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2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › To Cut › 2NC – S – Info sharing

YES

O’Mahony et al., '22 – associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND (O'Mahony, Angela, David E. Thaler, Beth Grill, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Jason H. Campbell, Rachel Tecott, and Mary Kate Adgie; "Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies: Framing Army-to-Army Partnerships"; RAND Corporation; https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA600/RRA641-1/RAND_RRA641-1.pdf; 2022, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

As the Army prepares for the possibility of near-peer conflict and focuses on increasing its expeditionary agility, developing and maintaining the ability to interoperate quickly and effectively with highly capable allies will become increasingly important. A key reason that U.S., British, and Australian personnel have been able to work together so well in recent operations is the steady state interactions between these allies, ranging from high-level embeds, multinational exercises (e.g., joint warfighter exercises), education and training programs,10 and officer and unit exchange programs (e.g., the Military Personnel Exchange Program). However, the British Army explicitly states that the integration skills jointly developed during nearly five years in Afghanistan are perishable and that a comprehensive defense engagement program to preserve these lessons should be developed: “The challenge during this fallow period before the next coalition operation is how to start the next operation as an integrated coalition, capitalising [sic] on those coalition synergies from the start.”11

Implications

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › To Cut › 2NC – S – SFKSDLF

bilat

Inserra, '17 – Former Policy Analyst for Homeland Security and Cyber Policy (David Inserra; "Cybersecurity Beyond U.S. Borders: Engaging Allies and Deterring Aggressors in Cyberspace"; Heritage Foundation; https://www.heritage.org/cybersecurity/report/cybersecurity-beyond-us-borders-engaging-allies-and-deterring-aggressors; 7-14-2017, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

Greater Collaboration with Allies and Partners. In addition to combatting cybercrime, nations must also work together to decrease their vulnerability to attack and reduce the consequences of a successful attack. Collaboration on cybersecurity defenses, technology, organizations, training, and exercises across both military and civilian portions of the network is an essential step toward cybersecurity. While no defense is perfect in cyberspace, more can be done to improve upon the status quo.

On the civilian side, constant and regular engagement among U.S. and foreign Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) and Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs) is a necessity.29

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › To Cut › 2NC – S – SFKSDLF

Bilat solve

Pernik, '21 – Piret Pernik is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). She has researched cybersecurity strategic and policy aspects since 2013. She has published research reports and analyses on cyber resilience, military 5G security, cyber commands, and cyber defence training (Piret Pernik; "Cyber deterrence: A case study on Estonia’s policies and practice"; Hybrid CoE; https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211012_Hybrid_CoE_Paper_8_Cyber_deterrence_WEB.pdf; 10-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

Credible cyber deterrence was associated with international cybersecurity cooperation and Estonia’s efforts to strengthen international cyberspace stability. In this respect, this document communicated a view of the Estonian Foreign Policy Development Plan 2030, but provided more details. For example, hosting international cybersecurity events and cyber exercises in Estonia, establishing NATO-associated facilities (such as NATO’s cyber range and NATO CCDCOE located in Tallinn) and other allied infrastructure in the country are considered important for fostering credible deterrence. In like manner, binding agreements with key allies and regular cyber defence exercises and training sessions are seen as mechanisms for implementing cyber deterrence in practice.84 Notably, Estonia has bilateral cybersecurity and cyber defence agreements with several NATO allies (the US and France), and has established a joint platform for secure cyber threat intelligence-sharing with the US. Thus, operational-level and technical bi- and multilateral cooperation, including information- and intelligence-sharing and technical exercises, are viewed as critical components of strategic deterrence against cyberattacks.85 This reflects a pragmatic understanding that high-level political declarations and commitment cannot deter cyberattacks, but timely cyber threat intelligence can.

In accordance with the strategy, a necessary element of deterrence is an ability to attribute cyberattacks. The strategy prescribes developing a procedure to attribute attacks, which includes political, legal and technical criteria (this mechanism 23 was established in 2019) and measures to attribute cyberattacks in the grey zone (below the threshold of armed attack). Estonia must actively attribute attacks together with partners and implement collective countermeasures.8

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 2NC – Perm › 2NC – AT: PDCP – AT: Member States

The difference is vital and fundamental

Brian Collins 2, Lt. Col. In the US Air Force and a faculty member of the National War College in Washington, D.C., “Operation Enduring Freedom and the Future of NATO,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 2, Georgetown University Press, 2002, pp. 51–56

