2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Settler Colonialism
Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 3-6, October 2021, MG)
Ironically, the winter months preceding the pandemic were just the opposite of isolation and social distancing. As part of a collective political struggle during the winter, many of us in British Columbia (BC) and elsewhere were involved in an active alliance with youth and elders involved in Indigenous resurgence and environmental activists to protest the armed occupation of Indigenous territories by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in support of aggressive pipeline expansion. Like an epochal rip in the fabric of normal time and space, the provincial Parliament Buildings in Victoria, BC, were surrounded by a large Indigenous youth encampment, vibrant with the lighting of sacred fires, drumming, inspiring speeches, and a field of red dresses symbolizing murdered and missing Indigenous women, all carried out with a spirit of love, not violence, and with very courageous, very determined resolve on the part of the Indigenous youth and elders. I may have been teaching a seminar on the politics of race and power by day, with that haunting trilogy of Black Skin/White Masks, Red Skin/White Masks, and Brown Skin/ White Masks, 2 but by night many students were at the encampment in active solidarity with Indigenous youth, while others responded to frequent appeals during the night-time hours to come to the Legislature to help protect the Indigenous youth from possible police violence. What I witnessed over the winter was a glimpse into the possibility of a more just future traced out in all its social creativity, political courage, and profound ecological understanding by Indigenous thought and practice, and by strong alliances between Indigenous youth and many other young people conscious of the historical injustices of settler colonialism.
Then, the pandemic struck, with all its globalized panic fear and political cynicism. The darkness of the pandemic spring was just the opposite of the lightness of winter politics. Watching President Trump’s daily televised orgies of unconstrained narcissism and spasms of self-pity interspersed with mean-spirited scapegoating and cynical lies, all applauded by an enormous popular following howling the deep rage of their discontent, I was reminded of Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the continuing power of seductive appeals to the suicidal death drive of fascism.3 Here the political virus of right-wing populism, fuelled by panic fear and intense anxiety over the loss of jobs in the very real-life context for many people in the contemporary economy of work or starve, seeks to attach itself to the host cell of the television audience, releasing its genetic instructions and then waiting as the host cell reproduces the virus, whether expressed in the form of angry white male hysteria, scapegoating of Asians, border violence against asylum seekers, or studied popular silence concerning the cynical hijacking of relief funds by large corporations in the United States and by carbon-heavy energy companies in Canada.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Psychoanalysis
Featherstone 10 (Mark Featherstone PhD - Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University, “Death-Drive America: On Scott Wilson’s Vision of the Cultural Politics of American Nihilism in the Age of Supercapitalism”, FastCapitalism, 2010, , MG)
Given the addition of the notion of joy, Wilson’s thesis is not simply that a kind of sensuous violence pervades contemporary American culture, and that this is paradoxically the product of a repressive Puritan society, but rather that the fusion of religion and technology in America creates a limit situation defined by perfect mechanization that recalls the mythic state of joyess rapture where the chosen people leave their fleshy earthbound bodies behind and ascend towards the heavens to become one with God. It is through reference to this thesis, which recalls Achille Mbembe’s (2003) work on necropolitics, that Wilson shows how America has evolved a mystical culture of negation, where technological death and destruction is necessary for the elevation of particular humans to a joyess new state. What is more is that this runs parallel to the Islamic fundamentalists’ apocalyptic cult of death of the suicide bomber, which transforms the ghoulish spectacle of the exploding body into a cause for celebration. That is to say that in much the same way that the Islamic fundamentalist body explodes when it reaches the joyess state of maximum intensity represented by the condition of martyrdom before God, the American techno body pushes towards the limit condition of organic death through a culture of techno-theology that aspires to reach the mystical state of oneness with the divine through a state of perfect mechanization that would render the fleshy body obsolete and signal the emergence of posthuman cybernetic man.
Given that this psychocultural apocalyptic structure has, as Kroker (2006) shows, been central to American thought from the very beginning illustrates why it will not be enough for Obama to simply turn back to multilateral politics and away from the empire talk of Bush II. In Kroker’s theory of American postmodern ideology, what happened under Bush II is that the ancient Old Testament Puritanism of the original settlers came back to enchant the postmodern techno-politics of post-Berlin Wall America that was already gripped by the messianic language of the end of history. Thus, the thinkers who inform Kroker’s vision of the America of Bush II are Einstein and Weber who illustrate the possibility of a quantum culture where religion and techno-reason fuse to form an apocalyptic complex that is endlessly thrown back to the future in search of salvation. It is this image of techno-Puritan America that Wilson (2008a; 2008b) extends in his books through French theory, with the added value that the psychoanalytic basis of his work may provide some way out of the psychological complex of quantum culture through the recognition of the way the compulsion of repeat sustains the bipolarity of Americanism. In other words, through recognition it may be possible to work through and eventually overcome the condition of bipolarity that currently means that the conservative-paranoid line through Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush II will never end. This is, essentially, the therapeutic model that sustains the Freudian-Lacanian theory that Wilson employs in his books to explain the structure of the order of joy that he believes organizes American culture.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Psychoanalysis
Featherstone 10 (Mark Featherstone PhD - Lecturer in Sociology at Keele University, “Death-Drive America: On Scott Wilson’s Vision of the Cultural Politics of American Nihilism in the Age of Supercapitalism”, FastCapitalism, 2010, , MG)
It is now clear that the essential result of the total unreflexive expansion of these globalizing technologies under the tutelage of the American state over the course of the last twenty years has been the more or less apocalyptic crash of the global economy which was never governed by value rationality, but rather operated on the basis of mindless principles of economic struggle, such as competitive advantage. However, to imagine this crash somehow signals the end of Americanism and that Obama will be presented with a clean slate on which to build a more socialistic America is, I think, a mistake since the standard view of the Chicago School economic thinkers would be to regard the current economic chaos in posthuman terms by suggesting that what has happened over the course of the last year or so is best represented by the image of the personal computer re-booting itself after receiving the essential software update that the credit bubble was over-inflated and needed to burst in order for the economy to start to expand in future. The idea that we should tamper with the economy on the basis of the essential re-boot, and think in humanistic terms about the effects of the re-start on the world’s human population, would be lost on a thinker such as Milton Friedman (2002), who would assert the need to let the economy work itself out of the downturn, simply because he was possessed by the apocalyptic spirit of technology that has become normal in the Americanized world. Unfortunately for the human population of the planet, the modern / postmodern age has been, and continues to be, defined by the dominance of the spirit of technology in ways that stretch far beyond the economic theories of Friedman and the Chicago School thinkers and are perhaps better illustrated by Heidegger’s (1977) theory of completed nihilism that describes a world totally possessed by instrumental reason.
