As a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“East” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). It represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the West must confront forcefully. Moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: Today, bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror, Islam exposed, the Arab threat and the Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). This portrayal of the East as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of Orientalist literature. However, as well as exaggerating the East’s distinctiveness, the Orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. The second core characteristic of Orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from Western norms. Specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as Chaim Weizmann put it to Arthur Balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). What is more, unlike superior Europeans, [they] Orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). In dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). Furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, Orientalism is committed to rectifying it. The East must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the West imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. The knowledge produced by Orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. For this reason, Said brands Orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of Western power’ (ibid., p. 223). Having said this, recognition of Orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. The third prominent feature of Orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). Said explains that over time Western writing about the Orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. Analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. Their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). Every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. This problem is exacerbated by the tendency for Area Studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). Some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: First is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). Second is eternality: the Orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. Momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). Third, Orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the West. Prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘Oriental personality’ (ibid., p. 31). Fourth, Orientalists have a great talent for combining ‘imperial vagueness and precise detail’ (ibid., p. 50). Therefore, while indulging in the most shameless of generalisations, Orientalists simultaneously bombard the reader with ‘sheer, overpowering, monumental description’ (ibid., p. 162). Fifth, despite pretensions to expertise, numerous Orientalists are remarkably underqualified to speak about the East and cannot even claim knowledge of the relevant languages (ibid., pp. 178, 193). In developing the argument outlined above, Said refers almost exclusively to representations of the Arab world. However, as an intellectual model, Orientalism lends itself to application well beyond its original field of study as a means of drawing attention to any area of scholarship in which the literature has become stuck in a monotonous cycle of reaffirmation. With this in mind, this article employs Orientalism to critique Western discourse on Russian foreign policy. Orientalism and Russian foreign policy Orientalism and Russia are not unacquainted. In fact, Russia (or the Soviet Union) features more than ten times in Orientalism. There is also a substantial secondary literature that explores Orientalism in the Russian context (e.g. Bolton, 2009; David-Fox, Holquist and Martin, 2006; Khalid, 2000). However, for both Said and the vast majority of subsequent scholars, Russia is significant, not as an object of Orientalist modes of thought, but as an origin. In particular, the literature highlights Russia’s long imperial history, its tendency to define its core culture in contradis-tinction to those of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and its imposition of a standardised way of life upon the peoples of its empire. However, just because a culture is itself an instigator of Orientalism does not mean that it is not also a recipient. This fact has been recognised by Iver Neumann. In Uses of the Other, Neumann describes the historical construction of Russia as Europe’s Other. In particular, he draws attention to representations of the country as a ‘barbarian at the gate’ (Neumann, 1999, p. 77), acknowledges the popular stereotype of ‘an alleged Russian Volksgeist (“national character”) of sloth, drunkenness, and laziness’ (ibid., p. 104) and highlights the perception of Russia as ‘a gigantic specimen to which the most advanced legal and administrative ideas could be applied with a completeness impossible in western Europe’ (Anderson, quoted in ibid., p. 78). In making this case, Neumann cites Said and clearly demonstrates the appropriateness of his model to this context. However, Russia is not the exclusive focus of his book and, even when dealing with the subject, Neumann’s concern is with long-standing cultural representations of the country and not contemporary portrayals of its position in international