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2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad – Russia

Russia is reactionary – they wouldn’t have invaded Ukraine if NATO had not provoked them

Maguire 22 MAIREAD MAGUIRE (peace activist from Northern Ireland, Nobel Peace Prize recipient), July 7, 2022, "Nato expansion has been main cause of Ukraine military conflict,", Irish News, https://www.irishnews.com/opinion/letterstotheeditor/2022/07/04/news/nato-expansion-has-been-main-cause-of-ukraine-military-conflict-2761003/

Patrick Murphy’s column –‘Pope’s comments may help avert global conflict’ (June 18) – are courageous and challenging. Courageous in that Ireland (and most of Europe) are caught up in Russia-phobia and war propaganda being peddled by our mainstream media and military industrial complex. Mr Murphy quoted Pope Francis as saying that the war was “perhaps somehow either provoked or not prevented”. I think this statement hints towards the elephant in the room (Nato/US endless expansion). The US Peace Council of May 12 describes the Ukraine as a US-manufactured conflict and says “Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine could have been avoided if the US had not relentlessly provoked it”. Nato – the US-dominated global war machine – whose policy is ‘full dominance spectrum’ contrary to its claims it is not a defensive organisation. Its purpose has been to act as an instrument for US world domination and to prevent all challenges to US hegemony. It should have been disbanded in l99l after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, but instead expanded into 15 new countries and breaking its promise to President Gorbachev, that it would not expand east. This relentless eastward expansion of Nato during the past decade has been an existential threat to a nuclear-armed Russia and the main cause of the present military conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s military intervention into Ukraine should never have happened and the suffering inflicted upon the Ukrainian people (and Russian) has been horrific and it is right all those who have suffered so much should be helped. However, sending arms into Ukraine only adds fuel to the fire. There are vested interests from western powers hard at work, and much money to be made. As it stands the west is bankrolling the war with arms and billions in dollars/euros, for their own agenda. These people will not shed a tear for the young dead of Ukraine. Their aim is for a weakened Russia (through sanctions), more military spending and a more divided and economically weak Europe, and as long as we continue not to question their role in Ukraine, they will succeed. There seems to be only one winner in this, and they are not in Europe. Now is the time for dialogue and those western political leaders who stoke the fire of fear, division and hate in Ukraine, instead of calling for ceasefire and negotiation, must consider the misery brought upon the poor people that most live with the horrors of war.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Bad – Russia

Increasing NATO’s capabilities creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes Russia more likely to lashout

Achar 22 Gilbert Achcar (Gilbert Achcar is a professor at SOAS, University of London. His new book, The New Cold War: The United States, Russia and China from Kosovo to Ukraine, will come out in early 2023.) , 6-23-2022, "NATO From Bad to Worse," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-china-russia-us/

