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2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- Warming Advantage › 2NC --- Warming Defense

--It's hyperbole that misrepresents actual climate science – even the worst case isn’t extinction.

Kerr et al. 19 – Amber, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub. Daniel Swain, Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne. Peter Kalmus, Professor and Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in Working Group. Richard Betts, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. William Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence”, Climate Feedback, , 06-04-2019

This is hyperbole. The scenario constructed in this report does not have a “high likelihood” of occurring in part because it requires a confluence of circumstances coming together. While it’s certainly true that climate change will be damaging to society and the environment and many of the consequences will be severe this does not equate to a high likelihood of civilisation coming to an end.

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- Warming Advantage › 2NC --- Warming Defense

--It’s a tail-end scenario in the far future.

Kerr et al. 19 – Amber, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub. Daniel Swain, Climate Science PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research. Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne. Peter Kalmus, Professor and Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in Working Group. Richard Betts, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. William Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. “Claim that human civilization could end in 30 years is speculative, not supported with evidence”, Climate Feedback, , 06-04-2019

Scientists who reviewed IFLScience’s story found that it failed to provide sufficient context for this report—differentiating, for example, between speculative claims and descriptions of peer-reviewed research. In particular, the story’s headline (“New Report Warns ‘High Likelihood Of Human Civilization Coming To An End’ Within 30 Years”) misrepresents the report as a likely projection rather than an exploration of an intrinsically unlikely worst case scenario.

See all the scientists’ annotations in context.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- Warming Advantage › 2NC --- Warming Defense

--Even if everyone stopped all emissions today it wouldn’t solve warming

Cascio 19 – Jamais, a professional futurist who has been exploring the intersection of environmental, technological, and cultural change for 25 years. Selected by Foreign Policy magazine as one of their Top 100 Global Thinkers in 2009, Cascio specializes in plausible scenarios of the future. He is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute for the Future, where he works on a wide array of projects. Cascio’s written work has appeared in both academic and popular journals and collections. “The apocalypse: It’s not the end of the world”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 75, No. 6, pg. 269-272, , 10-28-2019

There’s a 25- to 50-year lag between the emission of atmospheric carbon and its persistent impact on temperature. This means the environmental disruption attributable to global warming we’re seeing now is the result of carbon emissions up through the 1980s. It also means we could cut off all carbon emissions today, globally, and still see another generation of warming. Beyond the environmental, economic, and human consequences, imagine the political impact of taking bold action that produces no observable benefits for 20 years, or even longer.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- Warming Advantage › 2NC --- Not Good for Warming

A UBI would make it impossible to do anything to combat warming.

Salla Kalaniemi et. al 12-01-2020 (Salla Kalaniemi and Jukka Heionen - University of Iceland, Faculty of Civil and Environmental Engineering. Juudit Ottelin and Seppo Junnila - Aalto University, Department of Built Environment. "Downscaling consumption to universal basic income level falls short of sustainable carbon footprint in Finland" Published in ScienceDirect. Accessed 06-19-2023. URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1462901119315333#abs0005) MSUCB

The UBI carbon footprint determined in this study, 4.8 tCO2-eq per capita, is notably smaller than the average carbon footprints for Finnish households in the comparison groups. Yet, they are still around three times as high as the long-term sustainable level suggested by O’Neill et al. (2018), but close to the global average. If the current global CO2 emissions (Le Quéré et al., 2018) were shared equally among all the people, everyone would have approximately a carbon budget of 5.6 tCO2 in 2017 following the IPCC (2018) 1.5-degree mitigation pathway. This number is quite close to the carbon footprint value estimated in this study for the UBI consumption level. However, this study only included the personal consumption component of carbon footprint excluding capital goods and governmental consumption, which have been shown to be significant globally and for European countries (e.g. Ivanova et al., 2016; Södersten et al., 2018; Heinonen et al., 2020).

In a recent study on Finland, Ottelin et al. (2018a) estimated that the final demand of households causes 77 % of the carbon footprint of total final demand in Finland. If the government consumption (14 %) and investments (5%), and the final demand of non-profit institutions (4%) are added to the UBI carbon footprint estimated in this study by following Ottelin et al. (2018a), the average carbon footprint at the UBI level would be 6.2 tCO2-eq per capita. However, Ottelin et al. show how the share of these emissions is larger in low-income than in high-income households. Thus, the UBI households probably use public services more than an average household, so the total average carbon footprint is likely to be more than 6.2 tCO2-eq., and thus higher than the global 1.5-degree mitigation pathway level. Moreover, to stay on the pathway, the emissions would need to be cut by approximately 10 % annually in addition to first reaching the current pathway level. Similarly, previous studies on the interaction between environmental and social Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have shown that bringing the global population to a moderate expenditure level (still lower than the UBI level in this study), would lead to difficulties in achieving the climate targets unless additional mitigation measures are taken (Hubacek et al., 2017; Scherer et al., 2018).

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- Warming Advantage › 2NC --- Not Good for Warming

It can’t be solved without conditioning payment.

MacNeill, T., & Vibert, A. (2019). Universal Basic Income and the Natural Environment: Theory and Policy. Basic Income Studies, 14(1). doi:10.1515/bis-2018-0026 MSUCB

Conditions could be attached to the receipt of basic income funds. For example, part of basic income payments could be made in the form of vouchers for locally produced sustainable food, or public transit. Such policy suggestions do not appear in English-language academic journals, however Arnsperger (2015) does make an argument that a UBI be introduced as a complementary currency (which is exactly what a voucher is). Suggestion of conditions, however, were adamantly rejected by all experts consulted for this research at NABIG and via personal correspondence. This is not surprising, since, both BIGs and UBIs are premised on unconditionally. In reality, adding conditions changes the meaning of a BIG or UBI, necessitating the use of a different label – Conditional Minimum Income (CMI) will be used in the remainder of this paper.

For many advocates, a CMI would undermine a main premise of a UBI or BIG – a commitment to personal freedom of recipients and aversion to paternalistic behavior management on the part of the state. This value attached to personal freedom is not only an ethical decision. As Sheila Regehr (personal communication, June 25, 2018) points out, studies have shown a negative relationship between health outcomes and the restriction of the ‘sense of control’ people have over their lives (Rodin, 1986).

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- Warming Advantage › 2NC --- Not Good for Warming

It undermines collective institutions.

MacNeill, T., & Vibert, A. (2019). Universal Basic Income and the Natural Environment: Theory and Policy. Basic Income Studies, 14(1). doi:10.1515/bis-2018-0026 MSUCB

Canadian Indigenous leaders consulted for this research, and present at NABIG, were also concerned about the environmental problems associated with increased consumption. In addition, they were concerned that environmental protection could be undermined if a BIG were to be implemented in a way that undermined collective institutions and indigenous culture. The North Shore Tribal Council (NSTC) surveyed members of 34 First Nations in Northern Ontario, Canada as part of a community consultation on basic income. Despite promises of more money per person, the idea of direct cash transfers from a provincial government to individual did not resonate well with indigenous interviewees. The NSTC (2017) report expressed concerns that a BIG simply would represent “a shift from one form of dependency to another” (p. 2). The report continues:

[T]he historical shift to dependence on the welfare system has been a big factor in the now acknowledged undermining of First Nation culture and community… It has also been of concern that the welfare system is rooted in western “individualism” which runs counter to and has negatively affected First Nation’s as communities and the holistic “Anishnawbe way” of living (p. 2).

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- Not Good for Heg

Moreso, it decreases productivity.

Jacob Dowell 3-8-2019. (Jacob Dowell is an economics student particularly interested in the Austrian school of thought and its monetary theory., . "Andrew Yang’s Math Doesn’t Add Up on Universal Basic Income." No Publication. Web. accessed 6-19-2023 < https://fee.org/articles/andrew-yang-s-math-doesn-t-add-up-on-universal-basic-income/ >.)MSUCB

Efficient Employment, Not Enjoyable Employment A common argument against UBI is that it will incentivize people not to look for work. Yang answers this criticism, saying that $12,000 per year will still not be a good enough living for most people, so people will still be incentivized to get jobs and contribute to production. However, there are still marginal effects at play that can add up to huge changes: 1) It decreases the incentive for workers to quickly find new employment once they’re out of a job, and 2) it decreases their sensitivity to income differences between jobs. The increased time between jobs means there will be lower employment at any given time and, therefore, less production. And the decreased sensitivity to higher incomes means people will be more likely to do less productive work for the sake of enjoyment. While it may be desirable for workers to balance their income needs and their work preferences, a UBI would skew choices towards enjoyable work rather than efficient or productive work. Yang even admits this: “UBI increases art production, nonprofit work and caring for loved ones.” While these may be admirable activities, Yang is forgetting to consider the opportunity costs associated with them. While people will be more inclined to make art, write novels, and work less, the amount of needed goods in society will decline. This may be a worthwhile tradeoff to some, but when the main stated goal is to help those in poverty, producing less clothing and food is not going to achieve the desired ends. Andrew Yang does bring up some admirable points about a UBI avoiding the welfare cliff and reducing bureaucracy. However, the overall greater expansion of the government, the even more massive resource transfer from savers to consumers, and the productivity-reducing effects on labor all toll to a huge loss for the economy in the long run.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- Not Good for Heg

It guarantees bankrupting the federal government meaning that there is no way for them to compete with China.

