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Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 141-142
These are some of the questions in the minds of Western/American strategic analysts, who are wondering how to maintain U.S. preponderance in a world of anarchy and uncertainty. The conservative realist Samuel Huntington asks: “If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?” Obsessed with this self-imagery, many scholars and policy planners have been keen to reinvoke the timeless, structural certainty of geopolitical rivalry, and to embrace the ‘back to the future’ scenario, maintaining that despite the dawn of the post-Cold War period little has changed—the world remains a dangerous, volatile place. With such searching eyes for an enemy, it would be surprising if China failed to come into view. Indeed, China makes a perfect candidate, in that “China remains the major source of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific.” That is, not only do the implications of its economic transformation and military ambition remain unclear, but the resilience of the Communist government even after its roundly condemned Tiananmen suppression seems also to fly in the face of the ‘End of History’ triumphalism. Consequently, (and before September 11), the only major certainty coming out of the post-Cold War era seems to be an unpredictable and dangerous China. From the beginning, this ‘China threat,’ I suggest, is not a result of its actual challenge to the West or the United States per se, but primarily a discursive dimension of the neorealist construction of the American self in terms of global supremacy and indispensable leadership. As Huntington makes it clear, “Chinese hegemony will reduce American and Western influence [in Asia] and compel the United States to accept what it has historically attempted to prevent: domination of a key region of the world by another power.” In the absence of such self-fashioning, most of China’s neighbours, which might arguably be more vulnerable to a China threat if there is one, have traditionally adopted a much less alarmist view on the ‘Middle Kingdom.’ Thus, China’s real challenge for America, as Yu Bin notes, “is perhaps more psychological and conceptual—that is, how to deal with a major power whose rise is not necessarily guided by Washington, unlike the post-World War II rise of Japan and Germany.” Also, it can be argued that the existence of an ‘enemy’ is indispensable to the continued imagination of the ‘indispensable nation.’ In Charles Frazier’s novel Cold Mountain, Inman, a soldier returning home from battle during the American Civil War, pondered the question: “What is the cost of not having an enemy?” Such a cost, then, seems very high indeed, for at stake here is what is seen as the ‘fundamental’ modern Western/American self-identity as a (global) rational being and indispensable leader. Heroic leadership would not be so needed if there was little left to fight for. Clearly mindful of this, Georgi Arbatov, Director of Moscow’s Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, told a U.S. audience the year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: “We are going to do something terrible to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy.” While he correctly noted that for the U.S. to live without an identity-defining enemy is terrible indeed, Arbatov was only half right, for the ‘enemy’ itself often has no control over its status as an enemy. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a ready-made discursive category built into the American self-imagination. With this discursive category as the analytical framework for understanding other actors on the world stage, Western and particularly American scholars did not simply ‘discover’ a China threat out there; it was cognitively constructed beforehand.
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Chengxin Pan, 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics,” Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pg. 66-69, Pan is the Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University. ZKMSU
The twin paradigms of China threat and China opportunity are animated by Western/American neocolonial desire. Their constructions of self and Other are not merely discursive in nature, but have political and strategic consequences. Rather than divorced from power, they are always in the service of power and at the same time (re)produced by it through the political economies of fear and fantasy. How knowledge, desire, and power interact in the cases of these China paradigms will be the focus of Chapters 4-7. Thus far, scholarly analysis of Western representations of China has tended to treat those representations merely as knowledge, which is then empirically evaluated against so-called ‘objective facts’ in China. Depending on whether they are thought to match Chinese reality or not, they are labelled either ‘truth’, ‘misrepresentations’, or something in between. But this empirically-grounded approach misses a crucial point. That is, it leaves intact and unquestioned the complicity of China knowledge in power relations. What is needed, therefore, is a critical examination of the power/knowledge nexus in the two modes of China representation. How the ‘China threat’ paradigm relates to the political economy of fear and informs political practice is the focus of this and the following chapter. And Chapters 6 and 7 will deal with the ‘China opportunity’ paradigm. To better understand the dynamics of power/knowledge/desire in the ‘China threat’ paradigm, we need to recognise this paradigm for what I think it is, namely, a particular form of desire—fear—disguised as certain knowledge. Fear, it may be argued, is primarily a biological instinct inherent in probably all animals that are both capable of fear and have experienced such an emotion. And yet, in the human context at least, fear is as much a sociocultural phenomenon as it is a natural, biological reflex. This is because most forms of fear in modern society are not experienced directly through actual physical encounters, but rather are created, mediated, maintained and reinforced through often-institutionalised knowledge resources such as images, symbols, metaphors and, above all, discourses. Sometimes referred to as ‘prevailing danger codes’, those knowledge resources serve as ‘an extremely dense layer of mediation between what one might be advised to fear… and what one’s moment-to-moment experience appears to be’.3 In a study of the politics of fear in the media, David Altheide argues that fear ‘did not just happen or emerge’ from uncertainty, the lack of community or a sense of lack of control over our lives; rather, it is largely produced and reproduced through ‘the entertainment formats of mass media and popular culture’. Only through coming to grips with this culturally-mediated dimension of fear, can we better understand why one’s sense of fear is often not directly or proportionally linked to the object of that fear. 4 In fact, quite often the opposite is true. For instance, Altheide points to the paradox that ‘there is widespread public perception [in the West] that risk and danger are everywhere, that we are not safe, and that the future is bleak’, even though most in Western societies ‘are safer, healthier, living longer, and more secure in their environments than virtually any population in history’.5 How is such a strange ‘surplus’ of fear produced and consumed in an otherwise reasonably safe and wealthy society? Michael Shapiro suggests that the increased level of popular representation in the political process has not been matched by a similar increase in people’s ability to represent safety and danger as they find them in their daily lives. 6 Rather, just as more and more supermarket products nowadays are no longer made locally, so too the ‘commodity’ of fear is increasingly outsourced from elsewhere, manufactured and packaged as knowledge by all sorts of security, intelligence, health and environment experts. And just as consumers part company with their money in exchange for whatever fantasies are evoked by commercial advertisements, consumers of fear surrender their power to scaremongering experts and political leaders, in exchange for the promised certainty and security. In return, through their knowledge of danger and threat, those experts and politicians gain trust, power, and the ability to influence others to behave in ways that meet their expectations. In this way, whatever form of knowledge that can effectively tap into fear and constantly reproduce it is, without doubt, ideally placed to serve power and enforce discipline. Little wonder that the discursive production of fear and threat has been a fixture in modern-day politics. In Australia, no recent federal elections were complete without some forms of politics of fear at play in the political campaigns, be it about ‘boat people’, terrorism, workers’ rights or even interest rates. Of course, fear is not always an undesirable element in politics and social life. Moïse argues that ‘an element of fear is an indispensable protection against the danger of overconfidence. Fear is a force for survival in a naturally dangerous world’.7 The ‘China threat’ paradigm should be understood in this broad context. This paradigm does not reflect a pre-existing sense of fear about a menace ‘out there’, but rather is a discursive site where such fear is first constructed and where a particular form of political economy of fear emerges. With a specific focus on the US, this chapter will examine how the China threat knowledge, which gives the popular fear of China an aura of objective credibility, serves the political and economic interests of the power elite, and is at the same time shaped by those interests. However, when fear is systematically deployed in politics, it is worth asking whose interests this fear politics intends to serve and how such fear is produced and for what purposes. THE CHINA THREAT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEAR The political economy of fear has been a much-cherished ingredient in statecraft for millennia. ‘Let them hate as long as they fear’, the Roman emperor Caligula once proclaimed. ‘[I]t is far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both’, admonished Machiavelli in The Prince. 8 Thus, Robert Higgs argues that fear is a foundation of every government’s power: ‘Without popular fear, no government could endure for more than twenty-four hours’.9 While the state has traditionally relied on such visible instruments of fear as the army, the police, the legal system, and the prison to maintain discipline in a society, it has also resorted to a less visible instrument: the discursive production of fear. One particularly fertile ground for such fearrelated knowledge production has been the realm of international relations, where the objects of fear appear plentiful. The French political philosopher Jean Bodin observed that ‘the best way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is… to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause’.10 Similarly, Adam Smith examined in The Wealth of Nations how a government could use the nation’s anxiety for security to induce its citizens to agree to a new tax which otherwise they would probably resent.11 It is in this context that the fear of the China threat has been a recurring feature in American politics in general and during the presidential and congressional midterm elections in particular. During the 2010 midterm elections, for instance, New York Times reported that in a space of just one week, at least 29 candidates from both sides of politics unveiled advertisements accusing their opponents of being soft on China, with the undertone that China had been the chief villain for current American economic woes. Such is the political economic use of fear especially when it is disguised as scientific knowledge.