Supporters of NATO’s eastward expansion wanted the US empire to encompass a large chunk of the former Soviet empire in the belief that, sooner or later, post-communist Russia would seek to revive its long imperial tradition. It was therefore necessary to preempt this inevitable development by securing US control of as much of the former Soviet empire as possible. Since Putin’s regime has indeed engaged in predatory behavior since 2008 in what has traditionally been regarded by Russia as its imperial “near abroad”—intervention in Georgia in 2008, annexation of Crimea and intervention in Donbas in 2014, attempted invasion for “regime change” in Ukraine in 2022, and ongoing efforts to occupy the whole of Donbas and adjacent areas—one would be tempted to believe that those who advocated NATO’s enlargement have been proven right. The truth is, however, that this outcome is precisely what those who opposed the enlargement had cautioned against. They rightly predicted that the Russians would see NATO’s eastward expansion as a hostile gesture and that it would therefore breed revanchist attitudes among them. In other words, they warned that enlarging NATO in preemption of Russia’s return to imperial behavior would actually act as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 1997 summit officially invited Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance. The three Eastern European countries’ accession was completed two years later at the Washington summit that celebrated NATO’s 50th anniversary. It happened at a time when the alliance was bombing Yugoslavia in contravention of international law, in the first post-1990 US-led war not authorized by the United Nations Security Council. Along with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 that circumvented yet again the UNSC, and NATO’s subsequent enlargement in 2004 to seven more East European countries, including the three Baltic states, which were formerly part of the USSR, this sequence of events was decisive in creating the animosity between Russia and the West that was a prelude to the invasion of Ukraine. The forthcoming summit in Madrid will be the occasion of a major qualitative leap in the definition of NATO’s raison d’être, no less consequential than the 1997 summit. This is not an allusion to the formal invitation of Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, although this development is certainly very significant, more so perhaps than all previous rounds of enlargement, because it will considerably lengthen NATO’s direct border with Russia (Finland’s border with Russia is 1,340 kilometers long). On this issue, the only question mark is Turkey’s position, since any new membership offer must be unanimously approved by all existing NATO members, a principle that grants each one of them an actual veto right. Ankara wants the two Nordic states to take measures against the Kurdish movement, strongly represented among refugees in both countries. But the most dangerous novelty at the Madrid summit consists of a major qualitative extension of NATO’s purpose. Originally founded as a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union and its subordinate states, NATO has mutated after 1991 into a “security organization”—meaning that it has been involved in military actions (NATO as such did not formally engage in any war in the USSR’s days)—and redefined its purpose in ostracizing post-Soviet Russia by expanding toward its borders. The NATO-Russia Council created in 1997 was a meager consolation given to Moscow in lieu of inviting it to join the alliance. Nobody was fooled. From tacit, NATO’s hostility to Russia became explicit after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The forthcoming Madrid summit is going to directly involve NATO in open hostility to China, far beyond the alliance’s original area of relevance. This area is defined in the 1949 treaty constitutive of NATO as comprising “the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” NATO’s post-1991 mutation led it to intervene beyond its members’ territory—first in the Balkans, then much further from its original area, in Afghanistan, in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks. Participation in the organization’s meetings has nevertheless remained restricted to Europe and North America. No longer. Japan, along with Australia, New Zealand and South Korea have been invited to attend the Madrid summit as NATO “partners” in the Asia-Pacific region—a very serious provocation to Beijing. It can only interpret this invitation as a step toward the consolidation of US-led alliances in a single global network opposed to both Russia and China. After the preliminary meeting of NATO’s defense ministers held on June 16, the organization’s secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, declared that the new NATO Strategic Concept that will be adopted at the Madrid summit will set out the alliance’s position “on Russia, on emerging challenges, and for the first time, on China.” From the perspective of Washington’s drive to perpetuate its hegemony over most of Europe and the Asia Pacific by portraying Russia and China as enemies—a grand strategy that has been followed by all successive post-1991 US administrations—the new escalation to be confirmed in Madrid makes full sense. While resolutely supporting Ukraine’s resistance to the Russian invasion, President Biden has multiplied provocative gestures toward Beijing, including his statement, prior to a summit meeting in May of the anti-China alliance known as the Quad (Japan, Australia, and India along with the United States), that the United States would defend Taiwan militarily. The statement was quickly watered down by the State Department, which had in May removed from a Taiwan Fact Sheet on its website the statement “we do not support Taiwan independence” and reinstated it in June. From the perspective of Europe and the Asia Pacific, acquiescing to this de facto extension of NATO’s role is equivalent to being herded like Panurge’s sheep toward throwing themselves into the sea. Antagonizing China is not in Europe’s interest, nor is it in the interest of any of the states invited to the Madrid summit. Even if the European governments believed that Russia has now irreversibly become a threat to their security, it would be utterly counterproductive for them to push Beijing toward consolidating an alliance with Moscow. These developments bring the world closer to a conflagration that could dwarf the ongoing war in Ukraine and endanger the future of humankind. It is urgent to rebuild a global peace movement opposed to all military alliances, demanding their dissolution, a movement opposed as well to the ongoing massive increases in military budgets. It is high time to return to global disarmament under the aegis of the UN, as foreseen in the UN Charter. This charter is the cornerstone of international law whose role must be renewed against the ongoing drift toward the law of the jungle. The huge and ever-growing amounts that are spent on armament and destruction would be wisely reallocated to the only wars that are truly in humanity’s interest: the wars against poverty and climate change.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – Russia

The aff doesn’t expand NATO but even if it did there would be no long-term damage to the US/Russia relationship

Lanoszka 20 Alexander Lanoszka (Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. His research addresses issues in American foreign policy, alliance politics, nuclear strategy, and theories of war, with a general regional focus on Central and Northeastern Europe), 04-07-2020, "Thank goodness for NATO enlargement," Springer Nature International Politics volume 57, pages 451–470, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-00234-8

Meaningful cooperation remained possible with NATO enlargement. Indeed, NATO and Russia collaborated extensively in Afghanistan, and the United States attempted to cultivate closer ties with Russia after Barack Obama won the presi-dency in 2008. Contrary to Mearsheimer’s fatalistic predictions about nuclear reduc-tions, the ‘reset’ by the Obama administration even involved both countries signing and ratifying the New START Treaty, an arms control agreement that cut 30% of their strategic nuclear arsenals and capped them at deployed weapons each. Rus-sia did violate the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated land-based cruise missiles and launchers of ranges from 500 to 5500 miles, but it has previously complained of the constraints imposed by that treaty for reasons relating to China, not NATO (Gates 2014, 154).Tensions did erupt between the USA and Russia, but the causal impact of NATO enlargement is probably much less than what the conventional wisdom suggests. Some, like Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, argue that domestic political and economic developments drove Russia to be more confrontational toward the United States. Putin justified political repression at home with reference to the threat alleg-edly posed by the USA (2015, 169, 178).The argument that NATO enlargement has provoked Russian aggression against its neighbors is likely wrong. In one study of Russian leaders’ foreign policy rhetoric from 2000 to 2016, Maria Snegovaya (2020) finds that Russian leaders articulate anti-Western statements most when oil prices are high, suggesting that—like other petrostates—they are emboldened to press their claims against their neighbors under these circumstances. She uncovers little evidence that NATO enlargement drives anti-Western rhetoric. Another study finds that Russian diplomats consistently adopt a competitive posture vis-à-vis other envoys in various international organizations (Schmitt 2019). NATO enlargement does appear to have played a role in the lead-up to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, though the alliance rejected giving a Member-ship Action Plan to Georgia partly because of worries about being dragged into a conflict with Russia. Territorial disputes and strong personalities made that bilat-eral relationship ripe for conflict (Lanoszka 2018). NATO also rejected Ukraine’s application for a Membership Action Plan in 2008. Similarly, NATO played a much lesser role in stoking tensions with Russia than some accounts suggest because it posed at most a very limited threat to Russia. Operationally, national caveats sty-mied NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan while a large majority of its members spent far less than 2% of their gross domestic products on defense (Saideman and Auerswald 2012; Stanley-Lockman and Wolf 2016). The US and NATO military presence east of Germany was (and remains) threadbare, con-sisting mostly of elements making up a missile defense system that even Russian observers like Alexei Arbatov (2016, 168) acknowledge would not undermine strate-gic stability. During much of the Obama administration, the USA was withdrawing military forces from Europe so as to concentrate more fully on East Asia (Simón 2015). Crucially, NATO enlargement was a non-issue when the Maidan movement began in Kyiv in late 2013. At stake was Ukraine’s signature of the Ukraine–Euro-pean Union Association Agreement, which was similar to what long-time Rus-sian protégé Serbia had negotiated earlier that same year. This agreement did not even guarantee that Ukraine would be a European Union member, but would have spurred closer economic and political ties. NATO membership remainder at best a distant prospect.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – Russia

