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Security K › Link › Climate Migration
Wojciech et al 22 - Deputy director of the Institute of Political Sciences and Administration of the UO, Assistant professor - Department of Regional Studies Wojciech Opioła1a, Bartosz Czepila , Marcin Dębickib , Ewa Ganowicza , Justyna Kajtac , Katalin Kovályd , Łukasz Mollb , Natalia Niedźwiecka-Iwańczakb , Elżbieta Opiłowskab , Grigorii Pidgrushniy April 25, 2022 “Editorial: War and politics. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and refugee crisis on the eastern EU border from the perspective of border studies” https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Wojciech-Opiola/publication/360557978_War_and_politics_The_2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine_and_refugee_crisis_on_the_eastern_EU_border_from_the_perspective_of_border_studies/links/6284ffaa14a92616f0426adc/War-and-politics-The-2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine-and-refugee-crisis-on-the-eastern-EU-border-from-the-perspective-of-border-studies.pdf
For decades, we could observe two parallel but contrary processes – debordering and rebordering – a decreasing and at the same time increasing impact of borders. Whereas the former was linked to the process of political and economic European integration and globalization, the latter was justified by security measures. Borderlands studies have followed these developments and analyzed the changes generated by Europeanization, globalization and the recent revival of nationalism. Increasingly, the migration crises brought to the fore the question of the ethical dimension of the bordering process. By taking into consideration that borders do not only divide physical space but are also used to sort people according to the degree of their belonging, Laine (2021, p. 747) questions the state-centric thinking and emphasizes that “borders carry considerable moral weight in determining ethical responsibilities towards those who are not considered to belong”. However, since people live in networked societies today, and not in isolated national communities, the humanitarian principle is not the sole argument that borders should be made more permeable. Hence, Laine proposes the ethics of unbounded inclusiveness to move away from the nation state-centric form of organization and the rigid borders and to consider alternative forms of belongingness towards more inclusive societies.
Nevertheless, as the optimistic vision of a borderless world has already vanished, and the idea of cosmopolitical citizenship (Balibar, 2010) has not been implemented by nation states yet, we can rather observe border securitization in Europe than debordering policies (cf. Prokkola, 2021; Léonard & Kaunert, 2020). The tightening of borders and the adoption of more restrictive migration policies results in the increase of clandestine journeys and more desperate and risky attempts to enter EU member states. Thus, securitization which leads to violence, injustice and bad treatment of migrants, also provokes humanitarian impulses on the side of public opinion, NGOs, and migrant activists’ groups. In effect, securitization and humanitarianism at the border are two sides of the same coin: the former is supplemented by the latter, and the latter is determined by the former. This double-bind can be described as ‘hostipitable’ (both hostile and hospitable) condition of EU border regimes (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). What migrants face when they approach Europe is the state of indifference between security measures and human rights. The policies which should help to differentiate between unwelcomed invaders and deserving refugees only contribute to arbitrary treatment of people on the move. The role of states in having control over national borders (and their permeability to different categories of people), but also over boundaries, which relate to social exclusion and inclusion (Donnan & Wilson, 2007) – is strongly evident in current events.
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Security K › Link › Climate Change
Warner and Boas 19 (Warner, Jeroen is a professor of sociology at Wageningen University and Boas, Ingrid is an assistant professor at Wageningen University, “Securitization of climate change: How invoking global dangers for instrumental ends can backfire”. EPC: Politics and Space 2019, Vol. 37(8) 1471–1488. ) //AP
Davoudi (2014) shows how the social understanding of nature moved from nature-asclockwork (Enlightenment) through nature-as-finite (Club of Rome, 1970s), through nature as risk (1990s) to discourses of global danger and insecurity caused by nature. The author traces the rise of ‘climate securitization’ back to a conference, ‘The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ in Toronto in 1988, which portrayed the consequences of climate change as only second to nuclear war. Since the 1990s climate change has often been presented as a global crisis, an existential threat to human civilization, a planetary catastrophe (Paglia, 2018). Yet, unlike an aggressive force out to conquer foreign territory, climate change is a special domain of emergency, that of ‘threats without enemies’ (Prins, 1993). As argued by Methmann and Rothe (2012: 328), climate is depicted as an external threat, with impacts coming suddenly, ‘from the outside’. Issues of risk and security ‘can provoke strong emotions, legitimise extraordinary practices, and lead to practices that are otherwise indefensible’ (Davoudi, 2014: 371–372). Environmental securitization however is an uncertain domain for securitization (Buzan et al., 1998; Trombetta, 2008). In climate change, the burden of proof to legitimize securitization is especially tricky. While a clear majority of the academic community considers anthropogenic climate change sufficiently proven, its invisibility as a source of anticipated catastrophes that have yet to happen, cannot easily compete with visible weather events in the ‘attention economy’ (Hamblyn, 2009). Other publics, then, are not convinced, as has become clear for instance under the Trump administration. Moreover, there is no ready consensus within the academic community on a clear and present nexus between climate change, violent conflict and/or migration (Adams et al., 2018), and if there is, that it can be successfully averted through a particular course of action.
