided a window of opportunity as the media expressed more diversity thanks to democratic transition (Bayram 2010). Similar to Latin America (Guerrero 2014), a wave of deregulation in the early 1990s resulted in further commercialization (Yıldırım, Baruh, and Çarkoğlu 2020) and led to “captured liberal” media. It is necessary to mention here that the literature on political communication refers to both direct (or classic) and indirect censorship (Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015) over media in its “captured” aspect. Hence, with 22 the direct and indirect censorship media is now facing, Turkey’s media freedom has hit an unprecedented low. The following chapter aims to describe the process of the Turkish case of digital authoritarianism under AKP’s rule regarding tools and strategies mentioned in the previous section. Three strategies are essential: media ownership and leverage of government founded upon crony relationships, censorship and bans on alternative media, intimidation of its users by abuse of legislative framework, and lastly, employment of manipulation by trolls and bot accounts. 3.1 Media Ownership: Creating a Government-Friendly Media Landscape by Crony Capitalism As is the case with the general populist rhetoric, Erdoğan and AKP came to power as challengers to the existing regime and status quo. As a prominent party figure, Erdoğan has explicitly been vocal about his distaste in media since the beginning, for its being owned by the “elite” and maintaining the status quo. Another factor of utmost importance in shaping this attitude was Erdoğan’s experience in Refah Partisi (Welfare Party). Existing media outlets held Erdoğan and RP in a negative light. This was made evident with the four months imprisonment sentence Erdoğan received due to reciting a poem in 1997. Media coverage regarding the adjudication showed apparent enthusiasm about the unfolding of events, with the most memorable headline being “He will not be able to become even a headman” (Radikal 1998). This headline became a central piece of Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric in underlining “the people’s” triumph over the preceding regime in later years. In combination, the two motives mentioned above propelled AKP and Erdoğan to replace the media with a pro-government one. Control over traditional media has set the stage for AKP’s digital authoritarianism. As the media became tied to conglomerates owning several pro-AKP outlets, said outlets’ news sites became a projection of their traditional counterparts. In tandem with the increasing control, ‘professional’ digital media became dominantly in favor of the government. 23 Figure 3.1 Democracy Index Scores DemocracyIndexOverallScore Turkey’s descend into competitive authoritarianism came gradually. As Figure 11 shows, it is not unique in this aspect that each of the four countries mentioned throughout this thesis has experienced a slight but consistent decrease in their democracy scores over the last fourteen years. AKP’s media control was no different, a ‘patient struggle’ against the conventional media (Aladağ 2013). Between 2014 and 2018, the asymmetry in media ownership in pro-government and opposition was made official. This clear government bias was the consequence of a series of changes that took place since 2002. By buying outlets and shifting ownership to businessmen with close ties to the government, AKP has laid the ground for what came to be called havuz medyası by its opposition.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 1nc

A slide to worldwide Digital Authoritarianism is worse than extinction!

Di Minardi 20 “The grim fate that could be ‘worse than extinction’,” BBC Future, 15th October 2020 https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201014-totalitarian-world-in-chains-artificial-intelligence//cpd

Though global totalitarianism is still a niche topic of study, researchers in the field of existential risk are increasingly turning their attention to its most likely cause: artificial intelligence.

In his “singleton hypothesis”, Nick Bostrom, director at Oxford’s FHI, has explained how a global government could form with AI or other powerful technologies – and why it might be impossible to overthrow. He writes that a world with “a single decision-making agency at the highest level” could occur if that agency “obtains a decisive lead through a technological breakthrough in artificial intelligence or molecular nanotechnology”. Once in charge, it would control advances in technology that prevent internal challenges, like surveillance or autonomous weapons, and, with this monopoly, remain perpetually stable.

2022 Michigan Negative
Neg – AI Logistics Updates – FMPS › Non-Democratic Country PIC › 1nc

Expansion of non-democratic governments of NATO states diminishes alliance credibility and risks a slide to global authoritarianism

Jonathan Katz and Torrey Taussig 18, "An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO," Brookings Jonathan Katz is director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) based in the Washington, DC, office. Torrey Taussig was the research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. 7-10-2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/10/an-inconvenient-truth-addressing-democratic-backsliding-within-nato/, accessed 6-21-2022//cpd

There is also significant democratic backsliding among NATO member states. The cast of illiberal characters—who are leading the charge in the wrong direction—includes the recently reelected and empowered Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS) Party in Poland, and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the ruling Fidesz Party. Each has proven more than willing to repress free media, dismantle checks and balances, demonize political opposition, clamp down on civil society, and diminish the rule of law. America’s democratic system and norms under President Trump are also under duress; as a result, Freedom House downgraded the country’s score on the basis of weakening political rights and civil liberties.

Despite these alarming developments, NATO leaders have relegated democratic backsliding to the backburner. Opponents of making the case for democracy within NATO might argue that pushing Ankara, Warsaw, and Budapest too hard on their commitments to good governance will exacerbate already tense divisions in the alliance. Others might say that Russia would be the prime beneficiary of a contentious democracy discussion at NATO. Yet this is a counterproductive approach with current and potential costs to NATO’s future. Here are three security-based reasons why the United States and NATO should care about democratic backsliding, and actions the alliance can take to address them.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Alt DA – Collapse Bad

Alternative produces a collapse of the international system

Hunt ‘07 (Michael H., The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained & Wielded Global Dominance, p320-324, The University of North Carolina Press, Michael H. Hunt is Everett H. Emerson Professor of History Emeritus at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.) //Doof

