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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Framework › Discussing precarity good
Lorey et al 15(Lorey, Isabell, et al. , Lorey is a Queer Studies Professor at the Academy of Media Arts in Cologne, works for transversal texts, the publication platform of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. , “Care Crisis and Care Strike .” State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious, Verso, London, 2015, pp. 92–94.) //RB
The Precarias’ derive inscribes itself in the tradition of ‘militant research’, generating ‘minor knowledge forms’ for the purpose of self-organization. This practice refers back to the idea of co-research associated with the Italian workers’ movement of the 1970s, as well as to practices of consciousness-raising deriving from second-wave feminism.4 Starting from their own precarized existences, in their encounters and affections with other precarious they seek to break through the isolation and individualization of post-Fordist living and working conditions.5 They traverse not only places of work, residence, shopping and meeting, places of sexuality and of transport, but also the different modes of subjectivation involved. The Precarias a la deriva start, first of all, from their own different experiences of precarity and precarization, in order to enable a common orientation with others in the derives. This orientation is not directed to a goal, but emerges in practice. In the derive they pass through social spaces and explore the conditions of precarized everyday life, in order to find out, first of all, what a common struggle against precarity and precarization might mean.6 As they start from the presupposition that the precarious goes far beyond the realm of work and covers the whole of existence, there is no search for a common identity that would conjoin everyone into a unity. Instead, the Precarias are interested in inventing ‘common notions’ in Spinoza’s sense.7 Such notions are formed by way of the affective connections of bodies, through what they have in common in their mutual affections. Common notions arise through actualizing that ‘which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body\s Developed in encounters with others, in exchanges with them, both the multiplicity and the singularities of existence manifest themselves in common notions.
Similarly to Butler, the Precarias also argue against traditions of thinking that refuse our fundamental social relationality, warn against infection by others, maintain a logic of individualism and security, and thus perceive precarization solely as a threat. They contrast this kind of social and political logic with a ‘logic of care’/ situating the term ‘reproduction’ and the multiplicity of care activities associated with it in the context of post-Fordist production conditions, and taking into consideration the new forms of communicative knowledge and affect work. In their militant research the Precarias focus not only on housework, nursing, child-raising and education, but also on work in call centres and sex work.10 Enhancing the status of these care activities enables alternative political responses to current problems, which the interminable reformulations of the logic of threat and security are not capable of providing. Contrary to the tradition of the political of a ‘care community’, a cuidadania.'11
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Framework › C/I – Fem Action Research
Reid 04, (Colleen Reid, Simon Fraser University, “Advancing Women’s Social Justice Agendas: A Feminist Action Research Framework”, published in IIQM) GP
Participatory research and contemporary feminism share a number of major underlying features centering on the analysis of political economy and praxis (Maguire, 1993). The notion of praxis challenges the theory-practice relationship and raises problems associated with value-free science. The term “praxis” originates from the Greek word prasso meaning “doing” and “acting,” in contrast with the theoretical designs of epistemology; theoria 3 (Audi, 1995). Lal (1996) refers to pedagogical praxis the erasing of the boundaries between theory, methodology, and practice, and between field and home (Lal, 1996). Other researchers define praxis as a dialectical process of collective reflection and action (Israel et al., 1994; Kirby & McKenna, 1989), the joining of theory and action so that each is informed by and changes through its relation with the other (Ristock & Pennell, 1996), and the integration of knowing and doing (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). For praxis to be possible, theory must not only illuminate the lived experience of social groups, it must also be illuminated by their struggles (Lather, 1991). Theory is thought of as experience-based (Park, 2001), and reflection itself is embedded in praxis, not separate from it. Action upon reality and analyses of that learning may change awareness of the nature of problems and the sources of oppression (Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001). The processes of uncovering marginalized knowledges, giving priority to these knowledges, and enabling the collaborative development of action strategies are simultaneously theoretical and methodological. Woven within and between each of the following characteristics of a FAR framework is the notion of praxis theory, methods, and practice in dynamic interplay. A Feminist Action Research framework FAR guidingPrinciples Through integrating participatory research with feminist theory and research, the following guiding principles for FAR emerged: inclusion, participation, action, social change, and researcher reflexivity. Inclusion The first principle of feminist action research is inclusion. To include is to cause to be a part of something, to consider with, or to put into a group (Morris, 1982). Feminist action researchers contend that no social practices or activities should be excluded as improper subjects for public discussion, expression, or collective choice; no one should be forced into privacy (Young, 1990). Gender and women‟s daily experiences are central in the construction of theoretical frameworks and feminist action research methods. Women‟s experiences are central in several ways in understanding patriarchy as a system of domination and oppression, in identifying key issues and questions in all phases of the research process including action and evaluation, and in giving explicit attention to how women and men as groups benefit from the project.4 Feminist action researchers expose the inadequacy of androcentric research and its partial, inaccurate, and incomplete representation of human experience when women are muted (Maguire, 2001). By beginning with the experiences and research needs of women who have traditionally been silenced, the process of knowledge production is transformed and the ideological power base is challenged (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). Feminist action researchers seek to connect the articulated, contextualized personal with the often hidden or invisible structural and social institutions that define and shape our lives. Feminist action researchers attempt to make possible the development of strategies and programs based on real life experience rather than theories or assumptions, providing an analysis of issues based on a description of how women actually experience those issues (Barnsley & Ellis, 1992). Participation Inclusion is a precursor to the second principle of feminist action research participation. To participate is “to take part, join, or share with others” (Morris, 1982). Feminist action researchers are committed to making women‟s voices more audible and facilitating women‟s empowerment through “ordinary talk” (Maguire, 2001).
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › AT: Perm
Gentry 16, C. E. (2016). (Caron Gentry is Senior Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews and Chair of the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section of the International Studies Association, The ‘Duel’ Meaning of Feminisation in International Relations: The Rise of Women and the Interior Logics of Declinist Literature, Global Responsibility to Protect, 9(1), 101-124. doi: )
Feminisation as Devalorisation ir scholarship, amongst other scholarship, has always valued masculine traits above feminine ones: rationality of capability over weakness (as well as the rationality of attitude over one informed by emotion); sovereignty over cooperation/dependency.86 Therefore, the discourse of progress and good governance is not only Western-centric but inherently masculinist as well. To demonstrate this I will unpack the feminist understanding of ‘feminisation’. It is not enough to think that simply by ‘including’ women in policies, solutions, or measurements means that progress is being made. This is the assumption that Chakrabarty pointed out as a hypocritical fallacy. Instead, a deeper grasp of what gender is and how it operates as a structure must be understood. The declinist literature is not manipulating women’s positions but it is replicating gender dynamics when it fails to pay attention to certain violence, like structural violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against sexual minorities. Ann Tickner begins her seminal text on gender and international relations by working through a critique of how Morgenthau transposes the rational man onto the state. This has given mainstream ir scholars the presumption that states are (or ought to aspire to being) rational, sovereign actors.87 Yet, as Tickner points out, rationality and sovereignty are masculine attributes.88 In a logocentrism, such as the one that exists in the masculinity-femininity binary, one side is always valued over another. Particular masculinities are valorised— rational, wealthy, white, heteronormative ones;89 most if not all femininities are devalorised.