Robert D. Atkinson 1-19-2021. (As founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), recognized as the world’s top think tank for science and technology policy, Robert D. Atkinson leads a prolific team of policy analysts and fellows that is successfully shaping the debate and setting the agenda on a host of critical issues at the intersection of technological innovation and public policy. . "Never Mind COVID-19: Andrew Yang Is Still Wrong About UBI." No Publication. Web. accessed 6-19-2023 < https://itif.org/publications/2021/01/19/never-mind-covid-19-andrew-yang-still-wrong-about-ubi/ >.)MSUCB

In the long run, absent massive tax hikes, UBI would bankrupt the federal government. Moreover, if the payments are high enough to provide real income security, the program would boost the unemployment rate as some would simply take the money instead of focusing on finding job opportunities. And the longer people stay unemployed, the higher the risk for their skills to atrophy. This creates yet another chain of unfortunate situations—folks would face lower chances of ultimately exiting unemployment and higher chances of receiving lower wages if they finally return to work. If the government decides to make these payments small enough to not permit people to live with just this income, then the point of a universal basic income is lost, replacing the whole idea with a universal supplemental income. For a crisis like the one we are currently experiencing, the federal government needs to quickly get cash to low- and moderate-income Americans, especially those who are unemployed. And one problem is that the process of getting the money to Americans is clunky, and some Americans don’t even have bank accounts. But most of them have smartphones. As ITIF proposed, Congress should accelerate the adoption of mobile payment technology so that, for the next crisis, the Treasury Department would send money to people’s smartphone bank accounts in minutes, instead of weeks. For ongoing challenges, instead of a UBI that would reach tens of millions of Americans who do not need it, Congress should increase the minimum wage. This way, low-income workers would end up spending their increased earnings, ultimately creating jobs. To support workers who’d lost their jobs, Congress should modernize the unemployment insurance system. It should start by providing funding to states to modernize their unemployment websites which currently fail to meet basic standards. More importantly, Congress should strengthen the unemployment insurance system, as many states provide only minimal income support to laid-off workers. For that, Congress should increase the federal unemployment insurance tax and remit the funds back to state trust funds, in order to reduce the competitive pressure for states to keep their benefits and eligibility low. Strengthening unemployment insurance programs rather than implementing UBI would create a stronger countercyclical system of payments where payments would go up when overall economic demand would go down; in contrast UBI would always stay the same regardless of the economy lagging or booming. If the nation ever succumbs and passes UBI, it will be the penultimate evolution of an American culture of selfishness. “Who doesn’t want free money?” you might ask. Everyone who is a responsible citizen.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- No Heg Impact

--Heg has not fostered peace in 60 years and last 20 years prove decline

Ames 21 – Beverly, professor emerita of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, and former director of UC Berkeley’s Center for German and European Studies.. “Unmasking the Weakness of Liberalism: Why the Future of the Liberal Order Is in Danger and What We Can Do to Safeguard It”, Politics, Governance, and the Law, , 07-26-2021

Post–World War II international institutions enshrine many of these principles and provide the basis for what is called “the liberal international order.” This “order” was constructed to ensure that the political and economic fail- ures that led to two world wars in the twentieth century would not reoccur. Its creators built institutions of global governance to promote peaceful international cooperation, universal human rights, free markets, and economic devel- opment. As Ana Palacio (2017) aptly puts it, this liberal or- der opened “a moral umbrella over the existing Westphalian state system...creating a universal structure within which national governments could collaborate in the pursuit of progress.” The liberal international order, as this narrative goes, succeeded in freeing trade, preventing another world war, and spreading prosperity to Western allies.

Many argue that these institutions must have a “leader” to survive. Why? States participating in these organizations must relinquish some of their sovereignty and sacrifice their own self-interest for the common good if the rules demand it. But they look first to their own interests, and only secon- darily to the common good. Also, unlike in domestic soci- ety, there is no enforcement mechanism for liberal interna- tional rules. Therefore, the creation and maintenance of a liberal rule-based global order would not have been possible without the power and willingness of the strongest coun- try to use its great might to create incentives for coopera- tion and make sacrifices for the common good. That power was the United States. It shaped the rules of liberal institu- tions and agreed to pay the costs of international cooper- ation by providing “side payments” to those who believed their participation might not serve their interests. For ex- ample, through a system of extended deterrence and al- liances, the United States offered and paid for security to those who cooperated. And by providing a reserve currency and an open economy, the United States greased the wheels of a global economic system, even if that meant suffering a trade deficit. As the story goes, the United States sacrificed some of its own power for the common good.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- No Heg Impact

--Afghanistan, Arab Spring, JCPOA, Paris all thump hegemonic power and show the decline of the ILO

Odeh 21 – Nabeel, a political researcher and an opinionist. He works at TRT as a Senior Producer. His works are interested in global affairs, foreign policy analysis, and digital politics. He is a regular TV commentator and lecturer. He is a PhD Candidate in International Relations in Kadir Has University. “U.S Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Only the Latest Proof of the Liberal Order’s Decline”, Al Sharq Strategic Research, , 10-12-2021

As the last United States’ soldier left Afghanistan on August 30, the world witnessed one of the latest American foreign policy fiascos in the Middle East and Central Asia. The attempt of the United States (US) to construct a democratic and liberal state in its own image, failed. President Joe Biden declared following the withdrawal from Afghanistan that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan was not about spreading democracy or liberal order in the country, but fighting terrorism. The president’s downplaying of Afghanistan’s value-based intervention is only the newest piece of evidence of the waning of the U.S. policy of liberal interventionism, and a clear sign of the decline of liberal hegemony. This decline, however, does not entail the collapse of the global liberal order built on democratic value, human rights, free trade, and interdependency. The liberal order will stay as the fundamental framework of U.S. foreign policy.

However, the decision-makers in Washington are shifting from liberal interventionism (e.g., replacing illiberal regimes with democratic governments that adopt liberal principles and respect human rights) to a realist foreign policy, especially in response to the challenge imposed by rising powers such as China and Russia. This new shift in perspective will be reflected in international politics in three interrelated and interwoven areas: balance of power, arms race, and reformulating alliances, which can be considered as the fundamental principles of realism.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- No Heg Impact

--Middle Powers destabilize Heg

Aydin 21 – Umut, a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington, Seattle, and MA in Political Science from McGill University, Canada. Before joining the Institute, she was a Max Weber Post-Doctoral fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, and assistant Professor of Political Science in Bogazici University, Turkey. “Emerging middle powers and the liberal international order”, International Affairs, Vol. 97, Issue 5, , 09-06-2021

In sum, whereas emerging middle powers' rise to prominence contributed to the stability of the liberal international order, their stagnation and decline might be detrimental to it, at a time when it is already challenged on multiple fronts, as Kornprobst and Paul outline. As they decline, emerging middle powers no longer help to support and legitimize multilateral organizations, and their contributions to niche areas and to norm promotion in the periphery dwindle. Rather than acting as stabilizers and conflict mediators, they may even become spoilers of peace in their regions. While the literature to date has for the most part emphasized middle powers' positive impact on the international order, this article highlights how their decline may destabilize both their own regions and the international order. Emerging middle powers do not challenge the liberal international order as Great Powers are capable of doing; nonetheless, they may still chip away at its stability.