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Chengxin Pan, 2012, “Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics,” Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., pg. 84-86, Pan is the Associate Professor of International Relations at Deakin University. ZKMSU
WHAT’S THE COST OF IMAGINING AN ENEMY? In Charles Frazier’s award-winning novel Cold Mountain, the male protagonist Inman, a badly wounded soldier running away from the bloody battlefield during the American Civil War, meets a blind street vendor. Similar to his own wounds, someone must have been responsible for his blindness, Inman wonders. To Inman’s surprise, however, the street vendor says he was actually born that way. Looking at his terrible wounds at the hands of known enemies, Inman somehow starts to pity that blind man. ‘For how did you find someone to hate for a thing that just was? What would be the cost of not having an enemy? Who could you strike for retribution other than yourself?’3 A self-fulfilling prophecy 85 As he quickly flips through these questions in his mind, suddenly Inman begins feeling lucky—at least he knows his enemy. To that blind man, knowing no enemy denies him that precious sense of certainty or a clear target for revenge. With his known enemy, the lucky Inman is in good company. In many ways, the military-industrial complex finds itself in a similar situation, but its lucky star is the perceived certain threat of China. Without knowing this threat, the high-level military spending would be difficult to justify, and without that military spending, the political economy of fear could not function properly, nor could military Keynesianism continue to flourish. This is why Richard N. Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations and former Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department, observes that having survived decades of the Soviet challenge, containment might not be able to survive its own success. 4 While the lack of an enemy—real or imagined—appears costly indeed for the discursive identity and institutional ‘survival’ of the militaryindustrial complex, I contend that having an enemy, even an imagined one, is by no means cost-free. In fact, in the case of China, it could be very costly in that the construction and treatment of China as a threat could result in China becoming one in reality. In other words, the cost lies in the fact that the ‘China threat’ paradigm could become self-fulfilling in practice. To the military-industrial complex, the absence of a threat/enemy constitutes an ultimate threat. A self-fulfilling prophecy, according to American sociologist Robert Merton, means that ‘a false definition of the situation which makes the originally false conception come true’.5 What is ‘false’ in hindsight or in the eyes of a bystander is frequently defined as real by the actor in question; and ‘if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences’. 6 In international relations, fear, often based on ‘false’ images, can have precisely such self-fulfilling consequences. Thucydides, the author of a realist ‘great text’ History of the Peloponnesian War, noted a self-fulfilling prophecy of fear in interstate politics. In his account for the war’s outbreak, Thucydides suggested that ‘What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta’.7 More than two millennia later, another realist scholar-practitioner, George Kennan ascribed the origin of the Cold War to the paranoid ideology of the Soviet Union.8 If so, the fear manifested in the ‘China threat’ paradigm could also become confirmed in reality. Two interrelated processes are at play here. First, the ‘China threat’ paradigm, taken as objective truth, would imply the need for containing China in practice. Second, such practice, given the logic of mutual responsiveness, is more likely than not to be mirrored back by China in either symmetric or asymmetric ways. As the latter’s hardline mimicry apparently ‘confirms’ the initial fear of the China threat, what we are witnessing is a classic case of self-fulfilling prophecy.
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Niv Horesh and Lim Kean Fan, May 2017, “The "China Model" as a Complicated Developmental Trope,” Project Muse, China: An International Journal, vol. 15 no. 2 pg. 166-176, muse.jhu.edu/article/661224, Niv Horesh (Niv.Horesh@durham.ac.uk, corresponding author) is Visiting Professor in China Studies at the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University, United Kingdom. He obtained his PhD in East Asian Studies from the Australian National University. His primary research interests include the world history of money, Shanghai's rise to prominence, foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and the East Asian developmental state model. Lim Kean Fan (keanfan.lim@nottingham.ac.uk) is Assistant Professor in Economic Geography at the School of Geography, the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom. He obtained his PhD in Economic Geography from the University of British Columbia. His primary research examines the relationship between place-specific policy experimentation and the structural coherence of the Chinese political economy. ZKMSU
Commentator Joshua Ramo had famously lumped various threads of narrative under the rubric of “Beijing Consensus”. Subsequently, that narrative took on new dimensions, both in China and abroad, countervailing along the way the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as the organs behind globalising Anglo–American neo-liberal discourse (“Washington Consensus”).12 Then, why has Beijing’s narrative attracted so much attention if the Chinese experience is in reality so hard to define? It can be attributed mainly to an emergent insecurity among policymakers and the intelligentsia in Western Europe and North America about the validity of their own social and political values, and the salubrity of their own societies. Evidence to that effect can be found not merely in Brook’s litanies about the loss of American dynamism and the bumbling of the Barack Obama administration. More importantly, a growing body of academic literature has accumulated over the last few years to underscore how grossly unequally distributed income has become in the West. Many economists, not just on the far left, now indict the Ronald Reagan– Margaret Thatcher project of neo-liberalism for reversing the great post-war baby boomers’ march towards equal opportunity. Inequality seers like Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas Picketty or Luigi Zingales may not necessarily agree about the health of the Chinese economy per se, but they certainly share a platform when it comes to inveighing against the godfathers of financial deregulation, which they see as the underlying cause of America’s post-2008 recession.13 To be sure, there has always been critical interest among American academe in the failings of the “system”, and in democratic “optimisation” of economic outcomes. Buchanan and Tullock’s pioneering 1962 work on public choice is a case in point. They sought a free-market-friendly mathematical formula that would curb the ability of vested-interest groups to bypass the will of the silent majority through, for example, “pork-barrelling” swing voters or “lobbying” career politicians. However, in the 1960s, even studies such as Buchanan and Tullock’s were informed by the “genius” of America’s founding fathers and its 1787 Constitution,14 whereas many commentators of different partisan persuasions today view the Constitution itself, if not the Union’s whole political architecture, as anachronistic and unfit for the purpose in that they paralyse decisionmaking in Washington.15 In search of new answers, the insecurity premise, as discussed earlier, has resurrected interest in the once-marginalised, “heterodox” economic theories, ranging from Mancur Olson, Hyman Minsky, Wolf Ladejinsky, Karl Polanyi to John K. Galbraith. All heterodox thinkers shared, in their time, deep-seated suspicion of the ability of free markets or representative democracy for that matter, to pre-empt the harbingers of resource misallocation. In other words, they rejected in one way or another neoclassical economic theory. As has been argued elsewhere, this disillusionment with neoclassical diktat has also led to renewed interest in the lessons that economic history, economic sociology and new institutional economics might offer, thus revitalising these three disciplines.16 Recent historically informed work by economists is now almost de rigueur and has gone well beyond the left-leaning circles. Taking issue with the root causes of the 2008 global financial crisis, such work—ranging from Reinhart and Rogoff’s rightleaning This Time is Different to Acemoglu and Robinson’s more centrist Why Nations Fail—harks back to several centuries earlier in its temporal scope. At the same