Offensive realism is wrong and can’t explain Russia’s actions in Ukraine – 3 warrants

Davenport 22 John J. Davenport (John J. Davenport teaches political philosophy, including just war theory, human rights, global governance, democratic theory, and related topics at Fordham University in New York City), 7-5-2022, "Shared blame for Russia's war on Ukraine is not realism — it's irrational," National Catholic Reporter, https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/shared-blame-russias-war-ukraine-not-realism-its-irrational

But the controversy surrounding Francis' remark derives from its resonance with the political scientist John Mearsheimer's "offensive realism" theory that "great powers" will generally do whatever is necessary to dominate their region of the globe as a means to their own national security — whatever they pretend to believe about the human rights of civilians and codes of international law, which have banned annexation of territory by force for over a century. In his infamous New Yorker interview, and in a lecture widely circulated online, Mearsheimer blamed NATO nations for provoking Putin's war on Ukraine by ignoring Putin's view that for Ukraine to become "pro-America liberal democracy" would be an "existential threat" to Russia. Despite its shocking incompatibility with the "rules-based international order" established by 150 years of treaties rooted in just war theory and natural law, Mearsheimer's view is popular because it claims to be brutally honest about "harder, darker constraints of an anarchic world," which follow from a few postulates about sovereign states and their leaders' motives. But in fact, the spell it casts on thinking about foreign policy is deeply misleading for three main reasons, ranging from more to less obvious. First, offensive realism is not merely an empirical or predictive device, as its defenders sometimes like to claim: It tells leading nations like the United States to allow other powerful states a limited "sphere" in which they act as hegemons, but also to "counterbalance" them when, like China today, they threaten interests beyond their own immediate region. This is an imperialist standpoint typical of 19th-century thinking, as Mearsheimer readily admits: It tolerates, and thus encourages, the poisonous notion that a nation's great power permits it to turn otherwise-independent states around it into mere proxies and use their peoples as "buffers" against conceivable foreign attacks. For example, in 2016, Mearsheimer and coauthor Stephen Walt wrote in Foreign Affairs that what "really matters" most for the United States is to preserve "U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere" while weakening other potential hegemons. They recommended leaving Syria to Putin, despite the Russian forces targeting thousands of civilian buildings and hundreds of hospitals during its air campaign in Syria. ADVERTISEMENT This view, which once countenanced American attempts to control regimes in Latin America, has been rejected by popes at least since Populorum Progressio in 1967, and by the U.S. government since the late 1980s. As Adam Tooze explains, offensive realism traces back to the Nazi lawyer Carl Schmitt's belief in "a world order based on dividing the planet into large spatial blocs, each dominated by a major power." The moral idea that legitimate sovereignty depends on protecting human rights, or the common good more broadly understood, which underwrote the U.N.'s "responsibility to protect" doctrine, has no place in this framework. Second, while Mearsheimer has been lauded for "predicting" the war in Ukraine, he got Putin's motives mostly wrong. Putin knows that NATO is a defensive alliance that has no plans or desire whatsoever to invade Russia. Kremlin experts understood that NATO admitted Eastern European nations only to secure them against any return to the horrors they suffered under the totalitarian fist of the Soviet Union — fears that have now been fully justified. Two decades ago, Putin even wanted Russia itself to join NATO; this tragically wasted opportunity runs contrary to offensive realism theory. Instead, as Robert Person and Michael McFaul argue, what Putin feared was never NATO expansion but rather the spread of democratic values. Kremlin complaints about NATO were correlated with upsurges of democratic reform movements within Russia inspired by the Arab Spring in 2011 and later by Ukrainians ousting Putin's puppet ruler in Kyiv. In sum, Putin sees that the main threat to his kleptocratic dictatorship is not NATO forces within his geographic region, but rather ideals of democratic self-governance and global standards that clamp down on corruption. Add to this, as Ross Douthat notes, following Anne Applebaum, Putin's "very personal desire to restore a mystical vision of a greater Russia." More generally, as Applebaum and Garry Kasparov argue, the dictators in Russia, China, North Korea, Belarus, Iran and Nicaragua "understand that the language of democracy, anti-corruption, and justice is dangerous to their form of autocratic power." Offensive realism theory massively understates the influence of such big ideas that move hearts and minds. It would have us believe that governments should focus only on material wealth and physical protection of territory. Political leaders' motives in foreign relations are more complex than this naive deterministic picture implies. For example, Chinese leaders fear uncensored Hollywood movies as much as they fear insecure supply chains for food and raw materials, which they are shoring up through increasing their influence in Africa. Their terror that "Western" ideals — they mean individual autonomy and independent thought — will harm Chinese "interests" has more in common with Taliban religious dogma than with military or economic strategy. This ambiguity about "national interests" explains why offensive realism theory offers no clear criteria to delimit a great power's "natural" sphere within which we should recognize its suzerainty. For example, are small islands near the Philippines in China's putative sphere, despite an international tribunal's ruling against Beijing's claim? Similarly, in 2014, one could have invoked Mearsheimer's own power-balancing rationale to argue for admitting Ukraine into NATO as a way to "contain" Russia's rising power not only in Belarus but also in Syria, Iran, Libya and Mali, which are far from any romanticized ancient Slavic empire. Third, the strategic axioms on which offensive realism is based only remain plausible while not enough world leaders believe in a rules-based order founded on the common goods of humanity. Thus, offensive realism helps foster and maintain the very attitudes of distrust and expectations of success through conquest that force peoples who only want peace and prosperity instead to adopt a war footing. In other words, offensive realism's attraction is like the proverbial emperor's new clothes: It is a partly self-fulfilling prophecy that would predict little in a world where a global alliance of even moderately just republics established trust in minimum thresholds of decency for all governments.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – Russia

