2022
Georgetown
Negative
T-Cybersecurity › 1NC – Defensive › 1NC Topicality – “Cybersecurity”
Ricoh USA. (n.d.). What is cybersecurity? What is Cyber Security? | Definition, Types. How It Works. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from usa.com/en/insights/articles/an-intro-to-cybersecurity //kinsey
Cybersecurity is the act of implementing sophisticated layers of network defense and firewalls to protect critical systems and sensitive information against threats from digital attacks. The reality is that the types and severity of cybercrime are constantly evolving and multiplying. There are malware attacks such as viruses that attempt to destroy data. Ransomware is a particularly nasty type that locks down systems and threatens to erase data unless a ransom is paid. Phishing scams try to trick unsuspecting end users into giving up sensitive personal information such as social security (SSI) and credit card numbers to sell on the dark web. There are Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that overwhelm a website with traffic. Man-in-the-Middle attacks involve hackers trying to intercept messages between two parties to steal company data. And not all threats are external. Current or former employees with a grudge and intimate network knowledge can wreak havoc on a business from behind the firewall. Companies must be on the lookout for cybercrime from all directions. Cybersecurity solutions, therefore, are applications, measures, and devices that constantly monitor network traffic for suspicious activity. Upon detecting a threat, it isolates and quarantines affected files and devices, and immediately alerts IT staff as to the exact location and proper response to the breach, limiting its impact and assisting with recovery. Cybersecurity management includes physical controls, procedural controls, technical controls, and compliance controls. There are tools that search for signs of stolen credentials on the dark web, and silicon-based boot processes to validate servers have not been compromised in Zero-trust environments. Maintaining cybersecurity in a constantly evolving threat environment is a never ending challenge, and one that usually requires outside expertise.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Impact D- Cards › NATO bad/not key
Carpenter 2022 (Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011, “NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies”, )//MargaretE
SINCE THE end of World War II, U.S. officials have had an unduly expansive concept of what constitutes worthwhile strategic allies for the United States. In too many cases, the “allies” that Washington touts are small, weak, often militarily useless dependents. Worse, some of them are on bad terms with more powerful neighboring states. Under those circumstances, the so‐called allies are major liabilities rather than assets to the United States. Indeed, they are potential snares, ones that can entangle America in unnecessary military confrontations.
Washington would do well to become far more selective about which nations it includes in its roster of allies, and U.S. leaders should stop elevating security dependents to the status of allies. When U.S. officials described the regimes that Washington installed through military force in Afghanistan and Iraq as allies, it became clear that they had lost even minimal understanding of the concept. That point became abundantly evident when their Afghan client collapsed almost overnight in the face of the Taliban military offensive. It’s time for U.S. policymakers to do better.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Impact D- Cards › NATO bad/not key
Jacobs 2022 (Seth Jacobs is a history professor who studies the political and cultural history of the U.S. in the 20th century. His research focuses on the connection between U.S. domestic culture and foreign policy, “On NATO”, )//MargaretE
Three decades on, we are still stuck with the alliance, and as recent events demonstrate, it is no laughing matter. NATO has become obsolete. Indeed, Washington’s whole Europe-first orientation is anachronistic, a wasteful, expensive holdover from the cold war that ought to have been abandoned years ago and that distracts us from the true dangers we face abroad.
Mearsheimer, to his credit, deplored this development more vehemently than anyone. A self-described “unrepentant realist,” he had no patience for the aggressive internationalism that defined Western statecraft in the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies. NATO as an anti-Soviet bloc made sense to him; NATO as an ever-expanding club of vaguely like-minded nations was foolish—and dangerous. According to the tenets of realism, when one great power trespasses upon another’s sphere of influence, the result is nearly always conflict, and Mearsheimer insisted that that was the case with NATO’s eastward march. It did not matter that officials from the United States and its European allies insisted that they had no designs on Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin was not convinced. He perceived their encroachment as an existential threat and responded violently, first by annexing Crimea in 2014, then by invading Ukraine in 2022. While most pundits in the West denounced Putin’s barefaced breach of international law, Mearsheimer proclaimed that NATO was to blame, that its leaders ought to have recognized that their apparent intent to incorporate Russia’s bordering countries into their alliance would trigger war, and that Putin was only doing what an American president would do if, say, Iran built a military association and invited Mexico and Canada to join. In a gauntlet-flinging guest essay for the Economist in March and a follow-up interview in the New Yorker, Mearsheimer condemned NATO for naiveté and called for a pragmatic solution to the crisis that would keep Ukraine as a neutral country and leave Putin in power, with Crimea and the Donbas in his grasp.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Impact D- Cards › No impact to warming
Nils P. Gleditsch 21, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, “This time is different! Or is it? NeoMalthusians and environmental optimists in the age of climate change,” Journal of Peace Research, pg. 5-6, 2021, SAGE. clarification denoted with brackets.
