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2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The United States Federal Government › USFG---Singular Whole---2NC

“Government” is a collective noun, meaning the whole body

Dr. Loreto Todd 5, Professor and Reader in International English at the University of Leeds & Author of More Than 20 Books on Linguistics & English Usage, International English Usage, Ed. Hancock and Todd, p. 133

The term collective noun refers to a singular noun that has a plural implication (e.g. [for example,] government) and is used when the whole body (and not the constituent members) is being considered. The category collective nouns is not discrete, and it can be argued that some usages are midway between collective and mass nouns. For example, team is clearly a collective noun and butter is clearly a mass noun but it is not so easy to decide the status of such nouns as: hair linen royalty.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Topicality---Starter Pack 2022 › The United States Federal Government › USFG---Singular Whole---2NC

It’s not one branch.

Arthur Miller 86. Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law – Emory University. Summer 1986. “Congress, the Constitution, and First Use of Nuclear Weapons.” Review of Politics. Vol. 48, No. 3.

Three other points merit mention in this discussion of collective decision-making. First, both the formal and the secret constitutions allocate power over foreign relations and defense to the central government, to, that is, the United States of America visualized as a single entity. What, however, is "the" United States? The question has never been definitively answered; and indeed has seldom been asked in judicial opinion or scholarly discourse.42 Asked another way, the question is this: Where does sovereignty lie in the American polity? The formal constitution is supposedly based on popular sovereignty, with ultimate power resting in the people. That, however, is far from accurate. Proof positive that sovereignty lies in the "state" came when General Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox: "the people" of the South were not to be permitted to exercise their "sovereignty." The powers of the national government are supposedly only those delegated to it, either expressly or impliedly. But that is scarcely accurate, as 200 years of constitutional development attest. The Framers of the formal constitution established a governmental system that, as Justice Robert Jackson commented, would ensure that the dispersed powers of the federal government would be integrated into a workable government. "Separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity" was the constitutional command.43 The meaning is unmistakable: "the" United States is a single metaphysical entity, encompassing state, society, and government in one artificial being. These terms are not synonymous. The state is the fundamental entity; government its apparatus; and society is composed of the individuals and groups governed. Much like the business corporation, the state-"the" United States-is an artificial construct, more a method than a thing. It exists in constitutional theory-in, for example, the state secrets privilege in litigation-even though judges and commentators alike often confuse the term with government and with society. A legal fiction that by itself can do no act, speak no work, and think no thought, the state (like the corporation) has "no anatomical parts to be kicked or consigned to the calaboose; no soul for whose salvation the parson may struggle; no body to be roasted in hell or purged for celestial enjoyment." 44 Despite loose language to the contrary from executive branch lawyers and even the Supreme Court, "the" state or "the" government-or "the" United States-is not to be equated with the executive branch. Nor with any one branch, for that matter; each branch is part of an indivisible whole.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – at: nb – exec circumvents / strikedown

Exec circumvents AND Courts strikedown the CP

By Erica H. Ma 21, J.D., 2020, New York University School of Law; B.A., 2015, University of Pennsylvania, "Article: The War Powers Resolution and the Concept of Hostilities," Northeastern University Law Review, 13, 519, pp. 535-537, May 2021, Lexis, nihara

In line with the purpose of the resolution, the Senate report of the WPR noted that Section 5(b) is the "heart and core" of the resolution and "represents, in an historic sense, a restoration of the constitution[al] balance which has been distorted by practice in our history." 87Executive branch officials, however, have challenged this provision in particular as an "unconstitutional infringement on the President's authority as Commander in Chief." 88Moreover, the executive branch has argued that this provision "interferes with successful action, signals a divided nation and lack of resolve, gives the enemy a basis for hoping that the President will be forced by domestic opponents to stop an action, and increases risk to U.S. forces in the field." 89While Section 5(c) of the WPR allows Congress, through a concurrent resolution, to direct the President to remove U.S. armed forces from situations of hostilities, the Supreme Court's 1983 decision INS v. Chadha, which struck down one-house legislative vetoes not presented to the President for signature, has cast doubt on the constitutionality of Section 5(c). 90