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is irrational and fueled by violent nationalistic desires, not NATO

Majumdar 22 Bhaskar Majumdar, 6-27-2022, "Russian Imperialism, Not NATO Expansion, Caused the Ukraine War," Fair Observer, https://www.fairobserver.com/politics/russian-imperialism-not-nato-expansion-caused-the-ukraine-war/

When it comes to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it is easy to get into the popular narrative of the Cold War. Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, this narrative still lives subconsciously, if not consciously, in people’s minds. It puts things in easy perspectives: a binary black and white, the US against Russia, us versus them. To quote George W. Bush (Bush Junior), this narrative is simple: “If you are not with us, you are against us.” While the Cold War mindset might be obvious, other modes of thinking are less so. A key one is imperialism. In my naive youth, I had never believed that Americans would think of their role in the world from a great-power imperialistic perspective. When the Iraq War broke out in 2003, my impression was rudely shattered. I met a doctor in Connecticut and told him that I had just come from Kuwait. The good medic had never been outside his native state of Connecticut. Yet he expansively waved his hands and asked me: “So how are we managing the region?” I realized then that this attitude was as imperial as the British one of “managing” India or the French one of “managing” Algeria or that of any colonial power “managing” a colony. Our good doctor was well aware that the US Army had a base in Kuwait and the gateway to Iraq was directly through Kuwait. He assumed that the US was responsible for the whole region as some form of a world’s policeman and sovereign states in the region had little say in the matter. Given the fact that the US is the top dog as the sole superpower, it is easy to blame it for neo imperialism and more. Yet imperialism is not an American monopoly and it is important not to view the world through a monochromatic lens. US Provocation or Russian Imperialism? Some of the popular narrative in many countries is that the US is responsible for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, at least in part. John Mearsheimer, professor at the University of Chicago, has popularized this line of thought. He argues that NATO’s eastward expansion provoked Russian President Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine. The problem with this argument is that it is curiously imperial. As per Mearsheimer’s worldview, NATO in general and the US in particular were at fault for welcoming countries that were in the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Admitting the three former Soviet republics in the Baltics was rubbing salt into wounded Russian pride. This view forgets that the Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, expanded in western Europe as well as in the east all the way to the Pacific. In 1979, the Soviet troops even marched into Afghanistan to protect the communist government. None of the countries that suffered under Moscow’s yoke wants to go back to those. That is what so many of them lined up to join NATO when the Soviet Union fell. Eastern European nations also turned to the EU because of economic opportunities on offer. Poles, Lithuanians and even Hungarians prefer to work in France, Germany and the UK instead of in Russia. In a nutshell, NATO guaranteed security against an imperial Moscow while the EU boosted the economy for Eastern Europe. An imperial view would see the expansion of NATO as a win for the US and a loss to Russia. However, it might be a good idea not to think of NATO or even the EU expanding east but Eastern Europe moving westward. “Go West, young man” had a new meaning for Poles suffering from nightmares of the 1943 Katyn Forest Massacre when the Soviets slaughtered the flower of Polish society. Obviously, Russia did not like the eastward expansion of NATO or the EU. For a historically imperial power, this was deeply humiliating. In particular, the Soviet collapse scarred Vladimir Putin. This former KGB officer ended up driving a taxi for a bit. As Atul Singh and Glenn Carle write, the 1990s deeply traumatized Russians “who interpret almost every US action and statement as pieces of a long term, coherent plan to undermine Russia.” Russia claims that NATO threatens its sovereignty by encroaching on its near abroad. What Is the Conflict Really About? The reality is that NATO armies have no designs on Russian territory. It is Russia that annexed Crimea with impunity and in contravention of international law. Now, it has attacked Ukraine without provocation. It is razing entire cities, killing civilians and committing atrocities in a classically brutal Russian way. The history and the current reality of Russia puts fear into the hearts of its neighbors. That is why Finland and Sweden have applied to join NATO. Their action is defensive, not offensive. US President Joe Biden may have been at fault in Afghanistan but he is not at fault for Ukraine. Putin is the man responsible for this conflict. Running a kleptocratic regime, this authoritarian leader needs to squash a democratic Ukraine. This removes the risk of calls for democracy in Russia. If Russian forces had taken Kyiv, a Moscow-friendly government would be in place. That was a key objective for Putin’s reckless assault on Kyiv. Unfortunately for the new tsar of Russia, Ukrainians beat back Russian forces. Now Russian troops are taking over the Donbas region and much of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast so that Russia has a land route to Crimea. Putin’s constant references to history are self-serving justifications and too clever by half obfuscations. Putin recently compared himself to Peter the Great who fought the Great Northern Wars from 1700 to 1721. Addressing young scientists and entrepreneurs, Putin “talked politics and power.” He spoke about the new battle for geopolitical dominance and proclaimed Peter the Great to be a role model who in Putin’s eyes reclaimed Russian land. For Putin, it is all about land. Russia wants the Donbas, period. And maybe some more.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – Russia