The rise and decline of emerging middle powers: Turkey and Mexico

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- Heg Bad

China Rise is key to solve disease, climate change, prolif, and conflict

Lu Jing, 2-15-2015, Director of the Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University. "China’s rise will restore history of peaceful benefits for its neighbors" Global Times. Accessed 5-4-2019 [http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/907832.shtml]/mnw

Early this year, a special seven-part series of documentary titled Super China, which was produced by the state-run Korean Broadcasting System, have sparked South Korean discussions about the "China threat." The "China threat" theory has been widely circulated and constantly hyped by Western countries during China's rise and is often cited by China's neighboring countries. It typically reflects the Western thinking of realpolitik in international relations. In fact, be it in history or in the current stage, a powerful China has never posed a threat to the peace and stability of its neighboring countries or the whole world, but instead it has created a positive influence. People may infer that a mighty China will manifest its identity by all means based on their memory of the Middle Kingdom or the tributary system. However, looking back, China in its powerful times was always favorable to others in economic ties, adhered to the principle of benevolence in political relations and was cautious about resorting to force. Having been through harsh humiliation in recent history, today's China holds firmly that one should not impose his or her beliefs on anyone else. Today, a rising China is determined to guide and exercise its relations with the outside world by using new diplomatic mind-set focused on win-win cooperation. China has realized that if a country wants to seek development, security and well-being, it has to allow others to have them. It is out of this concept that China has taken on more and more duties as a big power to safeguard the prosperity and stability in the region and the world. While China has proposed to build a new type of major power relationship, it also adopts the principles of closeness, sincerity, sharing in prosperity and inclusiveness in fostering neighborhood relations to make neighbors benefit from China's development. China has become the largest trade partner and export destination and exporter of many neighboring countries. China has proactively joined the efforts to address global issues that range from the UN peacekeeping missions, prevention and treatment of infectious diseases, climate change, non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons to a series of regional hot-spot issues. Its roles are highly recognized. China remains a developing country faced with arduous development problems and needs a stable international environment. It means a lot for China to prevent the world from falling into violence and tumult. A weak China will actually serve as a threat to the neighborhood stability. China's feebleness in recent history not only invited a century-long humiliation for itself, but it also drew in the countries around. If China with its more than 1.3 billion population is still mired in poverty and turbulence or even undergoes internal collapse, the resulting problems of refugees and emigrants will pose a threat to the neighborhood and the rest of the world. As President Xi Jinping noted in his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in 2013, a well-developed China with over 1.3 billion people will bring tangible benefits to the world. On the contrary, if China becomes feeble, it will be a matter of grave concern for the world. The rising might of a country can't decide whether it will bring threats or opportunities to the outside world. The key lies in the diplomatic mind-set it advocates and in what ways it carries out its diplomacy.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- Heg Bad

Causes escalation

Michael Fitzsimmons, 11-16-2017, Visiting Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. "The False Allure of Escalation Dominance" War on the Rocks. Accessed 5-3-2019 [https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/false-allure-escalation-dominance/]/mnw

Peacetime provocation. Quite apart from the dynamics of crisis decision-making, pursuit of escalation dominance as a declaratory policy is, itself, escalatory. It could exacerbate unreasonable fears of U.S. aggression and prompt otherwise unnecessary arms races. This point is not simply a matter of taking the dovish side of the eternal security dilemma. There are certainly limits to the importance of declaratory policy, and U.S. challengers clearly have many motivations beyond reacting to U.S. provocation. Still, official discussion of managing escalation through dominance or comprehensive superiority supports the prevailing narrative of opponents of American power, and thereby may help empower those factions in the Chinese and Russian governments most dedicated to frustrating U.S. interests. Moreover, U.S. advocacy of escalation dominance may complicate alliance politics, undermine assurance, and impede cohesion within NATO.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- Heg Bad

US Military primacy fails

Michael Fitzsimmons, 11-16-2017, Visiting Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. "The False Allure of Escalation Dominance" War on the Rocks. Accessed 5-3-2019 [https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/false-allure-escalation-dominance/]/mnw

Indeed, escalation dominance is superficially appealing. Its deterrent logic is easy to grasp. What could dissuade a regional challenger more effectively than comprehensive superiority? And it comports well with the strategic habits of mind ingrained in a generation of U.S. policy makers by unrivaled post-Cold War military superiority. Nevertheless, the concept has always suffered from serious flaws and is particularly poorly suited to the regional deterrence challenges the United States faces in the 21st century. At least five problems are cause for concern. Asymmetric stakes. As already noted, one of the key sources of escalation risk is the asymmetry of interests between prospective combatants. The most plausible scenarios of escalation involve core, vital interests of the challengers juxtaposed with American extended deterrence commitments to allies and partners. For instance, the United States seeks to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. But under extreme circumstances, Chinese leaders may well see the survival of their regime riding on a military victory, while U.S. stakes in protecting Taiwan lie in more abstract goals of maintaining stability, order, and deterrent credibility. Will the United States really engage in nuclear war over Taiwan? Or, in a NATO-Russia conflict, risk trading Virginia Beach for Vilnius? Such potential imbalance of interests is a long-standing problem of extended deterrence. Thomas Schelling famously observed that escalation may take the form of a “competition in risk taking,” and therefore may be governed at least as much by “balance of resolve” as by balance of capabilities. This poses a challenge for any escalation management strategy, but is especially problematic for escalation dominance, which relies heavily on superiority in capabilities. While theoretically plausible, establishing “dominant” resolve as well as dominant capabilities is a difficult standard to meet in a conflict where a capable, nuclear-armed rival has already gambled great stakes. Conventional balance. For escalation dominance to produce the desired deterrent effect, both parties must recognize one side’s superiority at multiple levels of escalation, below and above the nuclear threshold. Superiority itself is of no use if it goes unrecognized or doubted. On this point, escalation dominance faces another formidable obstacle. As alluded to above, the longstanding conventional capability gap between the United States and both China and Russia has shrunk in recent years. The match-ups are becoming too closely balanced to confidently predict that one side will prevail, especially in those fait accompli scenarios in which an adversary seeks a quick victory enabled by local tactical advantages. Even analysts who believe that relative regional shortfalls in U.S. conventional strength have been exaggerated could readily agree that America’s ability to dictate the pace and intensity of a conventional war has diminished. Information and decision-making challenges. Crisis decision-making is subject to a host of extra-rational factors and information limitations, which makes it difficult for actors to precisely evaluate their rivals’ escalation thresholds. In a crisis involving nuclear weapons, factors like time pressures, risk tolerance, incomplete or conflicting intelligence, and psychological stress are a few of the unpredictable elements that complicate fine-tuned chess moves of escalation. This is true regardless of one’s escalation management strategy, but its pathologies may be magnified by a strategy that depends on establishing and communicating superiority at every turn. The party asserting dominance may be more apt to underestimate its adversary’s resolve, while the ostensibly “dominated” party may become more risk-tolerant in the face of a tempting but fleeting opportunity for successful escalation of its own. Similarly, misperception of adversary behavior, intent, and communication is a common feature of international affairs and military history, including in cases of crisis escalation. Even if U.S. decision makers are confident of their own information and analysis, it is not possible to reliably discern adversary values and interpretations of thresholds. In a seminal 2008 study of escalation, RAND Corporation analysts concluded that, relative to the Cold War, “predicting how [U.S. opponents] will perceive U.S. actions is not dramatically easier and, in some cases, can be even more challenging.” Influence of new technologies. Rapidly improving and proliferating capabilities in long-range precision strike, and cyber and space operations have complicated the concept of an escalation “ladder.” Kahn’s original ladder with 44 rungs spanning conventional and nuclear war was already quite complex. Today, the menu of non-nuclear options available to strategic competitors to signal or attack each other has expanded dramatically. Whether the proper metaphor for 21st-century escalation is a ladder or a vortex or something else entirely, there is little doubt that contingency planning for escalation is harder than ever. Where in the hierarchy of escalation does a disabling but reversible Chinese attack on U.S. military satellites belong? Is a Russian cyber attack on the U.S. electrical grid more or less escalatory than missile strikes on European bases? This kind of complexity also compounds the challenges of misperception. If a shared framework among potential adversaries for understanding escalation thresholds was elusive in the Cold War, it is only farther from reach today.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- Heg Bad

The affirmative is sticking to the old hegemonic world order without the affirmative - Multiplexity fills in—this solves every reason they think US-led coop is necessary and solves our offense and defense

[Amitav Acharya 17] (After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance and Distinguished Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service, American University, Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp. 271-285) Full Date: xx-xx-2017 {PR/MoState} Accessed: 2-20-2019