2022
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Security K › Link › Climate Change
McCormack and Gilbert 22 - Killian McCormack is a Research Associate in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto, where he completed his PhD in 2020. His research examines the intersections of militarization, global health, and geopolitics, with a specific focus on the US military’s global health engagement practices. Emily Gilbert is Professor of Canadian Studies and Geography at the University of Toronto, where she is also Vice-Principal of University College. Her research examines contemporary forms of securitization and militarization, across multiple domains (eg borders, war, climate change), with a particular focus on north America. She is an Editor at the journal Security Dialogue, [“The Geopolitics of Militarism and Humanitarianism”, University of Toronto, Progress in Human Geography, 2022, Vol. 46(1) 179–197, ]RA
Military response is also mobilized domestically in response to crises, often with respect to marginalized and alienated populations as with Hurricane Katrina in 2005 where the predominantly black population was targeted by state violence (Smith, 2006), or with Indigenous activism, whether the 1991 Oka crisis in Canada or the ongoing Dakota pipeline protests in the US (Estes, 2019). Yet militaries are also undertaking pre-emptive action. For example, this is evident in Operation Continuing Promise, launched in 2008 by US Southern Command, to provide basic medical care to vulnerable communities in Latin America and the Caribbean in anticipation of potential future crisis, which Joe Bryan (2015) has shown renders humanitarianism as a means of waging war without end. In this way, humanitarian practices and spaces form a part of a larger geography of war, anticipating and pre-empting future conflict by deploying militaries in the present. Militaries are also involved in the securitization of channels of global migration. Geographers have underlined the ways that borders, and the work they do, are extended internally and externally through appeals to humanitarian care and control, which paradoxically serves to reinforce and securitize the very national and regional borders that asylum seekers are trying to cross (Islemen, 2018; Jones, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins, 2018). Of course, the securitization and militarization of migration is not new. But the technologies of migration management – and the forms of circumvention or resistance that are mobilized – are taking new shape and form. What begins as a ‘humanitarian’ operation can quickly devolve into a more interventionist and militarized operation of capture, containment and control. For example, both NATO and the EU have launched military operations in response to the ongoing refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli (2018) have argued that although their stated aim is to protect migrants and disrupt smuggler’s networks, these missions act to dissuade migration flows through the central and eastern Mediterranean and disrupt the potential of certain populations to move through space. Migrants are both the subjects to be saved, and those who are prevented from travelling – a phenomenon that is not limited to Europe (Loyd et al., 2016; Mountz, 2020). Recent moves to militarize the response to refugees have been fuelled by the conflicts and war in Middle East and Africa – paradoxically, the means of war are increasingly being used to regulate the consequences of war – but discourses around militarization have also proliferated with the anticipated rise of ‘climate refugees’ in response to climate change (Gilbert, 2012; Hartmann, 2010). In all these examples, the nexus of militarized-humanitarianism is leading to more violence, rather than its mitigation. As Fassin and Pandolfi (2010: 12) have argued, disasters and conflict are rendered equivalent behind the moral discourse of humanitarianism, prompting military intervention or militarized responses, and leading to the ‘naturalization – or depoliticization – of war’. Citizens are turned into ‘passive beneficiaries’ of the responsibility to protect, transformed from rights-bearing agents to ‘recipients of charity’ (Mamdani, 2009: 264). Weizman (2011: 52) has noted that the blurring of roles of militaries and humanitarians has led belligerents ‘to construe aid workers as enemies, an integral part of the occupying force’, rendering them more vulnerable to attack and violence (see also Foley, 2008). In turn, this has resulted in what Mark Duffield (2012) has termed a bunkerization of the aid industry, with the presence of humanitarian organizations becoming increasingly fortified in conflict zones, further tying them to security actors and rendering the space of aid intervention also a space of security. This reflects a hardening of boundaries that characterizes militarized humanitarianism, with specific spaces of security produced that reinforce divides between those who save and those who will be saved. However, as Jennifer Fluri has shown, attempts to secure the lives of international aid workers in conflict zones can also render civilian bodies more vulnerable, for example, through the disruptions arising from highly securitized compounds, to the violations of private spaces (Fluri, 2011). Despite these vulnerabilities, military engagement in humanitarian response is used to legitimate it as a force of good, which obfuscates its lethal force. As new crises unfold, from disasters caused by climate change to health emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, geographers will need to continue to interrogate the militarized responses that are marshalled in the name of humanitarianism, as they take new shape and form.
2022
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Security K › Link › China – Military
Yuan and Fu, 20 (Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 10 July, 2020, Chinese Journal of International Politics, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/13/3/419/5869540?redirectedFrom=fulltext)
While both China and the Soviet Union are narrated as a military threat, China is largely framed as a regional one rather than a global one. Admiral Philip. S. Davidson, the Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command said in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on US Command Posture on 12 February, 2019: ‘The PLA is the principal threat to US interests, US citizens, and our allies inside the First Island Chain’.121 It should be noted that China’s so-called military threat does not signify that China’s forces have surpassed or actively challenged US military power but rather that China’s military threat arises as long as China can potentially pose a challenge to US military predominance. In this narrative logic, China’s increased military spending, upgrading and expanding of weapons systems and technologies, and overseas deployments to protect its commercial interests, or even the limited access to information on China’s military planning are taken as evidence of China’s rising military threat. This kind of hawkish rhetoric is widespread in annual Department of Defense reports to Congress on China’s military power and in US Defense Intelligence Agency reports on China’s Military Power. One notable feature of the evolving discourse is the growing attention the United States is paying to the PLA’s cyber and nuclear warfare capabilities.
2022
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Security K › Link › China – Great Power Competition
Yuan and Fu, 20 (Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 10 July, 2020, Chinese Journal of International Politics, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/13/3/419/5869540?redirectedFrom=fulltext)
American hawks, especially those of the ‘deep state’ intelligence and defence community, advocate a new Cold War script where China constitutes a progressively serious political threat. This rhetoric has been on the rise over the last couple of years. In the first place, an existential threat is the ideologically and politically antithetical Other. To American hawks, China is an authoritarian regime under Communist one-party rule, which in itself constitutes an existential threat to the free democracy of the United States. For example, the 2017 US National Security Strategy states that China ‘spreads features of its authoritarian system’.115 This mindset is even more apparent in an open letter from former military officials, scholars, and other conservative China watchers to President Trump in 2019, in which they emphasise that China and its Communist party are an existential threat to US values and the US-led world order.116 Meanwhile, it should be noted that although there is a rising rhetoric on ideological differences, it is more about China’s political system itself than the expansive nature of communism so often promoted in the Soviet threat story. In the second place, there is the China Model. In this frame, China represents an authoritarian capitalism, and its great economic success offers other countries an alternative model. This constitutes a challenge to the United States’ free democratic market economy model in the global order. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community released by the Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats in 2019 bluntly points out that China will more actively ‘seek to assert China’s model of authoritarian capitalism as an alternative’ for other countries to the Washington Consensus, which may ‘threaten international support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law’; also that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a platform to expand China’s ‘global economic, political, and military reach’ and ‘diminish US influence’.117 In the third place is the whole-of-society threat. In this hawkish portrayal, China is taking advantage of the United States’ open environment and political loopholes to gain economic, political, and military benefits, thus threatening US security from the inside. Although this mode of thought has long existed in the China threat discourse, the ‘whole-of-society threat’ concept was coined by FBI Director Christopher Wray during a Senate hearing in February 2018. He said that, in order to replace the United States’ global leadership, China employs not only state institutions but also non-traditional collectors like students and professors to amass intelligence and steal intellectual property rights, so this is ‘not just a whole-of-government threat, but a whole-of-society threat’.118 This narrative template was reinforced in Vice President Pence’s China policy speech in October 2018, in which he said China was attempting to ‘shift American public opinion and public policy’, influence US elections, and fragment domestic interest groups by ‘rewarding or coercing’ agents of influence, such as students, scholars, journalists, and think tanks in the United States.119 One month after the Pence speech, a report from the Hoover Institution echoed this frame by detailing how China has employed agents of influence to influence American domestic politics and policies towards China.120 This narrative was rapidly transposed into government policy. Over the last two years, the visas of certain Chinese scholars have been withdrawn, a number of Chinese Confucius Institutes closed, and the enrolment of Chinese students in certain key areas has also clearly been affected.