Because of the dispute over the constitutionality of Section 5(b), the meaning of "hostilities" under the WPR has become contested through the years, as the sixty-day termination clock is only triggered when U.S. armed forces are introduced "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." 91At the time of the WPR's passage, a report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee defined "hostilities" broadly: It noted that "hostilities" is "broader in scope" than an "armed conflict" (a term with legal meaning under international law), and that "hostilities" can include a "state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired." 92However, as Section II.C elaborates, subsequent presidential administrations--including the Ford Administration, the first to submit a forty-eight-hour report pursuant to the hostilities/imminent hostilities prong of the WPR--interpreted "hostilities" narrowly to encompass only situations where "units of the U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces." 93This narrow interpretation of "hostilities" has allowed Presidents through the years to claim that there is a greater range of situations into which he can send U.S. armed forces without triggering the WPR's withdrawal mandate.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – strikedown

1 – standing – Courts routinely dismiss suits for lacking

Donald A. Dechert 18, III, J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University (2018); B.A., Valparaiso University (2003); A.A.S., Cochise College (2008); MA, University of Chicago (2010). "Note: Perpetual Warfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional Amendment for the War Powers." Valparaiso University Law Review, 52, 457, pp. 467-469, Spring, 2018, Lexis, nihara

Multiple parties have sought to litigate the War Powers Resolution. 59 The War Powers Resolution has proven resistant to litigation. 60 The first problem is standing discussed in Part II.B.1.a. 61 Beyond standing are other judicial doctrines barring litigation in Part II.B.1.b. 62

a. Standing for Plaintiff to a Lawsuit, whether member of Congress or not

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – flex good – renewables

Warming causes extinction -- leads to severe weather conditions, ecosystem collapse, and armed conflict

Sprat 19 – Spratt is a Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Melbourne, and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action. Other contributing author: Ian T. Dunlop is a member of the Club of Rome. Formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading. (David, “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach.” BT Policy Paper. May 2019. DOA: September 5, 2020.

By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant.20 While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: A number of ecosystems collapse, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, become unviable. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land degradation21 and rising sea levels contributes to perhaps a billion people being displaced. Water availability decreases sharply in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about two billion people worldwide. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. According to the Global Challenges Foundation’s Global Catastrophic Risks 2018 report, even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated due to sea-level rise, and In high-end scenarios “the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end”.22 National security consequences: For pragmatic reasons associated with providing only a sketch of this scenario, we take the conclusion of the ​Age of Consequences ‘Severe’ 3°C scenario developed by a group of senior US national-security figures in 2007 as appropriate for our scenario too: Massive nonlinear events in the global environment give rise to ​massive nonlinear societal events​. In this scenario, nations around the world will be ​overwhelmed by the scale of change and pernicious challenges, such as pandemic disease. The internal cohesion of nations will be under great stress, including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability. The flooding of coastal communities around the world, especially in the Netherlands, the United States, South Asia, and China, has the potential to challenge regional and even national identities.​ Armed conflict between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased religious fervor to ​outright chaos​. In this scenario, climate change provokes ​a permanent shift in the relationship of humankind to nature​’.23 (emphasis added)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – flex good – renewables

Decarbonizing the grid is sufficient to mitigate the catastrophic effects of global warming -- top predictive studies conclude it’s the only way

Roberts 20 – journalist focusing on energy and climate change. (David, “How to drive fossil fuels out of the US economy, quickly.” Vox. August 6, 2020. DOA: September 2, 2021. https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21349200/climate-change-fossil-fuels-rewiring-america-electrify)//MG