. The bias towards masculinity is what V. Spike Peterson refers to as feminisation.90 Peterson clarifies that Gender is not simply an empirical category that refers to embodied men and women and their material activities but also a systematically analytical category that refers to constructions of [privileged] masculinity and [devalorised] femininity and their ideological effects (emphasis true to text).91
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › AT: Perm
Gentry 16, C. E. (2016). (Caron Gentry is Senior Lecturer in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews and Chair of the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section of the International Studies Association, The ‘Duel’ Meaning of Feminisation in International Relations: The Rise of Women and the Interior Logics of Declinist Literature, Global Responsibility to Protect, 9(1), 101-124. doi: )
Feminisation as Devalorisation ir scholarship, amongst other scholarship, has always valued masculine traits above feminine ones: rationality of capability over weakness (as well as the rationality of attitude over one informed by emotion); sovereignty over cooperation/dependency.86 Therefore, the discourse of progress and good governance is not only Western-centric but inherently masculinist as well. To demonstrate this I will unpack the feminist understanding of ‘feminisation’. It is not enough to think that simply by ‘including’ women in policies, solutions, or measurements means that progress is being made. This is the assumption that Chakrabarty pointed out as a hypocritical fallacy. Instead, a deeper grasp of what gender is and how it operates as a structure must be understood. The declinist literature is not manipulating women’s positions but it is replicating gender dynamics when it fails to pay attention to certain violence, like structural violence, sexual and gender-based violence, and violence against sexual minorities. Ann Tickner begins her seminal text on gender and international relations by working through a critique of how Morgenthau transposes the rational man onto the state. This has given mainstream ir scholars the presumption that states are (or ought to aspire to being) rational, sovereign actors.87 Yet, as Tickner points out, rationality and sovereignty are masculine attributes.88 In a logocentrism, such as the one that exists in the masculinity-femininity binary, one side is always valued over another. Particular masculinities are valorised— rational, wealthy, white, heteronormative ones;89 most if not all femininities are devalorised.
. The bias towards masculinity is what V. Spike Peterson refers to as feminisation.90 Peterson clarifies that Gender is not simply an empirical category that refers to embodied men and women and their material activities but also a systematically analytical category that refers to constructions of [privileged] masculinity and [devalorised] femininity and their ideological effects (emphasis true to text).91
2022
Michigan
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › AT: Perm
Lorey et al 15(Lorey, Isabell, et al. , Lorey is a Queer Studies Professor at the Academy of Media Arts in Cologne, works for transversal texts, the publication platform of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies. , “Biopolitical Governmentality .” State of Insecurity: Government of the Precarious, Verso, London, 2015, pp. 36–39.) //RB
Within the framework of its welfare-state paradigm of protection, liberal governmentality was based on multiple forms of precarity as inequality through othering: on the one hand, on the unpaid labour of women in the reproduction area of the private sphere; on the other hand, on the precarity of all those excluded from the nation-state compromise between capital and labour - whether as abnormal, foreign or poor - as well as those living under extreme conditions of exploitation in the colonies.31 All those who did not meet the norm and normalization of the free, sovereign-bourgeois, white subject, along with his concomitant property relations, and all those who threatened this norm, were precarized. Western modernity, along with its conceptions of sovereignty and biopolitics, is unthinkable without a ‘political culturc of danger’,34 without the permanent endangerment of the normal, without imaginary invasions of constant, everyday threats such as illness, filth, sexuality, criminality or the fear of ‘racial’ impurity, which must be immunized against in various ways.35 The presumed paradox of biopolitical governmentality is evident here in a further aspect: this mode of governing makes it possible, as Cornelia Ott has aptly phrased it, ‘for human beings to learn to consider themselves as unique “subjects”, while uniting them at the same time as an amorphous, standardized “population mass” . .. The reverse side of the “right to life” here is always the exclusion or destruction of life.’36
The liberal mode of governing produces precarities as economic, social and legal relations of inequality through systematic categorizations and hierarchizations according to ‘body’ and ‘culture’. In this sense I use precarity as a structural category of ordering segmented relations of violence and inequality. This dimension of structural inequality, however, is missing in Foucault’s conception of governmentality.-37
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Impacts › Militarism/Heg impact
Turpin 97 [Jennifer Turpin 97, doctorate in Sociology at the University of Texas at Austin, “The Gendered New World Order: Militarism, Development, and the Environment”, 1997, ] Mr.Mr.
We cannot understand the new world order without examining gender and militarism. Yet women’s invisibility in military affairs and policymaking reflects taken-for-granted international assumptions about the maleness of war. Even though they are more likely than men to become war’s casualties or refugees, women have little or no say in making military or security decisions.
