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2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Perm – Pragmatism

The aff is the first step in reorganizing the social system by granting people opportunities to work for an ethical and sustainable environment

Arenas 03 – [Alberto, PhD from UC Berkeley, “In Defense of Good Work: Jobs, Violence, and the Ethical Dimension,” vol 30, no 3, “The Intersection of Ideologies of Violence,” 2003, pgs 94-107, ] /jsam

I have emphasized the idea that a basic first step in reclaiming the ethics of work is to seriously engage the notion of respect, understood here in terms of (1) dignity toward the self and (2) the ultimate purpose of the product or service. In the first sense, respect is an acknowledgement that a strong element of pride and self-esteem is derived from doing excellent work. As Studs Terkel (1975: xiii) wrote, work "is about a search for daily meaning as well as daily bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather than torpor; in short, for a sort of life rather than a Monday through Friday sort of dying." In the second sense, respect is related to a wider commitment to the public good, including the environment. The highly individuated person in the name of self-interest and rationality has led to an unparalleled assault on society's welfare. It is imperative to leave behind the mistaken view of economics as a value-free science and to redirect economic forces in ways that leave room for individuals to fulfill their need for adequate economic compensation and craft while safeguarding an ethical dimension. A job enrichment process is one mechanism used by employers to transform jobs into less mind-numbing and sterile activities. In some lines of work, changes have ranged from the cosmetic and trivial (e.g., casual dress and gourmet coffee bars) to the substantial (e.g., decent salaries and job rotation). Both the trite and meaningful are important for improving any workplace. As Roszak forcefully wrote, no matter what improvements a job undergoes, if the product or service is useless, dishonest, or degrading, the second form of respect is violated: Work that produces unnecessary consumer junk or weapons of war is wrong and wasteful. Work that is built upon false needs or unbecoming appetites is wrong and wasteful. Work that deceives or manipulates, that exploits or degrades is wrong and wasteful. Work that wounds the environment or makes the world ugly is wrong and wasteful. There is no way to redeem such work by enriching it or restructuring it, by socializing it or nationalizing it, by making it "small" or decentralized or democratic (Roszak, 1979: 220). Within the logic of capitalism, both forms of respect are seriously undermined. Capitalism creates conditions that compel most individuals to concentrate on the first two motivations for work (and on the third, or craft motivation, for a lucky few). The fourth motivation, a larger moral concern, is denied to most individuals. Due to real (and perceived) economic pressures, little space is left for finding employment that people can genuinely deem a vocation. A key task, then, for employees and employers alike is to perceive work as an inherently valuable activity in itself, regardless of extrinsic economic benefits such as productivity quotas or efficiency rates. Equally necessary, though a more daunting task, is to reorganize our economic and social system so that more people have opportunities to choose work that is imbued with a new spirit of self-discovery and ethical commitment.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › AT: Withdrawal

Failure is insufficient – dogmatic attachment forecloses necessary transformation.

Bryant, 12 – Professor of Philosophy at Collin College.

(Levi Bryant, “Critique of the Academic Left”, Larval Subjects, , condensed underpants gnome portion, punctuation [expanded] for readability, gendered language [replaced])

Unfortunately, the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. It’s good at carrying out critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here I’m reminded by the “underpants gnomes” depicted in South Park:

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › AT: Withdrawal

Planned failure is the perfection of anti-instrumentality which forgoes practical commitments to collective continuance – turns case.

Levine, 21 – David and Kathleen Ryan Professor of Humanities at Cornell University. (Caroline Levine, "The Long Lure of Anti-Instrumentality: Politics, Aesthetics, and Sustainability", Modern Fiction Studies, Volume 67, Number 2, Summer 2021, pg. 225-246, DOI: 10.1353/mfs.2021.0010, ILake-MO)

I argue here that it is particularly urgent for the Left to reconsider our longstanding attachment to anti-instrumentality at this moment of rapid and destabilizing climate change. Ecocritics have argued especially strenuously against all instrumentalizing programs, insisting that any teleological thinking is in cahoots with capitalism and colonialism, and only re-entrenches the destructive ideologies that caused the climate crisis in the first place. Refusing to coerce others into exploitative use or service, they take a principled stand in favor of passivity and deliberate political withdrawal. Anne-Lise François, for example, turns toward “recessive action” (xvii)—the “nonappropriative” (xxiv), minor gesture that rejects any illusion of human mastery or conquest. And Anahid Nersessian argues, “For better or worse, works of art resist practical application or problem-solving” (2), which means that the task of the aesthetic disciplines is to face the “traumatic knowledge that climate catastrophe is certain and unfathomable.”

There is something attractively pure about refusing all complicity with capitalism and colonialism. But there is also a strange logic to the argument that any attempt to slow or stop global warming would be so much in keeping with instrumental reason that we have no choice but to surrender to the climate catastrophe to come. Can it be true that our only ethical option is to accede to our own extinction—not to mention the extinction of many human and nonhuman others in the process? Or, to put this another way, acquiescing to forces of massive, global destruction that will intensify the suffering of the world’s poorest is not a recognizably leftist position, if by the Left we mean a political commitment to collective, egalitarian flourishing.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Alt Fails

Dominant left-wing thinking has been characterized by “folk politics” – privileges reacting to change over imagining new long-term goals

Srnicek and Williams ’15 (Nick Srinicek and Alex Williams, Nick Srnicek is a Lecturer in Digital Economy at King's College London and Alex Williams is a political theorist and lecturer in digital media and society, “Inventing the Future: Post capitalism and a World Without Work,” Verso Books, )

Folk politics presents itself as another possible response to the problems of overwhelming complexity. If we do not understand how the world operates, the folk-political injunction is to reduce complexity down to a human scale. Indeed, folk-political writing is saturated with calls for a return to authenticity, to immediacy, to a world that is ‘transparent’, ‘human-scaled’, ‘tangible’, ‘slow’, ‘harmonious’, ‘simple’, and ‘everyday’.27 Such thinking rejects the complexity of the contemporary world, and thereby rejects the possibility of a truly 9 postcapitalist world. It attempts to give a human face to power; whereas what is truly terrifying is the generally asubjective nature of the system. The faces are interchangeable; the power remains the same. The turn towards localism, temporary moments of resistance, and the intuitive practices of direct action all effectively attempt to condense the problems of global capitalism into concrete figures and moments. In this process, folk politics often reduces politics to an ethical and individual struggle. There is a tendency sometimes to imagine that we simply need ‘good’ capitalists, or a ‘responsible’ capitalism. At the same time, the imperative to ‘make it local’ leads folk politics to fetishise immediate results and the concrete appearance of action. Delaying a corporate attack on the environment, for instance, is lauded as a success – even if the company simply waits out public attention before returning once again. Moreover, as Rosa Luxemburg pointed out long ago, the fetishisation of ‘immediate results’ leads to an empty pragmatism that struggles to maintain the present balance of power, rather than seeking to change structural conditions.28 Without the necessary abstraction of strategic thought, tactics are ultimately fleeting gestures. Finally, the abjuring of complexity dovetails with the neoliberal case for markets. One of the primary arguments made against planning has been that the economy is simply too complex to be guided.29 The only alternative is therefore to leave the distribution of resources to the market and reject any attempt to guide it rationally.30 Considered in all these ways, folk politics appears as an attempt to make global capitalism small enough to be thinkable – and at the same time, to articulate how to act upon this restricted image of capitalism. By contrast, the argument of this book is that folk-political tendencies are mistaken. If complexity presently outstrips humanity’s capacities to think and control, there are two options: one is to reduce complexity down to a human scale; the other is to expand humanity’s capacities. We endorse the latter position. Any postcapitalist project will necessarily require the creation of new cognitive maps, political narratives, technological interfaces, economic models, and mechanisms of collective control to be able to marshal complex phenomena for the betterment of humanity.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Violence Turn

Work is the base of a responsible society – the unemployed are more likely to engage in unrest and riots

Chamberlin 13 (Dr. James Chamberlain is an Associate Professor of Political Science, specializing in political theory, “The Unstable Meaning and Value of Work: An Exploration of the Refusal of Work through the 2011 UK Riots and Public Sector Strikes,” APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper American Political Science Association, 8/22/2013, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300892) -MP

Although these responses display a reticence to understanding the causes of the riots in general, or seeing them as political protests more specifically, politicians, media commentators, and other researchers nonetheless developed various explanations of the disturbances, the most interesting of which for our purposes will be what I call the embrace of work as a panacea for personal and social ills. The riots thus set the stage for a flurry of discursive production around the importance of employment to individuals and their communities, which in turn functioned to shore up the ideology of work. One fairly simple connection between (un)employment and the riots, given the widespread occurrence of looting, concerns the ability of people to acquire the things that they need or want. For example, the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) report quotes one person who thought that fewer young people would resort to a life of street crime if there were more employment opportunities available to them. According to this view, unemployment and poor job prospects stimulate criminal behavior like looting, because it offers a way to “get what you really want.”13 It is worth noting, however, that the opportunity to acquire material goods was not the only motivation of rioters, since many also engaged in confrontations with the police and the destruction of property. The final report of the Riots Communities and Victims Panel (RCVP) offers a more complex, if not more ambiguous, statement of the relationship between work and the riots. 14 Here we learn that “neighbourhoods that suffered from riots are more pessimistic about their local areas and the opportunities for local people than those areas that did not suffer from riots.”15 The report identifies rising unemployment as a particular source of stress, and goes on to claim that “if we are to avoid further riots, we have a responsibility to ensure young people receive an education which stimulates and inspires them, and prepares them for future work.”16 The panel found that “hopes and dreams” were low among young people, and recommends a series of measures to reduce youth unemployment as part of the broader goal of building “social and economic resilience.”17 These measures would reduce the number of “young people falling through the net and ending up NEET [not in education, employment, or training] and at risk of rioting.”18 While the report finds a strong correlation between coming from a deprived neighborhood, ‘being NEET’ and taking part in the riots, 19 it appears less confident about making causal claims. Almost in passing, the panel claims that “having a job is key to people feeling that they have a stake in society,”20 and that when people have a stake in society there is a lower likelihood of unrest and disorder. 21 This conclusion also coincides with NatCen’s finding that “poor job prospects” and long-term unemployment meant that some young people felt they had little to lose by taking part in the riots.22 The implication is that employment incentivizes moral and law-abiding behavior, a virtue whose popular appeal cannot be overestimated in the climate of fears about the ‘breakdown of morality’ and ‘law and order.’ Although he does not explicitly refer to jobs, Nick Clegg (the Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the Liberal Democrats), expressed a similar view when he told party members just days after the riots (and months before the publication of the panel’s final report) that “the best defence against this kind of nihilistic behaviour is to ensure that everyone has a stake in society.”23 For this to happen, according to Mr. Clegg, people must have “opportunities” (presumably related to education and employment), which in turn “gives them the drive, discipline and responsibility to do the right thing.” Within days of this speech, David Cameron echoed its sentiment when he suggested that “work is at the heart of a responsible society. So getting more of our young people into jobs, or up and running in their own businesses is a critical part of how we strengthen responsibility in our society. …it’s only by getting our young people into work that we can build an ownership society in which everyone feels they have a stake.”24 Although the RCVP identifies other factors besides unemployment to explain the disturbances, it is striking that their findings in this area so neatly match the pronouncements made within days of the riots by the very same politicians who set up the panel. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the report has drawn criticism for being “a superficial glossy brochure” that “tells us nothing new about the riots.”25 The notion that unemployment can account, at least in part, for the outbreak of urban unrest has thus received support from government commissioned inquiries as well as politicians of liberal and conservative persuasions, but one can find a broadly complementary narrative on employment and social inclusion in academic work too. Geographer Tom Slater, for example, argues that we must connect the riots “to urban marginality in British society and pay attention not only to material deprivation but to the denial of dignity it implies”26 Both politicians and state institutions have essentially failed young people, according to Slater, leaving them in poverty and unemployment. The riots, then, were a “response that should have been expected” to what Loic Wacquant has called the “massive structural violence” visited upon urban youth. 27 In an interview with The Guardian, Simon Hallsworth, director of the Centre for Social and Evaluation Research at London Metropolitan University, complements this analysis by criticizing the shift away from a commitment to full employment and toward labor market flexibility. In his view this has excluded young people from the jobs that would allow them to buy consumer items, like clothes and phones, which are so central to social respect in contemporary society. 28 As Slater goes on to note, the denial of dignity to young people has fuelled “collective rage” in France and Greece, to name just two recent examples. The coalition government’s swingeing budget cuts in the climate of austerity have heightened the British youth’s sense of being “abandoned and betrayed,” while many who took part in the riots must daily endure the dishonor of living in a stigmatized neighborhood, with all the social and economic costs that this imposes on them. 29 Similarly, youth charity founder Camila Batmanghelidjh draws attention to the “repeated humiliation” that disadvantaged young people experience in London, and suggests that, while we are all capable of “savagery,” “some of us have been lucky enough not to have to call upon it for survival; others, exhausted from failure, can justify resorting to it.”30 While this account of the rioters’ behavior expresses empathy and understanding for their plight, its invocation of ‘savagery’ conjures up the threatening figure of an undomesticated and unruly beast, an image to which we will return shortly. These various reports, speeches, and articles express the belief that unemployment creates a sense of marginality, hopelessness, and indignity that will almost inevitably produce violent disturbances among young people. Yet a common theme in these texts concerns the fact that not everyone in challenging socio-economic circumstances took part in the riots. In the speech quoted above, Nick Clegg, for example, stressed that the “rioters were the exception, not the rule,”31 while the RCVP undertook to discern why some young people engaged in the disturbances while others shied away. In its final report, we learn that ‘character’ is a key factor both in determining whether or not young people took part in the riots, and in shaping their employment prospects. These explanations qualify the almost deterministic accounts of the riots that focus on socio-structural factors by introducing the theme of agency. While this move is to be welcomed by those seeking rigorous empirical understanding of the riots, it is worth noting that it also helps legitimize the status quo by pointing to those who, despite adversity, did not feel compelled to ‘act out.’ According to the panel, young people with ‘character’ display “self-discipline, application, the ability to defer gratification and resilience in recovering from setbacks.”32 Although the panel notes that “it is difficult to gather quantitative evidence on whether a lack of character in the rioters led to their criminal actions,” it claims that “rioters chose not to resist the temptations and excitement that the riots offered them while many of their peers, experiencing similar disadvantage, made a positive choice not to go on to the streets and damage their communities” (emphases added). The logical inconsistency of the assertion that the rioters effectively chose to take part in the disturbances with the claim that a lack of selfdiscipline and the ability to defer gratification were at the root of their involvement deserves closer scrutiny. If one lacks self-discipline, how could one choose to resist temptation? The panel’s insistence on the ‘choice’ of the rioters, even as it defies logic, supports Nikolas Rose’s claim that contemporary liberal society governs “autonomous individuals through their freedom,” where freedom includes determining “the course of one’s own existence through acts of choice.”33 While the panel isolates the moment of ‘choice’ on the part of the rioters, thus holding them accountable for their actions, by contrasting it with the “positive choice” of those in similar circumstances who did not take part in the riots, it implies that the rioters’ choice was ‘flawed.’ Of course, this choice was ‘negative’ in terms of its impact on those whose property was stolen or destroyed, but I use the word ‘flawed’ to convey the sense that, from the panel’s perspective, the rioters’ lack of self-discipline tarnished the process by which they made that choice. Moreover, given that liberal subjects operate within in a “space of action” which leaves them free to choose among a range of options, Rose shows how “well-regulated liberty” in the nineteenth century required the cultivation of “normality, rationality and sensibility.” As Rose puts it, “these practices governed through liberty, to the extent they sought to invent the conditions in which subjects themselves would shape their conduct.”34 He goes on to note that riots were a particular concern in the nineteenth century, because they were “not the exercise of freedom but its antithesis: the greatest challenge to a public order of liberty.”35 These same concerns are highly visible within the responses to the 2011 riots: those who took part in them were presumed devoid of self-discipline and, we will see below, rationality, and thus fell short of the standards of conduct befitting a liberal subject. In this sense, the rioters provoked such anxiety precisely because they posed a threat to “well-regulated liberty.”