time, older work by contrarian economic historians and economists that has been somewhat neglected in the 1980s, when neo-liberalism was fast advancing, found new readers among conventionally trained economists—from Paul Bairoch, Chalmers Johnston to Alice Amsden. Also, authors outside academe like Joe Studwell draw on that onceneglected work and converge on the view that the East Asian experience belies neoliberalism and exposes the small-government biases thereof.17 Freshly published, Studwell’s path-breaking and quantitatively-compelling research in economic history is further validating his insights. Allen and Lind have both respectively shown, for example, that unfree-market, big-government designs had not only typified the East Asian path to industrialisation. In fact, such grand design could also be attributed to America’s rise in the early 19th century. Baldly put, Allen, Lind and others argue that wealthier countries start preaching to poorer countries about the need for free trade (read: reduce tariffs designed to protect nascent industries) and the need to reduce government size (read: allow foreigners to buy out vital sectors of the national economy) only after they themselves had completed industrialisation on the back of very protectionist measures.18 For these reasons, the human rights discourse in the modern developed world is critiqued by scholars like Noam Chomsky, Daniel A. Bell and Martin Jacques as a values-laden, ahistorical sugarcoating of what is, in essence, crude economic interests of/in advanced capitalist countries. Much like “free markets” in neoclassical parlance, human rights are conceived of as bringing about immediate betterment of the human condition irrespective of time and place, whereas in the Chinese narrative “individual” rights and “markets” are both viewed as contingent on “collective will” and on evolutionary social reform. Yet, as Stiglitz alluded to, the wealthier “collectivist” China becomes, the harder it is to shrug off its affinity with the “individualistic” United States. While, on the right, some Western critics still cling to democracy-vs.-tyranny binary, and on the left, some critics starkly posit the American neo-imperialism vs. China’s “peaceful rise” thesis, both contending powers are in fact experiencing flagrantly unequal wealth distribution—they are both big polluters, big military spenders, capital-punishment enthusiasts; and they also incarcerate big segments of their population.19 Perhaps more importantly, not only are their logics of socio-economic regulation increasingly more similar to each other, they are now more economically interdependent than at any other point in history.20 Much of the self-doubt in America as well as the newfound interest in institutional economics, have, after all, to do with the fact that the “one man, one vote” system proved incapable of stalling the reversal of the post-war social contract in the West, which had in turn stamped out the spread of communism. Ironically, as Picketty poignantly shows, once the spectre of communism had diminished, inequality exploded.21 Recent works are very important in this context because they show—based on independently gathered polling data—that the absence of “one man, one vote” in China is not yet costing the CPC much popular support. Peerenboom, in particular, does much to dispel the fairly common Western notion that the peoples of the developing world would prefer a greater degree of democracy and social equality to raising of living standards in absolute terms.22 The argument, to be sure, might hold well beyond China. It specifically brings to mind Latin America: while that part of the world democratised relatively recently, in some cases following decades of oppressive dictatorship, most Latin Americans still seem to prize economic performance over universal suffrage. Moreover, a few democratically elected Latin American governments have arguably taken social inequality well beyond the norm under their dictatorial predecessors.23 US-based academics like Pei Minxin and Huang Yasheng often invoke India by way of an inspiration for the developing world that is alternative to the “China Model”; one that is more democratic and therefore one that would prove more economically compelling in the long run.24 After all, India is the biggest and one of the longestrunning democracies in Asia. However, as Drèze and Sen’s work indicates, the fact that the Gini coefficient for supposedly-communist China may now be higher than that of India conceals the tough everyday realities that the overwhelmingly rural populations of either country face. For Drèze and Sen, perhaps more instructive is the fact that Chinese economic reforms of the last three decades did not whittle away at arable land distribution. In India, by way of contrast, arable land distribution remains badly skewed despite Nehru’s socialist legacy.25 What this points to, then, is the need for any transfers of concrete policies and regulatory ideologies—in particular that of the supposedly superior neoliberal reason—to be contextually and historically grounded.
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Gregory Kulacki, 9-21-2012, “The Risk of Nuclear War with China,” Huffington Post, , China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. ZKMSU
On the edges of the official competition, misanthropes in both nations spread sensational and frightening disinformation that poisons public discussion, making steps towards dialog and cooperation more difficult for political leaders to take. In the face of growing strategic distrust, neither government seems willing to accept the risks for peace that are necessary to minimize the risks of war, which, while still small, continue to grow.
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Kittelsen, 9 – Researcher for the Security programme @ the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (Sonja, “Conceptualizing Biorisk: Dread Risk and the Threat of Bioterrorism in Europe,” Security Dialogue vol. 40, no. 1, February)
The dread that the prospect of bioterrorism elicits thus not only compounds the distinction between actual and imagined threat, but also challenges the conventional spatio-temporal relationship between ‘threat’ and ‘security’, in that it reinforces a sense of imminence and pervasiveness of possible attack. Its imperceptible nature means that insecurity can exist independent of an actual attack occurring, the mere threat of infection and contagion carrying the capacity to evoke a heightened sense of fear long before and well after an attack has been identified as ever having taken place. In the absence of fact about a threat that deliberately evades detection, the demand on governments to act proactively has become all the more salient, and providing for security has taken a precautionary turn. Strategies aimed at mitigating the threat of bioterrorism have thus involved attempts at delineating security through spatio-temporal techniques that involve intervening in the present in order to avoid the potential for serious and irreversible damage in the future. They constitute an attempt at rearticulating the boundary between ‘secure’ and ‘insecure’ space through the active act of anticipation. Inherent in such an anticipatory logic, however, is an in-built vulnerability, in that this logic is necessarily informed by the subjective insecurities that the threat of bioterrorism elicits. It simultaneously functions within and constitutes a product of the dread that the threat of bioterrorism evokes, and accordingly does not so much serve to reduce the threat of bioterrorism as it serves to mitigate the effects of what is considered an inevitable occurrence. It there- by runs the risk of perpetuating insecurity to the extent that it facilitates threat through its enactment. Engaging with the threat of bioterrorism, then, neces- sarily requires recognizing how the same logic that informs the dread that bioterrorism elicits also serves to inform the security practices pursued to confront it. Just as the molecular body is no longer conceptualized as a unified whole, so too is Europe less a self-contained entity than a site of circulation and exchange. Mitigating the threat of bioåterrorism, then, necessitates explor- ing the ways in which security practices and perceptions of threat interact with each other and with the more tangible aspects of the threat of bioterror- ism to make Europe not only vulnerable to biological insecurity, but also a producer and perpetuator of it. This article argues that it is by conceptualizing bioterrorism through the notion of ‘dread risk’ that this self-perpetuation of vulnerability and threat can be exposed and the necessary inroads provided by which to engage more critically with the threat of bioterrorism, its produc- tion and perpetuation, as well as with the constitution of ‘security’ itself.