While U.S. hegemony entails perplexities and burdens, an abandonment of hegemony may carry risks. Diminished U.S. leadership could prove dangerously disruptive of the international system and imperil the well-being of peoples everywhere, Americans included. A U.S. retreat could undermine an international economy that has generated impressive global abundance and peace beneficial to many. Simply consider the resources now available today (an annual worldwide output of $30 trillion at the end of the twentieth century) compared to fifty years earlier when it was a tenth that figure. Imagine what this amazing, unprecedented leap in global productivity has meant to health and welfare in all lands. Without U.S. leadership, so the defenders of hegemony claim, these gains might well have been limited, even nonexistent. A future of diminished abundance might prove distinctly unpleasant: greater discord among states and peoples leading to rising cultural intolerance, flaring nationalist fervor and rivalry, deepening international divisions, and fraying economic ties that would slow growth and press down longevity and health in wide swaths of the human population. This would be a world of narrower horizons, fewer choices, and less interaction among peoples and cultures. It would also be a world with diminished capacity for addressing mounting global problems. Advocates for maintaining U.S. dominance along current neoliberal lines hold the ideological high ground. The predominant version of American nationalism took a distinctly activist turn in the course of the twentieth century. From the 1890s to the 1920s the notion of the United States as a dynamic republic with the vision and energy to manage the world’s affairs began to come into its own. Republicans dedicated to an assertive policy along a broad front contributed to this shift in thinking. So too did Woodrow Wilson with his fervent support for the ideal of a progressive international society. In 1941 Henry Luce blended this set of nationalist ideas in his vision of an American century marked by the advance of political freedom, unhampered commerce, and general economic abundance. The most activist U.S. leaders after World War II drew from this creed, as appealing to visionary Wilsonians such as Harry Truman as to corporate-minded Republicans such as Ronald Reagan and the younger Bush. Over the past half century it has become an orthodoxy so potent in its appeal that challengers risk exile from membership in the foreign policy establishment and exclusion from government posts. Such is the allegiance commanded by the one true faith. Or as John Adams observed pungently, “Power always thinks it has a great Soul, and vast Views.”¹⁰ Even so, a good case can be made for a U.S. retreat from hegemony and toward a more modest and sustainable role in the world. A searching critique has no reason to linger on matters of style, particularly such easy targets as a policy governed by restless unilateralism or simplistic assumptions. Such a critique should instead turn to the hegemonic project itself. The place to begin a critical evaluation is with the tendency of the champions of hegemony to oversell the product. They point to its historical achievements to the neglect of the costs it has imposed on others. The leaders of the United States have managed hegemony with a lamentably heavy hand—with scant respect for human life and scant respect for human diversity. Millions died and many societies suffered profound disruption as a result of the U.S. interventions that dot the pages of this account. To those costs would have to be added an intolerance of views on markets and the state that diverge from U.S. preferences. As a result, U.S. pressure has in some cases blocked or disrupted socioeconomic and political experiments favored by others, especially in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. In other cases, an insistence on an American way has generated tensions with major states such as China or regions such as western Europe with divergent interests and values; that insistence has also strained ties with genuinely international organizations such as the UN. On virtually every front U.S. leaders have left themselves open to charges of hypocrisy—of ignoring if not violating the ideals of democracy and self-determination that they publicly profess. A look into the future reveals more grounds for doubts about the hegemonic project. Put simply, the time for U.S. hegemony may have passed. As the relative U.S. advantage in economic might and cultural appeal slips, attempts to exercise hegemony may prove increasingly counterproductive, doing more to further undermine than to confirm U.S. dominance. The U.S. economy labors under limits. Persistent structural problems include oil dependency, low domestic savings, and deep trade and federal budget deficits. The core U.S. cultural model—a faith in unending corporate-driven growth and the unending delights of consumerism—may be fading at least in the developed world. Western Europe and Japan have both drawn alongside the United States in their technological capacity, their income levels, their capital resources, and the depth and integration of their home markets. They need no longer look to the United States as a model in any of these areas. The consumer revolution led by Americans may have at least in these two regions run its course. Rising per capita income beyond a point (in the range of $15,000 in a fair sampling of countries recently surveyed) seems to produce no greater individual satisfaction while imposing costs captured not by conventional GDP data but by social GDP estimates.¹¹ In military affairs, the United States has retained, even increased, its dominance. But to what end? Its massive nuclear stockpile can be used only at the risk of profound and widespread moral revulsion and in some circumstances of devastating counterstrikes. Its high-tech forces may be the wonder of the world. But they are effective only against the most peripheral and isolated of states (in what one observer has dismissed as “theatrical micromilitarism”), and they have limited capacity to rebuild what they have destroyed.¹² The exercise of military might has proven a poor substitute for the intricacies of diplomatic negotiation, the trade-offs indispensable to international comity, and the long-term commitment of resources to economic development and human welfare. Finally, hegemony may hurt the hegemon. Evidence can be found in the privileging of corporate interests harmful to popular welfare, a fixation with military power that amounts to a national obsession, an increasingly infantilized and inert public, and the rise of an imperial presidency antithetical to genuine democracy. These trends validate a sharply critical view of foreign adventures that prevailed during the country’s first century. Proponents of republicanism claimed that crusades, even crusades conducted in the name of freedom, threatened freedom at home. The history of republican experiments across history showed that foreign entanglements and adventures created dangerous concentrations of political power within and undermined the very civic virtues on which the survival of any republic depended. Vindicating this republican fear is the rise of the imperial president and the concomitant atrophy of the democratic process. While most Americans today may not see hegemony through this anxious republican lens, many have voiced their discontent with the outward thrust of U.S. policy. Some express it in frustration and chagrin directed not against U.S. leaders but against a seemingly ungrateful, unyielding, dangerous world and call for scaling back international commitments. The most restive have contended that a more isolated, less burdened America would be better off— less vulnerable to attack, less dependent on fickle friends, less likely to get entangled in distant quarrels, and more secure in its homeland and its domestic liberties. Others refuse to go this far and instead put the blame squarely on U.S. leaders—political and corporate—whose free-market, environmental, and human rights policies have betrayed values as important at home as in the international community. Taken together, these critical reactions suggest a broad-based skepticism about hegemony. But the critics may be so fundamentally divided philosophically, politically, regionally, and socially that they cannot cobble together a common program to serve as an alternative to hegemony. A retreat from hegemony need not lead to isolationism. This myth about the nature of U.S. foreign relations in the past, which was constructed in the first place for the very purpose of justifying U.S. dominance, is likely to figure prominently in any defense of the status quo. But the notion of isolation is flawed as history and as a source of lessons. Today as earlier, the United States has a major stake in a productive, peaceful, and just global society. By extension, the United States has an obligation rooted in self-interest if not calculations of altruism and long-term human welfare to help mobilize a collective international response to the problems generated by that society. A retreat implies that the United States would act in world affairs not as the leader but as a leader, perhaps in some circumstances the first among equals. Engaging in a genuinely collaborative relationship with other states and taking international institutions and norms seriously may hold out the best hope of extending the considerable achievements of the previous fifty years and in the bargain maintaining U.S. influence and advancing U.S. well-being. The historical case for the efficacy of collaboration is compelling. The U.S. role after World War I calmed, for a time at least, the arms race, gave the Europeans a chance to sort out their monetary tangle, and sustained the turn-of-the-century drive to create humane standards of international conduct. The post–World War II record is even more striking. The achievements in setting norms (such as outlawing genocide), rehabilitating defeated Germany and Japan, and creating a framework for global prosperity were the result of collaboration richly repaid in international support and respect, not to mention enhanced U.S. security. This collaborative element helped not only to distinguish the U.S. from the Soviet side during the Cold War, but also to determine the outcome of a competition that was as much about systems and values as military might. International cooperation is not an illusion; it yields results far better than a course defined by narrow self-interest and pursued by brute force. Whatever the attractions of a more modest, collaborative internationalism, winning broad acceptance of such an approach faces serious difficulties. It requires that Americans think about their role in the world in a fresh, genuinely global way quite distinct from the cautious opportunism familiar from the first U.S. century and the rising assertiveness that has marked recent decades. It also requires a sensitivity to the intricacies of the global system and the cultural diversity of its parts. That sensitivity will not come easily to today’s body politic, which features a disengaged, ill-schooled public and a political class beholden to interest groups and trapped by shallow rhetoric and narrow, short-term calculations. Above all, the middle way offers nothing heroic to a country of individualists that may be dependent on civic nationalism as one of the few sources of collective identity. Indeed, calls for serious, long-term support for economic development programs, genuine respect for international norms, and tolerance for regional diversity collide with prevailing nationalist and neoliberal notions, which continue to inspire bold dreams of global transformation under the American aegis and in the American image. A retreat from hegemony would require a lot: a more cosmopolitan understanding of other cultures, a more sophisticated grasp of U.S. limits, a genuinely democratic electoral system responsive to popular preferences, and a better informed electorate able to think through those preferences. The fate of the current ascendancy with its hegemonic dimensions may well hang on how Americans measure up to these high standards and how rapidly structural problems eat away at the foundations of our hegemony. What the next page of the national story has to say may depend on how well we take into account the possibilities and constraints created by a history of burgeoning state power, strong nationalism, and intrusive global forces.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Alt Fails

The alt fails to solve, only incremental changes at the nation-state level can solve, while sweeping global reforms solving is nothing but a utopian pipe dream.