The most extreme contrarian position is, of course, to deny one or both key conclusions of the IPCC: the reality of global warming or the human contribution to it. However, most environmental optimists accept these two key conclusions but raise other problems with the panel’s discussion of the social effects of climate change and even more so with popular interpretations of the panel reports. For instance, Hausfather & Peters (2020), by no means ‘climate deniers’, decry the common use of choosing the high-risk [scenario] RCP8.59 to illustrate ‘business as usual’ as misleading.
The causal chains from climate change to the proposed effects on human beings are long and complex, and the uncertainty increases every step of the way. In the literature on the social effects of climate change, including the IPCC reports, statements abound that something ‘may’ lead to something else, or that a variable ‘is sensitive to’ another, without any guidelines for how to translate this into probabilities (Gleditsch & Nordås, 2014: 87f). Uncritical use of the precautionary principle, where any remotely possible calamity unwittingly becomes a probable event, is not helpful.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Impact D- Cards › No impact to meltdowns
WNA 22, World Nuclear Association is the international organization that represents the global nuclear industry: including AEA, WANO, and the OECD-NEA. March 2022 Safety of Nuclear Reactors - World Nuclear Association, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/safety-of-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx Accessed 25 June 22
A particular nuclear scenario was loss of cooling which resulted in melting of the nuclear reactor core, and this motivated studies on both the physical and chemical possibilities as well as the biological effects of any dispersed radioactivity. Those responsible for nuclear power technology in the West devoted extraordinary effort to ensuring that a meltdown of the reactor core would not take place, since it was assumed that a meltdown of the core would create a major public hazard, and if uncontained, a tragic accident with likely multiple fatalities. In avoiding such accidents the industry has been very successful. In the 60-year history of civil nuclear power generation, with over 18,500 cumulative reactor-years across 36 countries, there have been only three significant accidents at nuclear power plants:
Three Mile Island (USA 1979) where the reactor was severely damaged but radiation was contained and there were no adverse health or environmental consequences.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Impact D- Cards › No impact to grid collapse
N. S. Sodha & M. L. Sachdeva 22, Cyber Physical Security of the Critical Infrastructure | SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-16-8727-3_25 Accessed 24 June 22
Power Sector, a critical electrical infrastructure in India, is at risk due to increasing cyber incidences. The electrical infrastructure depends on electronic control systems for its operation which are Cyber physical IT systems. Cyber threats to system can take many forms e.g. failure of a system/element to act/react in designed way due to virus, software bugs, intrusion and congestion in the underlying/supervising system and it may lead the misguidance to the operating engineers and there by taking false decision in real time operation. Non availability of ICT systems is also a form of Cyber Security vulnerability. Cyber intrusions are costly to Power Sector and many are preventable following safe design and Cyber Security Standards. The effect of vulnerabilities in centralized systems e.g. SCADA/Automation etc. used in Transmission and Distribution sector is wider and has potential impact on the synchronous operation of entire Power System, leading to Grid collapse. As far as Distribution sector is concerned where bulk of Smart Grid activities are visible, the impact of compromise of a centralized SCADA/DMS can lead to disruption of services to critical customers like Hospitals, Metro Rail etc. which is critical for the units/Services involved but at the same time not global and widespread. The impact of cyber vulnerabilities is proportional to the criticality of the functions and systems being impacted. The paper details the Cyber threats and prevention techniques involving IoT sensors, communication protocols, cloud architecture and predictive data analytics.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Impact D- Cards › No Russia cyberwars/hybrid
Maschmeyer Lennart & Dunn Cavelty Myriam 22, Lennart Maschmeyer is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich and holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Toronto and an M.Phil in International Relations from the University of Oxford. Myriam Dunn Cavelty is a Senior Lecturer for Security Studies and Deputy for Research and Teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich , “Goodbye Cyberwar: Ukraine as Reality Check,” ETH Zurich, 05/2022, p. 4 p. https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP10-3_2022-EN.pdf
Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a series of experts predicted cyberwar: the massive use of Russian offensive cyber capabilities to “shock and awe” Ukraine’s defenses and undermine their will to fight. Some even suggested Russia need not invade because it could achieve the same outcomes by going to cyberwar. When that did not happen, the same experts predicted that Russia would still use offensive cyber capabilities sometime later – not only against Ukraine, but also against the West and its critical infrastructure as a punishment for its sanctions and support of Ukraine. Three months later, this has not happened either. Some experts are still expecting cyberwar to come, just sometime in the future. Others say that they were right, and cyberwar is here, except that the threat in Ukraine was deterred, or that attacks were launched but then neutralized in time. In contrast, we claim that experts who expect cyberwar to happen keep underestimating the practical limitations of cyberattacks (also called cyber effects operations) and consequently overestimating their strategic value – despite ample empirical evidence that cyberattacks are not very effective at coercive and destructive action. We aim to correct the distorted cyber threat debate by better grounding it in observable reality. While cyber operations remain important for intelligence operations and mildly disruptive attacks, destructive cyberattacks on key military or civilian infrastructure are challenging to implement and ineffective when compared to conventional attacks. The reason is an operational trilemma that constrains the speed, intensity, and control that cyber operations can achieve – thus limiting their strategic value and rendering catastrophic attacks highly improbable. Policymakers should focus on countering and mitigating actual threats, rather than on catastrophic scenarios that are theoretically possible, yet exceedingly unlikely in practice.
Expectations and Fallacies
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Impact D- Cards › No Russia cyberwars/hybrid
Sue Gordon & Eric Rosenbach 22, Gordan is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She served as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, after three decades at the CIA. Rosenbach is Co-Director of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. He served as the Pentagon's Chief of Staff and as U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security. "America's Cyber-Reckoning: How to Fix a Failing Strategy" (2022) 101:1 Foreign Aff 10. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/fora101&id=12&men_tab=srchresults
A decade ago, the conventional wisdom held that the world was on the cusp of a new era of cyberconflict in which catastrophic computer-based attacks would wreak havoc on the physical world. News media warned of doomsday scenarios; officials in Washington publicly fretted about a "cyber-Pearl Harbor" that would take lives and destroy critical infrastructure. The most dire predictions, however, did not come to pass. The United States has not been struck by devastating cyberattacks with physical effects; it seems that even if U.S. adversaries wanted to carry out such assaults, traditional forms of deterrence would prevent them from acting.
Behind those mistaken warnings lay an assumption that the only alternative to cyberpeace must be cyberwar. But in the years since, it has become clear that like all realms of conflict, the domain of cyberspace is shaped not by a binary between war and peace but by a spectrum between those two poles-and most cyberattacks fall somewhere in that murky space. The obvious upside of this outcome is that the worst fears of death and destruction have not been realized. There is a downside, however: the complex nature of cyberconflict has made it more difficult for the United States to craft an effective cyberstrategy. And even if lives have not been lost and infrastructure has mostly been spared, it is hardly the case that cyberattacks have been harmless. U.S. adversaries have honed their cyberskills to inflict damage on U.S. national security, the American economy, and, most worrisome of all, American democracy. Meanwhile, Washington has struggled to move past its initial perception of the problem, clinging to outmoded ideas that have limited its responses. The United States has also demonstrated an unwillingness to consistently confront its adversaries in the cyber-realm and has suffered from serious self-inflicted wounds that have left it in a poor position to advance its national interests in cyberspace.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › Defense › 2NC – A/C – Mistrust
Antonopoulos, '21 – independent geopolitical analyst (Paul Antonopoulos; "2021: A year of NATO disunity like no other"; BRICS; https://infobrics.org/post/34879/; 12-29-2021, Accessed 6-25-2022)//ILake-NoC
2021 is arguably the year when intra-NATO tensions and rivalry widened more so then ever since the alliance's inception in 1949. Although NATO most recently expanded its membership to include Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020, the rift caused by competing interests and the emboldening of revisionist ideologies (neo-Ottomanism and Anglo Chauvinism) among bloc members has only widened in recent years, but no other like 2021.