War and militarism become increasingly dangerous with the advent of new technologies. The past century has witnessed the killing of about 104 million people in wars— more than three quarters of all war dead recorded since the year 1500 (Hauchler and Kennedy 1994:183). Most people killed in war are civilians. But while 50 percent of the casualties in World War II were civilians, in the 1980s this figure rose to 80 percent, and by 1990 it was a staggering 90 percent. Women and children constitute the vast majority of these civilian war casualties.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Impacts › Environment Impact
Cuomo 16 (Chris, “Sexual Politics in Environmental Ethics: Impacts, Causes, Alternatives,” The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics. Edited by Stephen M Gardiner and Allen Thompson)
What matters in bringing attention to such linked harms is that real harms to bodies—biological bodies, psyches, social bodies/species, pseudo-bodies (eco-regions), and Earthly bodies (bodies of water or air)—are multiplied, exacerbated, and intensified through the collaborative synergies of multiple systems of oppression. Identifying linked harms points to the need for ethics and politics that can address those interwoven systems, and integrate considerations of social justice and environmental ethics at all levels. Regarding sex and gender, which are always interwoven with other factors, the “second class” yet simultaneously exhalted nature of feminity and what is associated with female biological reproductivity is a fundamental feature shaping ideas and relationships in sexist and nature-harming cultures, as is the identification of masculinity and superiority with domination and the absence of vulnerability. A second theme in work focused on matters of sex and gender in environmental ethics is the investigation of the conceptual presuppositions and frameworks, and hence the subtle values, that inform and enable systems of oppression. Philosophers and critical historicans have argued that environmentally destructive and dismissive value systems reflect meanings and symbolic systems built on identities and conceptions of nature and nonhuman animals that create and maintain a general logics of domination (Merchant, 1982; Warren, 1990; Allen, 1992). A guiding theory has been that nature and subordinated groups are symbolically associated on the debased side of western culture’s foundational hierarchies. Rather than being essentialist in an Aristotelian sense, this analysis emphasizes the historical material and symbolic associations between women and nature, and tracks evident patterns in who bears the brunt of the violence. To say that women and nature have been powerfully linked in western culture, and that those association have enabled sexist, racist, colonizing intersecting oppressions and social dominations, is not to imply that all femaleness is identified with only one cultural stereotype of what or how nature is, or that all women suffer the same or similar domination. Different women are symbolically identified with different aspects or fantasies of nature and anti-nature, and those associations have distinct repercussions in exploitative social systems, such as being revered as a natural beauty or being treated as a beast of burden. And naturalness is a pliable designation, for masculinities can be associated with certain ideas about nature and naturalness (physical strength, wildness), and femininity is also often characterized as a domesticating cultural force, or an enemy of nature. What matters for politics and ethics is not merely that nature and femininity are reductively associated with each other, but also that the effects of the association are debilitating and distorting for both. Pernicious cultural and symbolic connections between women and nature as reproductive, submissive, and decorative create and maintain divisions of labor that put women in closer proximity to the material world and symbolically associate femininity with subjectable naturalness, which can or even ought to be molded to man’s needs or whims. Projected associations between “women and nature” and the like propagate subordination and the potential for victimization, for example by compulsively relegating females to the work of caring for others. Hierarchical characterizations of male/female, nature/culture, primitive/civilized are interwoven systems of exploitation that shape and inform environmental relationships at every scale. Understanding sex and gender critically in relation to environmental ethics, and deconstructing the roles certain conceptions of nature play in propagating social oppression, complicates one-dimensional ideas about the nature of environmental problems, and points toward fruitful areas for ethical development and exploration.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Impacts › Environment Impact
Inwood and Tyner 22, [Joshua FJ Inwood and James A Tyner; Inwood works at the Department of Geography, Rock Ethics Institute, The Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA; Tyner works at the Department of Geography, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA; “Militarism and the mutually assured destruction of climate change,” , p.3-4, March 2022] Mr.Mr.
On the other hand, the military complex understands that ‘climate change is likely to cause an increase in demand for military forces in both disaster response and humanitarian assistance operations’ (Bigger et al, 2021; Brzoska, 2015; Burnett & Mach, 2021; Hayden, 2018; McGrady et al., 2010, p. 5; see also Smith, 2007). Indeed, in 2007 a group of eleven high-ranking, retired U.S. admirals and generals released a report arguing that climate change will act as a ‘threat multiplier’ that makes existing concerns, such as water scarcity and food insecurity, more complex and intractable and presents a tangible threat to U.S. national security interests (Brown, Hammill, and McLeman 2007, 1142). Much of this, however, remains hidden in plain sight. As Patricia Hynes (2014, p. 1) writes, ‘a well-glued solidarity between the military, national security advisors, civilian defense contractors, and government elites has cloaked this debt of pollution, destruction of land, and exploitation of finite resources under the paternalistic mantle of national security.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Saviourism Link
(Kozol 04, Wendy. , Wendy Kozol is a professor in the American Studies department at Oberlin College , “Domesticating NATO’s War in Kosovo/a: (In) Visible Bodies and the Dilemma of Photojournalism.” Meridians, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 1–38. JSTOR, .) // RB
Media Coverage of NATO Bombings Throughout the 1990s, the American news media represented the Balkans as a violent region rocked by ethnic cleansing following the collapse of communist regimes at the end of the Cold War. Reports on concentration camps, torture, mass murder, and expulsion of thousands from their homes reinforced a narrative about the failure of democracies rather than the failure of market economies to emerge. Moreover, by mid-decade, reporters began to discuss the extraordinarily high levels of sexual violence by Serbian and Yugoslav forces in this region, especially in Bosnia. Feminist analyses foreground the associations between Serbian national- ism, rape warfare, and ethnic cleansing in order to understand rape as a military and political tool (Milic 1993; B. Allen 1996; Rejali 1998). Lynda Boose, for instance, argues that the sexual sadism of Serbian brutality was crucial to this "orgy of nationalism" (2002, 74). Statistics vary widely but conservative estimates of women raped in Bosnia range from twenty thousand to fifty thousand. (Boose 2002) U.S. media attention turned to Kosovo/a in the late 1990s as violence escalated against Albanian Muslim populations. The moment of most intense interest in the region came during the NATO bombings when the United States was directly involved in the conflict through its military presence. NATO operations never achieved the popular support of the Gulf War, coming as they did shortly after the impeachment hearings of President Clinton. Instead, the bomb- ings provoked intense debates about appropriate methods of humanitarian intervention as well as exposed the problematic nature of NATO's very existence after 1991.
Television, newspapers, and the major newsmagazines all provided extensive coverage of the war. Even with the pervasiveness of television, Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News continue to influence a wide variety of Americans because "nearly every high school, public and academic library" purchases them (Ulrich's Periodical Directory 2003). Major media con- glomerates that own Time (Time-Warner) and Newsweek (Washington Post, Inc.) - U.S. News is independently published - are part of the powerful network of American and European news media that control "what much of the world reads, watches, and hears in its foreign news ..." (Shulman 1994, 108). Crucially, these newsmagazines frame global economic, political, and social conflicts through racial and gender categories that in turn justify the U.S. government's encroaching and imperialist notions of globalization.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Transnational Organizations Link
Connell 05, (RW Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinities, RW Connell was formerly a professor at the University of Sydney and an Australian sociologist)GP
( 1) Transnational and multi-national corporations, which typically have a strong gender division of labour, and a strongly masculinized management culture (Wajcman 1 999) . (2) The international state, including the institutions of diplomacy and UN agencies. These too are gendered, mainly run by men, though with more cultural complexity than multi-national corporations (Gierycz 1999) . (3) International media, which have a strong gender division of labour and powerfully circulate gender meanings through entertainment, advertising and news. New media participate in the commodification of women in an international trade in v.ives and sexual partners (Cunneen and Stubbs 2000 ) . (4) Global markets - in capital, commodities, services and labour - have an increasing reach into local economies. They are often strongly gender-structured (e.g. Chang and Ling 2000) , and are now very weakly regulated, apart from border controls on migration.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Prolif Link/Root Cause
Agarwalla 20 [Yashna Agarwalla, “The Gendered Dimensions of Anti-Nuclear Weapons Policy,” , 2020 WE DO NOT ENDORSED GENDERED LANGUAGE IN THIS CARD] Mr.Mr.