The U.S. -led military action in Afghanistan in response to the attacks of September II raised a number of important issues regarding the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the relationship between the United States and its transatlantic allies. On September 12, , NATO invoked Arti- cle 5 - the mutual defense clause of the Washington Treaty - thereby committing NATO to help defend the United States from the perpetrators of the attacks. Shortly thereafter, NATO sent seven of its Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) aircraft, crews, and ground support personnel to assist in the air defense of the United States. In addition to demonstrating NATO's military resolve and buttressing the political declaration of Article 5» the deployment of NATO AWACS aircraft also freed up U.S. aircraft for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

NATO also provided blanket air rights for U.S. aircraft, access to bases and ports, and other non-combat support. However, NATO did not lead Operation Enduring Freedom, nor did it develop the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) deployed to Afghanistan in the wake of the American rout of the Taliban. The Europeans expected more of a say in the planning and execution of operations since the alliance had stood firm with the United States after the attacks. Since the understanding for fifty years had been that the United States would come to the aid of Europe and lead its defense, it was only natural to assume that Europe would play a large role if the United States was attacked. However, this was not the case; the United States preferred a coalition involving NATO members but not NATO itself.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 2NC – Perm › 2NC – AT PDCP

NATO is the military alliance---to be considered a NATO activity, NATO itself must be the initiating or joint initiating authority.

NATO 22, “ABOUT NATO,” US Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

Formed in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty, NATO is a security alliance of 30 countries from North America and Europe. NATO’s fundamental goal is to safeguard the Allies’ freedom and security by political and military means. NATO remains the principal security instrument of the transatlantic community and expression of its common democratic values. It is the practical means through which the security of North America and Europe are permanently tied together. NATO enlargement has furthered the U.S. goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty — that an attack against one Ally is an attack against all — is at the core of the Alliance, a promise of collective defense. Article 4 of the treaty ensures consultations among Allies on security matters of common interest, which have expanded from a narrowly defined Soviet threat to the critical mission in Afghanistan, as well as peacekeeping in Kosovo and new threats to security such as cyber attacks, and global threats such as terrorism and piracy that affect the Alliance and its global network of partners.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 2NC – NB › 2NC – AT: L2NB – Tradeoff

Resources are deliberately allocated for NATO and do not blur with a member state’s general budget for domestic spending.

NATO, ‘22 – NATO. ("Funding NATO "; NATO; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm; 04-01-2022, Accessed 6-28-2022)//ILake-NoC

Allocation and control of common-funded resources are decided by consensus among Allies. Under the overall authority of the North Atlantic Council (or NAC), various bodies exercise managerial control over the four principal elements of the Organization’s financial structure:

the International Staff, financed by the civil budget;

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 2NC – Solvency › 2NC – S – Follow-On

Only bilateral cooperation ensures multi-way info sharing – ensures adjusted burden sharing based on a state’s domestic priorities.

Gressel, '19 – senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Berlin office (Gustav Gressel; "Protecting Europe against hybrid threats"; ECFR; https://ecfr.eu/publication/protecting_europe_against_hybrid_threats/; 6-25-2019, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

The activities of Russian intelligence services increasingly pop up in public security debates. In some cases, the known activities of Russian operatives involve classical espionage. In others, their activities hint at much more robust subversive aims: cultivation of anti-system forces, the purchase and preparation of infrastructure for future military incursions, training for paramilitary resistance groups, and the assassination of perceived enemies. These actions are top-tier covert actions. One may assume that other actions that provide the basis for this sort of activity – such as strategic reconnaissance, cyber penetration and espionage, excavation of data, the placement agents in positions of power, and reconnaissance of critical infrastructure – have progressed as well. Europe has a mixed record of disrupting these preparations.

While EU member states on the eastern flank have adopted very robust counter-intelligence laws and invested significant resources in monitoring Russian operatives, other states are more reluctant to do so. France has the legal framework for such action, but counter-terrorism is its first priority. Germany and Austria – both countries that were under Allied supervision and occupation after 1945 – have comparatively weak laws, and their decision-makers maintain a ‘hands-off’ mentality. In the past, bilateral cooperation with US services addressed these imbalances. As a legacy of the post-war situation, US and British services have the right to engage in counter-intelligence work in Germany. And Berlin, which has historical issues with counter-intelligence, has been happy to outsource this politically toxic work. In doing so, Washington – and to a lesser extent London – became an external balancer in intra-European affairs. And while the Trump administration and its sometimes erratic personnel have significantly undermined confidence in the US government, the US intelligence community has remained much more stable and able to preserve working contacts throughout Europe. But if relations with Washington deteriorate further, there is no tangible policy or political actor that could replace the US.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 2NC – Solvency › 2NC – S – Interoperability

The CP uses bilateral interoperability roadmaps to streamline SC broadly.