A similar mobilization will be necessary for the US to decarbonize its economy fast enough to avert the worst of climate change. To do its part in limiting global temperature rise to between 1.5° and 2° Celsius, the US must reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 at the latest. To achieve this, the full resources of the US economy must be bent toward manufacturing the needed clean-energy technology and infrastructure. FDR began with two questions. First, he asked not what was politically feasible but what was necessary to win the war. He also asked not how much funding was available in the federal budget but how much productive capacity was available in the economy — what was possible. Saul Griffith is trying to answer those same questions on climate change: what is necessary, given the trajectory of global warming, and what is possible, given the resources in the US economy. A physicist, engineer, researcher, inventor, serial entrepreneur, and MacArthur “genius” grant winner, Griffith’s recent work spans two organizations. First, he is founder and chief scientist at Otherlab, an independent research and design lab that has mapped the energy economy. And alongside Alex Laskey, co-founder of Opower, he recently started Rewiring America, which will develop and advocate for policies to rapidly decarbonize the US through electrification. (The organization is going to release a book called — be still my heart — Electrify Everything.) Last week, Rewiring America made its big debut with a jobs report showing that rapid decarbonization through electrification would create 15 million to 20 million jobs in the next decade, with 5 million permanent jobs after that. For the most part, the media covered it as just another jobs report, saying basically what other clean-energy jobs reports have said. But the jobs are, in many; ways, the least interesting part of the work. Much more interesting is Griffith’s larger project the model he’s built and its implications. In a nutshell, he has shown that it’s possible to eliminate 70 percent to 80 percent of US carbon emissions by 2035 through rapid deployment of existing electrification technologies, with little-to-no carbon capture and sequestration. Doing so would slash US energy demand by around half, save consumers money, and keep the country on a 1.5° pathway without requiring particular behavior changes. Everyone could still have their same cars and houses — they would just need to be electric. “The report reinforces a key finding,” says Leah Stokes, an environmental policy expert at the University of California Santa Barbara. “Cleaning up the electricity system solves the lion’s share of the problem. It allows us to electrify our transportation and building sectors and parts of heavy industry, which would address more than 70 percent of total emissions.” Some of Griffith’s conclusions run contrary to conventional wisdom in the energy space. And they are oddly optimistic. Despite the titanic effort it would take to decarbonize, the US doesn’t need any new technologies and it doesn’t require any grand national sacrifice. All it needs, in this view, is a serious commitment to building the necessary machines and creating a regulatory and policy environment that supports their rapid deployment. In this post, I will walk through the energy data he’s assembled, what the data reveals about the fastest way to decarbonize, how fast that decarbonization could be accomplished, why it’s doable, its political challenges, and its political promise. Griffith’s work is among the most interesting contributions to the climate discussion in ages. There’s a lot here, but it is worth your time. Let’s start with how he built the model. How energy is used in the US economy, explained In 2018, after applying for years, Otherlab was finally awarded a contract from the Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy to assemble in one place, for the first time, all publicly available data on how energy is used in the US. As it happens, the US has great energy data. In response to the oil crisis of the 1970s, presidents created the Energy Information Administration, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency. Those agencies began gathering data on how energy is generated, transported, and used in various parts of the economy, and since have accumulated an enormous catalog. Oddly, all that data has never been gathered, harmonized, and put in a single database. So Griffith and colleagues spent years poring over agency output from the last 50 years — he ruefully cops to being “the only person on the planet who has read every footnote of every DOE report since 1971” — and assembling it in a massive dashboard, which you can view here. It tracks where every unit of energy enters the economy and how it is used as it passes through. This is not a model, per se, it’s just lots and lots of data visualized, a close-up “machine-level” view of energy flows in the US economy. But having the data in one place provides the raw material for Rewiring America to build a high-resolution model of what it would actually take to decarbonize — how many machines must be built, what kind, and how fast. “Where most studies look at decarbonization in specific individual sectors such as transportation, the electricity grid, or buildings — and mostly only on the supply side,” the Rewiring America report says, “we build a model of the interactions of all sectors, both supply and demand, in a rapid and total decarbonization.” The fastest way to decarbonize is to electrify everything Griffith begins with a core assumption: We need to make a plan to solve the problem with the tools available. It is unwise, for instance, to bet on a large amount of carbon capture and sequestration coming online in time to make a difference. The technologies are still in the early stage and there are strong arguments they will never pencil out. Griffith takes a “yes, and” approach. If carbon capture sequestration works out, great. If next-gen nuclear reactors work out, great. If hydrogen-based fuels work out, great. But we shouldn’t rely on any of them until they are real. We need to figure out how to do the job with the technology available. On that score, Griffith’s modeling reaches two key conclusions. First, it is still possible to reduce US greenhouse gas emissions in line with a 1.5°C pathway. Specifically, it is possible to reduce US emissions 70 percent to 80 percent by 2035 (and to zero by 2050) through rapid electrification, relying on five already well-developed technologies: wind and solar power plants, rooftop solar, electric vehicles, heat pumps, and batteries. Think of those technologies as the infrastructure of 21st century life. If