Fukuyama ‘04 (Francis, 7/25/2004, An Antidote To Empire, The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/25/books/an-antidote-to-empire.html (Accessed 7/14/2022) Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama is an American political scientist, political economist, and writer.) //Doof

Well before 9/11 and the Iraq war put the idea in everybody's mind, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri had popularized the notion of a modern empire. Four years ago, they argued in a widely discussed book -- titled, as it happens, ''Empire'' -- that the globe was ruled by a new imperial order, different from earlier ones, which were based on overt military domination. This one had no center; it was managed by the world's wealthy nation-states (particularly the United States), by multinational corporations and by international institutions like the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. This empire -- a k a globalization -- was exploitative, undemocratic and repressive, not only for developing countries but also for the excluded in the rich West. Hardt and Negri's new book, ''Multitude,'' argues that the antidote to empire is the realization of true democracy, ''the rule of everyone by everyone, a democracy without qualifiers.'' They say that the left needs to leave behind outdated concepts like the proletariat and the working class, which vastly oversimplify the gender/racial/ethnic/ class diversities of today's world. In their place they propose the term ''multitude,'' to capture the ''commonality and singularity'' of those who stand in opposition to the wealthy and powerful. This book -- which lurches from analyses of intellectual property rules for genetically engineered animals to discourses on Dostoyevsky and the myth of the golem -- deals with an imaginary problem and a real problem. Unfortunately, it provides us with an imaginary solution to the real problem. The imaginary problem stems from the authors' basic understanding of economics and politics, which remains at its core unreconstructedly Marxist. For them, there is no such thing as voluntary economic exchange, only coercive political hierarchy: any unequal division of rewards is prima facie evidence of exploitation. Private property is a form of theft. Globalization has no redeeming benefits whatsoever. (East Asia's rise from third- to first-world status in the last 50 years seems not to have registered on their mental map.) Similarly, democracy is not embodied in constitutions, political parties or elections, which are simply manipulated to benefit elites. The half of the country that votes Republican is evidently not part of the book's multitude. To all this Hardt and Negri add an extremely confused theory, their take on what Daniel Bell labeled postindustrial society, and what has more recently been called the ''knowledge economy.'' The ''immaterial labor'' of knowledge workers differs from labor in the industrial era, Hardt and Negri say, because it produces not objects but social relations. It is inherently communal, which implies that no one can legitimately appropriate it for private gain. Programmers at Microsoft may be surprised to discover that because they collaborate with one another, their programs belong to everybody. It's hard to know even how to engage this set of assertions. Globalization is a complex phenomenon; it produces winners and losers among rich and poor alike. But you would never learn about the complexities from reading ''Multitude.'' So let's move on to Hardt and Negri's real problem, which has to do with global governance. We have at this point in human history evolved fairly good democratic political institutions, but only at the level of the nation-state. With globalization -- and increased flows of information, goods, money and people across borders -- countries are now better able to help, but also to harm, one another. In the 1990's, the harm was felt primarily through financial shocks and job losses, and since 9/11 it has acquired a military dimension as well. As the authors state, ''one result of the current form of globalization is that certain national leaders, both elected and unelected, gain greater powers over populations outside their own nation-states.'' The United States is uniquely implicated in this charge because of its enormous military, economic and cultural power. What drove people around the world crazy about the Bush administration's unilateral approach to the Iraq war was its assertion that it was accountable to no one but American voters for what it did in distant parts of the globe. And since institutions like the United Nations are woefully ill equipped to deal with democratic legitimacy, this democracy deficit is a real and abiding challenge at the international level. The authors are conscious of the charge that they, like the Seattle anti-globalization protesters they celebrate, don't have any real solutions to these matters, so they spend some time discussing how to fix the present international institutions. Their problem is that any fixes are politically difficult if not impossible to bring about, and promise only marginal benefits. Democratic institutions that work at the nation-state level don't work at global levels. A true global democracy, in which all of the earth's billions of people actually vote, is an impossible dream, while existing proposals to modify the United Nations Security Council or change the balance of power between it and the General Assembly are political nonstarters. Making the World Bank and I.M.F. more transparent are worthy projects, but hardly solutions to the underlying issue of democratic accountability. The United States, meanwhile, has stood in the way of new institutions like the International Criminal Court. It is at this point that Hardt and Negri take leave of reality -- arriving at an imaginary solution to their real problem. They argue that instead of ''repeating old rituals and tired solutions'' we need to begin ''a new investigation in order to formulate a new science of society and politics.'' The woolliness of the subsequent analysis is hard to overstate. According to them, the fundamental obstacle to true democracy is not just the monopoly of legitimate force held by nation-states, but the dominance implied in virtually all hierarchies, which give certain individuals authority over others. The authors dress up Marx's old utopia of the withering away of the state in the contemporary language of chaos theory and biological systems, suggesting that hierarchies should be replaced with networks that reflect the diversity and commonality of the ''multitude.'' The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that there is a whole class of issues networks can't resolve. This is why hierarchies, from nation-states to corporations to university departments, persist, and why so many left-wing movements claiming to speak on behalf of the people have ended up monopolizing power. Indeed, the powerlessness and poverty in today's world are due not to the excessive power of nation-states, but to their weakness. The solution is not to undermine sovereignty but to build stronger states in the developing world. To illustrate, take the very different growth trajectories of East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa over the past generation. Two of the fastest growing economies in the world today happen to be in the two most populous countries, China and India; sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, has tragically seen declining per capita incomes over the same period. At least part of this difference is the result of globalization: China and India have integrated themselves into the global economy, while sub-Saharan Africa is the one part of the world barely touched by globalization or multinational corporations. But this raises the question of why India and China have been able to take advantage of globalization, while Africa has not. The answer has largely to do with the fact that the former have strong, well-developed state institutions providing basic stability and public goods. They had only to get out of the way of private markets to trigger growth. By contrast, modern states were virtually unknown in most of sub-Saharan Africa before European colonialism, and the weakness of states in the region has been the source of its woes ever since. Any project, then, to fix the ills of ''empire'' has to begin with the strengthening, not the dismantling, of institutions at the nation-state level. This will not solve the problems of global governance, but surely any real advance here will come only through slow, patient innovation and the reform of international institutions. Hardt and Negri should remember the old insight of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, taken up later by the German Greens: progress is to be achieved not with utopian dreaming, but with a ''long march through institutions.''

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Turn – Anthro

Turn - Empire’s concept of biopower is anthropocentric and reductionist.

