2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Richard S. Kay: Oliver Ellsworth Research Professor and Wallace Stevens Professor Emeritus, University of Connecticut School of Law “UPDATING THE CONSTITUTION: AMENDING, TINKERING, INTERPRETING, SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSION: KAY” APRIL 13, 2019, 67 Drake L. Rev. 909 (2019), HeinOnline
Audience Member: I think it's safe to say, or at least a consensus or a soft majority of the academic community would agree, that the Constitution should be amended in certain places. But the problem with that being that you need a pretty strong majority to accomplish that. I'm going to harken back to something Professor Levinson hit on. In this country where the Constitution is viewed as this absolute, almost biblical, document in its original sense, is there a way to repackage the republican view that it is important to amend the Constitution but alternatively that maybe the Constitution has served as sort of a baseline?
Kay: I can't say that it's impossible. Nothing lasts forever. This Constitution has lasted a long time and things in this country are really different now. Different in a way that I've never experienced in my unfortunately very long life. So, yes, it's possible. I think what you need is a crisis though that's kind of a tough thing to wish for. But, we may not see it. I won't see it.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Jackson 15 (Vicki, Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, The (myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, Pages 575–605, )
2.3. Predictions of failure and normative objections may both contribute to disuse of amendment What may increase the difficulty of formal amendment in the United States is a seemingly widespread view that constitutional change cannot , as a practical matter, be sought through amendment, and that as a normative matter amendments should not be the vehicle for legal change (but rather changes in judicial interpretation should be sought). Taking account of these aspects of political culture in assessing the effects of the different amendment procedures is consistent with some recent studies indicating that the formal rigidity of amending formula has, at best, limited value in predicting rates of amendment. 37 Although I cannot offer conclusive proof in this paper that empirical beliefs in impossibility and normative attitudes of constitutional veneration contribute to disuse of the Article V amendment process, the suggestion that they may be causal factors is consistent with emerging work on the significance of culture as a factor influencing amendment rates. 38 On the first of these—overstatements of the difficulty of using the amendment process—as already noted, Levinson entitled a chapter in his book, “The Impermeable Article V,” and refers to Article V as making it “practically impossible” to enact constitutional change. 39 He is by no means alone in doing so. Professor William Eskridge describes the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment as having apparently been the “death” of the Article V amendment process. 40 Joel Colón-Ríos describes Article V as “creat[ing] almost insuperable constraints on constitutional change.” 41 These statements are widely echoed in the scholarly literature. Predictions of impossibility often combine with asserted reverence for the Constitution, related normative resistance to proposing changes in its text, and, sometimes, fears that any resort to the amendment process will invite populist movements to amend in undesirable ways; these all may cause hesitation to resort to the amendment process even when it would seem a logical response. Consider the reactions from groups that disagreed with the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n . 42 Public opinion polls after the decision indicated that public sentiment, among both Republican and Democratic voters, was running strongly against the decision. 43 One might have thought this was an opportune moment to go the people, through the amendment process, to obtain constitutional authorization for regulation of campaign expenditures and contributions. Yet some combination of reasons—which may include concerns for overriding the Supreme Court through amendment, reluctance to amend in any way the First Amendment, as well as a belief in the futility of the amendment process, and support for the decision by influential minorities—prevented any groundswell of support for a responsive amendment in the first years after the decision came down. Yet an immediate response through constitutional amendment (as occurred, for example, after Oregon v. Mitchell ) had some compelling reasons behind it, including the benefits of acting before spending and fundraising patterns adjusted to the new regime under Citizens United and expectations by politicians and corporations became entrenched. 44 A leading public interest group that opposed the Citizens United decision was the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. The Brennan Center devoted considerable effort to developing strategies for responding to the decision, including hosting conferences and preparation of research/policy papers. The nature of the organization’s early response is illustrated by a paper, Renewing Democracy After Citizens United, which proposed three strategies toward renewing democracy: enacting legislation for small donor public financing; increasing voter registration; and developing new jurisprudence, that is, new doctrinal arguments to persuade future courts of a different view. 45 In 2011, the Brennan Center held a conference, Accountability After Citizens United , also on responses to Citizens United , that focused on statutory approaches through securities and corporate law; activating administrative agencies, like the Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and, again, developing new jurisprudence around the issue. 46 The Brennan Center’s failure in those responses to devote any attention to the possibility of an amendment as a form of “democratic renewal,” or “accountability,” speaks volumes about its belief in the possibility, and/or desirability, of amendment. Similarly, an issue analysis prepared for another public interest group, the American Constitution Society (ACS), soon after the Citizens United decision, addressed several issues. 47 They included the need to have better factual records for “strict scrutiny” review to support the claimed need for regulation; increasing disclosure requirements; addressing disclosures and expenditure issues through corporate law and requirements of shareholder approval; moving towards public funding of campaigns; modernizing voter registration; and appointing as Supreme Court justices those with a “voter-centric” view of the First Amendment. 48 Despite its thoughtfulness and seemingly comprehensive overview of possible responses (including the constitutional politics of appointments to the Court), this memo for ACS did not mention the possibility of constitutional amendment. 49 To be sure, some critics of Citizens United have tried, and with some success, to promote a constitutional amendment in response. At least fourteen proposals were introduced in Congress within two years of the decision; these range from amendments sweeping broadly to say that corporations do not hold rights under the Constitution, to those authorizing legislatures to regulate corporate, or all, campaign contributions and expenditures, to those excluding campaign expenditures from First Amendment protections, to those establishing a substantive rule, for example, banning corporate contributions or expenditures. 50 An organization called “Move to Amend” seeks petition signatures for a proposed amendment to “our Constitution to firmly establish that money is not speech, and that human beings, not corporations, are persons entitled to constitutional rights”; they reportedly had about 300,000 signatures in mid-2013. 51 Another organization, “Free Speech for People,” supports amendments to “(1) enable Congress and the states to limit campaign spending and (2) to make it clear that corporations do not have constitutional rights;” in 2013 it claimed to be “one-third” of the way to succeeding with a constitutional amendment. 52 In 2014, the “Democracy for All” amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 19, 113th Congress, did not receive the necessary two-thirds vote, notwithstanding majority support in the Senate. 53 Some well-established public interest groups, including People for the American Way, 54 and Public Citizen, 55 have supported amendment as an approach, as have some legal scholars. 56 But other influential non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political actors who disagreed with the decision in Citizens United nonetheless ruled out seeking an amendment, either because they believed it is so unlikely to succeed and/or because they believe other approaches have normative advantages. It is possible that those groups that did not include amendment as a possible response to Citizens United did so because they believed a constitutional amendment is a bad idea for reasons other than its unlikelihood of enactment. 