Intense NATO disunity first became prevalent during the Syrian War. Turkey continues to be enraged that the US, France and other member states train, fund and arm the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) that Ankara recognizes as a terrorist organization. Meanwhile, Washington is furious that Turkey defied warnings to not purchase the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system, and thus in December 2020 imposed sanctions on its fellow NATO member, an unprecedented action. With former US President Donald Trump unwilling to confront Turkey in a serious way in order to not jeopardize his personal business interests in the country, his successor Joe Biden has more willingly confronted his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › Defense › 2NC – Allied Mistrust
University of Exeter 20 – public research university in Exeter, Devon, South West England, United Kingdom. Its predecessor institutions, St Luke's College “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” 09-2020, Accessed 06-28-2022, . //ILake-NoC
Nevertheless, the largest barrier to a joint cyber capability is national intelligence agencies’ tendency to keep their activities in cyberspace highly classified.182 As Chapter 2 discussed, effective cyberattacks are utterly dependent on excellent intelligence.183 Members have significantly stepped up intelligence-sharing over the last two decades. They established the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre in 2006, the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance initiative in 2012 and the Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD) in 2017. The JISD’s first Assistant Secretary General, Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, says it has fostered a new culture of intelligence cooperation, increased efficiency and has helped avoid the duplication 37 of effort.184 Notably, he claims this new fusion of intelligence has ‘positioned the JISD to contend effectively with the… cyber… threats increasingly confronting NATO’.185
However, von Loringhoven’s optimism glosses over the great difficulty of intra-Alliance intelligence sharing. Divulging secret information is a trade-off between trusting a partner enough to share information that could endanger one’s own source against the benefits of doing so.186 Therefore, national agencies are reluctant to share it with international organisations, instead preferring bilateral cooperation on a case-by-case basis.187 It is shared between states with closely aligned interests, mutual trust and good diplomatic relations, as seen in the Anglo-American UKUSA Agreement.188 The exclusive ‘Five Eyes’ Alliance this evolved into is a rare example of multilateral intelligence sharing, involving NATO members America, Canada and the UK. These agreements tend to be more concerned with the security of the intelligence shared rather than its content, due to concerns over how other states will circulate the information. 189 Accordingly, wider intelligence cooperation within NATO would be much harder to achieve, primarily because many states do not share strong levels of trust, common interests and diplomatic relations with each other. For instance, France remains unsympathetic to intelligence integration in any multilateral environment, preferring strategic autonomy.190 This is compounded by an uneasy relationship with the Alliance, with President Emmanuel Macron calling it ‘brain dead’ in 2019.191 Furthermore, some allies fear that if countries with lower resilience are infiltrated, they could possibly compromise sensitive information shared between members.192 Consequently, apprehension about Italy’s weak cyber systems hinders allies’ propensity to share with Rome, since the potential for leaks undermines their trust.193
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › Processing
Borghard and Lonergan 18 (Dr. Erica D. Borghard is an Adjunct Research Scholar in the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. Shawn Longergan Shawn W. Lonergan is a Senior Advisor to the U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission. “Confidence Building Measures for the Cyber Domain,” Fall 2018, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2166950058/abstract/4B6C015E3058436BPQ/1?accountid=11091)
However, rather than solely observing defensive exercises, the spirit behind the exchange of observers in the Helsinki Final Act was to provide reassurance among potential adversaries regarding each other's offensive forces-in other words, those that could pose a threat to stability. However, building offensive cyber operations into existing defensive exercises is fraught with difficulties. Currently, cybersecurity exercises typically have a defensive focus and are used to identify both technical and procedural vulnerabilities on internal networks.58 For example, most exercises spearheaded by the United States typically do not showcase the units that would conduct offensive operations or their capabilities and, therefore, are not designed to signal confidence in the command and control and efficacy of their offensive cyber forces.