Youatt ‘08 (R, August 2008, Counting Species: Biopower and the Global Biodiversity Census, (Accessed 7/14/2022), Department of Political Science Reed College Environmental Values Vol. 17 No. 3) //Doof

Driven both by the global loss of biodiversity and by the lack of knowledge about the vast majority of species that are being lost, conservation biologists and some of their allies in the environmental movement have called for and started a massive global census of biodiversity.1 Most prominently, E.O. Wilson has proposed a new mobilisation of scientific resources to complete a global survey of species.2 The identification of biodiversity ʻhotspotsʼ is the first step in a cascade of biodiversity investigation, Wilson hopes, which will culminate in a full inventory of global biodiversity and of the places where it is being lost. With complete information about the global population of biological species, Wilson is optimistic that we can undertake more refined conservation measures and ultimately move towards greater sustainability. In this article, I take the position that the global biodiversity census is as much about power and political life and the boundaries between nature and society as it is about scientific information gathering for conservationist ends. Drawing on Foucaultʼs concept of biopower, I suggest that the biodiversity census provokes us to think about the ways that biological nonhumans are embroiled in, and challenge, the technologies of power that see life itself as a political object. To the extent that the ʻactionʼ in the biodiversity census seems to rest largely with the human scientists who do the categorising, naming, counting, and labelling of nonhuman species, one analytic stance towards this scientific practice is an anthropocentric one. Here, the focus is on considering the field of social power in which scientific efforts take place, and asking questions about the discourses, resources and networks that make a biodiversity census plausible and possible. But what if nonhumans can be legitimately considered to be active participants in the field of biopower, just as human subjects who are censused are? Can nonhumans be sites of resistance to biopower, and disrupt its governing impulses? I argue that it is possible, and indeed necessary in the context of biodiversity, to extend the idea of biopower to include nonhumans as participants. Like human subjects, nonhumans are regulated and rationalised in matrices of knowledge and science, through which they are readied as productive resources for capitalism and mined as repositories of genetic information. Nonhuman participation in an ecological field of biopower also involves being part of an array of authority in environmental discourses, with effects for both humans and nonhumans, and constructing new possibilities for biosocial collectives. However, because nonhumans generally lack the capacity to be self-regulating subjects but are nonetheless necessary authorities in figuring biodiversity truth discourses, I suggest that they hold a different kind of place in biopower than self-regulating human subjects do. More specifically, because nonhumans constitutionally (rather than intentionally) refuse to internalise the meanings of human language, they are able to resist becoming self-regulating subjects to a significant extent, relying instead on their own semiotic interpretations of the environment and acting accordingly: for example, through migrating, reproduc- ing, consuming resources and filling ecological niches in unexpected ways, biotic nonhumans are constantly challenging the normalising will of biopower. At the same time, because environmental interventions to save species come to be justified on the grounds of global environmental well-being, the health and continued existence of nonhumans becomes an increasing imperative. In spite of the fact the biodiversity census may extend the reach of an ecologically unfriendly capitalism, I conclude that it will, on balance, reap important ecological goods in hybridising political practice and acknowledging extra-human locations of power. The article proceeds as follows. I start in Section 1 by reviewing the global biodiversity census proposal. In section 2, I consider how scientific power is extended through the census and what sources of power it draws on to do so. The science of censusing nonhumans requires a significant mobilisation of social power – financial, technological, institutional and discursive – in order to succeed. But because knowledge projects like demography have effects and techniques that reach beyond these sources of social power into life itself, I suggest that we cannot fully explain the importance of the biodiversity census through these means. In section 3, therefore, I extend Foucaultʼs concept of biopower into the nonhuman world as a means to explain the productive power and regulatory qualities of the census. Because the subjects of the biodiversity census are mostly nonhuman, however, I also consider how the concept of biopower mutates in light of their participation. 1. THE GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY CENSUS PROPOSAL Spurred by the problem of a major extinction event in which we do not even know what or how much is being lost, the basic knowledge-problem that the global biodiversity census is aimed at addressing is counting and describing all the species that currently exist in the world. According to the United Nations Environmental Programʼs (UNEP) Global Biodiversity Assessment, the best ecological estimates of extant species range from 3.5 million all the way to 111.5 million species, with the most likely figure at around 13.5 million.3 Only 1.75 million of those species are currently identified and described, however, or about 13 per cent.4 Each year, only 13,000 new species are formally described, a snailʼs pace given the magnitude of the task.5 Even when species have been described, the data often remains limited. Some species may have become extinct since being identified. May et al., for example, estimate that about 40 per cent of identified beetle species are known from a single examination in a single locality, sometimes an observation made decades ago.6 E.O. Wilsonʼs census proposal includes training and deploying a cadre of thousands of specialists in systematics, taxonomy and classification. He calculates that given 40 years of productive classification work per scientist, at the pace of ten species identified per year, approximately 25,000 professional lifetimes are needed, a number which ʻfalls well short of the number of enlisted men in the standing armed forces of Mongolia, not to mention the trade and retail personnel of Hinds County, Mississippiʼ.7 In the perfectly rational system that he hopes for, each expert would be assigned to a specific classificatory activity. While there are currently only three people in the world who are sufficiently expert in classifying termites, for example, Wilson would up their number proportionally to match the fact that termites comprise ten per cent of the total biomass of tropical regions. Wilson also champions investment in new computer technology that can combine scanning-electron microscopes with image-recognition software. Its goal would be to process and identify species instantly and to flag new specimens as they are passed through. The data held in the GenBank project, a computer database aimed at collecting information on all known DNA and RNA sequences, could be folded into this process. Given the massive numbers of species and the difficulty of resource mobilisation, other proposals suggest sampling procedures to get representative data on the global biopopulation. For example, Terry Erwin suggests that we aim for ʻmassive but achievable biotic inventoriesʼ that give us a relative fix on biodiversity.8 While it may not achieve Wilsonʼs goal of describing all species, targeting specific taxa and sampling certain species would have the effect of rationalising what is currently an ad hoc process. In the face of an ever larger human population, the United States census now makes limited use of representative sampling procedures, which its proponents argue make it more accurate than a large-scale but flawed collection of data about every individual.9 A global biodiversity census would aim to do the same. Some of the questions that surround the biodiversity census are scientific ones, such as concerns over the basic species concepts it employs and the problems of scale involved in identifying micro-species like bacteria.10 Given that the activities of science are not self-contained but always embedded in social relations, additional kinds of questions need to be asked, however. Yet little scholarly attention has been paid to what this biodiversity censusing effort means in political or social terms. Political ecologists have usefully inquired into the general effects of biodiversity discourses and the ways in which they are intertwined with regimes of power and governmentality,11 but they have not asked whether there is anything specific about the language and practice of censusing nonhuman bio-entities that is politically important. Environmental ethicists seem to have ignored the ethical dimensions of the topic altogether.12 Anthropologists and ethnobotanists have looked increasingly at the relationship between biological and cultural diversity, finding strong geographical and evolutionary correlations between the two and suggesting that a broader biocultural value linking nature and humans might be found in diversity complexes.13 However, they have not inquired into the importance of censusing as a technique by which the differences in biocultures might be constituted. Political scientists have written extensively and insightfully about the practice and effects of censusing human populations,14 but have not taken up how censusing nonhumans relates to political questions about power. The rest of the article aims to fill some of these gaps, particularly with respect to questions of how power functions in contemporary environmental science and politics. 