2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › AT – T-Cybersecurity › 2AC – OCOs = Defense
Tammet 21 (Tanel Tammet, “Autonomous Cyber Capabilities under International Law,” NATO CCDCOE, ch 3, 2021, ) -lh
Since ‘cyber security’ and ‘cyber defence’ cover a wide range of goals and activities, their meanings are—inevitably—somewhat vague and mostly overlapping. However, by ‘cyber defence’ people typically mean a more pro-active stance than is conveyed by ‘cyber security’. For example, cyber intelligence and reconnaissance are often described as ‘cyber defence’ activities.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › AT – Politics DA › !! – AT Economy
Clyde Wayne Crews & Ryan Young 19, Clyde Wane Crews is vice president for policy and a senior fellow at the CEI, M.B.A. from William and Mary, B.S. from Lander College; Ryan Young is a senior fellow at the CEI, M.A. in Economics from George Mason University, B.A. in History from Lawrence University, “The Case against Antitrust Law”, Competitive Enterprise Institute, 4/16/2019, , Accessed 24 June 22.
Antitrust regulation began as a populist reaction against big business and industrial concentration. Yet, it has proven ineffective at countering the perceive threat of bigness in business, while causing considerable harm to consumers, competition, and innovation. Moreover, many antitrust policies are based on faulty arguments that bear little relation to how real-world markets work. And throughout its history, U.S. antitrust law has created considerable uncertainty for businesses, as federal antitrust enforcers have tried different regulatory approaches over the last 130 years.
The “rule of reason” standard, which had no set criteria, became the standard for enforcing actions from fines to jail terms to firm breakups. During the New Deal, government policy turned in the opposite direction and actively encouraged cartel behavior. After a postwar change of heart, antitrust enforcement reached its peak in the 1950s and early 1960s. Around this time, economists’ arguments slowly earned mainstream acceptance in the legal profession. By the 1980s, a Chicago-style consumer welfare had become the dominant enforcement standard, and has remained so up to the present day. However, the combination of a populist presidential administration with a growing Neo-Brandeisian antitrust movement on the progressive side threaten to revert antitrust policy to something closer to an arbitrary rule of reason standard, which creates the potential for a sharp upswing in enforcement actions against large or politically disfavored firms.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › AT – Politics DA › !! - AT Tech Leadership
Robert D. Atkinson 21, Mr. Atkinson is president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Ph.D. in city and regional planning from the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, masters in urban and regional planning from the University of Oregon, Robert D. Atkinson 21,“Opinion | Antitrust Can Hurt U.S. Competitiveness,” Wall Street Journal, 07/05/2021, www.wsj.com, , accessed 6/24/2022.
When it comes to technology and the economy, the U.S. is grappling with two contradictory goals: competing with China in advanced technology industries and ramping up antitrust enforcement against leading U.S. tech companies.
Antimonopoly advocates argue that we can have our cake and eat it too. Go ahead and break up big tech, they say; we can still compete with China. But there is a long history of U.S. antitrust actions against technology companies, and the results suggest regulators should exercise caution.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › AT – Politics DA › 2AC – No Link [Fopo]
Dr. James M. Lindsay 20, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations, MA, MPhil, and PhD from Yale University, AB in Economics and Political Science from the University of Michigan, “Campaign Foreign Policy Roundup: Foreign Policy Is AWOL”, Council on Foreign Relations, 9/11/2020,
Today on the nineteenth anniversary of September 11 it is notable how little of the 2020 presidential campaign has been about foreign policy. It’s not just terrorism that has receded from the headlines. The same could be said about China, Russia, Iran, and a whole host of other issues.
To an extent, the fact that foreign policy has been AWOL on the campaign trail isn’t surprising. Domestic issues typically dominate presidential campaigns, and COVID-19 is perhaps the mother of all domestic issues. It has upended the economy, disrupted daily life, and exacerbated existing racial and social inequalities. Even so, it was only a few months ago that some experts were speculating that COVID-19 would catapult U.S. policy toward China to the forefront of the campaign and give Donald Trump a cudgel with which to beat Joe Biden. So far that hasn’t happened.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › AT – Politics DA › 2AC – No Link [Covert]
Alasdair Roberts 3, University of Massachusetts Amherst - School of Public Policy, 5/15/3, “Entangling Alliances: NATO's Security Policy and the Entrenchment of State Secrecy,” , p. 350-355.