NATO uncertainty causes Russia to capitalize on their weakness – the aff solves by unifying NATO

DeBski 22 SłAwomir DęBski, Opinion Contributor, 7-8-2022, "The wrong NATO signals to Russia could mean more war for Europe," Hill, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3549231-the-wrong-nato-signals-to-russia-could-mean-more-war-for-europe/

Since the USSR’s collapse, the Russian Federation’s strategic goal has been to maintain a buffer zone over its western neighborhood that includes NATO territory. A weakened Russia was unable to stop the sovereign aspirations of former Soviet republics in the Baltics, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. But it demanded that the free world recognize their independence merely as a tentative fact. Newly revealed German archival documents reportedly show that then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl exploited Russia’s weakness to unite Germany and opposed recognizing Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian independence, while vetoing their membership in NATO and the European Union. His successor, Gerhard Schröder, pushed for energy cooperation with Russia and, after suffering electoral defeat, became a lobbyist for the Russian gas giant Gazprom. Then, former Chancellor Angela Merkel blocked Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO in 2008. Former French President Francois Mitterand and his successors also fell prey to Russian arguments against their membership. So, Moscow got the memo that Europe’s whole, free and at peace moment is temporary and up for revision. The Obama administration’s unconvincing response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 only emboldened Russian President Vladimir Putin in his belief that the free world will comply with his subjecting former Soviet republics. Russia also saw President Biden’s policy of halting two decades of continuous wars fought by the United States, beginning with the immediate evacuation of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, as a window of opportunity to change the rules of the game — a “green light” to relaunch a war of aggression against Ukraine with a goal of exterminating it as a nation. Russia was unable to stand in the way of former Central European satellites joining NATO, but demanded that their membership status have a feeble character. Unfortunately, NATO agreed to this in 1997. Assuming Russia’s good will, the alliance created a political declaration — the NATO-Russia Founding Act. In essence, Russia received a political commitment from the alliance that it would not deploy substantial combat forces to new member states. Moscow perceived this as a victory, believing that provisional membership status for NATO’s newest members could be reversed one day, either diplomatically or by force. As long as Russia pursued peaceful politics, the Founding Act didn’t seem to be a big concession. But Russia has shielded its weakness by creating holes and hidden “gray zones” in Europe’s security system to exploit and undermine it whenever geopolitically possible. Russia’s 2014 attack on Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea violated all provisions of international law; war again became a political tool in Europe. That was when the Founding Act should have been thrown into the dustbin of history, since it was unceremoniously broken by Russia. Instead, some NATO members — led by Germany and France — did everything possible to prevent the act from landing in the rubbish heap. During the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw, buttressing the Eastern Flank was calibrated so as not to undermine the Founding Act by opposing the stationing of substantial combat forces in new member states threatened by Russian aggression. Russia received another signal that some NATO members evidently recognize its claims to a sphere of influence, provoking it to act aggressively. In December 2021, Putin issued an ultimatum to NATO and the U.S., demanding they give up their “open door” policy, withdraw forces from the Eastern Flank, and agree to legally binding limitations on military activity in the region. When the demands weren’t met, Russia attacked Ukraine. It should be clear that Russia exploits indecisiveness and wrong messaging, driven by political wishful thinking, for its aggressive, imperialist purposes. At its recent summit in Madrid, NATO formally invited Sweden and Finland to join the alliance. Members adopted a new strategic concept, labeling Russia a “clear and present danger.” They agreed to station more NATO and U.S. troops on the Eastern Flank, and will have larger reinforcements than before. From the military point of view, such decisions should strengthen defense and deterrence. But even now — after Russia’ss bombing of Kyiv and Kharkiv, and in light of atrocities committed by Russian troops in Bucha, Irpin and Mariupol — the Founding Act, which Russia has violated since February 2014, wasn’t denounced. Did some European allies object? Instead, a compromise formula was adopted — “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” But that’s not enough, as long as there is room for Russia to interpret that respecting the Founding Act means allowing second-class status for NATO’s Eastern Flank allies. Remember, Russia understands indecisiveness and a lack of will to act as weakness and an invitation for aggression.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good AT: French Nuclear Umbrella

French nuclear umbrella fails---it’s underdeveloped, and allies say no.

Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 761-762. Accessed via UMich databases, , AK)

Alternative to considering dependence on French and/or British nuclear forces

The hypothetical alternative of relying on French nuclear forces instead of US protection has been evoked repeatedly since France became a nuclear power in the 1960s; but the option has never been taken up by the non-nuclear-weapon state allies. For example, in 1985 Manfred Wörner, then the West German Defence Minister, said, 'France's nuclear capability is insufficient to protect the Federal Republic [of Germany]. We will have to continue to rely on the American nuclear umbrella.'21

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – TNWs Good – Allied Confidence

Weapons sharing is key to cohesion. Experts prevent accidents.

Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, page 769. Accessed via UMich databases, , AK)

Participating directly in NATO's nuclear posture provides select NATO allies with a cadre of nuclear experts and key officials with experience in thinking about nuclear deterrence and the requirements of nuclear crisis management operations. The national representatives in the NPG Staff Group at NATO headquarters in Brussels and the experts in nuclear policy issues in the defence ministries of NATO governments are often active-duty or retired military officers with experience in nuclear planning and operations. The allied roles in NATO's nuclear posture reflect a high degree of mutual trust and confidence. These roles promote alliance cohesion, add to assurance about the genuineness of US commitments, and make consultations more informed and meaningful.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – TNWs Good – Allied Confidence

Only TNWs send a strong deterrence signal and boost cohesion.

Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 761-762. Accessed via UMich databases, , AK)

In other words, the traditional arguments for keeping US nuclear forces in Europe remain valid in the judgement of many officials and experts in the alliance. These arguments can be summed up as follows: US nuclear forces based in Europe send a more potent deterrent message about US commitments than reliance solely on US nuclear weapons at sea and in North America. With the US nuclear presence, extensive nuclear risk- and responsibility-sharing, and consultative arrangements for multinational nuclear policy deliberations and implementation, the alliance has greater confidence in its strength and cohesion than it would have without these interrelated attributes—and greater confidence that adversaries will recognize NATO's resolve and capabilities.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – TNWS – Deterrence

TNWs are key to deterrence---they link US nukes together.

Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 768-769. Accessed via UMich databases, , AK)

The US nuclear weapons presence in Europe as a link to US strategic nuclear forces

The remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe—reduced by more than 97 per cent from the high level reached during the Cold War—have been regarded as sufficient for assurance and extended deterrence owing in part to the continuing link to US strategic nuclear forces.37 According to the 1999 Strategic Concept, one of the important functions of the US nuclear weapons presence in Europe is to provide linkage to the strategic forces that constitute the ultimate deterrent to aggression or coercion. Ever since the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957 and developed the world's first ICBMs, the alliance has been subject to periodic crises of confidence—in essence, European doubts about America's will to defend its allies, given the risk of prompt intercontinental nuclear retaliation from Russia. These doubts have been aggravated whenever Americans have expressed anxieties about US strategic capabilities—as during the 'bomber gap' and 'missile gap' controversies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the debates about ICBM vulnerability in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – Russia Deterrence

TNWs prevent a Russian nuclear first strike and aggression in the Baltics.

Bowman and Gabel 19 (Bradley Bowman, senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Andrew Gabel, research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 6-14-2019, "The US must deploy a sub-launched low-yield nuke," Defense News, , AK)

To address an important gap in America’s nuclear deterrent, the U.S. should deploy without delay a submarine-launched low-yield nuclear ballistic missile.

In its fiscal 2020 budget request, the Trump administration requested funding to deploy a low-yield SLBM in order to deter Russia’s potential employment of a low-yield nuclear weapon. Gen. John Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, testified in February 2019 that this capability was “necessary to our strategic deterrence mission and will serve to disabuse any adversary of the mistaken perception they can escalate their way to victory.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
NATO Good – TNWs Good – Top Level

Removing TNWs destroys alliance commitments and leads to WMD prolif.

Yost 9 (David S., professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, in the Department of National Security Affairs, as well as a published author on international security, missile defense and nuclear deterrence. Dr. Yost has been a consultant to various organizations, including the Rand Corporation, the Hudson Institute, the Ford Foundation, the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP), Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory. He is a member of the editorial board of Comparative Strategy sponsored by NIPP and serves on the advisory council (Conseil Scientifique) of the Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris. He has been a member of the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School since 1979. “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2009, Volume 85, No. 4, pp. 778-780. Accessed via UMich databases, , AK)

Possible consequences of a rupture with established arrangements

Given the views of policy-makers and experts in NATO countries, notably in Turkey and in some of the new allies in East and Central Europe, some observers are concerned that it could be deeply damaging to US credibility, disruptive of alliance cohesion and potentially destabilizing to European security to withdraw the remaining US nuclear weapons in Europe. Withdrawing the weapons could be perceived as a signal of US disengagement and as evidence of a diminished US commitment to the security of NATO Europe.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC Disability K – Political Engagement Good

A social deconstruction of disability fails. It erases difference and forecloses progressive social policy.