2. THE BIODIVERSITY CENSUS AND THE SOCIAL POWER OF SCIENTISTS Taken as a socially-embedded activity, the production of successful scientific knowledge necessarily requires mobilisation of economic resources, expansion of institutional power, and discursive legitimation.15 Successful science, in other words, must be socially forged. This point does not suggest that the status of scientific truth-claims is fully dependent on social interests; rather, the point is that thinking about a scientific activity like the biodiversity census requires attending not only to activities of classification and arguments over species concepts, but also to how those activities are made possible in the first place. In short, what kind of social power does the biodiversity census draw on, depend on and reproduce? What makes the use of a biodiversity census seem intuitively obvious as the right tool to address biodiversity loss? Here, I consider two forms of social power, both crucial to the census project. First, I ask what financial and institutional resources are necessary to allow agenda-setting power and the capacity to steer future resources in advantageous ways.16 Second, I suggest the allure of the census rests partly on the way that biodiversity scientists are able to tap into discursive power, particularly the seductive power of discourses like panopticism and discovery.17 I consider these forms of power in turn. The institutional push for a global biodiversity census is centred in the United States, where it has harnessed major sources of funding, including the National Science Foundation (a $14 million fund for ʻplanetary biodiversity inventoriesʼ), the Packard Foundation and Harvard University. It has created a network of scientific-political organisations mainly based in the United States and Europe dedicated to censusing different parts of the natural world and promoting the ʻcompletion of the Linnaean enterpriseʼ18 into a ʻCatalogue of Lifeʼ – the Census of Marine Life, NatureServe, the Global Taxonomy Initiative of the Convention on Biodiversity, Species 2000 and the All-Species Foundation. There has been increased funding for the academic fields of taxonomy and bioinformatics.19 New professional lives have opened up around these resources – ʻeach species merits careers of scientific study and celebration by historians and poetsʼ, as Wilson puts it.20 The biodiversity census makes these possible first through the act of species identification and then through the subsequent study of species behaviour, ecological roles and potential uses for humanity. The key institutions of the global biodiversity census are organised around information and communications technologies, which worm their way right into the names and missions of the organisations involved. The Global Biodiversity Information Facility (GBIF) and the Integrated Taxonomic Information System (ITIS) (in partnership with US federal agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)) are two of the global clearinghouses for establishing quality specieslevel data, aiming to be ʻopen portalsʼ of biodiversity data.21 GBIFʼs mission is to ʻdevelop methods for sustainably using biodiversity … [by] rapidly, openly, and freely delivering primary data about biodiversity to everyone in the global community, using digital technologiesʼ.22 The political intent is universal access, while its method of delivery is technological. The universally-wired nature of ʻtheʼ global community is taken for granted, even as a global digital divide and the barriers of expertise suggest that no such community exists. One critical role that information technology plays in organising the global biodiversity census is in its ability to suggest a panoptic biological future.23 ʻImagine an electronic page for each species of organism on Earthʼ, Wilson asks us, ʻavailable everywhere by single access on commandʼ.24 Genealogically related to projects like Diderotʼs Encylopedie, the modern ʻEncyclopedia of Lifeʼ is the endpoint and ultimate goal of the censusing project, organised in a technology that claims to outrun space and time. The rhetoric of ʻachievingʼ a global biodiversity census also taps into complex Western narratives of discovery and conquest of nature (ironically, since the conservation agenda of the census is aimed in part at preserving the wildness of nature). This rhetoric also draws on the position of social power held by the modern sciences to reveal the unknown to human publics. Wilson exhorts supporters of the census to have ʻfaith in the sprint to the finish of the global censusʼ, promising that ʻunknown microorganisms ... will be revealedʼ and that ʻnever again, with fuller knowledge of such extent, need we overlook so many golden opportunities in the living world around usʼ.25 Similarly, the All-Species Foundation tells us that the global biodiversity census ʻoffers an unsurpassable adventure: the exploration of a little-known planetʼ.26 Finally, the discursive power of the census is connected to economic life, in the way that it renders nonhuman agents ready for postmodern capitalism as semiotic constructions (as in genetic codes for bioprospectors or images in nature videos).27 As Arturo Escobar argues, whereas ʻnatureʼ marked modern capitalismʼs attitude towards the nonhuman, ʻbiodiversityʼ is a term of postmodern capitalism, in the way that it readies nonhuman nature for semiotic use rather than material use.28 Indeed, postmodern capitalism may protect nature materially even as it commodifies it semiotically, as in the case of protecting the Amazon rainforest for its pharmaceutical potentials.29 Yet, as Escobar argues, ʻonce the semiotic conquest of nature is completed, the sustainable and rational use of the environment becomes imperativeʼ.30 That is, once biodiversity discourses help conserve an area as a biodiversity reserve which is made valuable in terms of code-commodity, it also becomes part of a political system of global environmental governance that continues to manage it for capitalism. Thus, conservation biologists have mobilised an expanding pool of financial and institutional resources, drawing in part on the seductive qualities of the dream of panopticism and the historical glory of exploration. To the extent that the agenda of global environmental governance is steered by their expertise, consensus and public statements,31 they have also garnered increased authority in speaking about matters of conservation, ecotourism and economic development. While these forms of social power (institutional, financial, technological, discursive) explain some of what is at stake in the biodiversity census, I want to suggest that the power of a global biodiversity census also rests in its hybridising force. It introduces nonhumans into the discursive heart of an otherwise anthropocentric modern human politics, economy and knowledge that has generally denied that nonhumans have formed a part of these projects.32 It creates a framework through which humans interact with, pattern and position the diversity of natural nonhumans. Understanding the importance of the biodiversity census therefore extends questions of power past its traditional human context into an ecological context. The important questions, then, are: for whom does this extended politics and power work?33 What happens to anthropocentric understandings of power upon the participation of nonhumans in the process? Does the (re)introduction of nonhumans tell us anything about the ʻwhereabouts of powerʼ, to use John Allenʼs phrase?34 Can power be nearly everywhere, or does it have a specifically local character in relations between things and thus an uneven distribution? To answer these questions, I turn to the idea of Foucaultian biopower, which considers how power works at the micro-levels of individual life, in relation to the more traditional forms of power considered thus far. 3. BIOPOWER AND THE CENSUS In this section, I start by considering how human censuses are understood to relate to politics and governing institutions, specifically through the Foucaultian idea of biopower. Because biopower is concerned with the ways that techniques like censusing operate on the terrain of ʻlife itselfʼ, it is particularly suited to thinking about the biodiversity census, which similarly involves a strategy for administering and rationalising life in ways that reach into nonhuman biological life as such.35 The consideration of censusing nonhuman life through the lens of biopower involves a basic trade-off. On one hand, the extension of biopower into nonhuman realms raises the spectre of a more subtle, but nonetheless corrosive, form of human power over the natural world. On the other hand, because power and resistance are always co-existent, nonhumans may disrupt the functioning of environmental governance in new and distinct ways. Specifically, biopower faces difficulty in creating self-regulating nonhuman subjects who internalise conditions of subjection. 3.1 Self-regulating subjects and the justification of power In contrast to absolute power commanded by the Hobbesian sovereign to ʻtake life or to let liveʼ, Michel Foucault argues that the modern form of biopower which replaced it in the nineteenth century was a regulatory and disciplinary form of power that involved ʻthe administration of bodies and the calculated management of lifeʼ.36 Biopower organised and administered life, through a variety of techniques or methods of power that dragged human life itself into the grid of power-knowledge. Institutions such as universities, public health agencies and the army, and regulatory forms of knowledge, such as demography and modern medicine, not only analysed life-processes but permeated them as well. Yet it was not just the use of these techniques or the presence of these institutions that characterised nineteenth-century biopower. Two parallel political shifts made biopower distinct from sovereign power. The first shift was that the right of the sovereign to have power over life and death was no longer justified based on protecting the sovereign from external threat (as in conscription in cases of war) or internal threat (as in the death penalty). Rather, the power over life and death was now justified in terms of the population itself, in modern democratic language. When war was waged, it was not to protect the sovereign, but in the name of the people and their continued existence. The justification for biopowerʼs interventions into the details of life – reproductive health, the ways in which we die, normalising vaccinations – was similarly made in the name of the population. One effect of this shift, Foucault notes, is that the death penalty became more difficult to sustain logically: ʻhow could power exercise its highest prerogatives by putting people to death, when its main role was to ensure, sustain, and multiply life, to put this life in order?