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2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › China INB › Block – Impact – Supply Shocks

Taiwan’s a supply choke-point---it’s vulnerable now, and shocks ripple globally.

Crawford et al 21, Bloomberg News, (Alan Crawford, Jarrell Dillard, Helene Fouquet, and Isabel Reynolds, “The World Is Dangerously Dependent on Taiwan for Semiconductors”, Bloomberg News, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-01-25/the-world-is-dangerously-dependent-on-taiwan-for-semiconductors) //CHC-DS ‍

As China pushes the world to avoid official dealings with Taiwan, leaders across the globe are realizing just how dependent they’ve become on the island democracy. Taiwan, which China regards as a province, is being courted for its capacity to make leading-edge computer chips. That’s mostly down to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the world’s largest foundry and go-to producer of chips for Apple Inc. smartphones, artificial intelligence and high-performance computing. Taiwan’s role in the world economy largely existed below the radar, until it came to recent prominence as the auto industry suffered shortfalls in chips used for everything from parking sensors to reducing emissions. With carmakers including Germany’s Volkswagen AG, Ford Motor Co. of the U.S. and Japan’s Toyota Motor Corp. forced to halt production and idle plants, Taiwan’s importance has suddenly become too big to ignore.

U.S., European and Japanese automakers are lobbying their governments for help, with Taiwan and TSMC being asked to step in. Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron discussed the potential for shortages last year and agreed on the need to accelerate Europe’s push to develop its own chip industry, according to a French official with knowledge of the matter. The auto industry’s pleas illustrate how TSMC’s chip-making skills have handed Taiwan political and economic leverage in a world where technology is being enlisted in the great power rivalry between the U.S. and China -- a standoff unlikely to ease under the administration of Joe Biden.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › China INB › Block – Demand k Semconductors

European domestic semiconductor production is close --- but increased defense technology demand is necessary to spur production

Machi ‘21

(Vivienne, Vivienne Machi is a reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine“How will Europe’s planned semiconductor strategy affect its nations’ military ambitions?,” pg online @ //um-ef)

The European Union wants to build its own microchip manufacturing capability to counterbalance the dominant Asian market and ensure enduring technological sovereignty. Industry officials have separately called for a pan-European electronics strategy, but until a recent EU proposal becomes concrete legislation, the long-term effects on military programs may prove difficult to gauge. EU leaders recently announced the European Chips Act meant to support increased research, design and testing capacity as well as ensure national investments are coordinated with those of the broader union. “The aim is to jointly create a state-of-the-art European chip ecosystem, including production, that ensures our security of supply and will develop new markets for ground-breaking European tech,” said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen during her Sept. 15 state of the union address in Strasbourg, France. The ultimate goal is to increase Europe’s global share of semiconductor production to 20 percent by 2030, per the commission. Digital technology is the “make-or-break issue” facing the European market today, and “there is no digital without chips,” she said. While the global demand for semiconductors has exploded, the European share of designing and manufacturing those microchips has diminished, and nations have largely become reliant on Asian-made products, she noted. The COVID-19 pandemic sparked a global microchip shortage that prompted other governments, including the United States, to introduce a domestic semiconductor strategy, as the chips enable systems in virtually every sector from the military to health care and from computers to clean energy. Nations are developing interconnected, highly software-enabled platforms to operate in increasingly joint environments, and “digitalization” has become a buzzword across the global defense sphere. In Europe, those platforms include the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System program that would ultimately feature a next-generation fighter, unmanned drones, and a slew of sophisticated sensors and weaponry, all interconnected with each other. Meanwhile, NATO has highlighted “emerging and disruptive technologies” as a key focus area for the alliance. Many of the technologies it cited will rely on digitalization. The United Kingdom, Sweden and Italy are also co-researching and developing cutting-edge technologies to enable sixth-generation air combat platforms under their own initiative, dubbed Tempest by the British. Industry and government officials involved in that effort were asked about domestic electronics sourcing during a panel discussion at the biennial DSEI conference in London last month, which took place the same day as von der Leyen’s speech. A conference attendee asked whether the British-led effort would rely on European-sourced and -manufactured parts, rather than Chinese or American electronics. Richard Berthon, director of future combat air for the British Defence Ministry, said his team will access the global market for parts “where it’s cost-effective, [and] where our sovereignty and security are not impaired.” Berthon emphasized that the program office is taking security “incredibly seriously,” and that the entire Tempest enterprise “is all about ensuring that for the U.K., we’ve got the technology we need, the skills we need, that we can secure those, and we can sustain them over time.” Another panelist, Saab Deputy chief executive Anders Carp, called for a “pan-European or pan-Western strategy” to help governments and their industry partners prioritize key technology research and development efforts. Saab represents Swedish industry participation in the British-led aircraft push. The electronics sourcing conversation is broader than just one such technology initiative — or the fighter aircraft portfolio — and could encompass some other mix of trusted allies and partners, Carp noted. However it’s organized, “there should be some sort of strategy in place to look at how do we make sure that we don’t end up being reliant on someone ... that we don’t want to be reliant on, or may not want to be reliant on in the future,” he said in an interview with Defense News. When it comes to the broader Tempest effort, industry partners are discussing these issues “at a headline level,” as the program’s design phase remains in the study stages, Carp noted. Multiple European industry representatives declined to comment on the European Chips Act, citing the recent nature of the initiative. The EU has yet to announce when the European Chips Act might be formally unveiled or voted on. Thierry Breton, the European commissioner for internal markets, laid out proposed elements of the effort in a Sept. 15 LinkedIn post, including building European-based fabrication plants and establishing a European semiconductor fund. With 27 EU members, there will be divergent opinions involved in developing the legislation and “a lot of different interests on the ground level,” said Dan Darling, a senior analyst for Forecast International, a U.S. market intelligence firm. The focus on domestic semiconductor sovereignty makes sense, but the EU needs to move from “a declaration of vision and intent” to actual momentum, he said. Europe is home to a plethora of defense electronics companies, and a domestic supply of resources is sure to trickle up eventually, he added. That being said, European defense contractors have established business relationships with overseas chip suppliers — such as Samsung in South Korea and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company — not the existing suppliers on their own continent, said Franz-Stefan Gady, a cyber, space and future conflict fellow at the London-based think tank International Institute for Strategic Studies. “At the moment, European advanced semiconductor manufacturers produce low-volume niche products with limited military applicability,” he told Defense News. Some such niche products could make headway in Europe, like those related to aerospace sensors, or security chips for crypto processing and other cybersecurity technologies. But it’s unlikely European chipmakers would supply individual European nations’ defense industries over the next two decades, as the expense would be too great even with strong political will behind the effort, Gady added. “There is no real market and very little genuine demand from the European defense industry for indigenous European products en masse, despite paying lip service to the concept of strategic autonomy,” he said. Von der Leyen, who previously served as Germany’s defense minister, acknowledged in her speech that boosting sovereign semiconductor manufacturing capabilities will be a “daunting task,” but one required at this point in time to support both European competitiveness and technological sovereignty. “Let’s put all of our focus on it,” she said.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › China INB › Block – Solves Semiconductors

EU inter-coordination and strategic autonomy are key to Euro semiconductor stability---only domestic capacities and geopolitical leverage provide resilience against competition and shocks.