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Hege Good Turn

A dwindling work ethic undermines US hegemony

Wooldridge ‘23 (Adrian Wooldridge, 1-31-2023, "America’s Work Ethic Is Under Assault," archive.is, https://archive.is/78KqN)

The work ethic is the most important engine of capitalist civilization. It keeps workers working long after they have satisfied their basic needs, drives entrepreneurs to found new companies and inventors to invent new things, and, in general, generates the surplus that pays for productive investment and social welfare. Yet the belief that work is a moral duty rather than an inconvenient necessity is hardly a natural one. In most civilizations, social status has been determined by your distance from productive labor — aristocrats in Naples even lost their patents of nobility if they were caught doing anything useful — while workers abandoned the grindstone for the alehouse at the slightest opportunity. Ever since Max Weber published his landmark The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), historians have debated his claim that Protestantism, particularly in its Calvinist form, was responsible for the rise of capitalism because it treated hard work and wealth accumulation as proof of salvation. But they have largely agreed with the basic idea that the rise of capitalism required a revolution in attitudes to work. Which raises a troubling proposition: If the work ethic is the product of cultural change, it can be destroyed by cultural change. America is the world’s leading example of the power of the work ethic. The North was settled by work-obsessed Puritans fleeing persecution in England (the South was settled by Cavaliers who despised work and relied for their leisure on slave labor). Benjamin Franklin coined aphorisms about time being money and early to bed, early to rise being the secret of wealth as well as wisdom. Horatio Alger insisted that anybody could make it if they worked hard. Immigrants came to the United States in their millions in the hope that hard work and self-reliance would finally be rewarded. In some ways this culture still survives. Americans in the labor force work longer hours than Europeans and take significantly shorter vacations. The month-long summer holiday that the French regard as a right strikes many Americans as a form of decadence. High-earning Americans in law, banking and the executive suite routinely work more than 50 hours a week and some of them work more than 100. Yet this commitment to work is eroding at the edges and increasingly at the center. The US labor force participation rate — the proportion of working-age citizens either working or actively looking for work — has declined from a high of 67.5% at the turn of the century to 62.3%. “The US work ethic is really strong and healthy,” Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute quipped to me in an interview, “except where it isn’t.” The post-work revolution was led by men without college degrees. In Men Without Work, which was first published in 2016 and revised in 2022, Eberstadt produces some astonishing statistics on the number of prime-age men (25 to 64) who have fallen out of the labor market. More than 11% of these men — some seven million souls — are neither working nor looking for a job. Barely half of native-born prime-age men with no high school degree are in the job market. The “not in labor force” number has gone up by a percentage point every seven years since 1965 regardless of the state of the economy or the number of job vacancies. The Covid pandemic spread the post-work revolution to new groups — hence all the talk of “the great resignation” and “quiet quitting.” Many older Americans decided to fast forward their retirement by cashing in their 401k plans and/or selling their over-priced properties and moving to cheaper Valhallas: 1.75 million baby boomers retired in 2021 as compared with a million in the average year. Some prime-age workers (particularly women) decided during the furlough that going out to work wasn’t worth the hassle if you were spending most of your income on caring for children or aging parents. Most worrying of all is the changing attitude to work among the young. A 2010 Pew Research Center Report sounded the alarm with its discovery that three-fourths of respondents claimed that older people had a better work ethic than younger people do — a belief that was held just as strongly by the young as by their seniors. Since then, evidence of disillusionment has multiplied. Employers report that millennials are more likely to regard work as a means of self-fulfillment rather than just an income stream. Anti-work activists cite appalling corporate practices on Reddit, praise The Right to be Lazy (1883), by Karl Marx’s son-in-law, Paul Lafargue, debate the relative merits of “rage quitting” versus “quiet quitting,” and advocate the virtues of a universal basic income, which does away with the need to work at all. This anti-work revolt is obviously troubling for economic reasons: It reduces the economy’s overall productivity and leaves urgent jobs undone. It is also demoralizing. On being asked how a person might flourish, Sigmund Freud replied “love and work…work and love, that’s all there is…love and work are the cornerstones of our humanness.” Time-work studies of men who have dropped out of the labor market show that they spend most of their abundant “socializing, relaxing and leisure” time (as the American Time Use Survey defines it) in front of a screen, whether watching the TV or playing video games. Similar studies of early retirees also show enormous amounts of screen time. So how do we explain the trend? And how do we go about reversing it? Several specific explanations invite specific remedies. The opioid epidemic has wrecked lives across the country. Ill health and obesity make it harder for people to hold down a job. Disability rules discourage retraining. Ex-convicts find it hard to get back into the workforce, yet close to one-in-eight American men have been in prison. Tackling the opioid crisis and addressing the incarceration madness will also help to tackle the work crisis The problem of premature retirement may also be solving itself as retirees discover that they don’t have as much to live on as they previously expected. But the problem also has deeper cultural roots that require deeper digging if they are to be torn up. Start with two famous paradoxes about the nature of capitalism. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), Joseph Schumpeter argued that capitalism produces its own gravediggers in the form of tenured intellectuals who gorge on capitalism’s fruits while devoting their energies to denouncing its evils. This problem has now reached an extreme that would even have surprised a man who lived through the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It’s not just that liberal academics and administrators outnumber conservative ones by growing margins in the humanities, and that within the ranks of liberals, a more “progressive” mindset has taken hold. It’s that this progressive mindset is also now in the ascendant among faculty at traditionally vocational institutions such as law schools and business schools. Where once Harvard Business School students learned that their only duty was to maximize shareholder value, now they learn that they must reimagine capitalism in a world on fire.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Collapse Turn

Alternatives fail to consider the implication but solely focus on ideological level of post-work world; the result will be disastrous.

Konczal ’15 [Mike, director of Roosevelt’s Macroeconomic Analysis team. “The Hard Work of Taking Apart Post-Work Fantasy”; 6-29-2015, Roosevelt Institute, https://rooseveltinstitute.org/2015/06/29/the-hard-work-of-taking-apart-post-work-fantasy/; JFan]

Going further, the idea that a post-work economy would involve simply choosing between a handful of quasi-utopias strikes me as completely naive. In Thompson’s piece, for instance, the problem seems to be whether post-work people would spend their time in intellectual pursuits or as independent artisans. But it’s just as likely people would spend their days as refugees trying not to starve.

You can get the sense that something is missing because virtually all of these articles consider radical forms of leisure instead of ownership. (Indeed, in assuming that prosperity leads to redistribution leads to leisure and public goods, it’s really a forward projection of the Keynesian-Fordism of the past.) I rarely see any of these mass media post-work scenarios tackle these issues head-on, much less talk about “post-ownership” instead of just “post-work.” (Friend of the blog Peter Frase is one of the few who does.)

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Productivity Good

Productivity good – it is a prereq for the transition – worker power is key.

Konczal ’15 [Mike, director of Roosevelt’s Macroeconomic Analysis team. “The Hard Work of Taking Apart Post-Work Fantasy”; 6-29-2015, Roosevelt Institute, https://rooseveltinstitute.org/2015/06/29/the-hard-work-of-taking-apart-post-work-fantasy/; JFan]

Worker power matters, ironically, because it’s difficult to imagine the productivity growth necessary to get to this world without some sense that labor is strong. If wages are stagnant or even falling, what incentive is there to build the robots to replace those workers? Nothing is certain here, but you can see periods where low unemployment is correlated with faster productivity gains. The best way forward to a post-work atmosphere will probably be to embrace labor, not hope it goes away.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Jobs Good (AT: Gerber)

David Gerber’s Bullshit Jobs theory is bullshit—propped up by dubious, qualitative, biased evidence—capitalism is the root cause and marxist theory of labor alienation understands their phenomena better—prefer empiric testing

Soffia et. al 22 (Magdalena Soffia, Brendan Burchell, and Alex J Wood are researchers from the universities of Cambridge and Birmingham, respectively. “Alienation Is Not ‘Bullshit’: An Empirical Critique of Graeber’s Theory of BS Jobs,” Work, Employment, and Society. 2022. ) @ehatt