O’Mahony et al., '22 – associate dean for academic affairs at Pardee RAND Graduate School and a senior political scientist at RAND (O'Mahony, Angela, David E. Thaler, Beth Grill, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Jason H. Campbell, Rachel Tecott, and Mary Kate Adgie; "Prioritizing Security Cooperation with Highly Capable U.S. Allies: Framing Army-to-Army Partnerships"; RAND Corporation; https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA600/RRA641-1/RAND_RRA641-1.pdf; 2022, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

Security Cooperation to Expand Interoperability Is a Strong Focus of U.S.-Allied Military Relationships

Allies such as the United Kingdom and Australia support and encourage interoperability discussions and new investments during senior-level interactions with the Army. For example, interoperability discussions have historically dominated the agenda for the U.S.-British army-to-army staff talks. The Multinational Fusion Cell in the HQDA brings together assigned personnel from multiple allied countries (the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Germany, France, and others) to focus on interoperability and to develop U.S.-allied bilateral interoperability roadmaps. Standing organizations, such as ABCANZ, also exist to work through interoperability issues at the operational level. Large-scale exercises, such as the aforementioned biannual Talisman Sabre series between the United States and Australia, are very much focused on addressing interoperability challenges identified from recent operations and planning for future operations. NATO defines interoperability along three dimensions—human, procedural, and technical—which is a helpful way to categorize interoperability challenges.34 We find general agreement among our interlocutors that SC with highly capable allies to support human, procedural, and technical interoperability is advancing at the operational and tactical levels, but there is concern about a lack of multiyear funding and programming to guide longer-term planning for multinational interoperability exercises.35

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 2NC – Solvency › 2NC – S – T/L

Bilateral collaboration solves better – NATO cyber resources are stretched too thin.

Pernik, '21 – Piret Pernik is a researcher at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). She has researched cybersecurity strategic and policy aspects since 2013. She has published research reports and analyses on cyber resilience, military 5G security, cyber commands, and cyber defence training (Piret Pernik; "Cyber deterrence: A case study on Estonia’s policies and practice"; Hybrid CoE; https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/20211012_Hybrid_CoE_Paper_8_Cyber_deterrence_WEB.pdf; 10-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

Based on the Estonian case study, a policy recommendation for EU and NATO countries is to apply a three-layered deterrence model.73 First, EU and NATO countries should participate in entanglement and norms measures such as cyber diplomacy and capacity-building globally. Second, they should invest more in denial measures and, third, jointly develop policies for punitive response options, including developing public attribution procedures to enable quick attribution, and systematically implementing sanctions regimes. It would be feasible to establish memoranda of understanding, and operational- and technical-level frameworks to radically improve information- and intelligence-sharing. Participation in cyber defence and crisis management exercises should be open to like-minded NATO partner countries. Joint bilateral cyberspace operations likewise contribute to mutual trust-building and information-sharing, and increase parties’ operational and technical competence.74 Operational- and technical-level joint activities should be regularly practised among allies and with like-minded partners as they contribute to deterrence by denial. Given that NATO’s cyber response teams are stretched thin due to protecting NATO’s own networks, bi- and multilateral collaboration enables countries to share best practices and, in the event of an emergency, to provide mutual rapid assistance in crisis response.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 2NC – Solvency › 2NC – S – T/L

That’s key to tailor to country-specific needs.

Williams, '21 – Brandon Kirk Williams is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research (Brandon Williams; "U.S. and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific"; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/US_and_Allied_Cyber_Security_Cooperation_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf; 04-01-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

Key lessons emerge from assessing progress in the Transatlantic cybersecurity experience. Europe’s foundation for cybersecurity cooperation began in recent years. CCDCOE regularly assists Australia and Japan, and South Korea partners with the EU’s Malware Information Sharing Platform. The EU and NATO took the lead on responding to the request for cyber capacity by Indo-Pacific allies. Panelists concluded the United States and Europe must respect that local context triggers country-specific demand signals. The United States can commit to dialogue that will tailor solutions to country-specific needs. Countering APTs may take time. CCDCOE exercises and capacity building missions demonstrated that knowing local context sets a baseline, and one that will be essential for changing the perception of the cyber threat ecosystem and the solutions necessary to confront adversaries in cyberspace.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 2NC – Solvency › 2NC – S – T/L

Bilateral cyber partnerships already exist and guarantee an interoperable cyberspace.