It is possible to incorporate offensive actions into existing defensive exercises. For instance, a state could build into a defensive scenario a counterstrike that targets an infected server commanding the attack. However, any capability for access and attack that would be used in the scenario would most likely be limited to publicly available open source tools or would be fictionalized so as not to give away to the adversary the specific vulnerability in the target system it would be exploiting. Again, this reflects the fundamental requirement of secrecy for operational success. The ephemeral nature of offensive cyber capabilities and accesses means that revealing information about them effectively renders them moot.59 If a state used real cyber weapons from its arsenal, it is likely that any observing state (including allies) would develop hardware and software upgrades to render the demonstrated capability inert. Similar to the paradox presented by cyber arms control, this may undermine the very stability CBMs seek to create. However, public notification of the successful execution of such an exercise could increase the adversary's confidence in the actor's ability to command and control cyber capabilities, thereby serving a confidence building purpose.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › UQ -- Norms Strong Now
Saltzman 13 (Dr. Ilai Saltzman is the Israel Institute Visiting Assistant Professor of Israel Studies at the University of Maryland and previously served as a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College where he taught classes in International Relations, Israeli foreign and security policy as well as US foreign policy. “Cyber Posturing and the Offense-Defense Balance,” 11 March 2013, ) //NB
Both agencies represent a highly defensive reaction to NATO's security challenges involving cyber warfare. As the Bucharest summit declaration proclaimed, the official cyber policy ‘… emphasizes the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack’.109 Yet Russia's continued use of cyber warfare during the war in Georgia highlighted its escalatory nature and the possible negative implications on conventional military conflicts. In April 2009, as part of the Declaration on Alliance Security, NATO moved further to identify cyberattacks alongside terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the key global threats to member states and the international community.110
But the major breakthrough in NATO strategic thinking regarding cyber warfare, which went beyond the strictly technical aspect of network protection, occurred during mid 2010. A team of leading experts in matters of security, headed by former American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, was asked to prepare a preliminary report to be used as a basis for NATO's new Strategic Concept. According to this report, entitled NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement and submitted in May:
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › UQ -- Norms Strong Now
Erica Borghard et al. 22, Dr. Borghard holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University, is a term member at the Council on Foreign Relations, and senior fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Reviewing US Cyber Posture: An Analysis,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.2139/ssrn.4077962
https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.phpID=131074121084080064095101013088108093109023030014084091014024007126031069108084010090035056097013011097115067066028017082016123027020011005061088099086116110009080093061020081064111080021114113021023124100113002030083004089093110079087002018070092084073&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE
Norms have played a large role in U.S. cyber strategies, dating back to the 2011 International Cyberspace Strategy. Norms, or a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity, often follow a lifecycle in which they first emerge, then receive enough acceptance to reach a tipping point for a norm cascade, and finally are internalized in behaviors. Norm emergence, the first stage of the lifecycle, advents with a norm entrepreneur who shepherds the idea and attempts to convince others to adopt it. These norms entrepreneurs play a critical role in framing the issues at hand. Struggles over framing have significant long-term consequences because the initial framing tends to be sticky and difficult to dislodge. This “stickiness” can create a first-mover advantage in struggles to frame new norms. Beyond framing, norm entrepreneurs often create organizational platforms from which they seek to promote and institutionalize norms.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › UQ -- Norms Strong Now
Myriam Dunn Cavelty & Andreas Wenger 22, Myriam Dunn Cavelty is a Senior Lecturer for Security Studies and Deputy for Research and Teaching at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich. She studied International Relations, History, and International Law at the University of Zurich. She was a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies, and Andreas Wenger is professor of International and Swiss Security Policy at ETH Zurich. He studied History, Political Science and German Literature at the University of Zurich. He holds a Doctorate from the University of Zurich and was a visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. “Cyber Security Politics: Socio-Technological Transformations and Political Fragmentation,” 1st ed., Routledge, 01/18/2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.4324/9781003110224 https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/52574/9781000567113.pdf#page=201
Early internet pioneers, including John Perry Barlow, regarded cyberspace as a virtual environment not requiring formal rules or external controls (Barlow 1996). However, growing numbers of cyber security events affecting private as well as public information and communication technologies (ICTs) have undermined these non-interventionist positions. Over the course of the past two decades, voluntary norms of responsible behavior “have emerged along with confidence- and capacity-building measures as the principal policy tools of choice to meet the […] vision of an open, secure, accessible, and peaceful ICT environment” (Kavanagh 2017: 10).