The meaningfulness of work has long been a central concern of sociology (Bailey and Madden, 2017) and other disciplines (Steger et al., 2012). Indeed, meaningful work relates to both Marx’s (1964[1844]) theory of alienation and Weber’s (1978[1922]) theory of bureaucratisation (Kalleberg, 2011). The meaningfulness of work has been investigated both directly (Bailey and Madden, 2016, 2017; Budd, 2011) and indirectly as a component of ‘intrinsic job quality’ (Kalleberg, 2011). However, Bailey and Madden (2019) point out that few studies have directly investigated meaningless work. The publication of David Graeber’s (2013, 2018) ‘bullshit jobs theory’ has generated a heightened interest among academics, the public and policymakers regarding useless jobs. In fact, Graeber’s 2013 essay and 2018 book on bullshit jobs (BS jobs) have been cited more than 900 times, according to Google Scholar, and discussed widely in the popular media. While such bibliometrics may not provide a complete picture with regards to the extent of academic influence, it is important to take seriously claims contained within non-academic publications, such as Graeber’s, and subject them to rigorous empirical examination. In fact, sociology of work has frequently been influenced by popular works published by trade publishers. In particular, few would deny the influence of the likes of Harry Braverman (1974), Naomi Klein (1999, 2007), or Guy Standing (2011, 2014). Moreover, Graeber’s (2013, 2018) arguments have been taken up uncritically by some scholars such as Frayne (2015) and Spicer (2017) whose own books have gone on to be well received both within and beyond academia. The BS jobs theory suggests that many workers experience their jobs as being comprised of meaningless tasks in which they have to appear productive. As a result some academics writing on the future of work, and the post-work and anti-work traditions, have suggested that if, as Graeber claims, 30–60% of work is ‘bullshit’, radical reductions in the length of the working week could be easily achieved (e.g. Frayne, 2019; Susskind, 2020). It is important to recognise that Graeber is not simply stating that some people have useless jobs but is instead proposing a theory that seeks to explain why these jobs exist. This theory is premised on the existence of an economic system, that Graeber (2018) terms ‘managerial feudalism’, that produces a large and increasing number of workers with BS jobs, especially those with student debt in the finance, law and administration professions. However, the evidence presented by Graeber (2018) in support of his ‘bullshit jobs’ thesis is largely based on qualitative data from employees who approached the author to praise him for his earlier speculative essay on the subject and to share anecdotes with him. Not only does reliance on this data source provide little empirical support for Graeber’s generalisations but it is also likely plagued by self-selection bias. Fortunately, Graeber’s book offers several clear predictions that are straightforward to test quantitatively. This article, therefore, seeks to empirically test several of Graeber’s (2018) main propositions: 1. that the number of employees doing useless jobs is high (i.e. 20–50%); 2. that useless jobs have been increasing rapidly over time; 3. that some occupations have very high rates of BS jobs (e.g. financial services, marketing, administration) and others very low (e.g. refuse collectors, cleaners, farmers); 4. that young workers with higher education qualifications are more likely to be doing BS jobs due to student debts; 5. that useless jobs cause ‘spiritual violence’ and poor mental health Our findings demonstrate that while Graeber’s (2018) specific account of BS jobs and managerial feudalism cannot be empirically sustained, his work has uncovered an important and largely unresearched social ill. The scale of the problem is far from that predicted by Graeber’s theory. Nevertheless, millions of European workers suffer from work which they feel is not useful. Moreover, this experience is strongly associated with poor wellbeing. We, therefore, finish our analyses with our own tentative explanation, inspired by Marx’s writings on alienation, for why people think their job is useless. Since Graeber is quite emphatic that employees themselves are the most credible source of information about the true value (or otherwise) of their jobs, survey data provide an obvious opportunity to test this theory. We use the 2005–2015 European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS) to understand the drivers of respondents answering ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ to the statement: ‘I have the feeling of doing useful work’. However, our findings offer little support for any of these specific hypotheses generated from Graeber’s theory. Meaningless work and BS jobs What, then, differentiates Graeber’s BS jobs theory from the established literature on the meaningfulness of work? The key difference is that the meaningfulness of work has tended to be seen as a subjective phenomenon (Bailey and Madden, 2016, 2017; Kalleberg, 2011; Rosso et al., 2010). For instance, Bailey and Madden (2016, 2017) find that the meaningfulness or otherwise of work is not static but episodic and transitory; with the meaningfulness of work altering in relation to completion of tasks and goals, and participation in the rituals that reflect on these successes. In contrast, Graeber (2018) maintains that BS jobs are not just subjectively experienced as meaningless, pointless or useless, but that this subjective assessment is actually an accurate appraisal of the job’s lack of social value. That is to say, that it does not provide a ‘good or service [that] answers a demand or otherwise improves people’s lives’ (Graeber, 2018: 201). Specifically, Graeber (2018: 2) defines a BS job as: a form of paid employment that is so completely pointless, unnecessary, or pernicious that even the employee cannot justify its existence even though, as part of the conditions of employment, the employee feels obliged to pretend that this is not the case. This direct link between subjective assessments of usefulness and objective social value makes it possible for Graeber to distinguish between jobs which are ‘bullshit’ and those which are bad quality or (in his terminology) ‘shit’; ‘shit jobs’ being those that may be socially valuable but are poorly rewarded, whereas BS jobs provide little social value but are often highly remunerated. The rise of ‘managerial feudalism’ Graeber’s (2018) approach further diverges from established approaches to meaningful work, in that these tend to focus on the individual and organisational characteristics that influence whether a job is meaningful (Bailey and Madden, 2016, 2017; Kalleberg, 2011; Rosso et al., 2010). Graeber posits a theory that seeks to relate the claimed existence and growth of BS jobs to macro-political economy developments: namely financialisation and managerialisation. Graeber’s (2013) original BS jobs article took a conspiratorial tone; however, his book-length exposition (Graeber, 2018) constructs a more developed theory of ‘managerial feudalism’. Graeber’s theory holds that financialisation entails the appropriation of goods rather than making, moving and maintaining goods. The economic system which has emerged from the 1970s, therefore, more closely resembles feudalism than competitive capitalism. As in feudalism, financialisation does not require significant investment in production by the ruling class and, as their wealth is based on appropriation, they are incentivised to instead invest in an entourage of ‘lackeys’, ‘goons’ and others who can maintain their power and prestige. Moreover, these lackeys and goons are themselves argued to be rewarded for their service with retainers of their own. The result, according to Graeber (2018), is ‘managerial feudalism’, an elaborate economic hierarchy in which millions hold pointless jobs. As is illustrated in Figure 1, this transformation of industrial capitalism into managerial feudalism is held to have been made possible by two further factors: automation freeing large numbers of workers from the need to engage in useful labour and the growth of student debt ensuring an extensive supply of young workers willing to take BS jobs. The BS jobs thesis gives rise to many clear testable outcomes, five of which we can readily examine with the EWCS: 1. Graeber (2018) states that the development of his theory was premised on the expectation that a high proportion, between 20% and 50%, of jobs were BS and therefore we ‘need to ask ourselves . . . how did such a large proportion of our workforce find themselves labouring at tasks which they consider pointless’ (Graeber, 2018: xxiv). At other points in the book, Graeber suggests the proportion might be much higher, but certainly not lower. Therefore, if in reality there are only relatively small numbers of workers who see their jobs as useless, then this would undermine Graeber’s thesis. 2. Graeber (2018: 146) argues that as a result of financialisation and managerial feudalism, the number of BS jobs has been ‘increasing rapidly in recent years’. Therefore, if the number of BS jobs is not increasing or is even declining, this would again undermine the theory. 3. BS jobs should be concentrated in particular occupations and industries while being largely absent in others. As Graeber (2018: 6) explains: ‘many service workers hate their jobs; but even those who do are aware that what they do does make some sort of meaningful difference in the world . . . [Whereas] we can only assume that any office worker who one might suspect secretly believes themselves to have a bullshit job does, indeed, believe this.’ Graeber (2018) provides many examples of BS jobs and those which are not (summarised in Table 1). In general, the theory asserts that BS jobs should be concentrated in industries connected to finance, among professionals, administrators and managers. In contrast, they should be generally absent in low-paying, blue-collar, hourly-paid ‘shit jobs’, as Graeber maintains that there tends to be an inverse relationship between social value and economic reward – although, as Table 1 shows, Graeber also believes that there are some low-paying BS jobs. 4. Since Graeber (2018) argues that the growth of student debt has been an important supply-side cause for the growth of BS jobs, these jobs should be more prevalent among young workers with higher education qualifications. If BS jobs are not, in fact, concentrated in the predicted educational and age groups, then this would invalidate this aspect of Graeber’s theory and suggest that we should look for other explanations. 5. Graeber (2018: 102) argues that BS jobs are a form of ‘spiritual violence’ that inflict negative states of mind on individuals, including anxiety, depression and misery. If this is the case, we should detect a clear relationship between the perception of one’s job as useless and a validated measure of psychological wellbeing. From social value to the value of work relations As highlighted above, Graeber (2018) believes that when individuals report their jobs as being useless, this is an accurate appraisal by the individual of their job’s social value. This, Graeber goes on to argue, is harmful to an individuals’ wellbeing as it provides little identity or purpose1 and, moreover, requires workers to pretend this is not the case. Graeber (2018: 102) states this is a source of ‘spiritual violence’ that ‘makes clear the degree to which you are entirely under another person’s power’. This is held to be a psychologically damaging experience, because humans need to conceive of ‘themselves as capable of acting on the world and others in predictable ways. Deny humans this sense of agency, and they are nothing’ (Graeber, 2018: 101). This view of paid work as constraining essential human agency is striking in its resemblance to alienation, yet this concept is absent from Graeber’s account. Similarly, Marx argued that labour under capitalism is inherently alienating as it blocks individuals’ essential need for self-realisation. However, for Marx this was not the result of individuals being engaged in activity that was of no social value but rather because capitalist social relations frustrate the free development of human abilities in spontaneous activity.2 The alienation of labour then focuses our attention upon the social relations under which work takes place, generally (Braverman, 1974), and the process of control that exists over work relations, specifically (Hyman, 1975). As Wood (2020) argues, it is necessary to ‘recognise that paid work is not just a simple matter of market exchange but also of power relations’. Although Marx wrote of alienation as a fairly homogenous phenomenon, more contemporary writers have highlighted the degree to which work relations ‘differ in the relative power of employers and employees to control tasks, negotiate the conditions of employment, and terminate a job’ (Kalleberg, 2011: 83). Therefore, that work relations frustrate the potential for self-realisation may offer an alternative explanation for why people experience their job as useless. Moreover, Elster (1985, 1986) argues that self-realisation entails self-externalisation in addition to self-actualisation, as selfrealisation is dependent on abilities being observable to others who confirm or deny them. This understanding of alienation highlights that workers might see their work as useless and suffer reduced wellbeing when work does not provide them with the means to use and develop their skills, abilities and capacities, or because their abilities are denied by others in the workplace. Unlike the BS jobs theory, alienation is not premised on the view that the work being undertaken is inherently pointless and of no value. Instead, it highlights the importance of the social relations under which work is undertaken and the degree to which they constrain the ability of workers to affirm their sense of self through the development and recognition of skills and abilities. Bailey and Madden (2019: 1) point out that few studies have looked to investigate ‘under what circumstances work is rendered meaningless’. However, support for the work relations approach over BS jobs is provided by Dur and Lent (2019), who analysed the International Social Survey Program data from 37 countries in 2015 and found that workers are more likely to report being in a socially useless job in occupations that are generally seen to offer workers limited opportunities for intrinsic skill use and autonomy. These industries included ‘stationary plant and machine operators’, ‘assemblers’, ‘labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport performing simple and routine manual tasks’, ‘food preparation assistants’, ‘garment and related trades workers’ and ‘cleaners and helpers’. The importance of social relations and work organisation for the meaningfulness of work is also attested to by Bailey and Madden (2016), who find managers can destroy the sense of meaningful work in a number of ways such as: disconnecting workers from their values; taking them for granted; treating them unfairly; overriding their judgement; disconnecting people from supportive relationships; and putting people at risk of physical or emotional harm. However, in their cross-national study, Dur and Lent (2019) find that the feeling that one’s job is socially useless is not associated at the national-level with quality of management. Following the empirical testing of the BS jobs theory, we move on to consider the degree to which work relations, such as the quality of management, level of participation and social support in the workplace, provide an alternative means for understanding why workers feel their jobs are not useful. Evidence of BS jobs Graeber (2018: xxii) states that his theory has ‘been overwhelmingly confirmed by statistical research’. This statistical research consists of a YouGov poll of UK workers (YouGov, 2015) and a similar one by human resource firm Schouten & Nelissen of Dutch workers (Graeber, 2018: 6). Graeber (2018: 10) argues that, as it is not possible to calculate social value, we must take the workers’ ‘word for it’ because ‘it’s safe to assume the worker knows best’ as to how useful their job actually is. Therefore, the YouGov and Schouten & Nelissen surveys respectively asked respondents if their job is making a meaningful contribution to the world and if their job is meaningful. The YouGov survey found that 37% of UK workers say their job does not make a meaningful contribution to the world, while the Schouten & Nelissen survey finds that 40% of Dutch workers do not experience their job as meaningful. However, Graeber (2018) suggests that the problem of BS jobs is even greater. For instance, he combines the YouGov ‘don’t know’ (13%) responses with the ‘is not’ responses to create a new category of those ‘who are not entirely sure their job made any sort of meaningful contribution to the world’ (Graeber, 2018: 6). Graeber goes on to refer to a State of Enterprise Work Report which reports that, in 2016, US office workers spent 46% of their time dealing with emails, administrative tasks, interruptions for non-essential tasks and in wasteful meetings. These tasks are then classed as bullshit and used to argue that around 50% of non-BS jobs are actually bullshit and that, therefore, ‘we can probably conclude that at least half of all work done in our society could be eliminated without making any real difference’ (Graeber, 2018: 26). At another point, Graeber (2018: xx) introduces the concept of ‘second-order BS jobs’, which are non-BS jobs done in support of BS jobs. He then claims that ‘if 37 percent of jobs are bullshit, and 37 percent of the remaining 63 percent are in the support of bullshit, then slightly over 50 percent of all labour falls into the bullshit sector in the broadest sense of the term’. However, these calculations violate the methodological principle that workers are best placed to judge the social value of their work. Reporting that one deals with emails, administrative tasks, interruptions for non-essential tasks and wasteful meetings is not the same as saying these tasks are pointless, unnecessary or pernicious. Moreover, second-order BS jobs must by definition already be included in the 37% reporting their job as bullshit. Therefore, Graeber’s (2018: 267) conclusion that ‘upward of 50 percent to 60 percent of the population has . . . been thrown out of [useful] work’ cannot be sustained. But the lower estimate of 37–40% that he provides is also questionable; as Thompson and Pitts (2018) point out, the YouGov survey item is loaded in that it sets a very high bar for nonBS jobs. Clearly, saying your job does not make a meaningful contribution to the world is not the same as saying one’s job is completely pointless, unnecessary or pernicious, as it could quite conceivably be felt to be useful to one’s nation, community, neighbourhood, customers or family. We can find very little information of the methodology followed by Schouten & Nelissen but the 37–40% figure is contradicted by Dur and Lent’s (2019) findings, according to which only 8% of workers disagreed that their job is useful to society. For the UK, the figure was 10% – only half of what Graeber assumed while developing his theory. Moreover, these researchers find no BS occupations, that is, occupations where a ‘preponderance of workers feel their jobs are pointless’ (Graeber, 2018: 64). In fact, even the YouGov survey which Graeber (2018) relies on contradicts his theory, as the number who feel their job does not contribute to the world is higher among social groups C2DE than ABC1. In other words, the survey which Graeber uses to support his theory actually finds that BS jobs are more likely among lowest grade, semi-skilled and skilled manual workers than they are among supervisory, clerical, managerial, administrative and professional workers. Finally, Dur and Lent (2019) also demonstrate that the number of people who feel their job is useful to society has not increased since 1989. Despite the weak empirical support marshalled by Graeber (2018) in its favour, his BS jobs theory has been taken seriously by academics, journalists and policymakers. It therefore deserves rigorous empirical testing and below we outline how we propose to do so.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Work Provides Meaning