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Timothy W. Luke, Professor of Political Science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1997, Ecocritique, p. 65-69
Until the early 1970s, TNC adhered to many essentially romantic assumptions about Nature in its various operations. Nature existed as a real presence in places left undisturbed by human beings.27 At such sites, therefore, all plants and animals embodied Nature’s substance, and as such they were all worthy of protection. Therefore, acquiring any and all land that was not now being touched by some human settlement’s economic and social activity constituted a meaningful act of Nature conservation. The battle lines were drawn across territories understood as land under active current social utilization (or artificial zones without a large Nature presence) and land no longer or not yet put to such use (or natural zones without a large social presence), making it, therefore, worthy as a site of Nature conservancy. At some point in the 1960s and 1970s, these discursive frames became obsolete, even though many people today inside and outside of the environmental movement do not recognize their obsolescence. Bill McKibben and Carolyn Merchant, to a very real extent, are right.28 Nature has ended. Nature is dead. Perhaps it was the conquest of extraterrestrial spaces in the moon landings of 1969—70, whose televisual and photographic images of the Earth sublated conceptual antinomies like Nature/Society, out-there/in-here, wilderness/settlement, and environment/economy in pictures of one undifferentiated little blue planet floating in space. Perhaps it was the penetration of transnational capitalism even into Moscow and Beijing during Nixon’s detente, whose acceptance of Pepsi, Kentucky Fried Chicken, or Pan Am passengers underscored how commercial commodities now could go anywhere anytime anyone wished them to do so. Perhaps it was the collective shudder of the 1971—73 oil shocks from OPEC, whose antics illustrated how tightly coupled all human societies were to petrochemical energy supplies mostly pumped up from under a handful of Mideastern deserts. The brittleness in the traditional categories, pitting “Nature” against “Society,” finally snapped. There really were no lands without any traces of some large social presence. Hundreds of individual plants and animals were not merely being disturbed by humanity; they were being eradicated as species in wholesale extinctions. Scientific observations of air quality, water quality, atmospheric integrity, bone composition, or milk production were indicating that human beings have profoundly disturbed what had been regarded as unalterable sovereign Nature with industrial pollution, greenhouse gases, chemical contamination, and radioactive wastes. Hence, to pretend to be conserving “the untouched and undisturbed expanses of Nature” in simple actions of land ownership made very little sense. Nature, as it had been conceptualized by the Ecologist’s Union in 1945 for The Nature Conservancy to preserve after 1951, had been disappearing right from under everyone’s noses as global modernization accelerated at even greater rates from 1945 to 1973. Once-undisturbed lands could no longer be regarded as the container of Nature as such, they had to be continuously reassessed to determine their ecological values, creating the space of surveillance, as chapters 4 and 5 argue, known as “the environment.”29 From 1951 to 1973, TNC did have a decidedly scientific air about its operations, even though with its haphazard policies of property acquisition the organization still worked as a land collection program to preserve scenic beauty, rare plants, and wild animals on whatever land it would get whenever it could get it. Low-key and nonconfrontarional, The Nature Conservancy’s style of environmental protection had been fairly cozy with big business from the beginning. Under the leadership of Pat Noonan from 1973 to 1980, however, this almost accidental precedent was turned into an article of faith. During the intensive environmental conflicts of the early 1970s, as Noonan notes, “corporations and environmentalists were butting heads, but we knew the free-enterprise system was a fantastic motivator. So the Conservancy decided to reach out to corporate America. No other environmental group was doing it.” This operational strategy was augmented with a new mission statement from Bob Jenkins, The Nature Conservancy’s in-house biologist. Dissatisfied with the Conservancy’s acceptance of land with dubious ecological worth, although it often appeared to be undisturbed as natural scenery, Jenkins saw biodiversity rather than natural appearance as that quality which TNC should be preserving.31 Instead of protecting any and all land that it acquired, Jenkins’s strategy stressed preserving only those lands populated by rare or endangered flora and fauna in unique ecosystems. Scientific surveillance was combined with high-test property management to give TNC a much clearer purpose. Noonan’s acceptance of corporate free enterprise and Jenkins’s agendas for surveying, inventorying, and guarding biotic diversity recentered The Nature Conservancy’s ideologies and institutions on the strategies they continue to follow today. Grove concludes: The Nature Conservancy would henceforth seek out and attempt to save species and biotic communities that stood in danger of disappearing under human pressures. It would buy land when necessary, but to cut down on management and overhead costs, property was often turned over whenever possible to responsible federal and state agencies for protection. Further, TNC would decentralize, establishing state field offices that could keep closer watch on the land. Coinciding with its new focus, the national staff grew out of its basement quarters in Washington and moved just across the Potomac River into a high rise office building in Rosslyn, Virginia. Emerging as well in the months and years that followed were the practical arguments for maintaining biotic diversity. . . . Although morals and aesthetics still apply, the emphasis turned to “save this plant because we may need it someday” instead of “save this plant because we have no right to kill it.” Over the past two decades, TNC has grown by leaps and bounds by sticking to the operating objectives in this “preserving biodiversity” mission statement. Because Nature has ended, material signs of its now-dead substance need to be conserved as pristine preserved parts, like pressed leaves in a book, dried animal pelts in a drawer, or a loved one’s mortal remains in a tomb. Nature is dead, but long shall Nature live in the environmentalized forms of rare species, exotic biodiversity, land preserves, and threatened ecosystems. As powerful anthropogenic actions have recontoured the earth to suit the basic material needs of corporate modes of production, these artificial contours now define new ecologies for all life forms caught within their “economy” and “environment.” The “economy” becomes a world political economy’s interior spaces defined by technoscience processes devoted to production and consumption, while “the environment,” in this sense, becomes a planetary political economy’s exterior spaces oriented to resource creation, scenery provision, and waste reception. The pickets and suits deployed by other more vocal ecological groups perpetuate a faulty one-dimensional consciousness, “believing that environmental protection and economic growth are somehow mutually exclusive.”33 These antiquated perceptions cling to the illusion that Nature is alive, and somehow avoiding its subjection to capital in the commodity form by remaining wilderness. Recognizing the true totality of transnational capital’s power, which easily commodifies wilderness in many environmental products, the goal of “The Nature Conservancy is to change this unfortunate perception,” because, as anyone attentive to capital’s dynamics can attest, “our economy and environment are not antagonists, they depend on each other. ... protecting our natural resources generates economic benefits.”34 Natural resources exist, but Nature does not. Economic survival is imperative, but the commodity logics driving it need to be grounded in sound ecological common sense lest the limitless dynamism of commodification be permitted to submit everything to exchange logics immediately. Time is now what is both scarce and centrally important in the highly compressed time-space continua of contemporary commodity chains. It is no longer a question of jobs versus the environment, because fewer jobs will not resurrect Nature. Nature is dead, and the environment generating global production assumes that jobs are necessary to define it as the space of natural resources. Doing jobs irrationally and too rapidly, however, is what destroys these environments, making jobs done rationally and at an apt pace ecologically acceptable. Consequently, the agendas of environmental protection must center on the “question of the short-term vs. the long-term,” and this is “what the Conservancy is all about.”35
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Andreas Behnke, Lecturer, International Relations Group that gathers the enormous and varied expertise on international politics and strategy in the Department of Politics and IR, MA (Mainz), PhD (Stockholm), 2000, 'Inscriptions of Imperial Order. NATO's Mediterranean Initiative', International Journal of Peace Studies 5(1), 61-83,
Discussions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) role after the end of the cold war predominantly focus on its adaptation to the new security environment, the redefinition of its mission and the transformation of its military and political structures (Gordon, 1997; Kay, 1998; Yost, 1998). While this kind of literature is valuable in its own right, its underlying assumption about the adaptive logic of NATO's post-cold war policies tends to underrate the ability of the Alliance to actively shape the security environment through its discursive construction of security political 'realities' and the re-presentation of its institutional identity. At the same time, this literature arguably underestimates the task confronting NATO. The collapse of the cold war order does not only pose a problem to NATO in terms of adapting to a new reality, the features of which are are supposedly as clearly discernable as the ones of the cold war itself. Rather, its demise challenges NATO (and other international actors and institutions) to articulate new and stable 'structures of meaning' which can render "the unfamilar in the terms of the familiar" (Campbell, 1992:4) and which make it possible to re-assume political and military-strategic agency. The purpose of this essay is to analyze the way in which NATO is responding to these challenges. More specifically, it addresses the problem of the Alliance's 'Western' identity and the strategies of inclusion and exclusion through which this identity is re-defined and re-asserted after the disappearence of the constitutive Other of the cold war, that is, the Communist 'East'. At the same time, the essay deals with NATO's search for new adversaries and threats. These two issues, while often treated separately in the literature, are in fact closely related. As Owen Harries (1993:42) pointed out some years ago, The political 'West' is not a natural construct but a highly artificial one. It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can now survive the disappearance of that enemy. We need not take Harries' skepticism at face value in order to appreciate the problematization of what the West actually is. Suffice it to state that matters of identity are intrinsically related to the problem of difference and adversity. The articulation of a Western identity, Harries' argument suggests, was made possible, and depended upon the presence of a hostile 'East'. As Bradley Klein (1994:120-21) has argued, this presence has allowed NATO to prevail and survive the many crises and internal conflicts amongst its member-states. Already in the 1960s, Henry Kissinger analyzed the effects of détente on alliance cohesion in terms that anticipate to some extent the troubles NATO would face some 30 years later after the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. As the détente develops, the need to transform the Alliance from its present defensive concept into a political arrangement defining itself by some positive goals will grow ever more urgent. Defense against a military threat will soon lose its force as a political bond. Negotiations with the East will prove corrosive unless they go hand in hand with the creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody them (Kissinger, 1965:10). In other words, in the absence of a 'life-threatening' adversary, the West runs the danger of disintegrating and dissolving. That NATO was able to avoid this fate for forty years supports Klein's (1994:121) contention that the alliance strength rested on its ability to wed itself "to the defense of a distinctly modern, Western, Atlantocentric cultural project" which made it possible to deflect and externalize its internal contradictions and conflicts. If we acknowledge this internal relationship between (stable) identity and (hostile) difference, we can appreciate the paradox that the end of the cold war presented a much more serious threat to NATO than the East-West confrontation ever did. For the end of the cold war also means that the unraveling of Cold War representations has raised for the first time the fundamental issue of Western identity. It is no longer clear who is to be legitimately incorporated within the space of modern Western culture. ... Simply put the world under NATO's guidance is no longer subject to containment. It's boundaries have now been eroded... (Klein, 1994:133). Consequently, the West faces the problem of 'self-determination', of defining its identity and its borders against the rest of the world. Self-determination is usually assumed to contribute to peace in the international system. Thus, the United Nations (UN) Charter states in Article 1, paragraph 2 as one of its purposes, To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
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GIORGIO CAFIERO April 23, 2022 The Russian Threat Gives NATO New Purpose https://politicstoday.org/the-russian-threat-gives-nato-new-purpose/
It was not long ago when NATO’s divisions were running deep. Until recently, many in the West were questioning the security alliance’s purpose. As a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump said that if Baltic states weren’t “paying their bills” the U.S. shouldn’t necessarily protect them from Russia notwithstanding treaty obligations. In 2019, French President Emanuele Macron asserted that NATO was “becoming brain-dead”. The following year, tensions between Greece and Turkey led some experts to conclude that NATO was “paralyzed”. At that time, 70 percent of Turkey’s population saw the U.S., NATO’s dominant military force, as a threat to their country. Many voices in the West accused Germany of being a “shaky alliance partner” and “NATO’s biggest freeloader.” But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February was a geopolitical tsunami that fundamentally changed the strategic stakes for NATO members. Amid drastic changes in Europe’s security architecture, the Western alliance has regained a sense of purpose. Today NATO is more unified and cohesive than it ever has been since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991. “Threat is the glue that binds together a security alliance,” explained John Feffer, the director of Foreign Policy In Focus, in an interview with Politics Today. “When the threat increases–and there is a consensus on the nature of the threat–the alliance necessarily becomes more cohesive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has served to smooth over a number of disagreements within the alliance.” The Ankara-based Foreign Policy Institute’s Dr Tarik Oguzlu that “as we witness NATO’s European members awaking from their geopolitical hibernation, NATO is almost returning to its founding mission.” The war in Ukraine quickly led to a “revolution in German military affairs” with Berlin now committed to a hike in defense spending. The Germans put Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold. Berlin is also arming the Ukrainian resistance with lethal weapons despite previously opposing NATO’s militarization of Ukraine. For decades, a handful of Western countries accused Italy of being too Russia-friendly. But for the past two months, Italy has taken a strong stance against Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Now closely aligned with the Transatlantic alliance against Moscow, Rome has supported sanctioning Russia. As Italy’s Prime Minister Mario Draghi put it, Italy responded to the President of Ukraine’s appeal for weapons because “it’s not possible to respond only with encouragement” when a democratic country comes under attack. Talk in western capitals about kicking Turkey out of NATO has basically come to a sudden end. There has been somewhat of a rebound in Ankara-Washington relations as Turkey arms Kiev with Baykar TB2 drones. Based on shared concerns about Moscow’s conduct in Ukraine, Greece and Turkey have found common cause since 24 February. NATO’s Baltic members have long been far more alarmist about the Russian threat than those in Western Europe. But such East-West divisions within NATO are going away. “Western politicians are now saying to us, you were right,” Arvydas Anušauskas, Lithuania’s Minister of National Defence, Al Jazeera. Since 24 February, NATO members “have rallied together and acted quickly with new defence and deterrence measures such as activating the NATO defence plans, activating elements of the NATO Response Force, and approving the deployment of four new multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe,” Mihai Chihaia, a policy analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre, told Politics Today. “Reinforcing the Eastern flank has been a top priority and the Allies have shown a very high degree of solidarity. In addition, the strong commitment to Article 5 (mutual defense) has been constantly reiterated.” NATO is not only becoming more unified because of a growing common threat perception of Russia. The security alliance might be on the verge of expanding its membership. Sweden and Finland appear close to abandoning their decades-old foreign policy tradition of neutrality and entering NATO. Finland doing so would add to the border between Russia and NATO members.
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Celeste A. Wallander Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War Author(s): Source: International Organization , Autumn, 2000, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 705-735 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2601379
The integrated command structure as a general asset is crucial to understanding why NATO-and not other institutions, such as the UN or the Western European Union (WEU)-can act for post-Cold War military missions in Europe. "NATO has the military structure: look at Kosovo. The UN failed in Bosnia: it can do certain kinds of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions very well. But military missions require command and control, so this means NATO. Military command is crucial to what NATO does well."77 NATO has the headquarters with planning, logis- tics, and intelligence staffs, including military personnel who have all planned, trained, exercised, and schooled together for years and developed a deep trust.78 "If, for example, NATO were just the Article 5 commitment without any of its assets, it would be the WEU. What made NATO possible in the 1990s was what was devel- oped in the Cold War to deal with the Soviet threat and the alliance's internal tasks. One official said that the OSCE was considered as a vehicle for dealing with Yugosla- via, but officials recognized what it could and could not do. The OSCE is best at establishing norms and standards for political and human rights. "We do not need NATO for every security issue, but we did need it to be able to react to the ones that were on the agenda in the 1990s."80 Why were NATO's military command structure and political decision-making pro- cedures general, rather than specific, assets? Because, observed a senior defense official, "through its political consultation, integrated military command, and organi- zations for implementation, NATO is able to do the three things that have to be done for any policy: mobilize, organize, and implement."'81 Although developed during the Cold War, these capacities translate into post-Cold War missions and are crucial for multilateral security missions. While those who value efficiency bemoan NATO's slowness, the official noted, NATO "is not for maximum efficiency, but for acting together."82 Another official, when asked why NATO has been able to adapt, an- swered that it is because all political-military missions require planning, and "during the Cold War, that is what NATO did."83 And another official answered that it is NATO that has the tools for action, listing the integrated military command, logistics, command-control-communication, and the structures for coming to a coherent and cohesive consensus, whereas the UN and the OSCE do not.84 The political issues of non-Article 5 missions make the process more difficult, he observed, but the plan- ning mechanism is basically the same: procedures for generating forces and readi- ness are on the books, the militaries understand them, and governments are accus- tomed to and ready for them. However, just as clearly as Bosnia demonstrated that NATO's political consulta- tion and integrated command structures were general assets that made it adaptable to the new security environment of risks and non-Article 5 conditions, it also demon-strated that NATO lacked important specific military assets for dealing with out-of- area non-Article 5 contingencies. The alliance's potential new military missions re- quire smaller, lighter, and mobile forces with expertise and training in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and peace enforcement, in stark contrast to the Cold War mission of positional defense. This process of creating post-Cold War specific military assets began both among members and in conjunction with Partnership for Peace.