Poitiers 21, Research Fellow for Bruegel, Ph.D. in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona, a M.Sc. in economics from the Universität Bonn, and a B.Sc. from Universität Mannheim. (Niclas, “Digital European Economic Sovereignty? The Case of Semiconductors” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, ) //CHC-DS ‍

2.1 The Global Semiconductor Industry in a Geopolitical Storm The US-China conflict is often portrayed as a ’technological cold war’5 , where leadership in new technologies is key to obtaining or retaining economic supremacy. The EU, while being at the forefront of digital regulation, all the while harnessing the ‘Brussels effect’6 , relies on both the US and China for many digital goods and services. This leaves the EU caught in between the US-China rivalry. The highly specialised and globalised Informatics and Communication Technologies (ICT) industry and its core technology – semiconductors – is an interesting case study. Semiconductors are one of the most strategically important sectors of the modern economy. They have a wide range of use – from memory chips over sensors to processors – and are essential parts of the value chains in many industries. Semiconductors are embedded in all types of modern goods, from manufacturing machinery, computers and smartphones, 5G transmitters, medical equipment, cars to everyday household appliances. ICT goods are the most important Chinese export good. In 2019, they account for over 27% of Chinese total exports and 96% of high-tech exports from China to the US.7 Telecommunications equipment account for over 30% of EU imports from China. 8 However, for the most crucial input to these ICT goods – semiconductors – China is dependent on foreign inputs. As a result, semiconductors have become China’s single largest import, surpassing even oil (see Figure 1). China’s foreign dependency in its biggest industry has made semiconductors a critical target for US trade policy and sanctions. Semiconductors and related equipment account for a quarter of the US exports subject to the Phase I trade agreement9 , and the technology is used for targeted sanctions against Chinese companies10. Unsurprisingly, the development of ‘home-grown’ semiconductors is an important goal of Chinese industrial policy11. For such high-end products, know-how and production capacities are highly specialised but they are also integrated at the global level12. A few countries are home to cutting-edge semiconductor production capacities: the US, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Europe and increasingly, China. But to date, no country has achieved self-sufficiency in the sector13. In fact, according to one study14, the semiconductor value chain is made up of three steps along which high coordination between firms is required: 1) design; 2) fabrication; and 3) assembly (see Figure 2). Some firms, Integrated Design Manufacturers (IDM), do the first two steps and represent about half of the overall semiconductor market. The below analysis focuses on firms that only provide one production step15. The design phase specifies the physical architecture of the semiconductor by laying its functions and the electronic components that will be needed for production. The US is by far the leader in design with firms such as Qualcomm, Broadcom, Nvidia and AMD, but it is followed by Taiwan with Mediatek, Novatek and Realtek. However, Chinese market shares are increasing fast16 and Chinese firms such as Unigroup and Huawei subsidiary HiSilicon are important in this regard. Semiconductor designs rely on specific software for which the market is highly concentrated around three US-based firms – Cadence, Synopsy, Mentor –, and it is on this part of the value chain that US sanctions were most effective in blocking Huawei HiSilicon productions.

CHART OMITTED

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › China INB › Block – Solves Semiconductors

Collaboration is key to solve semiconductor supply shocks.

Tyson and Zysman 22, * Laura Tyson, a former chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers during the Clinton administration, is a professor at the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and a member of the Board of Advisers at Angeleno Group. ** John Zysman, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is Co-Founder of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy., (Laura and John, “From Sanctions to Semiconductor Resilience and Security”, Project Syndicate, March 22, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/how-the-west-can-secure-its-semiconductor-supply-chain-by-laura-tyson-and-john-zysman-2022-03) //CHC-DS ‍

Russia's war in Ukraine has highlighted the vulnerability of sprawling supply chains and underscored the importance of key technological inputs like semiconductors. With much of the world united in holding Russia to account, the moment is perfect for deepening multilateral collaboration in strategically vital industries.

BERKELEY – To be effective, economic sanctions depend on multilateral coordination. Freezing the Russian central bank’s holdings and kicking Russian banks out of the SWIFT financial messaging system for international payments in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are groundbreaking moves. But such measures will be successful only if there are no (or at least very few) ways to circumvent them. Their implementation and enforcement must be truly multilateral, extending beyond NATO and the transatlantic community. The unprecedented multilateral response to Russia’s war is an opportunity for the United States and its allies to strengthen their collaboration on a wide range of shared security and economic issues. Consider the semiconductor industry, which is crucial for today’s economy and for national security. The sanctions limiting Russian access to semiconductors depend on support from TSMC in Taiwan and Samsung in South Korea, the leading global producers of both commodity chips and the more advanced chips used in many weapons systems.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › China INB › Block – Solves Semiconductors

The CP solves the entirety of case and creates broad EU-NATO coop – tech is key.

FOE 21 [Friends of Europe, Peace, Security & Defence Summit 2021 — Autumn 2021. “Strategic foresight: a zero-sum game? The EU Strategic Compass and NATO 2030” DOA: 6/24/2022 //ArchanSen]

Building up defence capacity must focus on innovation, as new technological developments, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, quantum warfare and increasingly complex cyber threats, present a growing challenge, the summit was told.