Williams, '21 – Brandon Kirk Williams is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research (Brandon Williams; "U.S. and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific"; Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/US_and_Allied_Cyber_Security_Cooperation_in_the_Indo-Pacific.pdf; 04-01-2021, Accessed 6-27-2022)//ILake-NoC

The Transatlantic relationship illustrates the complexities of cyber security cooperation. The United States, NATO, and the European Union (EU) share common ground based on decades of partnership across issue areas. All parties agree on the necessity of a free, open, and interoperable cyberspace free from authoritarian state control. NATO members declared that collective defense—enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement—applies in cyberspace. Within NATO, the United States supports NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) and support for cyber missions. Separately from NATO, the United States retains strong bilateral cyber security partnerships with EU member states. USCC conducted Hunt Forward missions in EU nations to glean intelligence on malicious cyber activities.

2022 Georgetown Counterplan
CP – Bilat › 1NC – Jones

The threat of US OCOs alone sufficiently deters Russia.

1AC Jones 18 – Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Seth G. Jones, “Going on the Offensive: A U.S. Strategy to Combat Russian Information Warfare,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 2018, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181002_Russia_Active_Measures_FINAL1.pdf

It is important to play defense—including protecting U.S. and allied cyber networks, exposing Russian bots and trolls, and preparing for cyberattacks and disinformation. But Russia will continue to target the United States at home and abroad until the U.S. government implements a more aggressive offensive information campaign. The goal should be to coerce Russia to curb its information warfare campaign, punish Moscow when these incidents occur, and exploit Moscow’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities. An offensive U.S. campaign might include several steps. The first involves blunt and regular U.S. warnings to Russian leaders, both in public and private, that their information warfare campaign will be met with an equally forceful response. Senior U.S. officials like President Donald Trump have not seriously threatened Moscow despite substantial evidence of Russian activism in the 2016 U.S. elections; Russian efforts to exploit issues like gun control, Black Lives Matter, and the #MeToo movement; and cyberattacks against even conservative U.S. organizations like the Hudson Institute and the International Republican Institute. Following the Soviet Union’s global active measures campaign against the United States, U.S. President Ronald Reagan vowed to respond in kind and, ultimately, to “leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history.” Moscow understood that Reagan and his administration were deadly serious about combating Russian active measures, which is what Reagan did in authorizing effective overt and covert action programs against the Soviet Union. Second, the United States needs to continue developing its offensive cyber capabilities and—just as important—it needs to use them if necessary. President Trump’s decision to sign National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, a directive facilitating offensive U.S. cyber operations, is a helpful step. This directive rescinded the Obama administration’s more cautious approach under Presidential Policy Directive 20.46 But this change means little if the U.S. fails to use—or, more importantly, to threaten to use—cyberattacks to protect itself from cyber operations by countries like Russia. In his influential work “Arms and Influence,” the Nobel Prizewinning economist Thomas Schelling wrote that “it is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply.” Moscow needs to understand that the United States is prepared to use all available instruments—including cyber operations—if it continues to be threatened.

2022 Georgetown Negative

Alt – Paradigm Shifts

The alternative is to vote negative to refuse the 1AC’s prescriptions in favor of paradigm shifting experiments that center de-racialization against white supremist techno-futurity

Mbembe 22, interviewed by TORBJØRN- Achille is a member of the staff at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER) at the University of the Witwatersrand, visiting appointment at the Franklin Humanities Institute at Duke University PhD in History at the Sorbonne, DEA in Political Science at the Instituts d'études politiques [Achille, “Thoughts on the Planetary: An Interview with Achille Mbembe,” Decolonizing the Neoliberal University – Law, Psychoanalysis and the Politics of Student Protest, Interview first Conducted in 2018, Re-Published in this book and Edited by Jaco Barnard-Naudé, Professor of Jurisprudence in the Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town, DKP]

TORBJØRN: Some would then argue that there are still colonial or postcolonial structures operating in the neoliberal project. Would you say that there is then still a genocidal potential?

2022 Georgetown Negative

Link – AI = Whiteness

The fantasy of AI is the fantasy of Whiteness – a futuristic world where white servants serve white masters – the aff cements the domination of the future by an Anglo-European worldview of White Supremacy that conflates Whiteness with intelligence

Cave and Dai 20 – * Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK, ** Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK, [Stephen, Kanta, “The Whiteness of AI,” Philosophy & Technology volume 33, pages685–703 (2020), DKP]

This paper focuses on the fact that AI is predominantly portrayed as white—in colour, ethnicity, or both. We first illustrate the prevalent Whiteness of real and imagined intelligent machines in four categories: humanoid robots, chatbots and virtual assistants, stock images of AI, and portrayals of AI in film and television. We then offer three interpretations of the Whiteness of AI, drawing on critical race theory, particularly the idea of the White racial frame. First, we examine the extent to which this Whiteness might simply reflect the predominantly White milieus from which these artefacts arise. Second, we argue that to imagine machines that are intelligent, professional, or powerful is to imagine White machines because the White racial frame ascribes these attributes predominantly to White people. Third, we argue that AI racialised as White allows for a full erasure of people of colour from the White utopian imaginary. Finally, we examine potential consequences of the racialisation of AI, arguing it could exacerbate bias and misdirect concern.