Despite the dire warnings of the prophets of technological dystopia such as Heidegger we remain unable to really conceive of the value of organic life vis-à-vis the vitality of technology because we are infused by the spirit of the machine that has no purpose beyond the endless reproduction of its most basic function to work. As Kroker (2003) illustrates in his The Will to Technology, the prophets of the technological future, such as Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, understood that the machine, which is transformed into Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine in Wilson’s work, has no thought, philosophy, or reason. It simply works for the sake of working and ensuring that it continues to works in the future. In Kroker’s view this image of what Deleuze and Guattari call the mecanosphere was predicted by Marx, who advanced the notion of circulation, Nietzsche, who made the idea of the will central to this thought, and Heidegger, who linked Marx to Nietzsche in his theory of completed technological nihilism that simply wills the will that wills itself and so on. However, we know that this is not the end of the story. Akin to Kroker (2006), who shows that the closed circle of completed nihilism produces a mythical resurrection effect that pushes a primitive God who hires and fires and sort winners from losers centre stage, Wilson explains that the total expansion of the supercapitalist war machine through the various scalings of global space-time produces a utopian moment of convulsive pleasure comparable to the mystical union with an omniscient tech-no God for a post-Nietzschean nihilistic universe.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Psychoanalysis
Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 135-139, March 2004, MG)
Now, many working theorists have been this way before. Jean-François Lyotard recognized the death knell in the war machine of labour power, immediately calling for a recovery of a ‘libidinal economy,’23 a primitive pre-Marxism that would take labouring flesh back to an economy of pleasure and pain, an economy of sex and muscle, with the psychoanalytics of the suppressed id as the wild card in between. In The Mirror of Production, Jean Baudrillard was less utopian, more severe.24 In a twentieth-century reprise of that earlier meeting of French revolutionary thought of 1848 with the philosophy of the German Enlightenment, Jacobins with Hegel, the Paris Commune with German conservative reactionism, Baudrillard diagnosed Marx’s sleight of hand at the splitting of labour and labour-power for what it was: the foundations of a ‘structural law of value’25 in which Capitalism was to be cyberneticized in the form of the ruling axiomatic of signifier (use-value) and signified (exchange-value). More than Lyotard, who placed his theoretical bets on drawing out the differend in Marx’s theory of labour, Baudrillard wrote The Mirror of Production as Marx’s avenging angel, always insisting that the labour theory of value, far from inaugurating a new possibility of proletarian, let alone universal, emancipation, only functioned to install the ‘rational terrorism of the code’26 as the ruling order of the Capitalist axiomatic. For his fateful insights into the happy complicity of Marxism and Capitalism in sharing exactly the same episteme of the structural law of value, Baudrillard has suffered the usual fate: denounced everywhere as a cynic, this the most political of all thinkers, the most rigorously and naturally Marxist of all the post-Marxists, banished to an early twilight of thought on the (Parisian) margins.
If the twin gestures of Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy and Baudrillard’s The Mirror of Production cannot be assimilated into conventional Marxism, perhaps that is because Marx himself is the first post-Marxist, the first theorist, that is, who, unsettled by the ambiguities of identity and difference disguised here as the language of labour and labour-power, there as the supposedly warring poles of use-value and exchangevalue, wrote out his labour theory of value as a secret prolegomenon to a stage of Capitalism not yet existent. A code waiting for a material form, a theory of value awaiting its definite historical conditions of labour. Marx’s Capital, then, not so much an analysis of the definite conditions for the socialization of labour, although that too, but a secret history, written much in the tradition of the cabal, of a future Capitalism that would represent, as Marx theorizes in the third volume of Capital, the really existent history of ‘dead labour.’ It is, of course, around the corpse of Marx’s ‘dead labour’ that Libidinal Economy and The Mirror of Production circle, sometimes settling in the desert sands for a feeding frenzy of delirious theory, sometimes startled by the approach of passing armies of the night, taking flight, almost like a permanent evocation of ecstasy that was the Paris Commune and the slow decline of the German bourgeois restoration. Whether by way of Marx, who studiously wrote out the codes of the (industrial) Capitalist axiomatic only to write ‘dead labour’ as its epitaph and future, or by virtue of the chilling lightness of being of the French mind in the form of Lyotard and Baudrillard, who always and only begin with the last rites of dead labour, the spectre of post-labour haunts the Capitalist axiomatic.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 1AR---AT: Feminist Cyborg
DeCook 20 (Julia R. DeCook PhD - Assistant Professor of Advocacy and Social Change in the School of Communication at Loyola University, “A [White] Cyborg’s Manifesto: the overwhelmingly Western ideology driving technofeminist theory”, Media Culture and Society, 28 September 2020, , MG)
The concept of the cyborg has been fundamental in informing multiple fields – most notably, science and technology studies, women and gender studies, communication, postmodernism, digital culture, and more (Glazier, 2016). Haraway’s influence on these fields and even beyond them is irrefutable – however, the ‘universality’ of the cyborg is the issue at hand. The concept of the cyborg has continued to allow for the centering of whiteness and white identity and a techno-utopic worldview where technology is seen to be emancipatory, rather than oppressive. Indeed, many problems in our society in the 20th and 21st century in particular have all had technology thrown at them as a way of ‘fixing’ the issue – everything from climate change to racism to even pandemics (Benjamin, 2019; Engler, 2020; Eubanks, 2012; Huesemann and Huesemann, 2011). But time and time again, all of these ‘fixes’ have rather revealed the limits of technology in solving human problems – however, this has not stopped the slew of apps, devices, and other technological attempts in an attempt to do so, with no regard for the people behind the screens. In studying global digital cultures, Haraway’s notion of the cyborg is deeply Western in its theorization, and leaves behind those who do not exist in Western conceptions of personhood.
