Nadibaidze, 2021 - Ph.D. Student at the University of Southern Denmark [Anna Entry submitted for the Second OSCE-IFSH Essay Competition “Commitment to Control over Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/507341.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]
Strengthening Human Control: The Role of the OSCE Arriving to a common position on weaponised AI regulation will be challenging. The current global and European political atmosphere is one of distrust. There is distrust between two major European security players: Russia and the US. In June 2021, both President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin said that the bilateral relationship “has deteriorated to its lowest point in recent years” (Walters 2021). There is also distrust among state leaders towards technologies such as the Internet, AI, 5G and robotics, not least because they can be weaponised and used for threatening activities such as cyberattacks. This environment makes it difficult to find a common understanding and commit to principles on the use of weaponised AI. Nevertheless, in this section I argue that the OSCE possesses some key advantages to become the platform for making a step forward in the global debate. In 2019, the GGE on LAWS adopted a set of principles to guide the work of the group in the next years, which were endorsed by the CCW High Contracting Parties. These Guiding Principles are broad and have no legally binding force. As pointed out by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the “CCW principles were simply intended to guide the deliberations. They were never supposed to be an end in themselves or intended to provide the structure for or outcome to CCW work on lethal autonomous weapons systems” (2020, 1). Moreover, they do not provide further clarifications on the concept of human control, only stating that “human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since accountability cannot be transferred to machines” (Principle b). Thus, while member states accept in principle the importance of human control, they have until now not been able to agree on a common definition of this concept, which is stalling the progress of the CCW debate (Bolton et al. 2021). Just like the CCW, the OSCE operates via consensus, which requires seeking a compromise between participating States and can often hamper the decision-making process. However, this institution has been historically known for its ambition to form an inclusive security community and to build practices that “suggest a new model of international security”, described as “comprehensive”, “indivisible”, and “cooperative” (Adler 1998, 119). The former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a symbol of détente between the US and the Soviet Union, and a place for two rivals to find compromise on security issues, demonstrating the possibility of coexistence on the European continent (Rittberger et al. 2012, 42). The Helsinki Final Act negotiations were a cooperative process, with the goal of promoting communication, as well as increasing confidence between States (Sandole 2007, 65). The negotiations resulted in a declaration of common norms and values of the participating States. Following the Cold War, the OSCE was not only able to survive, but also to change its goals and adapt to the rising security challenges of the new world order. Its broad membership and comprehensive approach towards security make it a key, if not the most, legitimate institution for European security (Mosser 2015, 584). At a time when some experts debate whether Russia-US relations have entered a ‘new Cold War’ (Polyakova 2019), the OSCE’s inclusive approach towards security is the one that is needed to show that tensions can be dealt with in a forum, rather than in the battlefield.