ʼ37 In other words, the justifications for powerʼs activities have social effects that exceed the justifications themselves. What effect, then, will extending ʻprotecting lifeʼ to ʻprotecting biodiversityʼ have, if we consider the biodiversity census as an extended example of the logic of biopower? Part of the answer is that direct resource exploitation becomes more difficult, since power over life/death of animals, plants, insects or trees can no longer be justified by needs of the human population/sovereign to fight natural necessity with all its might.38 Ecological biopower thus involves both broader social trends like the rise of modern ecological consciousness and the emergence of conservationist ethics as part of it structural logic. At the same time, what becomes easier is both the management and regulation of nonhuman biological life by humans and the direct intervention in, and mutation of, biological and ecological life-processes, all in the name of bio- or eco-systemic ʻhealthʼ. Here, biopower can be understood as a logic of eco-governance that simultaneously subverts the resource-driven agenda of modern capital by trying to conserve material nature1 and enables and rationalises an entirely new form of intervention in life itself. The ecological sciences, on this reading, are one of the crucial institutions through which interventions into life are enacted, and the biodiversity census is one of its primary power-knowledge techniques. Thinking about biopower as involving nonhumans also has the consequence of changing the population in whose name powerʼs exercise is justified. If the idea of biopower adequately describes the intrusion of scientific, economic and regulatory techniques into the lives of nonhumans, then administering nonhuman life must be justified in the name of an expanded population as well – in this case, in the name of a global ecological population of species (and their genes), guided by an ethic of preserving and fostering biodiversity. In sum, in the name of planetary health (a metaphorical extension of modern biopowerʼs concern with human public health to a planetary scale), a new population is configured into which biopower intervenes, one explicitly composed of human and nonhuman members participating in ecosystemic communities. The second, parallel shift that Foucault notes was involved in the move from sovereign to regulatory power was that there was an unsettling effect on the practice of governing. Unlike sovereign power, regulatory biopower had the imperative to promote life, to ʻoptimise forces, aptitudes, and life in generalʼ, and its ʻhighest function was perhaps no longer to kill, but to invest life through and throughʼ.39 Yet, crucially, it had to do so in ways that did not make the population more difficult to govern.40 In other words, however life was politically managed, it had to be done in ways that ensured governability. This aspect of biopower was aimed at producing self-regulating subjects who internalised the qualities that promoted life but did not fundamentally disrupt social functioning. Self-regulating subjects were both efficient for power (since subjects did powerʼs work for it) and governable. Yet in this respect, the movement of nonhuman entities into the population in whose name biopower acts represents a potential location of freedom, or at least resistance, precisely because many nonhumans are constitutionally incapable of being self-regulating subjects who can internalise the conditions of subjection in biopowerʼs own terms. Nonhumans do not ʻknowʼ that they are a species or a member of a specific phylum, in those terms, or that they have a particular gene-sequence; rather, they have their own frameworks of understanding the moments of interaction with scientists and modes of environmental experience that guide their actions. In this respect, biotic nonhumans differ from the human subjects of biopower, who, as Foucaultʼs analysis suggests, become self-regulating subjects partly in virtue of the way that their consciousness is structured by biopower – by its language, its categories, and the techniques of self-making. When one looks at the minority of bio-entities that could be made partially self-regulating – genetically modified crops, pet clones, lab-grown tissue replacement, gene therapy and pre-selection, regulated game preserves in which species are fenced in or are trained to learn the boundaries of safe haven from human predators – they form a small fraction of the bio-population. Even in those cases, moreover, there are significant doubts over whether they can be made into self-regulating subjects in the same sense as humans. Their ability to accede to and internalise the normalising effects of power is limited by their biological constitution. Though they have varying kinds of subjective experience, they cannot be said to have the self-reflexive kind of subjectivity that humans do. Whereas human subjectivity is marked by the dual ability to be a distinct Self in contrast to the environment and to have the reflexive thought that ʻI am a Selfʼ, nonhumans are generally limited to the former possibility. If biopower cannot make most nonhumans into self-regulating subjects, then their governability rests solely on whether they can be controlled indirectly through the patterned grids of scientific prediction. Yet as groups and individuals, biological nonhumans routinely confound predictability, within their own kinds of subjectivities. They respond to ecological change by unexpectedly shifting migration patterns and locations. They expand in unanticipated ways into ecological niches that humans open directly (e.g., suburbs as feeding grounds for raccoons; rabbits introduced in Australia for hunting who subsequently overran the countryside; garbage dumps as sources of food for omnivorous bears) and indirectly (e.g., red-tailed deer population explosions in New England upon the over-hunting of deer-predators, causing substantial economic damage and fatal car accidents). Some species mutate at evolutionary speeds that far exceed those of humans (e.g., pesticide resistant strains of bugs or penicillin-resistant viruses). They sometimes form new relations with other species to the detriment of humans (e.g., birds as carriers of Asian bird flu). They remake ecosystems into new stabilities and undermine others. In short, while the lack of subjectivity and reflexivity in nonhuman populations is usually read as a source of acquiescence to human interrogation, it seems to also have an opposite effect, in that it constitutes them as ready sources of resistance and disruption to the desires of biopower to establish governable populations. Foucault says of biopower: ʻit is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes themʼ.41 Nonhuman agents effect some of the very same escapes simply by living. Life itself escapes biopower. 3.2. Array of authorities A second component of biopower is ʻone or more truth discourses about the “vital” character of living human beings, and an array of authorities competent to speak that truthʼ.42 In the context of the nineteenth-century societies that Foucault was analysing, these truth discourses about living beings included fields like demography and medicine. In the context of twenty-first-century biopower, Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose suggest that they might be extended to include fields like genomics, cloning and reproduction.43 What is critical to the truth discourses surrounding these fields is that there be an array of authorities, like the human sciences, public health agencies or social theorists, that both problematise a certain issue and endeavor to intervene in the field raised by that problematisation. These authorities both render the issue socially visible and strive to rationalise solutions. Just as scientists play a central role as authorities in the truth discourses of human sciences, so too are they central to the truth discourses of biodiversity loss. The project of the biodiversity census involves conservation biologists as a critical part of the authorities competent to create a truth discourse around species loss and conservation, through the rationalisation of species into an ordered catalogue of nonhuman life. But the involvement of nonhumans in this truth discourse exceeds a simple presence as scientific objects, and raises questions about whether we can think of biopower as authoritative about nonhumans without any account of how nonhumans might themselves testify to those truth claims, resist them, or actively participate to some degree in the making of scientific knowledge. An alternative account of scientific practice that moves towards such a distributed model of authority comes from Bruno Latour and others involved in theorising an actor-network approach, in which human and nonhuman agents are seen as collaboratively involved in the construction of scientific truth claims.44 On this account, scientific authority depends in part on the (nonlinguistic) ʻtestimonyʼ of nonhumans who are marshalled by scientists to establish the veracity of scientific accounts.45 While it is still human scientists who problematise the field of biodiversity loss, then, the array of authorities competent to ʻspeakʼ the truth discourses surrounding that field is distributed among both human and nonhuman. This line of argument about authority has three consequences. First, it speaks to the question of the ʻwhereabouts of powerʼ. One of the criticisms of Foucaultʼs analytic of power is that once it is taken past a specific institutional site into the broader practices of governing, it seems to be everywhere and nowhere.46 In a broader sense, space and place themselves seem to disappear from power. In