Intrinsic value card

Deranty 21

Jean-Philippe Deranty is an associate professor of philosophy at Macquarie University; April 27, 2021; Post-work society as an oxymoron: Why we cannot, and should not, wish work away; ;

The goods of working for individuals The next two sections draw on the analysis of work presented in the recent volume The Return of Work in Critical Theory (Dejours et al., 2018) and more generally the rich tradition of research on work in France in recent decades, around the work of Christophe Dejours, and theorists who have been associated with him, like Pascale Molinier (2006, 2013) and Yves Clot (1999, 2014; see Deranty, 2009; Dashtipour & Vidaillet, 2017, for synthetic presentations). A distinctive feature of this tradition is its focus on the ways in which the concrete, ‘ergonomic’ aspects of working activities impact on psyches and social relations. Considering what is specific about working activities usefully complements existing analyses of the goods of work. An earlier, seminal reference is the analysis of work in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1991, pp. 227–239, 270–273). Despite the many differences between work activities, a key aspect shared by all of them is that they are performed under several constraints. The first constraint relates to the success of the working activity. That success is defined not by the worker but by the addressee: whether the particular need (the part needed further down the production line, the care for a sick person, a legal or a cultural act) has been fulfilled (Hegel, 1991, § 192, p. 229). This judgement is to a large extent out of the hands of the worker. The need is fulfilled or not, well or not well, for the addressee of work. This dependence upon others for the meaning of the activity is one of the main reasons why work has traditionally been viewed as inherently servile (typically Aristotle, 1996, Book VIII, chapter 2–3). A second constraint is that this fulfilment of a need takes place within the general frame of social reproduction and thus involves more than just an interpersonal relationship. It is also a contribution to social reproduction at large (Hegel, 1991, § 199, p. 233). This means that there is a general expectation that the duty will be discharged. Not doing this work means failing to contribute to the cooperative scheme. Rawls’ ‘principle of reciprocity’, which places demands on each citizen as a member of this scheme, can be read as adumbrating this aspect of social contribution (Rawls, 1999, pp. xv, 88). A third type of constraint stems from the fact that the success of a working act is also defined internally, depending on whether it conformed to the norms defining an efficient act within a particular sector of the overall cooperative order. No work act occurs in isolation, as if the worker were facing the task for the first time and on their own. As a technical gesture, all work mobilises established knowledges, skills and ways to use these skills, which are more or less explicitly prescribed. These features define an occupational culture that can become a formal tradition, a public history of doing things in a particular way (Dejours, 2018, pp. 34–35). Even work performed in the intimate sphere has to abide by external norms, if only the cultural norms that define good caring. Another constraining frame is the external authority exerting command and control. In waged work, this is obviously the different levels of management. But even in non-waged work, the activity often remains under external controlling authorities, if only the anonymous gaze of society’s expectations. There are thus several types of constraining forces overdetermining working activities: functional, social, some stemming from an occupational culture, constraints stemming from controlling authorities, if only the cooperative scheme at large. These factors make work a singular type of activity, for better or for worse, and the goods attached to work difficult to access via other types of activity. These constraining factors make work activities intrinsically heteronomous: neither the satisfaction drawn from the work’s output, nor the norms by which the work gestures are to be performed and are evaluated, nor the significance of the work in the cooperative scheme, are determined by the subject all by herself. Indeed, as we saw, this is one of the issues raised by post-work theorists, that work is antithetical with autonomy, not just in its capitalistic organisation but intrinsically as a type of activity. To cite a well-known passage from Marx (1991, pp. 759–761), or Hegel (1991, p. 221), human beings, inasmuch as they have to contribute to the cooperative scheme, are under the sway of manifold ‘necessity’. And yet, just as Marx said, and Hegel before him, there can be ‘freedom in this field’. It is precisely in dealing with the heteronomy of work, having to face manifold ‘necessity’, that individuals draw specific goods from it. This is true first of all from the point of view of personal development. Rather than being only limitations on free will, the external constraints the subject faces in work are also parameters that enable action by defining its goals and the means to achieve them. External constraints, of course, can reduce autonomy to such an extent that the experience of work becomes one of domination and alienation. But in other cases, heteronomous determinations are an opportunity for action. They provide specifications regarding the type of output that is needed, the techniques to use, the deadline to operate under and so on. The subject remains the agent who has to operationalise all these elements. In cases where heteronomy is not overwhelming, the strong ‘necessity’ that the constraints represent become a chance for self-development. The subject has to mobilise all her capacities, physical, emotional, psychological, cognitive, to achieve the task. It is then precisely because of all its surrounding constraints that work can be the type of activity that promotes self-development. The subject is forced to grow, as it were. As Dejours argues, working on the world always involves also working on the self (Dejours, 2009, vol. 1, pp. 165–169; see Marx already, 1973, p. 611). This conception of self-realisation through work qualifies philosophical accounts that make full autonomy a necessary condition of meaningfulness (Bowie, 1998; Schwartz, 1982). Apart from the fact that these accounts often propound unrealistically maximalist views of autonomy, they also overlook the potentially educating aspects of engaging in heteronomous activities. As Elster claimed (1986, p. 100), self-realisation through work is made possible if the activity represents ‘a challenge that must be met’. This is especially so if the challenge is not self-defined but is an external, objective challenge, deriving from the imperative to fulfil some need. This paradoxical developmental power inherent in the heteronomy of work appears clearly in contrast to activities that an individual engages in outside the demands of social reproduction. These rarely provide the rigid frame within which the subject needs to mobilise all her powers to achieve tasks. It is through such mobilisation, however, that she will find the greatest chance of transforming herself in the process. This explains why even in playful activity, say learning to play tennis or chess well as a hobby, if a person is truly serious about it, she generally puts herself willingly in the heteronomous situation of heeding the advice and commands of a technical or moral authority, a tutor, a mentor, a teacher. Mastering any complex task is difficult, involves renouncing comfort and habits, one’s entrenched physical, emotional and cognitive patterns. The constraints of work provide remarkable opportunities for this. Another paradoxical constraint of work comes from the output. In work, the subject is under the sway of the work’s outcome, so to speak. The telos of the activity drives their actions and thoughts. Once again, however, what is a constraint from one angle is an opportunity for development from another. Acting in order to produce an outcome, one that will fulfil a need, is a typical case of a meaningful activity. If there is pressure to produce that outcome because it responds to a social purpose, according to norms that are publicly acknowledged, then the successful delivery is all the more meaningful, as it receives a public stamp of approval, both in the delivery of the output and in the worker abiding by normative expectations. Compare this with the achievement of a goal that a subject has given to herself on her own, in the privacy of her intimate life. The fact that this second type of outcome is not public, abides by no external norms, surely means that it has less meaning for the subject. This conception of meaningfulness in work mitigates accounts that deny it to menial activities, typically those that Hannah Arendt called labour as opposed to work, that produce no enduring trace in the world (Veltman, 2016, pp. 128–129). On the present account, individuals can find at least some meaning in their activity if it is clear how it contributes concretely to social reproduction. Another structural dimension of work activities is that, however detailed the prescriptions framing the productive act, such a framework can never pre-empt what it will take for a human agent to achieve the tasks (Dejours, 2006). There are just too many factors in complex reality for external prescriptions to anticipate every possible contingency. The subject as a result needs some room to accomplish the work in her own way. The work culture has to be adapted, notably to suit idiosyncratic ways of doing things, and to adapt to the situation. Technical aspects of the work process have to be discussed with the supervising authorities, and hopefully amended, both to suit the agents and to take into account the specific features of the situation. More responsibility and agency can be granted to the workers, notably where some form of workplace democracy exists. All these points signal that the intrinsic heteronomy of working in fact has to be mitigated for work to be performed well enough (Marx already, 1991, p. 612). And since the multidimensional necessity that confronts the worker remains mute regarding how she will actually perform the task, work activities can therefore promote not just the development of subjective capacities but also the development of creativity. Finally, in his account of ‘living labour’, Dejours makes a startling claim about a feature of work that can be called ‘transcendental’, in the Kantian sense of the term (Deranty, 2010). Authors using phenomenological approaches show that mastering particular skills leads to agents developing more encompassing and discriminating forms of perception and attention, which secure access to particular ‘niches’ within the world and a richer engagement with it (Zoller, 2017, for a recent statement). Such arguments apply even more if skilful action is placed within the frame of social reproduction. Then, the constraints attached to work are impossible for the subject to ignore. Yet, as current cognitive psychology documents at length, the human mind is particularly adept at misrepresenting reality, projecting its wishes and fears into external objects, ignoring important features of the real world, only confirming what it already knows and so on. The constraining aspects of work, which impose themselves to a subject who has to act within the framework they define, can constitute a kind of ‘reality principle’. Skilful action under such constraints has all the more chances of taking reality as it is, rather than as it wishes it to be. This dimension of work was already signalled by Marie Jahoda in her studies of the psychological impact of unemployment, which she termed a ‘tie to reality’ (1981, p. 189). Dejours concludes that true knowledge is best achieved through work (2006). This not just applies to scientific work (Borg, 2019) but can be understood even in a general sense. There are thus several ways in which work provides goods, which arise specifically from the peculiar structure of work activities. The problem with advocating a ‘post-work society’ is that one risks overlooking them. In fact, post-work theorists often acknowledge some of these goods. In many post-work writings, there often comes a moment when, after the critical parts, the irreplaceable role of work is more or less acknowledged, including for the goods it entails (quite strikingly in Livingstone, 2016, pp. 96–103; typically in Gorz, 1999, p. 99; 2018, pp. 130–131). A few post-work theorists, such as Weeks, Chamberlain or Bastani, acknowledge that work has benefits, but they prefer to emphasise other ways to be, and be active, in the world. In these cases, it seems the goods work entails disappear. At this point, we might ponder what would become of human subjects and society if they no longer had to work in the ‘poietic’ sense studied in this section. That society, one might fear, would be one whose members would unlearn a lot. They would lose the anchor point that ties them to reality. Indeed, they might well start to indulge in ravings that would most likely be not so benevolent, if past and present history are anything to go by. It would be a society in which we would get very bored, as we would have to come up with meaningful activities that would need to be supported solely by our own self-motivation. The social goods of working Defined as purposeful contribution to social reproduction, work also entails social goods that are characteristic of it. One obvious good of this kind is the social recognition one receives through participation in social reproduction. This aspect has been studied by many philosophers, in particular Axel Honneth (2012). However, focusing on work as an activity within the framework of social reproduction highlights more particular types of social interaction, which involve specific goods beyond general social recognition.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Work Provides Meaning

Work as work ethic and with the intent of being productive gives meaning and value to life

Morin ‘4 (Estelle, Organization Behaviour Professor at Montreal, August 20, 2004, “The meaning of work in modern times” Conference on the 10th World Congress on Human Resources Management)

To the extent that the work organization allows, work can serve as a tonic for personal identity in that it helps boost self-esteem. When an individual does a meaningful work, he actually develops a sense of identity, worth, and dignity. By achieving meaningful results, he actually achieves himself, grows, and even, actualizes his full potential. Somehow, he has an opportunity to become who he is and to contribute to the improvement of his life conditions and of his community. Work becomes problematic when an individual cannot relate to it. Some would say that this experience is «alienation».

