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2022 Michigan Negative

--AT Russia Blocks OSCE

The OSCE has been successful in incorporating Russia – cyber CBMs prove.

Egel, 2021 - Nuclear Security Visiting Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy [Naomi, PhD candidate at Cornell, January, Geneva Centre for Security Policy Strategic Security Analysis” Issue 16, “Reducing Military Risks through OSCE Instruments: The Untapped Potential in the European Arms Control Framework” https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/reducing-military-risks-through-osce-instruments-the-untapped-potential-in-the-European-arms-control-framework Acc 2/27/22 TA]

Moreover, the OSCE’s success in negotiating cyber CBMs in the context of tensions between the United States and the Russian Federation indicates that such tensions are not an insurmountable barrier to reaching agreement on CBMs of various kinds within the OSCE. Although negotiating new agreements in international organisations is rarely easy, the OSCE’s track record shows that it is capable of doing so. This stands in contrast to many other international organisations in which geopolitical tensions have prevented progress on agreements to govern new risks. The OSCE’s resilience in the face of such geopolitical challenges demonstrates its importance and efficacy as a vehicle for addressing security threats and military risks.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Net Benefit - UN Modelling

OSCE CBMs are the first step toward building consensus in the UN – it demonstrates that the political will exists.

Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

As a realistic starting point, the OSCE’s Confidence and Security Building Measures (CBMs) could provide a framework to exchange information and observations on the use of weaponised AI, in order to facilitate communication and dialogue (Egel 2021). The OSCE already has CBMs for Information Communication Technologies (ICTs), which, like weaponised AI, create “an area with much room for speculation, doubt, and ambiguity”, and “increase the potential for tensions between States” (OSCE website). There is also potential to go further than exchanging information informally within the CBMs framework. The next step should be, based on the recommendations of the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW), to “focus on the obligation to maintain human control over the use of force” which would “apply to all conventional weapons” (2021, 6). Taking this path will avoid the debate on defining LAWS, which has been hindering the progress of the CCW discussions. Based on the GGE Guiding Principles, the commitment to human control should be enshrined into a normative framework, for example a political declaration or a manual of best practices. Any document with a soft law standing, or a politically binding status, would already be a step forward. Such a political declaration could be part of the Vienna Document, or the result of a new Working Group established at the OSCE. Importantly, an OSCE political declaration or guiding code on weaponised AI would not go against the efforts at the CCW but would complement and build upon them. Shifting the discussion towards the current impacts of weaponised AI, rather than the potential future impact of ‘killer robots’ would be a progressive step to mitigate the risks coming from this emerging technology. An agreement at the OSCE would also be a preliminary step towards building consensus at the UN. It would demonstrate that finding consensus, especially in an atmosphere of political distrust, is possible. This is a relevant and crucial step for European and international security. While debates at the CCW continue, the operational trend towards further autonomy in the armed forces of OSCE participating States continues. As noted in the previous section, practices related to the use of weaponised AI have the potential to shape warfare norms. Yet, this trajectory is not inevitable and with the right approach, a political declaration committing to a common definition of human control is a realistic achievement.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend – OSCE CBM Solvency

OSCE declarations are a confidence building measure – OSCE CBMs are more legitimate due to their broad membership. Empirically proven.

Egel, 2021 - Nuclear Security Visiting Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy [Naomi, PhD candidate at Cornell, January, Geneva Centre for Security Policy Strategic Security Analysis” Issue 16, “Reducing Military Risks through OSCE Instruments: The Untapped Potential in the European Arms Control Framework” https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/reducing-military-risks-through-osce-instruments-the-untapped-potential-in-the-European-arms-control-framework Acc 2/27/22 TA]