Penalties for unauthorized disclosure. The security policy adopted by the Council in March 1955 made clear that "disciplinary action" was to be taken "against any individual who is responsible for the compromise of NATO classified information."' 12 No comparable provision was included in earlier policies. However, a series of substantial leaks in 1952 and 1953 demonstrated the need for firmer rules, and resulted in increased pressure on member states to adopt criminal penalties for unauthorized release of NATO information.' 1
Frustration with leaks peaked after a meeting of the Council in April 1953.1 14 The main aim of the meeting was the resolution of the sensitive issue of how much each nation would contribute toward a £250 million defense infrastructure program. The New York Times published details of the proposed plan two weeks before the meeting.1 15 A week later, the Times, London's Daily Telegraph, and the Associated Press simultaneously published details of NATO's plans for production of fighter aircraft. Matters deteriorated during the meeting when Le Monde reproduced the agenda and provided a running summary of the talks, while the Times summarized American and British background reports on relations with the Soviet Union.' 16 Major press services transmitted the final communique hours before the NATO secretariat formally released it. Later, the Times excerpted a secret paper on Soviet-Chinese relations discussed at the meeting. ' ' 7
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › AT – Politics DA › 2AC – No Link [Covert]
Andrés B. Muñoz Mosquera 16, Legal Advisor, Director, at NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Power, Europe - Allied Command Operations, October 2016, “Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU): A Philosophical and Empirical Approach (Part II),” NATO Legal Gazette, Issue #37, p. 34-38
The NATO Legal Deskbook briefly characterises MOUs as follows: “The form of MOU is frequently used to record informal arrangements between States on matters which are inappropriate for inclusion in treaties or where the form is more convenient than a treaty (e.g. for confidentiality). They may be drawn up as a single document using non-treaty terms, signed on behalf of two or more governments, or consist of an exchange of notes or letters recording an understanding reached between two governments, or a government and an international organization. MOUs usually do not require ratification. However depending on the content and the agreement between the Parties on the nature of the document, MOUs can be subject of a certain level of domestic ratification…NATO, in general, concludes MOUs in numerous occasions. MOUs are a very flexible and adaptable instrument to record the will of entities with legal personality to achieve practical results that do not amount to treaty obligations.”
How are MOUs practiced? There are several ‘schools’ of practice that nations and international organisations have developed, with different references to this practice in the British-law influential area5, continental European states and the United States.6 Aust highlights that in all of these areas, MOUs are considered ‘agreements without legally-binding force’ and refers to the European Commission document PESC/SEC 899 of 9 August 1996 to support his argument. Aust also admits that in certain circumstances nonbinding becomes binding.7 However, practice shows that states have different approaches depending on their political approach to the topic or topics addressed in specific MOUs.8
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › AT – Politics DA › 2AC – PTX Thumper
Pomerleau 19 – Reporter for C4ISRNET, covering information warfare and cyberspace. (Mark Pomerleau; "NATO to integrate offensive cyber capabilities of individual members"; C4ISRNet; https://www.c4isrnet.com/international/2019/05/28/nato-to-integrate-offensive-cyber-capabilities-of-individual-members/; 5-28-2019, Accessed 6-24-2022)//ILake-AZ
A relative latecomer to the cyber game, NATO is beginning to “operationalize” cyber capabilities into its overall structure by integrating those tools of member nations, said the alliance’s secretary general.
“We are tackling increasingly complex cyberthreats faster and more efficiently. And we are more aware of the threats, more resilient to incidents,” Jens Stoltenberg said May 23 at the Cyber Defense Pledge Conference in London. “We also need to consider how we can deter attacks in cyberspace.”