Further research on my part revealed that the love affair with A Cyborg Manifesto had been fraught earlier than I had imagined or seemed to perceive within my own graduate program and peers – in an essay from 2001, Maria Fernandez and Suhail Malik wrote, ‘Cyborg theory is mostly a self-serving sexying up of critical liberalism through great gadgetry and concept-busting movements in the technoscientific organization of living material and extended systems. Tie-dye T-shirts are swapped for leather deathpants and ethnic beads for prosthetic hardware in a desperate bid for contemporaneity’, (Fernandez and Malik, 2001). Even going so far to refer to the notion of the cyborg as a form of dogmatism, Fernandez and Malik note that the concept itself is hypocritical. Haraway did encourage the embrace of new technologies as a means of liberation – however, time and time again we have seen the ways that technology only continues to reify existing power structures, notably white supremacy and misogyny (Benjamin, 2019).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Feminist Cyborg
DeCook 20 (Julia R. DeCook PhD - Assistant Professor of Advocacy and Social Change in the School of Communication at Loyola University, “A [White] Cyborg’s Manifesto: the overwhelmingly Western ideology driving technofeminist theory”, Media Culture and Society, 28 September 2020, , MG)
The cyborg does not come without baggage, and in fact comes with its own value codes, which is perhaps amplified by our increasingly data-driven society that is run by algorithms and other agents that exist in technological infrastructures. Atanasoski and Vora discuss in their essay how these technological, networked infrastructures have begun to bring into question not even who counts as cyborg, but who and what even qualifies as human (Atanasoski and Vora, 2015). Their essay illustrates the limits of posthumanist fantasies of surpassing the boundaries of humanity, and how the views of this techno utopia formulate the ‘surrogate human’. Further, the fantasy that humans can be freed by technology from labor has perhaps collapsed in the age of the networked society, and although surrogate humanity may mark a shift away from capitalism, ‘it does so by reaffirming existing paradigms of racialized and gendered value through the figure of a surrogate human who performs degraded work that is always already meant to be invisible’, (Atanasoski and Vora, 2015: 7). Although not dealing with the concept of cyborg per se, this essay marks the introduction of the concept of the transhuman, the posthuman, and the surrogate human that technology has promised to create – and its failures to transcend identity in the form of gender, race, class, and ability, and rather continues to function and uphold in a colonialist, historical, capitalist power structure. Technology, the Internet of Things, data, and algorithms that enable the structure of modern day society are never neutral, and in fact all of these data-driven practices further ‘materializes assumptions of what constitutes a human . . .’ (Atanasoski and Vora, 2015: 13).
‘Techno-utopics surrounding big data, smart objects, and internetworking of humans and machines, however, do not dwell in the vitality of matter, but rather propose the thing as a surrogate human. In this way, they replicate the violent neoliberal impetus to enfold difference into sameness – into a shared space and time’, (Atanasoski and Vora, 2015: 16). However as Holland notes in their work The Erotic Life of Racism, there are beings that exist in time (white people) and beings who exist in space (Black people) – and when these two beings collide, there is an affront to the material and societal order within which they exist. The idea of technology, the cyborg, the transhuman and the posthuman as identities that exist in a utopia, in a beyond, is a myth that is being perpetuated and shifted by those who already benefit from hegemonic paradigms of what counts as being human in the first place. Bhattarai’s essay then further illustrates these concepts in their essay discussing algorithmic value, and how even investments in algorithms that seem benign are in fact reproducing a certain cultural logic of power in terms of knowledge, labor, and bodies (Bhattarai, 2017). The idea of source code, of algorithms, of data being the genesis of action is naïve – ‘because their agency is enabled and constrained by a larger network of cultural and economic encodings that render them executable’, (Bhattarai, 2017: 21), illuminating again that attempts to make technology and the tech world more inclusive and diverse as well as the attempts to use the category of cyborg as transcending difference are merely the master’s tools disguised as revolutionary action.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Feminist Cyborg
DeCook 20 (Julia R. DeCook PhD - Assistant Professor of Advocacy and Social Change in the School of Communication at Loyola University, “A [White] Cyborg’s Manifesto: the overwhelmingly Western ideology driving technofeminist theory”, Media Culture and Society, 28 September 2020, , MG)
I anticipated much about reading A Cyborg Manfiesto before I ever did. I understood it simply as conceptualizing the femme body as cyborg, dismantling the confines within which these categorized bodies have bene controlled and defined. Cyborg, in Haraway’s conception, blurs the lines of all of these boundaries of identities and will no longer think of itself or function in a society of other cyborgs being confined to these categories of difference and distinction. Notably, the rise of technological networks in the 1980s and beyond made some theorists hopeful that this would signify an end to sex differences being defined within the realm of embodiment (Puar, 2012; Wajcman, 2004, 2007), and the transhumanist movement started to formally organize and attempt to disseminate its ideology into the world during the same period (Bostrom, 2005). It was not necessarily the promise of machines, per se, that began peeling away the very definitions of what it meant to be human, but rather the sophistication and intelligence of the machines themselves and their capabilities that started to break down the idea of bodies ‘ending at the skin’ (Wilkerson, 1997). However, instead of shifting away essentialized notions of gender and sex away from the body, the technological revolution of the late 20th and early 21st century may have further reified and cemented these differences rather than usurping them – and, as recent conversations have begun to point out, this extends beyond gender and affects subjectivity and embodied notions of sexuality, race, and ability.
Although Haraway famously made her claim that she would rather be a cyborg than a goddess to mark the departure of the idea of the woman being a natural, biologically driven ‘goddess’ of the Earth and to embrace the potential of science and technology in what it could provide in shifting the idea of woman as a naturalized, essential concept, the issue still remains that technology is shaped by human factors, and that in turn, it shapes us and our humanity. Further adding to this entangled shaping and shifting that occurs is the rejection of the nature driven idea of the woman (the goddess) and replacing it with the cyborg. Is this desire to replace the concept of woman as goddess with the identity of the cyborg an indicator of washing away humankind’s need to tame nature? Or does it merely replace one technology of control with another? Indeed, the idea of the cyborg is a seductive one because it would potentially replace all of the fragile parts of our humanity with artificial and indestructible ones, but the epistemic groundings upon which much of science and technology are built upon and of which the cyborg is built upon are fraught with violence.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Capitalism
Bifo 15 [Francesco ‘Bifo’ Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, Heroes: Mass Murder and Suicide, Verso: Brooklyn, NY, 2015, p. 138-42]
The recombinant alliance of cognitive work and financial capital was over. The young army of free agents, selfexploiters and virtual prosumers was transformed into modernity’s horde of precarious cognitive workers: cognitarians, cognitive proletarians and internet-slaves who invest nervous energy in exchange for a precarious revenue.