CBMs are voluntary measures designed to communicate ‘credible evidence of the absence of feared threats by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity’. Given the OSCE’s membership and history, OSCE CBMs would make a particularly significant contribution to reducing the risks posed by AWS. The OSCE’s membership is both broad (the organisation has 57 participating States, encompassing not only all European states, but Central Asian and North American states as well) and includes seven of the top ten arms producers in the period 2015-2019. OSCE CBMs, thus, have a legitimacy based on both the breadth and number of states that subscribe to them and the involvement of key arms producers. Among international organisations (both regional and global), the OSCE is distinctive for its history of establishing strong norms for using CBMs as tools for risk reduction. AWS CBMs would build on the OSCE’s robust record of reducing military risk through CBMs. The Vienna Document - the cornerstone of OSCE CBMs - has provided a strong framework for building confidence among OSCE participating states, reducing military risks and increasing security in the OSCE region. Other OSCE instruments like the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty provide further information about states’ activities and are thus able to build trust among OSCE members (even though both treaties are currently under strain). However, these agreements are designed to address the risks posed by conventional weapons rather than risks from AWS. Still, the OSCE’s recent adoption of CBMs for Information and Communication Technologies (adopted in 2013 and updated in 2016) demonstrates that the OSCE and its approach to CBMs are well suited to developing risk-reduction CBMs applicable to advanced technologies. The OSCE’s cyber CBMs have also provided a template for other states or regional organisations to develop their own cyber CBMs, building confidence and reducing risk both within and beyond the OSCE’s membership; CBMs for AWS could play a similar role. Although the original Vienna Document was negotiated at the end of the Cold War, its updates and revisions, together with the development of other OSCE CBMs, reflect how CBMs are not merely an outdated Cold War legacy, but continue to play an important role in building confidence and reducing risks.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - OSCE Solves Best

The OSCE solves best due to its inclusive membership – that is best for building trust and cooperation with Russia.

Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Strengthening Human Control: The Role of the OSCE Arriving to a common position on weaponised AI regulation will be challenging. The current global and European political atmosphere is one of distrust. There is distrust between two major European security players: Russia and the US. In June 2021, both President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin said that the bilateral relationship “has deteriorated to its lowest point in recent years” (Walters 2021). There is also distrust among state leaders towards technologies such as the Internet, AI, 5G and robotics, not least because they can be weaponised and used for threatening activities such as cyberattacks. This environment makes it difficult to find a common understanding and commit to principles on the use of weaponised AI. Nevertheless, in this section I argue that the OSCE possesses some key advantages to become the platform for making a step forward in the global debate. In 2019, the GGE on LAWS adopted a set of principles to guide the work of the group in the next years, which were endorsed by the CCW High Contracting Parties. These Guiding Principles are broad and have no legally binding force. As pointed out by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the “CCW principles were simply intended to guide the deliberations. They were never supposed to be an end in themselves or intended to provide the structure for or outcome to CCW work on lethal autonomous weapons systems” (2020, 1). Moreover, they do not provide further clarifications on the concept of human control, only stating that “human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines” (Principle b). Thus, while member states accept in principle the importance of human control, they have until now not been able to agree on a common definition of this concept, which is stalling the progress of the CCW debate (Bolton et al. 2021). Just like the CCW, the OSCE operates via consensus, which requires seeking a compromise between participating States and can often hamper the decision-making process. However, this institution has been historically known for its ambition to form an inclusive security community and to build practices that “suggest a new model of international security”, described as “comprehensive”, “indivisible”, and “cooperative” (Adler 1998, 119). The former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a symbol of détente between the US and the Soviet Union, and a place for two rivals to find compromise on security issues, demonstrating the possibility of coexistence on the European continent (Rittberger et al. 2012, 42). The Helsinki Final Act negotiations were a cooperative process, with the goal of promoting communication, as well as increasing confidence between States (Sandole 2007, 65). The negotiations resulted in a declaration of common norms and values of the participating States. Following the Cold War, the OSCE was not only able to survive, but also to change its goals and adapt to the rising security challenges of the new world order. Its broad membership and comprehensive approach towards security make it a key, if not the most, legitimate institution for European security (Mosser 2015, 584). At a time when some experts debate whether Russia-US relations have entered a ‘new Cold War’ (Polyakova 2019), the OSCE’s inclusive approach towards security is the one that is needed to show that tensions can be dealt with in a forum, rather than in the battlefield.

2022 Michigan Negative

1NC - OSCE CP

CP Text - The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should adopt ethical principles to ensure human control in military artificial intelligence systems.

Solvency – The OSCE can establish norms on AI ethics. A declaration would promote international norms due to its history of working across the East West gap and its reputation for building trust.

Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

2022 Michigan Negative

AT NATO Key

NATO is not key – its diversity and complexity have are not well analyzed

Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]

To be sure, NATO is far from the only institution that impacts military AI governance and its security implications. Indeed, international technology governance is inherently complex because it includes diverse stakeholders in a system of “organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures” with a shared interest and responsibility in a given issue-area of world politics.9 Existing discussions of the impact of AI on international security have looked to nation-states, regional institutions like the European Union (EU), or international bodies like the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (UN CCW) for discussions on the military governance of AI.10 Without expanding on the role of these other stakeholders, this chapter begins to explore pressing questions for NATO and international relations scholars that illustrate NATO’s role in AI governance, which has not had a comprehensive analysis.11

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - Turns Ethics

AI’s ability to avoid human emotions is what makes it more ethical – autonomous weapons are able to avoid the atrocities that come from human psychological reactions

Del Re, 2017 – US Army Major [Amanda “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Take the Human Out of the Loop A paper submitted to the Faculty of the US Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Ethics of Emerging Military Technology Graduate Certificate. 16 June 2017 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1041804 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Humans are high-maintenance, flawed, and deal poorly with the horrific effects of war. Robots can be far more proficient at warfare. Humans after all, are human. They make mistakes often and emotion clouds their judgment. Humans require a great deal of maintenance to be at peak performance. Humans fall prey to the horrors of war, often resulting in atrocities and long-term physical and psychological damage. Human troops are expensive and, in the long run, more expensive than robots. Robots are unemotional, cheaper, and not susceptible to committing an atrocity for self-preservation or revenge. This chapter examines why humans are inferior warriors and why robots may be superior and more ethical combatants. The stresses of combat affect judgment. Consider a few personal accounts of dealing with combat stress. James R. McDonough, a Platoon Leader in Vietnam, describes his uncontrollable emotions after surviving his first firefight: “My emotions were breaking through the fatigue that had numbed them, and my mood shifted dramatically from one extreme to another.”2 McDonough is describing the effects of shock after trauma. He initially felt detached or “numbed,” and in the aftermath of battle his erratic emotions are irrepressible. Napoleon had described that the most dangerous point in battle is immediately after victory because that is when the soldier is most vulnerable to counterattack.3 Although Napoleon did not realize it at the time, he was describing “parasympathetic backlash” which occurs immediately after the attack “has halted and the soldier briefly believes himself to be safe.”4 During this parasympathetic backlash, a soldier becomes “physiologically and psychologically incapacitated” or, in McDonough’s case, “numbed.”5 Karl Marlantes, also a Platoon Leader in Vietnam, echoes this theory when he describes his experience in war as “the predominant feeling when you win in battle, is numbed exhaustion.”6 Critics of autonomous weapons state that humans possess judgment, something that a robot never could. However, the concept of the parasympathetic backlash undermines reliance on human judgment since humans may be unable to control their basic functions and emotions during and even some duration after the trauma of battle.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - Impacts

Human soldiers make terrible battlefield decisions – they are overloaded with stress, trauma, and revenge.

Arkin, 2013 – prof at Georgia Tech [Ronald “Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight of the Non-combatant” AISB Quarterly, No. 137, July https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/50079?show=full Acc 12/27/20 TA]

It must be noted that past and present trends in human behavior in the battlefield regarding adhering to legal and ethical requirements are questionable at best. Unfortunately, humanity has a rather dismal record in ethical behavior in the battlefield. Potential explanations for the persistence of war crimes include: high friendly losses leading to a tendency to seek revenge; high turnover in the chain of command leading to weakened leadership; dehumanisation of the enemy through the use of derogatory names and epithets; poorly trained or inexperienced troops; no clearly defined enemy; unclear orders where intent of the order may be interpreted incorrectly as unlawful; youth and immaturity of troops; external pressure, e.g., for a need to produce a high body count of the enemy; and pleasure from power of killing or an overwhelming sense of frustration. There is clear room for improvement and autonomous systems may help address some of these problems. Robotics technology, suitably deployed may assist with the plight of the innocent noncombatant caught in the battlefield. If used without suitable precautions, however, it could potentially exacerbate the already existing violations by human soldiers. While I have the utmost respect for our young men and women warfighters, they are placed into conditions in modern warfare under which no human being was ever designed to function. In such a context, expecting a strict adherence to the Laws of War (LOW) seems unreasonable and unattainable by a significant number of soldiers6. Battlefield atrocities have been present since the beginnings of warfare, and despite the introduction of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) over the last 150 years or so, these tendencies persist and are well documented,7 even more so in the days of CNN and the Internet. ‘Armies, armed groups, political and religious movements have been killing civilians since time immemorial.’8 ‘Atrocity. . . is the most repulsive aspect of war, and that which resides within man and permits him to perform these acts is the most repulsive aspect of mankind’.9 The dangers of abuse of unmanned robotic systems in war, such as the Predator and Reaper drones, are well documented; they occur even when a human operator is directly in charge.10 Given this, questions then arise regarding if and how these new robotic systems can conform as well as, or better than, our soldiers with respect to adherence to the existing IHL. If achievable, this would result in a reduction in collateral damage, i.e., noncombatant casualties and damage to civilian property, which translates into saving innocent lives. If achievable this could result in a moral requirement necessitating the use of these systems.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend – Soldier Links