Jenks 18 – PhD candidate in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware [Andrew. “Crip theory and the disabled identity: why disability politics needs impairment.” Disability & Society, Vol 24, Issue 3 (2019). Oct. 31, 2018.]

Negotiating disability identity: the case against social deconstruction

Law professor Bruce Pardy’s (2016) contention that students with disabilities who are allowed accommodations of extra time by Queen’s University on law school examinations have an unfair advantage caused a stir. Equating the extra time on an examination to a ‘head start’ in the 100-m sprint in the Olympics, Pardy (2017) questions the realness of those students’ disabilities. Implicitly, he is arguing that some impairments are less ‘real’ than others. Pardy would not, for instance, suggest that a student who was blind and needed to take examinations with a school-supplied reader should not be entitled to extra time. So, what makes a disability real? Disability politics, as originally articulated in the 1970s, was based on the premise that disability itself is a social creation. The issue Pardy is highlighting here is not about whether a disability is real, but whether these students have an impairment which is real.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC Disability K – Political Engagement Good

Overly pessimistic frames of disability deconstruction preclude future resistance and weaken political gains achieved by disability activists.

Jenks 18 – PhD candidate in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware [Andrew. “Crip theory and the disabled identity: why disability politics needs impairment.” Disability & Society, Vol 24, Issue 3 (2019). Oct. 31, 2018.]

Robert McRuer’s (2006) Crip Theory contends that the systemic factors which enforce compulsory able-bodiedness in society are not just thoroughly interwoven with compulsory heterosexuality, but these are mutually contingent upon each other. Crip Theory has taken the emancipatory message of a disability politics embraced by cross-disability organizations in the latter half of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and centered that message as one which can be the basis for examination of the forces which cause the oppression of marginalized social groups. Early disability organizing in the United States was not always done across disability groups and scant resources necessitated competition amongst some groups (Nielsen 2012). A collective disability consciousness does not necessarily even exist, or exist in the ways in which scholarship purports it to (Watson 2002; Engel and Munger 2003; Heyer 2015). While I acknowledge and encourage the uncovering of systemic, biopolitical forces which produce the corporeal able-bodied standard, or normate, subject, a thorny problem presents itself: does a coherent disabled identity or even an identifiable disability identity exist? An identity which McRuer relies heavily on in his presentation of the notion of a ‘queer/disabled’ subject. Contributions of Crip Theory and subsequent texts which explore cultural locations of disability like Alison Kafer’s (2013) successful and groundbreaking Feminist, Queer, Crip rely on this logic to articulate a pan-disability social identity.

Political science as a discipline largely ignores disability. Public opinion polling rarely includes discussion of people with disabilities. Two examples, an online Harris Poll from 2015 referencing the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and a 1999 Pew Millennium Survey question on the status of disabled people compared to 50 years ago, both found those surveyed thought disabled people were better off than in the past (Pew Research Center 1999; Shannon-Missal 2015). Literature on electoral participation by Lisa Schur has found disabled people are over time (since 1998) participating at rates comparable to non-disabled people (Schur et al. 2002; Schur et al. 2017). Political theory has recently developed a burgeoning interest in disability centered around issues of care, vulnerability, inclusion and exclusion, and incorporation into frameworks of capability (Knight 2014a, 2014b; Clifford 2012, 2014; Simplican 2015; Hirschmann 2012; Arneil 2009). This article largely deals with literature and debates outside of the purview of political science but that does not mean its content is not germane to the politics of disability, and the lives of disabled people.

2022 Michigan Kritik
2AC Disability K – Norms Good

Deliberative norms increase complexity of thinking which decreases dogma and increases self-reflexivity.

Jennstal 19 – Researcher in the Department of Government at Uppsala University focusing in deliberative theory and political participation. [Julia. “Deliberation and Complexity of Thinking. Using the Integrative Complexity Scale to Assess the Deliberative Quality of Minipublics.” Swiss Political Science Review, vol 25, issue 1, pgs. 64-83. Feb 06, 2019.]

Deliberative Conversational Norms and Complexity of Thinking

Deliberative democracy is supposed to be, at its core, inclusive, consequential and authentic (Dryzek 2009). While inclusiveness and consequentiality rely on design features and are critical in systemic approaches to deliberation, the authentic requirement refers to what takes place inside the ‘black box’ of deliberative conversations (Gerber et al. 2016). It denotes the quality of deliberative exchanges and is contingent on citizens’ actual adherence to, and internalisation of, deliberative norms in political exchanges (Rosenberg 2014).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AT Hegemony Impact

Heg is unsustainable---retrenchment is gradual now, but recommitting makes it violent and forced.

Kupchan 20, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Charles A., 10-21-2020, "America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President", Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/21/election-2020-smart-retrenchment/)

As the Trump era potentially comes to an end, many foreign-policy voices in the United States and abroad relish the prospect of the country’s roaring return to the global stage. But attempting a full-on comeback would be a mistake. If anything, the strategic pullback that President Donald Trump has initiated needs to continue—albeit in a more coherent and judicious manner.