everyone uses carbon-free energy to heat their homes and get around, the bulk of the problem will be solved. Second, to decarbonize in time, substitution of clean-energy technologies for their fossil-fuel counterparts must ramp up to 100 percent as fast as possible, after a brief period of industrial mobilization. Every time a gas or diesel car is replaced, it must be replaced with an EV; every time an oil or gas furnace is replaced, it must be replaced with a heat pump; every time a coal or gas power plant goes offline, it must be replaced with renewable energy. There is no room left in a 1.5° or 2° scenario for more fossil fuel infrastructure or machines. We need to radically ramp up production of electrification technologies and implement the policy and financing tools that will enable 100 percent substitution. Clocking the maximum feasible transition to clean energy Griffith and his colleagues set out to model a “maximum feasible transition” to carbon-free energy, limited only by the country’s production capacity. They describe it like this: The maximum feasible transition (MFT) involves two primary stages: (i) an aggressive WWII–style production ramp–up of 3–5 years, followed by (ii) an intensive deployment of decarbonized infrastructure and technology up to 2035. This includes supply–side generation technologies as well as demand–side technologies such as electric vehicles and building heat electrification. When it says production ramp-up, it’s no joke. Within three to five years, production of electric vehicles would have to increase four-fold, batteries 16-fold, wind turbines 12-fold, and solar modules 10-fold. Accommodating all those new electricity loads would also mean expanding the size of the grid by three- or four-fold. “Today, we deliver about 450 gigawatts constantly,” says Griffith. “In the model of the future — where everyone’s house is the same size, everyone’s car is the same size, but it’s all electrified — you need to deliver 1,500 to 2,000 gigawatts.” (To be clear, Griffith doesn’t necessarily think Americans should keep driving giant cars and living in giant houses. He supports urbanism and cycling and downsizing generally. He spent many years running a radical downsizing experiment on his own life. But he wants the public to know that changing their lifestyle is not necessary for decarbonization.) Almost all the heavy lifting in the maximum feasible transition is done by electrification, “the exception being 5-10 Quads of non–electrical energy sources coming from [biofuels]” the Rewiring America report says. “Hydrogen or other synthetic fuels (which are generated from electricity) are deployed for a few high–temperature applications. The scenario does not rely on any deployment of carbon capture and storage, and all primary energy sources are net zero.” In terms of generation, wind and solar do the bulk of the work, “along with a doubling of the current nuclear electricity fleet from 100GW to 200GW.” In particular, distributed energy (rooftop and community solar and batteries) plays a huge role, “accounting for around 25% of energy supply and a high degree of the storage capacity” would reduce the amount of energy the US needs by half. One key aspect of electrification makes this transformation possible, and it represents perhaps the most astonishing finding in Griffith’s modeling: Large-scale electrification would slash total US primary energy demand in half, from around 100 quads to about 45-50. This a huge deal — it means America only needs to produce about half the energy with renewables that it is currently producing with fossil fuels. And that massive drop in demand assumes no behavior change, no insulated buildings or double-glazed windows, no traditional “efficiency” measures of any kind. The transition from fossil fuel combustion to electricity, in and of itself, is the largest demand-side climate policy available. How is that possible? The simple answer comes down to the fact that electric motors are more efficient than fossil fueled motors at converting primary energy into useful work. The somewhat more complicated answer is this. You cut almost 10 percent off of energy demand right off the bat, says Griffith, because the Energy Information Administration has been overestimating, due to the way it accounts for nuclear and hydroelectric energy. (It’s too complicated to get into here.) Another 10 percent of energy used in today’s economy goes toward “finding, mining, refining, and transporting fossil fuels,” Griffith says, and that demand goes away in an electrified economy. So it’s down to 80 percent left to replace. Shifting from fossil fuel power plants to renewable energy saves another 15 percent, because carbon-free, non-thermal power sources rely on fewer energy conversions than thermoelectric sources. Electrifying transportation gets another 15 percent, because electric vehicles (EVs) are more efficient than internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. Electrifying buildings gets another 6 percent to 9 percent. To be clear, the US could reduce demand even more if it continued to better insulate buildings and other efficiency measures, if it downsized homes, drove less, and relied more on walking and electric cycling to get around. But it is worth emphasizing, again: The biggest demand-side policy by far is electrification, which could slash US energy demand by half. “You can’t efficiency your way to zero,” Griffith says. “You have to transform.” Industry is not as big a carbon problem as it appears The alleged difficulty of decarbonizing heavy industry has been a major topic in carbon circles lately. (I have written about it myself.) It is one of the reasons often offered for why large-scale negative emissions will be needed. Griffith disagrees. He points out that a big chunk of the carbon emissions attributed to industry are devoted to fossil fuels and will disappear as they do. For instance, 4 percent to 5 percent of US energy is used to turn oil into gasoline, a subcategory of industry that will decline along with ICE vehicles. As for the rest, “steel is tiny, and we can use hydrogen to make steel,” he says. “Aluminum traditionally makes a lot of CO2 because we use carbon electrodes for the smelting process; Alcoa and Rio Tinto already have carbonless electrodes for aluminum. Cement is still hard, but that’s only 1 percent. And the rest of industrial heat can mostly be done with induction for high-temperature heat or heat pumps for low-temperature heat.” In short, industry is a problem, but a relatively small one. “It’s the last 5 percent of emissions,” Griffith says. “It’s hardly the thing that should stop us.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – flex good – renewables