Even when human soldiers are not killed in combat, they live with the trauma of war for the rest of their lives, fueling an epidemic of suicide.

Del Re, 2017 – US Army Major [Amanda “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Take the Human Out of the Loop A paper submitted to the Faculty of the US Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Ethics of Emerging Military Technology Graduate Certificate. 16 June 2017 https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1041804 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The economic costs of losing soldiers and wounded soldiers pales in comparison to the societal costs. The psychological consequences of war are often costlier than the physical costs. A 2016 Veteran’s Affairs study found that 20 veterans commit suicide a day. The risk of suicide for veterans is 21 percent higher when compared to civilian adults. The civilian suicide rate rose 23.3% between 2001 and 2014 while the veteran rate rose 32%. More disturbing is the female veteran suicide rate which rose 85% during that time compared to their civilian counterparts which rose 40%.42 Suicide rates are at all an all-time high. It is an epidemic. This human cost could be alleviated by substituting robots for many of the combat roles now filled by their inherently fragile human counterparts. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is also more common in the military as compared to the civilian population. According to a recent Veteran Affairs study, approximately 7-8% of the population will have PTSD at some point in their lives. The veteran rate is higher and varies by war. Approximately 30% of Vietnam veterans were diagnosed with PTSD according to the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study (NVVRS).43 Approximately 20% of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom veterans have been diagnosed per year.44 The latter number will most likely rise as more cases are diagnosed. PTSD can and does affect a service member’s ability to do their job and can lead to a service member to be medically retired. The societal burden of warfare is costly and will continue to rise if the nation continues to rely heavily on large numbers of troops. A recent study claimed that veterans are 50% more likely to become homeless as compared to non-veterans. The study stated that the causes were due to: “poverty, lack of support networks, and dismal living conditions in overcrowded or substandard housing.”45 While those reasons are the immediate causes for homelessness they are indicative of addressing a symptom and not the actual problem. Veterans also struggle with the fact that after their uniformed service many do not have translatable skills that can be used in a non-wartime environment. Using robots would require soldiers to be able to troubleshoot and maintain the robots resulting in skills that are desired by many high-tech corporations. Additionally, it would decrease the number of soldiers needed for jobs that are not as applicable in a non-wartime environment such as route clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, and base security. In conclusion, humans are vulnerable to the detrimental effects of warfare while robots are not. The physiological effects of combat trauma may render a human physically and psychologically unable to make sound decisions. If employed in battle, robots will not be as unethical as humans have the potential to be. Humans are emotional, desire revenge, and are prone to commit atrocities as a result. Human service members are also expensive, especially when they are killed or wounded. The psychological impacts of war are unavoidable and destructive. Robots have no need for revenge, are unemotional, and are less expensive than human soldiers. Using robots on the battlefield will reduce economic and societal costs and save lives.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - Civilian Links

The Affirmative focuses on distinguishing Autonomous from Non-autonomous weapons is counterproductive - it prevents us from focusing on how to use them effectively and responsibly.