“Our competitors are shaping the environment, they are competing every day, the threats are permanent, they are boundless, and they are simultaneously used … we have to manage that,” cautioned General Philippe Lavigne, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – A2: Interoperability

EU-NATO security cooperation solves interoperability---PESCO and the EDA prove past successes.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Improved military mobility and interoperability While an increased European military posture is important per se, quick deployment and interoperability across the trans-Atlantic space is equally important. For this reason, NATO-EU cooperation appears even more relevant when it comes to military mobility, interoperability and procurement. Military mobility — defined as the ability to deploy and move thousands of troops across the European territory — is crucial to project an effective deterrence and is a key area where NATO-EU cooperation has been the most successful. Many factors slow mobility and therefore negatively impact the readiness of European defense, such as infrastructure incompatibility, as well as complex regulations on the transportation of weapons or military equipment. In 2019, NATO countries identified concrete steps to increase their military mobility, with the goal of being able to deploy 30 ground battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combatant ships in the span of 30 days.49 The steps focus on four main areas: (1) developing and strengthening infrastructure, (2) improving strategic airlift and sealift capabilities, (3) strengthening the command and control line as well as planning for better coordination on a large scale, and (4) easing legal and diplomatic procedures across the military and civilian sectors to facilitate clearance processes. However, an Atlantic Council report has noted some significant gaps within each of the above listed sectors, which include a lack of resources and institutional weakness in tackling military mobility. As military mobility has important repercussions for strategic projection and procurement,50 it should be an area where NATO and the EU could have a more constructive dialogue. Strategic location is not currently a prime criterion for the evaluation of new defense projects in the EU, as the union is not a military power and is not used to strategic thinking in the military field. For this reason, the EU could benefit from NATO geostrategic experience to identify areas where more resources are needed and how they could be put to better use when considering geographical factors. For safer military mobility, such infrastructure should also be made more resilient to cyberattacks. Given its regulatory power, the European Union could play a valuable role in easing military mobility by establishing simpler processes to attain custom and border permissions for the transportation of, for example, dangerous goods or military equipment. The EU is also well placed to strengthen roads and infrastructure that are crucial for military mobility. In fact, the EU has launched the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) projects, a series of studies and activities designed to eliminate bottlenecks to mobility across the continent by, for example, completing missing sections of transit corridors and developing new dual-use (civilian and military) infrastructure projects.51 EU countries have also started featuring military mobility in their defense projects under PESCO and have set parameters for non-EU members to join; for example, Canada, Norway, and the United States are expected to participate in a PESCO project led by the Netherlands to test the state of military mobility in Europe.52 Improving military mobility across the trans-Atlantic space would positively impact the interoperability of allied armed forces — specifically their ability to be deployed and to operate with one another across the territory of the alliance. NATO and the EU can already count on deep interoperability because they share the forces of 21 countries that are member states of both organizations. Yet, as there are important asymmetries in military capabilities across the EU and more broadly across the alliance space, interoperability is in constant need of improvement. So far, one success story of NATO-EU interoperability has been the technological cooperation between the European Defense Agency (EDA) and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) on air-to-air refueling operations (transferring fuel from one military aircraft to another in mid-air). This cooperation helped address one of the biggest EU defense shortfalls.53 In the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the AUKUS deal that marks the United States’ pivot toward the Indo-Pacific region, the debate over European defense has sharpened and more funds are being allocated to the European Defense Fund to strengthen the union’s military posture. In fact, the third EU “Joint Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Implementation of the Action Plan on Military Mobility” has noted significant progress since October 2020, including on custom formalities and work with the EDA on two Cross-Border Movement Permission Technical Arrangements.54 Most importantly, from next year onward, EU member states can use funding from the European Recovery and Resilience Facility to invest in transport, including dual-use infrastructure.55 The EU also has a budget of 330 million euros (roughly $375 million) for co-funding projects (subjects to call for proposals) on dual-use infrastructure.56 While this level of ambition is certainly welcome because of its positive impact on EU defense capabilities, the EDA and NSPA should closely coordinate their efforts in order to increase interoperability and ultimately NATO and EU resilience and readiness toward international security threats.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – A2: Interoperability

The EU is capable of coordinating military interoperability with NATO.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

In a world marked by COVID-19, deeper social divisions, more vulnerable supply chains, and increased competition in the international arena, the roles of NATO and the EU and their ability to tackle global challenges are constantly being questioned. Moreover, with the proliferation of ad hoc coalitions to tackle specific challenges, the two organizations are constantly fighting for relevance and space to operate. In this context, as this paper has shown, both NATO and the EU have more to gain through joining forces rather than competing with one another. In light of the arguments developed so far, some broad policy recommendations appear relevant: 1. NATO and EU member states should leverage their policy fora to discuss joint initiatives and better employ their assets — NATO’s military capabilities and logistical systems and the EU’s capacity building and financial assistance. This would enable a more coordinated approach to crises based on a division of labor agreed to on a case-by-case basis. Learning from past experiences, the two organizations should work to avoid another “Afghanistan scenario” in areas like the Sahel region. 2. NATO and the EU should increase information sharing and establish protocols in crucial sectors from anti-terrorism cooperation to cybersecurity. The periodic joint exercises performed so far are important steps toward building confidence and fostering regular updates and the sharing of best practices. Yet insufficient information sharing and the lack of protocols in case of a crisis hinder the utility of the exercises conducted. While this recommendation ultimately depends on political will, some smaller channels could be created to streamline limited but vital information, especially in the event of a cyberattack. 3. Regarding disinformation, NATO should take advantage of the EU’s apparatus and support it with its own solid structure for intelligence gathering — instead of having NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division duplicate the work of the EU StratCom task force. Alternatively, because countering disinformation is not the main job of the division, NATO could create a separate disinformation unit to work closely with the EU’s task force. Coordinating efforts to tackle different outlets of disinformation could help reduce the overall burden. In both scenarios, the two organizations should not just seek to counter disinformation but also prevent it as much as possible. 4. NATO and the EU should increase their dialogue on regulations and impediments to military mobility and interoperability. NATO’s deeper expertise on strategic airlifting and military operations could help the EU improve regulations to facilitate military mobility. More broadly, NATO should leverage EU regulatory power in conjunction with its objectives when it comes to capacity building as well as in countering China’s multifaceted influence. 5. To reinforce NATO’s posture in Europe and elsewhere, the EU should boost its military capability (as member states’ militaries contribute to NATO’s single set of forces). Enhanced military capabilities would also enable the EU to intervene independently from the United States in theaters that are no longer security priorities for Washington. European countries will need to assess their defense spending for greater efficiency and assess the advantages of a more integrated procurement system. While doing so, Europeans should consider mechanisms to enable the U.S. defense industry to participate; this could minimize the economic losses, foster technological development and cooperation on a trans-Atlantic level, and reduce dependence on geopolitically risky supplies. 6. NATO and the EU should foster cooperation in procurement and capability development to increase interoperability, including through the establishment of similar standards. This would enhance military mobility and interoperability across Europe and other theaters like the Indo-Pacific, where the engagement of the U.S. and Europe is growing.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – AI

The CP solves all of case and revitalizes tech cooperation.