Biden’s using executive wartime powers to secure critical minerals to develop clean energy – broad national security flex is key

Josh Siegel et al. 22, Zack Colman, Jordan Wolman and Tanya Snyder, 03/30/2022, “Biden eyes using wartime powers for minerals needed in clean energy push,” POLITICO, , nihara

The White House is weighing using wartime executive powers to boost U.S. battery production to help secure supplies for the growing market for electric vehicles and power storage on the electric grid, according to two people familiar with the Biden administration’s thinking.

President Joe Biden would use the Defense Production Act to help secure U.S. sources of critical minerals that are deemed key components of clean energy technology. While the U.S. possesses many of those minerals, industry and some lawmakers of both parties contend regulations have deterred development and forced the U.S. to rely on supplies from nations like China, Russia, South Africa and Australia.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – exec flex good

AND, NO impact – Presidents pursue Congressional support to shield political criticisms – unilateral action only occurs for isolated, non-escalatory instances

Robert Farley 21, Dr. Robert Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the Patterson School at the University of Kentucky. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), and Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), November 23, 2021, “America’s Imperial Presidency Problem: Fact Or Fiction?” 19FortyFive, , nihara

What does it mean to say that the United States suffers from an “Imperial Presidency Problem?” For at least the last fifty years, it has defined a line of critique of the Presidential power to make war without the consent of Congress.

The vast expansion of the standing military establishment in World War II meant that post-war Presidents had the means to wage war at the times and places of their choosing. The development of nuclear weapons meant that Presidents needed the authority to make decisions of war and peace immediately, without the advice and consent of Congress. To be sure, there is a long history of Presidents waging wars without Congressional intervention, but the advent of the Cold War raised the stakes immensely. In 1950, President Truman’s decision to intervene in the civil war on the Korean Peninsula seemed a harbinger of a vast expansion of Presidential power over war and peace.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – exec flex good

Executive flexibility is inevitable – even if they’re right – Congress will NOT re-engage due to political incentives – AND, gridlock enables executive power grabs – NO spillover

Daniel W. Drezner 21, Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 8-30-2021, " Why Congress will not reengage on foreign policy," Washington Post, , nihara

As more information comes out about the proximate causes of the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan, AEI’s Kori Schake has a good op-ed in the New York Times reminding everyone (including Trump administration officials hoping for national amnesia) about the February 2020 deal that the Trump administration negotiated with the Taliban that set the table for the horrible meal we are all digesting now.