57 They might believe that an amendment would be too hard to craft to achieve its goals in the hands of an uncertain Supreme Court; or that entrenching provisions relating to the subject is a bad idea for democratic politics; or even that “progressives” who oppose Citizens United should not seek amendment lest it encourage “conservatives” to seek amendments that progressives disagree with. 58 But a significant part of the opposition to amendment—among those who would like to overturn the effects of Citizens United —has to do with a belief that it would be impossible. For example, Mark Schmitt, Senior Fellow of the Roosevelt Institute, advanced a series of arguments, which appear mostly bottomed on the unlikelihood of an amendment passing. 59 In one debate with proponents of amendment, he stated that proceeding with an amendment would imply to those working on other approaches that “we can’t do anything until we have a constitutional amendment,” and argued that “under the current circumstances, ‘We can’t do anything until we have a constitutional amendment’ is exactly the same as saying, ‘We can’t do anything.’” 60 Later remarks made clear he was not substantively opposed to amendment insofar as it related to campaign finances, and that he agreed that Citizens United was wrongly decided, 61 though he also raised questions about the capacity to draft an adequate amendment. 62 Thus evidence suggests that opposition to amendment is based in part on concerns that it would be impossible and in part on normative worries about amendment as opposed to other mechanisms of change.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Jackson 15 (Vicki, Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, The (myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, Pages 575–605, )
Under existing procedures, it is not at all clear that the US amendment process should be regarded as “impossible” or even “close to impossible.” According to John R. Vile, a leading scholar of the US amendment process, of the thirty-three amendments that have been proposed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress, only six have failed to be enacted. 13 This record might be read to suggest that the major hurdle for amendments is the Congress, since the great majority of proposals that emerge are passed. How difficult is it to obtain agreement of two-thirds of both houses on proposals? It is not easy, to be sure. But if we consider the other situation in which the Constitution requires action by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, the two-thirds of both houses requirement does not appear to be an “impermeable” barrier. To propose an amendment to the states requires two-thirds of both houses; to override a presidential veto also requires two-thirds of both houses. There have been approximately 110 congressional overrides of presidential vetoes since 1789 (including 15 during the highly confrontational presidency of Andrew Johnson). 14 Although this number is under 5 percent of the total number of presidential vetoes, even this data suggests that it is far from impossible to obtain agreement from the two houses by a two-thirds vote on substantive issues. Moreover, more meaningful figures focus on only those “regular” vetoes that were not “pocket vetoes” (which do not go back to Congress for possible override), 15 and on public (rather than private) bills. 16 Focusing on these categories of presidential vetoes of legislation likely to be of consequence and capable of being overridden by Congress, one finds that a significantly higher percentage have been overridden. For example, a 2013 study finds that looking only at “regular vetoes” since 1961, thirty-seven out of 233 vetoes were overridden—for a rate of 15.9 percent. 17 If two-thirds of both Houses of Congress can join together to override Presidential vetoes at these rates, then perhaps the requirement that two-thirds of each House join in proposing amendments may not, by itself, be quite so large an obstacle to proposing amendments as might be thought; and as noted, most amendments proposed by Congress have been ratified by the states. On the other hand, there are differences between veto overrides and proposals for amendment relating to ease of formulation, 18 and prior congressional investment, 19 that may make it more difficult for Congress to propose amendments than to override vetoes. The most recent proposal for an amendment from Congress—the Equal Rights Amendment proposed in 1972—failed to be ratified; although garnering ratifications in 35 states, it fell three states short of the 38 needed, illustrating that the requirement of ratification by three-fourths of the states poses an additional and real obstacle. Moreover, the first 12 amendments occurred very early in US history—by 1804. There may, then, be political phenomena that exist now, that did not exist before, that make amendment particularly difficult. 20 Indeed, to the extent that an amendment becomes a highly partisan issue, under conditions of relatively even partisan divide, the amending formula will pose a very substantial obstacle. 21 Whether in the long run that is a good or bad effect is debatable; slowing down amendment in times of intense partisan divides is not necessarily a bad thing. 22 Overriding presidential vetoes also appears to have varied in rate over time; the first override of a presidential veto was not until 1845 (Tyler’s administration), and the pace of overrides has varied with the political makeup of the Congress and the President (with thirty overrides, for example, from the beginning of President Nixon’s term until the end of President Reagan’s). 23 A different way of looking at things is to introduce the possibility of variation in amendment pace over different time periods. 24 The United States has had several long periods without amendments: from 1804 to 1865; from 1870 to 1913; and from 1971 to the present (with the bizarre exception of the 27th Amendment). 25 Between 1865 and 1870, there were three important amendments in the wake of the Civil War; and between 1913 and 1971 there were eleven amendments. We may not, then, know the extent to which the Article V process is “dead,” or simply quiescent, as it has been in the past. There is at least a possibility that enacting amendments makes enacting other amendments somewhat more likely—and conversely, that disuse of the amending procedures may increase the political or cultural resistance to their use. 26
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Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Versteeg and Zackin 14 (Mila, Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; Emily, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University. American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited , The University of Chicago Law Review 81:1641, SSRN)
In fact, flexible and detailed constitutions may actually become more specific over time. The possibility of frequent constitutional updating may encourage a variety of issue-oriented groups to pursue constitutional change in advancing their particular policy goals. As constitutions begin to respond to these groups’ demands, other groups may follow suit, insisting on the inclusion of new or countervailing instructions. Thus, the frequent addition of detailed instructions on a wide range of policy choices may be a long-term mechanism through which constitutions require government to abide by the will of the governed.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Ginsburg and Melton 14 (Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago Law School; Lecturer in Comparative Politics, University College London, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 682, 2014), )
IV. Results: Amendment Difficulty or Culture? How well do amendment culture and amendment institutions predict observed amendment rates?43 We answer this question by estimating a series of ordinary least squares regression models, in which the unit of analysis is the constitutional system. Table 3 presents the results. The dependent variable is the unweighted amendment rate in columns 1-4 and the weighted measure of amendment rate in columns 5-9. For each measure of the amendment rate, two models are estimated on two different samples, for a total of four regressions. The two samples are the full sample of countries and a smaller sample of democratic constitutions only, following the convention adopted by Lutz and Lorenz.44 For each dependent variable and sample, we estimate one model with covariates and one without. Recall that the measures of amendment difficulty are expected to have a negative, statistically significant effect on the measures of amendment rate, and amendment culture is expected to have a positive effect. --Table 3 here-- The results are intriguing and consistent with our expectations. The best predictor of constitutional amendment rates, it turns out, is what we have called an amendment culture, as measured by the frequency of amendment in the country’s previous constitution. This is particularly true of the first four models; in each, amendment culture has a large effect. When we use weighted amendment rate as the dependent variable, though, amendment culture is only significantly related to the amendment rate in democratic constitutions. Notably, the coefficient estimates are quite large for the amendment rate, indicating both their statistical and substantive significance. The institutional variables are never statistically significant, and often, they do not even have the sign one would expect. For instance, large vote thresholds are positively correlated with the amendment rate, suggesting that higher vote thresholds actually yield higher amendment rates. Similarly, requiring