Noyes, 2019 - Major, US Army Reserve [Matthew MPP, Harvard Kennedy School 14-06-2019 “Autonomous Weapons: The Future Behind Us” https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085435.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Militaries have long used weapons with autonomous capabilities and are likely to increasingly use autonomous weapons as their effectiveness is demonstrated. Autonomous weapons predate remotely operated weapons in most domains. The air domain is instructive in this regard, as the invention of television in the 1930s disrupted prior work on more autonomous aircraft by allowing for the remote operation of aircraft out of sight from the pilot. Remotely operated systems are likely to continue to be generally preferred by militaries, but those systems will have increasingly autonomous capabilities, particularly in targeting enemy systems that disrupt their command and control links. This suggests rather than viewing “autonomous weapons” as a distinct class of systems, instead we should consider the autonomous capabilities of a weapon and how it is controlled by its user. Correctly considering autonomy in weapons begins with recognizing weapons are tools, and like all tools have a user. “Full autonomy,” in the sense of absolute independence, is not a desirable property of a tool. Rather, users will maintain some control over their tools to ensure they are accomplishing their desired purpose. Instead of trying to distinguish between what is autonomous and what is not, we should focus on the relationship between the user and the tool. To paraphrase David Mindell: “Where are the [users]? Who are they? What are they doing? When? Why does it matter?”152 Unencumbered with trying to distinguish between what is autonomous and non-autonomous allows analysis to instead focus on autonomy in executing particular functions. Recognizing militaries have long used autonomous weapons makes predicting their future use a matter of identifying the capabilities militaries have sought to achieve through autonomous weapons in the past, and how technology is changing what is possible. Considering this history, autonomous weapons have predominately been used to address at least one of four challenges: the mundane, the fast, the denied, and mass. Autonomous weapons aid militaries in addressing the mundane, or long duration, by providing greater persistence in observing and reacting to events over an extended period than is efficiently achieved with a manned system. In terms of both reaction speed and at high accelerations, autonomous weapons can operate at speeds exceeding what people are capable of. A particularly attractive feature of autonomous weapons is the ability to operate in denied environment, either due to environmental conditions or enemy action, that present unacceptable risk to manned systems or to the control channels for remotely operated systems. Finally, autonomous weapons provide increased mass, like most any military technology, by increasing the military power of a state relative to its available population for military service.

2022 Michigan Negative

1NC - Civilian Deaths DA

Banning autonomous AI weapons prevents the technological research that will make them more ethical and efficient.

Arkin, 2013 – prof at Georgia Tech [Ronald “Lethal Autonomous Systems and the Plight of the Non-combatant” AISB Quarterly, No. 137, July https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/50079?show=full Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Limited autonomy is also present or under development in many systems as well, ranging from the Phalanx system “capable of autonomously performing its own search, detect, evaluation, track, engage and kill assessment functions”2, fire-and-forget munitions, loitering torpedoes, and intelligent antisubmarine or anti-tank mines among numerous other examples. Continued advances in autonomy will result in changes involving tactics, precision, and just perhaps, if done correctly, a reduction in atrocities as outlined in research conducted at the Georgia Tech Mobile Robot Laboratory (GT-MRL)3. This paper asserts that it may be possible to ultimately create intelligent autonomous robotic military systems that are capable of reducing civilian casualties and property damage when compared to the performance of human warfighters. Thus, it is a contention that calling for an outright ban on this technology is premature, as some groups already are doing4. Nonetheless, if this technology is to be deployed, then restricted, careful and graded introduction into the battlefield of lethal autonomous systems must be standard policy as opposed to haphazard deployments, which I believe is consistent with existing International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Multiple potential benefits of intelligent war machines have already been declared by the military, including: a reduction in friendly casualties; force multiplication; expanding the battlespace; extending the warfighter’s reach; the ability to respond faster given the pressure of an ever increasing battlefield tempo; and greater precision due to persistent stare [constant video surveillance that enables more time for decision making and more eyes on target]. This argues for the inevitability of development and deployment of lethal autonomous systems from a military efficiency and economic standpoint, unless limited by IHL.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend Internal Link

Technology is the key to military superiority – improving speed and control are necessary to deal with future military threats.

Schmidt and Work, 2021 – Chairs of The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence [Eric and Robert, “National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence Final Report Executive Summary” Acc 6/7/22 TA]