Nuclear weapons are, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the most dangerous invention of mankind, and a fierce resistance to their proliferation remains at the very crux of the international security architecture. Nuclear weapons have also given rise to waves of anti-nuclear activism since their very invention, particularly during the Cold War years. One of the most significant debates surrounding anti-nuclear activism and the disarmament movement contends itself with gender. Nuclear weapons are seen to symbolise strength and the power of a particular state. Nuclear weapons are, thus, embedded in notions of masculinity and this perceived connection between masculinity and weapons of mass destruction serves as a hurdle to their abolishment. For instance, the naming of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as ‘Little boy’ and ‘Fat man’ respectively opened the door for masculine characteristics to be associated with nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, after India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998, a prominent Indian politician remarked that the tests were necessary to prove ‘we are not eunuchs’ (Perlik, 2018). This statement aptly captures the high societal value and status awarded to nuclear weapons and brings to light how disarmament is seen as an affront to masculine norms and is hence feminine and weak.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Nukes Link
Cecire 09, (Ruth Cecire, Feminist Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 2009), pp. 41-65, Feminist Studies, Inc., ) GP
Cohn reports that because of the constant need to prove one's manhood, a sexualized discourse, veritable verbal "pissing contests," served to obscure any personal vulnerability or concern about lives lost; to do so risked being ostracized and demeaned as "soft," a "pussy," or for "acting like a wimp," which is, in their eyes, femalelike. Concern that Russians were essentially "harder" permeated strategic discussions, while, at the same time, new entrants to the nuclear club were said to have lost their virginity. It is thus hardly surprising to learn that when Edward Teller communicated news of the first successfully detonated hydrogen bomb, his telegram exclaimed, "It's a boy." Extant customary weapons still reflect a time-honored masculine iconography. Like arrows and guns, conventional and nuclear bombs evoke clearly discernible phallic imagery; the power and immediacy of their impact connote a masculine orgasmic event
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › NATO Link
Hebert 11, (Laura Hebert, Analyzing UN and NATO responses to Sexual Misconduct in Peacekeeping Operations, published in Making Gender, Making war. Laura Hebert is an associate professor of Diplomacy and World Affairs at the Occidental College.) GP
NATO’s approach to gender mainstreaming is just as superficial as that of the UN. In the early 1960s, senior female service officers from NATO countries began meeting to discuss how women could be more effectively integrated and utilized in NATO forces. Their efforts eventually led the Military Committee (MC), NATO’s highest military authority, to establish a consultative committee in 1976 with the purpose of facilitating information sharing between NATO members on the representation of female military personnel and issues affecting women’s ability to perform effectively in the armed forces (Garcia 1999). The Committee on Women in NATO Forces (CWINF) met formally only once a year, for a maximum of five working days (NATO 2007b: 8). Nonetheless, for twenty years it was the only body in the organization directly addressing women’s roles and status. In 1997, the MC agreed to create the Office on Women in NATO Forces (OWINF), run by two staff members, in order to allow for greater continuity in NATO’s support for the integration of women (Garcia 1999). The establishment of these bodies was the result of many years of hard work by women serving in NATO’s armed forces. The CWINF and the OWINF, however, focused not on gender mainstreaming, but rather on the integration of women in NATO forces through increasing the representation of female military personnel, ensuring female military personnel enjoy the same personal and professional opportunities as their male colleagues, and improving the quality of life of female personnel.34 In May 2009, the MC made the decision to replace the CWINF with the NATO Committee on Gender Perspective, while the OWINF was renamed the NATO Office on Gender Perspective. According to the MC, these changes were made to support the organization’s objective of integrating ‘the gender perspective into all aspects of NATO operations,’ in line with Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (NATO 2009). The responsibilities of these bodies now include facilitating information sharing on gender mainstreaming within NATO, among NATO members, and between NATO and other relevant international organizations and agencies; providing advice and support on gender mainstreaming to the MC; and gathering information on the progress of member states in implementing Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (NATO 2009). The changes made, however, appear to have greater symbolic than practical significance. Like the bodies they replaced, the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives meets once annually for a maximum of five working days, while the NATO Office on Gender Perspectives is run by only two staff members, one of whom is an administrative assistant rather than a gender specialist. As with its anti-trafficking policy, the limited dedicated support the NATO leadership has directed to these gender mainstreaming bodies inevitably constrains their ability to have a substantive impact on NATO policies, planning priorities, and operations. From a feminist constructivist perspective, there is nothing surprising about the failure of the UN and NATO to go beyond a surface approach to gender mainstreaming in the security arena, even when these institutions (particularly the UN) position themselves as women’s rights standard-setters. Although International Relations scholars have made clear that states are not ‘black boxes’ that are uniform across time and place, common markers nonetheless distinguish states from other political entities, including their ability to harness the resources to wage war and preserve peace (Tilly 1990: 12). Prior to the mid-20th century, sovereign statehood was guaranteed only for those states that possessed the capacity to defend their sovereignty. Following World War II, however, sovereign statehood was granted to states through international recognition, whether or not they were fully capable in the modern sense (Jackson 1990). Since the period of decolonization, rapid militarization has occurred throughout the global South, attributable less to the practical urgency of state survival and more to global environmental processes and