Precarity is the general condition of semio-workers. The essential feature of precarity in the social sphere is not the loss of regularity in the labour relation, since labour has always been more or less precarious, notwithstanding legal regulations. The essential transformation induced by the digitalization of the labour process is the fragmentation of the personal continuity of work, the fractalization and cellularization of time. The worker disappears as a person, and is replaced by abstract fragments of time. The cyberspace of global production can be viewed as an immense expanse of depersonalized human time. In the sphere of industrial production, abstract labour time was embodied in a worker of flesh and bone, with a certified and political identity. When the boss was in need of human time for capital valorization, he was obliged to hire a human being, and was obliged to deal with the physical weaknesses, maladies and rights of this human being; was obliged to face trade unions reclaims and the political demands of which the human was a bearer.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Capitalism
Ratta 20 (Donatella Della Ratta, writer specialising in media and visual cultures in Syria, “Digital Socialism Beyond the Digital Social: Confronting Communicative Capitalism with Ethics of Care,” tripleC 18(1), 2020, pgs. 101-115)//JRD
In his semantic taking over of the concept and emptying it of all things political and class-related, Kelly argues that the emerging form of socialism is “uniquely tuned for a networked world” and far away from “your grandfather’s socialism […] It is not class warfare. It is not anti-American” (Kelly 2009). In Kelly’s cyber-utopian rhetoric, digital social becomes in fact “the newest American innovation”, a type of “socialism without the state”, running over “a borderless Internet” and “designed to heighten individual autonomy and thwart centralization” (Kelly 2009). In his colourful techno-language, digital socialism replaces the tedious bureaucracy of the five-year plans with the “brilliant chaos of a free market”, refashioning state factories into “desktop factories connected to virtual co-ops”, and exchanging national production with peer production, “government rations and subsidies” with a “bounty of free goods” (Kelly 2009). In his apology of digital socialism, Kelly feels to have to justify the choice of “such an inflammatory heading” and “redeem” it, as “technically it is the best word to indicate a range of technologies that rely for their power on social interactions” (Kelly 2009). In his over excitement for all things tech, when the masses “contribute labor without wages and enjoy the fruits free of charge” (Kelly 2009), that’s socialism. As much as Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is socialism, real-time Twitter and RSS feeds are socialism, unlimited free cloud computing and passionate opinions on the Huffington Post are socialism of the digital type that Kelly heralds as the new, perfect form of “cultural OS” elevating “both the individual and the group at once” (Kelly 2009). One might excuse this over-enthusiastic apology by looking at the time in which it was authored, 2009, a year that was, for many, still full of digital promises and utopias. But Kelly believes so staunchly in digital socialism that he makes sure to declare his long-term view over the matter. Even if this phenomenon has not yet reached the mainstream at the time of his writing, “clearly the population that lives with socialized media is significant”, Kelly emphasises. “The number of people who make things for free, share things for free, use things for free, belong to collective software farms, work on projects that require communal decisions, or experience the benefits of decentralized socialism has reached millions and counting” (Kelly 2009). And, he vigorously concludes, “revolutions have grown out of much smaller numbers” (Kelly 2009). Ten years after this passionate attempt to redefine the meaning of socialism, the USA’s enemy number one China seems to have learned the guru’s lesson and embedded it into institutional forms, implementing an up-to-date version of state-led digital socialism. In 2020, the so-called “social credit system” will standardise the assessment of citizens’ reputation producing a mechanism for ranking them according to their social and economic behaviours and sanctioning them if they fail to pay taxes on time, as much as if they do not show up after having booked a restaurant table or a hotel room. In this dystopian, Black-Mirror like15 framework, the Chinese government seems, in its turn, to have borrowed mechanisms of control and surveillance not from repressive institutions or authoritarian regimes, but precisely from the new digital social of social networking platforms. A way to visualise and quantify, therefore to evaluate, control, and sanction social relationships, that is possible to adopt at a state level and in such a pervasive, dystopian fashion only after the mechanism has become not just acceptable and familiar but, also, desirable for the global masses. While this semantic redefinition is carried out, albeit in different ways, both by Silicon Valley’s libertarian utopians and by China’s new institutional form of authoritarianism concealed under the more attractive guise of the digital, the European Union responds to the hegemonic re-appropriation of the social by emphasising its citizens’ rights to own their data and to protect their privacy. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)16 is probably the most striking example of such a timid, apprehensive reaction to the takeover of the social, which reveals a lack of a proper understanding of this phenomenon happening at a global scale. GDPR attempts at building a defence against the aggressive pervasiveness of the digital social by giving individuals the (illusion of) control and ownership of their data, upon which they would enjoy the right to request a portable copy and also, under certain circumstances, the possibility to have them erased. However, this promise of opening “the algorithmic ‘black box’ to promote challenge, redress, and hopefully heightened accountability” (Edwards and Veale 2017, 18) might just result into yet another “transparency fallacy” (Edwards and Veale 2017, 43), as there are complicated legal and infrastructure-related issues that might prevent the granted rights to be properly exercised by their holders. And yet even these legal or infrastructural impediments are not what is really at stake with the GDPR and similar policies. Its underlying problem is rather, in my view, an approach responding to the pervasive appropriation of the digital domain that renders all things digital “social” by simply reaffirming values such as ownership and property. The stark contradiction between data that have constantly to move and circulate – that have to be “spreadable” (Jenkins, Ford and Green 2013) – as per the business model of all things social, and the right to own and control such fluctuating, pervasive, and ever-multiplying immaterial goods, becomes apparent here. It’s the overall acceptance of a giant money machine and revenue-making system in the hope of regaining control of it by tweaking some small details. It’s a David and Goliath situation, where the actual little stone being thrown at the latter’s forehead does not affect the whole gigantic immaterial apparatus firmly in place. The contradiction inherent in a GDPR-like approach is that while we struggle to regain little bits of ownership and control over our data, the “feedback infrastructure” (Morozov 2019) stays firmly in the hands of platform capitalism. This rights-based attitude and the values themselves that it claims to defend and protect – property, ownership and privacy – are the core of the problem, not its antidote. Claiming back ownership and privacy does not challenge the system, instead it seeks to mitigate the worst effects of communicative capitalism, protecting small territories of individual freedoms against a market that stays as greedy as ever (if not more), appealing to individual personal rights and responsibilities rather than addressing a political collective.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Capitalism
Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 142-145, March 2004, MG)
Or is something else at work in the contemporary era? Not simply the Capitalists’ ability to supervise and discipline labor,27 but just the opposite, technology’s ability to supervise and discipline Capital. Just as the Capitalist ‘will always seek to extend the duration and intensity of work,’ the will to virtuality necessitates the extension of the duration and intensity of Capital. The process of Capitalist production is not allowed to pause: consequently, the twenty-four-hour stock market pacing the celestial movements of the earth as it rotates around the sun, after-hours trading as a way of disturbing the rhythms of daytime trading, streamed capitalism as the final triumph of extensiveness over duration, of dead (technological) space over the time of living Capital.