AI-enhanced capabilities will be the tools of first resort in a new era of conflict as strategic competitors develop AI concepts and technologies for military and other malign uses and cheap and commercially available AI applications ranging from “deepfakes” to lethal drones become available to rogue states, terrorists, and criminals. The United States must prepare to defend against these threats by quickly and responsibly adopting AI for national security and defense purposes. Defending against AI-capable adversaries operating at machine speeds without employing AI is an invitation to disaster. Human operators will not be able to keep up with or defend against AI-enabled cyber or disinformation attacks, drone swarms, or missile attacks without the assistance of AI-enabled machines. National security professionals must have access to the world’s best technology to protect themselves, perform their missions, and defend us. The Commission recommends that the government take the following actions: Defend against emerging AI-enabled threats to America’s free and open society. Digital dependence in all walks of life is transforming personal and commercial vulnerabilities into potential national security weaknesses. Adversaries are using AI systems to enhance disinformation campaigns and cyber attacks. They are harvesting data on Americans to build profiles of their beliefs, behavior, and biological makeup for tailored attempts to manipulate or coerce individuals. This gathering storm of foreign influence and interference requires organizational and policy reforms to bolster our resilience. The government needs to stand up a task force and 24/7 operations center to confront digital disinformation. It needs to better secure its own databases and prioritize data security in foreign investment screening, supply chain risk management, and national data protection legislation. The government should leverage AI-enabled cyber defenses to protect against AI-enabled cyber attacks. And biosecurity must become a top-tier priority in national security policy. Prepare for future warfare. Our armed forces’ competitive military-technical advantage could be lost within the next decade if they do not accelerate the adoption of AI across their missions. This will require marrying top-down leadership with bottom-up innovation to put operationally relevant AI applications into place. The Department of Defense (DoD) should: First, establish the foundations for widespread integration of AI by 2025. This includes building a common digital infrastructure, developing a digitally-literate workforce, and instituting more agile acquisition, budget, and oversight processes. It also requires strategically divesting from military systems that are ill-equipped for AI-enabled warfare and instead investing in next-generation capabilities.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend Links

Ethical limits that prevent the US from Using autonomous AI weapons gives China a technological edge.

Horowitz, 2018 – prof of political science at the Univ of Pennsylvania [Michael C., May, Texas National Security Review, The Scholar “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power” Acc 5/14/22 TA]

From a balance-of-power perspective, this scenario would be more likely to feature disruption among emerging and great powers but not a broader leveling of the military playing field. The ability to exclude many countries from advances in AI would concentrate military competition among current leading militaries, such as the United States, China, and Russia. There could be significant disruption within those categories, though. A Chinese military that more rapidly developed critical algorithms for broader battle management, or that was more willing to use them than the United States, might gain advantages that shifted power in the Asia- Pacific. This assumes that these algorithms operate as they are designed to operate. All militarily-useful AI will have to be hardened against hacking and spoofing. Operators will use narrow AI applications only if they are as or more effective or reliable as existing inhabited or remotely-piloted options.111

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend Uniqueness

The US has increased funding for AI development and minimized regulations to promote innovation

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

United States: The United States views American leadership in AI as necessary to safeguard American values and maintain defense and economic superiority. Recognizing the need to develop a national AI approach and reclaim the AI R&D global leadership position from China, which had already surpassed the US in several research output metrics by 2016,10 the Obama Administration developed an AI R&D prioritization in October 2016.11 Building on this urgency, the Trump Administration has prioritized AI and established the American AI Initiative in February 2019.12 This Initiative identified the need for a whole-of-government approach to prioritize AI R&D and deployment throughout the entire federal government. The Initiative also identifies the need to grow the US AI workforce, set national and global norms and standards, and work with industry and allies to promote an AI environment favorable to the United States.13 The United States’ federal government has made key strategic and tactical changes to achieve these goals. Federal AI R&D and the American AI Initiative are coordinated by several committees and subcommittees within the Executive Office. President Trump pledged to more than double non-defense AI R&D to $2 billion by 2022.14 Federal AI R&D, guided by the National AI R&D Strategic Plan, must now be reported annually for each federal entity.15 The United States has taken a “light-touch” approach to regulation, fearing overly burdensome laws will stifle innovation. However, guidance is not completely absent. The Office of Management and Budget released a memo to guide Federal agencies as they develop regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to non-government applications of AI and the Department of Defense published five AI principles to guide AI design, deployment, and adoptions in defense.16

2022 Michigan Negative

1NC - Military Technology DA

NATO’s current AI policy focuses on competition, innovation and speed, not ethics regulations

Lanata, 2020 - General, French Air Force Supreme Allied Commander Transformation [Andre, NDC Research Paper No.15 – December forward to ““NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” by Andrea Gilli https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1514 Acc 4/21/22 TA]