pressures that have come to define the symbols of legitimate statehood. Militaries, as described by Eyre and Suchman, ‘no longer build modern nations, but rather, the world political and social system builds modern nation-states, which in turn build modern militaries and procure modern weaponry’ (1996: 82). Military systems have not remained static. They have adapted to changing domestic and international environmental pressures and circumstances, including the shifting nature of security threats and technological developments that have altered strategic calculations and recruitment needs. But what largely remains unchanged is that military systems continue to function as ‘muscular,’ virile, masculine symbols of state power, irrespective of women’s gradual integration into armed forces (Peterson 1992: 48 and 2010: 23-24). Thus, for organizations such as the UN and NATO that rely on member states for their military capacity, to take 135 gender and gender mainstreaming into account is to threaten the military institutions that have been constructed as emblematic of sovereign statehood and substantive membership in the international society of states – a move inevitably resisted by their constituent states. Even with the rise of robust Chapter VII missions, peacekeeping continues to be characterized as a softer form of military power, with contemporary operations mainly requiring soldiers to perform a peace support rather than combat role. Although peacekeeping forces may serve a function distinct from national military systems, peacekeeping is ultimately inseparable from traditional militaries. Given the human and financial constraints facing most military systems, creating and training peacekeeping forces detached from military contingents serving national security interests is not a feasible option (Dandeker and Gow 2004: 12). Even in countries where the threat of inter-state war is remote, the priority is placed on preparing soldiers for the potential of combat situations and then ‘training down’ in order to ‘cater to the needs of missions in which a more restrained use of force is appropriate’ (Sorenson and Wood 2005: 11). Nonetheless, concerns persist among military leaders that the ‘peacekeeping ethos’ will filter into national military systems and erode combat capabilities (Boëne et al. 2004: 416). The failure of political and military leaders to take gender seriously in the security arena is thus neither the result of accidental oversight or lack of appreciation of the complexity of gender construction. Rather, attempts to penetrate military systems and culture in order to deepen the gender justice norm and prevent gendered exploitation continue to be frustrated by the fear of feminization – the fear at the heart of concerns that the peacekeeping ethos will taint national military systems. To expose the gender norms that inform (and are informed by) militarism is to exacerbate the perceived threat participation in peacekeeping missions poses to national military strength and preparedness. The norm of gender justice has sufficiently penetrated the security arena such that it can’t be ignored or overtly rejected, thus the recognition by the UN and NATO that their reputations and operational effectiveness are damaged by allegations of sexual misconduct. It can, however, be co-opted through the adoption of policies that invoke the appropriate language and give the impression of substantive change but which instead blunt its transformative potential. As long as the fundamental association between security threats, military capacity, and the masculine soldier ideal persists, we can expect that gender mainstreaming will continue to take the form of integrating women into already-defined masculine structures and efforts to address peacekeeper sexual misconduct will remain palliative rather than preventive.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › LAWs Link
Roff 16 (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)
Finally, and the most likely reason for intended gendering of AI, the purpose of gender is to reconstitute the gendered practices of the sending state’s military. As militarized masculinity is well known, the construction of a masculinized robot would act as an archetype for other human soldiers. The warbot would embody all of the “warrior virtues” and would surpass all of its human compatriots because it would never fatigue, require food, sleep or suffer from the trauma of war.23 As Goldstein (2001) points out, suppressing emotions, shaming and refusing to acknowledge wartime trauma are consistent practices across cultures to socialize men to war. A gendered warbot would act asa norm generator, and militaries, instead of trying to mold human soldiers to suppress their human tendencies by denying their physical limits through training, shaming and abuse, can instead create machines that embody all of these qualities. The humanoid robot fighter does not sleep, is “rational” in its calculations, is aggressive and can fight in the most dangerous of situations. It is Barrett’s (2001) vision of hegemonic masculinity in military culture. The result is that all humans become subordinated as weak, incapable and emotional; that is, feminized. One may object here and claim that all I have shown is that the creation of gendered humanoid robots perpetuates militarized masculinity. In a way, this is certainly true. Recall that Harding (2011) observes the mutually dependent relationship between the military and science/technology/engineering is coconstituted. If the producers and consumers of the technology co-constitute one another, then they will perpetuate already existing gendered practices. Humans gender because they are gendered. However, if I am correct, and the first-generation robots in the DRC portend a future of gendered autonomous warbots, then those machines will be hypermasculinized AIs in oversexed bodies. Technology is not going to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies, as Haraway (1990) suggests, but will instead reify those very practices and power relationships. I have suggested here that no human warfighter will be capable of living up to the standard set by these machines. To be sure, many of the “warrior virtues” are idealized, and human warriors often fall short of those standards. Humans will always be subject to the realities of fatigue, limitations of physical strength, hunger and emotion. Yet creating gendered autonomous machines entails that those machines will always live up to the ideal, and humans can never (and have never) met those standards. “Virtues” will not be “excellences” any longer; rather they will be the standard behavior for warbots. In turn, this will solidify a version of hegemonic masculinity, and further factionalize and subordinate all other masculinities and femininities. Thus I agree with Manjikan (2013) when she worries that “autonomous technologies might actually prove harmful to both genders” (12).