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Akturan, et.al., 2018 Ozan Beran Akturan, Jordi Vasquez, Noah McLean, Aurore Tigerschiold, and Forrest Alonso Haydon NATO-EU Cooperation: Transatlantic Perspectives on Regional Security Issues 2018 https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/nato-eu-cooperation-transatlantic-perspectives-on-regional-security-issues/
Introduction Born in critical times, developed over decades, and having weathered divisive conflicts, both NATO and the EU will soon enter a period of political uncertainty in terms of their cooperation. This article provides insight into the longevity and feasibility of cooperation initiatives by the EU and NATO by surveying both the bureaucratic and the strategic challenges faced. The inception of the European Union (EU) during the post Second World War era is perhaps the true starting point for analysing how transatlantic security cooperation adapted a self-sustaining and mutually reconcilable rationale. Winston Churchill’s for supranational European solidarity — a call for a “United States of Europe” — in his 1946 Zurich speech was not only necessitated by strategic US forebodings during the prelude to the Cold War, but also by a maturing understanding of the requirements of international security on both sides of the Atlantic. With this call for unity in mind, European Coal and Steel Community was conceived to foster economic interdependence among its members. From there on it surpasses its original purpose in becoming a safeguard of common European values. The American counterpart, NATO, was formed on the foundational principle of collective defence and deterrence, and emerged as a military alliance with abundant economic and political interests. Historically, NATO has prioritised the military and security while the EU aimed for economic and developmental progress. However, similar to the EU, NATO is an organization with an ever increasing dedication to a common set of values, through which is seeks to ensure stabilization and peace. Although NATO operates on more militaristic grounds than the EU, the alliance has overhauled its solely military focus to envision a wider appreciation of values, including as well as . NATO and EU’s positions -what they want- and interests -why they want- have not always overlapped. For instance, NATO actions had been in parallel to maintaining American unipolarity in the global order contrasted with EU prioritizing the multiscale cooperation with its neighbors and other world powers, including China, Russia and India. Exemplified by disapproving European position of American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO’s non-regional interventions is to be exceptions rather than a rule by EU Institute for Security Studies.
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Gabi Schlag Re-constituting NATO: Foundational Narratives of Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s. Uses of “the West”, 156–178. doi:10.1017/9781316717448.008 Print publication year: 2016
One could imagine that the saying ‘There is life in an old dog yet’ fits quite well for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Many serious challenges threatened its cohesion, such as the Suez crisis in 1956, the disputes over the so-called double-track decision in 1979, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1993. While the history of the alliance has often been told as a history of crises (e.g. Stanley Hoffman, 1981), neither internal disputes over the war in Iraq nor the disappearance of a ‘communist threat’ have led to a break-up of NATO. The transatlantic alliance lives on. It has even expanded in size and tasks after the end of the Cold War. Recent tensions between ‘the West’ and Russia over Crimea and Ukraine make clear that the Atlantic alliance is anything but dead. As Stephen Walt put it: ‘NATO owes Putin a big thank-you’ (Walt, 2014). In International Relations (IR), debates on the Atlantic alliance have witnessed ups and downs as well. While realist, liberal, and institutionalist scholars strove to explain the existence and persistence of NATO by referring either to an alliance against threat (Walt, 1990, 1997), an alliance of democracies (Risse-Kappen, 1995, Risse, 1996), or a security manager (Wallander, 2000), other approaches have advocated a more critical and reflective understanding of the discourses and practices which constitute(d) the alliance in the first place (Klein, 1990; Bially Mattern, 2005; Behnke, 2013; Hellmann, 2006; Jackson 2003; Neumann and Williams, 2000; Pouliot, 2010; Adler, 2008). NATO’s lasting ability to overcome internal and external challenges to its cohesion, I will argue, directs our attention exactly to the discursive practices which enabled a continuous re-constitution of a Western security community. By re-constitution I refer to the Janus-faced process of activating and transforming foundational narratives which justify the existence and continuity of NATO. This process commonly includes constructions of threats and a sense of a shared identity which are both ingrained in symbolic orders and mobilized by articulations of a common security strategy. Of further interest, therefore, is how the allies answered the question why NATO should exist, how they invented and used a common notion of identity, interests, and threats in order to justify a deep and lasting pattern of military cooperation between North America and (Western) European states. Such a critical constructivist approach directs our attention to the political dynamics whereby a Western security community is invented in the first place instead of already presuming it as taken for granted (cf. Tilly, 1998; Bartelson, 2009; Herborth, 2009). It emphasizes that the practical usage of meaning imbues an act of political power with quite tremendous institutional consequences. Invented as a geopolitical community of solidarity in the early 1950s with a clear distinction of friends and enemies, NATO symbolized more than a classical military alliance. Compared to the ‘pledge’ of collective defense in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 4 emphasized that the allies ‘will consult together whenever . . . the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’. Exactly this invocation of a political community made NATO’s evolution possible and enabled a smooth reorientation towards out-of-area missions and Eastern enlargement in the 1990s.
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Akturan, et.al., 2018 Ozan Beran Akturan, Jordi Vasquez, Noah McLean, Aurore Tigerschiold, and Forrest Alonso Haydon NATO-EU Cooperation: Transatlantic Perspectives on Regional Security Issues 2018 https://voices.uchicago.edu/euchicago/nato-eu-cooperation-transatlantic-perspectives-on-regional-security-issues/
Throughout history military alliances have formed to balance either countervailing power or the perceived threat thereof. They have collapsed when the need for a balance disappeared as a result of either power crumbling or threat perceptions changing. While the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can be found in its members’ perceived need to balance rising Soviet power in the aftermath of World War II, the collapse of Soviet imperial rule in the late 1980s did not lead to NATO’s demise. For that reason, NATO is often referred to as the most successful military alliance in history. Not only did it prove to be the key instrument in defending its members against Soviet attack or subversion and in helping to speed Soviet disintegration, the Atlantic Alliance survived and, at times, thrived in the decade since the disappearance of the Soviet threat robbed NATO of its main raison d'être. If success is measured by longevity, then NATO has rightly earned its historic designation. What accounts for NATO’s persistence? Three factors can be cited. First, in the immediate aftermath of Soviet imperial rule, few were ready to throw the Alliance overboard. As former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher remarked at the time, “You don’t cancel your home insurance policy just because there have been fewer burglaries on your street in the last 12 months!”1 The need to hedge against an uncertain future was reflected in the new Alliance strategic concept, adopted in November 1991 by NATO Heads of State and Government just days before the Soviet collapse. This concept pointedly noted that the need to “preserve the strategic balance in Europe” would remain one of NATO’s four fundamental security tasks.2 Second, the Alliance has always meant more than providing a countervailing balance to Soviet power. To a considerable extent, NATO evolved into a community of like-minded states, united not just by their opposition to Soviet communism but also by their determination (as the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 stated) “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”3 Over time, NATO grew from being an alliance principally dedicated to protecting its members against military threat or attack into the principal NATO in the 21st century - 7 - Final – March 19, 2001 institutional expression of the transatlantic community of states and the western values that both defined and united them. Together, the NATO allies formed a viable, yet pluralistic security community, one where (with the possible exception of Greece and Turkey) the thought of settling any dispute among its members by the threat or use of force has been ruled out a priori. 4 That community remains as vibrant today as it did at the height of the cold war. Third, when the military organization was established in the early 1950s to give full expression to the collective defense commitment of the Washington Treaty, the basis was laid for a large bureaucracy, staffed by many thousands of people dedicated to the organization and its mission. While old soldiers may fade away, large organizations rarely do. After initially resisting the need to change, the NATO bureaucracy responded, like all such bureaucracies, by seeking to adapt its mission and structure in a manner relevant to its new environment. On the military side, internal adaptation has taken the form of a streamlined and more flexible command structure capable of deploying military forces rapidly and over greater distances than was the case during the cold war. Politically, the Alliance has sought new missions to retain its relevance – from peacekeeping to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the process, NATO has not only survived but been transformed into a politico-military entity that differs in many significant ways from the organization that stood ready to meet a Warsaw Pact tank assault across the Fulda Gap.