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – AT A/C
Lété 21 -- Bruno Lété currently serves as a senior fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United States. He focuses primarily on NATO, transatlantic defense cooperation, developments in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, and cybersecurity. “Policy Brief: The Paris Call and Activating Global Norms” Published March 2021. // DG
The United Nations is unique because it convenes the full spectrum of global views and interests. But there are other international organizations and smaller groupings of countries that can be engaged by the Paris Call community to indirectly influence the UN processes and to advance the debate of norm creation and implementation. These gather diverse key players, their structures are more flexible, they possess a credible level of expertise, they often have more experience working with non-state actors, and they carry enough weight to negotiate on an equal footing with big countries like China or at the UN level. Projects can be developed in smaller bodies and then more easily transferred to the UN. The EU, ASEAN, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe are experienced in working with multiple stakeholders and are a good place to engage in policy experimentation and vetting. NATO could offer a good platform to introduce new ideas around a transatlantic zone of cyber stability.
The Paris Call community should also look at relevant geographic clusters. This would make it easier to identify local attitudes and policy goals, and to create projects of common interests. Initiatives could, for example, feature regions with exemplary cyber behavior as a role model or connect cluster of countries with other clusters and assist them in implementing norms of responsible cyber behavior. The goal would be to build an ever-increasing number of geographic pockets of cyber stability. A good example of this is how the Baltic states cooperate on cyber-hygiene initiatives in the public sector and exchange best practices. There have also been efforts between the EU and the United States to strengthen cooperation on the global norms debate, despite the U.S. government not having signed the Paris Call yet. In other words, to act globally the Paris Call also must think regionally.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – AT A/C
Lonergan and Montgomery 22 -- Dr. Erica Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery is the senior director of the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation. “PRESSING QUESTIONS: OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS AND NATO STRATEGY” Published January 25, 2022. //DG
NATO’s shift to incorporating offensive cyber operations into existing strategy and policy has focused on integrating offensive effects into conventional military plans and operations in the context of a conflict. While NATO’s updated strategy is a positive development, its limited focus on conflict scenarios for employing cyber power fails to accurately account for the cyber threat environment NATO faces—particularly the mismatch between the alliance’s clear distinction between wartime and peacetime and the approach of adversaries like Russia, who adopt a competition-conflict continuum. Additionally, the focus on employing offensive cyber during a high-end conventional fight is also not consistent with how several NATO members are already engaged in gray zone offensive cyber operations.
The primary threat to NATO allies in the cyber domain is not from high-end, decisive cyberattacks. Instead, cyber threats more frequently and effectively manifest as gray zone tactics designed to have a corrosive effect without rising to the level of warfare. There are numerous examples of this type of threat. For instance, in July 2021, NATO publicly condemned a range of malicious cyber behavior, including the Microsoft Exchange hack (which NATO attributed to China) and ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure. Russia has leveraged cyber and disinformation operations to interfere in democratic elections in the United States in 2016, 2018, and 2020; France in 2017; and Germany in 2017 and 2021—to name just a few examples. Russia also conducted distributed denial-of-service cyberattacks against government websites in Montenegro during the lead-up to, and following, Montenegro’s ascension to NATO in 2017. And when NATO forces were positioned in the Baltics beginning in 2017 as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence, two threat actors, GhostWriter and Secondary Infektion, conducted a range of disinformation campaigns.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – NATO Key
Talihärm 13 (Anna-Maria Talihärm, Senior Analyst of the Legal and Policy Branch, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE), “Towards Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberwar Through International Cooperation” UN, vol. L, no. 2, August 2013, ) -lh
Malicious cyberactivities have been affecting individuals, private entities, government institutions and non-governmental organizations for years. We have witnessed large-scale cyber-incidents such as in Estonia in 2007, with numerous sophisticated targeted attacks, hacktivism and countless instances of identity theft and malware. Due to the unpredictable nature of cyberthreats, an incident that may appear in the beginning as an act of hacktivism or financially motivated cybercrime may rapidly escalate into something much more serious and reach the threshold of national security, even cyberwar.