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › LAWs Link
Roff 16 (Heather, Gendering a Warbot, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 18:1, 1-18, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246)
Jean Elshtain (1987) notes that the narrative of men as “Just Warriors” and women as “Beautiful Souls” does not “denote what men and women really are in time of war, but function[s] instead to re-create and secure women’s location as noncombatants and men’s [location] as warriors” (4). Identifying this “trope” is one way to see the power of gender hierarchies and to question and break down that power relation. The masculine male as ideal solider, the feminine female as ideal noncombatant (innocent, victim, powerless) is something we should, and have more recently started to, question in practice.1 Indeed, with the United States repealing its exclusion of women for direct combat roles (United States Department of Defense 2013), one might hope that breaking down the gender hierarchies is on the horizon. However, as one hand gives, another takes away. While women are now de jure permitted to engage in combat roles, and thus all roles in warfighting, there is another movement afoot which threatens this process of gender balancing and mainstreaming: the creation of humanoid robotics. While some might view the creation of autonomous robotic warfighters as emancipatory, potentially freeing the military of gendered practices, I argue that this viewpoint is incorrect. Rather, the creation of humanoid robot fighters further entrenches a hegemonic masculinity that subordinates all humans. The humanoid robot fighter is the ideal of masculinity in western culture, for it represents an “independent, risk-taking, aggressive, heterosexual and rational ”being free from any weakness, particularly irrationality, frailty, emotion or desires (Barrett 2001, 79). The article traces three potential avenues for the construction of gender in a “warbot,” or humanoid robot warfighter. First, I look to hardware, or the physical constructions of humanoid robots. I utilize the United States Defense Advanced Research Project Agency’s (DARPA) Robotics Challenge as current evidence of these physical design choices (and potential trajectory for future designs).2 Second, I look to the naming of these systems, as well as their intended roles. I argue that the way research teams currently name and task these systems perpetuates and reifies gendered roles and power hierarchies. I caution that without a critical examination on the part of researchers and engineers, the current practice may lead to an accretion of gendered practices that threatens inclusion and mainstreaming. Third and finally, I look to the software of a potential humanoid robotic warfighter. Using feminist critiques of the philosophy of science, epistemology, technology and artificial intelligence (AI), I argue that the AIs created will not only emulate and/or co-opt the biases of their creators, but that the creators will actually distill gender into hegemonic masculinities and femininities for these machines. Taken together, these three gender vectors will produce an artificially intelligent, artificially gendered, lethal autonomous humanoid robot. Instead of using technology to free us from gendered practices and hierarchies, a` la Haraway’s (1990) conception of the post-human cyborg, this machine will perpetuate domination and subordination.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › “Great Powers” Link
Sjoberg 2013 (Laura Sjoberg, Professor of Political Science at U Florida. Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War (Print Book)) CL
This card has a bunch of stuff in it and it can be recut to make any of those args
In addition to having a narrow conception of what states’ relationships are, the literature on dyadic causes of war often focuses on a narrow subset of states that have relationships. While much of the quantitative work on dyadic causes of war includes either all dyads or all politically relevant dyads,20 many of the case studies look at great powers, and most of them do not dig significantly deeper than the (assumed rational, unitary) governments of those great states. By contrast, feminist analyses have come to see individual welfare rather than great power stability or even how governments interact as a central factor in global politics. The security of the least powerful women in the least powerful states in the world is not only a key security issue for feminists but also a key unit of analysis, given that many feminists see the margins as a crucial and inseparable part of local, global, and international politics. Feminist research shows how those at the political margins can be made insecure even while states are being made more secure. Women’s bodies have been considered the means to an end in debates over the U.S. security force in South Korea, the prevalence of and possible solutions to AIDS, and debates about refugee camp composition and makeup, to name a few, at the state and system level.21 Research into women’s lives in war and conflict has shown that they are often made insecure when military operations cut off households’ access to food, water, or electricity; when soldiers rape them; when crime and “domestic” violence increases as a result of war; and when severe economic deprivation leaves them vulnerable to disease.22 These threats are often, both statistically and existentially, more vicious than the threat of great power war.23 Feminist work has demonstrated a link between what happens to women in wars and the gendered dynamics of the making and fighting of wars.24 Because feminists often see individual security as a central issue in global politics, their work has critiqued the hierarchy that many liberal approaches to war(s) identify and espouse in global politics. Feminists have recognized that the least fortunate and the least free in global politics are often the people whose needs are neglected by policy decision makers and policy analysts.25 Additionally, “feminist scholars have repeatedly shown that gender operates at various levels at which it intersects with class, ethnicity, race, nationality, and sexuality to produce and reproduce an intricate web of inequalities between and among men and women.”26 Feminist theory, then, is critical of social and political hierarchy for the pressure that it puts on the “bottom” of that hierarchy.27 Many dyadic theories of war, like many system-level theories of war, do not share feminist theorists’ interests in identifying, critiquing, and deconstructing hierarchies in and among states.28 Instead, I argue that dyad-trait accounts of war value hierarchy by valuing the domestic organization of states (and how that organization affects peoples’ lives) as a means to the end of interstate peacefulness without particular regard for how what happens inside the state affects the people inside the state. Some “mainstream” war theorists concede that those left out of the planning of the international system “consider the system to be unfair, corrupt, biased, skewed, and dominated by hostile forces” but often do not give significant attention to the possibility that such a perception is true and normatively problematic.29 Feminist work has provided critiques both of the narrow definition of power (as domination)30 and the narrow view of whose power and security matters in these accounts. Arguing that it is possible to recognize through gender lenses the normative value and empirical impact of lives on the margins of international security, much feminist work looks for alternative ways to analyze war. This is important because, as Fiona Robinson notes, “those who care for others, and those who are most in need of care, are among the world’s most marginalized people.”31 While some characterize small powers as irrelevant because they “pose no threat to the dominant nation’s leadership in the international system,”32 many feminist perspectives express concern that this view justifies political and social oppression for the good of peace among great powers. Likewise, while some would ignore the concerns of the weak within states, because they do not make decisions or change policies directly, many feminist scholars have seen such a move as not only empirically problematic but also discriminatory: A concept of national security which gives priority to military threat rather than to dangers in the economic and social sectors of society can be bought only at the cost of poverty and misery and the violation of human rights—a cost borne by all poor people but especially by women and future generations.33 As referenced above and discussed in more detail in chapter 9, wars tend to have a number of gendered and sex-differential impacts in a number of areas, including direct material destruction, the implications of infrastructural damage, interactions with patriarchal militaries, the fallout of economic downturn, and the problems associated with environmental destruction.34 These harms are often distributed disproportionately on the basis of not only sex but also race and class to the margins of societies,35 and those people’s suffering is often ignored in dyadic and state-level war theorizing. Feminist theorizing, on the other hand, often looks for what happens at the margins.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Facial Recognition Link
Aradau and Bunz 2022 (Claudia Aradau, Professor of International Politics at King’s College London and a member of the editorial collective of Radical Philosophy. Mercedes Bunz, Reader in Digital Culture and Society at the Department of Digital Humanities, King’s College London, and an editor of the Open Access meson press. Her work explores the digital transformation of knowledge, and its effect on power. Radical Philosophy Issue 212, “Dismantling the apparatus of domination? Left critiques of AI”)
The critique of power addresses AI as an apparatus of domination and traces the technology through the production of data – data collected by corporations thriving in so-called ‘platform capitalism’ as well as by the state and its repressive agencies. Power emerges in multiple forms, from the historicity of data, its extraction by corporations and the state, its valorisation and the effects of surveillance and oppression it creates. What statisticians and computer scientists refer to as bias is created by training data reflecting historical or social inequities. When gathering training data, specific groups – such as people of colour, minorities or women – are often underrepresented. They might have been overlooked in the process of data sampling or during the testing of the AI technology. This ‘prototypical whiteness’ that renders racialised subjects invisible is entwined with surveillance technologies that render them hypervisible, as Simone Browne has shown.15 For example, a dataset called‘Faces in the Wild’, which had long been considered as a benchmark for testing facial recognition software, now comes with the warning that its data is not representative – 70% of the faces are male and 80% white, as digital activist Joy Buolamwini found out.16 And even if values representing race, gender, sexual orientation or class are removed, AI models, always looking for patterns, turn to proxy discrimination using statistical correlations of postcodes, education or particular expressions to discriminate. As Wendy Chun pointed out in her study Discriminating Data: ‘These “errors” often come from “ignoring” race – that is, wrongly assuming that race-free equals racism-free’.17
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Environment Link
Breidlid 13 [Anders, Professor, Master programme in Multicultural and International Education, Oslo University College, “Education, Indigenous Knowledge, and Development in the Global South”, p. 23-25]Mr.Mr.