Many of its proposals closely match Allied Command Transformation (ACT) efforts to lead the transformation of NATO’s military instrument of power, and principally ACT’s own contribution to the establishment of a NATO AI strategy. This strategy should aim at: leveraging AI to out-think, out-perform, and out-pace our potential adversaries; improving decision making at every NATO echelon; optimizing performance of priority NATO capabilities; and driving agility and continuous improvement. Such a strategy requires efforts in various directions. We should start by sourcing commercially mature AI applications to demonstrate value and create early momentum for the adoption of AI. We must also improve our ability to pro-actively shape the AI technology investment landscape and development of the defence specificities. Moreover, NATO has to rethink its operating model and organization with a prime focus on speed. Finally, NATO will need to scale AI with a technology and talent foundation, meaning we need to establish a NATO Infostructure. A key condition to implement successfully these lines of effort is truly embracing innovation and agility. ACT, as one of the leading agents for innovation at NATO, has taken bold steps in this direction in the last two years. We established an Innovation Branch, a place where our innovators are “protected and nurtured”, to use the words of the “NATO-mation” study. As part of it, our Innovation Hub has been equipped with an “Open Innovation Lab” capability, implementing state-of-the-art agile methodologies (“DevSecOps”4). Our Innovation motto, “Start Small, Think Big, and Scale Up towards Full Scale Continuous Innovation”, is a concrete way to phrase the “3S” strategy approach proposed by the “NATO-mation” study. The Lab is notably exploring currently the potential of AI to mine and analyze open source datasets to provide Intelligence communities easily-accessible, supplementary data facilitating target area risk assessment during mission planning and real time operations. We need to build upon these successful experimentations and adopt the agile approach at the NATO Enterprise level. This is the intent of the proposals put forward with our sister command, Allied Command Operations, and of the partnership we established this summer with the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) to work towards the adoption of DevSecOps in NATO at scale. Scaling up is also about appropriately funding innovation, an imperative that we have raised on numerous occasions and that I will continue to advocate with passion. On another note, ACT strives to cultivate an innovative workforce through our regular “i3” (initiate, innovate, imagine) events, and bring fresh perspective to NATO through our young disruptor forum, Hackatons and Innovation Challenges. We also explore the potential of emerging technologies through Disruptive Technology Assessment Games in order to help build concretely common understanding among the Allies, and address the interoperability issues upstream via our TIDE Sprint events. We have established a pool of expertise on data within ACT, notably missioned to advocate for NATO to become a Data Driven Organisation. Last but not least, we support NATO HQ to progress on the key ethical questions raised by the adoption of AI for military purposes. On this topic, I am convinced that we will identify these issues as we progress – we are just at the beginning of our journey. My message to our political leaders is that the ethical reflections are essential but must not slow us down in the exploration of the potential of this technology and in our R&D efforts. This study comes in handy to make our case on the necessity to continue these efforts!

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - No Definition

States the utilize Autonomous Weapons have an incentive to disagree over definitions

Thornton, 2019 - Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Defence Education Research and Analysis, King’s College [Rod, “One to ponder: the UK’s ethical stance on the use of Artificial Intelligence in weapons systems https://defenceindepth.co/2019/06/17/one-to-ponder-the-uks-ethical-stance-on-the-use-of-artificial-intelligence-in-weapons-systems/ Acc 4/16/22 TA]

Given its declared position, it might seem logical for the UK to push for an international ban on the use of LAWS. Trying to level the playing field so that no other state possessed them would seemingly work to the UK’s advantage. A ban is also the favoured UN option. UN Secretary General António Guterres has, for instance, described LAWS as ‘morally repugnant’. Within the UN, however, the UK is part of a group of states (alongside Australia, Israel, Russia and US) that has collectively stated that currently they do not want to see any regulation that forbids the use of LAWS. To explain the UK’s position, an MOD spokesperson said that, ‘We believe a pre-emptive ban is premature as there is still no international agreement on the characteristics of lethal autonomous weapons systems’. We are thus back to the thorny problem of definitions. If we do not know what something is then how can it be banned? The question here, though, is why is the UK trying to prevent a ban on a weapon it has ‘no intention’ of developing itself? This does not look very ethical or, indeed, sensible. It seems to be giving licence to potential adversaries to continue with their own development of LAWS while the UK sits on its AI hands. Whatever the UK’s position, it seems that LAWS will prove impossible to ban anyway. Firstly, because the world’s major states will be seeing the benefits of LAWS there will probably (and maybe conveniently?) never be an internationally agreed definition on them, which would then allow any ban to accrue. Secondly, the technology that underpins any ‘killer robot’ will come to be developed anyway in the civilian sector – with systems designed, for instance, to deliver parcels or to tackle forest fires. Any military organisation could simply buy such systems off the shelf and convert them readily into LAWS. The genie will thus be out of the bottle on LAWS fairly soon anyway and can never be put back in. It will therefore, and unfortunately, be very hard for the UK to maintain a credible stance as a ‘pioneer in ethical AI’.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - Russia and China

The plan will not solve Chinese AI – they are not concerned about ethical issues.