Many pundits see the emerging world order as a return to multipolarity, but this is misleading. There are at least five major differences between prewar multipolarity and the emerging twenty-first-century world order. First, prewar multipolarity was largely a world of empires and colonies. The primary actors in world politics were the great powers, and those were mainly European, though the United States and Japan joined the club in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In contrast, the contemporary world is marked by a multiplicity of actors that matter. These are not only great powers, and not even just states, but also international and regional institutions, corporations, transnational nongovernmental organizations, social movements, transnational criminal and terrorist groups, and so on. Second, the nature of economic interdependence today is denser, consisting of trade, finance, and global production networks and supply chains, whereas prewar multipolarity was mainly trade-based. Third, contemporary economic interdependence is more global compared to that in the nineteenth century, when it was mostly intra-European, with the rest of the world in a situation of dependence on the European empires. Fourth, there is far greater density of relatively durable international and regional institutions today, whereas pre–World War I Europe had only one—the defunct European Concert of Powers—and the interwar period only had the short-lived and failed League of Nations. Fifth, challenges to order and stability have become more complex. The traditional challenge to world order, interstate conflict, has declined steadily since World War II and now stands at a negligible level. Meanwhile, intrastate conflicts and transnational challenges have grown considerably. Arguably, the biggest threat to the national security of many countries today comes not from another state but from a terrorist network. Moreover, issues such as climate change, human trafficking, drugs, and pandemics do not respect national boundaries and are magnified by interdependence and globalization, further complicating the mosaic of security challenges facing the twenty-first-century world. The emerging world order is thus not a multipolar world, but a multiplex world. 18 It is a world of multiple modernities, where Western liberal modernity (and its preferred pathways to economic development and governance) is only a part of what is on offer. A multiplex world is like a multiplex cinema—one that gives its audience a choice of various movies, actors, directors, and plots all under the same roof. Trump and Brexit have shown that there are serious variations and differences in the script of world order even within the West—not just between the West and the rest, as is commonly assumed. At the same time, a multiplex world is a world of interconnectedness and interdependence. It is not a singular global order, liberal or otherwise, but a complex of crosscutting, if not competing, international orders and globalisms. A multiplex world is not defined by the hegemony of any single nation or idea. This does not necessarily mean the United States is in decline—this is still arguable. But it does mean that the United States is no longer in a position to create the rules and dominate the institutions of global governance and world order in the manner it had for much of the post–World War II period. And while elements of the old liberal order will survive, they will have to accommodate new actors and approaches that do not bend to America's commands and preferences. Crosscutting Globalisms, Not Liberal Hegemony It is wrong to say that globalization is over. Instead, in a multiplex world it will take, and is already taking, a different form. Globalization may become less driven by trade and more by developmental concerns. This might give more space to the initiatives of the emerging powers, which tend to focus more on infrastructure than on free trade. Thus, the new globalization could well be led less by the West and more by the East, especially China and India, as it had been for a thousand years before European colonialism. On its own, China may not be able to lead globalization outright, but it has the potential to reshape it with initiatives like the One Belt, One Road strategy and the AIIB. Moreover, the new globalization will be anchored more by South-South linkages rather than North-South ones. This is already happening: According to the United Nations Development Programme, the South has increased its share of global output from one third in 1990 to almost a half today, and it has increased its share of world merchandise trade from 25 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 2010. 19 And South-South trade jumped from less than 8 percent of world merchandise trade in 1980 to about 25 percent in 2014. 20 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, South-South flows in foreign direct investment now constitute over a third of global flows. 21 These trends could reshape globalization. Due to the prominence of China and other emerging powers, the new globalization might also be more respectful of sovereignty, especially compared to the Western-led globalization during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which has been associated with colonialism and direct and indirect military intervention to secure Western economic and strategic interests (a long list of examples would include the Suez and numerous interventions in Latin America). This is not to say that emerging powers do not use force or violate sovereignty. With its growing overseas investments, China will be tempted to abandon its professed policy of noninterference and to use force or coercion in support of its economic and strategic goals. But in line with the outlooks of the emerging powers, the new globalization is likely to be more economic and less political or ideological (especially compared to the West's promotion of democracy and human rights). G-Plus, Not G-Zero, Governance Many of Trump's stated policy positions suggest a nationalist, inward-looking U.S. foreign policy. His policies on trade and security are undermining global institutions, such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations, and disrupting climate change negotiations. In many ways, this may push the system of global governance to be even less U.S.- and Western-centric. But here, too, as noted earlier, the post-war architecture of global governance was already moving in that direction. Global governance has already begun accommodating the growing roles of private bodies (corporations, foundations, etc.), civil society groups, and regional arrangements, thus reducing the position of formal intergovernmental organizations. And the emerging powers have already been clamoring for a greater voice and leadership in existing institutions while also creating new global and regional mechanisms, such as the BRICS-initiated New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (a financial mechanism), the AIIB, China's OBOR and its Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia mechanism, and India's own plans for infrastructure development in South Asia, to name a few. And while the demand for global governance will remain, the architecture will continue to fragment and decenter, confirming the onset of the multiplex world. The maintenance of world order depends on regional orders. As Henry Kissinger argues, “The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another.” 22 Yet developing such inclusive, open regional orders is a critical challenge. This would require creating new regional mechanisms and supporting those that already exist but are constrained by a lack of resources. While some liberal thinkers see regionalism (not including the European Union) as a threat to world order, there are many regional initiatives that, if recognized and strengthened, could actually support world order. For example, ASEAN + 3's Chiang Mai initiative on finance has allowed those countries to better cope with short-term liquidity problems, supplementing the existing capacity of the International Monetary Fund. 23 As another example, though the Obama administration feared the Chinese-inspired AIIB would be a competitor to the World Bank, its structure and rules mimic those of established multilateral institutions, and its management includes persons from Western countries. Thus, it is more likely to complement rather than compete with the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. In a fragmented and pluralistic world, exploring local and regional initiatives in diverse issue areas that complement older but fragmenting global institutions could be one of the most promising way to build world order in the twenty-first century. A multiplex world will not be free from disorder, but it is also not necessarily doomed to be what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini call a G-Zero World—“one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage—or the will—to drive a truly international agenda” 24 —simply because of the loss of a predominant U.S. leadership role. Leadership-sharing between the Western powers and the emerging powers is more attainable than (hard) power-sharing. A world less dependent on U.S. leadership—but without a complete U.S. retreat into isolationism—will still find ways to cooperate. It will still come together in crisis, a‘s happened at the G-20 summit after the 2008 global financial crisis, or to combat common perils, as happened with the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change. 25 The latter was made possible not because of proactive U.S. leadership but because of common understanding among the Western nations, the emerging powers (led by China), and civil society groups. Importantly, the agreement avoided the traditional Western legalistic sanction-based approach in favor of a softer, voluntaristic approach that is characteristic of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. A multiplex world is a G-Plus world, featuring established and emerging powers, global and regional institutions and actors, states, social movements, corporations, private foundations, and various kinds of partnerships among them. The Stability of a Multiplex World There are several things that should be kept in mind by the international community in general and the Western nations in particular to help manage the transition to a multiplex world. First, stop pining for the return of liberal hegemony, by which I mean the post–World War II world order created and dominated by the United States and centered around Western interests, values, and institutions. That order might have delivered much good (as well as lots of bad) to the world, and some of its institutions (such as the UN system) will continue, but the particular historical circumstances behind the rise of liberal hegemony are gone. The global power shift is for real and here to stay. Second, unless and until the Trump administration radically changes course or is replaced, prepare to live without significant U.S. support for multilateralism. Under Trump, this support might come selectively and sparingly, but its absence should not deter international cooperation if other major players participate or offer support. Third, the end of U.S. hegemony does not equal the “return of anarchy,” if anarchy implies the end of global cooperation, as some worry. 26 Progress in global governance was never linear to start with, nor was there ever any consensus that global governance is a good thing. Demand for global governance has and will continue to be varied depending on the issue area. Such demand is driven by a mix of strategic, functional, and normative motives as well as a domestic political calculus. 27 While the normative and domestic motivations may be declining among Western states, the functional and strategic motivations might yet drive demand for global governance in several areas, including climate change and transnational security.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- Heg Bad

US can’t lock in hegemony or the liberal international order – the aff’s cling to an unsustainable system only guarantees violent transition wars with China

[Christopher Layne 18] (The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana, , University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, pp. 89-111) Full Date: 1-xx-2018 {PR/MoState} Accessed: 2-20-2019