votes in multiple parliamentary sessions is associated with higher amendment rates. The only procedural variable with the correct sign is the one indicating the number of approving actors. More approvers decrease the amendment rate, but the magnitude of the coefficient is not large enough to achieve statistical significance. Some of the control variables in the model are also interesting. First, as expected, the length of the constitution is positively correlated with the amendment rate. Length is a significant predictor in model 3, where the unweighted amendment measure is used. In that model there is expected to be about 1 additional amendment every 10 years a constitution survives for every additional 1,000 words in the constitution. Scope is statistically significant in the same model. For an increase from minimum to maximum scope, the expected number of constitutional amendments is expected to decrease by 2.5 for each 10 years of a constitutions life span. The effect of judicial review is also interesting. Surprisingly, the presence of judicial review actually increases the amendment rate. Although the effect is only statistically significant in model 4, the sign of the variable is consistent across models. This suggests that de jure judicial review may not substitute for constitutional amendments, a finding that should be explored further in future research. From a constitutional design perspective, this result is a bit depressing. The results suggest, quite strongly, that constitutional designers have little influence over the observed flexibility of their product. V. Conclusion: Whither Amendment Culture? This article has spent a good deal of time on technical issues of measurement, showing that existing measures of amendment difficulty are poorly correlated and may not be valid. But even more critically, we have suggested that a perfectly valid measure may not matter at all in terms of constraining or facilitating amendment. Our argument is that institutions are not the primary determinant of amendment rates. At the end of the day, it is hard to disagree with Rasch, who summarizes the situation by noting that the “empirical relationship between rigidity and amendment is however not very robust.”46 Instead, we argue, attitudes about amendments matter. Our main claim is that something we are calling amendment culture exists and is important. There have been other efforts to tie particular constitutional amendments to cultural concerns, even concerns about the nature of writing and change.47 But to our knowledge no one has articulated the idea of an amendment culture at the level of a constitutional system.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Jay Riestenberg 18, M.A. in Political Management from George Washington University, citing three Supreme Court Justices, two U.S. Solicitor Generals, one U.S. Attorney General, and thirty-one Professors of Law, 3/21/2018, “U.S. Constitution Threatened as Article V Convention Movement Nears Success,”
“But no rule or law limits the scope of a state-called constitutional convention. Without established legal procedures, the entire document would be laid bare for wholesale revision. Article V itself sheds no light on the most basic procedures for such a convention. How many delegates does each state get at the convention? Is it one state, one vote, or do states with larger populations, like California, get a larger share of the votes? The Supreme Court has made at least one thing clear — it will not intervene in the process or the result of a constitutional convention. The game has neither rules nor referees.” – McKay Cunningham, professor of law at Concordia University “The result will be a disaster. I hate to think of the worst-case scenario. At best, the fight over every step along the way would consume our country’s political oxygen for years.” – David Marcus, professor of law at the University of Arizona
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
John A. Eidsmoe 92. 1992, Prof of Law @ Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, United States Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies, “A New Constitutional Convention? Critical Look at Questions Answered, and Not Answered, by Article Five of the United States Constitution”, Lexis.
It is no wonder, then, that Lawrence tribe, Professor of constitutional Law at Harvard, warns that a new constitutional convention could lead to domestic political confrontations of “nightmarish dimension” between Congress and the Convention, between Congress and the Supreme Court, and between Congress and the states-not to mention between the Supreme Court and the Convention. Tribe continues, Particularly in a period of recovery form a decade ruptured by war, political assassination, near impeachment and economic upheaval, and particularly in a time when such recovery has already been interrupted by new domestic and international crises, it is vital that the means we choose fro amending the Constitution be generally understood and, above all, widely understood as legitimate. An Article V convention, however, would today provoke controversy and debate unparalleled in recent constitutional history. For the device is shrouded in legal mysteries of the most fundamental sort, mysteries yielding to no ready mechanism of solution. Given the significance of the United States Constitution both for our nation and for others, it would not be surprising if a convention of this magnitude were to result in serious economic instability at home and abroad, as well as substantial disruption of America’s relations abroad.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Kay ’19 Richard S. Kay: Oliver Ellsworth Research Professor and Wallace Stevens Professor Emeritus, University of Connecticut School of Law “UPDATING THE CONSTITUTION: AMENDING, TINKERING, INTERPRETING” 67 Drake L. Rev. 887 (2019), HeinOnline
III. THE DANGERS OF "TINKERING" Even if the intrinsic difficulty of amendment were less challenging than it is usually agreed to be, it would still, in our current situation, face formidable obstacles. That is because any proposed constitutional change confronts a presumption that it poses serious legal and political risks.44 Studies of relative amendment flexibility have increasingly recognized the importance of these qualitative factors under the caption of "amendment culture. ' 45 The evaluation of such a culture presents obvious problems of measurement. Tom Ginsburg and James Melton have attempted to "operationalize amendment culture as the rate at which a country's previous constitution was amended" and concluded that, so measured, it was a better predictor of subsequent amendment rates than the formal attributes of the procedure.46 There is good reason to think that the current amendment culture in the United States exhibits a decided reluctance to change the Constitution. The clearest evidence of this attitude is the pronounced anxiety that appears whenever we get close to reaching the number of state legislatures necessary to approve a national constitutional convention 47 in light of worries about the extent of the changes such a convention might propose.48 The fear that any constitutional reform is likely to make things worse has a long history. The original ratification of the Constitution was closely contested and spawned "bitter disagreement of great ideological depth. 49 Despite this inauspicious beginning, the Constitution's authority was promptly accepted on all sides.50 Its former Anti-Federalist opponents, in fact, were soon citing "the strict words of this frail Constitution, insisting on a literal interpretation of a document that many of them had vilified on fundamental grounds. ' 51 The historian, Lance Banning, explained that the generation of the Constitution makers, steeped in classical republican thought, held a deep attachment to a mixed or balanced government. Maintaining such a government demanded an "unremitting attention to the stability of the state. ' 52 "According to their favorite histories of England and of Rome, constitutional change, like water, always flowed downhill."53 In light of these fears, the Constitution began to look better, even to those who had been its vigorous opponents. These beliefs set the stage for what Banning described as "constitutional apotheosis. '54 Even the disagreements that led to the great crisis of disunion in the mid-nineteenth century were not about the merits of the Constitution. Southern statespersons on the brink of secession continued to cite the Constitution in their defense.55 The prospects of amendment cannot be evaluated without taking into account the continued existence of U.S. "Constitution worship.”5 6 This attitude naturally discourages any attempts to improve or replace the original text.57 When the National Constitution Center's website posted the video of a debate on the propriety of a national amendment convention, it introduced the subject by noting, "[I]t is always tempting to invoke Article V to amend the Constitution-to 'fix' it, or 'restore' it, or 'improve' it. But, on the other hand, there is a substantial risk to tinkering with the Constitution: many amendments seem to have unintended consequences. '58 Worries about "tinkering with the Constitution" come up whenever constitutional revision is suggested. 59 That description connotes something trivial, something to be contrasted with the solemn majesty of the Constitution. In 1915, an article with that title, by Joseph R. Long, was published in the Yale Law Journal. 