Franke 21 [Franke, Ulrike Esther. ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2021. JSTOR, . //ArchanSen]

International competition on technology, such as 5G, has recently attracted significant attention. At the 2020 Munich Security Conference, for example, tech was an important topic – yet the discussion was not really about tech, but about power, as the rivalry over who builds 5G telecommunications infrastructure turned into a US-Chinese competition. This was despite the fact that the leading 5G providers are European and Chinese.

There is a growing realisation that the adoption of AI-enabled systems may have geopolitical consequences and eventually affect the global balance of power. In particular, AI may give one actor considerable power over others, be it in the form of an economic boost or an AI-enabled military advantage, or through control over crucial technology components and standards.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – Cyber – Generic

EU-NATO cooperation is key to cyber security.

Shea 19 (Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow at Friends of Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, “EU-NATO COOPERATION A SECURE VISION FOR EUROPE,” Spring 2019, https://www.friendsofeurope.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/dp_2018_web.pdf)//JRD

To strengthen inter-organisational cyber security and cyber defence cooperation, the EU and NATO should solve the political blockage, develop joint action plans to be implemented by member states and do away with technical issues such as the lack of formal agreements between institutions. The work done at staff-to-staff level must now be replicated at the national level by launching and investing in joint activities and projects that will increase member states’ capabilities. While top representatives spoke of ‘prioritising strengthened cooperation’ at the 2016 and 2018 NATO summits, more should be done to generate investments from the capitals. The following policy proposals aim to designate a number of joint activities with an aim to create more substantial cooperation among the member states of both organisations. A strong political support and prioritisation is necessary also from the key capitals. First and foremost, an EU-NATO working group on cyber security and defence issues must be established. These topics must also be regular agenda items in other joint working and high political level meetings, such as the EUNATO capability development group and the NAC-PSC meetings. This new working group should discuss policy themes where closer cooperation can create synergy (synchronising crisis response mechanisms, speeding political decision-making, developing joint response options to cyberattacks, etc). Joint working groups at the subject matter expert level should explore possibilities to develop joint research and innovation programmes and coordinate national and union-level activities in the area of emerging technologies (including 5G and artificial intelligence). Joint education and training courses should be created with the first step of opening all existing courses to each other’s officials and member states. The EU must be granted observer status at the Steering Committee of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), as suggested by the Allied Command Transformation. Formal cooperation – including technical arrangements for information sharing – must also be established with ENISA and other relevant EU bodies (such as the Cybersecurity Research and Competence Centre and EU-CERT) in order to facilitate participating in each other’s exercises. Closer cooperation between research and competence centres is needed to jointly develop doctrine and concepts, and launch common research projects in areas such as cyber activities in the grey space, supply chain security, military dependencies on civilian critical infrastructure (such as energy, transport and finance), including how do develop common methodology to assess inter-dependencies. The NATO Cyber Defence Pledge could also be applied to non-NATO EU countries and possibly in third countries. The resiliency requirements and cyber security standards of the EU and NATO should be complementary and ensure the minimum common level of protection in all countries. Information sharing between the organisations has been improved but more should be done to create joint threat assessments and intelligence sharing for attribution of cyberattacks. The EU and NATO should continue synchronising their hybrid threats playbooks with a view to creating joint responses. They must also synchronise cyber defence capabilities development roadmaps and experiences on improving civilmilitary information sharing. One way forward is through joint EU-NATO joint exercises, be they technical, crisis management or table-top style. The table-top exercises at the subject matter expert and ambassadors, foreign and defence ministers level should explore the application of EU’s cyber diplomacy toolbox and joint response options. More joint action is also needed to promote the application of international law, confidence building measures, and state responsible behaviour in cyberspace. Both organisations should create common cyber capability building programmes, including joint trust funds, for the third countries. In the area of cyber defence, the EU and NATO should explore options on how to use the sovereign effects of the NATO Cyberspace Operations Centre with a view to support future EU missions and operations. PESCO’s recent ‘Cyber Rapid Response Team’ initiative – comprised of nine participating EU member states – could be deployed to assist non-EU NATO countries and third countries to prevent, detect and respond to cyber incidents.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – Cyber – Generic

The EU can enhance security cooperation with NATO on cyber---EU funding solves better than the AFF.

Deschaux-Dutard 21, Delphine Deschaux-Dutard is lecturer in Political Studies at Grenoble – Alpes University and fellow at Centre d’études sur la sécurité internationale et les coopérations européennes (CESICE). Her research interests are Cybersecurity and Cyber Defence European Union, Transatlantic and European Security (NATO, EU), Military Cooperation in Europe, and International relations., (Delphine, “Is NATO ready for cyber war?”, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, NATO Briefs Series n°05, https://www.frstrategie.org/en/publications/nato-briefs-series/nato-ready-cyber-war-2021) //CHC-DS ‍

Last but not least, NATO also develops an important cooperation with the EU on cyber defence. Both organizations have enhanced their cooperation in cyber defence since their joint declaration at the Alliance summit in Warsaw in 2016. They regularly organize common training and exercises and develop information sharing in order to raise mutual. Cooperation is even more needed in a context of limited financial resources: some experts suggest using the Berlin Plus agreements in cyber defence. The EU and NATO have also concluded a technical agreement between their response teams for cyber incidents (NCIRC and CERT-EU) in February 2016 to intensify their cooperation on cyber defence. This agreement has been enforced to discuss cyber threats in the context of 2019 European elections for instance.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – Cyber – Generic

EU-NATO cooperation over cyber security solves best --- maximizes resources, fills defense gaps, and avoids article 5 activation

Deschaux-Dutard ’21 – Delphine, Associate Professor in Political Science at the University Grenoble Alpes, France. She is also a researcher at CESICE and Vice-Dean for International Relations at the Faculty of law at the same institution., (“Is NATO ready for cyber war?”, pp.1-3, 8/30/21, ) – sel