Philipp Pattberg (2007) discusses the ideology of domination over nature that is still with us today, how it is “|d]eeply rooted in our every-day beliefs, actions, reflections and hopes, it lies at the center of any attempt to transform the world into a more loveable, friendlier, lighter and safer place” (p. 7). By discussing what he terms the enslavement of nature and the enslavement of humans by other humans, he concludes that this has led to a global state which is not sustainable. Exploring its historical trajectory, the ideology of domination over the natural environment took hold, according to Pattberg, “in the context of . . . the decline of Christianity as a total explanatory structure for human existence, the scientific turn of Cartesianism and the rise of capitalism to a self-replicating structure of rational choice” (p. 8). Lynn White (1974) suggests that the ecological crisis is due to the orthodox Christian legacy, especially its Western branch, stating, “Christian- ity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia’s religions (except, perhaps Zorastrianism), not only established a dualism of man and nature but also insisted that it is Cod’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends” (p. 4). Moreover, White proposes that “(o]ur science and technology have grown out of Christian attitudes towards man’s relation to nature which are almost universally held, not only by Christians and neo-Chris- tians but also by those who fondly regard themselves as post-Christians” (p. 5). Interestingly, White suggests a return to unorthodox Christianity spearheaded by St. Francis, an idea I will return to later in this book. Max Weber’s thesis, 7he Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism (1905/2001), is based on the assumption that there is a close relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, that capitalism’s basis is (what was interpreted as) the Christian work ethic, particularly in Calvinism. The idea is that domination over nature through hard work and frugality will be rewarded by God. There is therefore an important epistemological dimension to this crisis. As Kincheloe and Steinberg (2008) put it, “Some indigenous educators and philosophers put it succinctly: We want to use indigenous knowledge to counter Western’s science destruction of the Earth. Indigenous knowledge can facilitate the 21st century project because of its tendency to focus on relationships of human beings to both one another and to their eco-system” (pp. 136-137). The exclusion of alternative epistemologies and the privileging of rational science have meant the demise of ecological sustainability while the epitomization of scientific truth and rationality has excluded values that transcend the so-called rationality dogma of the West. This denial of epistemological diversity and the privileging of European epistemic mono-culture is still hegemonic and perceived as a sign of development and modernity. Ideological Pathology There is a naive belief among modernization theoreticians that since ecological problems are a result of the economic activities of modernization, further economic activities should cure these environmental problems. Due to the finiteness of the earth’s resources, the vicious circle of repair- ing the consequences of progress with further progress is not sustainable. Ronald Wright (2004) argues that the 20lh century was a period where unlimited growth in terms of population, consumption, and technology exploited the natural systems in an unsustainable way. Wright calls these activities of ecological unsustainability the very worst kind of “ideologi- cal pathology.” While colonialism and the capitalist world system have been beset with territorial, political, and economic conquest, Western science is based on the same idea of conquest, that is, not respecting the earth’s ecological limits. Moreover, in line with worid-systems analysis, there is an ecologi- cal unequal exchange here, as the core’s exploitation and utilization of the world’s resources is matched in the periphery with the burden of negative ecological costs imposed by the core. As has been discussed above, the issue of Western science and knowledge production is existentially important because the Eurocentric epistemology of knowing (mastering) and dominating the world is, despite its mer- its, dramatically problematic in a world where the majority of the world’s population not only suffers from hunger and malnutrition, illiteracy, and lack of work, but where the hegemonic epistemology upsets the relationship between [people] man and nature as it seeks to possess the earth in the same way as a master exploits his slave. The ecological challenges are closely intertwined with the current economic challenges in the West, and it is difficult to ignore that the aggressive ideology of exploitation and the maximizing of profits, which are so central to European hegemonic epistemology, is detrimental to the efforts to save the planet from ecological disaster. Vivas (2011) is right when contending that the difference between the present economic crisis and those of the 1970s and 1929 is “its ecological aspect. Indeed, we cannot analyze the global ecological crisis separately from the crisis in which we are immersed or the critique of the economic model that has led us into it.” Even if we do not agree that the crisis is due to capitalism’s inherent contradictions, the global economic crisis has long been there; the eco- nomic crises in Greece, Italy, and Spain are miniscule compared to the permanent crises in the South, where millions go hungry to bed every day and live on a dollar per day despite heavy interventions from the aid com- munities in the West/North. Even though economic hegemony is shifting to Asia (China and India) and Latin America (Brazil), there is no reason to believe that the hegemonic discourse of resource exploitation and profit maximization will change. On the contrary, China’s economic growth is based on the same Eurocentric discourse, and the ecological challenges in China are, as a consequence, enormous, not only for China, but for the world as a whole. Its emission of greenhouse gases is the highest (in volume) in the world. There is a shortage and pollution of water. Annual desertification of land amounts to an area of about 13000 sq km (the size of Connecticut), and economic growth and rapid development mean “increasing urbanization, consumerism, and pol- lution’' (Council on Foreign Relations, 2011). The failures of past climate summits in Copenhagen (December 2009), Cancun (December 2010), and Durban (December 2011) show the inertia of the governments in wealthy countries. Actually, there is no global leader- ship to fend off the ecological crisis, simply because the leaders of wealthy countries are entrenched in an economic system that prioritizes non-sus- tainable development. There seems to be no willingness or ability to find a solution that requires a comprehensive social and economic transforma- tion, such as the necessity to decrease consumption levels in the North (given that similar consumption levels across the globe would require sev- eral planets). Here there is no difference between Communist China (a capi- talist in economic matters) and the US. This is one important reason why “the critique of the epistemic foundations of Western academic discourse has triggered and nourished discussions on the possibilities of construction of an alternative to capitalism” (Santos et a!., 2008, p. xxxiv). It was the universalist claims of Europe’s hegemonic epistemology (as discussed earlier in the chapter) that was employed to justify Europe’s “civi- lizing mission,” which is still hegemonic globally. As Griffiths and Knezevic (2009) state: This scientific universalism, the most recent manifestation of European universal ism, asserts objectivity across all phenomena and time . . . Such claims of universalism, or assertions of universal truths, function as meta-narratives that encapsulate the ideology of those groups with power in the world-system . . . (pp. 67-68).