Much of the debate surrounding the next administration’s foreign policy has focused on boldly reasserting U.S. leadership in the world. And it’s true: Global interdependence and upheaval do require steady U.S. leadership and engagement. What’s been largely missing from this debate, however, are the challenges facing the next president when it comes to right-sizing U.S. engagement abroad—especially military involvement—and bringing the nation’s strategic commitments back into line with it means and purposes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AT Hegemony Impact

No leadership impact.

Fettweis 20, Associate Professor of Political Science at Tulane University. (Christopher J., 6-3-2020, "Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy", A Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, )

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on faith alone.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally peaceful, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its forces throughout the 1990s, as well as while it doubled its military spending in the first decade of the new century.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to global stability.

Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other 95 percent, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most civil wars and ethnic conflicts. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more peaceful today than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony cannot take credit.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not extend.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Militarization Good

Militarized foreign policy solves a variety of non-military threats

Reveron 15, chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center (Derek, “Security Cooperation: A Key Pillar of Defense Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, BB

The preventive and cooperative approach to foreign policy is visible in today’s military, which has undergone dramatic change over the last three decades. Defense strategy embraces the notion that the U.S. military does much more than fight wars. The military trains, equips, and deploys peacekeepers; provides humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and supports other militaries to reduce security deficits throughout the world. With national security focused on weak states and regional challengers, the U.S. military has been evolving from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation. The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the US or the international community would face pressure to intervene in the future. Given America’s global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States, but the US also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are: Obtaining base access as a quid pro quo Augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to coalition partners in the Middle East Promoting a favorable balance of power by selling weapon systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran Harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense Promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip program Reinforcing sovereignty through programs like Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative with Mexico Supporting the US industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F-35 program As these reasons suggest, security cooperation is much bigger than train and equip forces in combat zones. Given the scope of these programs and diversity of the partners, one can develop measurable objectives. These include: the strength of regional security agreements, the types of regional cooperation (e.g., participation in U.S.-led air, maritime, or land operations), willingness of foreign governments to counter threats the U.S. identifies (e.g. terrorism), and the relative receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country. Internal to countries, one can measure how well partners combat security challenges, the strength of civil–military relations, and the levels of respect for human rights. Measurement can include the extent to which international commerce flows freely, levels of cooperation between military and international relief organizations, and support for international initiatives to combat disease, illicit activity, and weapons proliferation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Militarization Good

Militarized foreign policy leads to global peace

Reveron 15, chair of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and is a faculty affiliate at the Belfer Center (Derek, “Security Cooperation: A Key Pillar of Defense Policy,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, BB

As the United States looks ahead, the country is sure to follow the tradition in defense strategy that prioritizes enabling partners through training and equipping their forces. Over the last 15 years, the number of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) increased from 40 to 117. This is due, in part, to the fact that while administrations may change, fundamental U.S. interests have not. These include: protecting the US homeland from catastrophic attack, sustaining a global system marked by open lines of communication to facilitate commerce, promoting international security, and preventing powers hostile to the United States from being able to dominate important areas of the world.[4] The United States aspires to create true partners who can confront their own threats to internal stability, which organized crime, violent actors, and regional rivals exploit. Known as the “indirect approach,” the U.S. helps countries fill security deficits that exist when a country cannot independently protect its own national security. American generosity helps explain this, but U.S. national security benefits too. For example, by providing radars and surveillance technology, Central American countries can control their airspace and can interdict drug-filled planes bound for the US; by providing logistic support, Pakistan can lead a maritime coalition promoting maritime security in the Indian Ocean; and by selling AEGIS destroyers, Japan can counter North Korean missiles and provide early warning of missile threats to the United States. Through security cooperation programs like these, the United States helps other countries meet their immediate national security needs, but there is also an effort to foster independence so states can contribute to global security. This is most visible in a program such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative that trains and equips foreign militaries to participate in peacekeeping operations. While the United States does not want to deploy ground forces under the United Nations flag, it does play a key role in peacekeeping by training and equipping over 250,000 peacekeepers since 2005. Programs like GPOI enabled Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to participate in an African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. An officer from Chad seemed to capture the rationale for other countries’ efforts to contribute to global security: “When your neighbor’s house is burning, you have to put it out, because if not, yours is next.”[5] U.S. security cooperation often provides the tools countries need when their national security demands exceed their security capacities.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AT Diplomatic Cred N-B---Militarization Good

Military-first should be the objective for all security assistance

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation,

Another report published this month by the Center for a New American Security rightly suggests that security assistance in the Middle East should be guided by strategy and applied narrowly to military effects. However, the report’s recommendations are limited to counterterrorism activities and a strategy of deprioritizing the Middle East in favor of the Indo-Pacific. If limiting security assistance to military purposes would make programs more effective in a region of waning emphasis, it stands to reason that this should be the formative basis for all security assistance programs, especially when strategy calls for increased investment in the security capacities of partner nations. Reforms to security assistance should push the agencies in this direction, encouraging—or compelling—State to design its programs in closer coordination with the Pentagon and in support of Defense Department’s operational needs, such as improving military forward presence, wartime resilience and interoperability.