6° Long criticized a proposal to amend Article V to make the adoption of new amendments easier.61 The recent approval of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments, he argued, belied the claim that amendment was near impossible.62 But mainly, like Madison, he worried that too many revisions would "impair the dignity of a constitution. ' 63 The substantive reforms motivating many proposed amendments would be better accomplished by federal or state legislation. 64 The Constitution, he conceded, "is not perfect," but a careful and deliberate process was essential before altering a document that "is justly regarded as the greatest instrument of government ever ordained by man. 65 A more recent illustration of the same phenomenon is the response to efforts to procure a constitutional amendment giving Congress the power to punish desecration of the United States' flag. These proposals were seriously mooted in the wake of decisions by the Supreme Court, holding that prosecutions for flag defilement were prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 66 Many people considered disrespect for the flag to be a grave offense, and opinion polls showed a fairly consistent majority favoring criminal prosecution. 67 Opponents of such a constitutional amendment, however, were able to mount effective arguments exactly along the lines discussed. 68 That is, they did not stress the rightness of constitutional protection for flag burners. Instead, they emphasized the dangers of toying with the Constitution and especially with the Bill of Rights.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Brown 36 - Professor of political science @ University of Michigan [Everett S. Brown, “The Procedure of Amendment,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 185, (May, 1936), pp. 85-91]
As the political leader of his party and as the President of the United States, the President may exert a great deal of influence in the proposal of amendments, but there his participation ends. Pg. 87
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Weber 86 - Professor of Political Science @ University of Louisville [Paul J. Weber, “The Constitutional Convention: A Safe Political Option,” Journal of Law & Politics, 3 J.L. & Pol. 51 1986]
The President will also most likely become involved if the amendment affects presidential prerogatives or powers. While there is some discussion about the formal role of a President in the amending process, there is little question but that presidents may use their immense informal powers to influence Congress and the public at large. Pg. 68-69
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Lawrence Schlam 94. Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law, State Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, Winter 1994, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 269
Bills have been proposed in Congress setting out procedures that Congress must follow when calling and conducting a convention upon general application of the states. See, for example, S. 817, introduced by Senator Orrin Hatch, and S. 600, introduced by Senator Jesse Helms in 1981. A similar bill was proposed by Senator Sam Ervin in 1967. It passed the Senate in 1971, but died in the House Judiciary Committee. Most commentators believe such a law would be helpful in resolving conflicts in advance. See Article V and the Proposed Federal Constitutional Convention Procedures Bill, Report and Recommendation to the New York State Bar Association by the Committee on Federal Constitution, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 529 (1982) [hereinafter N.Y. Bar Report]; Note, Proposed Legislation on the Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1612, 1615-29 (1972). Such "legislation would . . . help avoid the chaos and substantial delay which might result if Congress had to make, on an ad hoc basis following receipt of thirty-four applications, all decisions concerning the sufficiency of applications, the convening of the convention, and the procedures to be followed by it." Id. at 1617. As Senator Sam Ervin said in support of his bill: "The Constitution made the amendment process difficult, and properly so. It certainly was not the intention of the original Convention to make it impossible . . . . My bill seeks to preserve the symmetry of article V by implementing the convention alternative so as to make it a practicable but not easy method of constitutional amendment." Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the Constitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 875, 895 (1968). But cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 193 (1972) (stating that the Ervin bill is unconstitutional, unwise, and could not bind Congress in the future).
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Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Michael B. Rappaport, 10, director of USD’s Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism, November, 2010, “REFORMING ARTICLE V: THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE NATIONAL CONVENTION AMENDMENT METHOD AND HOW TO FIX THEM”, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20788836.pdf?acceptTC=true
Now, consider a different amendment provision. This provision allows Congress to amend the Constitution, subject to ratification by state legislatures or conventions, but it provides no other amendment method. Thus, it gives Congress a veto on any amendments. This provision would also make the Constitution less reflective of popular views and less desirable. Given the desire of political entities to maintain and expand their power, Congress is unlikely to allow the Constitution to be amended to limit its power. Moreover, because Congress tends to adopt the perspective of the federal government generally, Congress might not be quick to limit the power of the other branches of the federal government.62 Thus, if a change in values or circumstances were to require additional limitations on Congress or even on the federal government, it is unlikely that an amendment adopting those changes would be passed. Moreover, if Congress were to abuse its power, no constitutional reform would be forthcoming. Over time, then, one would expect the Constitution to become increasingly distorted normatively. The Constitution would fail to add needed checks on Congress and the federal government, but would grow to include additional limitations on the states (and perhaps the President). Finally, consider the existing Article V provisions. We can see that it is [are] largely the same as the one described immediately above that permits only the congressional amendment process. Given the defects in the convention process, it is as if that process does not exist. Thus, the same normative distortions that apply to a constitution with only the congressional amendment procedure--a bias in favor of Congress and the national government, and against the states--apply to the existing Constitution. The one exception to this claim is that the national convention process would be available if matters ever turned catastrophic. At that point, the state legislatures might be willing to risk a runaway convention and the other costs to address genuinely overriding problems. But absent this extraordinary situation, the national convention process would not be employed and the Constitution would exhibit serious normative problems. My argument that the failure of the national convention method undermines the constitutional amendment process by preventing certain amendments from being enacted is confirmed by our constitutional history. The dominant pattern of constitutional amendments reveals an amendment process that has neither placed checks on Congress or the federal government, nor provided protections to the states.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Strauss 1 — (David A. – Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, “The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments,” 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1457, http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2986&context=journal_articles)