the case of biodiversity sciences, at least, extending the participants in the biopower formation to nonhumans gives power concrete locations – in the places where data is collected, in the laboratories where representative samples are brought under the microscope, and in the bodies of species who experience different life-possibilities and pathways because of the process of classification. What makes biodiversity discourses potent at all, in other words, is the marshalling of human and nonhuman authorities to its truth-claims in particular places and particular biological bodies. Second, the intrusion of nonhuman life into authority-generating processes like the biodiversity census disrupts the human subject at the centre of modern biopower by forcing a new set of constituents into the political field who cannot quite be captured by it in the same way. Because the biopower depends on the relative flourishing of life, biopower cannot speak and act authoritatively on behalf of the health of global biopopulations and simultaneously extinguish them. The necessity of nonhuman life for biopower both enables its extension and increases the living things that disrupt biopowerʼs desire for smooth governing. To return to Foucaultʼs analysis of the death penalty, if biopower (in contrast with sovereign power) complicated the state killing its own citizens, then so too should ecological biopower be seen to complicate the domination of nonhumans (in modern relations with nature), including the ongoing anthropogenic species extinction event. Finally, if the Latourian understanding of authority as distributed between both scientists and scientific objects is correct, this critique should also apply to humans, in the human sciences that Foucault was considering. The authority of scientific claims depends not only on scientists, academics and public servants, but on the very human subjects that make authoritative claims possible. Not only is resistance coexistent with power within human subjectivity, as Foucault claimed,47 but a more distributed kind of authority also resides in the practices of biopower, among the subjects who take part in its data collections, experiments and interventions. 3.3. Biosocial collectivities In Foucaultʼs historical analysis, the formation of biopower occurs within the context of the rise of the modern nation-state. Yet the biodiversity crisis, which I have been thinking of here in terms of an extension of human biopower into biodiversity-power, presents a political situation in which there is a veritable state of emergency (species loss), and yet there is no state in which to declare such a state of emergency. This observation is true in two senses. It is true, first, in a spatial sense, in that the biodiversity crisis is global, yet there is no global state in which such a crisis could effectively be addressed.48 While a layer of global environmental governance may be growing and even using environmental problems as a way through which its expansion is made plausible,49 it does not yet have the logical or practical means to resolve the wider problems of social justice and development involved in the biodiversity crisis.50 In a second sense, there is also no political formation that accepts the participation of nonhumans within its confines. The nation-state is a modern, secular and thoroughly human mode of organisation, one that is based around a community of humans who in turn decide what is right or good for themselves and their environment. Its reasoning is decidedly and openly anthropocentric, as ecologists who advance biodiversityʼs cause almost all accept as a necessary part of communicating the biodiversity crisis to human publics.51 Similarly, the discourses of global governance draw on a thin kind of global political community,52 but they do not grasp nonhumans as participants in their ideological vision. Global governance is hardly democratic with respect to humans, much less politically inclusive of nonhumans.53 Understood in this way, when global governance discourses address biodiversity loss, they do so either as the next logical step in the postcolonial mission (moving from ʻcivilisation, progress, poverty, [to] environmental sustainabilityʼ),54 or as simply another problem area for governance to address.55 In the context of biopower that I have been considering, what then is the effect of global biodiversity census without a global state? If the modern census was part of a power-knowledge formation that was both organised by and constitutive of the nation-state as part of biopower, then a global biodiversity census should have some transformative effects in constituting political forms. The hypothesis that I want to suggest is that a biodiversity census will help construct new ideas of a multi-layered and multi-species global community. As a way into this hypothesis, consider the effect of the modern human population census on ideas of community. Benedict Anderson, for example, argues that the modern census was integrally related to the creation of the categories necessary for the creation of postcolonial nation-states. Anderson argues that the ʻ(confusedly) classifying mind of the colonial stateʼ created identities through the census that might not have been recognised as such by those who were censused and classified.56 The census involved a ʻtotalising classificatory grid, which could be applied with endless flexibility to anything under the stateʼs real or contemplated controlʼ.57 Yet by undertaking this project, the conditions of postcolonial nationalism were shaped and forms of intelligibility were constructed (and imposed) that were not otherwise there. For present-day aspirants to statehood, a census remains an important marker of a consolidated national citizenry, as in the push for a Palestinian census as a way towards achieving a de facto Palestinian state.58 Similarly, then, a global biodiversity census might be understood as part of constructing a global biocitizenry and in forming a global ecopolitical community. Rabinow and Rose suggest that biopower must include ʻstrategies for intervention in the name of life or health, initially addressed to populations that may or may not be territorialised upon the nation, society or pre-given communities, but may also be specified in terms of emergent bio-social collectivitiesʼ.59 Like Foucault, Rabinow and Rose are concerned with human populations, but their use of ʻbio-social collectivitiesʼ that are not necessarily dependent on a territorial population suggests the possibility of forms of community that are not tied to the nation-state. If the nation-state is not necessarily the right analogy for biosocial collectivities of humans and nonhumans, then Michael Hardt and Antonio Negriʼs expansion of biopower past Foucaultʼs state-bound apparatuses of governing points towards how a de-territorialised collectivity might be theorised.60 If Foucaultʼs use of biopower was used in the concrete historical analysis of the transition in nineteenth-century Europe from the sovereign state of absolute power over life and death to one ʻin the name of the peopleʼ of disciplinary and regulatory power, Hardt and Negri push the historical analysis forward another step by drawing from Gilles Deleuze the idea of a transition from a Foucaultian disciplinary society to a society of control. Disciplinary society exists in relation to individual subjects, setting the parameters of what is normal and deviant, prescribing the rules of social behaviour, and constructing the boundaries of the social space in which its citizens rattle around. Power in disciplinary society is concentrated in institutions. By contrast, a society of control moves into the very interior of its subjects. It regulates not from outside but through its distribution and internalisation into ʻbrains and bodiesʼ.61 It is a form of power that exists in networked interiorities (i.e., the linked, self-regulating consciousness of subjects), not in external impositions, limits, sanctions or structurings. Power in a society of control is also unique in the way that it is able to make biopower its exclusive terrain of reference. For Hardt and Negri, it is also a more totalising form of power than disciplinary power – it ʻextends throughout the depths of the consciousness and bodies of the population – and at the same time across the entirety of social relationsʼ.62 It is such an organising power that Hardt and Negri see as globally operative in the social production of subjects. But Hardt and Negri are critical of the way in which the global society of control has been considered in a disembodied way. They argue that the abstractions of language, communication, and intellectual ideas have been given productive precedence over the material and corporeal. 63 In their neo-Marxist reading, the potential of a biopolitical analysis rests with its study at the level of labour, production and bodies. If Marxist analysis of modern capitalism understood communication as external or secondary to the material relations of production, Hardt and Negri want to read it as internal and immanent to production in postmodern capitalism. The semiotic reconfiguration of postmodern capital that Escobar suggests is thus the very productive activity in Hardt and Negriʼs framework, and biopower is a Foucaultian/Marxist hybrid.64 In such a framework, biodiversity is something produced, and the ʻthingsʼ of biodiversity – the individuals, the species, the communicative fabric of science around which knowledge of them is built, the development projects of which biodiversity is a component – are implicated in a global society of control. Like Foucaultʼs conceptualisation of power, Hardt and Negriʼs vision of biopower as a field or fabric of social and capitalist production is an image that makes us see a total matrix of power. Yet their relative exclusion of nonhumans is curious, since there is a slew of nonhuman agents outside of that productive field. There is a multitude of nonhumans, so to speak, that includes the ʻbacterial proletariatʼ, in E.O. Wilsonʼs colourful metaphor and the nomadic animal populations who routinely exceed national borders.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Thesis – Empire = Wrong