Despite the lack of consensus on exactly what constitutes cyberwarfare or cyberterrorism, governments need to ensure that their infrastructure is well protected against different types of cyberthreats and that their legal and policy frameworks would allow to effectively prevent, deter, defend and mitigate possible cyberattacks. Not being able to agree on common definitions of central terms such as “cyberattack” and “cyberwar” should not prevent states from expressing the urgency of preparing their nations for possible cyberincidents.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – NATO Key
Fidler 13 (David P. Fidler, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, “NATO, Cyber Def , Cyber Defense, and International Law,” Articles by Maurer Faculty, 2013, ) - lh
In its sixty-four year history, NATO has been at the center of national security challenges faced by members of the Alliance, whether the challenge involved confronting Soviet military power in Europe, expanding its collective defense strategy in the postCold War period, responding to humanitarian crises, or participating in efforts to address international terrorism. NATO’s cyber defense strategy means that the Alliance has started to deal with yet another security threat, spurred in particular by the Estonia cyber crisis. However, despite the progress NATO has made with its operational capabilities through NCIRC and its decision-making processes on cyber defense issues, NATO is not, at present, at the center of cybersecurity thinking taking place within the policy circles in NATO members, especially the United States. The more NATO lags behind in cybersecurity policy and law, the more the Alliance will be stuck in a reactive mode—a situation that will reduce NATO’s ability to be a more constructive platform for cybersecurity both within the Alliance and between NATO and non-NATO countries. NATO could proactively play a more significant role in global cybersecurity but only if NATO members empower NATO to lead rather than just trail behind.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – Cohesion Key
Namias 22 – Dominic Namias is a legislative fellow at the US House of Representatives. “U.S. Warfare Within the Fifth Domain: Deterring Russian Cyber Aggression” Published 2022. //DG
NATO has been generally successful in implementing the private sector of their various nations into the cyber defense field and serves as an example of the private cybersecurity industry aiding the public sector. Through NCI Agency, the information technology, communications and cyber defense arm of NATO, billions of dollars have been invested in private companies from NATO countries to train and equip professionals in the public field to defend against attacks. This is an example of successful strategy that has also been used by the U.S. Department of Defense. These investments show a common strategy among NATO member states which has been extremely successful. Through sharing strategies and information, the U.S. and NATO can learn from one another the best means to deter cyber aggression.
Working with NATO Counterparts
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – Cohesion Key
Kramer 20 – Franklin Kramer is a member of the board at the Atlantic Council and the Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. “NATO needs continuous responses in cyberspace”. Published December 9, 2020. //DG
President-Elect Joe Biden’s transition team has declared cyber threats as “one of the defining challenges of our time.” In its early days, the incoming US administration must take on cybersecurity threats as one of its key priorities. Nowhere will that effort be more important than with the United States’ closest Allies at NATO, a cornerstone for Western security. Today, NATO’s security is threatened by Russia’s and China’s continuous cyberattacks on the Alliance and its members. To accomplish its mission of deterrence and defense, NATO needs to implement a strategy of proactive, continuous responses to China and Russia in cyberspace, where great power competition is playing out in real time.