2022 Georgetown Negative

Link – AI Integration

The integration of AI via security cooperation constitutes the unshackling the nation-state from the population at the level of economic and military power – that turns case – it paves the way for unchecked racialized necropolitics as a value that informs politics and replaces human governance with AI that kill with impunity and result in endless, endemic warfare

Grove 20 – Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai’i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai’I at Mānoa, PhD in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University [Jairus, “From geopolitics to geotechnics: global futures in the shadow of automation, cunning machines, and human speciation,” International Relations 2020, Vol. 34(3) 432 –455, DKP]

The automation of war and the reduction of human troop sizes has a similar effect. Wars aided by drones and as a result significantly smaller numbers of soldier casualties continue on for decades in a kind of sustainable warfare.28 The political and material cost of casualties like the material cost of striking are being removed from the political equation making states less and less accountable in the case of social justice and the pursuit of violence outside their borders.

2022 Georgetown Negative

Link – AI – Tech Thesis

The advent of modernity is marked by the disappearance of humanity – the global integration of AI is a strategy of racialized governance via digitalized corporatization that has exceeded sovereignty and become a Leviathan built on speed and acceleration into a dystopic future that marks populations deemed unworthy for death

Mbembe 19 – member of the staff at the Wits Institute for Social and Economic Research (WISER) at the University of the Witwatersrand, visiting appointment at the Franklin Humanities Institute at Duke University PhD in History at the Sorbonne, DEA in Political Science at the Instituts d'études politiques, [Achille, “Bodies as Borders,” From the European South 4, pg. 5-18, DKP]

My intervention is a set of urgent, fragmentary, and unfinished reflections on our global present. When I say ‘our global present’, what I truly have in mind is the sustainability and durability of our planet. As a matter of fact, this is an almost existential preoccupation, which is increasingly expressed in many different voices and shared by various people all over the world.

2022 Georgetown Negative

Saalman, 18

Lorea Saalman, EastWest Institute Asia-Pacific Program Vice President, “"Fear of false negatives: AI and China's nuclear posture"; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. April 2018. https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/fear-of-false-negatives-ai-and-chinas-nuclear-posture

New pockets of excellence. In its relations with Russia and the United States, China has long contended with nuclear asymmetry. AI and autonomy, in contrast, offer Beijing the long-term potential to disrupt Washington’s traditional strengths. They open the door for swarm and other technologies that could overwhelm conventional and nuclear platforms that are larger, more cumbersome, and less agile. While China may be concerned about potential adversaries tracking its own nuclear platforms and systems, Beijing is just as likely to avail itself of these relatively inexpensive methods of disrupting US activities. Also, Chinese publications indicate that Beijing is building autonomy into its own “bolt-out-of-the-blue” systems, for example in hypersonic glide vehicles such as the DF-ZF. As China debates integration of automation via launch-on-warning, doing so with a greater range of AI and autonomy in its tool kit could lead to destabilizing trends. Again, the most sensational advances in these enabling technologies do not necessarily carry the greatest implications for China’s military and nuclear force structure. Instead, what counts is the level of AI and autonomy introduced into Beijing’s command and control structure.

When it comes to platforms, this author’s preliminary review of Chinese technical writings on AI and autonomy reveals that Beijing’s greatest emphasis, at least where the most flexible systems are concerned, is on unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles. In China’s view, these systems can be leveraged for a range of activities, including enhanced accuracy in: battlefield reconnaissance, surveillance, patrolling, electronic reconnaissance, communications, electronic interference, combat assessment, radar deception, projectile firearms, laser guidance, target indication, precision bombing, interception and launch of tactical missiles and cruise missiles, and anti-armor, anti-radiation, and anti–naval vessel capabilities; as well as nuclear, chemical, and biological detection and operations. When the topic turns to leveraging new means of warfare, Chinese writings discuss the use of swarm systems (link in Chinese) for a number of purposes, with battlefield applications focusing on anti-submarine warfare and countering integrated air defense.