Whereas in the industrial Capitalism of the twentieth century, the decisive political struggle was between labour and Capital, in the virtual Capitalism of the twenty-first century, the key historical contradiction lies between Capital and virtuality, between, that is, the will to Capitalist accumulation and the accumulative instincts of the will to virtuality.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Capitalism
Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 145-147, March 2004, MG)
For Capital, it’s bitter irony. The emergence of the will to virtuality out of the economic disguise of the circuit of circulation implies not only that labour is factored out of (Capitalist) production, but Capital itself now is factored out of (virtual) reproduction. The cycle of history, with its stories replete of the rise and fall of all the dominant signs – power, war, labour, Capital, sex – breaks with the ossified structures of modernist myth, setting in motion the latest historical play, that of virtuality to be the once and always hoped for unifier of the siren of history. However, to speak of virtuality and history in one breath, to see in the circuits of virtuality a terminus ad quem of historical indeterminacy, is already to escape the present dialectic of Capital and virtuality, to say that in the valorization of the value-form of Capital lie not only the origins of the will to virtuality, but the future as the metaphysics of technicity. To say this is impossible, because to speak of the overcoming of Capital in the language of technicity, to announce Marx’s famous ‘circuit of circulation’ for what it is, the basic code of the fully realized technological future, would be also to brush Heidegger against Marx, to speak, that is, of the hidden presence in Marx’s Capital of Heidegger’s will to technicity. But we all know that Marx was a prophet of the left and Heidegger a tombstone of the right, so this encircling, indeed this declension of the invisible Heidegger in the visible Marx, is not permitted. Unless, that is, the equally famous ‘forgetting’ in Heidegger’s ontology of being is not the withdrawal of the gods from the ‘desolation of the earth,’ but another more proximate forgetting: the withdrawal of the visible signs of Capitalist accumulation from the (virtual) circuit of circulation. Marx, then, as the precondition of Heidegger, and Heidegger as the epiphany of Marx: a historical incompossibility.
From the ‘Circuit of (Capitalist) Circulation’ to the Circulation of (Digital) Circuits
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Baudrillard
Kroker 4 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “THE WILL TO TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF NIHILISM: HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE, AND MARX”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 184-185, March 2004, MG)
And why not? It’s the age of the streamed body, the data body.
The body has always been the site of the most radical political, indeed eschatological, struggle – the decisive site for the inscription in flesh of power as its speaks the body future.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Baudrillard
Kroker 14 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, “Exits to the Posthuman Future” , Polity Press, Pages 72-73, 2014, MG)
Certainly, in the present circumstance, Jean Baudrillard was correct. Like all the great referential signs before it – power, consciousness, desire, sex, money – history now also begins to follow a reverse movement, instantly repolarizing, energizing itself by a fatal, interminable exhumation of the past. Which is probably why everything now appears to operate under the historical injunction that the past must be exposed, deciphered, coded, programmed – endless histories of war, chilling histories of ethnic massacres, media exposés of the rise and fall of celebrities, histories transmitted by mass media, histories written in the language of cinematography, histories that are mobile, cellular, networked. Of course, with each repeated media exposure, historical events grow successively colder, further removed from the temporality of human passion, more distanced from immediate emotional response the closer they are to the eye of digital perception. When historical narratives disappear into the image simulacrum, when history is literally captured by the speed of the information machine, what remains is an imploding field of fractured debris, fully exposed, imaged, and narrated, but, for all that, ultimately unknowable as to its ultimate purposes.
Like all other sign-forms, history has probably always yearned to escape its heavy referential destiny, to finally decouple itself from the language of social signification and the epistemological responsibility of hermeneutic interpretation in favor of something else, history as a radical paroxysm of future events, never really knowable in advance nor understandable in the past tense precisely because history has now mutated into a recombinant sign – complex, mediated, bifurcated, fractured, multiple, and contradictory. In this case, the precession of history stipulates that there can no longer be any definitive end of history because the question of the end has itself become something enigmatic: temporally enigmatic since with light-time ends are often beginnings; and spatially enigmatic since with light-space ends are matters of pure artifice. Or perhaps something more perverse – that fascination with the end of history functions as a psychological displacement of anxiety about the impossibility of framing the question of history itself. Consequently, historical archives everywhere, memories recorded, stories decoded, past events patiently exhumed, premonitory signs of the future anxiously interpreted, museums of history reanimated – all this because real time may move too quickly for traditional historical interpretation, just as light-space throws the object of history into a gathering darkness.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Baudrillard
Kroker and Kroker 21 (Arthur Kroker - emeritus professor and adjunct professor of political science at the University of Victoria, Marilouise Kroker - feminist scholar, publisher, editor, writer, theorist, and performance artist, “Technologies of the New Real”, University of Toronto Press, Pages 132-134, October 2021, MG)
While Jean Baudrillard might once have noted that the seduction of Disneyland is its convincing pretence that its fantastic simulations are an escape from the real world rather than what Disneyland really is – a perfect model of the real-time model of soft power, modulated violence, and crowd management – Robot Land was to be the technological rider after the age of simulacra. Here, there would be technologically enabled thrills – roller coasters dangling from the outstretched arms of massive robots – mesmerizing robotic spectacles, and spectacular feats of imagination, but no order of simulacra, no sense that the new order of robotics is anything than what it really is: a key component of the Korean version of the power of the new real. With its mixture of entertainment spectacles, industrial promotions, and a graduate school in robotics, Robot Land was to be a place where fun illusions and delirious spectacles would always be underwritten by a very visible undercurrent of dead-eyed economic seriousness of purpose and carefully orchestrated research visions of (certain) robotic futures. This notion of place is, of course, the proposed theme park’s biggest problem: the future of robotics will probably have nothing to do with any territorial referent; certainly, it will not be a “land” in any physical or even symbolic meaning of the term but will most definitely constitute a new order of time – robotic time. In this case, Robot Time, rather than Robot Land, would probably be a more accurate description of the new epoch ushered in by all futurist robotic designs, from mass entertainment spectacles to the complex artificial sensors working the assembly lines of the manufacturing world. When the future of robotics, one already anticipated by contemporary developments, turns away from its ready-to-hand terrestrial manifestations – artificial fish, mega-statues, humanoid machines – and enters the databases of globalized networked culture as their indispensable artificial intelligence and machine-to-machine and machine-to-human communication, then we will recognize that we are not following a technological pathway that will lead to a certain place (Robot Land) but one that will lead towards a certain (robotic) order of database time that is networked, communicative, and neutral. As with all things having to do with theme parks, actually expressing such a fundamental eschatological rupture in the order of things – the displacement in importance of visible space by the invisibilities of (database) time – is challenging. Such a challenge is probably why, although it takes momentary refuge in the comfortable referential illusion of Robot Land, this proposed theme park is one that will probably always be known for the hauntological traces of its essential missing element – the once and future epoch of Database Robot Time. There are definitely no “magical kingdoms,” no “fairy-tale princesses,” no “pirates” – just a proposed theme park on the edge of the rising time of the East, which announces that, for all the psychic exuberance of its robotic fossils, from fish and statues to carousel animals, it is one Tomorrowland that will not be able to camouflage for much longer what is really taking place in this second invasion of Incheon: the newly emergent order of the time of the robots, with humans kept on standby as their necessary prosthetics. Now that the original vision of I, Robot Land has been discarded, we may never have an answer to the question concerning the time of robots, but we definitely know that, in the future as in the present, design based on speculative fiction is still at the mercy of real historical time with its rise and fall of both human and robotic imaginaries.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Antiblackness