When one thinks of work, one often thinks of a job. But work is far more than a job. Although work certainly provides for basic subsistence needs and decent living conditions, this is not its only function. Work is, above all, an activity through which an individual fits into the world, creates new relations, uses his talents, learns and grows develops his identity and a sense of belonging.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Work Provides Meaning

Gainful employment provides individuals with a sense of fulfillment that is adversely affected by lack of work

Smith ’11 (Nicholas Smith, 4-21-2011, Professor of Philosophy, Macquarie University, "A philosopher's view: the benefits and dignity of work," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/a-philosophers-view-the-benefits-and-dignity-of-work-829)

Work is widely seen as activity which is done exclusively for the sake of something else, as worth doing solely as a means to some external end. Of course, gainful employment in a market economy always _is _done for the sake of something else: it is how most people make a living for themselves and their families. Work, as gainful employment, is an instrumental good. It is instrumentally valuable from the individual worker’s point of view because of the income it brings. And from a broader social-economic point of view, it is instrumental in the creation of the common wealth. Now if this were the whole story about the value of work, then those who get an income without working, say by gaining an inheritance, or winning the lottery, or even claiming benefits, would not really be missing out on anything. Indeed, they would be in the enviable position of receiving the benefits of work (income) without having to pay the costs (the effort, the time). But it is clear that the lives of people who do not work are typically lacking in certain goods. Research shows that physical and mental health are adversely affected by lack of work. You are more likely to suffer from obesity and depression, for example, if you are unemployed. This may be linked to another good that work helps to provide: self-esteem. Self-esteem, in the sense of having a perception of the worth of one’s own existence, is bound up with the recognition one receives from others of one’s competences, achievements and contributions. Your family and friends may love you just for who you are, and you may feel entitled to certain basic rights, like a right to basic welfare, just on account of being a person. But the status of being a somebody, as the German philosopher Hegel famously put it, depends in modern societies on the public recognition of skills and achievements, which participation in a suitably regulated labour market is able to secure. This brings us to another good that work can help to realise: the sense of being connected to something larger than oneself. By participating in the division of labour, the French sociologist Durkheim observed, individuals can come to a livelier appreciation of their dependence on others and the need for cooperation. And day-to-day practice in the activity of cooperative problem-solving, the American philosopher John Dewey persuasively argued, provides vital training for the citizens of a healthy democracy. Health, the exercise and development of skills and capacities, self-esteem based on the recognition of one’s achievements, a sense of social connectedness and exposure to the demands of cooperation are some of the intrinsic goods associated with working life that are imperilled by lack of work. Such goods are not subjective preferences, or expressions of cultural bias, but rationally justifiable ethical objectives that a government can legitimately seek to pursue. But of course these goods are endangered not just by unemployment, but by the way in which work is actually organised. Many jobs are in fact bad for your health, they stunt your capacities, they damage your self-esteem, leave you feeling isolated, and seem systematically designed to prevent you from cooperating with anyone. So if the “new culture of work” called for by the prime minister is to have ethical weight, it needs to involve much more than the provision of more jobs: the _quality _of work has to improve. For the benefits and dignity of work are as much a matter of what one _does _while working, and of the social relations one enjoys or endures there, as they are of the economic power it brings.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Work Provides Meaning

Work serves as a personal responsibility and functions as a social contract

Chamberlin 13 (Dr. James Chamberlain is an Associate Professor of Political Science, specializing in political theory, “The Unstable Meaning and Value of Work: An Exploration of the Refusal of Work through the 2011 UK Riots and Public Sector Strikes,” APSA 2013 Annual Meeting Paper American Political Science Association, 8/22/2013, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300892) -MP

According to the various articulations of the ideology of work analyzed in this section, employment not only functions to provide a means of material existence through wages, it encourages individuals to take personal responsibility for their lives, to behave in a moral, law-abiding fashion, and in doing so lays the groundwork for ‘well-regulated liberty.’ Responses to the riots thus lend support to the conclusion that Britain exemplifies a ‘work society,’ in the sense that authors such as Kathi Weeks and André Gorz give that term, since they not only defend work “on grounds of economic necessity and social duty,” but also understand it “as an individual moral practice and collective ethical obligation.”But it is important to note that the invocations of work considered here focus less on its promise of social mobility or self-actualization, as in the industrial and post-industrial work ethics that Weeks identifies, and more on its general social benefits. 43 In this respect, the aftermath of the riots provides a glimpse of the construction of work as “fundamental to the basic social contract” and as a “basic obligation of citizenship.”44 Indeed, this formulation helps understand the existential threat posed by the rioters: how can a rabble of undisciplined, unfree and irrational ‘beasts’ be incorporated into the political community when the social contract (like any contract) depends on the freedom and rationality of its parties? 45 Although the riots were not political in the sense of making demands or advancing a cause, 46 it is clear that they nonetheless provoked a collective anxiety about the unraveling of social ties, which, in a ‘work society,’ are to a large extent sustained by employment. It would not be difficult to trace elements of the work ethic in contemporary British society, and it is both a familiar Foucauldian insight, and evident in myriad quotidian practices (from careers counseling to the imposition of rigid deadlines for school assignments), that habits, routines, desires, and hopes adequate to work require continuous inculcation. 47 By contrast, if Weeks is right that the “social role of waged work has been so naturalized as to seem necessary and inevitable,”48 then we should understand the articulation of the ideology of work as fundamental to society in the aftermath of the riots as an event of singular importance.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Work Inevitable

The necessity of social reproduction makes work human nature – the best we can do is reform.

Deranty 21

Jean-Philippe Deranty is an associate professor of philosophy at Macquarie University; April 27, 2021; Post-work society as an oxymoron: Why we cannot, and should not, wish work away; ; //[TMS—GK]

The world of work today is rife with problems, including the threats to many jobs from automation, rising levels of working poverty, increasingly precarious employment conditions, new forms of control and surveillance, the invasion of private life by work demands and a heightened sense of meaninglessness in professional life. For a number of social and political theorists, these issues demonstrate that the modern work ethic has become obsolete and that it is time to move to a different, ‘post-work’ model of social organisation, one where work is no longer central. This article presents an alternative response to the worrying situation of work and employment. Rather than moving to a ‘post-work’ society, the article argues that we should instead reform the world of work, precisely by keeping in view why working is important to individuals and the community. We might want to reject the current work ethic but still hold on to some ‘ethic of work’, that is, continue to believe in and seek to realise the goods that work can bring. This argument is based on the premise that it is in fact not realistic to believe that human societies could ever do without work. Because human societies are by necessity work societies, and work, if organised correctly, entails many goods, we cannot really, and we should not, wish work away. The first section presents the arguments of ‘post-work’ theorists, emphasising that, rather than a rejection of work per se, what many of them advocate is a rejection of the modern ‘ideology of work’. The second section presents a basic conception of work and society on which the article’s other claims are based. Human society can be viewed as the outcome of all the individual and collective actions enabling individual lives and their community to be maintained and cared for. From this point of view, work denotes more specifically those activities that purposefully aim to fulfil needs, and thereby contribute to the reproduction of individual and social life. These activities are not restricted to those that attract a wage or are framed by a formal work contract. The first implication of such a view is that all human societies are work societies, in the basic sense that all societies rely upon their members to sustain their lives, and that of the collective, over time. Secondly, this perspective helps to outline specific features of working activities, what distinguishes them from other activities, and the specific goods they entail as a result. Section three focuses on the goods entailed in work activities for the individual engaged in them. The point in highlighting these different goods is that they seem very significant, if not essential, to a fully human life, and they would be difficult to access through other forms of activity. Section four performs the same kind of analysis in relation to the goods that are harboured in social relations of work. Once again, the aim in this section is to highlight goods that would be difficult to access through other social relations. Problems with the ‘work society’ As Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka point out (2019, p. 207), the true target for ‘post-work society’ thinkers is not the activity of ‘work’ but rather the ‘work society’. The following passage from Kathi Weeks’ The problem with work sums up nicely what is meant by that: the refusal of work is not in fact a rejection of activity and creativity in general or of production in particular. It is not a renunciation of labor tout court, but rather a refusal of the ideology of work as highest calling and moral duty, a refusal of work as the necessary center of social life and means of access to the rights and claims of citizenship, and a refusal of the necessity of capitalist control of production. (2011, p. 99) Work here means specifically waged work, work that is performed to make money, by producing outputs for the profit that can be extracted from them, from which wages are granted to workers. For a whole strand of post-work theory inspired by Marx, notably the ‘autonomist’ tradition that Weeks draws on, the ‘refusal of work’ is justified by the fact that work in its present sense is supposed to reduce all aspects of individual and collective life to functional factors in production for capital (Negri, 1991; Virno & Hardt, 1996). At issue then is the undue privilege granted to a narrow understanding of work, the modern ‘ideology of work’. As a result, the main argumentative strategies of post-work theorists take the form of an ‘ideology critique’, which operates in several ways. First, post-work theorists highlight the enormous gap between the ideal of work that is supposed to provide the economic and social goods listed by Weeks, as opposed to the reality of contemporary work. Critics note that many jobs today are ‘bullshit jobs’ (Graeber, 2018), involving activities that have no real social usefulness or meaning for the individuals performing them. They note that many jobs in fact produce deleterious outputs, to the self, to others, to society and to the environment, either directly (Cholbi, 2018b; see Frayne’s ‘working pains’ in 2015, pp. 46–66) or more generally because the work ethic is tied to a productivist mindset that ignores its devastating consequences (Gorz, 2018). Indeed, working implies costs and burdens that are often not taken into account (Cholbi, 2018a). Having a job today in no way ensures that an individual is able to sustain their material well-being, both because wages are under continuous downward pressure and full-time employment in well-paid occupations tends to become the exception rather than the norm (Gorz, 1980, p. 3; 1989, pp. 5–8; Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 67). Post-work theorists also berate the content of the modern ideology of work. Making work the main vector of social inclusion is inherently unjust, as it excludes all those individuals who are not well integrated in the labour market. It excludes those whose jobs have been made redundant by automation. Some people are marginalised because the labour market is inherently unwelcoming, typically if they have a disability (Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2019, p. 220). And the work society unfairly discriminates against those who do not share the work ethic (Van Parijs, 1995). In all these cases, the emphasis on work as the foundation of personal identity and social bonds overlooks the model’s exclusionary dimensions. Chamberlain (2018, pp. 109–123) identifies this problem even in some post-work theorists like Gorz, who continue to make social inclusion and political participation dependent on work contributions. A direct implication of the ideology of work is the demonisation of populations who for some reason cannot or do not want to be part of the work model, the so-called ‘shirkers’ and ‘skivers’ (Coote & Lyall, 2013; Frayne, 2015, p. 154). But if full employment has become an unattainable goal, the denunciations of these populations seem perverse. Such criticisms can be included in broader modalities of an ‘ideology critique’ of work centrality framed as critiques of capitalism. One feature of such models, which can cite Marx as a key reference (Marx, 1991, pp. 958–959), highlights the contradiction inherent in making work a vector of personal and collective goods, since by its very nature it is an instrumental activity. As such, work cannot and should not dictate the definition of higher ends, and it is unable to carry disinterested forms of interaction or promote self-realisation (Frayne, 2015, p. 64; Gorz, 1980, pp. 92–10; Livingstone, 2016, chapter 3). Modern work is also heteronomous because activities are increasingly standardised, mobilise technologies, notably powerful digital processes and increasingly autonomous machines, over which the workers have no insight or control (Srnicek & Williams, 2015). Modern work is also heteronomous because workers have little to no decisional power over any aspect of their own activity. More simply, workers are under the orders of those who rent out their labour-power. The structural lopsidedness of making an instrumental action the chosen medium of autonomy manifests itself in the perverse economic logic whereby production drives consumption (Gorz, 1989, p. 114), and false needs are constantly fabricated to keep the economic machine going (Gorz, 1989; Srnicek & Williams, 2015, pp. 116–117). In this more encompassing critique of the work ethic, the cultural representations making up the ideology of work are a key target (Beder, 2001), in direct reference to Weber’s analysis of the ‘spirit of capitalism’. At issue are discourses that continue to propound the old, religiously infused denunciations of idleness, and the moralistic injunction to be active and productive, as though individuals still had to redeem a debt to God or society through punishing labour (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p. 82). Finally, the centrality of work is a problematic ideological construct because it represses other conceptions of individual and social life, in which self-realisation, solidary social bonds and full citizenship could be achieved through alternative ways of being in the world (Weeks, 2011), through truly autonomous activity, leisure (Hunnicutt, 2013), play (Bastani, 2020), even idleness (O’Connor, 2018) and embracing ‘the right to be lazy’ (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, pp. 81–83). These criticisms of the centrality of work seem plausible because the pathologies of contemporary work they highlight are very real. However, if the problem with work is the gap between its reality and the ideal, is the ideal the problem or the way in which work is organised currently, such that it falls short of the ideal? Post-work critics acknowledge that many people spontaneously articulate deep-seated expectations towards the goods of work. They treat these statements with suspicion, as remnants of an obsolete industrialist mindset and the unconscious manifestation of ‘adaptive preferences’ (Cholbi, 2018a). Isn’t another interpretation possible? We could trust people when they contrast the negative experience they have of their current work against the expectations towards better work. If another problem with the work society is that exclusion is built into it, is the conclusion necessarily that we should move to a model of community no longer centred on work? Couldn’t it be that inclusion through work could be extended, by recognising forms of socially useful work that are not sufficiently acknowledged yet, by opening up the labour market to all, indeed, as Gorz proposed, by making means of production more easily available to everyone? If the problem with work is that it is inherently tied to capitalism, is moving beyond work the best or the only response? Isn’t another response that we should transform current social and economic practices so that work is no longer a vector of domination and exploitation? On the basis of the same empirical evidence, different conclusions can thus be drawn than that we should move to a ‘post work society’. It could be the case that we should reject the capitalist work ethic and the way in which the current organisation of the economy mobilises it, without rejecting all ethics of work. The next sections present an alternative response to the problems with work highlighted by post-work theorists. The work of social reproduction The perspective from which work and a form of ‘work society’ will be defended here is captured in the notion of ‘social reproduction’. By social reproduction is meant the myriad activities, which enable individual lives and collective life to be maintained. This notion of social reproduction is a standard one in contemporary philosophy. For Rawls, for instance, it is tied to his view of society as ‘cooperative scheme’ (1996, p. 18): society is…a more or less complete and self-sufficient scheme of cooperation, making room within itself for all the necessities and activities of life, from birth until death…It produces and reproduces itself and its institutions and culture over generations and there is no time at which it is expected to wind up its affairs. Donaldson and Kymlicka similarly argue that cooperation should be understood as ‘reproduction of our shared social world and natural environment’ (2019, p. 221). Social reproduction is also a central notion in Marxist (Marx, 1990, pp. 711–724) and post-Marxist scholarship, notably in materialist feminism (Bhatthacharya, 2017; Fraser, 2014; Fraser & Jaeggi, 2018; Hennessey & Ingraham, 1997). In Marx, it designates the processes by which the lives of workers are created and maintained so that labour-power remains available for capitalist exploitation. Already in his analyses, many areas of individual and social life are implicitly included beyond the immediate consumption of active workers. In order to ‘reproduce muscles, nerves, bones and brains of existing workers, and to bring new workers into existence’ (Marx, 1990, p. 717), all kinds of social and cultural institutions and practices are in fact required. Feminist scholars use this expanded sense of reproduction to emphasise the many forms of work performed by women in the background of capitalist production, as one of its structural conditions. As they do this, they generalise the view of society as the outcome of acts of reproduction. What the Marxian and feminist takes on ‘social reproduction’ add to the sense it has in post-Rawlsian political philosophy, is an emphasis on the diversity and concreteness of the activities that are involved in it, beyond the focus on the rights and duties that arise from participation in the general scheme. Observing society from the point of view of the activities that ensure its reproduction helps to specify the meaning of work in a way that is enlightening for post-work debates. Social life is reproduced daily in all sorts of ways. Many of the activities contributing to social reproduction do so without individuals seeking to achieve such an aim. Simply speaking my language helps to ensure my linguistic community continues to exist. Celebrating collective memories, recounting shared stories, reproduces the past between friends and family and the past of the community at large. It helps to keep knowledges, values, norms alive. By simply living their lives in all their dimensions, individuals de facto reproduce all the features of their lifeworlds. Donaldson and Kymlicka emphasise how vast is this array of practices that are necessary for individual and social life to be maintained (2019, p. 217). They do so notably in reference to theorists of universal basic income who highlight all the ‘passive contributions’ that individuals make in simply living their everyday lives. Noting the great variety of such contributions and the fact that many of them are not the result of intentional activity is important for these theorists as it shifts the meaning of cooperation away from the exchange of work outputs and thereby severs the link between guaranteed income and work contribution. Precisely this distinction, however, between intentional and non-intentional contributions to social reproduction, helps to identify the specificity and value of work activities. As a matter of fact, there are activities that contribute to the reproduction of life in a purposeful manner. They specifically aim at producing some useful outcome, making something or doing something that is needed by someone in some way, or that helps along some socially significant process, an economic or technological or administrative one (see Cholbi, 2018b, for a definition of work along those lines). These activities can be called work. In explicitly seeking to produce such outcomes, these activities knowingly help in the reproduction of life under a specific aspect. They do so, even if the main motivation of the individual is self-focused, for instance earning an income. And in the case of a ‘bullshit job’, the whole reason a job can be experienced as ‘bullshit’ is precisely that it is supposed to be making a real contribution when in fact the worker knows it does not. If we take seriously the idea that human society operates as a cooperative scheme that ensures its own reproduction and that of its members, then it is unrealistic and misguided to advocate for ‘post-work’ societies. As a matter of fact, as anthropological (Godelier, 2007; Spittler, 2016) and historical scholarship (Komlosy, 2018) highlights, human societies to date have been work societies in the sense in which the term has just been defined, and there is no reason to believe things will be different in the foreseeable future. By work society is meant simply a society in which a large part of social reproduction is ensured by work activities. Even if robots and automated systems destroy many existing industrial and service jobs, human society will still need to be reproduced through activities, many of which can only be completed by humans for the purpose of social, human reproduction. This includes activities of care, but also the activities involved in the material, affective and symbolic reproduction of both individual and collective life. Robots and automated processes might well be included in all kinds of reproductive activities. But we will not want robots and automated processes to replace human agents in delivering all the outcomes needed for social reproduction. Beyond debates on the future of employment, which are far from settled (Nieswandt, 2021), even if new technologies make some forms of human work redundant, human societies will remain work societies, if by work is meant the activities human beings purposely engage in to sustain their own and their peers’ lives, within the frame of collective organisation. A society where all the work as it is defined here would be performed by machines would hand over what allows it to remain a human collective entirely to non-human processes. Such a society would be entirely dystopian. Even if we agree with post-work theorists about many of the problems with contemporary work, it is still important to emphasise the role played by work activities in individual and social life, as it is to those activities that we owe their reproduction. A second set of reasons for rejecting a post-work position relates to the goods attached to work as defined here. By underplaying the role of work in reproducing society, post-work society scenarios lose sight of these goods. In the next section, I highlight goods that specifically derive from working for individuals as they come into view from the perspective of social reproduction, that is, as highly specific types of human activity. This activity-centred perspective enables us to complement existing arguments characterising the goods of work, as Gheaus and Herzog (2016) have done thoroughly in relation to work in formal employment. There is a substantial body of scholarship showing that work can be a vector of autonomy (Breen, 2019; Roessler, 2012; Schwartz, 1982), self-realisation (Elster, 1986), meaningfulness (Veltman, 2016; Yeoman, 2014) and self-esteem (Honneth, 1995, 2012). Focusing on work as a special kind of activity provides further arguments demonstrating why we should hold on to it, for what it brings to human lives.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › K of K Affs › Cognitive Cap