In a more and more connected world cyberspace has become the fifth battlespace. The latest Pegasus case, refereeing to a spying hardware which affected many European heads of states and government in the Summer of 2021, shows how much cyber threats are now part of the international security arena. NATO has tackled the cyber topic for over a decade. NATO’s awareness towards cyber threats started raising in the late 1990s, following cyberattacks by Serbian hackers against NATO Supreme Command’s (SHAPE) website during the air bombing campaign on Serbian positions in the frame of the Kosovo war. The cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 and in the context of the conflict in Georgia in 2008 urged the Alliance to take this new threats seriously. NATO is today the most advanced international organisation regarding cyber defence. With a cyber command structure set up in 2008, its 2010 Strategic Concept has enabled it to lay the foundations of its vision for cyber defence. Indeed NATO frames cyber threats as a direct challenge for transatlantic and national security as stated in the 2010 Strategic Concept. The Alliance approved its first Policy on Cyber Defence in 2008 (revised in 2011 and 2014) and established a Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) in 2008 and even a Cybersecurity Operations Centre within NATO Command Structure in 2018. The Strategic Concept adopted in November 2010 in Lisbon fully acknowledges cyber defence capabilities as a necessity for the Alliance. NATO also created tools to prevent cyber-attacks and cyber offensive capabilities with a central objective: to defend the Alliance’s own communications and information systems and to arouse its member states’ awareness on the need to protect critical infrastructures implied in contemporary military operations. At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014, the organisation crossed a new important threshold by recognizing cyber defence as part of the Alliance’s core task of collective defence and therefore included cyber threats as relevant article V material. This concretely means that NATO could trigger the article V of the Washington Treaty in case of a massive cyber attack with lethal implications against one of its members. Yet such a case would raise the difficult question of the attribution of the cyberattack. Such an attribution to a specific state or state-sponsored hacker would necessitate a consensus among the member states within the North Atlantic Council, which would probably make it difficult as it tackles diplomatic strings and strategic priorities which keep diverging among the EU member states. Indeed attribution continues to be a competence of member states until now, and not of NATO as such. Since 2014 NATO regularly reaffirms the importance of cyber defence as one of the core tasks of the Alliance, as it has been done during the Alliance’s summit in Brussels in June 2021: NATO endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy supporting the three main priorities of the Alliance (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security). The member states also agreed to commit to making use of the full range of capabilities to actively deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats at all times. Aside from these policy aspects, NATO also develops a wide range of tools and capabilities in the area of cyber defence, with the aim of being able to provide assistance to its member states in case of cyber-attack. It should also be acknowledged that NATO owns its information and computer networks used in NATO military missions, whereas in the case the EU for instance, the EU depends on the members states ICT infrastructures for CSDP missions. NATO set up a specific agency dedicated to cyber defence in 2012 at its SHAPE headquarters: the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), which hosts since 2016 a Cyber Security Operations Center (CyOC) dealing with around 500 cyber incidents each month and responsible for the cyber defence of NATO’s information and computer infrastructures in the world and on military theatres (like in Afghanistan until August 2021 for instance). This Cyber Operation Center should be fully operational in 2023. In addition to these tools the Alliance created a Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, which is a research and training facility dealing with cyber defence education, research and development. The main task of the Centre is to provide expertise on cyber defence, and organise cyber exercises involving both NATO Allies and partners. These tools are completed with NATO’s smart defence initiatives entailing cyber defence aspects and aiming at bringing member states to cooperate to develop and maintain capabilities they could not afford to develop or alone. The Alliance develops yearly exercises under the label Cyber Coalition. The development of NATO cyber capabilities over the last 15 years clearly shows that NATO started developing its own cyber defence culture. The organization therefore issued a Cyber Defense Pledge at the Warsaw summit in 2019 to facilitate cyber cooperation among its member states. As a follow up, France decided to host the first international conference in Paris in 2018 gathering the 29 NATO member states and the Secretary General of the Alliance to urge its allies to keep developing strategic thinking on cyber issues. Last but not least, NATO also develops an important cooperation with the EU on cyber defence. Both organizations have enhanced their cooperation in cyber defence since their joint declaration at the Alliance summit in Warsaw in 2016. They regularly organize common training and exercises and develop information sharing in order to raise mutual. Cooperation is even more needed in a context of limited financial resources: some experts suggest using the Berlin Plus agreements in cyber defence. The EU and NATO have also concluded a technical agreement between their response teams for cyber incidents (NCIRC and CERT-EU) in February 2016 to intensify their cooperation on cyber defence. This agreement has been enforced to discuss cyber threats in the context of 2019 European elections for instance. NATO also started a partnership with industry through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership (NICP). More precisely the Alliance develops links with computer firms such as Microsoft, Atos, Thales, Cisco or Apple. The panorama of NATO’s cyberdefence assets shows therefore that the Alliance takes cyber threats seriously and dedicates resources and reflection to the topic. Even though NATO could not decide itself to trigger article V against a cyber aggressor, its member states have the common framework enabling them to act, should they manifest the political will to do so.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – Biotech – Generic

Transatlantic cooperation on biotech solves

Giddings ’22 – Val, Senior fellow at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, (“Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation in Biotech Policy—A US Perspective”, 3/11/22, ) – sel