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Econ Link
Skilling 14 [3/1, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Management @ Auckland University of Technology, “Everyday Emergency: Crisis, Unease, and Strategy in Contemporary Political Discourse,” retrieved 5/19/14] Mr.Mr.
Narratives of crisis often invoke the specter of existential, physical threats to the body of the nation such as terrorist threats (Huysmans and Buonfino ); it is in this physical sense of security that Bigo (, p. 63) notes that human migration is ‘increasingly interpreted as a security problem’. Importantly, however, the production of unease also draws on everyday and (especially) economic challenges in a competitive global economy. Indeed, key aspects of contemporary economic life (tax and welfare regimes, productivity and innovation, and employment law, for instance) are increasingly interpreted as problems of national security. In the realm of immigration policy, for instance, national security no longer simply requires keeping out the dangerous, the poor and the sick. Rather, national security is also achieved by actively attracting and retaining desired, ‘talented’ migrants. Hence the contention of the Singaporean Prime Minister (cited in Ong , p. 188) that the successful attraction of ‘foreign talent will be a matter of life and death’ for the nation, where he clearly had in mind not the physical security but the continued economic viability of the nation. As Ong (, p. 5) suggests, the state of exception occasioned by neoliberalism ‘can be deployed to include as well as to exclude’ (emphasis mine).¶ Economic viability within a global economy is thus increasingly constructed as a matter of national security problem. As Agamben (, p. 13) notes, while the idea of the state of emergency was normalized during World War I, after the war, ‘military emergency … ceded its place to economic emergency’. The key discursive move in constructing economic viability as an issue of national security is the application of the metaphor of war to economic challenges. Agamben () cites Franklin D. Roosevelt’s response to the Great Depression (‘I shall ask the Congress … for broad Executive power to wage war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe’ (p. 22)) to ground his claim that ‘the metaphor of war [became] an integral part of the presidential political vocabulary’ (p. 21). The metaphor of war is deployed within a narrative of constant crisis in which national economies are engaged in an unending global contest for resources, trade access and investment. As we shall see, the challenges of neoliberal globalization are not constructed primarily as crises of environmental degradation or political sovereignty, but – overwhelmingly – as a pervasive crisis of economic competitiveness.¶ The state-at-war metaphor is one of the main ways in which an economically based ‘shared purpose’ is naturalized and used to suppress alternative conceptions (Skilling , p. 78). It is during times of war that the state can most easily call for an almost endless degree of loyalty and sacrifice in the name of a clearly defined shared objective. It is during times of war that it becomes most acceptable to ask what citizens can do for their country, and to recognize and reward them on that basis. And, in a context of permanent crisis, the criteria of individual contribution to national viability can be used to justify massive inequalities of outcome.¶ Neoliberalism, then, can be understood as a mode of ‘governing through freedom’ that institutes the danger and uncertainty that lies at the far side of that freedom. And within a neoliberal global economy, the external environment is constructed as a fluid and potentially hostile realm of opportunity and challenge. The pursuit of global economic competitiveness, in turn, is justified as the urgently necessary response to that danger and uncertainty: as the salve for unease. It is thus essential to its legitimacy that the state is seen as offering a credible and coordinated response to that challenging environment. Far from eroding state power, neoliberalism provides the conditions that enhance the status and legitimacy of the state (and other actors) as the producer and implementer of strategy (see Thrift , p. 95), even if that strategy stipulates a decreased scope of direct governmental action or control. As Kim McKee (, p. 469) notes, ‘less direct government in society does not necessarily entail less governing.’ In neoliberalism’s recasting of politics as a ‘problematizing activity’ and its ‘transforming [of] situations of uncertainty into calculative strategies’ (Ong , p. 178), a dialectic emerges between problems and strategies. Problems call forth a ‘necessary’ strategic response; strategy produces correlative problems. The practice of strategy validates and empowers those experts able to formulate, implement and assess the technical solutions that the discourses of crisis, risk, unease and (in)security require.
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Fem IR Supplement – NEG › Links › Cyberwar/cyberterror Link
Rid 13, [Thomas, reader in war studies at King's College London, author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place," "The Great Cyberscare," 3/13/13, ] Mr.Mr.
The White House likes a bit of threat. In his State of the Union address, Barack Obama wanted to nudge Congress yet again into passing meaningful legislation. The president emphasized that America's enemies are "seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions, and our air traffic control systems." After two failed attempts to pass a cybersecurity act in the past two years, he added swiftly: "We cannot look back years from now and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our economy." Fair enough. A bit of threat to prompt needed action is one thing. Fear-mongering is something else: counterproductive. Yet too many a participant in the cybersecurity debate reckons that puffery pays off. The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber Pearl Harbor." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat. The paper seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same." A reminder is in order: The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of the Pentagon document offer such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation in a self-respecting political science department. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After all a bit of fear helps to claim -- or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end. Mandiant's much-noted report linking a coordinated and coherent campaign of espionage attacks dubbed Advanced Persistent Threat 1, or "APT1," to a unit of the Chinese military is a case in point: The firm offered far more details on attributing attacks to the Chinese than the intelligence community has ever done, and the company should be commended for making the report public. But instead of using cocky and over-confident language, Mandiant's analysts should have used Words of Estimative Probability, as professional intelligence analysts would have done. An example is the report's conclusion, which describes APT1's work: "Although they control systems in dozens of countries, their attacks originate from four large networks in Shanghai -- two of which are allocated directly to the Pudong New Area," the report found. Unit 61398 of the People's Liberation Army is also in Pudong. Therefore, Mandiant's computer security specialists concluded, the two were identical: "Given the mission, resourcing, and location of PLA Unit 61398, we conclude that PLA Unit 61398 is APT1." But the report conspicuously does not mention that Pudong is not a small neighborhood ("right outside of Unit 61398's gates") but in fact a vast city landscape twice the size of Chicago. Mandiant's report was useful and many attacks indeed originate in China. But the company should have been more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence, as the computer security expert Jeffrey Carr and others have pointed out. The firm made it too easy for Beijing to dismiss the report. My class in cybersecurity at King's College London started poking holes into the report after 15 minutes of red-teaming it -- the New York Times didn't. Which leads to the next point: The media want to sell copy through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post should have reminded its readers that the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage -- Stuxnet -- was actually executed by the United States government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some of the evidential problems in the Mandiant report; instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. On issues of cybersecurity, the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the security establishment.