The social brain of debate is overwhelmed with work – the imperative to labor in our thought is a virus that latches onto the field of desire and breaks down our sense of social reality –the pathos of productivity suppresses the cognitive dissonance of debate’s frantic need to do something – refuse the teleological speed of cognitive capitalism

Smith 9 (Jason, preface to Bifo’s The Soul at Work: From Alienation to Autonomy, [CL])

The soul is the clinamen of the body. It is how it falls, and what makes it fall in with other bodies. The soul is its gravity. This tendency for certain bodies to fall in with others is what constitutes a world. The materialist tradition represented by Epicurus and Lucretius proposed a worldless time in which bodies rain down through the plumbless void, straight down and side-by-side, until a sudden, unpredictable deviation or swerve-clinamen-leans bodies toward one another, so that they come together in a lasting way The soul does not lie beneath the skin. It is the angle of this swerve and what then holds these bodies together. It spaces bodies, rather than hiding within them; it is among them, their consistency the affinity they have for one another. It is what they share in common: neither a form, nor some thing, but a rhythm, a certain way of vibrating, a resonance. Frequency, tuning or tone. To speak of a soul at work is to move the center of gravity in contemporary debates about cognitive capitalism. The soul is not simply the capacity for abstraction, for the subsumption of the particular. It is an aesthetic organ as well, the exposure of thought to the contractions and dilations of space, to the quickening and lapsing of time. To say the soul is put to work is to affirm that the social brain or general intellect (to use two of Marx's, phrases that have some currency in these debates) is not the primary source of value in the production process. Rather the soul as a web of attachments and tastes, attractions and* inclinations. The soul is not simply the seat of intellectual operations, but the affective and libidinal forces that weave together a world: attentiveness, the ability to address, care for and appeal to others. The contemporary subject of cognitive capitalism-Bifo speaks of the cognitariat, but perhaps there are other names-is not simply a producer of knowledge and a manager of symbols. Capitalism is the mobilization of a pathos and the organization of a mood; its subject, a field of desire, a point of inflexion for an impersonal affect that circulates like a rumor. The cognitariat carries a virus. The Soul at Work calls itself an experiment in "psychopathology," and it describes how something in the collective soul has seized up. The world has become heavy, thick, opaque, intransigent. A little, dark light shines through, though. Something opens up with this extinction of the possible. We no longer feel compelled to act, that is, to be effective. Our passivity almost seems like a release, a refusal, a de-activation of a system of possibles that are not ours. The possible is seen for what it is: an imposition, smothering with the eclipse of the possible, at the point zero of depressive lapse, we are at times seized by our own potentiality: a potency that, no longer invested in vectors of realization, washes back over us. Depression occurs, Franco "Bifo" Berardi argues, when the speed and complexity of the flows of information overwhelm the capacities of the "social brain" to manage these flows, inducing a panic that concludes, shortly thereafter, with a depressive plunge. Depression is so widespread today, Bifo argues, because the contemporary organization of production of surplus-value is founded on the phenomenon-the accumulation-of speed. In well-known pages from the Grundrisse, Marx spoke of a tendency, a limit point in the process of the valorization of capital: the impossible possibility that capital might circulate "without circulation time," at an infinite velocity, such that the passage from one moment in the circulation of capital to the next would take place at the "speed of thought." Such a capital would return to itself even before taking leave of itself passing through all of its phases in a process encountering no obstacles, in an ideal time without time-in the blinding flash of an instant without duration, a cycle contracting into a point. No less an authority than Bill Gates restages this fantasy-a limit point of capital, toward which it strains, its vanishing point-in his Business @ the Speed of Thought, cited by Bifo as a contemporary formalization of this threshold, summoning the possibility of the circulation of information that would, Gates fantasizes, occur as "quickly and naturally as thought in a human being." There is speed and there is speed. It is not simply the phenomenon of speed as such that plays the pathogenic role here. The social factory is just as much governed by the destabilizing experience of changes in rhythms, differences in speeds, whiplash-like reorientations imposed on a workforce that is flexible, precarious and permanently on-call-and equipped with the latest iPhone. This organization of work, in which just-in-time production is overseen by a permanently temporary labor force, is mirrored in the form of governance characteristic of democratic imperialism, sustained as it is by appeals to urgency, permanent mobilization, suspensions of norms: governance by crisis, rule by exception. It is impossible to separate the spheres of the economy and the political these days. In each case, a managed disorder, the administration of chaos. The social pacts and productive truces of the old welfare states are gone. Instability is now the order of the day. Disorder, a technique of government. Depression starts to look less like a drying up of desire than a stubborn, if painful, libidinal slowdown or sabotage, a demobilization. The soul on strike. The Soul at Work wants to answer this question: How did we get from the particular forms of workers' struggle in the 1960s, characterized by widespread "estrangement" of workers from the capitalist organization of production, to the situation today, in which work has become the central locus of psychic and emotional investment, even as this new libidinal economy induces an entire range of collective pathologies, from disorders of attention to new forms of dyslexia, from sudden panics to mass depression? How, in other words, have we passed from the social antagonisms of the 1960s and 1970s, when worker power was paradoxically defined by a refusal of work, its autonomy from the capitalist valorization process, and its own forms of organization-its defection from factory discipline-to the experience of the last two decades, where work has become the core of our identity, no longer economically necessary, yet vital to the constitution of the self? In short, from fleeing work to identifying with it? Something happened in 1977. Bifo hangs his story on this mutation. Its the year when refusal of work reaches a fever pitch in the Italian autonomia movement, the year that the logic of antagonism and worker needs-what Mario Tronti called the "antagonistic will" of the proletariat-gives way to a logic of desire, in which social productivity can no longer be accounted for in strictly economic categories, and in which the insurrectionary vectors no longer map onto the old imaginary of social war. The centrality of the category of worker needs in the struggles of the 1960s primarily took two forms. In the sphere of consumption, there was the form of direct democracy known as "political" pricing, in which neighborhoods and entire sections of cities unilaterally reduced the costs of goods and services such as housing, transportation and electricity, on the basis of a collective decision that refused any economic rationality in the determination of prices. At the point of production, the primary lever of antagonism was the wage struggle, in which worker power was exercised in a refusal to link wage levels to productivity, insisting the wage be treated as an "independent variable." The mutation represented by the events of 1977, in which the logic of needs and antagonism gives way to desire and flight, is where The Soul at Work really begins. For what is at stake in its story is the aftermath of this mass defection from factory discipline, this unilateral withdrawal from the social pact drawn up by capital and its partners, the unions and the worker parties, in view of "saving" the Italian economy after the war. It asks: how has the sphere of desire, the field of the imaginary and the affective, whose affirmation as the fundamental field of the political once led to a collective abandonment of the sphere of work, been transformed into the privileged force in the contemporary order of work, the privileged moment in the production of value? Desire braids together emotional, linguistic, cognitive and imaginary energies that affirmed themselves against the regime of work in the 1960s and 1970s, a refusal that is then paradoxically put to work by capital itself. This colonization of the soul and its desire-the entry of the soul itself into the production process- spawns paradoxical effects. It transforms labor-power into what managerial theories call human capital, harnessing and putting to work not an abstract, general force of labor, but the particularity, the unique combination of psychic, cognitive and affective powers I bring to the labor process. Because this contemporary reformatting functions through the incitement of my specific creative and intellectual powers, I experience work as the segment of social life in which I am most free, most capable of realizing my desires: most myself

Robinson 12 (Andrew, political theorist and activist based in the UK, “Jean Baudrillard: Critique of Alienation – Draft 1,” April 14th, 2012,

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › K of K Affs › Academy K

The academy is the new factory – the affirmative positions the plan in relation to knowledge as a tool of transaction that reduces education to commodity-status – their energizing of the rat race of pedagogy is the ultimate form of micro-fascism – prefer impotence

Lewis 11 (Tyson E., Montclair State University, Faculty, “Rethinking the Learning Society: Giorgio Agamben on Studying, Stupidity, and Impotence”, Springer Science+Business Media, 2011, , [CL])

