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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Perm: Do CP
Johnston ‘19
(Seth, Fellow, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, “NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan,” pg online @ //um-ef)
This integration, capped by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium, extends through various echelons and included the ISAF headquarters and other NATO structures in Afghanistan.7 Thus, for this article, “NATO” refers to the various formal institutions and not the group of allied countries. Likewise, the focus is on the collaborative conduct and not that of the United States, other allies or partners, the government of Afghanistan, or other regional actors. Nor does the article address the efficacy of counterinsurgency warfare.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Perm: Do CP
22 USC § 2796d(d)
(pg online @ //um-ef)
NATO ally
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Perm: Do CP
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 2003 (“Vlt Corp. v. Lambda Elecs.,” 01-CV-10957-PBS, Lexis)//BB
1. It Depends On What the Word "The" Means The first skirmish involves the word "the." The claim language states "circuitry for recycling the magnetizing energy stored in said transformer to reset it." (Emphasis added). Lambda asserts that the word "the" means all of the magnetizing energy in the transformer. Vicor contends that the claim allows for the possibility that some of the energy may be recycled [**10] to reset the core while other energy is delivered to the load. In other words, it argues that the word "the" can mean "some of the," and explains that the word "the" was used to distinguish "the magnetizing" energy from the more general term "energy" that is used earlier in the preamble. Nice linguistic jousting, but the use of the word "magnetizing" alone would have been an adequate adjective to single out the kind of energy intended for recycling. If only some of the transformer's energy needed to be recycled, the word "the" would not have been used. Lambda's argument that the word "the" connotes all the magnetizing energy is persuasive because it gives ordinary and common sense effect to the word "the" in the claim language. See Merriam-Webster's [*352] Collegiate Dictionary 1221 (10th ed. 1993) (giving one definition of "the" as: "used as a function word before a noun . . . to indicate reference to a group as a whole"). This claim thus describes an invention that recycles all of the magnetizing energy to reset the transformer core.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Perm: Do CP
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 15 (“Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC,” File Name: 15a0087p.06, Lexis)//BB
Turning from "authorized by law," we find another reason to disqualify special counsel as officers under the plain meaning of the Dictionary Act. Mainly, that Headnote 13 Special counsel do not perform "the duties" of any office. The use of the definite article preceding both "duties" and "office" in the definition in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C.S. § 1, restricts the court's interpretation of that language. The word "the" frequently (but not always) indicates a particular thing. It can also be used to refer to something generically, as may be the case with "the office." By way of example, officers include any person authorized by law to perform the duties of the office in question--which could be the (Ohio) Office of Attorney General or some other public office. However, the word "the" that precedes "duties" has only one sensible construction--that it refers to a specific thing--all duties associated with the office in question. It would be unreasonable to construe "the," in that instance, to mean "a," "some" or "any." It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. And it is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs interpretation of texts. More like this Headnote End Headnote 13 special counsel do not perform "the duties" of any office. The use of the definite article preceding both "duties" and "office" in the Dictionary Act's definition restricts our interpretation of that language. "[T]he word 'the' frequently (but not always) indicates 'a particular thing.'" NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561, 189 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014). It can also be used to refer to something generically, id., as may be the case with "the office." By way of example, officers include any person authorized by law to perform the duties of the office in question—which could be the Office of Attorney General or some other public office. However, the word "the" that precedes "duties" has only one sensible construction—that [**22] it refers to a specific thing—all duties associated with the office in question. It would be unreasonable to construe "the," in that instance, to mean "a," "some" or "any." See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876, 187 L. Ed. 2d 729 (2014) ("It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2042, 182 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2012) ("And it is normal usage that, in the absence of contrary indication, governs our interpretation of texts.").
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Perm: Do CP
NATO 22 – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO "10 things you need to know about NATO," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 5-10-2022, T File 10 things you need to know about NATO Collective defence: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949 and is a group of 30 countries from Europe and North America that exists to protect the people and territory of its members. The Alliance is founded on the principle of collective defence, meaning that if one NATO Ally is attacked, then all NATO Allies are attacked. For example, when terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11 2001, all NATO Allies stood with America as though they had also been attacked.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Competition
Kinne ‘19 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, “The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)”, June 1, 2019, )//RG
Browsing the “military matters” category of the UNTS reveals agreements on military cemeteries, radar stations, tobacco use by military personnel, and various other topics. Even seemingly trivial defense agreements are numerous. Accordingly, I distinguish DCAs from those defense agreements that have previously received scholarly attention, such as nonaggression pacts, mutual defense pacts, strategic partnerships, and status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs).