Heikkilä, 2021 - Politico’s AI Correspondent in London [Melissa, Politico March 31 “AI Decoded: NATO on AI warfare — AI treaty consultation — Unions call for more AI protections” https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/ai-decoded/politico-ai-decoded-nato-on-ai-warfare-ai-treaty-consultation-unions-call-for-more-ai-protections/ Acc 4/9/22 TA]

The China question: Beijing supports banning the use of these weapons, but not their development or production. The U.S. and NATO have argued that they need to keep autonomous lethal weapons in their arsenals as deterrence and defense against “malign” actors — all very reminiscent of the Cold War and nuclear politics. Van Weel, the assistant secretary-general, said: “China has a seamless flow of these new technologies from the private sector into the defense realm. I’m … not sure that they’re having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they’re definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies.” Coyle doesn’t trust Beijing either, calling it an “insincere partner in many of their multilateral agreements.”

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - Political Obstacles

Political obstacles block NATO cooperation and leadership on Responsible AI use.

Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]

On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.

2022 Michigan Negative

--Extend - Trade Off

Focusing on autonomy in AI weapons trades off with other AI Issues like cyber security and reliability

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Overall, the absence of concrete German, European, or transatlantic military AI frameworks means that industry has a different starting point when determining the most appropriate framework for responsible military AI. There is no immediately available information on government-guided implementation and requirements validation. With the government more focused on arms control, the German interest in a whole-of-lifecycle approach to AI governance may turn into a delegation of labor—with government looking at responsible use and diffusion and industry focusing on development. The mix here of both self-regulation and waiting for multilateral guidance indicates a clear German interest in military AI governance and ethics—even if more narrow questions around autonomy in weapon systems continues to monopolize public debate. This focus on autonomy in weapons is an important factor in assessing the degree of coherence between U.S. and German approaches to military AI, as it risks overwhelming less controversial issues. Beyond FCAS, the limited bandwidth for AI ethics beyond the tip of the spear could also mean the countries have different bases for how they develop and procure defensive systems and countermeasures. Further, it is not yet clear how the German military government is looking at AI ethics that are separate from autonomy in weapons. Without this separation, it could be more difficult to coalesce on views like the importance of cybersecurity and operator training to building trustworthy, reliable AI for defense.

2022 Michigan Negative

Solvency Resps

1. A focus on Ethics distracts attention from other aspects of Responsible Use, and leaves us vulnerable to Unethical states.

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Allies with articulated views also translate their obligation to protect into language on military AI. This can be seen in arguments for the moral imperative to pursue AI-enabled capability development to maintain freedom of action and protect from adversaries whose uses of AI do not respect legal and ethical obligations.190 In these views, maintaining freedom of action can also mean maintaining interoperability, or even developing AI systems that help protect friendly forces, as most allies depend on cooperation to fill capability gaps.191 Beyond operational risks, responsibility also means incorporating ways to minimize risks in the international security environment. DOD has a role to play off the battlefield in this regard as well, including by developing norms around arms control. Allied concerns about diffusion and access, as embedded in the German international security and AI governance agenda, as well as risks that the Dutch identify, make this a compelling area for responsible AI cooperation between defense ministries. In doing so, the United States could find complementary areas of interest with allies that see responsible military AI as encompassing norms in the international environment. In fact, this may be a palatable way to move debates beyond questions exclusive to autonomous weapon systems. While autonomy in weapon systems undoubtedly introduces important questions for ethics, legality, and responsibility, the dominant attention it receives tends to overshadow other aspects of military AI. This not only includes responsible AI implementation, but potentially even the responsibility states have to defend against AI-enabled threats from less ethical adversaries. The fact that most allies are still transitioning from ethical questions wrapped up in autonomy in weapons means that DOD can facilitate and complement their views on ethical and technical dimensions of AI in non-lethal or non-autonomous systems. In doing so, it could help steward the conversation toward other, underrated aspects of ethical design, development, and deployment of military technology.