That agreement led to “the release of 5,000 combat and political Taliban prisoners” and bypassed the Afghan government entirely. As Schake writes, “For someone who prided himself on his abilities as a dealmaker and displayed an ‘I alone can fix it’ arrogance, the agreement he made with the Taliban is one of the most disgraceful diplomatic bargains on record.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – exec flex good

Ukraine proves Congressional re-assertion in foreign affairs is occurring now – BUT, is only escalatory – AND, runs counter to executive restraint

Rachael Bade 22, Rachael Bade is a 10-year veteran of the congressional press corps, where her stories illuminated the power struggles and personal dynamics animating the major policy clashes of Capitol Hill. She spent the past two years covering House Democrats' oversight of the Trump Administration for The Washington Post, where she routinely broke news on the party's attempts to hold the president accountable as well as the historic impeachment effort. She is currently writing a book, "A Perfect Phone Call," for HarperCollins' William Morrow publishing house about how and why the move to oust Trump failed. Before joining the Post in early 2019, Rachael covered Congress for POLITICO, where she spent six years of her journalism career. From her vantage point on the Hill, she chronicled President Trump's remaking of the GOP, churning out stories with behind-the-scenes details about the struggle between pro-Trump lawmakers and those fearful of the new direction of the party. Rachael is a political analyst for CNN and has also appeared on CBS's "Face the Nation," ABC's "This Week" and Fox News' "Fox News Sunday." A small-town, Ohio-native, she graduated from the University of Dayton with degrees in political science and communication and is a former classical ballet dancer., 03/14/2022, "POLITICO Playbook: Something unusual is happening between Biden and Congress," , nihara

PRESSURE POLITICS — Something quite striking has happened in Washington since Russia invaded Ukraine. Congress — which typically takes a back seat on foreign policy matters — has repeatedly driven the White House beyond its comfort zone with bipartisan demands for more assertive policies.

It started with calls for tougher sanctions, then escalated to an appeal for a larger military and humanitarian assistance package. Members of both parties then clamored for a U.S. ban on Russian oil, which the White House saw as politically risky given the effect on gas prices at home. And they insisted that the U.S. end permanent normal trade relations with Russia.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
aff answers › 2ac – exec flex good

Executive flexibility solves terror AND prolif – extinction – Congress is structurally incapable at crisis response

John Yoo 17, John Yoo is the Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, a nonresident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, 4-13-2017, "Trump’s Syria Strike Was Constitutional," National Review, , *added [undermine], nihara

The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by preexisting legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action — sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances — that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or that is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would [undermine] paralyze American policy while foreign threats grew.

Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure.

2022 Georgetown Negative

AT --- Ukraine Cyberwar Now

Russia cyber efforts are low-level currently, but the plan changes the calculus.

Kallberg 22 — Jan Kallberg, Assistant Professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Research Scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, PhD in Public Affairs and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Texas, LLM from Stockholm University, 2022 (“Ukraine: Russia will not waste offensive cyber weapons,” The Cyberwire, March 14th, Available Online at )

When Russia’s strategic calculus would dictate major cyber attacks.

2022 Georgetown Negative

2NC --- Deconfliction Turn

Info-sharing ruins any potential benefits of OCOs.

Black and Lynch 20 — James Black, Research Coordinator at RAND, MSc in International Security from Sciences Po, LSE in History from the University of Cambridge, and Alice Lynch, Former Defense and Security Analyst at RAND, M.A. in Applied Security Strategy from the University of Exeter, 2020 (“Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” CCDCOE, Available Online at https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)

Policy differences exacerbate conceptual ones. Allies differ in their policy and legal constraints, strategic cultures, threat perception, resources, planning and budgetary cycles and forces (Sondhaus, 2006). While solidarity ultimately remains NATO’s strongest asset, these differences create seams that adversaries can exploit. This is especially so with cyberspace, where there is more sensitivity and less commonality to emerging national approaches than in more established domains, and to MDO, which is inherently predicated on integration and interoperability (Sharpy, 2020).

2022 Georgetown Negative

1NC --- Deconfliction Turn

The plan causes cyber deconfliction — that makes effective OCOs impossible AND ruins NATO cohesion — turns both advantages.

Jacobsen 21 — Jeppe T. Jacobsen, Visiting Scholar at New York University, former Cyber Coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, M.A. in International Politics from the University of London, M.A. in Political Science from the University of Aarhus, 2021 (“Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities,” International Affairs, May, Available Online at )

Confliction—the issue of secrecy

2022 Georgetown Negative

2NC --- Terminal Impact

Putin won’t back down — guarantees nuclear escalation.