Mbembe 15. Achille Mbembe, “Achille Mbembe on The State of South African Political Life,” September 19, 2015, http://africasacountry.com/2015/09/achille-mbembe-on-the-state-of-south-african-politics/
The old politics of waiting is therefore gradually replaced by a new politics of impatience and, if necessary, of disruption. Brashness, disruption and a new anti-decorum ethos are meant to bring down the pretence of normality and the logics of normalization in this most “abnormal” society. Steve Biko, Frantz Fanon and a plethora of black feminist, queer, postcolonial, decolonial and critical race theorists are being reloaded in the service of a new form of militancy less accommodationist and more trenchant both in form and content. The age of impatience is an age when a lot is said – all sorts of things we had hardly heard about during the last twenty years; some ugly, outrageous, toxic things, including calls for murder, atrocious things that speak to everything except to the project of freedom, in this age of fantasy and hysteria, when the gap between psychic realities and actual material realities has never been so wide, and the digital world only serves as an amplifier of every single moment, event and accident. The age of urgency is also an age when new wounded bodies erupt and undertake to actually occupy spaces they used to simply haunt. They are now piling up, swearing and cursing, speaking with excrements, asking to be heard. They speak in allegories and analogies – the “colony”, the “plantation”, the “house Negro”, the “field Negro”, blurring all boundaries, embracing confusion, mixing times and spaces, at the risk of anachronism. They are claiming all kinds of rights – the right to violence; the right to disrupt and jam that which is parading as normal; the right to insult, intimidate and bully those who do not agree with them; the right to be angry, enraged; the right to go to war in the hope of recovering what was lost through conquest; the right to hate, to wreak vengeance, to smash something, it doesn’t matter what, as long as it looks “white”. All these new “rights” are supposed to achieve one thing we are told the 1994 “peaceful settlement” did not achieve – decolonization and retributive justice, the only way to restore a modicum of dignity to victims of the injuries of yesterday and today. Demythologizing whiteness And yet, some hard questions must be asked. Why are we invested in turning whiteness, pain and suffering into such erotogenic objects? Could it be that the concentration of our libido on whiteness, pain and suffering is after all typical of the narcissistic investments so privileged by this neoliberal age
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Antiblackness
Marriott ‘7 /David, associate professor in the History of Consciousness Department at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Haunted Life: Visual culture and Black modernity, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, Pg. 233-237/
Fanon borrows this formulation from Nietzsche, in particular The Genealogy of Morals and The Will to Power. Nietzsche defines "ressentiment" as developing in those "natures who are denied true reactions, those of deeds."!' Ressentiment psychology – and this point is crucial both for Nietzsche and for Fanon's appropriation – is distinguished by a consciousness of loss, by a failure to integrate experiences of powerlessness, leaving this experience to remain in the memory as a traumatic kernel, leading to an obsession with past racial injuries that poison the ability of the self to function in the present or project an active future. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche defines "Slave ethics are what] begins by saying no 110 to an "outsider," an "other," a non-self, and that no is its creative act. This reversal of direction of the evaluating look, this invariable looking outward instead of inward, is a fundamental feature of rancor. Slave ethics requires for its inception a sphere different from and hostile to its own. Physiologically speaking, it requires an outside stimulus in order to act at all; all action is reaction" (Nietzsche, The Birth, 170-171). The slave blames the other, or outsider, for his suffering, makes him or her the symbol of evil and a phobic object. This response remains reactive. The slave does not act on the basis of his or her sovereignty, but in opposition to the other's domination. Nietzsche argues that ressentiment indicates a failure, not so much to accept responsibility for one's existence (Sartrean "bad faith"), but a failure to affirm life as a spirit of becoming. Fanon terms it a slavish, reactive attitude toward the future and the past. In this "pessimism of indignation" one assumes that one can do nothing because one is wretched, and one blames someone else for one's wretchedness. This is why, in Wretched of tlte Earth, Fanon argues that the first stages of spontaneous anticolonial violence are always reactive: "racism, hatred, resentment," "the legitimate desire for vengeance," cannot sustain a war of liberation. 14 Such reactive moments are linked to questions of time but in a negative sense, as examples of a reactive affirmation of history. It is precisely because he recognizes racist historicity in these attitudes that Fanon's work is taken up with the problem of time and death. If the limit set to black life is the significance conferred on presence by racism which voids all black life of value as life, with the result that one cannot live it, racism also robs the black of his or her ability to live and so to die as a free subject. Spurned by history, the attempts by blacks to reimmerse themselves in time have resulted in a turn toward allegory and myth. These attempts are condemned because they restrict the life as lived to one held in abeyance, in suspension, a life ossified either by its slavish reverence for the precolonial past or by its abject sacrificing of itself to the future to come, the freedom always to come in eternity. Both attitudes are positings of finite being that refuse to tarry with death as the true scandal of black historical experience and so become even less capable of resolving it. This is not to say that Fanon has lost faith in a redemptive future, or that he wants to routinize and categorize such temporal ecstasies by representing death as life's categorical commandment. Rather that, as in the letter to Tayeb, what matters is the life earned when it plunges into the inexplicable and emerges from it; what matters is how we, like Orpheus, take up the cunning and creativity of ressentiment as a culture on the edge of nothingness. Only by negotiating power and violence can we engage and reconfigure virtue for the modem polity (the "new humanism" that emerges from the "tabula rasa" opened up by the colonized on the path toward revolution-a possibility which is neither an end nor a beginning but an endless "tension of opening" between the twO).IS That is, death as lawless violence is the predicament and possibility of who we are and might become, here, now, the tenses through which we belong irreducibly to this time. This is also why Fanon rejects Sartrean, Hegelian, and other forms of determinate historicism, the logic according to which everything that happens had to happen. Against dialectical logic – and its view that out of experience, no matter how negative. something emerges – Fanon posits a black existential time in which what happened happens and keeps on happening in ways that remain unforeseeable and unknowable but which nonetheless forces us to be responsible at the level of ethics, politics, and will. Throughout Fanon's oeuvre. antihistoricism turns on the difficulty of naming and situating a black orphism beyond identity and alterity, beyond loss and the annihilation of being. True anticolonial violence, if it is to go beyond such Manichacism, must arrive at a teleological suspension of the ethical and so go beyond the spurious opposition between murder and illegitimate right, or murder dressed up as political vengeance. Manichean violence is ressentiment, for liberation is not a higher ethical law than murder and can only be justified in the pursuit of freedom, which is incommensurable with domination but nevertheless implicated in its violence. Hence Fanon is not trying to ethically justify the violence of anticolonial war (as he is often accused of doing). but trying to account for the use of violence in the revolutionary pursuit of freedom." Liberatory violence. in brief. as one possible memory of the future; as one possible pathway through the unjust violences of the political world. Both the conclusions to Black Skill, While Masks and Wretched of t/-ie Earlh define that memory as thc horizon of revolutionary hope and politics. as a rupture of time without end but within time's workings. POl' this reason, I cannot accept Patrick Taylor's dircrnpuvc opposition between Black Skill, While Masks as a work that ends with ethics over history. and Wretched of the Earth as a work that moves from ethics to revolutionary history (Taylor. Narratives, 74-76). Such opposition misreads the conclusion to Black Skill, White Mllsks. where Fanon writes, "I am not the slave of the Slavery that dehumanized my ancestors" (230). Antillean culture is a slave culture for Fanon, following Nietzsche, because its ressentiment represents a cultural-historico paralysis which has not yet become creative and so achieve that active forgetfulness of the past that accompanies successful repression and defines a noble memory of the will. This peculiar anamnesis, which is the result of historically distinct configurations of power, dominarion. and race war, reveals how, for Fanon, the traumas of cultural assimilation for the colonial subject is already marked by historical forces and decisive events whose trauma cannot simply be dispelled by the time of analysis or the methods of genealogy. 17 Slave ethics, insofar as it is reactive and denies responsibility and its ability to act, cannot achieve this cultural-historico transmutation. Through decolonization and violence the colonized can break through the impasse of ressentiment and enter into history. The task for the colonized, Fanon implies, is to risk the orphic "leap" into the "black hole" while also moving Out to the universal (199). One must move beyond the "absurd drama" of colonialism dialectically. One must move to ethics from history because ethics is the affirmation of the radical transformation of time, a decision to change both the meaning of the deathliness of black life and its sign of ressentiment. In the essay "West Indians and Africans," Fanon writes, 'The task consists of removing the problem, puuing the contingent in its place, and leaving the Martinican the choice of supreme values. One sees everything that could be said by envisaging this situation in accordance with the Kierkegaardian stages. "18 These stages arc the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious, Fanon's turn to Kierkegaard is not, as Patrick Taylor presents it, a move from ethics to history or, more accurately, inner morality to objective or ethical freedom. but a recognition of how violence and law pervade each other, and of how ethics is an encounter with the violence of power and its legitimation. The task is to move, not from values based on race to human values understood as transcending the old humanisms of Europe, which formed the foundations of colonial racism, but to address the phantasmatic and racist underpinnings of value as such. Fanon explicitly mentions Kierkegaard when discussing how law and violence remain implicated in the movement from ethics to freedom in history. The slave's struggle for freedom cannot only be defined in ethical terms. On the other hand, it is naive to assume that the decolonial world will exist beyond law and coercion. In Black Skin, W!tiLe Masks Fanon writes, "The former slave, who can find in his memory no trace of the struggle for liberty or of that anguish of liberty of which Kierkegaard speaks, sits unmoved before the young white man singing and dancing on the tightrope of existence" (22t). Because the slave has no memory of that "anguish of liberty," the ethical and the historical condition of freedom remains unavowable. The slave remains a dumb wimess to his own violated singularity which he can neither comprehend, renounce nor test. Fanon says that "the real leap consists in introducing invention into existence" (229). One shows how the ethical is mediated by the promise and actuality of such "invention" by becoming actively creative at the level of history. Acceptance of this coexistence does not "eliminate ... the ethical in oneself," but forces one to return to the ethical as the always potential encounter with the violence of the world as a test of one's faith (Taylor, Narmtives, 76).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Antiblackness
Koerner ‘12 /Michelle, Professor of Comparative Literature @ UC-Berkeley, “Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson” Genre, Vol. 44, No. 2 Summer 2011 DOI 10.1215/00166928-1260183/
In “The Case of Blackness” Moten (2008b: 187) perceptively remarks, “What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies.” What if we were to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming? How might such a thinking transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of history and the thinking of history (Moten 2008a: 1744)? Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition, a “lived experience,” and in doing so effectively eradicate its unruly character as a transformative force. Deleuze and Guattari, I think, offer a compelling way to think of this unruliness when they write, “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self- positing as concept, escapes History” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). To bring this relation between blackness and becoming further into the open — toward an affirmation of the unexpected insinuation of blackness signaled by the use of Jackson’s line as an “event in its becoming” — a few more words need be said about Deleuze’s method. The use of Jackson’s writing is just one instance of a procedure that we find repeated throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where we constantly encounter unexpected injections of quotations, names, and ideas lifted from other texts, lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force. One might say they are deployed rather than explained or interpreted; as such, they produce textual events that readers may choose to ignore or pick up and run with. Many names are proposed for this method — “schizoanalysis, micropolitics, pragmatics, diagrammatism, rhizomatics, cartography” (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 94) — but the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation of texts, proposing instead that we think of a book as “a little machine” and ask “what it functions with, in connection with what other things does it or does it not transmit intensities?” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 4).8 Studying how Soledad Brother functions in Deleuze’s books, connecting Jackson’s line to questions and historical issues that are not always explicitly addressed in those books, involves one in this action. And further, it opens new lines where the intensities transmitted in Jackson’s book make a claim on our own practice. This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice and to challenge some of the major assumptions of Western Marxism. In an interview with Antonio Negri in the 1990s, Deleuze (1997: 171) clarifies that he and Guattari have “remained Marxists” in their concern to analyze the ways capitalism has developed but that their political philosophy makes three crucial distinctions with respect to more traditional theoretical approaches: first, a thinking of “war machines” as opposed to state theory; second, a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”; and finally, the study of social “lines of flight” rather than the interpretation and critique of social contradictions. Each of these distinctions, as we will see, resonates with Jackson’s political philosophy, but as the passage from Anti-Oedipus demonstrates, the concept of the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter with Soledad Brother. The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts. It is above all for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari insist that society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of the movements, energies, and intensities (i.e., the lines of flight) that such machines transmit. The thinking of machines forces us not only to consider the social and historical labor involved in producing society but also the ongoing potentials of constructing new types of assemblages (agencement). One of the key adversaries of this machinic approach is “interpretation” and more specifically structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions. According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 293), structuralism persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result produced a theory of subjectivity, and also an account of language and the unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction. Defining lines only in relation to finite points (the subject, the signifier) produces a calculable grid, a structure that then appears as the hidden intelligibility of the system and of society generally. Louis Althusser’s account of the “ideological State apparatus” as the determining structure of subjectivity is perhaps the extreme expression of this gridlocked position (an example we will come back to in a later section). Opposed to this theoretical approach, diagrammatism (to invoke one of the terms given for this method) maps vectors that generate an open space and the potentials for giving consistency to the latter.9 In other words, rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system, Deleuze and Guattari’s method aims to map the ways out of it.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Antiblackness
Ashley and Billies 19 (Colin Patrick Ashley and Michelle Billies, CUNY Graduate Center, CUNY Kingsborough Community College, 3-27-2019, CUNY, "Affect & Race/(Blackness) ", https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1209&context=kb_pubs)//guyB
For Wilderson, for Hartman, for Fanon, for Aimé Cesaire—the possibility of black liberation means that the world must be destroyed and at the center of that destruction is the human. (See Ball, 2014, interview with Wilderson.) This is why theorists concerned with questions of liberation can no longer engage in materialisms that assume the exploitation of the human but refuse to engage in the ontological question of what the human is. It is telling that within black studies those beings that enter the world produced through blackness as black beings, black objects, black capacities are increasingly at the heart of breaking down the ontological assumptions of the status of the human. The post-human nature of affect theory is at a great loss if it doesn’t consider the question of blackness as it relates to the idea of the human—especially if blackness is itself ‘pre-human.’ Clough and Wilse (2010) reminds us that “future governance will continue to engage methods of manipulating affective potential” (p. 60). Likewise, Harney and Moten’s work on debt and governance is a political directive to take seriously this affective capacity of blackness. Taking affective blackness seriously questions the idea of ‘affect and race’, modeling a focus on specific racial productions and capacities for their singular (complex, proliferating, historical, future-oriented) capacities. The distinct ways in which blackness has been used to shape philosophies of the human is just one devastating outcome of its capacity toward death that has played a fundamental role in Western thought and world formation. Thinking through blackness and capacity allows for generative thought around black capacity—what black bodies or black space or black populations do—more specifically what blackness produces—without being stuck in the quagmire of binary structuring that is the space of essentialism vs constructionism and identity vs structure. This also actually allows us to fully embrace some of the ontological assumptions of affect theory and therefore becomes the direction in which we believe that a field of affect ultimately needs to head, in order to account for its own theoretical history, acknowledge how it has either shunned blackness in its desire for universality and distance from human subjects, or gotten trapped by thinking blackness, race, and ethnicity are primarily about human interaction, in order to participate in maximizing the potential for understanding blackness, as well as any other specific racial and ethnic formation for their affective capacities. And, if the response to this piece is “Why blackness and not _________ (insert other “race”)” this is the point of our piece, part of our critique of the utilization of race, and why we find value in affect theory.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Antiblackness
Polsky 21 (Stephanie Polsky PhD - Visiting Fellow at Goldsmiths at University of London’s Department of Visual Cultures and Principal Researcher at Vienna University of Technology’s Institute of Art and Design, “Aspirational Theft: Technocapitalism, Cognitive Augmentation Devices and Algorithmic Coloniality”, Goldsmiths, 2021, , MG)
Everything that the wearer experiences and conveys is thusly made available to its enslaved sensor who freely refines that material into the stuff of further dependency and then moves it onwards into a greater commercial channel of mass amplification. Through the ubiquity of these technologies, it is possible to conceive of the world itself as a vast plantation where fugitive thought, expression and movement of one sort, or another within the algorithmic estate can be restrained and recaptured, in instances where it cannot be initially deterred. The development of the Internet of Things is systematically contingent on the existence of a central master, which coordinates the communications between slave devices and the Internet. Here whiteness is ‘metaphorically represented by technology’ (Chude-Sokei 89).
This metaphor, Louis Chude-Sokei argues, can only succeed through the presumption that slavery is synonymous with blackness, the Negro slave is construed as a ‘“device”’ and the machine standing in for the white master is ‘potentially “autonomous”’ in carrying out its orders (90).
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
The Digital Cyclops Affirmative --- BFHR › Kritiks › 2AC---AT: Antiblackness
Polsky 21 (Stephanie Polsky PhD - Visiting Fellow at Goldsmiths at University of London’s Department of Visual Cultures and Principal Researcher at Vienna University of Technology’s Institute of Art and Design, “Aspirational Theft: Technocapitalism, Cognitive Augmentation Devices and Algorithmic Coloniality”, Goldsmiths, 2021, , MG)
Humanity’s nervous system has adopted into itself synchronised patterns of behaviour that rhythmically conform to highly modulated electromagnetic frequencies. These conjoined phenomena contribute to a heavily assayed atmosphere, where ‘wearables and the movements of capital steadily converge along with ever-widening circuits of extraction and expressivity’ (Seigworth 24). Here it becomes of paramount concern to discern whether the information being received portends ‘promise or threat’ (24). What humans regard as their world is now made both substantial through interaction, and valuable through an immaterial architecture of discernment which draws upon the ubiquity of consciousness as a natural resource, that can artificially refine down to the granular level of apprehension and thus seized upon as data. At a meta-level, the planet itself is being primed to contribute to ongoing processes of soliciting and securing its own patterns of extrusion. The skin of the world and the skin of the body act as conduits for the premutation of entry and retrieval. The Anthropocene looms over these surfaces as a posthuman assemblage capable of redirecting complex modes of entrainment that can no longer be classed as essentially biotic. The world to come is one teeming with a multiplicity of animistic awareness, and therefore its energies cannot be exhausted by the limitations of humanoid language and human intelligence.
A seemingly depleted environment can now be imbued with unbounded nonhuman vitality such that the digital marketplace will eventually cease to rely solely on human capacities for perception to produce their grounds for advancement. The Earth’s engineered milieu, then becomes a territory of extended cognition, through the colonial imposition of a range of digitally enhanced concepts and points of view that dilute humanity’s powers of imagination. These entities need not be highly intelligent themselves, but simply capable of drawing an account of their aliveness and intention to act as agents for the progress of this situation. This allows data to evolve organically as an active entity replete with its own history, traits, behaviour, and personality. Their patterns of accrual has nothing whatever to do the formal texture of life. It is for the very reason that they become favoured modes of survival on a dying planet necessarily requiring of its subjects that they be post-cognitive, post-user and post-human in their intelligent design strategy, throwing off the previous constraint of having to consume responsibly and adopting its place a new condition of obligation to extort critically within the context of human and nonhuman digital cohabitation. If posthuman is a term that connotes the upper limits of humanity as a construct, what must necessarily reside beneath is a less than a human which remains subject to extractive labour, beholden to the privatisation of property and artificially tethered.