politics. Elsewhere, some scholars have explored specific deficiencies in the Western political discourse about Russia (Gleason, 1951; Lieven, 2000; Malia, 1999; Mikoyan, 2006; Solzhenitsyn, 1980); most recently, studies have highlighted anti-Russian sentiment among US policymakers (Tsygankov, 2009) and lack of balance in Western media coverage of the 2008 Russo–Georgian war (English and Svyatets, 2010). And yet, as valuable as these contributions are, they tend to frame their arguments in terms of Russophobia and do not recognise the interdisciplinary relevance of Orientalism. This article fills the gap in this literature by demonstrating how Said’s model can be employed to make sense of the clichés, distortions and exaggerations that taint this discourse. The use of this alternative framework is a valuable addition, not only because it highlights some heretofore un-noted deficiencies, but also because it does so by drawing upon a more substantive and deep-rooted theory than the nebulous Russophobia. As such, rather than simply describing the weaknesses, the Orientalist model is able to employ its sophisticated understanding of the process of Othering to offer a clear and credible account of their emergence. Moreover, Said’s depiction of how the discourse about a region can come to be dominated by a partisan and self-perpetuating orthodoxy provides a valuable explanation for the pervasiveness and durability of the unfortunate representation of Russian foreign policy that is detailed here. Each of these considerations provides significant scope for further research, thus encouraging the opening up of this subject area to much-needed intellectual rejuvenation. At this point I should make clear that it is not my intention to suggest that all Western accounts of Russian foreign policy are Orientalist; there are many fine studies that do not fit the model. However, as the following paragraphs reveal, there is a sizeable mass of literature that unmistakably displays the characteristic symptoms of Orientalism. With regard to the first trait – the exaggeration of difference – there is a striking propensity to portray Russian foreign policy as markedly different from that of Western states. Although probably of older origin, this perception was powerfully reinforced by the stark dividing lines of the Cold War and by Moscow’s use of ideological rhetoric to justify its international strategy. Despite the collapse of communism, this image of Russia as an Other, which pursues a qualitatively different mode of behaviour, remains prominent in Western scholarship. It might be noted that all branches of Area Studies are prone to stress countries’ dissimilarities, while downplaying their commonalities, since this represents much of the field’s unique selling point. However, be this as it may, there is certainly a tendency for Russia’s mode of engagement in international affairs to be presented as unusual. To be specific, scholars regularly present Russian foreign policy as puzzling, unpredictable and divergent from the Western norm. Indeed, the country’s behaviour is considered to be so exceptional and difficult to define that standard analytical models are not thought to apply (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008; Kubicek, 1999, pp. 547–548; Legvold, 2007a, pp. 10–11). Bobo Lo, one of the best-known Western experts on the subject, clearly highlights this conception, beginning his popular textbook with the observation that Russia’s external activities reflect ‘the perversity of human nature’ and, ‘far from exhibiting an underlying if specific pragmatism ... have been liberally streaked with irrationality’ (Lo, 2002, p. 1). Moreover, in accordance with the Orientalist model, this image of inscrutable foreignness is persistently reaffirmed through shared language use. Most notable in this regard is the literature’s compulsive repetition of Churchill’s claim that Russia’s actions are a ‘riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’ (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008, p. 118; Donaldson and Nogee, 2009, p. 65; Joyce, 1984, p. 134; Lo, 2002, p. 1; March, 2006, p. 88; Rubinstein, 1989, p. 12). Another popular means of expressing the same idea is the medical metaphor, whereby Russia is presented as ‘genetically different’ (Wesson, 1974, p. 3), exhibiting allergic reactions (Lo, 2008, p. 258) and afflicted by various ailments, including Borderline Personality Disorder (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008). Meanwhile, others contribute to this sense of exoticism, deviance and distance via clichés about bears (Garnett, 1997, p. 61; Menon, 1995), chess (Goldman, 2008, pp. 92, 154–155) and nesting dolls (Legvold, 2009, pp. 42–43). Furthermore, as Said predicts, as well as being presented as somehow more extraordinary and incomprehensible than the behaviour of any other large, complex state, Russian foreign policy is portrayed as significantly more dangerous. Despite its ‘syndrome of backwardness’ (Snyder, 1994, p. 181), Russia continues to represent a serious potential threat to international stability (Kubicek, 1999, pp. 567–568; Pipes, 1997; Snyder, 1994, p. 197) and is thus a popular subject for Western polemic (Baker and Glasser, 2005; Lucas, 2008). Turning to the second tenet of Orientalism – the assumption of Western superiority – there is also clear evidence that Russia’s mode of engagement in international politics is routinely presented as inferior to that of Western countries. In a manner that contributes to the image of Russian deviationism (though contradicts the illusion of mysterious unpredictability), a substantial values gap is proposed to exist between Russian and Western strategic cultures (Forsberg, 2004, pp. 261–263; Mankoff, 2010, p. 134; March, 2006, p. 93). In essence, while the West is considered to have largely transcended Hobbesian modes of thought, Russian foreign policy remains ‘nakedly realist’ (March, 2006, p. 92), fixated with security, sovereignty and the pursuit of national interest. This is an entirely legitimate observation, yet what is dubious is the disparaging suggestion that this approach is un-European (ibid., p. 93), anachronistic (Lo, 2008, p. 176) or even so backward as to be rooted in a different historical era (Vihavainen, 2009, pp. 53–54). What is more, not only is Russia’s strategy deemed outdated, but its attempts to implement it are also seen as substandard since its policymaking is habitually cast as chaotic, error prone and even feckless (Garnett, 1998, pp. 67–70; Legvold, 2007a, pp. 7–10; Lo, 2008, p. 141; Simes, 2007, p. 36). Again, there may be some truth to this, especially with regard to the early 1990s, yet so embedded has this image become that even successful (from the Russian perspective) undertakings – such as the use of energy as a means of economic and political leverage, and military intervention in Georgia – are instinctively portrayed as fundamental failures (Baev, 2008, pp. 128–129; Sestanovich, 2008, pp. 25–26; Vendil Pallin and Westerlund, 2009). Furthermore, as the Orientalist model suggests, as well as being convinced of the waywardness of Russia’s approach, Western scholars are committed to rectifying it. The issue of how its pupil was ‘lost’ in the 1990s continues to be debated (Columbus, 2001; Eyal, 2009; Simes, 2007), thus assuming that Russia was ever someone’s to lose, and academics presumptuously dictate how the country can be returned to the ‘right’ path (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006). While nominally independent, such scholarship clearly shares and serves the interests of Western power. Finally, traces of Orientalism are detectable in the intellectual models employed in the study of this subject. Although the number of publications in this area is large, accounts of Russian foreign policy, when not essentially heavyweight descriptions (e.g. Donaldson and Nogee, 2009; Kennedy-Pipe, 1998; Rangsimaporn, 2009), are remarkably repetitive and unimaginative. Testimony to this fact is provided by the surprising number of similarities to be found in the analyses, if not the ultimate expectations, of liberal (e.g. Legvold, 2007b) and conservative (e.g. Pipes, 1996) commentators. Rather than undertaking innovative research into how findings from other disciplines can be applied to this context or drawing new cross-national comparisons, scholars habitually reiterate a core set of convictions which, on the basis of use rather than truth, has become the standard narrative. Employing simplifications and unsubstantiated claims that would not be tolerated with regard to Western states, this basic approach does little to enhance our understanding of Russian foreign policy. At core, the orthodox discourse takes the view that there is a specifically Russian mindset or pattern of behaviour to which the country inevitably reverts. While Western states are assumed to respond rationally to incentives and constraints, Russian policy is guided by some primordial instinct that has been indelibly imprinted upon its national character by the weight of geography and history. This predisposition naturally inclines the country towards expansionism, militarism and autocracy (Brzezinski, 1984; Galeotti, 1995, pp. 3–24; Lo, 2003, pp. 72–83; Pipes, 1996; Snyder, 1994, p. 179). Moreover, so enduring is this assumed inclination that it is deemed to apply across the fault lines of Russian and Soviet history. In consequence, there is an uncommon tendency to explain Russia’s current foreign policy by drawing upon historical precedent (Bunce, 1993; Joyce, 1984; Lederer, 1962; Legvold, 2007b and 2009; Lo, 2008, pp. 17–37; Vihavainen, 2009). For example, Russia is said still to possess a collective ‘Mongol complex’ as the result of the subjugation of Russian lands from the 13th to 15th centuries (Lo, 2008, pp. 18–19; Vihavainen, 2009). This phenomenon apparently helps account for today’s ambivalent national identity and troubled relations with both East and West. In explaining why no respected scholar would account for modern British policies in such a way, Timo Vihavainen states bluntly that ‘England had changed, while Russia had not’ (2009, pp. 18–19). Encouraged by this view that Russia is trapped in the past, all manner of modern phenomena are labelled atavism and dubious parallels are drawn between modern and historical figures, such as between Vladimir Putin and Peter the Great, Stolypin and Stalin (Lo, 2003, pp. 6, 133–134; McDonald, 2007, pp. 182–183; Murawiec, 2000). Of course, there is nothing wrong with historical comparison per se; it is a widely used and valuable analytical technique. However it should be employed when genuinely merited and not simply as a matter of convention.