Recently there have been several important critiques of ‘‘learning discourse’’ as well as the ‘‘learning society’’ in educational philosophy (see for instance the collection edited by Masschelein et al.2007). Paradigmatic of this growing suspicion of the rise of learning theory and practice, Bingham and Biesta (2010) argue against what they see as an implicit inequality within the discourse of learning as it is widely conceptualized today. Bingham and Biesta critique the fundamental assumption behind the ubiquitous usage of learning precisely because the learner is constructed in terms of a lack or gap. The authors write, ‘‘The learner is the one who is not yet complete’’ and thus is the one who is perpetually ‘‘not yet knowledgeable, not yet skillful, not yet competent, not yet autonomous and so on’’(Ibid, p. 134). Biesta further argues that the discourse of learning is dangerous because it emphasizes education as an ‘‘economic transaction… in which (a) the learner is the (potential)consumer, the one who has certain ‘needs,’ in which (2) the teacher, the educator, or the educational institution is seen as the provider, that is, the one who is there to meet the needs of the learner, and where (3) education itself becomes a commodity—a ‘thing’—to be provided or delivered by the teacher or educational institution and to be consumed by the learner’’ (2007, p. 20). Importantly, for Biesta, the learner here is a constant consumer who must be provided with services in order to satiate a lack. Thus learning equates education with consumption. If Bingham and Biesta critique the theory of learning for the reproduction of unequal hierarchies between teacher and student, Jan Masschelein provides an equally critical appraisal of the broader phenomenon of ‘‘the learning society.’’ Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, Masschelein argues that within a society driven by capitalist production and consumption, political life has been overcome by the eternal return of laboring life. Masschelein’s thesis thus becomes: ‘‘The discourse of the learning society is at the same time an effect and an instrument of the victory of animal laborans’’(2001, p. 2). Learning becomes an organizing principle for optimizing labor productivity, and in turn the citizen becomes first and foremost a learner within a flexible, knowledge economy that demands constant ‘‘retraining’’ or ‘‘reskilling’’ to fulfill high-tech, informationally rich jobs. With the rise of the learning society, everyone is put under heightened risk, and survival becomes the ultimate imperative. Masschelein writes, ‘‘We can say that in the learning society we live in a situation of permanent threat: threatened in our survival (as species, school, university, scientist, teacher, organization, enterprise, citizen, nation and so on), threatened with exclusion, with no possibility of appeal’’ (Ibid, p. 12). Although approaching the question of learning from different perspectives, it is instructive to compare and contrast Bingham and Biesta’s analysis with Masschelein’s. If, for Biesta, learning is equated with consumption, for Masschelein, learning is equated with survival. Thus the former concerns inclusion through hierarchical partitioning of the relations between student and teacher while the later concerns exclusion according to the logic of a fundamental ban wherein the learner is placed under perpetual threat of exclusion. A second key distinction here is that whereas Bingham and Biesta argue that the learner is perpetually a lack or gap, Masschelein argues the opposite: within the learning society, the learner must be the ‘‘energetic, working, autonomous individual’’ (2001, p. 14)capable of continual adaptation to an unstable economic world where unemployment is always right around the corner. In this sense the learner is not simply a ‘‘not yet’’ consumer(Bingham and Biesta2010) but is more importantly a ‘‘capacity for labour’’ (Masschelein2001, p. 15). In this sense, Masschelein is very similar to Foucault who argued that education is a type of ‘‘social orthopedics’’ that has ceased to punish individuals and instead focuses on ‘‘correcting their potentialities’’ (2000, p. 57) in order to maximize competencies and efficiencies. Rather than being dependent on the teacher as in Bingham and Biesta’s previous model, Masschelein and Simons (2010) describe how potentialities within the learning society are connected to self-directed, self-managing behaviors in a form of ‘‘governmentality of the self.’’ As with Foucault’s description of neoliberalism(2008), Masschelein and Simons describe how life-long learning is part of a ‘‘withdrawal of the state’’ that shifts responsibility for governance to private individuals, thus trans-forming economic, political, or educational problems into individual problems of the ‘‘care for the self.’’ For Foucault, ‘‘educational investments’’ (2008, p. 229) by the neoliberal state transform us into entrepreneurial individuals who can organize our own potentials for maximum economic outputs. The battery of tests which the individual undergoes throughout a lifetime help to identity, classify, train, and actualize their unrealized potential as students, workers, and citizens. In the rest of this article, I will make a modest intervention into our understanding of learning and of the learning society with reference to Giorgio Agamben’s recent critique of neoliberal democracy. For Agamben, what is at stake in neoliberal democracy—and in turn the logic of learning that it embodies—is the question of potentiality in relation to actuality. The major problem with neoliberalism is not that it views the child or the student as a lack but rather that it views the child as an infinite potentiality that can and must be actualized through constant performance testing. Thus what the liberal democratic learning society sacrifices is not equality or potentiality but rather our impotentiality, our ability not to be. As Rene ten Bos argues, within this current environment, ‘‘reflections about work and organization [and I would add education] run the risk of becoming senseless and irrelevant when elements such as form, goal, differentiation, efficiency, or coordination are lacking’’ (2005, p. 26). As an alternative to the discourse and practice of learning within a work culture organized according to means-end logic of organization, I propose we turn to Agamben’s theory of study for a provocative alternative that breaks the correspondence between human activity and teleology. It is his theory of study that enables us to retain our (im)potential, and in turn recognize that our very potentiality to not be is in fact our greatest form of freedom. Thus if the lesson of learning is to become a self-regulating entrepreneur then the lesson of study is to become nothing at all but rather remain within a pure capacity to be or not to be. While building on insights from both Bingham and Biesta as well as Masschelein and Maarten Simons, an emphasis on the complex nature of potentiality will enable me to draw out several significant conclusions concerning learning and its alternatives which these authors have not adequately addressed.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › K of K Affs › Cognitive Labor

The aff breaks down the distinction between social/cognitive and economic labor. The knowledge they produce is introduced into an economy driven by knowledge and mental labor—that inevitably resists, which prevents cognition and affect.

Bifo 2007 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social history of communication at the Accademia di belle Arit in Milan and Founder of A/traverse, “Technology and Knowledge in a Universe of Indetermination,” SubStane #112, Vol 36 no 1, pp. 68-72)

When we talk about the mental nature of the productive process we mean that the functions assigned by governments to the productive processes are subsumed and internalized by them. There is no longer any distinction between processes of social labor and the general governance of society. Of course, there remains the fiction of a political decision, of a political representation, but the actual ability to govern the social processes on the part of the political will can only play an extremely marginal role. It isn't politics (with all its complicated mechanisms of representation, decision, and sanction) that decides on the fundamental questions arising in the spheres of technology and finance or in the creation of an interface connecting technology, finance, society, languages, and the imaginary. Government is integrated into the circulation of information, if we consider information in its fullest sense, as an algorithm of processes that can be activated by techno-social automatisms. Programming, understood as the elaboration of a software able to analyze, simplify, systematize, and mechanize entire sequences of human work, is at the core of government action, if we call government a function of decision and regulation. Within the process of techno-social elaboration, of software development, we see the configuration of alternatives which have completely disappeared from the scene of political representation and of ideology. According to the user interfaces realized by the programmer, technology can function either as an element of control or as an agent of liberation from work. The political problem is entirely absorbed within the activity of the mental worker, and of the programmer in particular. The problem of the alternative, of a different social use of certain activities, can no longer be detached from the very forms of this activity. The person who works in a machine shop, or on the assembly line, has to separate herself from her workplace if she wants to rediscover the conditions for a political transformation, if she wants to upset the political and technological modes of oppression. This is why, during the proto-industrial era, it was necessary to build a political organization external to the factory and to the working knowledge of the worker. But this is no longer the case when work becomes an activity of coordination, invention, understanding, and programming. In the age of mental labor, the problem of organization and of political action can no longer be separated from the one concerning the paradigms of the productive operation. Software programming reveals the close relation between dependent labor and creative activity; in this case, we observe how the mental [End Page 68] work of the programmer acquires a political function of transformation within his very way of operating, and not only a productive function of valorization. The two functions can be distinguished in the sphere of project-oriented consciousness, but they live on the same operational plane. The consequence of the increasingly mental nature of social labor is that politics is replaced by an internalized function of social production and becomes a specific and decisive choice between the alternative uses of a certain knowledge, an invention of interfaces situated between crystallized information and social use, between cognitive architecture and an ecology of communication. Obviously, this doesn't prevent politics from continuing to celebrate its ever more excessive rituals. But these rituals have lost their efficacy; their only consequences are internal to politics itself. But if this is what is happening to politics, what about economics, both as a discipline and as a field defining human activity? Is economics still a science when the determining factors in the economic field are becoming unstable and immaterial, when they seem to elude the quantifying rules which are at the core of economics as a conceptualizing system? Keynes, the post-Keynesians and the neo-classicists alike cast the economy in a model in which a few constants drive the entire machinery. The model we now need would have to see the economy as "ecology," "environment," "configuration," and as composed of several integrative spheres: a "microeconomy" of individuals and firms, especially transnational ones; a "macroeconomy" of national governments; and a world economy. Every earlier economic theory postulated that one such economy totally controls; all others are dependent and "functions." […] But economic reality now is one of three such economies. […]. None totally controls the other three; none is totally controlled by the others. Yet none is fully independent from the others, either. Such complexity can barely be described. It cannot be analyzed since it allows of no prediction. To give us a functioning economic theory, we thus need a new synthesis that simplifies – but so far there is no sign of it. And if no such synthesis emerges, we might be at the end of economic theory.25 Economics became a science when, with the expansion of capitalism, rules were established as general principles for productive activity and exchange. But if we want these rules to function we must be able to quantify the basic productive act. The time-atom described by Marx is the keystone of modern economics. The ability to quantify the time necessary for the production of a commodity makes possible the regulation of the entire set of economic relations. But when the main element in the global productive cycle is the unforeseeable work of the mind, the unforeseeable work of language, when self-reproducing [End Page 69] information becomes the universal commodity, it is no longer possible to reduce the totality of exchanges and relations to an economic rule. In any system as complex as the economy of a developed country, the statistically insignificant events, the events at the margin, are likely to be the decisive events, short range at least. By definition they can neither be anticipated nor prevented. Indeed, they cannot always be identified even after they have had their impact.26 Economic science doesn't seem able to understand the current transition because it is founded on a quantitative and mechanistic paradigm that could comprehend and regulate industrial production, the physical manipulation of mechanical matter, but is unable to explain and regulate the process of immaterial production based on an activity that can't easily be reduced to quantitative measurements and the repetition of constants: mental activity. Information and communication technologies are disrupting the social and economical mechanisms of the developed countries. The current indicators of traditional macroeconomics are becoming obsolete and of little significance; moreover, the place and function of economics itself as we still see it are put into question. The phenomenon of growth without job creation devalues a whole series of concepts. This is how even the concept of productivity fails to resist the challenge raised by the new realities. With the new technologies, the majority of production costs are determined by research and equipment expenses that actually precede the productive process. Little by little, in digitalized and automated enterprises, production is no longer subjected to the variations concerning the quantity of operational factors. Marginal cost, marginal profits: these bases of neoclassical economic calculations have lost a good part of their meaning. The traditional elements of salary and price calculation are crumbling down.27 Robin's analysis shows that economic categories can't explain the majority of the processes that are truly meaningful in our time, and the reason clearly consists in the fact that mental work is not quantifiable like the work performed by an industrial worker. Therefore, the determination of value – the keystone of classical economy both as a science and as daily economic practice – becomes aleatory and indefinable. In Symbolic Exchange and Death, Baudrillard wrote: The reality principle corresponded to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather than the outdated reality principle. Finalities have disappeared, the models generate us now. […] Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model.28 [End Page 70] With the digitalizing of production, the abstraction of capital makes a qualitative leap. Not only is production an abstract production of value, but the economic indicators are autonomous from the system of production, and are constituted as a synchronic, structural, self-referential, and autonomous system, independent from the real world. The increasingly financial nature of our economy means exactly this. The stock markets are the places where obsessions, psychological expectations, fears, play, and apocalyptic ideologies regulate the game. Realist economies were governed by their goals, the naïve goal of producing use value for the satisfaction of specific needs, or the subtler goal of valorization as the increase of invested capital. Now, instead, it is impossible to explain our economies on the basis of their goals, whether we identify them with the intentions of certain individuals or certain groups or with the goals of an entire society. The economy is governed by a code, not by its goals: Finality is there in advance, inscribed in the code. We can see that nothing has changed – the order of goals has simply ceded its place to a molecular play, as the order of signifieds has yielded to the play of infinitesimal signifiers, reduced to their aleatory commutation.29 The economy therefore appears as a hyper-reality, a simulated, double, and artificial world that cannot be translated in terms of real production. The mental nature of today's economy is not only expressed by the technological transformation of the productive process, but by the global code in charge of interpreting the process constituting our entire world. Consequently, the science of economics can no longer explain the fundamental dynamics governing humanity's productive activities; nor can it explain their crisis. Economics has to be replaced by a global science whose characteristics and field of inquiry are still unknown: a science that would be able to study the processes of formation of Cyberspace, understood as the global network of signs-commodities. In an interview published in 1993 by the Californian magazine Wired, Peter Drucker develops once again the theme of the inadequacy of economic categories associated with the digitalization of productive processes: International economic theory is obsolete. The traditional factors of production – land, labor, and capital – are becoming restraints rather than driving forces. Knowledge is becoming the one critical factor of production. It has two incarnations: knowledge applied to existing processes, services, and products is productivity; knowledge applied to the new is innovation. […] Knowledge has become the central, key resource that knows no geography. It underlies the most significant and unprecedented social phenomenon of this century. [End Page 71] No class in history has ever risen as fast as the blue-collar worker and no class has fallen as fast. All within less than a century.30 Furthermore, Drucker remarks that the concept of intellectual property, which is the juridical concept that was at the basis of classical economy and of the capitalist system, no longer has any meaning in an age when the circulating commodity is information and the market is the info-sphere: We have to rethink the whole concept of intellectual property, which was focused on the printed word. Perhaps within a few decades, the distinction between electronic transmissions and the printed word will have disappeared. The only solution may be a universal licensing system. Where you basically become a subscriber, and where it is taken for granted that everything that is published is reproduced. In other words, if you don't want everybody to know, don't talk about it.31 The system of property regarding the products of intellectual labor no longer works in the age of the reproducibility of information. As a conclusion to these observations on the obsolescence of economics as a generalized interpretive code, I would like to quote André Gorz, who writes in his Métamorphoses du travail: Discipline by means of money is a hetero-regulation that interrupts the communicational infrastructure ensuring the symbolic reproduction of the experiential world. This means that all the activities that transmit or reproduce cultural acquisitions, knowledge, taste, manners, language, mores […], and that allow us to find our bearings in the world as givens, certitudes, values, and self-explanatory norms; all these activities cannot be regulated by money or by the state without causing serious pathologies in our world of experience.32 Money (i.e. economics) and the State (i.e. politics) are no longer able to govern or to discipline the world of production, now that its center is no longer a de-brained force, a uniform and quantifiable time of manual work. That center is now occupied by mind flows, by the ethereal substance of intelligence, which eludes every measurement and cannot be subjected to any rule without inducing enormous pathologies and causing a truly maddening paralysis of cognition and affectivity.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › K of K Affs › Exhaust Debate

Our alternative is to exhaust debate. Instead of seeking to energize debate with political activism and participation, we should choose to exhaust that energy, which disrupts the neoliberal drive to constantly be productive.