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Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis
While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.
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Mack 91 – Doctor of Psychiatry and a professor at Harvard University (John, “The Enemy System” http://www.johnemackinstitute.org/eJournal/article.asp?id=23 *Gender modified)
The threat of nuclear annihilation has stimulated us to try to understand what it is about (hu)mankind that has led to such self-destroying behavior. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the adversarial relationships between ethnic or national groups. It is out of such enmities that war, including nuclear war should it occur, has always arisen. Enmity between groups of people stems from the interaction of psychological, economic, and cultural elements. These include fear and hostility (which are often closely related), competition over perceived scarce resources,[3] the need for individuals to identify with a large group or cause,[4] a tendency to disclaim and assign elsewhere responsibility for unwelcome impulses and intentions, and a peculiar susceptibility to emotional manipulation by leaders who play upon our more savage inclinations in the name of national security or the national interest. A full understanding of the "enemy system"[3] requires insights from many specialities, including psychology, anthropology, history, political science, and the humanities. In their statement on violence[5] twenty social and behavioral scientists, who met in Seville, Spain, to examine the roots of war, declared that there was no scientific basis for regarding (hu)man(s) as an innately aggressive animal, inevitably committed to war. The Seville statement implies that we have real choices. It also points to a hopeful paradox of the nuclear age: threat of nuclear war may have provoked our capacity for fear-driven polarization but at the same time it has inspired unprecedented efforts towards cooperation and settlement of differences without violence. The Real and the Created Enemy Attempts to explore the psychological roots of enmity are frequently met with responses on the following lines: "I can accept psychological explanations of things, but my enemy is real. The Russians [or Germans, Arabs, Israelis, Americans] are armed, threaten us, and intend us harm. Furthermore, there are real differences between us and our national interests, such as competition over oil, land, or other scarce resources, and genuine conflicts of values between our two nations. It is essential that we be strong and maintain a balance or superiority of military and political power, lest the other side take advantage of our weakness". This argument does not address the distinction between the enemy threat and one's own contribution to that threat-by distortions of perception, provocative words, and actions. In short, the enemy is real, but we have not learned to understand how we have created that enemy, or how the threatening image we hold of the enemy relates to its actual intentions. "We never see our enemy's motives and we never labor to assess his will, with anything approaching objectivity".[6] Individuals may have little to do with the choice of national enemies. Most Americans, for example, know only what has been reported in the mass media about the Soviet Union. We are largely unaware of the forces that operate within our institutions, affecting the thinking of our leaders and ourselves, and which determine how the Soviet Union will be represented to us. Ill-will and a desire for revenge are transmitted from one generation to another, and we are not taught to think critically about how our assigned enemies are selected for us. In the relations between potential adversarial nations there will have been, inevitably, real grievances that are grounds for enmity. But the attitude of one people towards another is usually determined by leaders who manipulate the minds of citizens for domestic political reasons which are generally unknown to the public. As Israeli sociologist Alouph Haveran has said, in times of conflict between nations historical accuracy is the first victim.[8] The Image of the Enemy and How We Sustain It Vietnam veteran William Broyles wrote: "War begins in the mind, with the idea of the enemy."[9] But to sustain that idea in war and peacetime a nation's leaders must maintain public support for the massive expenditures that are required. Studies of enmity have revealed susceptibilities, though not necessarily recognized as such by the governing elites that provide raw material upon which the leaders may draw to sustain the image of an enemy.[7,10] Freud[11] in his examination of mass psychology identified the proclivity of individuals to surrender personal responsibility to the leaders of large groups. This surrender takes place in both totalitarian and democratic societies, and without coercion. Leaders can therefore designate outside enemies and take actions against them with little opposition. Much further research is needed to understand the psychological mechanisms that impel individuals to kill or allow killing in their name, often with little questioning of the morality or consequences of such actions. Philosopher and psychologist Sam Keen asks why it is that in virtually every war "The enemy is seen as less than human? He's faceless. He's an animal"." Keen tries to answer his question: "The image of the enemy is not only the soldier's most powerful weapon; it is society's most powerful weapon. It enables people en masse to participate in acts of violence they would never consider doing as individuals".[12] National leaders become skilled in presenting the adversary in dehumanized images. The mass media, taking their cues from the leadership, contribute powerfully to the process.
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Alexandra Gheciu First Published March 19, 2019 Article Commentary NATO, liberal internationalism, and the politics of imagining the Western security community doi.org/10.1177/0020702019834645 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0020702019834645
In recent years, there has been renewed interest among International Relations (IR) scholars in the ability of the Western security community to protect itself from a variety of threats and challenges. In this context, longstanding debates concerning the role played by the organization that is widely regarded as the institutional expression of that community—NATO—have recently taken on new dimensions. Scholars and policymakers often disagree in their interpretations of the relative strength of NATO, but many agree that the alliance needs to play a central role in protecting the West from a mix of conventional and non-conventional dangers, ranging from an increasingly assertive Russia to transnational terrorism. One of the key assumptions underpinning many analyses is that NATO constitutes the institutional expression of a pre-existing Western security community united around liberal-democratic norms and values. However, a close reading of the alliance’s history shows that, far from simply representing a pre-given community, NATO has always been involved in constructing “the West.” At the heart of that process of social construction lie practices of collective (re)imagining of the Western world in specific ways, as well as the representation—and management of—internal tensions as feuds within a community united by shared liberal values. Today, the task of managing internal differences has been rendered particularly difficult by the rise of radical conservative political forces in several allied states. This has translated into a clash between liberal and illiberal interpretations of the Western security community, which has the potential to seriously complicate inter-allied relations in the foreseeable future. As this paper shows, contrary to conventional wisdom, middle powers have always played important roles in the constitution of the Western security community. More recently, they have also played significant roles in contesting liberal interpretations of the security community, and articulating an alternative, radical conservative vision of the West. Recent developments in allied countries such as Turkey and Poland are a potent reminder that not all middle powers are alike; on the contrary, based on their socially constructed, historically specific definitions of identity, they can perform a diversity of international roles—in support of, or, conversely, as obstacles to liberal internationalism. The narrative of Western unity and the politics of collective forgetting during the Cold War One of the most influential narratives of international security put forward by liberal IR scholars and practitioners centres on the Euro-Atlantic security community, consisting of a group of countries united around a set of key liberal norms and institutions that generate “dependable expectations” of peaceful resolution of conflicts that might arise among them.1 From that perspective, NATO is an institution that was created in the context of the Cold War to protect the pre-existing security community from the threats posed by the West’s dangerous other: the communist bloc. Yet, as a series of constructivist scholars have persuasively argued, there is nothing natural about the Western security community.2 In Emanuel Adler’s words, “security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.”3 Furthermore, the absence of violence should not lead us to conclude that the construction of security communities in general and the Western community in particular were power-free processes. On the contrary, as Adler and Barnett explain, central to the establishment of a security community is the dialectic between power—primarily symbolic power—and knowledge.4 Thus, in the physically non-violent context of security communities, power is primarily “the authority to determine the shared meanings that embody the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to goods and benefits.”5 Applying this logic to the specific case of NATO, we can see the alliance not as the institutional expression of a pre-given community, but, rather, as an organization that has been deeply involved in power-filled practices of construction and reproduction of that community.6 Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux states—did not take the Western security community for granted. Instead, they engaged in a systematic set of practices aimed at constructing a sense of community around a shared set of liberal-democratic norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, and placed the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the heart of those practices. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded as less worrisome than the danger of communist subversion within the weakened societies of Western European states.7 In that context, as Louis St. Laurent—then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—argued, the best way to prevent a third world war was by confronting “the forces of communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of freedom.”8 At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of communism inspired a collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The “spectre of Communism” provided the defining other against which decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective definition of a Western community. That community was seen as based on the common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member states; its defining mark was the set of shared values of individual liberal freedoms, the rule of law, and democracy.9 This view is clearly reflected in the preamble to the Washington Treaty (NATO’s foundational treaty), which stipulates that the alliance is based on principles of democracy, individual liberty, and law.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › Aff › A2 Unanimity
Christopher Skaluba and Conor Rodihan, 1-18-2022, "No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective.," Atlantic Council, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 7-3-2022)
Yet as the crisis evolves, decisions about how to support Ukraine will become more difficult, and there’s a limit to how unified NATO can be. While the West might agree on introducing tough new economic sanctions and reinforcing the Alliance’s eastern flank, boosting Kyiv’s military capacity—by supporting an insurgency, for instance, or —will be impossible to achieve by consensus and is much more likely to come from individual members than under NATO auspices. This shouldn’t be surprising. Consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its ongoing support for separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region: NATO actions in support of Kyiv have been more political than operational, leaving it to individual allies to provide munitions, equipment, and training to Ukrainian forces. And despite a recurrent pledge that Ukraine would one day be welcome to join the Alliance, as well as the sympathy expressed by allies for Ukraine’s plight, there’s been precious little progress on this front. NATO is primarily concerned about defending its members from Russian aggression—which it is also wary of provoking by supporting the Ukrainian military. Yet despite its lack of meaningful military support for Ukraine, the crisis has been the animating issue on the Alliance’s agenda since 2014. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and its support for separatists have driven major NATO initiatives on , , , , and , with an eye toward beefing up the Alliance’s northern and eastern flanks and deterring Russia in both the conventional and sub-threshold realms. As an institution established to safeguard Europe, it has successfully geared itself to deter the type of destabilizing Russian belligerence currently on display. Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about , creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second, a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its —particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right. Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its —the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with in taking on the Islamic State. Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor, not evidence of its ineptitude. In the case of military support for Ukraine, policymakers will find more attractive alternatives for dealing with Moscow’s aggression outside of the auspices of the Alliance. Up to and including its recent dialogue with Russia, it has taken a host of consensus actions to support Ukraine—from and politically to with an expectation that Ukraine will eventually become a member. It might even for the Ukrainian military. And while it won’t find a consensus to fight, it could provide the foundation for certain allies to support Ukrainian forces in ways consistent with their national priorities outside of NATO. In that case, NATO’s enabling value to its members in complicating Putin’s cost-benefit assessment should be applauded. Last week’s NATO-Russia Council meeting showcased an Alliance working in lockstep and finding political consensus in responding to preposterous Russian demands. NATO should always strive for this degree of consensus. But if and when this crisis intensifies, and Putin advances further into Ukraine, expectations for NATO assistance will be raised, decisions about how to respond will become more difficult, and consensus will be more elusive. Despite the rhetoric we might hear in response, this is not evidence of NATO’s ineffectiveness—but rather a reflection of how democratic institutions function. And even absent consensus, NATO can still contribute invaluably to Ukraine’s sovereignty.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › Aff › US Model Solves
Andrew W. Eichner, spring 2020, “The Limitations of System Autonomy: Analyzing Obstacles to the Vision of Autonomous Horizons and the Inevitable Future of Warfare,” Washburn Law Journal, (accessed through LexisNexis software) https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=dd10ccd5-b0a7-4e35-8886-4b0cdc98cdcb&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalytical-materials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5YN8-87X1-FFFC-B085-00000-00&pdsourcegroupingtype=&pdcontentcomponentid=152481&pdmfid=1516831&pdisurlapi=true, (MDUFF/MSDI, Acc: 6-29-2022)
Potential problems may arise if the Air Force or other DoD components begin utilizing more fully autonomous machines, especially in lethal operations. Despite noting the importance of continued human-system interaction, the Office of the Chief Scientist predicted that "as the capabilities of autonomy increase, (including the ability to handle a broader range of situations and uncertainty) it is anticipated that the need for human intervention will decline." 26Just four years after releasing Autonomous Horizons, the Office of the Chief Scientist already appears to have envisioned expanding the roles of autonomous systems even further as detailed in The Way Forward, suggesting that autonomous systems "should be able to take on a subordinate, peer, or supervisory roleand change that role with humans or other [autonomous systems] within the organization, [*213] as the task or environment demands." 27Given the progress that has been made in autonomous machines and the need to remain ahead of our rivals, it is foreseeable that in the next thirty years warfighting machines will be designed to require fewer human inputs given the complex and evolving nature of today's battlefields. 28 As the prospect of fully autonomous machines becomes more of a technological possibility, the DoD should anticipate opposition from the international community. Special efforts should be made to ensure that autonomous systems conform with international customs and practices. As discussed further in subsection II.C, the U.S. is likely to be a global trendsetter with its approach to using autonomous systems in military operations. As such, its practices should set the expectation that international law should be respected when autonomous systems are utilized on the battlefield, which may require keeping their autonomous capabilities in check and ultimately limiting the developmental ceiling of the technology.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › Aff › 2030 Validates Solvency
NPA, 7-4-2021, NATO Parliamentary Assembly https://www.nato-pa.int/news/virtual-visit-france-nato-parliamentarians-discuss-space-security-biotech-advances-and-nato-st, "NATO PA," In virtual visit to France, NATO Parliamentarians discuss space security, biotech advances and NATO S&T cooperation | NATO PA (ermo/sms, Acc:7-3-2022)
Finally, the delegation also learned of the importance of cooperation in the field of S&T, and in particular the role of the Collaboration Support Office (CSO) in NATO's Science and Technology Organisation (STO). John-Mikal STØRDAL, CSO Director, emphasised that “collaborative Science and Technology within NATO has enabled the Alliance to produce the most advanced and efficient defence systems the world has ever seen.” He warned that there is a real possibility that NATO could lose its technological edge but stressed that the work of the Assembly’s Science and Technology Committee has had a positive impact in raising awareness of this possibility, citing the 2018 NATO PA report, Maintaining the Edge and Enhancing Alliance Agility. “Today, emerging and disruptive technologies are firmly placed on the agenda for NATO 2030, as was clear in the last Summit Communique,” he said.
2022
SDI
Evidence
MSDI NATO – Solvency › Aff › US Leadership Solves Turkey
Al Jazeera, 3-13-2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/13/greece-turkey-leaders-seek-common-ground-over-ukraine-war, "Greece, Turkey leaders seek common ground over Ukraine war," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-4-2022)
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis have held talks in Istanbul, seeking a rapprochement against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Both countries have key roles to play in the changing security situation in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and their increased cooperation would have benefits for the region, the Turkish presidency said in a statement following Sunday’s talks.