Empire fails to account for 9/11 and events afterwards, making it useless in a contemporary context.

Moore ‘03 (David, Hardt and Negri's Empire and Real Empire: The Terrors of 9-11 and After, (Accessed 7/14/22) Economic History and Development Studies Programme, University of Natal, Durban, South Africa 4041.) //Doof

Are We All New Yorkers? It is ironic for Empire readers that the horror of 9-11 happened in the centre of the empire so vividly portrayed in that book. The Twin Towers symbolised everything Empire discussed. From the earth-encompassing power of finance capital, to internet capitalism’s connection and compression of space and time, and to the cosmopolitan nature of the workers there, the towers were the epitome of everything Empire loved and hated about the world today. Antonio Negri said ‘we are all New Yorkers’ in an interview after 9-11 (Cocco and Lazarrato 2002) and it is clear that the book he and Michael Hardt produced really does see the whole world as if it was New York. For Hardt and Negri, the global ‘multitude’ is composed of urban (and urbane) citizens whose autonomy and hybridity make institutions such as states, and ideologies such as religions, evaporate into the mists of the immaterial labour that now drive the world. The multitude’s labour is impossible to measure, so all of its members have equal value (cf. Resnick and Wolff 2001; Dyer-Witherford 2001) and they all really want the same thing. Be they waiters in the Greenwich Village cafés, analysts for the currency speculators on Wall Street, or professors at Columbia University – or at similar sites in New York’s image anywhere in the world – sometime soon they will all oppose capitalist exploitation and national oppression, replacing them with the joys of being a communist. The kind of resistance that brought the Twin Towers down, however, forces the irony to take an awkward and bitter twist. Al-Queda hardly represents the postmodern enemies of post-imperialism envisaged (for the most part) in Empire. Empire’s sweep is so vast and so fast that religion, nationalism and any of the other forces inspiring Osama bin-Laden and his many followers are in the dustbin. When these forces revisit the postmodern world their aspirations are ‘incommunicable’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 54, Hardt and Negri 2001a; Negri 2002): it is as if they have arisen from the dead. Contrary to Empire, however, they dealt New York and – more importantly but also almost erased from the book – the state within which the city is ensconced a blow that catalysed a form of empire Hardt and Negri thought had disappeared. A ‘one state beats all’ form of imperial power has arisen from the ashes of Twin Towers. It is now wreaking terror in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq and chilling the hearts of European politicians and United Nations multilateralists – and it inspired 15 million members of the ‘multitude’ to demonstrate. But the people who guided their passenger-packed planes into the Twin Towers were not ‘New Yorkers’ in the mold of Hardt and Negri’s multitude. Nor were most of those in Iraq on whom bombs rained and American troops shot in March and April 2003. Neither are the Americans who supported the campaign. The actions, beliefs and structures of the world in the post 9-11 era are significantly different from those inscribed in Hardt and Negri’s Empire – as is the etiology of the event. There are three ways to assess Empire’s inability to foresee the world in the wake of 9-11. I list and analyse them in reverse order of theoretical priority (indicated in the abstract) because the spectacle of such an event as 9-11 demands that in this instance the ‘epiphenomenal’ comes first (Campbell 2001). Firstly, the act of terrorism that destroyed the Twin Towers and killed the approximately 3,000 people within it must be analysed in terms of the way in which Hardt and Negri understand the nature of resistance to global capitalism (or, in their lexicon, ‘the informational mode of production’). Their uncertainty about the agents and strategies of resistance lends ambiguity to their thinking about 9-11 and similar events. Secondly, the importance of the ‘state’ as a structure within both core and peripheral components of global society must be re-stated and theorised in the light of Empire’s elision of that task. The contradictions inherent in state formation in the third world combined with those of the construction and maintenance of American empire in the current global conjuncture create both the terror of ‘resistance’ from below and ‘régime change’ from above. Hardt and Negri tend to wish these complexities away in their construction of a world full of libertarian flows of desire and capital. The ‘terror from above’ that has been visited on Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of 9-11 suggests the increasing dominance of American state power qua state power, instead of the erasure of such authority as predicted in Empire. Thirdly – and most critically in terms of structural fundamentals – it is necessary to undertake a foundational ‘political economy’ critique deconstructing Hardt and Negri’s assessment of the nature of the global capitalist system. Their hasty ironing out of the fundamentally uneven development of the global complex of state-society formations is simply unsustainable when one gets down to the ‘nitty-gritty’ of political economy. Empire smoothes out all of the contradictions of ‘third world’ development in spite of itself. This myopia regarding the underdeveloped world is at the root of Hardt and Negri’s too exuberant celebration of global cyber-capitalism – and thus also at the centre of their erasure of the state and their misunderstanding of the resistanceterror nexus. This essay will thus reposition empire on the ‘real world’ rather than the ethereal one created in Empire – while acknowledging that much of the required rethinking has been inspired by the simultaneously frustrating and stimulating book.