Defined as shared expectations of appropriate behavior, norms can be of regulative (i.e. describing obligations, prohibitions and permissions) or constitutive (i.e. creating categories of actors and actions) nature (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Wiener 2017; Björkdahl 2002). “By shaping agents’ understandings of their social environments, associated interactions, and possible outcomes”, they foster coordination and predictability, and in turn reduce contextual ambiguities to manageable levels (Ferguson 2019: 1). In contrast to formal legal provisions, norms rely on softer means of enforcement and implementation.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › Integration Bad
Mariarosaria Taddeo 19 (Fellow in Cyber Security and Ethics in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick and Research Associate at the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, UK, “Norms and Strategies for Stability in Cyberspace,” Chapter 3 in “The 2019 Yearbook of the Digital Ethics Lab,” edited by Christopher Burr and Silvia Milano, )
In this scenario, state actors make policy decisions to protect their abilities to launch cyber attacks. Strategic ambiguity is one of these decisions. According to this policy, states decide neither to define and nor inform the international community about their red lines—thresholds that once crossed would trigger state response—for non-kinetic cyber7 attacks (Mariarosaria Taddeo 2011). This approach leaves de facto unregulated cyber attacks that remain below the threshold of an armed attack.
Strategic ambiguity has often been presented as a way to confuse the opponents about the consequences of their cyber attacks. As the US National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues officer put it:
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › Nato OCO’s Bad
Long 17 (Austin Long is a Research Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and the Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies at Columbia University. “A cyber SIOP? Operational considerations for strategic offensive cyber planning” in Journal of Cybersecurity, 18 February 2017, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/3/1/19/3003367) //NB
For a cyber-equivalent to the SIOP (i.e. a plan for strategic OCO), planners need similar objectives. Deterrence is an obvious parallel objective between nuclear and cyber but deterrence of what? During the Cold War strategic nuclear forces were intended to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks, while more recently unclassified guidance “directs DOD to strengthen non-nuclear capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks” [17]. Are strategic OCO intended primarily to deter adversary OCO or are such operations part of a broader set of deterrent capabilities, including nuclear forces? The latter seems more likely but this is a policy choice different administrations may answer differently.
If deterrence fails, OCO planners need subsequent objectives. Here the parallel with nuclear operations, at least those from the Cold War context, may be less obvious. Is the next objective for strategic OCO the control of escalation? It could be but this might vary by adversary and scenario. Failure of deterrence regarding a great power like Russia or China might lead to a subsequent objective of escalation control but North Korea or Iran might be different, with the objective being the prompt neutralization of adversary strategic capabilities in order to limit (or eliminate) damage from enemy attack.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › US OCO’s Bad
Lin and Smeets 18 (Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. Max Smeets is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative, and author of “No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-Force”, published with Oxford University Press and Hurst in May 2022. “An Outcome-Based Analysis of U.S. Cyber Strategy of Persistence & Defend Forward,” November 28, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/outcome-based-analysis-us-cyber-strategy-persistence-defend-forward) //NB
One path towards escalation involves adversaries becoming more aggressive and conducting attacks that are highly disruptive to society—in other words, adversary activity leads to a less stable cyberspace. This could be the result of either an adversary’s increased willingness to conduct attacks using existing capacities or increased capacities of the adversary. Indeed, with respect to the latter, the U.S. vision—and associated changed course of action—may encourage other actors to grow their budgets to conduct offensive cyber operations. The proliferation literature on weapons of mass destruction has extensively covered the role of special interests in stimulating demand for weapon development. This makes it a strong possibility that the new U.S. vision can be used by those groups within a given country favoring a growing cyber command to justify and lobby for increased military spending.