Litwak 22 — Robert Litwak, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies at the Wilson Center, former Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics, 2022 (“Russia’s Nuclear Threats Recast Cold War Dangers: The “Delicate Balance of Terror” Revisited,” Wilson Center, May 3rd, Available Online https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/russias-nuclear-threats-recast-cold-war-dangers-delicate-balance-terror-revisited)

Since the Cuban Missile Crisis, assured retaliation—eliminating incentives for a surprise first strike—has been the sine qua non of strategic stability. The risk for crisis stability is that arms race instability could revive those incentives, making the deterrent relationships more “delicate.” With the advent of new technologies, escalation during a crisis could occur in a non-traditional domain—cyber or space—and could misleadingly be viewed as non-escalatory because it would be non-kinetic. But an inadvertent escalatory spiral could be set off by a Russian cyberattack to interfere with U.S. communications with its nuclear systems or an attack on reconnaissance satellites to blind the United States. Hints of that potentiality are already manifest: Russia conducted an anti-satellite missile test last November and, during the Ukraine war, has carried out extensive cyberattacks, often in coordination with its battlefield operations.

2022 Georgetown Negative

2NC --- Russia Turn

Even if the status quo doesn’t escalate, the plan guarantees massive preemptive cyberwar in the future.

Healey 22 — Jason Healey, Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School for International and Public Affairs specializing in cyber conflict, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, 2022 (“Preventing Cyber Escalation in Ukraine and After,” War on the Rocks, March 9th, Available Online at , Accessed on 06-19-2022)

Future Risks

2022 Georgetown Negative

1NC --- Russia Turn

OCO sharing OR a NATO posture shift causes Russia to freak-out and undermines strategic stability.

Lewis 15 — James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Senior Advisor to UN Groups of Governmental Experts on Information Security, PhD from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Role of Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO’s Collective Defense,” The Tallinn Papers, Available Online at )

Dissimulation is an essential part of hybrid warfare, and Europe and the US face a propaganda barrage that is much more sophisticated than the clumsy Soviet efforts of the Cold War. Despite this clumsiness, a good portion of the Western public has found it persuasive. Similarly, those critical of NATO will find new complaints about aggression and militarisation credible. Russia has already complained that NATO’s defensive cyber doctrine is destabilising warmongering and part of a larger conspiracy to advance western hegemony.11 The Snowden revelations have lent a powerful impetus to Russian propaganda.

2022 Georgetown Negative

1NC --- Squo Solves

Maintaining OCO secrecy sufficiently solves the 1AC.

Lewis 15 — James Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Senior Advisor to UN Groups of Governmental Experts on Information Security, PhD from the University of Chicago, 2015 (“The Role of Offensive Cyber Operations in NATO’s Collective Defense,” The Tallinn Papers, Available Online at )

It could be argued, given NATO’s defensive orientation ( pace Russian fears of diabolic plots), that a purely defensive and technical focus for cyber operations is appropriate. The question, however, is whether NATO can field a credible military force without some public linkage to an offensive cyber capability.

2022 Georgetown Negative

2NC --- Info-Sharing Fails

Even if the U.S. successfully shares OCOs, NATO can’t use them.

Black and Lynch 20 — James Black, Research Coordinator at RAND, MSc in International Security from Sciences Po, LSE in History from the University of Cambridge, and Alice Lynch, Former Defense and Security Analyst at RAND, M.A. in Applied Security Strategy from the University of Exeter, 2020 (“Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” CCDCOE, Available Online at https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)

C. Capability and Force Development Priorities Assuming NATO can overcome conceptual and policy hurdles, significant effort will still be required to develop the necessary forces and capabilities across all domains, but perhaps especially for cyberspace.

2022 Georgetown Negative

1NC --- Info Sharing Fails

Cyber info sharing fails — too unpredictable, technical hurdles, and uncertain effects.

Jacobsen 21 — Jeppe T. Jacobsen, Visiting Scholar at New York University, former Cyber Coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark, M.A. in International Politics from the University of London, M.A. in Political Science from the University of Aarhus, 2021 (“Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities,” International Affairs, May, Available Online at )

Challenges to a smooth integration of cyber effects