A WORLD OF BIOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES Mutual self-interest provides a strong basis for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology based on shared recognition of its vast potential to provide solutions to some of civilization’s most pressing problems. Thanks to explosive advances in our understanding of the many ways in which promiscuous nature has been manipulating DNA and RNA for the past billion years, it is widely anticipated that the 21st century will belong to biology.1 We are now at the point where our ability to innovate is constrained less by technical capability than by the limits of our imaginations. Multiple laboratories and companies on both sides of the Atlantic (and throughout the world) are pursuing promising applications, and experience confirms progress would be accelerated by cooperative approaches. But there are some considerable challenges, especially in agricultural and industrial contexts. The most important rate-limiting factor in our ability to harness biological innovations to the challenges of feeding the world, sustaining human and environmental health, and addressing climate change, is the burden imposed by ill-considered regulations. Unless this bottleneck can be unblocked, the enormous potential for transatlantic scientific cooperation will not yield the necessary fruits. DIVERGENT REGULATORY PATHS: PRECAUTION VS. OPENNESS TO INNOVATION Existing policies, legislation, and regulations do little or nothing to advance human or environmental safety.2 Born out of understandable caution at the dawn of recombinant DNA technologies, today their most obvious impact is to obstruct and discourage research, development, and deployment of innovative solutions to various challenges.3 This is so despite an abundant record of production and consumption of new biotech products with enviable records of improved safety, superior sustainability, and widespread beneficial economic impacts.4 The benefits are so substantial that a pattern has emerged of farmers breaking the law to acquire and plant improved seeds in countries where governments have lagged in allowing access.5 It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability, but only impede our ability to use the most innovative, precise, and safest tools to address our gravest challenges.6 In terms of regulatory policy and openness to biological innovations, the width of the Atlantic might be measured better in light years than miles or kilometers. As imperfect as regulations for the products of biotechnology are in North America, they are simply indefensible in Europe.7 The United States decided in 1986, after years of study and consultation, that no new laws were required to ensure the safety of crops and foods improved through biotechnology. This was based on the finding that they present no novel hazards, and foreseeable risks of their development and use fall into categories with which humans have considerable experience from millennia of conventional plant and animal breeding.8 The United States therefore decided to regulate these novel products under existing authorities administered by the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration, and Environmental Protection Agency.9 While implementation of this policy, the “Coordinated Framework,” has been far from perfect, it has been sufficiently predictable and science-based to enable an explosion of innovation, new product development, and commercial activity. Consequently, the United States has led the world to the present day wherein crops improved through biotechnology are now the global standard for quality seeds, delivering improved yields, safety, sustainability, and economic productivity around the world, with the lion’s share of benefits accruing on behalf of small farmers in developing countries.10 Europe took a different approach. It is one thing to implement policies and regulations ostensibly designed to ensure safety; it is quite another to ignore vast data and decades of experience around the world to maintain obsolete policies and regulations that add nothing to safety or sustainability. The European Union decided to regulate seeds improved through biotechnology as a novel class governed under new regulations specifically focused on an arbitrary category known as “GMOs” (for “genetically modified organisms”). The conceit was that because they represented gene combinations produced by mechanisms supposedly “not found in nature” (but actually ubiquitous) they must present novel hazards, even though none has ever been identified. These putatively novel hazards, despite the lack of any concrete manifestations, allegedly required dedicated, specific, “precautionary” regulations. The resulting regulatory regime proved so burdensome it led to the general collapse of agricultural biotechnology in Europe, which had played a leading role in its discovery and invention. Permissions for field trials proved almost impossible to obtain, products could not be developed and brought to market, academic labs abandoned the field, and the industry relocated most of its assets and activities to the Americas. And Europe became the world’s largest importer of commodity foods improved through biotechnology, only recently surpassed by China. OPPORTUNITY FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION Many scientists in the EU (and around the world) knew from the beginning that this was the wrong approach, yet the EU pushed its model internationally, with aggressive diplomacy, leading to emulation by many countries in the developing world, with equally unhappy results to those seen in Europe.11 But a growing number of scientists, policymakers, and even “green” NGOs that had originally opposed GMOs, now recognize the counterproductive results of this approach and are working to avoid repeating the same mistakes with gene editing. This shines a spotlight on the most important and potentially fruitful opportunity for transatlantic cooperation in biotechnology: the revival of science-based regulatory regimes in which the degree of regulatory oversight is proportional to the hazards involved, and regulation that enables, rather than discourages the safe development of innovative products. A return to and reaffirmation of these first principles would provide fertile ground for cooperation and coordination globally. Regulatory reform (everywhere, not just in the EU and its emulators, though the need is greatest there) provides fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation and coordination. We have robust models of proven approaches.12 Without such cooperation, other progress in developing and deploying innovative solutions through biotechnology will be impeded or foregone. As to national security risks, just as with other risks, novelty attributable to biotechnology is elusive. One can do very nasty things with conventional bioweapons, and they are easily magnified with recombinant DNA techniques. At the same time, defensive capacities are also buttressed by biotechnology, as demonstrated by the rapid development of mRNA vaccines against SARS-CoV-2. There has been some good work done in this area, but this topic is worth exploring at greater depth. The OECD has a track record of thoughtful analyses with such topics. One possibility would be to build on that foundation by establishing a joint OECD/NATO working group to serve as a forum.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – Generic

Solves better and prevents extinction.

Belin ’19 — Célia; visiting fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. Her areas of expertise include trans-Atlantic relations, U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, French politics and foreign policy, domestic determinants of foreign policy, and the politics of travel under COVID. She holds a doctorate in political science (University Paris 2), a master's degree in international relations (University Paris 2), and a bachelor’s degree in Modern Languages/Business (University of Burgundy). April 2, 2019; “NATO matters, but the EU matters more”; Brookings; ; //CYang

Americans who are truly committed to the idea of a Europe “whole and free” should realize that NATO is no longer the main spinal cord of the European project; the European Union is. When George H. W. Bush coined the phrase in 1989, the level of intra-European integration was arguably on par with the defense alliance as providing stability and prosperity to the continent, and Americans were still heavily involved in both. Remember, this was pre-Maastricht Treaty, before the EU itself. Three decades of political, economic, and monetary integration later — and 16 new members later — the European Union is deeply entrenched in the lives of Europeans.

Today, 28 European democracies, which used to compete among themselves and sometimes fight to their ultimate demise, now choose to pool sovereignty and have their interests communally discussed and collectively defended. The EU is a power multiplier: Every one of the 28 has a stronger individual voice because they stand together in the European Union. Small European countries, whose geography and demography would force them to cave to stronger neighbors, can now count on the solidarity of the group — as illustrated by the unwavering support for Ireland by the other 26 member states and the Brussels institutions in the Brexit negotiations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › Block – Solvency – Generic

The CP solves interoperability, cooperation, and Euro defense autonomy---zero funding or overlap deficits. **an IL to Euro autonomy INB

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

Synergies in procurement and capability development As with the cyber domain, NATO and the EU could respond to outside pressure by increasing and improving procurement and technological cooperation. The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered shortages and vulnerabilities in the supply chain, and the competition for rare earth material and high-technology products (such as microchips) has increased. Meanwhile, breakthrough technological achievements are opening new frontiers for competition in the security domain. First, European allies could better coordinate their defense spending within the framework of the European Union; the absence of an integrated defense structure inevitably leads to duplications and wasted resources. Moreover, the armed forces of different European countries may encounter difficulties in operating with one another, given that there are 138 defense systems in Europe (compared to only 30 in the United States).70 As stated in a European Commission report, the lack of cooperation in the European defense industry produces a loss of 25 billion to 100 billion euros per year, while 30% of the costs could be saved if a joint procurement was in place.71 In the United States, several commentators point out that a more integrated procurement system at the European level will negatively impact U.S.-EU trade relations in the defense industry.72 Although some economic losses for the United States are indeed possible, there are ways to contain them and of course an EU with a stronger defense would make a more reliable partner for the United States. In fact, the U.S. and EU are currently discussing administrative agreements with the EDA to allow the United States to participate in PESCO projects. Through a franker dialogue, the two sides of the Atlantic could strengthen the defense market without resorting to protectionist stances on either side. This is particularly relevant considering the strong ties between the U.S. and EU defense industries; they both could benefit from deeper cooperation and exchanges on the technological level, and from free and fair competition in the trans-Atlantic defense market based on common rules and standards. On this point, the EU could leverage resources from the European Defense Fund and the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 program to develop new technologies and fill security gaps. Both the fund and program are relatively young and would benefit from a deeper exchange with NATO — whose experience in military procurement is unrivalled — to help define standards as well as characteristics of the technology. NATO and the EU address capability development in markedly different ways. NATO focuses more on procuring a given item from a given state to meet a specific need of the alliance, whereas the EU focuses more on filling capability gaps and encouraging member states to cooperate to develop new assets. In this regard, the EU appears to have a comparative advantage given the role of the European Defense Agency to go beyond specific operational requirements and its ability to consider long-term trends and ways member states can cooperate on the development of new capabilities. In particular, the EU defense procurement benefits from strong support from EU-led research and development programs, as well as from considerable financial resources from the European Defense Fund. As European defense capabilities advance, there will be overlap between the EU Capability Development Priorities and the NATO Defense Planning Process; this gives the EU and NATO an opportunity to foster greater cooperation and build up a more efficient and competitive trans-atlantic defense.73 A recent study from the French Institute of International Relations identifies areas where defense requirements could be harmonized and where the EU and NATO could work on joint research projects: from cyberdefense, air superiority, logistics, and medical support capabilities to science and technology, arms control, and intelligence.74 A more synchronized approach in these areas — that would also entail a joint assessment of member state performances — will undoubtedly reinforce both NATO- and EU-led operations as well as deterrence.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › NATO Coop Solves › 1NC/2NC EU-NATO Coop Solvency

A balance between bolstering EU autonomy and multilateral cooperation is possible---they’re compliments. **solvency advocate for EU-US coop CP and EU-NATO coop CP

Puglierin 21, Dr Jana Puglierin is Head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies. From September 2013 to December 2015 she was a program officer at the DGAP’s Future Forum Berlin (Berliner Forum Zukunft). Prior to this she was an advisor on disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation at the German Bundestag, where she also worked on matters relating to German and European foreign and security policy., (Jana, “Strategic Partnerships and EU Security and Defence” in “Achieving Strategic Sovereignty for the EU”, European Parliament, ) //CHC-DS ‍

However, the next four years of the Biden presidency should not be wasted on meta-debates. They present a window of opportunity for both sides of the Atlantic. It is up to the Europeans to prove that the European quest for greater strategic sovereignty can at the same time be positive for the transatlantic partnership and that a strong and self-reliant Europe is in America’s interest. And it is up to the Americans to show that they are interested in real partnership on greater eye-level, instead of curating vassals. The starting conditions are good: President Biden wants to repair the shattered relationship with the Europeans and make the transatlantic partnership the cornerstone of a unified Western approach toward great power competition. The recent US request to join a PESCO project on military mobility as a third country represents an initial test case – and a big opportunity - for a constructive future EU-US cooperation. For the Europeans, this also means that they must contribute greater added value to the transatlantic partnership through measures that simultaneously strengthen their own strategic sovereignty. First of all, this would be the development and procurement of more effective European capabilities, including high-end spectrum capabilities and strategic enablers. Very few PESCO initiatives currently address these capability gaps. Even if the issue of transatlantic industrial cooperation will remain difficult – Biden will be tough when it comes to buying and selling American – a basic willingness to support credible efforts to strengthen European defence capabilities is there. But the EU will need to demonstrate that its efforts go beyond subsidizing European defence industries and lead to a tangible boost in Europe’s operational equipment that would be available also within a NATO framework. Second, the EU needs to take some military load off the United States. They should assume greater regional responsibility in its Southern and Eastern neighbourhood and also increase their operational readiness for operations abroad. Third, Europeans should spell out what the European pillar of NATO is supposed to be and how it relates to CSDP. Cooperation between the EU and NATO has made much progress in recent years, but there is clearly still unused potential. Capability development and defence planning could be even better coordinated and further aligned. The ongoing Strategic Compass process should be closely linked to the NATO review process, especially in the areas of countering cyber and hybrid threats as well as fighting terrorism and disinformation campaigns, cooperation between the two institutions should be strengthened. The EU needs to reemphasise its effort to strengthen European military mobility and provide adequate funding.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – INB – Impact/Turns Case

A weak EU turns NATO capabilities---tanks burden sharing and hurts US public support---EU autonomy solves.

Retter et al 21, 1) Lucia Retter is a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition, M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); B.A. in modern and medieval languages, University of Cambridge, 2) Stephanie Pezard is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; M.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po); M.A. in political science, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva; B.A. in history, French Institute of Political Science, Paris (Sciences Po) 3) Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University; A.B. in political science, Columbia University 4) Gene Germanovich is an international defense researcher and currently serves as the acting international portfolio lead for the RAND National Security Research Division. B.S. in international affairs, Georgia Tech; M.A. in security studies, Georgetown University 5) Sarah Grand-Clement; publisher, 6) Pauline Paillé is an analyst at RAND Europe working in the area of defence and security. M.A. in international relations, Sciences Po Bordeaux (“European Strategic Autonomy in Defence: Transatlantic visions and implications for NATO, US and EU relations”, RAND Europe, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html) //CHC-DS ‍

European and US interviewees came up with several arguments pointing to the benefits of a strong European pillar not only for NATO and the EU, but also outweighing the challenges that may emerge in the process. Whether these efforts come under the umbrella of European strategic autonomy and EU-level defence integration or via bi- and multi-lateral programmes, or some combination of both, did not make a substantive difference to the well-shared perception that a more capable Europe is good for NATO and good for the transatlantic partnership. A less engaged, less capable, less coherent and less reliable European pillar of NATO is unlikely to be capable of meaningful burden sharing. And from a US national perspective, justifying investment in European defence matters to the U.S. public would be very difficult if European nations choose not to invest in strengthening their contribution to NATO. While a weak Europe (our Scenario 2) would require least policy effort and resources, it would also be the one with least benefits for NATO and the U.S., particularly as it looks for allies in an emerging systemic competition with China. Naturally, the question arises as to whether the pursuit of European strategic autonomy is the ‘right way of going about it’, and whether the lack of clarity in relation to the concept creates more problems than it solves when it comes to the transatlantic relations. All in all, despite the risks of misunderstanding and miscommunication, the concept of European strategic autonomy, if underpinned by continuing defence consolidation, does seem to offer a unifying principle for a much needed defence integration to enable the EU to take up greater responsibilities for its defence and security matters.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – INB – Impact/Turns Case

EU dependence makes Russia/China war unwinnable---wargame simulations prove.

De Maio 21, Giovanna De Maio was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. With a background on Russia and international security, as well as on Italy’s relations with Russia, EU and United States, De Maio’s research analyzes transatlantic relations vis-à-vis the challenges posed by the rise of China and Russia, with a particular focus on NATO and EU. At Brookings, she has extensively worked on Italian foreign policy and on the European Union. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris., (Giovanna, “OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION”, December, Brookings Institute, ) //CHC-DS 🐱‍👤

A stronger European defense to strengthen NATO’s posture While the EU has made significant progress in countering hybrid warfare since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the same cannot be said with regard to developing more effective traditional deterrence capabilities. Such capabilities are increasingly necessary, not just because of Russia’s aggressive posture — expanding its area of operations beyond the post-Soviet space to Syria and Africa — but also because of the growing geopolitical and security alignment between Beijing and Moscow.

Since 2014, cooperation between China and Russia has expanded beyond the domain of arm sales. The two countries have supported each other’s development of strategic weapons (such as for missile defense) and artificial intelligence, as well as each other’s political positions in the United Nations Security Council.41 Beijing and Moscow have deepened their interactions in Africa, where Russian Wagner Group mercenaries patrol Chinese facilities,42 and conducted military exercises including a shared air patrol in the Asia-Pacific region.43 They also have been seeking common ground on Afghanistan since the departure of U.S. troops.44 Such alignment is increasingly resembling a partnership that is reflected at the military level too. After the past year’s military drills in the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea, and the Indo-Pacific, China and Russia recently conducted a joint military exercise called Zapad/Interaction-2021 in China’s northwestern region of Ningxia, where for the first time they used a joint command and control system and shared equipment — mimicking the way NATO forces work with each other.45 Meanwhile, the United States has begun to shift its security focus toward the IndoPacific region and South China Sea where Beijing is threatening Taiwan. Consequently, should a direct confrontation with China occur in the medium to long term, Russia could take advantage of the situation and potentially target Europe while U.S. forces and attentions are directed elsewhere. For this reason, it is crucial for European allies to have the military capabilities to push back against Russia with little support from the United States, at least in the initial phases. With more defense capabilities, European allies would also have the resources to respond to crises that arise in the Mediterranean region. After four years of strained trans-Atlantic relations — where the defense spending issue has intoxicated the broader debate on trans-Atlantic security — a stronger European defense would help Washington recognize the increased geopolitical cohesion and security concerns of the bloc. Unfortunately, as described earlier, such capability has yet to be achieved. A RAND Corporation wargaming simulation exercise assessed that in the case of a conventional attack by the Russian Federation, Moscow’s forces would be able to reach the outskirts of either the Estonian or Latvian capital in around 60 hours, and the NATO allies would not be able to defend these territories because of a (totally fillable) shortage of military capabilities.46 Similarly, a scenario analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies argued that without the help of the United States, conventional forces from European NATO countries would not be able to push back against the hypothetical conquest of Lithuania and part of Poland by the Russian Federation.47 To ensure that they can successfully respond to a land attack from Russia, or a coordinated Russia-China operation, Europeans need to increase the quality and readiness of their defense apparatus. A policy brief by the NATO Defense College calls for multinational battlegroups in Poland and in the Baltics to increase their readiness in terms of support capabilities, such as artillery and air defense, and for European allies to fulfill their NATO 2018 Readiness commitment of providing several land combat brigades and maritime task groups.48 The authors also point out that to increase deterrence, European allies need sufficient and effective air and missile defense capabilities to protect critical infrastructure, as well as long-range conventional precision-strike weapons to limit Russia’s options for regional conventional attacks.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – INB – A2: EU Tech Inevitable

Not inevitable – we’re on the brink – it’s only a question of what happens now.

Csernatoni 21 [Raluca Csernatoni, 12-6-2021, "The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex", Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/06/eu-s-defense-ambitions-understanding-emergence-of-european-defense-technological-and-industrial-complex-pub-85884, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Also, the emergence of a common European approach to security and defense technological and industrial matters has not gone as smoothly as expected. At the same time, the European Commission’s expanding competencies in these fields remains a sensitive issue to other EU institutions and member states. This sensitivity reflects long-standing national protectionism related to the high politics of security and defense, and ongoing competition with other EU institutions and agencies, such as the EDA, over the EU’s security and defense policy agenda.10

The above interrelated developments have all contributed to the EU momentum to proceed on defense industrial and market integration. They provide a link between the why, the who, and the how:

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – INB – Tech Key

EU tech leadership is necessary for broader clout.

Csernatoni 21 [Raluca Csernatoni, 8-12-2021, "The EU’s Rise as a Defense Technological Power: From Strategic Autonomy to Technological Sovereignty", Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/08/12/eu-s-rise-as-defense-technological-power-from-strategic-autonomy-to-technological-sovereignty-pub-85134, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Behind the EU’s recent multiple sovereignty agendas is the need to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to innovation. The very label of a geopolitical European Commission implies a new level of engagement for the EU in the global balance of power. Technological and digital sovereignty are at the heart of such ambitions.

The outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic has further exacerbated the urgency to shore up technological, digital, and regulatory responses to preserve the EU’s economic clout, industrial competitiveness, and geopolitical influence, as well as to reduce dependencies in critical technology areas. What has the EU done so far, and what must it still do to meet that goal of technological sovereignty?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
EU CP › EU Leadership INB › Block – INB – Spillover

The CP signals willingness to cooperate – causes EU cohesion.

Csernatoni 21 [Raluca Csernatoni, 12-6-2021, "The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex", Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/06/eu-s-defense-ambitions-understanding-emergence-of-european-defense-technological-and-industrial-complex-pub-85884, DOA: 6-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

The historical development of closer European security and defense industrial and technological cooperation is a complex affair.8 It has involved highly networked and transnational EU-state-industrial relations across various EU institutions and agencies, interest groups, and security and defense industrial actors. It also illustrates member states’ increasing willingness to give the EU a more significant part to play in security and defense matters. Given the salience of current debates concerning the EU’s defense and technological sovereignty, the costs and benefits of European security and defense research and innovation programs need to be set out in full.9 Moreover, the contributions of various interest groups and EU institutions also need to be further examined. Linked to this discussion is a broader understanding among member states that the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) needs a new level of strategic ambition, with an awareness of the benefits of establishing a European defense industrial and technological research and innovation policy.