A second possibility is that increased U.S. offensive cyber activity that operates below the threshold of armed attack activity reduces the value of cyber norms of behavior that support a more stable cyberspace. Even today, some observers believe that the high level of offensive activity in cyberspace today demonstrates quite forcefully that nations find value in conducting such activity, and that such activity points to the difficulty of establishing a more peaceful cyber norms regime. These observers argue that there is no reason to expect that increasing the U.S. contribution to such activity worldwide will make it easier to establish such a regime. Finally, a third possibility is that increased U.S. offensive cyber activity will complicate diplomatic relations with allies and other nations whose cyber infrastructures are used in support of such activity.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › OCOs Bad
Gil Baram 18 (Gil Baram is the head of research at the Yuval Nee'man Workshop for Science, Technology and Security, and a research fellow at the Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center. “The Theft and Reuse of Advanced Offensive Cyber Weapons Pose A Growing Threat,” 6/19/18, https://www.cfr.org/blog/theft-and-reuse-advanced-offensive-cyber-weapons-pose-growing-threat)
Almost exactly one year ago, the world experienced two destructive cyberattacks in which offensive cyber tools developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) were stolen and shared with the public. In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware hit over 300,000 computers in 150 countries. One month later, the NotPetya attack hit the computer systems of companies and governmental entities across the globe causing millions of dollars in damages. These attacks exploited numerous vulnerabilities, and have subsequently exposed the slow response time of targeted countries and the lack of effective information sharing mechanisms between responsible agencies, something which could have mitigated the severe damage caused by the attacks.
The interesting feature of these attacks is that those responsible—North Korea and Russia—used the leaked offensive tools originally developed by the NSA. The investigation into WannaCry ultimately revealed that the attackers had exploited a security vulnerability called EternalBlue, originally developed by the NSA. NotPetya used a variant of the same vulnerability, which is still wreaking havoc a year later. For example, in February 2018, security researchers at Symantec reported that an Iran-based hacking group had used EternalBlue as part of its operations.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
OCOs Turn › OCOs Bad
Erica Longergan and Keren Yarhi-Milo 22 (Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and a research scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University; Yarhi-Milo is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor of War and Peace Studies in the political science department and the School of International and Public Affairs, “Cyber Signaling and Nuclear Deterrence: Implications for the Ukraine Crisis,” War on the Rocks, 4/21/22, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/cyber-signaling-and-nuclear-deterrence-implications-for-the-ukraine-crisis/)
So far, the Biden administration has attempted to dismiss Russia’s announcement as irresponsible saber-rattling. But as Putin continues issuing nuclear threats, policymakers are likely to feel growing pressure to respond. In particular, they may be tempted to find ways to signal to Russia to deter the use of nuclear weapons. One way this might be done is through cyber operations. In fact, some cyber experts are already calling for the United States to consider cyber attacks for signaling purposes. For example, writing in the Washington Post, Dmitri Alperovitch and Samuel Charap call on the Biden administration to consider a cyber “shock-and-awe demonstration” in response to a major Russian cyber attack against the West. They claim that such a response, which could include disrupting the Internet throughout Russia, would signal U.S. resolve and help prevent further escalation that they fear “could result in nuclear war.”
However, conducting cyber operations to signal deterrence would, paradoxically, increase risks of escalation. This risk is not just hypothetical, especially in light of Russia’s updated declaratory policy for the first use of nuclear weapons, which may include responses to cyber attacks. Russia has reinforced this message during the war in Ukraine. In early March, a hacking group affiliated with Anonymous claimed that it had shut down the control center of Russia’s space agency. While denying that the attack took place, Russia nevertheless warned that a cyber attack against its satellites would be a justification for war.
2022
Georgetown
Negative
Politics › 1NC
Saletan 22 – Saletan, William: “Putin Wants to Break NATO. Republicans Want to Help Him.” The Bulwark, 12 Apr. 2022, www.thebulwark.com/putin-wants-to-break-nato-republicans-want-to-help-him/. Accessed 24 June 2022.
Vladimir Putin’s central objective in Europe isn’t to capture Kyiv, the Donbas, or any other part of Ukraine. It’s to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which protects most of the continent against him. And in that longstanding campaign, Putin scored two significant victories this week.
One was in France, where Marine Le Pen, a , finished a close second to Emmanuel Macron in Sunday’s French presidential election. Le Pen is running with Macron in polls for the April 24 runoff. She has said that if she wins, she’ll from NATO’s command structure.