2022
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Security K › Link › China – Great Power Competition
Yuan and Fu, 20 (Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 10 July, 2020, Chinese Journal of International Politics, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/13/3/419/5869540?redirectedFrom=fulltext)
Rather than the rationalist approach to national security, we adopt a narrative approach to unravelling the narrative process whereby national threats are constructed. Having encountered three successive national rivals since WWII, the United States has constructed three distinctive threat stories to safeguard its hegemonic identity. The Soviet threat consists in the story of two ideologically opposed rivals competing for world domination; the Japan-bashing narrative tells a victimhood story stemming from Japan’s unfair competition. China threat stories, however, are now more complex, conflating a story of US victimhood at the hands of China’s unfair competition, advocated by President Trump, with a widely embedded but malleable epic tale of power competition between a rising power and the ruling power, and a new, ‘deep state’ defence community-propagated Cold War script. All these threat stories have framed what is perceived and what should be done, but they are merely those from among other alternative narratives that eventually gained a dominant position at critical junctures. These so called national threats are hence no more than narrative constructs in a self-other manner of articulation rather than one of objective existence. Upon examining the narrative templates of US threat stories, we find striking differences among them. The Soviet threat spectrum ranges from the ideological to the political and military domains, and economic challenge is the focus of the Japan threat. But China represents the full spectrum of threats that previously featured in both the Soviet threat story and the Japan-bashing narrative. Upon zooming in, we further find that an ideological conflict constitutes the main thread of the Soviet threat storyline, but that the economic challenge of the China threat outweighs the ideological and political ones. On the political front, the Soviet Union’s totalitarian dictatorship is the polar opposite of liberal democracy, while China is often styled as an authoritarian state—a far less antagonistic wording. As to military threats, the Soviet threat is urgent and global, but the China threat is only a rising and regional one. To counter the economic challenge emanating first from Japan and then from China, the United States adopted different strategies to construct its victimhood story, namely, coining new concepts for Japan, and cashing in on stereotypes for China. In spite of the above-marked differences, however, we can also clearly discern continuity in the United States’ national threat stories. This is reflected not only in the United States’ consistently resorting to the victimhood narrative to counter economic challenges from both Japan and China, and unremittingly cashing in on its widely-shared mythologies and images regarding the Self and Others to achieve resonance, but also, more revealingly, in the underlying logic of US national threat-making. The United States will invariably adopt a zero-sum mindset in making a diametrical self-other story for any country—be it a formidable power with an antagonistic ideology like the Soviet Union, an ally like Japan, or a rising peer competitor like China—that might threaten its hegemonic identity. According to this logic, the American Self is always superior to Others, and articulating the threat confirms its superiority. Not surprisingly, when Others, like Japan or China, challenge its economic primacy, the United States, rather than examining its own problems, will always blame such others for playing an ‘unfair game’. This paper also provides us with a vantage point to appreciate the current debate on Sino–US relations. Clearly, we are in the second half of the critical juncture wherein the question is not whether the United States and China will compete with each other but in which way the competition will unfold, for the bankruptcy of the liberal international order discourse makes it unlikely to revert to yesteryear’s policy of engagement. As the three narrative threads of the China threat stories all point to competition and conflict, and can be self-fulfilling, we may witness increasing tensions between them. Specifically, the Japan-bashing victimhood story can shed considerable light on our understanding of Trump’s China policy. We find that the story President Trump advocates to a large extent matches the victimhood story that the revisionists concocted to deal with Japan in the 1980s. Trump’s rhetoric regarding unfair trade and industry targeting, slapping of trade tariffs amounting to blackmail on both China and US allies, resultsoriented approach to trade negotiation, and the US high-tech stranglehold that curbs or bars investment in the industry by US competitors can all be found in the Japan threat story toolbox. Having pivoted China policy towards conflict, however, there are few indications that Trump wants to act out a Cold War script. In accordance with the storytelling logic, should Trump retain his presidency in the coming election, the trade war will probably not end in a ‘fair’ trade agreement until such time as the US economy far outperforms China’s, because US superiority entails outperformance, failing which the blame must go on unfair play. That is what happened to Japan, that is to say, successive rounds of sanctions and negotiations until Japan drifted into the Lost Decade. China may, moreover, face even greater US hostility to its high-tech industry and investment, as happened in 1980s. These are issues that China’s political nature and growing military may further complicate. But it should be noted that China is not Japan and will neither give in easily as Japan did nor pose a solely economic challenge to the United States. The Soviet threat story also offers insight. Indeed, a new Cold War rhetoric is rising in Sino–US relations narratives in the United States. Hawks in the US defence community, among them congressman like Senators Rick Scott and Marco Rubio, former officials like John Bolton, and to some extent even Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have all contributed to the rise of a Cold War mentality. The effect of this Cold War rhetoric is apparent in government policy, such as the barring of visits from certain Chinese scholars and treating Chinese news media as ‘foreign missions’. Although this new Cold War script may sensationalise and aggravate the already deteriorated Sino–US relations, unless major events or crises occur, it seems unlikely to become a grand dominant narrative in the near future. This is partly due to the fact that China, unlike the Soviet Union, does not export Communism, so what Americans are agonising most about now is China’s catching up and the United States’ relatively underperforming economy. Moreover, quite apart from China’s refusal to accept and act on such a script, China has become deeply embedded in the world economy, and its trading partners have little incentive to contain China. The future dominant threat story is hence likely to be a hybrid one that allows cooperation while being open to confrontation.
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Security K › Link › China – Great Power Competition
Gilkey, Qiana, 2022, (Malmö University, Faculty of Culture and Society (KS), Department of Global Political Studies (GPS).) "How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?: A critical discourse analysis of perceptional and ideological differences in American discourse vis-à-vis the Belt and Road Initiative.," DIVA, https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?dswid=-6447&pid=diva2%3A1667683
The hegemonic position held by America and its position in the international system as a dominant state is central to its identity. As Fukuyama’s (1989) article noted, the collapse of the Soviet Union shaped American identity as a global hegemon, an example of them as a leading Western liberal and democratic state, and a state which aims to spread liberal and democratic values. The US perceives its hegemonic position, therefore its core identity, as being threatened by China. The previous subsections have demonstrated how there has been a rise in securitizing discourse regarding the BRI which affects multiple sectors, not solely the economic and military sectors. The analysis also demonstrates the role that conflicting ideologies play in securitizing speech acts. While explicitly stating that China is using the BRI to actively spread its authoritarian and communist values in the economic sector, the analysis shows how the perceived ideological expansion and perceived threats further contribute to the securitization of China and the construction of the ‘China threat’. The securitization of China is in no way a new and untouched subject of study, however, the use of poststructuralism has been underutilized. The aim of this thesis was to explore how securitization regarding the BRI also includes differences in ideologies and perceptions, as ample research has mainly focused on the economic, military, and strategic elements. The use of Fairclough’s three-dimensional model along with the theoretical framework developed by Hansen has been used to highlight the perceptional and ideological differences which play key roles in the securitization of China. It also reveals the latent power relations and how the discourse by US elites reproduces these unequal power relationships. The method and theoretical framework were chosen to explore how historical context and social contexts at a specific period in time affect speech acts. The articles reviewed mainly focus on the economic and military sectors, and while this is acknowledged to play a substantial role, the ideological differences have shown to also securitize the political and societal sectors as well. The inclusion of more sectors provides a more robust and deeper understanding of the securitization process and how it contributes to the further securitization of China. The addition of poststructuralism contributes to the security field by emphasizing different ontologies and epistemologies, which only serves to deepen the understanding of the securitization process and if it will be successful or not. It also allows us to understand why US-Sino relations have been strained and how this can affect the current international system dominated by Western liberal and democratic concepts. The guiding argument was that differences in ideologies and perceptions contribute to the securitization of China. In the analysis, we can clearly note the increase in securitizing language being utilized by political elites over the years. This may be due to the change in the presidency or the fact that the BRI was implemented over a longer period, nonetheless, there is a clear correlation in how the discourse has framed China as a threat in a more obvious way. The language has also reflected the rising inclusion of the general public. The historical construction of the American identity in the international system has been shown to contextualize how their identity being threatened plays a more considerable role in why there is an escalation of securitizing discourse. Securitizing the BRI, therefore further securitizing China as a whole, is advantageous to the US as these efforts will assist in preserving the current status quo, therefore retaining their unipolar and hegemonic identity.
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Security K › Link › China – Economic Competition
Lupovici 21 Lupovici, Amir. “The Dual-Use Security Dilemma and the Social Construction of Insecurity.” Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 42, no. 3, 2021, pp. 257–285., Amir Lupovici is a senior lecturer in the School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs at Tel Aviv University and a research fellow in the Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center at Tel Aviv University. He was a faculty fellow in the School of International Service at American University (2017-2018) and a visiting scholar in the Centre for Conflict Resolution of International Conflicts at the University of Copenhagen (2014) https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2020.1866845. //parip
This literature review illustrates how China has been securitized because of ideological and perceptional differences. The literature demonstrates how the BRI has been securitized but not explicitly because of ideological and perceptional differences, rather there is more of a focus on the economic impact of China’s policy. While Singh (2020) and Almén et al’s (2021) highlight the BRI’s debt-trap issue, there is substantial controversy concerning the legitimacy of the debt-trap threat. However, by using securitization theory focused on post structural aspects as Song (2015) demonstrates, we can gain a deeper recognition of the performative aspect of speech acts and if securitizing actors legitimize the debt trap narrative. Post structural 10 securitization theory, as noted by Hansen (2011: 358), ‘may enable a more critical engagement with the politics of security’, for example, the power-knowledge nexus and the ways in which discourses on security construct the objects of which they speak. This thesis contends with the reviewed literature that China has been securitized. However, the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the distinctiveness of poststructural securitization theory in analyzing the perceptions and ideological differences concerning the BRI. Scholarly analyses have mainly focused on the economic and military sectors of security in relation to the threat China presents, therefore examining the differences in ideology and perceptions in relation to the BRI and American strategy aspects outlined by Chengqiu (2020) will aid in determining what other security sectors are affected. 3. Theoretical Framework In order to answer the research question “How do speech acts contribute to the securitization of China?”, it is necessary to discuss securitization theory developed by the Copenhagen School. This theory has been widely used in previous research concerning China, and therefore it is advantageous for this thesis to widen the understanding of how discourse concerning the BRI has been connected to security through the process of securitization. Additionally, Hansen expands securitization theory by (re)adding elements of poststructuralism. This part of the thesis has two purposes: first, laying the foundation for this thesis’ operational framework of poststructural securitization, and secondly for the utilization of it in the analysis chapter. 3.1 Securitization Theory In Buzan, Wæver, and Jaap’s (1998) revolutionary book Security: A New Framework for Analysis, they address two conceptual developments: sectoral analysis and Wæver’s concept of securitization. Securitization involves framing an issue as ‘a special kind of politics or as above politics’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 23), therefore can be viewed as a ‘more extreme form of politicization’ (ibid). One of the distinguishing features of this theory is the framing of a subject as an existential threat and a ‘specific rhetorical structure’ (ibid), as in if the problem is not addressed quickly, it will be too late and we will not be able to rectify it. Securitization places emphasis on speech acts which assume that speeches are not only to express an idea or present information but also to perform an action. Speech acts also illustrate the power knowledge nexus. ‘We are subject to the production of truth through power and we cannot 11 exercise power except through the production of truth. Thus the production of a truth, or the creation of knowledge through a discourse, is an exercise of power.’ (Ibrahim, 2005: 164). Therefore, the securitizing actor performing a speech act is exercising power over the intended audience. However, securitization theory has been subject to many criticisms. It has been critiqued for being too static and not being able to take on the developments in the security field, Derrida criticized securitization for being too strict in evaluating the success of the speech act, and Howell and Richter-Montpetit (2019) have even criticized it for being Eurocentric and racist. Hansen (2011) recognized the shortcomings of Buzan et al’s (1998) work and expanded on it by (re)adding elements of poststructuralism. In a sense, it is re-adding poststructural elements because securitization and speech act are rooted in poststructuralism.
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Security K › Link › China – Economic Competition
Yuan and Fu, 20 (Zhengqing Yuan, Senior Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Qiang Fu, Associate Professor at the School of Foreign Studies of Central University of Finance and Economics, 10 July, 2020, Chinese Journal of International Politics, https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article-abstract/13/3/419/5869540?redirectedFrom=fulltext)
However, it should be noted that, in the original Greek text, Thucydides himself does not explain the war as a structural mindset. It is Allison who inserts a structural frame when emplotting the war, one that perfectly captures in people’s minds the schema of a rising power and the ruling power, thus contributing to its popularity.108 This structural interpretation of Sino–US relations and the world arena is, at best, just one of the possible ways of narrating the reality. Other alternatives, like ‘a new model of major-power relationship’ or ‘a community of shared future for mankind’, can also tell a coherent story with the same facts. For example, through the lens of ‘a community of shared future for mankind’, the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative can be seen as evidence of the public goods China offers towards achieving with the world common prosperity, whereas through the lens of the Thucydides Trap, they would be rendered as evidence of China’s move to replace American hegemony. As is explained in the theoretical section, threat stories can be self-fulfilling. Once the story of power competition between a rising power and a ruling power is accepted, people will depend on it to make sense of the world and take actions. In other words, the focus of US policy towards China turns from engaging with China to preparing for the worst. China is first and foremost perceived as an economic threat that presents a global challenge. Most of this discourse falls under two kinds of narrative template: one where China challenges US economic hegemony; the other story of victimhood in which the United States has suffered huge job losses, a serious decline in its manufacturing industries, and an enormous trade deficit due to China’s unfair trade practices and competition. These two modes of narration are two sides of the same coin which differ only in their emphases. One the one hand, China is an economic challenger. China’s challenge in hightech sectors is a salient node of the threat discourse network. Traditionally, the United States has taken technological leadership to be an indispensable feature of its hegemonic identity, as it signifies both cultural superiority and a guarantee of US economic prosperity and military superiority.109 But now the United States increasingly believes that its economic competitiveness is under serious threat from China’s advance in high-tech industries. What most alarms Americans is China’s high-tech initiatives, especially the ‘Made in China 2025’. A 2019 senate committee report chaired by Senator Marco Rubio articulates that China’s ‘Made in China 2025’ seeks to be ‘the global leader in innovation and manufacturing’, and that such a goal ‘would be an unacceptable outcome for American workers’.110 Another significant node of China’s economic challenge discourse network is that of China’s challenge to the world economic order dominated by the United States. According to these stories, as China’s economy continues to grow, China will rewrite the existing rules of the world economy and reshape the international political economy in a way that favours its interests. For example, China’s proposal to reform the current international monetary system is perceived as challenging dollar hegemony, and the newly established Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is interpreted as a move to replace the US-led World Bank and International Monetary Fund. On the other hand, the discourse tells the story of US victimhood. Similar to what the revisionists did in 1980s, proponents of China threats also invoke a victim story to make sense of China’s economic rise and the United States’ underperformance in competition with China. President Trump is a major advocate of this story. In his State of the Union address in 2019, he said: ‘We are now making it clear to China that, after years of targeting our industries and stealing our intellectual property, the theft of American jobs and wealth has come to an end’.111 In crafting this story, many negative images and memories of China, in American novels and movies, have been cashed in on, and ‘China the thief’ and ‘China the manipulator’ are now two widely used narrative templates. Within the metaphorical frame of ‘thief’, Chinese government agencies and companies have proactively engaged in economic and industrial espionage that has caused huge economic losses for American corporations and great harm to their economic competitiveness. For example, an investigation report by the Office of the United States Trade Representative in 2018 states that China is the most active actor in economic espionage, having gained ‘unauthorised access to a wide range of commercially-valuable business information’.112 Notably, cyber theft and intellectual property theft are the most common memes in the discourse. In the manipulator narrative, meanwhile, China exercises unfair trade practices through manipulating exchange rates, monetary policy, subsidies, etc. to promote exports and restrict imports, resulting in the failure of American companies, an enormous trade deficit, and immense job losses; and at the same time, China manipulates its economy through such measures as industry policy, market access restriction, forced technology transfers, and government procurement, among others. A 2018 White House report states that, in order to dominate high-tech industries, the Chinese government has carried out industrial policy though state-sponsored theft, forced technology transfers, economic coercion, information harvesting, and statebacked investment in high technologies.113 As to the ‘thief’ and ‘manipulator’ tales about China, such stories can also blind people. For example, the allegations of China’s currency manipulation and forced technology transfers may to a large extent be apocryphal or at least exaggerated, and rather than being made victims, US companies benefit from China, as even certain hawks have noticed that ‘Americans are investing more in China’ amid the trade war.
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Pan, 2021
(Chengxin, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Deakin University, “Racialised politics of (in)security and the COVID-19 Westfailure,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 9, Iss. 1, 2021, pp. 40-45, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2021.1904195, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)
Mainstream security theory and practice (methodologies) consist in a highly racialised IR epistemology-cum-ontology. These three imbricated layers together provide a crucial context within which the West’s interpretations of and responses to COVID-19 need to be understood. First, the racialised politics of (in)security has allowed many in the West to intuitively associate the threat of coronavirus ontologically with the ‘zone of insecurity’, particularly the ‘yellow people’. Initially identified in China, COVID-19 was quickly ontologised, perhaps subconsciously by many, as a disease of non-whites, Asians, and particularly Chinese, possibly due to their seemingly unhygienic and even inhumane practices such as the ‘wet market’. In a UC Berkeley’s Health Services Center ‘managing fears and anxiety’ informational post on Instagram in early 2020, xenophobia towards Asian people was listed as a ‘normal reaction’ (Hussain 2020).
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Security K › Link › Automated Weapons (Drones)
Suchman, 2020
(Lucy, professor of the anthropology of science and technology at Lancaster University, “Algorithmic warfare and the reinvention of accuracy,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 8, Iss. 2, 2020, pp. 175-187, https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2020.1760587, accessed 7/2/2022, ZW)
The discourse surrounding Project Maven overwhelmingly begs the question of the criteria by which ‘objects’ are identified as imminent threats. Just what constitutes the profile of an ‘ISIS pickup truck’ (Peniston 2017), and what were the 38 categories used by those who hand-labelled 150,000 images to form the initial training data set? Most pressingly, what does it mean to be living under drones, where the presence of what is seen by the US apparatus as ‘abnormal activity’ (Weisgerberger 2017) might at any point trigger the identification of a threat and attack from weapons operating outside the range of one’s own perception (Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012)? The project demands that we turn our attention to the highly problematic systems of classification by which categories like ‘Islamic State militants’ operating in Iraq, Syria, Somalia and other areas of US strategic interest are constituted. Even more urgently, it calls on us to question the premise that those categories are pre-existing and stable and that their members exist independently of the classificatory schemes that identify them, or of classification’s violent consequences (see Bowker and Star 1999).
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Security K › Link › AI – Tech Race – China
Abb 20 (Dr. Pascal Abb, senior researcher at PRIF, 09/3/2021, “Fraying Ties: The Securitization of the US-China Relationship”, PRIF Spotlight, https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/Spotlight1120.pdf) //KL
This trend has played out most prominently in techno- logy and innovation, where since 2015, China has followed an ambitious plan to become a world leader in key technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, telecommunications and next-generation computing. This policy quickly became a bone of contention with the US and other developed countries. The main concerns were that unfair advantages enjoyed by Chinese tech companies – state subsidies, forced intellectual property transfer, denial of market access to foreign competitors in China, and even industrial espionage – would, if left unchecked, eventually allow them to dominate these fields. Due to the dual-use potential of such technologies in military as well as civilian applications, US policy- makers have increasingly viewed this competition through a national security lens.2 This has been an especially big concern under the Trump administration, which made it a strategic priority to shore up a domestic manufacturing base and increasingly identified “economic security” as a fundamental building block of national security. This view can be found in the most recent US National Security Strategy (NSS) the physical separation of network infrastructure, the banning of platforms outside of Chinese control, and widespread censorship and manipulation of the remaining content.10 However, the previous principled opposition of the US to such moves and its advancement of a different, much more open vision for internet governance makes it striking that its current policy seems to follow very similar premises. A similar point can be made over the economic security concept at the heart of the 2017 NSS. In the late 1990s, Chinese scholars had begun to advance a very similar framework that was named identically, explored many of the same concerns and shared the overall view that strategic competition between states would ultimately be settled through an economic-technological race.11 Specifically suggested policies, like building and protecting a national innovation base, or developing independent world-class capabilities in the IT sector, both inspired China’s subsequent innovation strategy and are now being mirrored in US security policy. This bilateral dynamic is a particularly troubling aspect of securitization, since it creates an imperative to match the other side’s policies or risk a competitive disadvantage. By simultaneously embracing this line of thinking, the US and China have entered a new kind of security dilemma, marked by a technological rather than a military arms race. Clashes over fundamentally incompatible political agendas and visions of world orders may have contributed to the unfolding US-China confrontation, but this is an aspect in which their increasing similarity is the problem.
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Lindh 22 (Marcus Lindh, Two-year Political Science MA programme in Global Politics and Societal Change Dept. of Global Political Studies. “The Geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence: A Comparative Policy Analysis of French and Chinese Artificial Intelligence Policy Discourse”. Malmo University Political Science Master’s Thesis. Spring 2022. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1663057/FULLTEXT01.pdf)
Through looking at previous research conducted on the geopolitics of AI it was found that it is quite limited. As AI is still quite a nascent area of study specifically relating to fields such as global politics, not much research has been conducted so far. As a result, there exists significant gaps within the research wherein this study can fit in, particularly in studying and comparing specific countries and their geopolitical polices in relation to AI. Moreover, the use of the theoretical frameworks of realism and liberalism, as well as the WPR methodology, have not been used to study AI and its geopolitical aspects, all of which this study will apply. 3.2. Chinese Artificial Intelligence Policy As discussed in the preceding section, within the study of Artificial Intelligence there is a significant focus on China and its AI policies. China is one of the countries that has come the furthest in regard to not only implementing artificial intelligence technologies in various areas but also in developing AI strategies and governance surrounding its implementation and impact both domestically and internationally. As a result of this, much research has been done on China and its approach towards AI and AI policy. Within the research that has been done on the Chinese AI approach, little attention has been placed on specifically studying the geopolitical aspect of Chinese AI policy. One of the few studies conducted on AI in China from a more geopolitical viewpoint is the article mentioned in the previous section on the securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China by Zeng (2021). In this article, Zeng applies securitization as the analytical framework in order to study how AI is becoming a security matter within Chinese AI discourse and being tied to its national security. Zeng (ibid) further argues that the Chinese AI discourse being linked to securitization is a result of it being embedded within the historical, geopolitical and domestic Chinese contexts. Specifically, the context of the “century of humiliation” and its historical failures in competing technologically with other countries. Moreover, Zeng (ibid, pp. 418-420) states that China’s securitization of AI is fueled by its geopolitical competition with the US wherein the perception of each other’s AI capabilities and advancements accelerate the process of securitization. This understanding of Chinese AI policy is shared by Alexander (2021). In his article on the 9 geopolitical implication of China’s AI development Alexander (ibid) agrees that global competition is a major driver in China’s approach to its national AI policy. He argues that Chinas national policies concerning AI are a response to external factors particularly those of security as well as competition in economics and AI development. Moreover, that through their AI policy, China is attempting to create a distinct path in the geopolitical system and become a new model for development globally. This is a point that is also shared by Zeng (2021, pp. 418-420) who states that the key objective of Chinese AI policy and development is to become a global leader in AI. Even though there exist significant research on Chinas AI policy and some in connection to geopolitics, most of it is solely focused on the national context of China. If a comparison is made within the research it is exclusively made with the United States. Moreover, as with the research on the geopolitics of AI, none of the research conducted on China utilizes the theoretical frameworks of Realism or Liberalism to analyze the Chinese approach to AI policy.
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Arif 16 (Muhamad Arif, researcher at The Habibie Center’s ASEAN Studies Program. He currently is a lecturer at the University of Indonesia and teaches several topics, including International Security Institutions, “How Threat Assessment Could Become Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Case of U.S.-China Relations,” Global: Jurnal Politik Internasional. https://scholarhub.ui.ac.id/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=global) //AA
China’s expansion of national interests which followed by its military modernization alarms the other side of the Pacific. An observation on U.S. official documents reveals how U.S. is alarmed with rapid military modernization of China. 10 As early as 2006, U.S. has been aware that China, among other countries, has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S. In terms of military technology, U.S. is also aware that the gap with China is closing and unless U.S. could formulate counter strategies, its military advantages would soon be offset (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 29). The tone of anxiety about China’s military modernization has not much changed years afterwards. In latest edition of Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2014, p. 6), it is stated that “In the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber and space control technologies. Similar notion is found in 2012 Department of Defense’s document of strategic guidance in which stated that “States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities” (Panneta & Obama, 2012). From these publications we can also get a sense on how it is very difficult, if not entirely impossible, for states to acquire complete information regarding their adversaries’ current and future intentions. This problem is worse in the case of China whose authoritarian government is not really familiar with the idea of transparency. Thus, U.S. seems to have no other choice than just equate China’s increasing military capabilities with unfriendly intentions. In Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006, it is stated that “… the United States, its allies and partners must also hedge against the possibility that a major or emerging power could choose a hostile path in the future (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 28).” It does not require a rocket science to identify the region where there is an emerging power as well as a number of U.S. allies. In Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, it is stated that “… the rapid pace and comprehensive scope of China’s military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both military capabilities and intentions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2014).” The general observations on some publications of U.S. government reveals how U.S. feels, at the very least, alarmed by the rapid military modernization of China. Once this hostile image attached, China’s further military modernization is regarded as a proof to that hostile image. This can be shown, for example, on how U.S. dubs China as developing what it calls as Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities which can be used, and believed is going to be used, to deter and counter U.S. involvement in the events of conflict in China’s Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 18(2) 125 periphery. Applying our theoretical framework of “spiral model,” this stage can be regarded as one when U.S. applying the first logic of overestimating the hostility of its rival, in this case, China. Feeling threatened by the perceived-as-hostile strategic behaviour of China, U.S. starts to respond. In the midst of economic struggle and defence budget cut, U.S. tries to check the rise of China mainly through what it calls as “rebalancing” strategy which involves an intensification of alliances and basing strategies. The strategy covers U.S. basing in Darwin and Guam, the provision of advanced naval weapon systems such Patriot missiles and Aegis system to its alliances, and also diplomatic and economic initiatives such as Trans-Pacific Partnership which exclude China. Hillary Clinton’s “America’s Pacific Century,” (2011) one of the earliest record that lie down U.S. strategic pivot to Asia-Pacific, provides the stated rationale behind the strategy which is to uphold U.S. leadership commitment in the key driver area of current global politics. Interesting to note here how Clinton frames that U.S. rebalancing is not desired by U.S. only, but also by the region itself, hence justifying U.S. continuing presence. Another important note is how U.S. seems to truly believe that it has been a Pacific state. This statement can be regarded as a way U.S. tries to frame that its presence expansion in Asia-Pacific is for benign purposes. U.S. “rebalancing” strategy, which was initially intended to preserve stability in the region, turns out generate the very opposite outcome. China considers U.S., with its “rebalancing” strategy as a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China’s political influence and harms China’s interests; as China rises, the U.S. will resist (Nathan & Scobell, 2012). This view appears to be much influenced by China’s understanding of U.S., as well as China’s view of the international system and how to behave in such system.11 The sense of China being threatened by U.S. strategic behaviour can also be found in China’s official documents. In 2008 edition of China’s National Defense (2009), U.S. military deployment realignment and its strengthened military alliances with countries like Japan are regarded as influencing the complexity of the regional security environment. That U.S. continues to sell advanced weapons systems to Taiwan is also regarded as an infringement to the “one China” policy and U.S.-China joint communiqes. These two issues have been persistently raised afterwards (China's National Defense in 2010, 2011). 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue perhaps is the perfect evidence that shows how China is feeling threatened by U.S. strategic behaviour in Asia-Pacific, and vice versa. Muhamad Arif 126 Responding to U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that criticized China for its “destabilizing, unilateral actions” particularly in the South China Sea, Lieutenant General Wang Guanzhong, the Chinese military’s deputy chief of general staff said that Hagel’s speech was designed to “create trouble and make provocations” (Han, Barnes, & Page, 2014). Lt. Gen. Wang continued by saying that Hagel’s speech was “full of hegemony, full of words of threat and intimidation,” and part of “a provocative challenge against China.” This speech was then backed by another Chinese official, Major General Zhu Chenghu, who said in an interview, “If you take China as an enemy, China will absolutely become the enemy of the U.S. (Han, Barnes, & Page, 2014).” From this exchanges of strong words by high ranking officials from both China and U.S, we can get a sense of antagonistic, even hostility, in the relations between the two. The sense of being threatened by U.S.’ “rebalancing” strategy leads China to intensify its military modernization. China continues to increase its defence expenditures, until today. Moreover, China intensifies the development of advanced weapons systems that provide it with capability to neutralize U.S. force in the Pacific. These capabilities, which U.S. calls as A2/AD capabilities –which in itself is U.S.’ overestimation of China’s hostility- ranges from fifth-generation fighter aircrafts, advanced intermediate and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, long-range land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons to offensive cyber capabilities. And as the “spiral model” postulates, U.S. has been investing considerable amount of resources to develop strategy to counter China’s counter-strategy against U.S. presence in Asia-Pacific. In other words, the conflict between U.S. and China is spiralling.
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Security K › 1NC Shell
Van Rythoven 14 (Eric Van Rythoven, PhD candidate at Carleton University studying emotion, securitization, and world politics, E-international Relations, December 21, ) SW
The recent forum on emotions and world politics in the journal International Theory is a welcome development for the field of International Relations. The contributors helpfully remind us that emotions research in IR remains hampered by a number of deeply embedded assumptions, such as the belief that emotions are only private and personal phenomena, or the belief there is a sharp dichotomy between emotion and rationality. Critically assessing these assumptions is important not only because it highlights what the discipline gets ‘wrong’ in its picture of world politics, but because it illuminates how current theories help to propagate such distortions.
In this brief intervention I focus on an additional assumption concerning emotion, one which permeates the subfield of security studies. Here I am referring to the widely shared belief in the ubiquity of fear in the politics of security. While this association is historically rooted in Hobbesian accounts of anarchy it has a distinct contemporary form. Fear, we are told by a variety of figures, permeates the politics of security and is consistently and successfully marshalled by political elites, security professionals, and bureaucrats to sustain new images of threat which lead to an ever broadening security agenda. Fear, whether over predatory great powers, immigrant minorities, or infectious diseases, facilitates securitization. As a latent social resource collective fears always appear to be waiting patiently in the margins of discourse until they are easily and unproblematically deployed in a security argument.
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Eberle and Daniel, 2022
(Jakub, Research Director at the Institute of International Relations Prague, and Jan, researcher and the Head of the Centre for the Study of Global Regions at the Institute of International Relations Prague, “Anxiety geopolitics: Hybrid warfare, civilisational geopolitics, and the Janus-faced politics of anxiety,” Political Geography, Vol. 92, January 2022, Article 102502, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102502, accessed 6/30/2022, ZW)
On the other hand, however, the Lacanian take allows us to account also for the politics that is imminent in the failure of these anxiety-managing attempts. As we have argued, all narratives built around particular objects of fear, including geopolitical ones, are eventually failing, as these objects are ultimately ‘false targets’. They are merely temporary discursive vessels functioning as placeholders for expressing deeper ontological anxiety, which is bound to strike back. Consequently, attempts to make societies (feel) more secure, habitually end up making them (feel) equally, or even more, insecure and anxious, regardless of how much effort is invested into fighting this or that particular threat. As Heath-Kelly (2015, 2018) and Jacobsen (2020) have shown, successful security discourses like counter-terrorism or cybersecurity have actually managed to internalise this ‘failure to secure’ (Heath-Kelly, 2015) by incorporating it into their very structure. According to them, counter-terrorism and cybersecurity are constructed as dangers so slippery and multifaceted that once we resolve one problem (by killing Osama bin Laden, resolving a particular cyberthreat), a whole new range of terrorist groups or cyber issues emerges to occupy their place.
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Aff answers › War Turns DA
Magsamen 19 (Kelly Magsamen, vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, “The Case for a New U.S. Relationship with Afghanistan,” Center for American Progress,
• Opportunity cost #5: Two decades of military conflict have eroded U.S. military readiness. While the U.S. military has global responsibilities, it has finite resources, and nothing drains U.S. military readiness like an active war, as made clear by the 2017 report of a Task Force on Defense Personnel co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and former National Security Adviser James Jones.39 For the Pentagon, prosecuting the war in Afghanistan is a top-level priority that requires significant time from its top officials as well as tremendous resources—from regular rotations of thousands of personnel to equipment to budget expenditures. With pressing needs to bolster U.S. force posture in Asia and Europe to deter threats from Russia and China and adapt the military to emerging threats such as cybersecurity, the U.S. military will have a difficult time dedicating the necessary attention and resources to these threats while fighting an indefinite war with roughly 14,000 troops in Afghanistan.
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Aff answers › War Turns DA
Magsamen 19 (Kelly Magsamen, vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, “The Case for a New U.S. Relationship with Afghanistan,” Center for American Progress,
Opportunity cost #4: Managing a war saps U.S. focus and diplomatic energy. While the United States is a global power, it does not have endless capacity. Inevitably, the attention of high-level policymakers is focused on the highest-priority concerns— and as long as the war in Afghanistan continues, it will rightly garner significant attention and resources from all sectors of the U.S. government. When it comes foreign policy priorities, urgency outweighs importance, so regular decisions about the war require the highest-level attention at the White House, the State Department, and the DOD. For the senior-most national security officials, time is precious, and dedicating enough time to issues such as climate change or China can be crowded out by the need for regular, high-level engagement on life-or-death decisions in Afghanistan.
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Aff answers › China Not Revisionist
McKinney and Butts 19 (Jared Morgan McKinney, PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). Nicholas Butts, Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leader, “Bringing Balance to the Strategic Discourse on China’s Rise”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, pg. 75-76, 2019, )
In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion.
When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27
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Aff answers › No China War
Nielsen 19 (Nicolai Fogth Gjøde Nielsen, holds a master’s degree in International Relations - European Studies and a bachelor’s degree in Language and International Studies, both of which were obtained from Aalborg University in Denmark. “How China Avoids War in the South China Sea.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 15 Jan. 2019, nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-avoids-war-south-china-sea-41677, WC)
China has been able to avoid an all-out conflict in the region by taking only small bursts of actions that are unlikely to cause any detrimental fallout from neighboring countries. This strategy of below-the-threshold expansion allows China to acquire strategic territories, since Chinese actions are calibrated to avoid full-on war, despite very negative responses from its neighbors. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, as an exception, has expressed his support for China’s territorial claims, stating that Russia does not recognize the fact that the Court of Arbitration ruled against the Chinese claim of the Spratly Islands, nor that China has violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines by intervention.
Despite the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the outcome ultimately is in China’s favor, as a bilateral agreement between China and the Philippines enables China to retain the artificially built islands. This is just one example of a case that highlights China’s growing confidence and influence in the region. This is arguably a long-term gain for Beijing since China has built artificial islands in the disputed areas and restricted access for Filipino fishermen and oil exploration vessels even inside the Philippines’ own exclusive economic zone.