In this respect, a mature society might be compared to a long-term contractual agreement. n10 The parties to such contracts often do not rely solely, or even substantially, on the text of the contract to govern their day-to-day relationship; they have developed extratextual understandings. Similarly, in a mature society, people accept the acts of legislatures, courts, and executive agencies - and the political and nonpolitical acts of their fellow citizens - even when those acts augment or arguably conflict with the foundational text. In a newly formed political society, any apparent deviation from the words of a constitution might be seen as revolutionary and might cause the society to break apart; in a mature society, relationships and patterns of trust are so well developed that that does not happen. As a result, by the time an Article V supermajority is galvanized into action, chances are good that much of society has already changed by one of these other means. And if a formal amendment process were unavailable, society would find another way to enforce the change it has determined to make - by legislation and judicial interpretation, or by alterations in social understandings and private sector behavior. The change might not be accomplished as neatly or as decisively; outliers might not be brought into line as quickly, for example. But relatively speaking, that is a detail. Those other institutions - not supermajoritarian constitutional amendments - will be the truly important means of constitutional change. This explains why, when [*1463] society has changed enough to produce a supermajority in favor of a formal amendment, the amendment is probably unnecessary. One cannot, however, just say simplistically that any set of political forces strong enough to bring about a constitutional amendment is strong enough to change society in some other way, because that is not always true. A supermajority might act, and adopt an amendment, even if society has not fundamentally changed. An amendment might represent a momentary high-water mark of popular sentiment on a question, or an effective effort by an interest group at the height of its power to secure its position. n11 At a later time, many people, even a majority, might decide that the amendment was a mistake - but there it is, entrenched in the Constitution. On these occasions the formal amendment will be relatively insignificant for a different reason. When there is no lasting social consensus behind a textual amendment, the change in the text of the Constitution is unlikely to make a lasting difference - at least if it seeks to affect society in an important way - unless society changes in the way that the amendment envisions. Until that happens, the amendment is likely to be evaded, or interpreted in a way that blunts its effectiveness. This is, in a sense, the other side of the fact that a mature society has a variety of institutions, in addition to the text of the Constitution, that can affect how the society operates. Those institutions can change society without changing the Constitution; but they can also keep society basically the same - perhaps with some struggle, but still basically the same - even if the text of the Constitution changes. This was, most notoriously, the story of the Fourteenth and, especially, the Fifteenth Amendment. The Fifteenth Amendment was somewhat effective in the short run, but within a generation it had been reduced to a nullity in the South. n12
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Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Strauss 1 [David, Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law at University of Chicago, Harvard Law Review, “THE IRRELEVANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS”, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1457, lexis]
One final implication is the most practical of all. If amendments are in fact a sidelight, then it will usually be a mistake for people concerned about an issue to try to address it by amending the Constitution. Their resources are generally better spent on legislation, litigation, or private-sector activities. It is true that the effort to obtain a constitutional amendment may serve very effectively as a rallying point for political activity. A constitutional amendment may be an especially powerful symbol, and it may be worthwhile for a group to seek an amendment for just that reason. But in this respect constitutional amendments are comparable to congressional resolutions, presidential proclamations, or declarations of national holidays. If they bring about change, they do so because of their symbolic value, not because of their operative legal effect.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Huq and Ginsburg 18 (Aziz and Thomas, Professors of Law, University of Chicago Law School, "How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy," 65 UCLA Law Review 78 (2018), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=13666&context=journal_articles )
1. Constitutional Amendment Imagine that a political party had disciplined majorities in both houses of Congress and the thirty-eight states necessary to utilize Article V. Or alternatively, suppose that the growing chorus of calls for a new constitutional convention yielded fruit.281 It would then be feasible to reform core elements of the American Constitution. The content of such reforms is not hard to imagine. Perhaps, following patterns in other illiberal democracies, a first target might be the Twenty-Second Amendment, which constitutionalized term limits in the wake of Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency. Or simply examine the various liberty-restricting constitutional amendments that have been proposed in Congress over the years, mainly to overturn court decisions.282 To be sure, there are other amendments that have been proposed that would enhance liberty. But the point is that there is nothing structural in Article V that prevents this disciplined national majority with sufficient political support at the state level from using constitutional amendment to entrench its power and restrict liberty. Nevertheless, we do not think that constitutional amendment will play a significant role in promoting the retrogression of constitutional liberal democracy for two reasons. First, American political parties have historically lacked discipline relative to their counterparts in other democracies—a complex result of history, geography, and our electoral system. And the very veneration of the Constitution suggests that amendments are likely to receive a good deal of attention, working as focal points for constitutional resistance by regime opponents.283 As a strategic matter, more subtle mechanisms are likely to be more effective and hence more likely to be deployed.284 Second, Article V of the Constitution establishes “some of the most onerous hurdles in the world for the ratification of amendments.”285 Indeed, it has been so rarely used that some scholars have argued that it has fallen into desuetude.286 In most other contexts in which amendment has played a large role in facilitating backsliding from democratic practices, by contrast, the amendment rule has been less demanding.287 There is an irony here: Article V has been condemned roundly by commentators, especially on the political left.288 Yet the rigidity of the formal constitutional procedure largely takes off the table at least one potent instrument of constitutional retrogression at a moment when liberal commentators might well feel their priorities most imperiled.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Pulignano ‘16 Vincent Pulignano: Managing Editor, Florida Law Review; J.D. 2016, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law “A KNOWN UNKNOWN: THE CALL FOR AN ARTICLE V CONVENTION” FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 67] 2016 http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/Pulignano.pdf
A. The Fear of a Runaway Convention The threat of a runaway convention is the primary reason why the People are hesitant to call a convention of states. A runaway convention is a convention that begins proposing other policies that were not supposed to be considered, and authority for such consideration was not granted to the convention at the outset. Hence, the fear is a runaway convention ultimately could throw out the U.S. Constitution and replace it with a new one. However, commentator Michael Stern notes that when one is evaluating the risk of a runaway convention, one must also consider the risks that may be reduced with the use of a convention and its prevention of a “runaway Congress.” 29 Advocates for a convention think that a runaway convention is really not a threat at all for three reasons: (1) the convention can only be called for a limited purpose, (2) the Supreme Court would be able to weigh in on any violations of specific rules and procedures the convention creates for itself, and (3) more states are needed to ratify the proposals than are needed to call the convention. There are several perspectives on whether the convention can be limited in scope to prevent a runaway convention.30 First, some advocates believe that Congress can limit the scope of the convention and propose rules for it under the political question doctrine.31 However, most believe this is untrue and hold that Congress’s calling of the convention is merely ministerial because the entire purpose of the convention is to circumvent a corrupt Congress.32 Since limiting the scope of the convention is not constitutionally committed to Congress, it falls outside the political question doctrine.33 Furthermore, Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 85 specifically mentions Congress’s inability to limit the convention.34 Because Federalist No. 85 never mentions a restriction on the states to place limits on the convention,35 the states are the ones most likely to implement the limits. Under another perspective, opponents of a convention believe that, based on the original text and meaning of Article V, there are no limits that can be placed on a convention that would hold any legal force.36 They conclude the states have no authority to limit the scope of the convention for two reasons. First, the original text of Article V provides for making “amendments” plural, therefore precluding any attempt by the states to limit the convention to proposing one amendment.37 This argument fails, however, because the use of “amendments” only gives discretion to the convention to propose more than one amendment that will achieve its explicit goal.38 Second, opponents hold that states have no constitutional grant of power beyond initiating the convention.39 This argument at least partially fails because in order to give states the ability to circumvent a corrupt Congress, states must be able to limit the convention to achieve this purpose.40 Therefore, the inability of states to limit the scope of the convention would frustrate the purpose of the Convention Clause. Instead, while they may not have direct, explicit authority to limit the procedures of a convention themselves, states can curtail the convention’s scope by limiting the purpose for which it is formed. A third perspective reveals the debate over whether the convention can propose anything it so decides or whether it can only propose amendments covering the subject matter detailed in the states’ applications.41 If, once the convention is convened, it can propose anything outside of the subject matter discussed in the applications, then there is a chance—albeit remote—that the convention could claim ultimate authority and create a separate governing body.42 However, this fear can be checked by the requirement that three-fourths of the states must ratify any convention amendments.43 The ratification process can also place a check on the possibility the convention would exceed its scope.44 Additionally, the history of the Convention Clause suggests that the convention is only supposed to act as an aid to the states rather than as a separate entity in and of itself.45 But again, questions swirl as to whether the delegates can change the ratification process and require ratification by a majority of states in the convention (or something to that effect).46 This idea appears unfounded. Any convention-made “rule” like this that would affect the Constitution as it stands today would still require ratification to have any legal effect on the current U.S. government.47 Another check on the convention process is that Congress would have the right to not propose to the states for ratification any amendment that surpassed the convention’s scope.48 This reasoning falls in line with Congress’s—and even state legislatures’—responsibility to uphold the Constitution if the convention entered the process having limited itself to a single subject.49 B. The Supreme Court’s Potential Role Another area of primary concern is whether there is any body of government that can enforce any rules and procedures a convention would make for itself. If the Supreme Court can rule on issues regarding a convention’s rules and procedures, would this upset the purpose of the convention because a government branch, which the convention is trying to bypass, is interpreting its rules and procedures?50 There is no good answer to this question, but it appears the Supreme Court weighing in on violations of convention rules would not upset the convention’s purpose, as the Supreme Court’s duty is “to say what the law is.” 51 C. Threats to the Convention Process and the Constitution In addition to the concerns already discussed, there are others worth noting. First, the convention could be open to special-interest lobbying from groups that deal with issues over which the convention would be deliberating.52 This could threaten the integrity of the negotiations and the proposal of amendments.53 Also, a more apocalyptic concern is that a convention of states could result in a complete overhaul of the Constitution.54 This is unlikely for the reasons explained above, but some commentators still hold this belief based on the only other convention in American history, the Philadelphia Convention of 1787.55 There is a debate over whether that convention stayed within its scope when revising the Articles of Confederation and producing the current Constitution.56 However, in any case it would seem all convention “proposals would be subject to the checks and balances written into the Constitution.” 57
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Condray and Conlan 19 (Patrick, MA from George Mason, Public Policy PhD student with the Schar School (George Mason University), Timothy J. Conlan is University Professor of Government at George Mason University. He holds a Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University and an undergraduate degree in Political Science from the University of Chicago, Article V Conventions and American Federalism: Contemporary Politics in Historical Perspective, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Volume 49, Issue 3, Summer 2019, Pages 515–539, )
In 2013, a group called Citizens for Self-Governance (CSG) initiated the Convention of States (CoS) Project, which seeks to amend the U.S. Constitution through an Article V Convention. With funding and support from conservative entities such as the Koch Brothers and the American Legislative Exchange Council, the Project promotes amendments designed to “impose fiscal restraints on the federal government,” “limit the power and jurisdiction of the federal government,” and “limit the terms of office for federal officials” (Guldenschuh 2015). As of early 2019, fourteen states had issued calls for a convention to consider these amendments. Another conservative effort bringing new life into state calls promoting a convention to adopt a Balanced Budget Amendment has generated a total of twenty-eight applications as of 2018. Meanwhile, on the left, a smaller and less well-funded effort has led to six states issuing calls for an Article V Convention focused on campaign finance. They seek to amend the Constitution in order to overturn the Supreme Court decision overturning various campaign-finance limits in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Active state Article V Convention calls continue to be debated in multiple state legislatures. For example, as of March 2019 the Convention of States call (pushed by CSG, which modestly describes itself as the “largest Article V grassroots organization in the country”) has been the subject of active legislation in fourteen state legislatures in 2019 (Convention of States 2019). Arkansas and Utah passed the CoS call in 2019. Efforts such as these have drawn renewed attention to the state convention method of amending the U.S. Constitution. Article V of the Constitution allows two-thirds of the states to call for a convention of states for proposing Constitutional amendments. Unlike the alternative and more familiar process of advancing Constitutional amendments by a two-thirds vote of the Congress, followed by state ratification, the power to call for a Constitutional convention rests with the states. As Article V states, in part: “The Congress … on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments…” Because the convention method has never been employed under the U.S. Constitution, the prospect of a convention raises many questions and alternative assessments. Must all of the state calls be expressed in identical language? Can such a convention be limited in scope or would it constitute an entity immune from preconditions? What role (if any) do the courts play in deciding such questions? Uncertainty about these and other issues has long posed a political hurdle to utilizing the convention approach, with many observers raising the prospect of a “runaway” convention that might trample on the Bill of Rights or other provisions (Goldberg 1983). Accordingly, these and other aspects of an Article V convention have prompted considerable discussion and analysis by lawyers, scholars, and public officials (Caplan 1988; Vile 1993). Less is known, however, about why and how states have articulated Article V applications over time and how contemporary movements to call a convention may align with or differ from historical patterns. Over the course of American history, states have issued at least 354 distinct calls for an Article V convention. Some, such as the efforts to provide for the direct election of Senators or to require a balanced federal budget, have come close enough to garnering support from two-thirds of the states that they provoked a preemptory response from Congress. Others have prompted momentary interest and then faded away. Many have been motivated by states’ interest in enhancing their power relative to the national government, but others have been focused on important policy issues of the day. Can these and other patterns from the past inform our understanding of today’s efforts to amend the Constitution through a convention of the states, or are there features of contemporary calls for an Article V convention that are different and unique?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Stephen D. Mumford 17. Expert on fertility and population growth, Ph.D., M.A. University of Texas School of Public Health, B.A. agriculture, University of Kentucky, “The Catholic Church and Divisiveness in America,” 5-27-2017, http://churchandstate.org.uk/2017/05/the-catholic-church-and-divisiveness-in-america/
The Church and Divisiveness in America Because the Catholic Church ignores the principle of separation of church and state, it is the most divisive force in America. The March 19, 1984, issue of U.S. News and World Report examined two secret Catholic elite religious societies in this country: the Knights of Malta with one thousand U.S. members who are prominent in government, business, or professional life and Opus Dei with three thousand members of widely varied backgrounds. The Knights of Malta organization dates back to the time of the Crusades; its members include some of our nation’s most prominent Catholics: CIA Director William Casey; William Wilson; Vernon Walters; Senators Denton and Domenici; Alexander Haig; William Sloan; and William F. Buckley, creator and leader of Young Americans for Freedom, from which a large proportion of the Reagan administration team were drawn. Because many Knights and recipients of the Order’s honors have worked in or around the CIA, critics sometimes suggest a link between the two. The CIA has been dominated by the Catholic hierarchy. According to members, the order serves “as an international defender of the Church.”[7] In June of each year a ceremony is held in Rome for Knights of Malta which includes the “swearing of allegiance to the defense of the Holy Mother Church.”[8] Herein lies the problem for population growth control and its recognition as a national security issue. Population growth control seriously threatens the survival of the Vatican, as discussed in chapters one and four. Knights are committed to defending the Church. Only the most devout and obedient are invited to join the Knights and Opus Dei (which its detractors have compared to mind-controlling cults).[9] If the Vatican has determined that population growth control threatens the Holy Mother Church, the members of these societies are obliged to counter this threat by thwarting the development of population growth control government policies and their execution. It is inevitable that the best interests of the Vatican and those of the United States are not always going to be the same. For this reason, no one can possibly swear complete allegiance to both and mean it. The acts and attitudes of the Knights of Malta in the Reagan administration seem to reflect this complete allegiance to the Catholic Church rather than to our country. This deep conflict has serious ramifications for population growth control. As long as it exists, it is not possible to effectively deal with the population problem. The real population problem is not convincing people that they must have small families or delivering the family planning services to them. This we can most certainly achieve in just ten years for 95 percent of the world’s population and at a price we can afford. The real population problem is this conflict between the needs of the Church and the desperate needs of humanity to control its proliferation. Consider the intensity of the commitment of these secret society members as “international defenders of the Church.” It is hardly a secret that one of the most important American advances in “defending the Church” by Catholic elitists was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The activities of the CIA go far beyond intelligence gathering of an international nature.[10] The CIA serves as an agency through which secret “assistance” to the Holy Mother Church can be provided by secret American society members acting as her defenders: During the CIA’s formative years, Protestants predominated…. Somehow, however, Catholics wrested control of the CIA’s covert-action section. It was no coincidence that some of the agency’s more grandiose operations were in Catholic countries of Latin America and the Catholic regime of South Vietnam.[11] For creating the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime predecessor to the CIA, and this special arrangement with the Vatican, General William “Wild Bill” Donovan was decorated in July 1944 by Pope Pius XII with the Grand Cross of the Order of Saint Sylvester, the oldest and most prestigious of papal knighthoods. This award has been given to only one hundred other men in history, who, “by feat of arms or writings or outstanding deeds have spread the faith and have safeguarded and championed the Church.”[12] Donovan did more to safeguard and champion the Church than any other American, and he was rewarded for his services with the highest Catholic award ever received by an American. No doubt, thousands of others have striven with their deeds for similar recognition. What has this meant in terms of the issues cited in Table I? Communism is the greatest threat faced by the Church. The Catholic Church and communism cannot coexist. They are both rival absolutists. Both indoctrinate their children so as to ensure complete rejection of the other. Columnist Robert Blair Kaiser who covered the Vatican for Time magazine had a conversation with Pope John XXIII in August 1962. “For too long, he [the pope] said, the Church had been waging a so-called holy war against the forces of communism. That was getting us nowhere.”[13] This holy war continues in Central America today! [ Table1 OMITTED ] It is believed by some historians that the reason the Vatican aided Hitler in his rise to power was so that he could destroy Russian communism. When this failed, the Vatican through its defenders called upon the United States to stop the spread of Russian communism in Europe and elsewhere. A Vatican-inspired hate campaign against the Russians, the greatest hate campaign ever endured by Americans, was launched. To this day, like most other Americans, I am a victim of this campaign launched during my childhood. In August 1984, President Reagan showed his intense hatred of the Russian people in his infamous radio microphone test, “My fellow Americans, I’m pleased to tell you today that I’ve signed legislation that would outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.” No doubt, this Vatican-inspired hate campaign has influenced Mr. Reagan. By this theory, at a cost of hundreds of billions of American dollars, we built a war machine for the protection of Catholicism. For this same reason have we built a nuclear arsenal powerful enough to destroy the world five times over and have we seen the Russians match it? This is, I feel, in great part the origin of the other great threat to civilization—nuclear war. Hundreds of millions of dollars were spent to protect Catholicism from communism, and one can only conjecture about the ways in which the world would have been different if this money had been spent differently and if the first requests to the World Health Organization by India for population growth control assistance had not been blocked by the Vatican thirty-four years ago. Our commitment to saving the Catholic government in South Vietnam from communism (only 5 percent of the people of South Vietnam were Catholic, [14] causing some observers to refer to it as a Vatican colony) can be thought of as a result of the activities of the “U.S. Catholic defenders of the Church,” largely members of the CIA. The French provided this same service to the Vatican for eighty years before they gave up on the holy war in Vietnam.[15] A number of issues cited in Table I, including U.S. military support for El Salvador and other Central American governments, the Grenada invasion, and maintaining the status quo in Latin America can be seen as Vatican-inspired actions to prop up Catholic (Vatican-dominated) governments against popular uprisings. They are the “holy wars against communism” mentioned by Pope John XXIII. During a May 1984 fundraising visit to New York, the archbishop of Managua, Nicaragua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, said his campaign represented the best-organized opposition in Nicaragua to popular Sandinista government efforts.[16] Another example is Lebanon. Most Americans are not aware of the closeness of the Gemayel government to the Vatican. “Maronite Christians,” a minority group in Lebanon, are the Eastern Catholic Church. “The Maronites are in communion with Rome and have a college for the education of their clergy in Rome. In the year 1181, at the time of the Crusades, the Maronites…made peace with Rome and became attached to the Holy See.”[17] Gemayel, like his politician father, was Jesuit trained in a Catholic university.[18] The Vatican wishes to see the Maronites continue to be the dominant power in Lebanon so that the only country in the Middle East in the Vatican sphere of influence will remain so. In all of these cases the Vatican, to maintain and expand its geographical control, seems to be calling upon the services of the U.S. Defense Department to serve as an instrument of Vatican foreign policy in much the same way it has in Cold War Europe. My purpose in presenting this brief discussion of selected foreign policy initiatives of the Vatican is to show the lengths to which “defenders of the Church” in the Reagan administration are willing to go in order to “safeguard” the Church. To these “defenders,” Vietnam, El Salvador, Grenada, and Lebanon are viewed in part as “holy wars for the preservation of the Church.” They are unquestionably willing to go to similar lengths to protect the Church from population growth control activities. Population scientists, field workers, and, more importantly, journalists must acknowledge the magnitude of this obstacle to solving the population problem and deal with this problem in its entirety—and without delay. In the meantime, the Vatican is enhancing its political power through generating domestic divisiveness. The abortion issue is clearly the most important to the Church and one of the most contentious issues in American history. It has allowed the Church to mobilize (under the guise of an emotional or “moral” issue) many Catholics, though a minority of those in this country, for political purposes. But it has also given the Church the opportunity to mobilize a large number of non-Catholics, mostly Protestant fundamentalists, to serve the needs of the Vatican. Just after the Reagan administration announced the radical change in U.S. population assistance policy, Senator Bradley of New Jersey sent out a press release dated August 8, 1984. He sharply condemned the Reagan administration policy change in the name of abortion restriction. “I cannot comprehend the logic of this new policy. It is not about abortion. What the policy is about is denying support for family planning services…. The administration’s new policy will do a great deal to suppress family planning efforts . . .”[19] (emphasis added). The Vatican’s real target here was family planning, and it expects Americans to be fooled by its strategy. Most Protestant fundamentalists have no problem with family planning, but they have been used here by the Vatican to accomplish Vatican goals. Few fundamentalists are opposed to family planning, international population assistance, or illegal immigration control. Yet the Vatican uses its “Moral Majority” and the political force of the fundamentalists to undermine family planning, international population assistance, and illegal immigration control through this organization of lobbyists. Federal aid to public education has always been opposed by the Church. Between 1925 and 1945, it was blocked by the Catholic lobby[20] because it enhances the disparity between Catholic education and public education and shifts some decision-making to the federal level where it is less susceptible to Church influence than at the local level. The Vatican is opposed to the United Nations and its agencies because it sees them as a competitor for the role of international arbitrator and peacemaker. Parochial school aid is viewed by the Church as vitally important. Only 30 percent[21] (about three million[22]) of Catholic children attend Catholic schools. While these schools produce enough obedient Catholics to advance the Vatican agenda, tripling this proportion would substantially enhance the power of the Church. School prayer is important because, the more religious the public schools are made, the easier it is to justify government assistance to parochial schools. Other issues appearing in Table I have been discussed elsewhere in this text and need not be dealt with here. What is important is that the Church picks up non-Catholic support on each of these issues. For example, non-Catholic private school parents who send their children to nonreligious schools support the Church’s political initiatives because they stand to gain from them. The Vatican has elevated fundamentalist leader Jerry Falwell to a position of power and status of which he never dreamed. He is enabled to have frequent meetings with President Reagan and given an opportunity to be one of the nation’s foremost “moral leaders,” delivering “Moral State of the Union” speeches on nationwide prime-time telecasts. In return, Falwell provides the Church with a constituency of millions of fundamentalists to mask as a “Christian” effort the Vatican’s lobbying effort against abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, family planning, and population assistance issues. The Vatican’s extensive intrusion into American policy-making is causing considerable national divisiveness. The Vatican gains considerable political advantage from its allies among non-Catholics and uses it to heavily influence government policy (or to thwart the making of policy altogether in some areas). Their manipulation has frustrated mobilization in this country to deal with the nation’s most pressing problems, such as population growth control, nuclear disarmament, illegal immigration control, environmental degradation, including the pollution of our nation’s waters and soil, soil erosion, and the “greenhouse effect.” Our country is finding itself in a position similar to those in Latin America which are literally being buried under their problems because their national interests sometimes differ from Vatican interests.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
Thomas Berg 98. Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University, “The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation,” University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review, 20(3), 1998, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 715, http://lawrepository.ualr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1623&context=lawreview
Of course, there are other ways to reinstitute a general legal rule that accommodations should be afforded except in cases of overriding government necessity. Advocates of religious freedom could seek to convince the Court to abandon Smith and return to the rule requiring accommodations; failing that, they could seek to amend the Constitution to reverse Smith. Or they could work at the level of individual states, pushing for such a general standard through state statutes or constitutional amendments. The constitutional amendment process is obviously long and arduous, and nothing would happen unless the required three-fourths of the states ratified the amendment. The constitutional amendment process illustrates the power that can be exercised by a few interest groups who are opposed to religious freedom in the cases that concern them. Groups from prison wardens to the architectural preservation lobby to public educators to animal rights activists could force exceptions to be written into the amendment at the front end--or more likely, they could defeat it entirely at the back end by blocking passage in just a few states. The experience could be similar to that of the Equal Rights Amendment, which shot out of the starting gate in 1972 but ran into insurmountable difficulties getting the last few states to ratify.39 The amendment process would also tend to sweep in other issues in the contentious area of church and state, such as various forms of prayer in public schools and financial aid to religious schools-a concern expressed by a number of members of Congress at hearings held last year in the wake of Boerne.'° The state legislative or amendment process is more likely to produce tangible results, but it too would move very slowly. It also is practically guaranteed to produce uneven results, with lobbies that are powerful in particular states enjoying greater ability to force exceptions to the religious freedom law. Already some states have proposed to exempt prisoner claims;4 in other states, lobbyists for groups on the other side of particular disputes may be able to demand exceptions.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Future Gens CP › Aff › Fourth Branch Fails
James Pinkerton 03, fellow at the New America Foundation, "Freedom and Survival,” 2-4-2003, http://abob.libs.uga.edu/bobk/ccc/cc020403.html
Historically, the only way that the slow bureaucratic creep of government is reversed is through revolution or war. And that could happen. But there's a problem: the next American revolution won't be fought with muskets. It could well be waged with proliferated wonder-weapons. That is, about the time that American yeopersons decide to resist the encroachment of the United Nations, or the European Union—or the United States government—the level of destructive power in a future conflict could remove the choice expressed by Patrick Henry in his ringing cry, "Give me liberty, or give me death." The next big war could kill everybody, free and unfree alike. Which leads to the second argument. Spaceship earth may not be as fragile as a space shuttle, but it's still fragile. By all means, let's have homeland defense and missile defense. But let's also get real. If the weapons get bigger, and the planet stays the same size, then prospects for human survival shrink accordingly. For the time being, North Korea seems to have gotten away with breaking out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Kim Jong Il's arsenal could be eliminated in the future, of course, but in the meantime, the atomic cat is out of the nuclear bag. Writing in the February 3 Weekly Standard, Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington D.C., offers up scenarios for the spread of nuclear weapons that are much more compelling than the scenarios for their unspreading. Countries such as Iran, Syria, Egypt, Turkey, Algeria, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, he writes, have all flirted with the idea of building atomic weapons. And one could add to Sokolski's list other countries, such as Brazil, where the new president, Lula da Silva, seems to be forming an axis of anti-Americanism with the likes of Venezuela and Cuba. Meanwhile, every one of those potential proliferators could be brought into line, and we'd still face the problem of "super-empowered individuals." Yup, the prospect of Moore's Law-computer power doubles every 18 months-affects cyber-geek and terror-creep alike. Such computational capacity is inherently "dual use" -the ultimate double-edged sword, hanging over all of us, to be wielded by some of us. As technofuturist Ray Kurzweil predicts, "We'll see 1,000 times more technological progress in the 21st century than we saw in the 20th." Most of that progress will be to the good, but not all. What could a hacker-terrorist alliance come up with, weapon-wise? There's only one way to find out. Sooner or later, Moore's Law will meet Murphy's Law, and we'll realize just how vulnerable we all are, six billion souls, crowded into a narrow band of soil, stone, air and water, hugging the flimsy, filmy, easy-to-rub-off surface of the earth. Let's hope that before we have that rendezvous with deathly destiny, we've had the foresight to build an escape ladder for ourselves.