The coming end of the Pax Americana The fate of international orders is closely linked to power transition dynamics. Throughout modern international history the prevailing international order has reflected the balance of power that existed at the time of its creation. When that balance changes sufficiently, the old order will be replaced by a new one. Viewed from this perspective, what are the Pax Americana's prospects? How will China's rise, and America's decline, affect the international order in the years ahead? The surprising answer given by top US security studies scholars is: ‘Not much.’ The United States, so the argument goes, can ‘lock in’ the Pax Americana's essential features, including its rules, norms and institutions.65 John Ikenberry, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth are the leading proponents of the lock-in thesis. Ikenberry was the first to set out the concept, arguing in After victory that a hegemon, by building an institutionalized, rules-based international order, ‘can lock-in favorable arrangements that continue beyond the zenith of its power’.66 In other words, the international order can remain intact even after the hegemonic power that created it has lost its pre-eminent position in the international political system. On this point, Ikenberry echoes Robert Keohane's argument in After hegemony that, once a liberal international order has been established by a hegemonic power, if the hegemon declines it is possible for a small group of Great Powers to take the place of the former hegemon and collectively manage the international system.67 That is, under certain conditions ‘hegemonic stability’ can exist even if there is no hegemonic power. In Liberal Leviathan, Ikenberry built on this logic to argue that, even if the Pax Americana were to wither completely, the LRBIO would nevertheless survive. As Ikenberry put it: ‘America's position in the global system may decline but the international order it leads can remain the dominating logic of the twenty-first century.’68 Ikenberry's view seems to have evolved, however. In jointly authored articles in International Security and Foreign Affairs, Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth embrace hegemonic stability theory.69 That is, they contend that, like all international orders, the post-1945 international order does, in fact, require a hegemonic power to maintain it—and not just any hegemon, but the United States. The logic of their argument is that the LRBIO and the Pax Americana are one and the same, and that US pre-eminence is a necessary condition for the LRBIO. According to them, the United States must exercise ‘global leadership’—the US foreign policy establishment's code phrase for hegemony—by acting as a security provider and geopolitical stabilizer; by maintaining an open, liberal international economy; and by promoting global cooperation through upholding and revising the post-1945 liberal order—which is both ‘institutional and normative’—created by the Pax Americana.70 They also claim that the post-1945 Pax Americana ‘allows the United States to … wrap its hegemonic rule in a rules-based order’.71 This helps to conceal the actual motives of self-interest and realpolitik that underlie American hegemony. Read together, the International Security and Foreign Affairs articles by Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth make clear the authors' view that the post-1945 LRBIO is inextricably linked to US hegemony; that is, to the Pax Americana. This is in keeping with the common understanding of hegemonic stability theory. As they see it, the post-1945 international order based on American pre-eminence ‘has served the US well for the past six decades and there is no reason to give it up now’.72 The argument has special force given that, according to the—correct—logic of their argument (and of hegemonic stability theory), if American hegemony goes, the LRBIO goes with it. In their preference for maintaining the post-1945 hegemonic American international order, Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth echo the renowned late nineteenth-century British statesman Lord Salisbury. Presiding over a hegemonic Britain that was already perceptibly declining, he famously said: ‘Whatever happens will be for the worse. Therefore, it is in our interest that as little should happen as possible.’ The post-1945 international order is (or was) a concrete manifestation of America's hegemonic status. So, of course, the US foreign policy establishment wants as little change as possible in international politics. Why would it wish otherwise, when change would inevitably be both the cause and effect of diminishing American power and influence? The United States has every incentive for wanting to prolong the post-1945 international order. After all, for most of the last 70 years or so, the US has occupied the geopolitical penthouse (‘when America ruled the world’). From that lofty height, however, the only direction it can go is down. The lock-in strategy is seductive because it holds out (or appears to hold out) the possibility that the United States can preserve the status quo—the post-1945 international order—even as the geopolitical status quo of American hegemony is changing. Lock-in is attractive—superficially—because it assumes that China's rise will not effect a major change in the international system. Specifically, lock-in holds that China's rise can be managed by integrating it into the post-1945 international order, and ensuring that the exercise of Chinese power takes place within that order's rules and institutions.73 By doing so, it is claimed, the United States can offset its declining power and ‘ensure the international order it leads can remain the dominating logic of the twenty-first century’.74 Lock-in assumes that China has no interest in overturning—or significantly modifying—the post-1945 international order in which it rose and became wealthy. Certainly, China did rise within the Pax Americana's LRBIO. However, China did not rise to preserve that American-dominated order. For some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms) China took a low profile in international politics, and avoided confrontation both with the United States and with its regional neighbours. Integration into the open international economy spurred China's rapid growth. China's self-described ‘peaceful rise’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’ However, the fact that China bandwagoned with the United States in joining the international economic order did not mean that its longer-term intention was—or is—to preserve the post-1945 international order. In joining the liberal economic order, Beijing's goal was not simply to get rich; by integrating itself into the post-1945 international order, China was able to avoid conflict with the United States until it became wealthy enough to acquire the military capabilities necessary to compete with America for regional hegemony in east Asia.75 Judging from Xi Jinping's policy pronouncements, China's days of biding its time and hiding its capabilities are over. Lock-in proponents argue that even as the Sino-American military and economic balance continues to tilt increasingly in Beijing's favour, the post-1945 international order's rules, institutions and norms will offset America's loss of hard power. There is historical evidence that suggests this is wishful thinking. Take the case of Britain after the Second World War. Despite the dramatic weakening of Britain's economic and financial clout caused by its efforts in the two world wars, after 1945 British leaders believed that the United Kingdom could remain one of three major world powers. In pursuit of this goal, they formulated their own version of lock-in. As the historian John Darwin puts it, officials in London thought that by transforming the Commonwealth, Britain could transition ‘from an empire of rule to an empire of influence’.76 Specifically, they believed that ‘free from the authoritarian, acquisitive and exploitative traditions of the old version of empire’, the reconfigured Commonwealth ‘would make the British connection voluntary, democratic, and mutually beneficial’.77 The reformed Commonwealth therefore would serve as the institutional instrument of continuing British world power, within which shared values and norms would bind Britain's former colonies and dominions to London's leadership.78 The reasons why British policy-makers bought into this vision sound an awful lot like the reasons why the present-day American proponents of lock-in think it will preserve the United States' global leadership even as its hard power erodes. Lock-in did not work for Britain following the Second World War, and there is scant reason to think it will work for the United States in the coming years of the twenty-first century. The lock-in strategy also assumes that if the Pax Americana's institutions are reformed, Beijing (and other non-western emerging powers) will find it more attractive to remain in the post-1945 international order than to overturn it. That assumption, however, is logically flawed: achieving lock-in by reforming the existing international order presumes that the United States can have its cake (preserving the Pax Americana) and eat it too (reforming the current international system's legacy institutions). But, as we all know, when the cake is eaten, it's gone. Reform—at least, any kind of reform that would appeal to China—would mean the United States yielding significant power in international institutions to accommodate Beijing. However, doing so would reduce US ability to shape outcomes, diminish Washington's voice in international institutions, and impose constraints on US autonomy in foreign and domestic policy.79 As University of Birmingham lecturer Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou observes with respect to institutional reform: ‘It is questionable whether this will really preserve US influence or rather, on the contrary, diminish it, as the United States will have to share power in a reformed order and thus will be restricted in its ability to act unilaterally.’80 The US foreign policy establishment may talk the talk of reforming the international order (and the institutions that underpin it), but it is doubtful it will walk the walk with respect to reform, because that would mean accepting a downsized American role in international politics. On the contrary, Washington's opposition to the AIIB indicates that the United States is not prepared to see its influence in the international order diminished. And, with respect to reforming the post-1945 international order to accommodate the reality of a risen China, this is the nub of the problem: instead of preserving the Pax Americana, reform would lead to changes in the international order that would undermine it. Of course, regardless of whether there is institutional reform, the coming decades are likely to witness major changes in the international order irrespective of America's preferences. What will happen to the international order as China continues to rise, and America's relative power continues to decline? As Yogi Berra, the greatest of all American philosophers (immortalized in baseball's Hall of Fame), said: ‘Making predictions is hard. Especially about the future.’ However, one thing seems pretty certain: China is not on the verge of either of ruling the world, or becoming a global hegemon comparable to the United States after the Second World War; not yet, anyway. Thus, for the next several decades (at least) it will be neither China's world nor America's: international leadership will be contested.81 During this period, China can be expected to act pretty much as one would expect any Great Power to act while making the shift from rising to risen: it will use its newfound power to seek a much greater voice in managing—and shaping—the international order, and its underlying norms. For example, China will want others to acknowledge its ‘core interests’, including respect for its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. Beijing has expanded the geographic scope of its core interests beyond Tibet and Taiwan to include the South and East China Seas and Xinjiang. And, reflecting its insistence that states should refrain from intervening in others' internal affairs, preservation of its political, economic and social systems also has been defined as a core interest.82 During the period of contested international leadership there is unlikely to be wholesale abandonment of the post-1945 international institutions. For example, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Beijing is an acknowledged part of the Great Power club. Similarly, we should not expect to see a dramatic overhaul of the international economic system. As the world's top-ranking exporter and trading state, China benefits hugely from economic openness. However, the state plays a much greater role in China's economy than it does in the United States and Europe. Beijing will want rules that protect its semi-mercantilist economic policies and also ensure that its state-owned industries are not disadvantaged. Beijing will continue pressing for an even greater voice, both for itself and for the developing world, in institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (unless or until they are superseded by new ‘made in China’ institutions). In this respect, China will position itself as the developing world's champion—a role for which it is well suited. Like many nations in the developing world—but unlike the United States—China has been a victim of western Great Power policies of imperialism and colonialism. As such, China has a claim to prominence in constructing a new international order that reflects the values of the developing world rather than those of the United States and the West.83 Even though the international economy will remain (more or less) open, in other respects the international system is likely to become much less liberal politically. The Chinese Communist Party's 19th Congress demonstrated that China is not converging with the West: it is not going to become a democracy any time soon—if ever. Consequently, as China's role in shaping the international agenda increases, democracy and human rights will become less salient. China will almost certainly try to change the norms that favour democracy promotion, ‘humanitarian’ intervention, human rights and the Responsibility to Protect. Beijing will resist norms that divide states into two camps, ranging democratic ‘good guys’ against non-democratic ‘bad guys’.84 Instead, it will offer its policy of ‘market authoritarianism’ to developing states as a better model of political, social and economic development than the US model based on the Washington Consensus. As its power continues to increase, China will seek to recast the world order in a way that not only advances its interests but also acknowledges both its enhanced power and its claims to status and prestige equal to those of the declining hegemon.85 For now, Beijing is (mostly) ‘working within the system’ to revise the post-1945 international order while simultaneously laying the groundwork for an alternative international order that eventually could displace the Pax Americana. As a 2007 report by the Center for a New American Security concluded: Rather than seeking to weaken or confront the United States directly, Chinese leaders are pursuing a subtle, multifaceted, long-term grand strategy that aims to derive as many benefits as possible from the existing international system while accumulating the economic wherewithal, military strength, and soft power resources to reinforce China's emerging position as at least a regional great power.86 Even as it stays within the post-1945 international order, Beijing is not doing so to preserve it. In this sense, as Martin Jacques has observed, China is playing a double game. It is operating ‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’.87 The creation of the AIIB, which Beijing intends should ultimately eclipse the IMF and World Bank, is a good example of this strategy. American scholars and policy-makers believe that a lock-in strategy can be employed to head off any Chinese attempt to create a new international order, or to create a parallel order. They believe this because they have imbued the concept of a ‘rules-based, institutionalized, liberal international order’ with a talismanic quality. In so doing they have air-brushed Great Power politics out of the picture. As they see it, rules and institutions are politically neutral and, ipso facto, beneficial for all. Hence, they can be an effective substitute for declining hard power. However, rather than existing separately from the balance of power, rules, norms and institutions reflect it. Hence the world is no more likely to continue upholding the Pax Americana once US power declines than Britain's dominions and former colonies were inclined to perpetuate the empire after the Second World War. The fate of the Pax Americana, and that of the international order, will be determined by the outcome of the Sino-American rivalry. As the British scholar E. H. Carr observed, a rules-based international order ‘cannot be understood independently of the political foundation on which it rests and the political interests which it serves’.88 The post-Second World War international order is an American order that privileges US interests.89 Even the discourse of ‘liberal order’ cannot disguise this fact. Today, the ground is shifting beneath the Pax Americana's foundations. Those who believe that lock-in can work view international politics as being, in essence, geopolitically antiseptic. For them, Great Power competition and conflict are transcended by international institutions, rules and norms. This is not how the real world works, however.90 Great Power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in a vacuum, hermetically sealed off from Great Power politics. Nor are they neutral. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. In his classic study of international relations between the world wars, The Twenty years' crisis, Carr analysed the political crisis of the 1930s caused by the breakdown of the post-First World War order symbolized by the Versailles Treaty.91 The Versailles system cracked, Carr argued, because of the widening gap between the order it represented and the actual distribution of power in Europe. Carr used the events of the 1930s to make a larger geopolitical point. International orders reflect the balance of power that exists at time of their creation. Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s). When the balance of power swings—or is perceived to swing—in its direction, a rising power becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the international order, and seeks to revise it. The challenger wants to change the rules embodied in the existing international order—rules written, of course, by the once dominant but now declining Great Power that created it. It also wants the allocation of prestige and status changed to reflect its newly acquired power. The incumbent hegemon, of course, wants to preserve the existing international order as is—an order that it midwifed to advance, and consolidate, its own interests. The E. H. Carr Moment presents the incumbent hegemon with a choice. It can dig in its heels and try to preserve the prevailing order—and its privileged position therein; or it can accede to the rising challenger's demands for revision. If it chooses the former course of action, it runs the risk of war with the dissatisfied challenger. If it chooses the latter, it must come to terms with the reality of its decline, and the end of its hegemonic position. The E. H. Carr Moment is where the geopolitical rubber meets the road: the status quo power(s) must choose between accommodating or opposing the revisionist demands of the rising power(s). Liberal internationalists such as John Ikenberry argue that China will not challenge the current international order, even as the distribution of power continues to shift in its favour. This is a doubtful proposition. The geopolitical question—the E. H. Carr Moment—of our time is whether the declining hegemon in east Asia, the United States, will try to preserve a status quo that is becoming increasingly out of sync with the shifting distribution of power, or whether it can reconcile itself to a rising China's revisionist demands that the international order in east Asia be realigned to reflect the emerging power realities. Unless the United States can adjust gracefully to this tectonic geopolitical shift, the chances of a Sino-American war are high—as they always are during power transitions.92 However, whether change comes peacefully or violently, the Pax Americana's days are numbered.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- XT: Neo Revisionist