Defense pacts and nonaggression pacts have been heavily studied (e.g., Gibler 2009; Mattes and Vonnahme 2010; Walt 1987). Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long (2002) place both agreement types under the broader definition of a military alliance:
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Competition
Kinne ‘19 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, “The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)”, June 1, 2019, )//RG
International defense cooperation is a complex, heterogeneous phenomenon. While military alliances dominate the study of this topic, countries routinely engage in defense cooperation outside of alliances. This article draws attention particularly to defense cooperation agreements, which are ambitious agreements that establish institutional frameworks—or legal umbrellas—for the entirety of their signatories’ cooperative defense activities. DCAs promote substantive, routine, day-to- day interactions between governments, militaries, defense industries, and other actors relevant to global security. Not only have DCAs exploded in number in recent decades, but anecdotal evidence suggests that governments view DCAs as essential elements of their global security strategies. Preliminary statistical evidence further suggests that DCAs may have tangible effects on a wide range of activities, from arms trade to peackeeping to bilateral lending and militarized interstate disputes (cf. Kinne 2016, 2018; Kinne and Bunte 2018).
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 2NC --- Competition
Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG
The universe of defense agreements is large. Treaty records reveal agreements on everything from war cemeteries to nuclear materials to military cartography. The vast majority of these agreements focus narrowly on specific threats or issues, and many follow from unique historical events, such as wars, occupations, state failures, or colonialism. Glaring asymmetries are common, and few agreements are long term. DCAs are different. I define DCAs simply as formal bilateral agreements that establish institutional frameworks for routine defense cooperation. DCAs typically involve relatively symmetric, long-term commitments for both sides, with an emphasis on coordinating core areas of defense policy and encouraging interpersonal contacts. A 2006 DCA between France and India illustrates:
1.1 The purpose of the Agreement is to promote cooperation between the Parties in the defence and military fields, defence industry, production, research and development, and procurement of defence materiel.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 1NC/2NC --- DCAs Spill-Over
Kinne ‘19 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, “The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)”, June 1, 2019, )//RG
In developing a comprehensive theory of DCA formation, I synthesize cooperation theory with network-analytic insights.7 States cooperate in order to obtain joint gains.8 Exogenous macro-level shifts in the global security environment— including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline in interstate war, and the growth of nontraditional security threats—have increased the joint gains of defense cooperation and thus increased demand for DCAs. These systemwide trends translate into specific dyadic influences. Faced with an increasingly complex security environment, states use DCAs to (1) modernize their militaries and improve their defense capacities, (2) improve coordinated responses to common security threats, and (3) align themselves with communities of like-minded collaborators. At the dyadic level, demand for DCAs depends on whether potential partners can help one another meet these goals.
However, joint gains tell only part of the story. Even when demand for cooperation is high, information asymmetries may limit the supply of cooperative institutions. States often lack credible information about one another’s trustworthiness, or willingness to cooperate rather than exploit the cooperation of others for unilateral benefit.9 Because DCAs involve sensitive national security issues, including access to classified information, coordination of defense policies, and proliferation of sophisticated weapons technologies, they inherently involve issues of trust. States further may lack information about one another’s institutional design preferences, such as the preferred scope and precision of formal agreements, which leads to distributional conflicts.10 If states are unsure of others’ trustworthiness or unsure about the types of agreements others are willing to sign, the supply of DCAs will remain low.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › DCA Mechanism › 1NC --- CP Shell
Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, )//RG
Bilateral defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs, are now the most common form of institutionalized defense cooperation. These formal agreements establish broad defense-oriented legal frameworks between signatories, facilitating cooperation in such fundamental areas as defense policy coordination, research and development, joint military exercises, education and training, arms procurement, and exchange of classified information. Although nearly a thousand DCAs are currently in force, with potentially wide-ranging impacts on national and international security outcomes, DCAs have been largely ignored by scholars. Why have DCAs proliferated? I develop a theory that integrates cooperation theory with insights from social network analysis. Shifts in the global security environment since the 1980s have fueled demand for DCAs. States use DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-minded states. Yet, demand alone cannot explain DCA proliferation; to cooperate, governments must also overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts. I show that network influences increase the supply of DCAs by providing governments with information about the trustworthiness of partners and the risk of asymmetric distributions of gains. DCAs become easier to sign as more states sign them. I identify two specific network influences—preferential attachment and triadic closure—and show that these influences are largely responsible for the post-Cold War diffusion of DCAs. Novel empirical strategies further indicate that these influences derive from the proposed informational mechanism. States use the DCA ties of others to glean information about prospective defense partners, thus endogenously fueling further growth of the global DCA network.
On 26 June 2015, the US-Brazil defense cooperation agreement entered into force. This agreement, the first formal defense treaty between Brazil and the US in over thirty years, is ambitious in scope, promoting cooperation in “defense-related matters, especially in the fields of research and development, logistics support, technology security, and acquisition of defense products and services,” as well as “exchanges of information,” “combined military training and education,” “joint military exercises,” “meetings between equivalent defense institutions,” and “exchanges of instructors and training personnel.”Footnote 1 Since the end of the Cold War, the US has signed similar bilateral defense cooperation agreements, or DCAs, with dozens of partners. And the US is not the only country active in DCAs. In 2015 alone, nearly a hundred DCAs were signed between countries as diverse as Indonesia and Turkey, South Africa and Liberia, and Argentina and Russia.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Net Benefits › 2NC --- Avoids Ptix & NATO BAD
Shifrinson ‘21
(Joshua, PhD in political science/international relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Shifrinson’s research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, European and Asian security, alliance politics, and diplomatic history, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” pg online @ //um-ef)
America’s aversion to cost and risk also impacted NATO’s internal politics. Reluctant to tie the U.S. too firmly to Europe’s defense, American leaders demonstrated a proclivity for working behind the scenes to set alliance policy with individual allies. This often meant determining the alliance’s agenda separately with each of the so-called Big 3 — France, Britain, and West Germany — rather than allowing NATO, with its “one state, one vote” procedures, to determine U.S. policy. At the same time, U.S. leaders began objecting to allied “free-riding” starting in the 1960s. These protestations were present even in the 1950s, when no less a figure than President Eisenhower complained of “having the whole defense burden placed on U.S. shoulders” and charged the Western Europeans with nearly “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam.”4 Assertions of this kind were increasingly frequent during the second half of the Cold War. By that time, not only had Western Europe effectively recovered from the deprivations of World War II; the United States also faced mounting economic problems and political dislocations at home. Combined, these developments spurred a growing domestic debate over the necessity and wisdom of American patronage of states that seemed able to assume greater responsibility for their own defense. The net result was a sustained American drive throughout the 1970s and 1980s to push Western European states to assume greater burdens. U.S. officials threatened that the United States might abandon NATO if the allies did not spend more on their defense. Starting in 1981, Congress required the Defense Department to issue an annual report on allied contributions to the “common defense” so as to monitor, and potentially penalize, free-riders and those falling short of their obligations. In 1984, a group of senators led by Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat, proposed withdrawing substantial U.S. forces from NATO on an annual basis if European members of the alliance did not increase their military budgets. A bipartisan congressional panel in 1988 bluntly concluded that “our allies are not sufficiently aware of the strong political pressure in this country to reduce our defense commitments to our allies unless they are willing to shoulder more of the burden. This view is shared by the Congress. Therefore, the panel states in the strongest possible terms that Europeans had better be prepared to defend their own territory without a large-scale U.S. ground commitment, because that commitment cannot be guaranteed forever.”5
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Net Benefits › 2NC --- Net Benefits --- Delay/Costs
OTA ‘90
(U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment,“Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology,” May 1990 OTA-ISC-449 NTIS order #PB90-254160 pg online @ //um-ef)
European and American defense analysts have traditionally agreed about the desirability of increased cooperation in defense technology. The current disarray in the Warsaw Pact leads to a sharply reduced threat perception, while concurrently Western governments are under pressure to provide increased economic assistance to Eastern Europe. Both factors will tend to accelerate the decrease in Western defense spending. Yet, at the same time, the increasing sophistication of weapons systems demands ever higher investments in research and development. The resultant high per unit cost of weapons systems and consequently decreased ability of NATO governments to purchase sufficient numbers to meet projected forces requirements, risks so-called ‘‘structural disarmament. Collaboration provides one answer to this dilemma in theory by reducing duplicative R&D and achieving economies of scale through longer production runs. It also provides for a more robust and cost-effective Alliance defense through standardization and improved interoperability. This, of course, presents the argument in a somewhat idealized form. NATO collaborative projects have generally required lengthy negotiations and complex management systems, which increase costs in relation to the number of participating countries. While there is no established, accurate method of matching collaborative costs against savings resulting from elimination of duplication of weapons systems, the assumption that cooperation provides the greater overall benefit has rarely been challenged.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Net Benefits › 2NC --- Slow Adoption NB
Lawrence et al ‘11
(Anthony Lawrence, and Tomas Jermalavičius, International Center for Defense and Security, “From the Cold War and Hot Peace to the Long War and Beyond: What Are Our Armed Forces (Good) For?,” https://abcd.icds.ee/2011-3/summary-2/)
“Smart defence” or more “pooling and sharing” and better burden sharing could provide a way to increase collective capabilities even while spending is declining. This is not an entirely new way of thinking if defined it as the sum of all cooperative efforts and initiatives within the EU and NATO, rather than just as common ownership of assets and capabilities. Initiatives such as cooperative capability, security cooperation, mutual development or multinational formations such as Eurocorps – all designed to increase the capacity of the military to work together – have existed for a long time. New initiatives such as NATO’s strategic airlift consortium further advance this thinking and practice. We are already witnessing the dividends of these approaches in operations in Afghanistan. Certainly, there are many areas where this must be taken further and produce more – all very well illustrated by capability gaps in operations in Libya: air-to-air refuelling, ISTAR, combat SAR, tactical airlift etc. It does not matter through what sort of arrangement or under which nation’s lead this is delivered, as long as it is actually delivered rather than producing the very modest results of many past initiatives (DCI, PCC etc.) or projects (e.g. helicopter initiative in NATO). Civilian capabilities will also have to be enhanced through cooperative efforts such as the Weimar initiative, since the management of many contemporary crises requires civilian inputs. Prompted by the crisis, we often talk about spending on new capabilities such as cyber, but this cannot become a substitute for investing in real capabilities (cyber would have been of little use in Libya or against the Taliban) and doing it in a collective, coordinated manner. New approaches are needed to obtain those capabilities, especially doing away with many duplicate programmes in Europe. In the United States, despite the inherent waste of a large defence organisation, the military manage to derive a greater value from their investments than the Europeans. If Europeans continue in their current approach of just shrinking their “total war” force instead of reconfiguring it properly for the age of “limited wars”, the Americans will simply turn away and leave. Their executive branch and the military realise very well that even the United States cannot achieve everything alone and must cooperate with its allies and partners in Europe, but this may not arrest the growing sentiment of giving up on Europe felt in the legislative branch. On the other hand, some of the fault for the capability gaps and the steep decline in conventional heavy capabilities in Europe rests with the United States: many Europeans wanted to shine in the “coalitions of the willing” led by the Americans and therefore developed capabilities which bought influence instead of producing military effectiveness. “Pooling and sharing” will work best if it comes in a “bottom up”, pragmatic fashion – much in the way of the recent UK-France defence cooperation agreements – and if they are linked with U.S. capabilities. Indeed, it is likely that most of the workable arrangements will be bilateral and multi-bilateral rather than genuinely multilateral. “Pooling and sharing” has its limits, some of which arise from the difficulties encountered in agreeing upon and then implementing decisions in a consensus-based decision-making culture in organisations such as NATO and the EU. More fundamentally, however, diverging strategic cultures in Europe mean that there is no common threat perception and no common understanding of why and in what circumstances the use of military force is necessary and appropriate, which may render “pooled and shared” assets and capabilities unusable. There are interventionist countries keen on using force to advance interests and values, and those who exercise extreme caution and would reserve the use of force for the defence of the Alliance‘s territory. (This was illustrated by the challenges of reaching a common position with regard to NATO’s intervention in Libya.)
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Net Benefits › 2NC --- Slow Adoption NB
Bazin and Kunertova ‘18
(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ //um-ef)
Lastly, size matters; cohesion is more difficult to forge and maintain in an ever-enlarging alliance, especially when increasingly divergent national interests tend to change the modus operandi of the Alliance. More rather than less often, NATO’s international staff will need to find compromise during its decision-making processes between a political and formal equality hoped to enhance Alliance cohesion on the one hand and the desirable Alliance effectiveness on the other hand.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Net Benefits › 2NC --- Slow Adoption NB
Bazin and Kunertova ‘18
(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ //um-ef)
Furthermore, civil-military frictions on both NATO and national levels could negatively affect readiness of the forces. Long decision-making processes and underdeveloped institutional procedures in national headquarters could prevent the Alliance from developing a legal framework for a common course of action under the NATO flag; for instance, in addressing new adversaries that use unconventional means such as cyber. Put simply, NATO cannot be faster than the individual countries that make it up.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Net Benefits › 2NC --- Slow Adoption NB
Bazin and Kunertova ‘18
(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ //um-ef)
Organizational structures and processes. This project’s focus groups concluded that NATO’s rigid organizational processes that hold onto the past could result in an Alliance “unable to evolve with member states’ national interests.” Bureaucratic politics within the Alliance structures could cause NATO’s slow adaptation to contemporary needs and values. For instance, the participants listed the top-down defense planning process of determining capability requirements as a case where the Alliance and evolving national interests do not align.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Solvency › Solvency --- Interoperability
Hura et al ‘2
(Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, Eric Laron, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Dan Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin O’Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison, RAND Project Air Force, “Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations,” 2000, pg online )
The implications are twofold. The first is that interoperability planning must be adaptive enough to accommodate the possibility of coalitions of different sizes and composed of different coalition partners. “Plug-and-play” is a concept that is well known at the technological level. But it is also required at the national level to provide for the possibility of different combinations of coalition partners; to manage the comings and goings of coalition members as the mission focus changes and/or missions are added, completed, or abandoned; and to minimize disruptions to the overall coalition effort. This suggests a focus on long-term interoperability solutions, including organizations, doctrine, procedures, and system architectures that can accommodate the dynamic character of coalitions, including transitions. [Table A.3 OMITTED] The second implication is that because the United States’ NATO allies vary in their coalition participation with the United States, the United States might be able to achieve important interoperability through a series of bilateral rather than alliance-wide efforts.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Solvency › Solvency --- subs, NC3
Adgie et al. ‘22 - Mary Kate Adgie is a research assistant at RAND, with a focus in international development and national security, sub-Saharan African affairs, and socio-economic development; Jason H. Campbell is a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he focuses on issues of international security, counterinsurgency, intelligence, and measuring progress in post-conflict reconstruction; Beth Grill is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation specializing in national security policy and security cooperation; Jennifer Moroney is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for DoD clients; Angela O'Mahony is associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND; Rachel Tecott is an adjunct researcher for RAND Corporation who has helped to inform U.S. security cooperation and security force assistance efforts around the world; David Thaler is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation (RAND, “Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies”, 2022, )//RG
Allies such as the United Kingdom and Australia support and encourage interoperability discussions and new investments during senior-level interactions with the Army. For example, interoperability discussions have historically dominated the agenda for the U.S.-British army-to-army staff talks. The Multinational Fusion Cell in the HQDA brings together assigned personnel from multiple allied countries (the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Germany, France, and others) to focus on interoperability and to develop U.S.-allied bilateral interoperability roadmaps. Standing organizations, such as ABCANZ, also exist to work through interoperability issues at the operational level. Large-scale exercises, such as the aforementioned biannual Talisman Sabre series between the United States and Australia, are very much focused on addressing interoperability challenges identified from recent operations and planning for future operations. NATO defines interoperability along three dimensions—human, procedural, and technical—which is a helpful way to categorize interoperability challenges.34 We find general agreement among our interlocutors that SC with highly capable allies to support human, procedural, and technical interoperability is advancing at the operational and tactical levels, but there is concern about a lack of multiyear funding and programming to guide longer-term planning for multinational interoperability exercises.35
Despite this focus, interoperability initiatives at the strategic level have been relatively ad hoc from allies’ perspectives. The Army’s Interoperability Campaign Plan frames and institutionalizes interoperability efforts internally and operationalizes it with designated partners. Allies support the Army’s focus on interoperability writ large, but the links between interoperability planning and ongoing SC activities needs to be stronger. As an example, the GORT, a bilateral event between the United States and the United Kingdom at the three- and four-star level, is not explicitly linked to the discussions that occur at the one- and two-star levels. According to key allied officials, issues raised at the GORT level should be automatically addressed at the subsequent Army staff talks (ASTs) and drive the discussions at the lower level working groups. Interoperability issues and priorities raised at the GORTs/staff talks should also be linked to other key bilateral SC activities, creating a real battle rhythm for interoperability.
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Solvency › Solvency --- TL
Goldman 20 [Emily, Director of the US Cyber Command; “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy”; Fall 2020 ; DOA: 7/20/22; ; Lowell-ES]
America’s approach to building cyber norms should adapt to the following realities. First, the United States is not in a hegemonic position to define the agenda for norms in cyberspace. For a single actor to set the public agenda and drive a convergence of behavior, it would need to have control over the primary incentives and disincentives within the system, which the United States does not possess. Nor is there a clear manner in which the United States could obtain such primary control, due to the highly diffuse nature of cyberspace. Second, what is and what is not currently acceptable varies greatly depending on national perspectives, even among liberal democratic states. Despite the stated desire of the United States to establish norms through international cooperation, such norms have not emerged. The result is intense competition to drive a convergence of expectations on behavior in cyberspace.
An alternative yet related approach to building norms is to model good behavior. Convergence of norms will occur over time as other actors see that more beneficial outcomes flow from modelled good behavior than from bad behavior. This approach presents several challenges. First, behavior that might be categorized as unacceptable still produces benefits that outweigh costs. Second, adversaries cite various allegations of American bad behavior in cyberspace — global surveillance and the Stuxnet hack of the Iranian nuclear program are two examples — in labeling the United States a hypocritical standard-bearer for norms. Third, as both state and nonstate actors continue to advance their interests through behaviors that the United States considers unacceptable, modelling can easily be misunderstood as tacit acceptance.41
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!!!Bilat CPs!!! › Solvency › Solvency --- TL
Adgie et al. ‘22 - Mary Kate Adgie is a research assistant at RAND, with a focus in international development and national security, sub-Saharan African affairs, and socio-economic development; Jason H. Campbell is a policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he focuses on issues of international security, counterinsurgency, intelligence, and measuring progress in post-conflict reconstruction; Beth Grill is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation specializing in national security policy and security cooperation; Jennifer Moroney is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for DoD clients; Angela O'Mahony is associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND; Rachel Tecott is an adjunct researcher for RAND Corporation who has helped to inform U.S. security cooperation and security force assistance efforts around the world; David Thaler is a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation (RAND, “Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies”, 2022, )//RG
The United States and its allies prioritize establishing shared standards and procedures to ensure that they have the ability to coordinate effectively in a potential conflict. Liaisons and personnel exchanges provide a way to sustain enduring relationships between U.S. and allied militaries. The United States conducts SC activities on a bilateral basis, engaging allies in liaison and military personnel exchange programs. The United Kingdom has as many as 15 liaison officers and 13 exchange officers placed in Army commands. These officers have the opportunity to share information on operational procedures, which helps build and sustain long-term interoperability between the two armies.19
Defense and military contacts, which are more short-term, also provide a means for sharing information. The contacts include army-to-army staff talks and key leader and senior leader engagements. According to G-TSCMIS, Australia and the United Kingdom have the highest number of SC engagements among highly capable partners, including planning conferences, bilateral and multilateral coordination meetings, and staff talks; the majority of these engagements are focused on interoperability.