Russia and China challenge NATO and its members in cyberspace on a daily basis, as part of ongoing hybrid campaigns to undermine the transatlantic community. The Kremlin’s actions have involved intrusions into Allies’ critical infrastructures, manipulating Allies’ elections through hacks and disinformation, and even blocking GPS information critical to NATO activities. The Chinese government has engaged in cyber espionage against Allies’ military capabilities; intellectual property theft related to sensitive technologies, industries, and infrastructure; and disinformation against transatlantic countries, including around the coronavirus. These efforts to weaken NATO countries and Alliance cohesion represent a persistent threat to Allied security.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – Cohesion Key
Christian 20 (Christian, Joshua D,, Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School, 2020-06), 6/6/20, accessed 6/24/22, “Russian CYber Operations to Destabilize NATO”, (JB)
This thesis uses a case study analysis to better understand the effects of Russian cyber operations. This approach is best to grasp how the cyber operations have become more effective and efficient over time. This has enabled Russia to conduct operations of similar ends against multiple states in order to further its own objectives. Russia views NATO expansion as a direct threat to Russia and reasoning behind this will be analyzed to discover where it fits into Russian grand strategy. Lack of political cohesion within the NATO Alliance creates a vulnerability for Russia to exploit. Political instability and distrust in the government can be analyzed through the 2016 presidential election, as well as the election tampering in Europe, because both are important case studies to showcase how Russia has adapted the use of cyber and technology to further the effectiveness of its activities. Civil preparedness and resiliency are key parts of NATO strength that Russia has attempted to exploit to diminish NATO’s capacity to respond during a crisis. Dragonfly and NotPetya displayed the progression of Russian cyber capabilities against critical infrastructure in a short period of time. The effectiveness and concerns highlighted by these cases are important to analyze in order for NATO states to better prepare to defend against cyber operations of this type. The disruption and damage that can be caused through critical infrastructure attacks has a global impact that far exceeds that of the United States and NATO.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – Cohesion Key
Davis 19 (Susan Davis, “NATO IN THE CYBER AGE: STRENGTHENING SECURITY & DEFENCE, STABILISING DETERRENCE,” NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 8/13/2019, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=sites/default/files/2019-09/148%20STC%20Davis%20-%20NATO%20IN%20THE%20CYBER%20AGE%20-%20fall%20revision%20-%20clean%2011.9.19.pdf)-lh
Policy circles within the Alliance and beyond continue to debate how cyber attacks affect stability during crises and armed conflict. Which types of cyber attacks would be de-escalatory, escalatory, or neutral? Would the answer differ depending on when, during a crisis or an armed conflict, they would be launched? And are there significant differences between various states on these answers? States most likely do not see a cyber attack as a viable option for a pre-emptive first strike. However, in a crisis or pre-war situation, they could perceive a significant “cost of going second” (Davis, 2014). In such situations, one side “may well be frightened of what would happen if the other side attacks and may be convinced that going first will be advantageous” (Davis, 2014). This could lead to high escalatory risks in a crisis. Another key problem is the difficulty of determining the intent of a cyber intrusion (Lindsay, 2015). When a defender detects a breach, he may not know whether the intruder wants to spy on him, conduct forward defence, gain a foothold for future defensive measures, or prepare for an imminent or future cyber attack (Slayton, 2017). It is extremely difficult to gauge intent in cyber space, and, in such cases, states tend to assume the worst (Hennessey, 2017). As a result, this can lead to misperception and an escalatory spiral (Slayton, 2017). In sum, escalation dynamics deserve considerably more attention. For now, however, the Alliance should seek to reduce escalatory risks through clear diplomatic messaging and engagement; a high level of transparency on cyber policies; examining escalation dynamics in exercises; as well as support to norm-development and confidence building measures.
III. NATO CYBER POLICY 23. At the political level, the Alliance continues to adapt its cyber security, defence, and deterrence policies through regularly updated action plans with concrete objectives and timelines. This section outlines NATO’s: - overarching strategies to counter cyber attacks; - cyber capability development; - the integration of cyber capabilities into NATO planning; - concrete cooperation in NATO; and - NATO’s cyber partnerships.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – Cohesion Key
Author?? 21 (author, “The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass,” 2021, https://www.europeum.org/data/articles/the-v4-towards-a-new-nato-strategic-concept.pdf)-lh
This issue, over which there are no major disagreements among V4 states, comprises cybersecurity and the development of the alliance’s resilience in cyberspace. All member states agree that this new operational domain has become vital in all types of conflicts, and therefore must be a key area of cooperation amongst NATO members. Our experts also noted that cyber resilience is an area where cohesion can be achieved at the lowest cost. This does not diminish the importance of the topic at hand; rather, it shows us that there are still key challenges which have to be overcome in the near future. Despite the fact that it is not a physical area of operations, cyberspace cannot be separated from the aforementioned geopolitical tensions. It is also connected with the question of the alliance’s stance towards Russia and China; both of these countries have robust capabilities in cyberspace, which they are keen to utilise in the developing great power competition. This factor is also relevant on a lower level, connected to other disruptive and hostile powers such as Iran or North Korea, as well as non-state actors such as international terrorist organisations. The V4 countries naturally have lower levels of readiness in cyberspace than the great powers do; however, it is entirely possible for small and medium-sized powers to enhance their resilience against cyberattacks. For example, Estonia reacted (with the support of NATO) to Russian cyber aggression, and developed robust defensive infrastructure and practices, which should be emulated by other countries.
Due to its limited size, resources, demography, and industrial capacity, Estonia could not aspire to such a power position in terms of conventional warfare. International cooperation in cyber resilience is also a force multiplier, and no country can or should rely solely on itself. Thus, it is in the interests of security and political stability to have more pronounced cooperation in this field. The V4 can be a champion in this area: Poland is a great example of the rapid development of the cyber industry, deeply anchored in the transatlantic alliance.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L – Cohesion Key
Bellasio and Silfversten 20 (Jacobo Bellasio and Erik Silfversten, Bellasio is the Senior Analyst Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe, Silfversten is the Co-Director Centre for Futures and Foresight Studies RAND Europe, “The Impact of New and Emerging Technologies on the Cyber Threat Landscape and Their Implications for NATO,” Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, 2020, https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/Cyber-Threats-and-NATO-2030_Horizon-Scanning-and-Analysis.pdf)- lh
C. Strengthening Trust and Interoperability Across the Alliance The coming decade will be of pivotal importance to NATO as a period characterised by a continuously evolving technology landscape with potentially disruptive effects in the cyber domain and beyond. In an era of uncertainty, constrained resources and political tension, cooperation and trust will be fundamental enablers of an agile, technology-driven and digital NATO. Only through joint efforts will NATO truly be able to harness the potential of the emerging technologies discussed in this chapter and successfully mitigate the risks and threats they may pose in the future. The need for trust therefore extends to both trust in technology and trust in the Alliance and its member states.
Similar to how the effects of emerging technologies should not be treated in isolation, NATO’s response to emerging technologies must be one of joint efforts and interoperability. Technical, legal, financial and organisational barriers to the implementation of emerging technologies are more likely to be overcome through joint capability and force development efforts, which will, by extension, also help build trust and facilitate interoperability. Several of the emerging technology areas discussed in this paper would place significant data, infrastructure and interoperability requirements on NATO, which may be particularly difficult to overcome given the current state of data heterogeneity and sometimes incompatible digital infrastructure across the Alliance. Several emerging technologies would also require interoperability in relation to shared vocabularies of technical terms, norms, standards and organisational practices, as well as human interoperability and joint training and exercising. For example, AI has been highlighted as a potential area of concern where a lack of interoperability and common definitions paired with technological mismatches could erode Alliance cohesion (Dufour, 2018).
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L - Deterrence
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
The benefits of a joint offensive cyber capability for conventional collective defence are far easier to discern than cyber-deterrence. NATO could use it for tactical operations to support combat operations and shape the battlefield.149 The most obvious scenario this could be used in is if NATO were attacked by Russia, the only state whose conventional forces pose a threat. Offensive cyber capabilities would be an important force multiplier in the event of a Russian attack on the Baltic states, where local force ratios would favour the attacker.150 Battlefield NATO commanders could use cyber effects to disrupt Russian C2 networks or the software on advanced weapons, like surface-to-air missiles or fighter aircraft.151 Anti-access/ area denial operations (A2/AD) like these seek to deny attackers the ability to bring their assets into a contested region and prevent them from operating freely within it.152 Offensive cyber capabilities have already been used in this way to great effect. In 2007, the Israeli Air Force allegedly used the Suter computer program to conduct an airstrike against a nuclear reactor in Northern Syria.153 This fed Syria’s air defence systems a false-sky picture, allowing Israeli fighter jets to successfully bomb the reactor without being detected.154 In many ways, cyber effects will become a basic necessity in conventional warfare. No modern air force would enter combat without electronic warfare (EW) capabilities; as cyber and EW merge into a single activity, air operations will require cyber support.155 Overall, since cyberweapons can be so effective on the battlefield, they would clearly aid NATO’s warfighting ability.
A joint capability would be the best way to fulfill this role. The CyOC is hoping to coordinate battlefield effects in a similar way.156 However, the secrecy of members’ capabilities and the persistence of sovereign operational authority will make it harder for SACEUR to quickly decide whether and how to use cyberweapons. This would be detrimental in a hot war scenario, the rapid pace of which demands decisions to be made ‘at the speed of relevance’.157 Additionally, offensive cyberweapons depend heavily on force integration to be effective on the battlefield.158 The greater the integration between conventional and cyber operations, the greater the multiplier effect achieved – as proved by Israel’s highly coordinated airstrike.159 However, it seems the current volunteer system is lacking in this regard. A senior NATO official has acknowledged the Alliance needs to get better at aligning its cyber assets with its Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltics as part of an A2/AD strategy.160 This means it needs to improve coordination with the EFP’s graduated response plans and practise battlefield cyberattacks in a more realistic way during exercises.161 To this end, the improved C2, knowledge transfer and resource allocation that a joint cyber capability offers would augment not just cyber-deterrence but collective defence too.
2022
Georgetown
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Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L - Deterrence
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
Additionally, a unified offensive cyber C2 structure would aid scenario planning and speed up decision-making. This is important, because NATO needs to streamline its current decision-making process in the cyber domain.115 A single command would help members agree on appropriate forms of retaliation in cyberspace in different scenarios, bolstering the credibility of deterrence-by-punishment even further. Without a clear command structure, it is very difficult for the 30 NATO allies – who have different threat perceptions and suffer from a lack of cohesion – to agree on effective response scenarios in contingency planning.116 As a case in point, Estonia is willing to strike back when attacked online, given its memory of the 2007 attack and its proximity to Russia.117 However, Estonian officials do not know whether other allies will support them, validating some scholars’ arguments that NATO needs to find common ground in cyber contingency planning.118 The secrecy that shrouds allies’ capabilities and the uncertainty surrounding cyber scenario planning might explain why offensive cyber effects do not feature in NATO’s mission planning process.119 This is not to say that NATO needs to publicly agree on a ‘red line’ in cyberspace that could trigger an Article 5 response. If anything, NATO’s current strategic ambiguity is key for deterring attacks that fall just below a defined threshold.120 However, unifying cyber C2 would help them carry out scenario planning behind closed doors, improving the Alliance’s readiness. Speeding up the decision-making process is crucial given how long it can take to attribute and then launch a retaliatory attack.121 Overall, streamlined scenario planning and decision- making, augmented by improved coordination of cyberattacks, would strengthen the credibility of deterrence-by-punishment. Although aggressors like Fancy Bear would not know when a certain threshold has been crossed, it would tilt their risk-benefit calculus knowing an attack could trigger a faster, well-coordinated retaliatory attack.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
Wave 1 – Aff Compiled › Adv 2 - Cohesion › I/L - Deterrence
University of Exeter 20. “Should NATO Adopt a Joint Offensive Cyber Capability?” September 2020. . //AN
Furthermore, a joint capability would improve NATO’s offensive cyber C2, improving attack coordination and mitigating fratricide. This is because NATO’s ‘volunteer’ system and its CyOC mark a striking departure from the way it usually handles C2of members’ assets.108 The NATO Force Structure dictates that conventional forces like ships and tanks come under the full operational control of an assigned NATO commander.109 However, according to a retired USAF Colonel leading the implementation of NATO’s 2017 cyber policy, the C2 problems inherent in the volunteer system make it ‘far from ideal’.110 This is because NATO commanders do not know the details of capabilities available to them, such as their legal consequences, impeding the decision-making process.111 Commanders also want to know how using cyberweapons might conflict with other operations; without this they are left ‘flying blind’.112 Failing to coordinate operations can have far-reaching consequences. For instance, intelligence agencies’ reconnaissance of target networks needs to be coordinated with cyber-sabotage operations, so they do not interfere with each other.113 Disaggregated C2 can even result in fratricide on other allies’ networks, because the distinction between internal and external security threats is much harder to ascertain in cyberspace than in the other four domains.114 The CyOC is a step towards resolving this, but until a NATO commander has control over members’ capabilities, these problems will not be fully resolved.