China is revisionist, but not revolutionary – they’re looking to carve a niche in the global order

Evan A. Feigenbaum 4-27-2018. (Evan A. Feigenbaum is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi. "Reluctant Stakeholder: Why China’s Highly Strategic Brand of Revisionism is More Challenging Than Washington Thinks." MacroPolo. Web. 4-27-2018. accessed 8-26-2022. < https://macropolo.org/analysis/reluctant-stakeholder-why-chinas-highly-strategic-brand-of-revisionism-is-more-challenging-than-washington-thinks/ >) MSUCB

China is a revisionist power but not a revolutionary one. This distinction is being blurred but actually matters. This distinction may sound too cute by half, but it is a distinction with a difference. China is emerging as a disruptive force on the international stage. For thirty years, it was encouraged to join international institutions and subscribe to their norms. Now, having joined them, it seeks, like most major powers, to leverage its seat at the top table to support its national interests. But this is not even one iota surprising. As China’s military, economic, and financial power have grown, it has been patently obvious that Beijing would not accept all global institutions, rules, standards, and norms exactly as they are configured today. And importantly, this would be true even without Xi Jinping in power. China’s sheer size, weight, and self-perception of its interests will invariably lead it to expect changes in the governance of international institutions and, in some cases, to their underlying rules. Yet the proposition that China aims to construct a “parallel” order of competing institutions, rules, and initiatives to subvert, and perhaps even replace, the postwar international system both misstates and understates the challenge China actually poses. It misstates the challenge because it lacks historical perspective and institutional memory. A “disruptive”China is not, after all, a “revolutionary” China. And we know this because we have seen precisely such a China in the very recent past. Less than fifty years ago, in the 1960s, Mao Zedong’s China actually did seek to overturn the architecture of the international system. Beijing opposed nearly every global institution. It promoted internal, often violent revolution against established governments from Bolivia to Borneo. It argued for an “anti-capitalist” order. When it entered the United Nations in 1971, the West’s biggest fear was that Beijing would disrupt and undermine the organization. And China isolated nearly every aspect of its own economic and social systems from outside influences and global trends, restricting flows of goods, capital, people, technologies, and information almost completely. Americans have largely forgotten what the world was like when China sought—and in many areas, achieved—a functional autarky. But today’s China is, quite obviously, not that China. And in the case of the AIIB, a China-backed institution has, in many ways, ended up aping and adapting practices from existing institutions. But if many critics overstate what China is not, they also understate what China actually is—a stakeholder in existing institutions and rules but a habitually reluctant, seldom satisfied, and frequently ambivalent one, at best. This means the challenge to Washington is far more complex than if China actually did seek to overturn the international order wholesale. To put this pithily, China accepts most forms but not necessarily our preferred norms. And that disconnect between forms and norms means that Beijing’s revisionism and demands for change often play out within the existing international framework. This, in turn, means we risk misidentifying the problem. China’s strategy is actually one of portfolio diversification, not the replacement of institutions and systems. Beijing aims to give itself options—and by extension, leverage—not least to push for reform of these various groups and a larger role for itself and its preferred outcomes and standards. To illustrate, look at the multilateral development banks: Beijing has not only joined but supports with financial muscle all of the prevailing development institutions, both globally and in Asia. It is the number-three shareholder in the Asian Development Bank—the very institution it is said to be “destabilizing” with its sponsorship of the AIIB. When China has endorsed new structures, such as the New Development Bank and BRICS contingency reserve arrangement, it has simultaneously made sizeable replenishment contributions to the IMF, where it now has nearly three times of Canada, about a third more than Britain and France, and only a whisker less than Japan. Beijing has joined regional development banks in Europe, Latin America, and Africa. It has transitioned from a net borrower to a net contributor in the International Development Association (IDA) and other institutions. And then there is the AIIB, where China wields a veto—there, Beijing’s “alternative” institution has struck up partnerships and co-finance arrangements with every other leading MDB, including the Islamic Development Bank, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, World Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. To put this somewhat pointedly, China is a revisionist power but one that is both highly strategic and carefully selective in its revisionism. In the maritime domain, for example, it seeks to advance its territorial claims by challenging international law and customary practice. In the cyber domain, it is promoting a distinctive vision of cyber sovereignty. But in the majority of instances and institutions, Beijing pursues structural change by demanding changes to the existing framework. And a more ambitious China cannot, by definition, be a “status quo” power, in any case. The same could be said of some other emerging powers. Merely by seeking a greater role, heftier voting weight, extra chairs and expanded shares, Beijing is, by definition, attempting to force structural changes and achieve gains relative to the established powers, especially America’s European partners. China is no revolutionary, then, yet it is determined to gain leverage in almost every prevailing institution and rule-making body.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- XT: Not Revisionist

China is defensive realist – only a policy of accommodation can reduce the risk of conflict

Ghazala Jalil 19---Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Institute of Strategic Studies, Volume 39, Issue 1, Spring 2019, MSUCB

However, since the 1970s China’s policies have shown less revisionist tendencies. The country has increasingly become a state that is embracing defensive realism. One thread of this evidence is that China has toned-down its revolutionary rhetoric. It is also not supporting insurgencies in other countries. The second thread of evidence is that since the late 1970s China has increasingly pursued a cooperative security approach in its relations with regional neighbours and in the international arena. By and large, China has tried to forge friendly relations with its neighbours. It includes ameliorating relations with states like India which is traditionally a rival. Their relations did become strained in 2017 when there was a standoff between the Indian and the Chinese forces on the Doklam plateau. Dhoklam is a territory claimed both by Bhutan (aligned with India) and China. However, Indo-China relations improved as the two countries held an informal summit in China in April 2018.30 The two countries even held a joint military exercise in December 2018, called Hand-in-Hand.31 Over the years, China has also managed to resolve border issues with so many neighbouring states. It has settled border disputes with countries like Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan initially and recently with Russia, bordering the Central Asian States and Vietnam.32 Moreover, China has territorial disputes with India and Japan but it has never made these disputes a hurdle in forging friendly ties with these two countries. Avery Goldstein dubs it a neo-Bismarckian grand strategy of China whereby it is pursuing its interests by reassuring those who may feel threatened and may form anti-China alliances.33 This, in his opinion, has resulted in a security environment that is conducive for China as well as for the region as a whole. Another indication that China does not show aggressive behaviour in its policies is that China has increasingly engaged and integrated with the international community. Over the past 30 years, China has amply demonstrated this by its increasing membership of international organisations and institutions as well as membership of treaties since the 1980s. China has increasingly participated in the regional multilateral institutions over the years. In the last few decades, East Asia has seen a number of regional institutions being formed. Foremost among those are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); ASEAN plus 3 and the East Asia Summit. China is part of most of these multilateral institutions as well as an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China was also a key player in the sixparty-talks in getting North Korea to halt and roll back its nuclear and missile programmes. On the global front, China sought participation in global institutions like the World Trade Organisation (WTO). China is also playing a very active role in the UN. According to one figure, China’s membership of international governmental organisations doubled (from 21 to 52) during the years 1977-1997. In the same time period, its membership of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) increased from mere 71 to an impressive 1,163.34 Similarly, according to another account, China signed less than 30 per cent of the arms control accords it was eligible to join in the 1970s compared to 80 per cent by mid-1990s. 35 China has actively taken part in the treaties of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as those of aimed at non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. It has also become a part of the voluntary non-proliferation groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004 and exercises strict export control policies. Since 2004, China has also shown interest in joining the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This is an indicator of China’s willingness to participate in international institutes and regimes, increasing comfort towards norms of interdependent behaviour among states. It has also exhibited the desire to somewhat shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation. This is definitely an indication of its tendency towards the status quo. It also advances China’s national interests and helps dispel concerns about its increasing economic and military power.36 This is also an indicator that China is willing to work in the existing Western-dominated systems of international institution and regimes rather than challenge the system or seek to break it up. Moreover, China consciously pursued a good neighbour policy. The pursuit of good relations with its neighbour is the foundation of its strategy for economic development. It has the dual benefit of attracting foreign trade and investment while, at the same time, it reassures its neighbours that it does not present a threat for them. Deng Xiaoping laid two paths for China’s foreign policy in 1990 ─ anti-hegemonism and establishment of a new multi-polar international order of politics and economics. This meant that China adopted a policy of active defence of China’s interest ─ of minding its own business and be neither a leader nor a challenger but a participant or co-builder of the westerns international order.37 This remains the foundation of China’s foreign policy today. Many analysts, however, argue that participation in the international institutions is not an adequate indicator but compliance with the norms, rules and goals of these institutions is a better indicator of whether a country is a status quo state or not. Along these lines, Alastair Johnston considers China’s compliance with five global normative regimes: these include sovereignty, free trade, non-proliferation and arms control, national self determination and human rights.38 As far as sovereignty is concerned he writes: “Today China is one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional absolutist concept (of sovereignty).”39 Similarly, free trade is another international norm that is seen as an indicator of status quo behaviour. China has moved to support the norms of global free trade. China’s membership of WTO in 2001 is a testament to its support for free trade. China’s tariff rates have declined from over 40 per cent in 1992 to less than 20 per cent in 1997.40 In 2015, the tariff rate was 3.4 per cent.41 China has gradually embraced global capitalist institutions and system. In the Belt and Road Forum that China held in May 2017, hosting 30 world leaders, it released a communiqué, which was signed by all 30 world leaders present on the occasion that emphasised the need to “build an open economy, ensure free and inclusive trade (and) oppose all forms of protectionism.”42 However, the ongoing trade war with the US has forced China to increase its tariffs. Since 2017, the US had imposed three rounds of tariff on the Chinese products worth US$250 billion. China has retaliated by imposing US$110 billion on the US goods. Beijing has accused the US of starting the “largest trade war in economic history.” 43 This damages the global free trade regime. China has gone even a step further and initiated projects like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is envisaged as a journey towards economic regionalisation. The CPEC is a framework of regional connectivity which is expected to be beneficial for China and Pakistan as well as the regional states like India, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Its primary aim is to promote geographical linkages and improve infrastructure connectivity. It would also result in a higher flow of trade and businesses in the region.44 Its ultimate aim is to have a well-connected region, promote harmony and accelerate economic development. This is also a clear indication that China is focused on economic development and regionalisation instead of displaying aggressive hegemonic behaviour. As far as China’s non-proliferation record is concerned, it has a fair record, with no blatant violations of international nuclear non-proliferation norms. The prevailing concerns mostly centred on the transfer of missile technology and components to Pakistan in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, China has not signed the 1987 MTCR, so it does not amount to any violations of China’s treaty obligations. On the positive side, in 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which a major nuclear non-proliferation proponent like the US has not done till date.45 It has been cooperating with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and has installed four new International Monitoring System (IMS) stations, bringing the total number of certified stations in China, to five. Furthermore, it is also a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the time that it was signed. Moreover, along with Russia, China has long been trying to get a treaty negotiated to ban the stationing of offensive weapons in outer-space. For nearly two decades, now there have been the Chinese and Russian efforts to negotiate a treaty for Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Many proposals have been put forward including the two Chinese working papers and a joint China-Russia working paper in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). However, PAROS remains blocked due to the US refusal to negotiate any such treaty because it goes against its missile defence and space plans.46 China has also played a stabilising role in the North Korean nuclear issue. It acted as a lynchpin in hosting and conducting the six-party talks, which were meant to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Even after the breakdown of the six-party talks in 2009 and the recent high tensions on the Korean Peninsula in 2017 with the US, China played the role of a stabiliser, urging both sides to show restraint and emphasising that war was not an option for any country. China has, thus, helped strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation norms. Also, China’s growing soft power47 or its “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia and elsewhere is another indicator that it is not an aggressive, power maximising state. Its economic progress has been accompanied by its increasing cultural and diplomatic influence around the globe. Its growing soft power is not only evident in Southeast Asia but also in Beijing’s economic partnerships in Latin America and Africa.48 The fact that China is able to attract and appeal the states in the region through its soft power is an indicator that its neighbours are increasingly viewing China as less of a threat. However, this has stirred the concerns of waning the US influence in the region. In many parts of Asia, Africa and the Latin America, the “Beijing Consensus” which advocates a mix of authoritarian government and market economy, is overtaking the “Washington Consensus” of market economics and democratic government which was popular in the past.49 With signs that the US is placing emphasis on hard power under President Donald Trump, China seems to be positioning itself as a champion of globalisation and economic integration. It seems to be placing an emphasis on soft power. Taiwan issue is one instance where China’s policies are viewed by the West as a non-status quo. However, the issue can be seen in terms of a security dilemma between the US and China. In the last few decades, America continued selling advanced weapons to Taiwan, mainland China considers these developments to encourage Taiwan’s independence and a threat to its interests. According to Yiwei Wang, “on the Taiwan issue, America’s logic is that peace comes from “balance of power.” China has time and again protested the matter of arms sales to Taiwan with the US but to no avail. China sees these moves as an effort to change the distribution of power in the region. In turn, China has threatened Taiwan against moves for independence and deployed missiles on the mainland as well. Consequently, this makes the US suspicious of China’s revisionist intentions towards Taiwan – locking the two powers in a security dilemma. Another area where China has been accused of displaying revisionist tendencies is in the South China Sea. The dispute centres on territorial claims over two island chains the Paracels and the Spratlys and surrounding oceans. The area provides valuable trade passage and fishing ground, as well as holds hydrocarbon resources ranging from 25,000 Mboe to 260,000 Mboe.51 China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims. The dispute has existed for centuries but things got tense in the last few years. China has been island-building since 2014 and has also increased naval patrols. It can be argued that China’s actions are defensive in nature. The US has had increased interference in the area. Under the garb of “freedom of navigation” operations, the US sent planes and ships in the disputed area to keep access to key shipping and air routes.52 In February 2017, the US deployed the aircraft carrier, Carl Vinson, strike force to the South China Sea under the garb of “freedom of navigation.”53 Another week-long US and British Naval exercise took place in January 2019.54 These are meant to send a signal to China to rescind claims over the disputed area. These exercises have angered China. China does not have expansionist or hegemonic designs in the South China Sea. It claims over the two island chains are not something new. Beijing has adjusted its strategy to safeguard its interests, as it becomes increasingly powerful. However, a military conflict over the dispute is not an option. Moreover, the US influence over other claimants of the territory complicates matters for China. This has resulted in China acting more assertively in the South China Sea in order to defend its interests. In fact, the US would act more aggressively if any country was to interfere in matters close to its borders. Overall, from the above analysis, it can be summarised that China has so far behaved more as a status quo power rather than as an aggressive revisionist power. This is apparent in China’s engagement with its neighbours, its participation in the regional and international institutions, it is in compliance with most of the international norms as well as its emphasis on projecting its soft power. The claims of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism are in contrast with Waltz’s defensive realism on several points. While Mearsheimer claims that great powers act aggressively and aim to gain so much power that they are the ultimate hegemons in the system, Waltz’s defensive realism sees the states as acting defensively to maintain rather than upset the balance of power. For Waltz, the states are primarily concerned with maintaining “their position in the system.”55 Defensive realists argue that offence-defence balance favours the defence. 56 Therefore, a robust defence and careful balancing should deter any aggressive impulses from great powers. Defensive realism argues that great powers are concerned with maintaining the status quo rather than maximising their power because often the cost of expansion outweighs the benefits. Defensive realism sees security dilemmas as a problem where an increase in the power of one state increases the insecurity of the other causing the latter to increase its power. Under the conditions of defensive realism, great powers would try to alleviate any security dilemmas rather than exacerbate it. China’s current policy seems to be firmly rooted in defensive realism. Its policy seems to be aimed at maintaining the balance of power rather than upsetting it. As the earlier section has argued, China is not a revisionist power but a status quo one. The analysts like Shiping Tang are convinced that China’s security strategy flows out of its realisation of the security dilemma whereby the Chinese leaders have understood that an aggressive expansionist strategy would just lead to counterbalancing alliances. “This recognition has led China to adopt a defensive realism-rooted security strategy emphasising moderation, self-restraint and security cooperation.”57 Moreover, China’s military modernisation, its Taiwan policy and its increased policies in the South China Sea also make more sense if seen through the lens of defensive realism. China’s Taiwan policy may be more geared towards preventing redistribution of power in the region. Since the US is providing arms assistance to Taiwan, China may be averse to the US aiding Taiwan’s independence ─ the latter issue is one where China has made clear that independence is not acceptable to China. Similarly, there is good evidence that China’s military modernisation programmes and training exercises since the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 are aimed partially at dealing with the issue of the Taiwanese separation.58 On the question of whether China is balancing against the US, Johnston says, “There seems to be little doubt that China’s military modernisation programme since the mid-1990s has been aimed in large measure at developing capabilities to deter or slow the application of the US military power in the region.”59 It would then seem that China is not concerned with gaining power or projecting its powers but with balancing against a predominance of the US power in the region. China has not shown any signs of hegemonic behaviour as a lot of Western analysts feared. Instead of guided by offensive realism, China’s policies seem to be guided by defensive realism where it is concerned with survival and with maintaining its position in the system. Just as the US fears China’s hegemonic rise, China also fears the increase of the US influence in the region and its talk of containing China. China’s policy may change in the future to display hegemonic tendencies. However, at present, there is not much evidence to support the theory of offensive realism.

2023 SDI Negative
2NC --- Case Neg vs. UBI Aff › 2NC --- China Advantage › 2NC --- XT: Not Revisionist

China isn’t revisionist

McKinney 19, *Jared Morgan; PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore); **Nicholas Butts; Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leader. He holds an LL.M. from Peking University, an MSc from The London School of Economics and an MPA from Harvard University where he was also a Crown Prince Frederik Scholar and a Cheng Fellow. (Winter 2019, “Bringing Balance to the Strategic Discourse on China’s Rise”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, pg. 75-76, ) MSUCB

In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion. When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27 Friedberg or Harris might object that America’s rise took place in the context of a different order. This is perfectly true, but the more important point is that the long nineteenth century (1815–1914)—the era of America’s rise—was the first iteration of the New Peace.28 The implication is that relative peace can and has coexisted with limited wars, property and territorial thefts, acts of coercion, and aggressive assertions of status. This does not mean any of these are desirable— they are not—but it shows that they need not be fatal to the system. Insofar as there is a lesson from that first period of relative peace, it is that Great Power confrontation is the one thing that is fatal. Accepting this does not mean capitulating in every instance, as implied by some,29 but it does mean rediscovering the rules of Great Power competition30 alongside the art of strategy.31 Focusing only on areas that China’s rise violates the scruples of the established powers, moreover, downplays the extent to which China, has, in fact, conformed to the existing order. As a RAND Corporation report published in 2018 concludes, China has been a supporter—albeit a conditional one—of the international order: “Since China undertook a policy of international engagement in the 1980s … the level and quality of its participation in the order rivals that of most other states.”32 The way in which Xi Jinping, following his 2017 Davos speech in defense of globalization, has been heralded as the most prominent champion of international order and defender of globalization underscores the fact that there are different elements of this order, and that China supports many, if not most, of them. Even in places where China is supposedly “altering” the current order, Beijing tends to simultaneously affirm that order. China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for instance, actually mirrors existing structures, and China has intentionally copied elements and “best practices” of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank. China is playing the same game, even if it is seeking a bigger role within it.33

2023 SDI Negative
Case Neg vs UBI › 1NC --- Economy Advantage › 1NC --- Econ Defense

No Econ Impact

Walt 20 – Stephen M, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, Foreign Policy, , 05-13-2020

One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term. To be sure, I can’t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days. So there is no guarantee that we won’t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting. But given that it’s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history, I’m going to hope I’m right about this one.