Bifo 2011 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social history of communication at the Accademia di belle Arit in Milan and Founder of A/traverse, After the Future, p. 135-139 https://files.libcom.org/files/AfterFuture.pdf)

Time is in the mind. The essential limit to growth is the mental impossibility to extend time (crybertime) beyond a certain point. I think that we are here touching upon a crucial point. The process of recomposition, of conscious and collective subjectivation, finds here a new—paradoxical—path. Modern radical thought has always seen subjectivation as an energetic process: mobilization, social desire and political activism, expression, participation have been the modes of conscious collective subjectivation in the age of the revolutions. But in our age, energy is running out and desire, which has given modern social dynamics their soul, is absorbed in the black hole of virtualization and financial games, as Jean Baudrillard argues in his 1976 book, Symbolic Exchange and Death. In this book, Baudrillard analyzes the hyperrealistic stage of capitalism, and the instauration of the logic of simulation. The end of the spectacle brings with it the collapse of reality into hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another reproductive medium such as advertising or photography. Through reproduction from one medium into another the real becomes volatile, it becomes the allegory of death, but it also draws strength from its own destruction, becoming the real for its own sake, a fetishism of the lost object which is no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denegation and its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal. The reality principle corresponds to a certain stage of the law of value. Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather that the outdated reality principle. We feed on those forms whose finalities have disappeared. No more ideology, only simulacra. We must therefore reconstruct the entire genealogy of the law of value and its simulacra in order to grasp the hegemony and the enchantment of the current system. A structural revolution of value. This genealogy must cover political economy, where it will appear as a second-order simulacrum, just like all those that stake everything on the real: the real of production, the real of signification, whether conscious or unconscious. Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. 'Ihe entire apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger apparatus of the structural law of value, this becoming part of the third order of simulacra. Political economy is thus assured a second life, an eternity, within the confines of an apparatus in which it has lost all its strict determinacy, but maintains an effective presence as a system of reference for simulation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 71-72, 2). Simulation is the new plane of consistency of capitalist growth: financial speculation, for instance, has displaced exploitation from the sphere of material production to the sphere of expectations, desire, and immaterial labor. The simulation process (cyberspace) is proliferating without limits, irradiating signs that go everywhere in the attention market. In semiocapitalist hyperreality, the brain is the market. And the brain is not limitless, the brain cannot expand and accelerate indefinitely. Collective subjectivation (i.e. social recomposition) implies the development of a common language-affection, which must happen in the temporal dimension. The semiocapitalist acceleration of time has destroyed the social possibility of sensitive elaboration of the semioflow The proliferation of simulacra in the infosphere has saturated the space of attention and imagination. Advertising and stimulated hyperexpression ("just do it"), have submitted the energies of the social psyche to permanent mobilization. Exhaustion follows, and exhaustion is the only escape: Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation, and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide. So hostages are taken. On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out, the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the terrorist—the hostage's death for the terrorist's. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. (Baudrillard 1993a: 37). In these impressive pages, Baudrillard outlines the end of the modern dialectics of revolution against power, of the labor movement against capitalist domination, and predicts the advent of a new form of action that will be marked by the sacrificial gift of death (and self-annihilation). After the destruction of the World Trade Center in the most important terrorist act ever, Baudrillard wrote a short text titled 7yie Spirit of Terrorism, in which he goes back to his own predictions and recognizes the emergence of a catastrophic age. When the code becomes the enemy, the only strategy can be catastrophic: all the counterphobic ravings about exorcizing evil: it is because it is there, everywhere, like an obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know that they can count on this unavowable complicity. (Baudrillazd 2003, 6). This goes much further than hatred for the dominant global power by the disinherited and the exploited, those who fell on the wrong side of global order. this malignant desire is in the very heart of those who share this order's benefits. An allergy to all definitive order, to all definitive power is happily universal, and the two towers of the World Trade Center embodied perfectly, in their very double-ness (literally twin-ness), this definitive order: No need, then, for a death drive or a destructive instinct, or even for perverse, unintended effects. Very logically—and inexorably— the increase in the power of power heightens the will to destroy it. And it was party to its own destruction. When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides. It has been said that "Even God cannot declare war on Himself." Well, He can. The West, in position of God (divine omnipotence and absolute moral legitimary) has become suicidal, and declared war on itself. (Baudrillard 2003, 6-7). In Baudrillard's catastrophic vision I see a new way of thinking subjectivity: a reversal of the energetic subjectivation that animates the revolutionary theories of the twentieth century, and the opening of an implosive theory of subversion, based on depression and exhaustion. In the activist view, exhaustion is seen as the inability of the social body to escape the vicious destiny that capitalism has prepared: deactivation of the social energies that once upon a time animated democracy and political struggle. But exhaustion could also become the beginning of a slow movement toward a "wu wei" civilization, based on the withdrawal, and frugal expectations for life and consumption. Radicalism could abandon the mode of activism, and adopt the mode of passivity. A radical passivity would definitely threaten the ethos of relentless productivity that neoliberal politics has imposed. The mother of all the bubbles, the work bubble, would finally deflate. We have been working too much during the last three or four centuries, and outrageously too much during the last thirty years. The current depression could be the beginning of a massive abandonment of competition, consumerist drive, and dependence on work. Actually, if we think of the geopolitical struggle of the first decade of the twenty first century—the struggle between western domination and jihadist Islam—we recognize that the most powerful weapon has been suicide. September 11 was the most impressive act of this suicidal war, but thousands of people have killed themselves in order to destroy American military hegemony. And they've won, forcing the western world into the bunker of paranoid security, defeating the hypertechnological armies of the West both in Iraq, and in Afghanistan. The suicidal implosion has not been confined to the Islamists. Suicide has became a form of political action everywhere. Against neoliberal politics, Indian farmers have killed themselves. Against exploitation, hundreds of workers and employees have killed themselves in the French factories of Peugeot, and in the offices of France Telecom. In Italy, when the 2009 recession destroyed one million jobs, many workers, haunted by the fear of unemployment, climbed on the roofs of the factories, threatening to kill themselves. Is it possible to divert this implosive trend from the direction of death, murder, and suicide, toward a new kind of autonomy, social creativity and of life? I think that it is possible only if we start from exhaustion, if we emphasize the creative side of withdrawal. The exchange between life and money could be abandoned, and exhaustion could give way to a huge wave of withdrawal from the sphere of economic exchange. A new refrain could emerge in that moment and wipe out the law of economic growth. The self-organization of the general intellect could abandon the law of accumulation and growth, and start a new concatenation, where collective intelligence is only subjected to the common good.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › K of K Affs › System Collapsing

The catastrophe is already happening; there is an economic downturn, coupled with a three decades of debt which cannot be paid back. Demand shrinks, jobs are lost, causing spending to decrease , causing a further decrease in demand, and so on ad infinitum. The planet does not have enough resources for a second capitalist boom. Our military-industrial complexes drive for more wars, which only exacerbate and accelerate decline, making misery and war all pervasive. We must withdraw from ideological investment in neoliberal rationality.

Bifo 2009 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social history of communication at the Accademia di belle Arit in Milan and Founder of A/traverse, “How to heal a depression?”)

The ongoing process cannot be defined as a crisis. Crisis means destructuration and restructuration of an organism that is able to maintain its functional structure. I don’t think that we will see any re-adjustment of the capitalist global structure. I think that we have entered a major process of catastrophic morphogenesis. The capitalist paradigm, based on the linkage between revenue and work performance is unable to frame (semiotically and socially) the existing form of the General Intellect. In the 1930s the possibility of a New Deal laid in the availability of physical resources and in the possibility of increasing the demand and consumption. All that is over. The planet is running out of natural resources and the world is heading towards an environmental catastrophe. The present economic downturn and the in oil prices are feeding the depletion and exhaustion of physical resources of the planet. At the same time we cannot foresee any boom in individual consumption, at least in western societies. So it’s nonsensical to expect the end of this crisis, nonsensical to expect a new policy of full employment. No full employment in the future. The crash in the global economy is not only the effect of the end of the financial bubble. It is also and mainly the effect of the burst of the work bubble. We have been working too much during the last five centuries. This is the simple truth. Working so much has implied an abandonment of vital functions of the social environment, has implied a commodification of language, affection, teaching, therapy and self-care. Society does not need more work, more jobs, or more competition. On the contrary, we need a huge cutback in work-time, a huge liberation of life from the social factory, in order to remake the fabric of social relationships. Ending the linkage between work and revenue will make possible a huge release of energy for social tasks that can no longer be conceived as a part of the economy and should create new forms of life. As demand shrinks and factories close people suffer from the lack of money and cannot buy everyday necessities. This is a vicious circle that economists know very well but are completely unable to break because it is the double bind that economy is doomed to feed. The double bind of overproduction cannot be solved by economic means but only by an anthropological shift, by the abandonment of the economic framework of revenue in exchange of work. We simultaneously have an excess of value and a shrinking of demand. A process of redistribution of wealth is urgently needed. The idea that revenue has to be the reward of a performance is a dogma we must absolutely get rid of. Every person has the right to receive the amount of money that is needed for survival. And work has nothing to do with this. Salary is not a natural thing but the product of cultural molding of the social sphere: linking survival and subordination to the process of exploitation was a necessity of the capitalist growth. Now we need to allow people to unfold their knowledge, intelligence, and affect. This is the wealth of today, not compulsive useless labour. Until the majority of mankind are freed from the linkage of revenue and work, misery and war will be the rule of social relationships.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › ALTERNATIVES › Alt – Cynical Distancing

The alternative is role-distancing through the lens of cynicism. This preserves the structures of state and employment, but liberates the spirit from the metaphorical prison forged by the concept of “work.”

Frayne ’15 [David, PhD, a sociologist taking a critical perspective on the future of work and welfare. “The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work”; 2015, Bloomsbury Academic; p. 222-223. https://sabrinasoyer.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/the-refusal-of-work.pdf; JFan]

What other escape routes are available to us? Perhaps one of the more common modes of escape is the one that Goffman called the practice of ‘role-distancing’ (Goffman, 1972). Role-distancing involves an attempt to demonstrate to others that we are dissatisfied and uncomfortable in our role. Goffman gives the example of an older child who clowns around on a merry-go-round, openly flouting the ride’s safety rules in order to show others that, whilst he might be riding the merry-go-round, he is doing so flippantly, having outgrown the childish role of ‘merry-go-round rider’. In the working world, role-distancing might take the form of similarly petty acts of noncompliance: slouching in a team meeting, doing paperwork sloppily or wearing a measured expression of incredulity (as perfected by Martin Freeman’s character Tim in the British version of The Office).

Drawing on their research into modern organisational cultures, Fleming and Spicer discuss the related strategy of cynicism (Fleming and Spicer, 2003). Cynicism is perhaps one of the more common escape strategies in the context of today’s emotionally demanding workplaces. When opportunities to genuinely change the system seem to be beyond us, cynicism represents a last-ditch attempt to create a free space in which we can feel less confined by work demands. As we saw back in Chapter 2, in relation to Catherine Casey’s study of Hephaestus, managerial attempts to engineer identification with work sometimes produce the opposite feeling in the worker (Casey, 1995). Workers try to preserve their individuality with a sense of disbelief, cynically dis-identifying with the work culture. A study by David Collinson records manual workers referring to the push to build a culture of excellence as ‘Yankee propaganda’. The company newsletter became known as the ‘Goebells Gazette’ (Collinson, 1992). These cultures of cynicism can undoubtedly act as important weapons in labour struggles, though they will only be effective if workers are also committed to the idea that an alternative is really possible. Fleming and Spicer argue that, by itself, cynicism can actually represent a very conservative force: