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2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › No VTL

The colonizing power of work ensnares individuals in a relentless cycle of labor. The ostensible free-time never detaches from the essence of work, dehumanizing workers into mere cogs in the labor machine.

Frayne ’15 [David, PhD, a sociologist taking a critical perspective on the future of work and welfare. “The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work”; 2015, Bloomsbury Academic; p. 60-70. https://sabrinasoyer.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/the-refusal-of-work.pdf; JFan]

Economic rationality has no room for authentically free time which neither produces nor consumes commercial wealth.

André Gorz - Critique of Economic Reason (1989: 115)

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Root Cause

The glorification of the work ethic as a cultural value is psychologically destructive exports control and exploitation to every aspect of life

Black 15 (Bob Black is an American anarchist with a degree in sociology from Georgetown. “Instead of Work,” LBC Books. January 1, 2015) @ehatt

The demeaning system of domination I’ve described rules over half the waking hours of a majority of women and the vast majority of men for decades, for most of their lifespans. For certain purposes it’s not too misleading to call our system democracy or capitalism or--better still--industrialism, but its real names are factory fascism and office oligarchy. Anybody who says these people are “free” is lying or stupid. You are what you do. If you do boring, stupid, monotonous work, chances are you’ll end up boring, stupid, and monotonous. Work is a much better explanation for the creeping cretinization all around us than even such significant moronizing mechanisms as television and education. People who are regimented all their lives, handed off to work from school and bracketed by the family in the beginning and the nursing home at the end, are habituated to hierarchy and psychologically enslaved. Their aptitude for autonomy is so atrophied that their fear of freedom is among their few rationally grounded phobias. Their obedience training at work carries over into the families they start, thus reproducing the system in more ways than one, and into politics, culture and everything else. Once you drain the vitality from people at work, they’ll likely submit to hierarchy and expertise in everything. They’re used to it. We are so close to the world of work that we can’t see what it does to us. We have to rely on outside observers from other times or other cultures to appreciate the extremity and the pathology of our present position. There was a time in our own past when the “work ethic” would have been incomprehensible, and perhaps Weber was on to something when he tied its appearance to a religion, Calvinism, which if it emerged today instead of four centuries ago would immediately and appropriately be labeled a cult. Be that as it may, we have only to draw upon the wisdom of antiquity to put work in perspective. The ancients saw work for what it is, and their view prevailed, the Calvinist cranks notwithstanding, until overthrown by industrialism--but not before receiving the endorsement of its prophets. Let’s pretend for a moment that work doesn’t turn people into stultified submissives. Let’s pretend, in defiance of any plausible psychology and the ideology of its boosters, that it has no effect on the formation of character. And let’s pretend that work isn’t as boring and tiring and humiliating as we all know it really is. Even then, work would still make a mockery of all humanistic and democratic aspirations, just because it usurps so much of our time. Socrates said that manual laborers make bad friends and bad citizens because they have no time to fulfill the responsibilities of friendship and citizenship. He was right. Because of work, no matter what we do we keep looking at our watches. The only thing “free” about so-called free time is that it doesn’t cost the boss anything. Free time is mostly devoted to getting ready for work, going to work, returning from work, and recovering from work. Free time is a euphemism for the peculiar way labor as a factor of production not only transports itself at its own expense to and from the workplace but assumes primary responsibility for its own maintenance and repair. Coal and steel don’t do that. Lathes and typewriters don’t do that. But workers do. No wonder Edward G. Robinson in one of his gangster movies exclaimed, “Work is for saps!” Both Plato and Xenophon attribute to Socrates and obviously share with him an awareness of the destructive effects of work on the worker as a citizen and a human being. Herodotus identified contempt for work as an attribute of the classical Greeks at the zenith of their culture. To take only one Roman example, Cicero said that “whoever gives his labor for money sells himself and puts himself in the rank of slaves.” His candor is now rare, but contemporary primitive societies which we are wont to look down upon have provided spokesmen who have enlightened Western anthropologists. The Kapauku of West Irian, according to Leopold Posposil, have a conception of balance in life and accordingly work only every other day, the day of rest designed “to regain the lost power and health.” Our ancestors, even as late as the eighteenth century when they were far along the path to our present predicament, at least were aware of what we have forgotten, the underside of industrialization. Their religious devotion to “St. Monday’s‚” thus establishing a de facto five-day week 150-200 years before its legal consecration---was the despair of the earliest factory owners. They took a long time in submitting to the tyranny of the bell, predecessor of the time clock. In fact it was necessary for a generation or two to replace adult males with women accustomed to obedience and children who could be molded to fit industrial needs. Even the exploited peasants of the ancien regime wrested substantial time back from their landlord’s work. According to Lafargue, a fourth of the French peasants’ calendar was devoted to Sundays and holidays, and Chayanov’s figures from villages in Czarist Russia‚--hardly a progressive society-- likewise show a fourth or fifth of peasants’ days devoted to repose. Controlling for productivity, we are obviously far behind these backward societies. The exploited muzhiks would wonder why any of us are working at all. So should we.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › AT: Work Provide Meaning

Moralizing work bad

Frayne ’11 (David Frayne, Doctor of Philosphy, “Critical Social Theory and the Will to Happiness: A Study of Anti-Work Subjectivities,” Cardiff University. https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/18497/1/2011FrayneDPhD.pdf )

The sociologist, Matthew Cole, whilst recognising the value of research on the experiences of unemployment, warned against the moralising tendency of thinkers who frame paid-work as a primordial source of human well-being and civility (Cole, 2007). In an interesting analysis of the moral biases that underpin the research of Jahoda and colleagues, Cole highlighted the normative status of employment in the imaginations of the researchers. He took issue with Jahoda’s suggestion that a jobless life is ‘undisciplined and empty’ (Jahoda, 1977: 66), disputing the portrayal of the unemployed in ‘animalistic’ contrast to the ‘cultured humanity’ of employed people (Cole, 2007: 1137). In particular, Jahoda et al’s idea that humans have a core psychological need for ‘regular activity’ seems to suggest that stillness and quietude are primitive habits, particularly for men, whose idling outside work puts them at the wrong end of a gender hierarchy (Cole, 2007: 1140). Furthermore, the researchers’ assertion that employment is crucial for ‘status and identity’ places undue bias on what a person does for work, rather than on who they actually are (Cole, 2007: 1140). According to the deprivation model, unemployment represents an injured identity, or an identity in abeyance until the period of ‘doing nothing’ draws to a close and another job is found: Nowhere is the unshakeable faith in the equation of work with the purpose of human life clearer than here, where to be unemployed is to be compromised as a human being – to be identity-less (Cole, 2007: 1411). The deprivation model deems employment essential for a humane existence and, as a consequence, presumes that without paid-work, there exists no moral code around which to orient a day-to-day ethic of living (Cole, 2007: 1138). Cole’s reinterpretation of Marienthal is persuasive, but we must of course credit (as Cole does) Jahoda et al’s good intentions as researchers of unemployment. More 41 dubious, however, are the intentions of those who extol the virtues of employment in a contemporary political context. Right-leaning agendas have a considerable history of representing those who do not or who cannot work as a moral threat and a drain on public resources6 . The Left have been less malevolent, but have nevertheless still approached jobless people as objects for management and rehabilitation. Walker and Fincham suggest that research which supports the positive relationship between employment and human well-being has provided an ideal context for successive administrations to make employment central to their management of public health (Walker and Fincham, 2011: 14). Dame Carol Black’s government review of public health (2008) provides a good example of current thinking, a hallmark of which is a tendency to imagine the relationship between employment and human well-being in terms of the simplistic dichotomy described above (‘employment is good for health, and joblessness is bad’). Black’s White Paper, Healthy Lives, Healthy People, categorically stated that ‘being in work leads to better physical and mental health’ (Department of Health, 2010: 5). Similarly, Theresa May, previous shadow minister for Work and Pensions, suggested that ‘in giving someone a purpose and a routine [employment] can improve health, self-esteem and social inclusion’ (May, 2010). Having a job is seen as essential to people’s usefulness, economic participation and thus their social worth, whilst people without jobs are the focus of moral concern. As a result, increasingly stringent welfare-to-work policies strongly encourage everyone to work if they are classified as capable. This emphasis on employment as a primordial requirement for a civilised and prosperous life has been a mainstay of mainstream British politics in recent history. New Labour arrived in office resolving to ‘rebuild the welfare state around work’ (DSS, 1998: 23), and previously protected groups of welfare claimants, such as lone parents and disabled people, were increasingly expected to seek paid-work (DWP, 2006: 19; Levitas, 2001). The most recent political development at my time of writing is the ConDem Coalition’s ‘big bold plan to get Britain working’ 6 This is a history that continues to be written. At my time of writing, the work and pensions secretary Iain Duncan Smith had recently declared it a ‘sin’ for an unemployed person to refuse work (Wintour, Ramesh and Mullholland, 2010). David Cameron had also depicted benefit claimants as malingerers, ‘sitting on their sofas waiting for their benefits to arrive’ (Conservatives, 2010a: online). There are numerous further examples I could have used. Whilst the official discourse of the Right refers to a reciprocal ‘bargain’ between the government and the responsible jobseeker, momentary slips like these disclose a more hateful philosophy. 42 (Conservatives, 2010: online). Amongst the changes in the government’s new Work Programme are a mandatory Work Capability Assessment for existing Incapacity Benefit claimants (to confirm their eligibility for the renamed, ‘Employment and Support Allowance’), and varying benefit sanctions (including complete benefit withdrawal for periods of up to three years) for those who refuse to accept ‘reasonable’ offers of paid work (Conservatives, 2010a). The government also aim to tackle the bad ‘habit of worklessness’ by enforcing compulsory periods of unpaid work for benefit claimants who cannot find a job (Helm and Asthana, 2010). It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to provide a detailed account of welfare reforms7 , and it is not entirely necessary to do so, since whilst the sanctions for those who do not co-operate in the ‘welfare bargain’ are becoming more stringent, the overall ideological thrust of policy remains constant. As Granter summarises, ‘government policy… continually refers to paid employment as the normatively positive state to which citizens should aspire’ (Granter, 2009: 148). There are some preliminary criticisms of the moralisation of employment – both in sociological research and government policy – that I wish to offer. These will be developed in relation to the findings of the present study. The first major criticism is that those who moralise work often fail to evaluate the psychosocial quality of the actual jobs that are available today; any job is generally considered better than no job (Beder, 2000: 2). ‘The emphasis on getting people into work for their own good is stripped of any notion of what work means, and what forms of work do to people’ (Williams, 2010: 198). The DWP, for example, in defence of workfare reforms, have referred to the benefits of the (singular) ‘work environment’ (cited in Helm and Asthana, 2010), whilst neglecting to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs. Cole also noted the conspicuous absence of any substantive discussion of actual forms of work in the research of Jahoda and colleagues, who took the suffering of the unemployed as evidence that ‘the mirror of unemployment – paid work – is a remedy for those sufferings’ (Cole, 2007: 1135). Such faith in the health benefits of employment clashes with the large body of critical sociological literature on modern 7 For a more comprehensive account of welfare reforms, refer to Grover and Pigott (2007) or Walker and Fincham (2011). 43 forms of work, which has often described work as alienating, insecure or characterised by the subjugation of the worker. A second major criticism of the moralisation of work is that it fails to recognise the legitimacy of forms of social solidarity, work, and social contribution, which do not produce economic value or which sit outside the scope of exchange relations. Such short-sightedness is grasped when one considers the narrowness with which ‘work’ is generally defined. It is specifically ‘paid employment’ that is deemed most worthy of social recognition, and there is scant acknowledgement of the intrinsic value of nonwork activities or the importance of forms of unpaid work, such as voluntary work or domestic labour8 . It is possible that the present research will provide an opportunity to develop these criticisms further. It is interesting that given the espoused psychological benefits of work that here, in the present study, I have recruited (with relative ease) a group of participants who have made a conscious choice to disengage from the world of employment. The research partly consists of an attempt to understand why the participants have resisted employment (when paid-work is generally deemed so significant a part of everyday life) and whether they have been successful at constructing and maintaining a rewarding life outside work. Are there moralities other than the work ethic around which a day-to-day ethic of living may be structured? Furthermore, what sorts of problems arise when a person attempts to resist employment in a culture that attaches moral value to it, and in a social system which does its best to denigrate those who do not feel that they want to, or necessarily can, perform paid-work?

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Workism

The aff is a prophet of workism – they worship productivity and sacrifice meaning at the altar of jobs.

Thompson ’19 (Derek, staff writer at The Atlantic and the author of multiple books and the Work in Progress newsletter, “Workism Is Making Americans Miserable,” FEBRUARY 24, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/religion-workism-making-americans-miserable/583441/)

The decline of traditional faith in America has coincided with an explosion of new atheisms. Some people worship beauty, some worship political identities, and others worship their children. But everybody worships something. And workism is among the most potent of the new religions competing for congregants.

What is workism? It is the belief that work is not only necessary to economic production, but also the centerpiece of one’s identity and life’s purpose; and the belief that any policy to promote human welfare must always encourage more work.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Inequality

The affirmative occludes the work place’s inherent nature of domination and submission which treats workers as slaves.

Weeks ’11 [Kathi, Associate Professor of Women's Studies at Duke University. “The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries.” Duke University Press. p. 20-22; JFan]

Whereas my analysis ignores the difference between work and labor and, in the end, defers the question of the precise relationship between work and class, it presumes the significance of another distinction, the one between freedom and equality. To get a sense of how this pair of concepts is conceived for the purposes of this project, let us return yet again to Marx’s description of what we see when we descend with the owners of money and labor power from the realm of market exchange to the realm of production. To recall our earlier discussion of the passage, accompanying the change of venue is a visible change in the physiognomy of the dramatis personae: we see the money owner stride out in front as capitalist, while the possessor of labor power follows behind as worker. “The one,” Marx continues, “smirks self-importantly and is intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but—a hiding” (1976, 280; translation modified). Whereas we had, as noted above, witnessed the formal equivalence of contractors in the labor market, in the realm of work we discover hierarchy. As the conclusion of the passage suggests, however, it is not only inequality that is revealed, with the capitalist striding in front and the worker following behind, but subordination, with the former smirking and self-important and the latter timid and holding back. In other words, the critical analysis of work reveals not only exploitation but—as the reference to the violence of a hiding serves to amplify—domination.11

The domination and subordination experienced at work is not merely incidental to processes of exploitation. Carole Pateman’s analysis of the employment contract is illuminating on this point. By her account, the problem with the labor contract is not just a function of the coerced entry that is ensured by the absence of viable alternatives to waged labor, nor is it only a matter of the inequality that is produced as the result of the contract’s terms. To translate this into a Marxist vocabulary, the problem can be reduced neither to forced labor nor to exploitation. Rather, we need to pay more attention to the relationship of dominance and submission that is authorized by the waged labor contract and that shapes labor’s exercise. Exploitation is possible, Pateman notes, because “the employment contract creates the capitalist as master; he has the political right to determine how the labour of the worker will be used” (1988, 149). This relation of command and obedience, the right of the employer to direct his or her employees that is granted by the contract, is not so much a byproduct of exploitation as its very precondition.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Wage Labor

Wage labor is an apparatus for social and economic control while failing to provide benefits for the worker and perpetuate the private surplus system.

Weeks ’11 [Kathi, Associate Professor of Women's Studies at Duke University. “The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries.” Duke University Press. p. 19-20; JFan]

Work is, thus, not just an economic practice. Indeed, that every individual is required to work, that most are expected to work for wages or be supported by someone who does, is a social convention and disciplinary apparatus rather than an economic necessity. That every individual must not only do some work but more often a lifetime of work, that individuals must not only work but become workers, is not necessary to the production of social wealth. The fact is that this wealth is collectively not individually produced, despite the persistence of an older economic imaginary that links individual production directly to consumption.5 Indeed, as Postone observes, “on a deep, systemic level, production is not for the sake of consumption” (1996, 184). The relationship may appear direct and incontrovertible, but it is in fact highly mediated: the goal of neither party in the work relation is consumption; one seeks surplus value, and the other income. The normative expectation of waged work as an individual responsibility has more to do with the socially mediating role of work than its strictly productive function (150). Work is the primary means by which individuals are integrated not only into the economic system, but also into social, political, and familial modes of cooperation. That individuals should work is fundamental to the basic social contract; indeed, working is part of what is supposed to transform subjects into the independent individuals of the liberal imaginary, and for that reason, is treated as a basic obligation of citizenship. (The fact that the economy’s health is dependent on a permanent margin of unemployment is only one of the more notorious problems with this convention.) Dreams of individual accomplishment and desires to contribute to the common good become firmly attached to waged work, where they can be hijacked to rather different ends: to produce neither individual riches nor social wealth, but privately appropriated surplus value. The category of the work society is meant to signify not only the centrality of work, but also its broad field of social relevance (see, for example, Beck 2000).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Productivity

Fetishization of productivity and work are exactly what demonizes workers and turns our educational institutions into tools of control

Carmichael ’19 (Patrick Carmichael, Managing Director of Camtree: The Cambridge Teacher Research Exchange. Camtree is creating a global platform for educators who wish to reflect on their practice and conduct research to improve learning in their classrooms and institution, “Refusal of Work, Liberation of Time and the Convivial University”, Education and Technological Unemployment, 30 April 2019, ) //OC

At the same time, there is, as Frayne (2015) describes in his recent book The Refusal of Work, a fetishization of work (what he calls the ‘work dogma’); a contrived collegiality of workplace ‘crews’ and ‘teams’; and a celebration of workaholic behaviours. This is accompanied by a political rhetoric that seeks to demonize the workless and those who choose, or even just seek, to extricate themselves from alienating cycles of work and consumption. In fact, Frayne argues, workers are caught in a ‘double bind’ because the nature of much employment allows them only limited opportunities and time in which to cultivate other interests, skills and social ties on which they might draw if and when they do become unemployed (2015: 110). Those who seek to do so may be identified as ‘thieves’, ‘time bandits’ or ‘parasites’ by their employers (Martin et al. 2010; Brock Baskin et al. 2017). When discussions about the inevitability of automation and associated technological unemployment turn to the implications for education, they tend to stress the need for learners to adaptable, resilient and prepared for lives of precarity. Nübler’s report for the International Labour Organization captures this: The main issue in education and training today is no longer about “what skills should be delivered” but “how to train the labour force” and what institutions are needed to generate the knowledge base and social capabilities that allow the economy to create new jobs in new sectors. (Nübler 2016: 23) This presents challenges for educational institutions, and in particular, newer universities committed to widening participation in higher education. These have been most concerned with improving the employability of their graduates, and have devoted much time and energy to developing key ‘skills for life’ (in the UK, a key recommendation of the Dearing Report of 1997 (National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education 1997: 133). They are encouraged to develop partnerships with stakeholders including employers, government bodies and professional organizations, and to link the education and training they offer to employer needs in order to address ‘skills imbalances’ (Cole and Tibby 2013; OECD 2016) and to become ‘demand-driven’: a recent report from Pearson suggesting that their priority should be to offer courses that focus on ‘ensuring graduates are job-ready’ and that they ‘respond to signals from society to ensure alignment between desired qualifications and available training’ (Deegan and Martin 2018: 7). Responses from higher education institutions often involve the deployment of digital technologies which themselves employ increasing levels of automation, and which focus on training needs and the demonstration of graduate attributes, at the expense of pedagogical practices and social interaction. Peters et al., point to these phenomena as being aspects of: … a cultural shift where we are all implicated in a use of language about education, technology and employment, that effectively edits out references to the real human labour that is required to address social issues. (Peters et al. 2019: 244)

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Economic Rationality

The workplace presupposes a neoliberal form of subjectivity that is superimposed upon the world in order to justify mass violence and homogenization. This also makes transition wars and economic collapse inevitable as it fails to understand how the crucial problem of today is one of symbolic exchange. Against this, we should withdraw from necroeconomics.

Bifo 2011 (Franco Berardi, Professor of Social history of communication at the Accademia di belle Arit in Milan and Founder of A/traverse, After the Future, p. 141-147)

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. The lead article in The Economist of July 18, 2009, was: "What went wrong with economics?" The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of economic knowledge and the profession of economics. For neoliberal economists, the central dogma of growth, profit, and competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect mathematical rationality of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It's a political strategy aimed at identifying humans as calculating machines, at shaping behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation for social action. But it's not an accurate description of social dynamics, the conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. It's an attempt to create the anthropological form of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his 1979/80 seminar, The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to see human beings as calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and has finally shown itself to be based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their calculation isn't perfectly rational, because the value of goods is not determined by objective reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes called "animal spirits:' In their book of the same name, Akerlof and Shiller (2009, 1) note, "We will never really understand important economic events unless we confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature," echoing Keynes's assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof and Shiner are acknowledging the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is not radical enough, and does not touch the legitimary of the economic episteme. Animal Spirits is also the title of a book by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008). Pasquinelli deals with bodies, numbers, and parasites, and goes much deeper in his understanding of the roots of the crisis than Akerlof and Shiner: "Cognitive capitalism emerges later in the form of a pazasite: it subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential" (93). "Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly devouring their everyday life" (15). Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social production has caused the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of financial craziness, but also the effect of the devitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of an economic epistemology that has guided politics for the last two centuries. Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of symbolic exchange. I mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire and social empathy. The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that its answer cannot be found in an economic conceptual framework. Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word "science" means the creation of concepts in order to understand and describe an object, economics is not a science. Its object does not exist. The objects of economics (scarcity, wage labor, and profit) do not exist before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme. Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic description is in fact normative. In this sense, economics is a technique, a semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value, bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity, demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance.... Thus economics shares the language of psychopathology—inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Bordello 1983). From the age of the enclosures in England, the economic process has been a process that produces scarcity (scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, the basic means of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to become proletarians, then waged industrial workers. Capitalism is based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique of scarcification of time, life, and food. Under conditions of scarcity, human beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who don't have property beyond their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth is making both water and air scarce. Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and exacerbating scarcity and need. This is why Maw did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies wealth as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to the lending of time and the transformation of human activity into wage labor. In recent decades, technological change has slowly eroded the very foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of economics are becoming totally artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as one can read in the writings of John Locke, is based on the need for exclusive consumption. An apple must be privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else might eat your apple. But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost? Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of private property loses its ground, its raison d'etre, and it can be imposed only by force. Furthermore, the very foundation of wages, the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able to determine price and wage. The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a self-regulated market, primarily the labor market. But self-regulation is a lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated. The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the basis of perfect knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect, rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because irrational factors play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. The idea that social relationships can be described in mathematical terms has the force of myth, but it is not science, and it has nothing to do with natural law. Notwithstanding the failure of the theory, neoliberal politics are still in control of the global machine, because the criminal class that has seized power has no intention of stepping down, and because the social brain is unable to recompose and find the way to self-organization. I read in the New York Times on September 6, 2009: After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may have found one. 'The bankers plan to buy "life settlements," life insurance policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash—$400,000 fora $1 million polity, say, depending on the life expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to "securitize" these policies, in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds or thousands together into bonds. They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. The earlier the policyholder dies, the bigger the return—though if people live longer than expected, investors could get poor returns or even lose money. Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would absolutely not do). My insurer, of course, will wish me a long life, so I'll pay the premiums for a long time, rather than him paying lots of money to my family if I die. But some enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the insurer. He buys the risk, and he invests in the hope that I die soon. You don't need the imagination of Philip K. Dick to guess how the story ends: financial agents will be motivated to kill me overnight. The talk of recovery is based on necronomy, the economy of death. It's not new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters, and genocides. But now the equation becomes unequivocal. Death is the promise, death is the investment and the hope. Death is the best future that capitalism may secure. The logic of speculation is different from the logic of spectacle that was dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle is the mirrorization of life, the transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation. Speculation is the subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of present life with future money that will never come, because death will come first. The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial high rollers will not stop their speculation, corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to protect society from the final assault. In 1996 J. G. Ballard (188) wrote: "the most perfect crime of all—when the victims are either willing, or aren't aware that they are victims." Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because the decisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The economy has been declared the basic standard around which decisions are made, and the economists have systematically identified the economy with the capitalist obsession of growth. No room for political choice is left, as corporate principles have become embedded in the technical fabric of language and imagination.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › *L – Jobs

Modern work is unsustainable and irredeemable – it just produces social and economic hierarchies. In this way, “guaranteed jobs” means guaranteed enslavement.

Black ‘16 Bob Black is an American anarchist. Bob Black graduated from the University of Michigan and Georgetown Law School. He holds two post graduate degrees–one in jurisprudence and social policy from the University of California, Berkeley and the second in Criminal justice from University Of New York, Albany.; 2016; Instead of Work; pg. 20-31. //[TMS—GK]

Bad news for liberals: regulatory tinkering is useless in this life-and-death context. The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration was designed to police the core part of the problem, workplace safety. Even before Reagan and the Supreme Court stifled it, OSHA was a farce. At previous and (by current standards) generous Carter-era funding levels, a workplace could expect a random visit from an OSHA inspector once every 46 years. State control of the economy is no solution. Work is, if anything, more dangerous in the state socialist countries than it is here. Thousands of Russian workers were killed or injured building the Moscow subway. Stories reverberate about covered-up Soviet nuclear disasters which make Times Beach and Three-Mile Island look like elementary-school air-raid drills. On the other hand, deregulation, currently fashionable, won't help and will probably hurt. From a health and safety standpoint, among others, work was at its worst in the days when the economy most closely approximated laissez-faire. Historians like Eugene Genovese have argued persuasively that-as antebellum slavery apologists insisted-factory wage-workers in the Northern American states and in Europe were worse off than Southern plantation slaves. No rearrangement of relations among bureaucrats and businessmen seems to make much difference at the point of production. Serious enforcement of even the rather vague standards enforceable in theory by OSHA would probably bring the economy to a standstill. The enforcers apparently appreciate this, since they don't even try to crack down on most malefactors. What I've said so far ought not to be controversial. Many workers are fed up with work. There are high and rising rates of absenteeism, turnover, employee theft and sabotage, wildcat strikes, and overall goldbricking on the job. There may be some movement toward a conscious and not just visceral rejection of work. And yet the prevalent feeling, universal among bosses and their agents and also widespread among workers themselves is that work itself is inevitable and necessary. I disagree. It is now possible to abolish work and replace it, insofar as it serves useful purposes, with a multitude of new kinds of free activities. To abolish work requires going at it from two directions, quantitative and qualitative. On the one hand, on the quantitative side, we have to cut down massively on the amount of work being done. At present most work is useless or worse and we should simply get rid of it. On the other hand-and I think this is the crux of the matter and the revolutionary new departure-­ we have to take what useful work remains and transform it into a pleasing variety of game-like and craft-like pastimes, indistinguishable from other pleasurable pastimes, except that they happen to yield useful end-products. Surely that shouldn't make them less enticing to do. Then all the artificial barriers of power and property could come down. Creation could become recreation. And we could all stop being afraid of each other. I don't suggest that most work is salvageable in this way. But then most work isn't worth trying to save. Only a small and diminishing fraction of work serves any useful purpose independent of the defense and reproduction of the work-system and its political and legal appendages. Twenty years ago, Paul and Percival Goodman estimated that just five percent of the work then being done-­ presumably the figure, if accurate, is lower now would satisfy our minimal needs for food, clothing, and shelter. Theirs was only an educated guess but the main point is quite clear: directly or indirectly, most work serves the unproductive purposes of commerce or social control. Right off the bat we can liberate tens of millions of salesmen, soldiers, managers, cops, stockbrokers, clergymen, bankers, lawyers, teachers, landlords, security guards, admen and everyone who works for them. There is a snowball effect since every time you idle some bigshot you liberate his flunkeys and underlings also. Thus the economy implodes. Forty percent of the workforce are whitecollar workers, most of whom have some of the most tedious and idiotic jobs ever concocted. Entire industries, insurance and banking and real estate for instance, consist of nothing but useless paper-shuffling. It is no accident that the "tertiary sector,'' the service sector, is growing while the "secondary sector" (industry) stagnates and the "primary sector" (agriculture) nearly disappears. Because work is unnecessary except to those whose power it secures, workers are shifted from relatively useful to relatively useless occupations as a measure to assure public order. Anything is better than nothing. That's why you can't go home just because you finish early. They want your time, enough of it to make you theirs, even if they have no use for most of it. Otherwise why hasn't the average work week gone down by more than a few minutes in the past fifty years? Next we can take a meat-cleaver to production work itself. No more war production, nuclear power, junk food, feminine hygiene deodorant-and above all, no more auto industry to speak of. An occasional Stanley Steamer or Model-T might be all right, but the auto-eroticism on which such pestholes as Detroit and Los Angeles depend is out of the question. Already, without even trying, we've virtually solved the energy crisis, the environmental crisis and assorted other insoluble social problems. Finally, we must do away with far and away the largest occupation, the one with the longest hours, the lowest pay and some of the most tedious tasks around. I refer to housewives doing housework and child-rearing. By abolishing wage-labor and achieving full unemployment we undermine the sexual division of labor. The nuclear family as we know it is an inevitable adaptation to the division of labor imposed by modem wage-work. Like it or not, as things have been for the last century or two it is economically rational for the man to bring home the bacon, for the woman to do the shitwork to provide him with a haven in a heartless world, and for the children to be marched off to youth concentration camps called "schools," primarily to keep them out of Mom's hair but still under control, but incidentally to acquire the habits of obedience and punctuality so necessary for workers. If you would be rid of patriarchy, get rid of the nuclear family whose unpaid "shadow work," as Ivan Illich says, makes possible the work-system that makes it necessary. Bound up with this no-nukes strategy is the abolition of childhood and the closing of the schools. There are more full-time students than full-time workers in this country. We need children as teachers, not students. They have a lot to contribute to the ludic revolution because they're better at playing than grownups are. Adults and children are not identical but they will become equal through interdependence. Only play can bridge the generation gap. I haven't as yet even mentioned the possibility of cutting way down on the little work that remains by automating and cybernizing it. All the scientists and engineers and technicians freed from bothering with war research and planned obsolescence would have a good time devising means to eliminate fatigue and tedium and danger from activities like mining. Undoubtedly they'll find other projects to amuse themselves with. Perhaps they'll set up world-wide all-inclusive multi-media communications systems or found space colonies. Perhaps. I myself am no gadget freak. I wouldn't care to live in a pushbutton paradise. I don't want robot slaves to do everything; I want to do things myself. There is, I think, a place for labor-saving technology, but a modest place. The historical and pre-historical record is not encouraging. When productive technology went from hunting-gathering to agriculture and on to industry, work increased while skills and self-determination diminished. The further evolution of industrialism has accentuated what Harry Braverman called the degradation of work. Intelligent observers have always been aware of this. John Stuart Mill wrote that all the laborsaving inventions ever devised haven't saved a moment's labor. Karl Marx wrote that "it would be possible to write a history of the inventions, made since 1830, for the sole purpose of supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working class." The enthusiastic technophiles Saint-Simon, Comte, Lenin, B. F. Skinner-have always been unabashed authoritarians also; which is to say, technocrats. We should be more than skeptical about the promises of the computer mystics. They work like dogs; chances are, if they have their way, so will the rest of us. But if they have any particularized contributions more readily subordinated to human purposes than the run of high tech, let's give them a hearing. What I really want to see is work turned into play. A first step is to discard the notions of a "job" and an "occupation." Even activities that already have some ludic content lose most of it by being reduced to jobs which certain people, and only those people are forced to do to the exclusion of all else. Is it not odd that farm workers toil painfully in the fields while their air-conditioned masters go home every weekend and putter about in their gardens? Under a system of permanent revelry, we will witness the Golden Age of the dilettante which will put the Renaissance to shame. There won't be any more jobs, just things to do and people to do them. The secret of turning work into play, as Charles Fourier demonstrated, is to arrange useful activities to take advantage of whatever it is that various people at various times in fact enjoy doing. To make it possible for some people to do the things they could enjoy it will be enough just to eradicate the irrationalities and distortions which afflict these activities when they are reduced to work. I, for instance, would enjoy doing some (not too much) teaching, but I don't want coerced students and I don't care to suck up to pathetic pedants for tenure. Second, there are some things that people like to do from time to time, but not for too long, and certainly not all the time. You might enjoy baby-sitting for a few hours in order to share the company of kids, but not as much as their parents do. The parents meanwhile, profoundly appreciate the time to themselves that you free up for them, although they'd get fretful if parted from their progeny for too long. These differences among individuals are what make a life of free play possible. The same principle applies to many other areas of activity, especially the primal ones. Thus many people enjoy cooking when they can practice it seriously at their leisure, but not when they're just fueling up human bodies for work. Third-other things being equal-some things that are unsatisfying if done by yourself or in unpleasant surroundings or at the orders of an overlord are enjoyable, at least for a while, if these circumstances are changed. This is probably true, to some extent, of all work. People deploy their otherwise wasted ingenuity to make a game of the least inviting drudge-jobs as best they can. Activities that appeal to some people don't always appeal to all others, but everyone at least potentially has a variety of interests and an interest in variety. As the saying goes, "anything once." Fourier was the master at speculating how aberrant and perverse penchants could be put to use in post-civilized society, what he called Harmony. He thought the Emperor Nero would have turned out all right if as a child he could have indulged his taste for bloodshed by working in a slaughterhouse. Small children who notoriously relish wallowing in filth could be organized in "Little Hordes" to clean toilets and empty the garbage, with medals awarded to the outstanding. I am not arguing for these precise examples but for the underlying principle, which I think makes perfect sense as one dimension of an overall revolutionary transformation. Bear in mind that we don't have to take today's work just as we find it and match it up with the proper people, some of whom would have to be perverse indeed. If technology has a role in all this it is less to automate work out of existence than to open up new realms for re/ creation. To some extent we may want to return to handicrafts, which William Morris considered a probable and desirable upshot of communist revolution. Art would be taken back from the snobs and collectors, abolished as a specialized department catering to an elite audience, and its qualities of beauty and creation restored to integral life from which they were stolen by work. It's a sobering thought that the grecian urns we write odes about and showcase in museums were used in their own time to store olive oil. I doubt our everyday artifacts will fare as well in the future, if there is one. The point is that there's no such thing as progress in the world of work; if anything it's just the opposite. We shouldn't hesitate to pilfer the past for what it has to offer, the ancients lose nothing yet we are enriched. The reinvention of daily life means marching off the edge of our maps. There is, it is true, more suggestive speculation than most people suspect. Besides Fourier and Morris-and even a hint, here and there, in Marx-there are the writings of Kropotkin, the syndicalists Pataud and Pouget, anarcho-communists old (Berkman) and new (Bookchin). The Goodman brothers' Communitas is exemplary for illustrating what forms follow from given functions (purposes), and there is something to be gleaned from the often hazy heralds of alternative/appropriate/intermediate/ convivial technology, like Schumacher and especially Illich, once you disconnect their fog machines. The situationists-as represented by Vaneigem's Revolution of Daily Life and in the Situationist International Anthology-are so ruthlessly lucid as to be exhilarating, even if they never did quite square the endorsement of the rule of the worker's councils with the abolition of work. Better their incongruity, though, than any extant version of leftism, whose devotees look to be the last champions of work, for if there were no work there would be no workers, and without workers, who would the left have to organize? So the abolitionists would be largely on their own. No one can say what would result from unleashing the creative power stultified by work. Anything can happen. The tiresome debater's problem of freedom vs. necessity, with its theological overtones, resolves itself practically once the production of use-values is coextensive with the consumption of delightful play-activity. Life will become a game, or rather many games, but not-as it is now-a zero/sum game. An optimal sexual encounter is the paradigm of productive play. The participants potentiate each other's pleasures, nobody keeps score, and everybody wins. The more you give, the more you get. In the ludic life, the best of sex will diffuse into the better part of daily life. Generalized play leads to the libidinization of life. Sex, in turn, can become less urgent and desperate, more playful. If we play our cards right, we can all get more out of life than we put into it, but only if we play for keeps. No one should ever work. Workers of the world ... relax!

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Automation

Technological unemployment allows for true, meaningful enjoyment and disrupts the relation between work and benefit

Danaher 16 (John Danaher, 3-11-2016, "Will Life Be Worth Living in a World Without Work? Technological Unemployment and the Meaning of Life," SpringerLink, , 10-14) @HA?

Similarly, Bertrand Russell suggests that ‘a great deal of harm’ is done by the belief that work is virtuous (2004); and Kathi Weeks (2011), in her Marxist-feminist analysis of work, argues that there is something puzzling about our commitment to work when it seems true that work itself is so bad both in terms of its quality and quantity. But what exactly does the badness of work consist in? There are two ways to answer to that question. The first is to highlight certain specific and contingent properties of different classes of work. Thus, it can be argued that few people are happy with their work;9 that many forms of work are degrading and humiliating (e.g. certain types of erotic and care work); that some are correlated with high rates of mental illness, depression and suicide (e.g. social work and legal work); that some expose workers to unacceptable physical risks (e.g. sweatshop labour); that workplaces are sometimes rife with bullying, intimidation and sexual harassment; that work often leaves one exhausted and deflated; and so on. The exhaustive enumeration of such bad-making properties would, no doubt, be instructive, but also quite limited. Opponents of the antiwork view could just as easily highlight good-making properties of work, such as the sense of accomplishment and social status that comes with it (Gheaus and Herzog, forthcoming), and the fact that working enables one to access other social goods and services. The problem is that the features that are typically highlighted are contingent upon particular forms or classes of work. Thus, even if everyone agrees that cleaning toilets is not the most glamorous way to make a living, they can point out that cleaning toilets is just one form of work among many. Indeed, one reason to embrace technological displacement in the workplace could be that it frees up workers to pursue more creative and meaningful forms of work. Thus, if we focus solely on contingent bad-making features of certain forms of work, we may end up welcoming some technological displacement, but maintaining our overall commitment to the value of work and the work ethic. I want to defend the more radical view that we should abandon that commitment. This is where the second type of argument comes in. This one highlights badmaking features of work that are intrinsic to the contemporary economic-political structure of work. That structure includes the fact that work is something that one must 9 In support of this one could cite the 2013 Gallup survey suggesting that only 13% of workers worldwide were engaged by their work. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/165269/worldwide-employees-engagedwork.aspx (accessed 26/10/15). 11 do in order to access the basic necessities and luxuries that make life possible and worth living. In other words, in the contemporary economy, work is intrinsically compulsory in nature. This is a controversial claim and needs to be finessed. It is not that we are wage-slaves. We are not physically or legally obliged to work. Rather, work (and the pursuit of work) is a practical and economic necessity, even in the absence of physical or legal obligation. Some might challenge this on the grounds that contemporary welfare states obviate the need for work. But such an argument would ignore the fact that most forms of welfare, in most states, are both insufficient for survival, and explicitly tied to the ability to work. One must usually prove either an active willingness to seek work, or a physical/mental inability to work, in order to access welfare entitlements.10 Thus, even in a relatively generous welfare state, one cannot escape the work ethic except through illness, old-age and death. It is in this way that we are all compelled to pursue work and to participate in a culture that glorifies work. This has at least two bad-making properties that could be eliminated in a postwork future. The first is that the compulsory nature of work leads to an impoverished system of egalitarian justice (Levine 1995). One of the central precepts of liberal egalitarianism is that the state should be neutral with respect to its citizens’ conception of the good life.11 It should not promote or force any particular conception of the good life on its citizens. It should work to tolerate and facilitate people in their pursuit of different conceptions of the good. Of course, it can only do this to the extent that a person’s conception of the good does not unjustly or unfairly deprive anyone else of their conception of the good. The key move for the antiwork proponent is to argue that non-work is a model of human flourishing that the neutral state should tolerate. And the problem with the compulsory nature of work is that it fails to tolerate and facilitate such alternative conceptions of the good life. 10 This ignores the recent social push toward, and limited experimentation with, unconditional basic income schemes. I ignore this for two reasons: (i) the rollout of such schemes is minimal and typically not sufficient to meet basic needs; and (ii) the increase in such schemes is arguably being driven by concerns about structural unemployment. 11 Appealing to the goodness of the neutrality of the state with respect to citizens’ choice of the good life does not imply any particular view of whether non-work is better than work. It merely claims that the state should not impose a choice on its citizens. This leaves open the door to arguing that non-work would be the better choice. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to make this clarification. 12 This is sometimes defended on the grounds that the state cannot facilitate such lifestyle choices: doing so would result in ‘lazy’ people being supported by other hardworking, economically productive individuals (van Parijs 1995). That would lead to injustice. But this is where anti-work arguments start to make more sense in an era of technological unemployment. If we are about to enter an era of technological unemployment, this allows for a re-ordering of the economic-political reality of work: machines can takeover the economically productive forms of labour and, provided the gains from this are appropriately redistributed, the ‘lazy’ lifestyle can be tolerated without a corresponding injustice to others. A second, and perhaps more persuasive, argument can be found in the work of Julia Maskivker (2010). She argues that compulsory work is bad because it undermines a core value of the liberal democratic state: freedom/autonomy.12 Many people would agree that freedom is an essential part of the flourishing life, and compulsory work certainly seems to undermines it. The strength of Maskivker’s analysis lies in identifying three specific ways in which this happens. They are: Freedom-undermining Properties of Work: Compulsory work (i) limits our ability to choose how to make use of our time; (ii) limits our ability to be the authors of our own lives; and/or (iii) involves exploitative/coercive offers. Each of these bad-making properties deserves some scrutiny. The problem with limiting how we can choose to spend our time is best understood in relation to the right to control self-ownership (Widerquist 2013). In the Lockean view, individuals have a right of ownership over their bodies and the fruits of their labour. The problem is that there are resources you need for effective selfownership. For example, people may need an adequate education and access to healthcare. Time is also an essential resource for self-ownership (Maskivker 2010). In fact, time is probably the ultimate resource (Zeckhauser 1973). Other skills and abilities only really have value when we have the time to exercise them. Furthermore, time is a peculiarly non-manipulable resource. There is a limited amount of time in which we get to act out our lives. This makes it all the more important for people to have access to 12 These can be understood as equivalent or distinct concepts. Gerald Dworkin (1981) argues, for instance, that freedom is local concept that applies to particular decisions, whereas autonomy is a global concept applying across a larger swathe of decision points. 13 time. The problem, as Weeks (2011) and others point out, is that work tends to monopolise our time. The modern knowledge-oriented workplace is particularly insidious in this regard.13 Modern communications technologies have broken down the barriers between work and leisure (Crary 2014). We are encouraged to use our time more productively, but also to be available to our workplaces at more times of the day. The death of the regular 9-to-5 workday has, if anything, encouraged work to monopolise more of our time. We have flexible working hours and our work is more outcome-driven, but the marketplaces are open 24/7 and they demand more outcomes from us. The result is an infiltration of work into every hour of the day. Dissolving this monopolisation of time is something we could look forward to in a more fullyautomated economy. The way in which work limits our authorship of our own lives, and the badness this entails, is also linked to the ideal of self-ownership. To understand the idea, we need to think about the individual who truly enjoys their work. Such an individual derives great personal satisfaction and meaning from their work. In this, they seem to be truly owning the narrative of their lives. You could consequently argue that work has no bad-making properties for such an individual. But there are reasons to doubt this. Maskivker uses the analogy between starving and fasting to make the point. When a person is starving or fasting, the physical results are often the same: their bodies are being deprived of essential nutrients. But there is something morally distinct about the two cases. The person who chooses to fast has authorship over their lives; the person who is starving is having their story written by someone else. When it comes to work, there is a sense in which we are all starving not fasting. We may enjoy it, embrace it and endorse it, but at the end of the day we have to do it. We do not have the true authorial control of the faster. This is another reason to embrace technological unemployment. Freeing us from the necessity of work will remove a barrier to authorial control. This brings us to the final bad-making property of work. It is related to the previous properties but can be treated separately. It is that work, in the modern economy, involves a coercive/exploitative offer. You are being asked to work ‘or else’, i.e. work or forgo a number of opportunities or necessities. Thus, even if work ends up being beneficial, it is not treating the worker as a truly autonomous agent. Some might 13 The way in which industrial capitalism polices and manages our times has been long discussed in the antiwork literature, see Woodcock (1944) 14 dispute the coercive or exploitative of the work-offer by arguing that coercive offers always require a threat to make you worse off than you might otherwise have been and it is not clear that the work-offer involves such a threat (Wertheimer 1988). The idea here would be that work is essential for economic productivity and that economic productivity raises societal well-being. In a world without compulsory work we would be much worse off. Thus, there is no sense in which the work-offer is threatening to make you worse off than you might otherwise have been. But, again, this is one place where technological unemployment makes a real difference to the strength of the antiwork position. It might be true in certain social orders that you would be worse off without work, but in a society in which machines can takeover most forms of productive labour, this is much less clear. In such a society, work seems like, at best, an unnecessary extravagance and, at worst, a form of slow torture. If the gains of machine labour can be appropriately redistributed, then we are not worse off for not working. And, indeed, if work retains its compulsory nature in such a society, it would become truly coercive, within the terms set out by the likes Wertheimer (1988). In other words, whatever you think about this bad-making property of work in contemporary societies, it would be particularly acute in a world of rampant technological unemployment.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Automation

Automation escapes the link between work and goods

Danaher 16 (John Danaher, 3-11-2016, "Will Life Be Worth Living in a World Without Work? Technological Unemployment and the Meaning of Life," SpringerLink, , 14-16) @HA?

These ‘work is bad’ arguments can be complemented by a set of ‘opportunity cost’ arguments. These arguments accept that work might have many good-making properties but insist that non-work is better. The opportunity cost arguments have been implicit in the discussion thus far. They can now be made explicit. For starters, it is worth pointing out that one’s choice of work is always limited by what kinds of activities are economically viable. And the kinds of activities that are economically viable are dependent on where wealth is located and how that wealth is disposed (Graeber 2011). There is no guarantee that distribution via the labour market allow workers to spend their lives in the pursuits they find most fulfilling. If we could break the link between income and how we choose to spend our time, then we could spend our time in the manner that best suits our skills, desires and aptitudes. Thus, the biased nature of the market gives us some reason to think that non-work is preferable to work. There are other instrumental and intrinsic reasons for thinking that non-work is better. Russell (2004), for instance, argues that the leisure classes (i.e. those free from 15 the necessity of work) have always been responsible for the scientific, cultural, and political developments that form the backbone of our civilisation. Consequently, he believes that freeing up more people into the leisure class will make for a better world. Bob Black takes a slightly different tack. He argues that the ‘ludic life’ (i.e. the playful life, free from work) is intrinsically better than the working one, and believes that it could lead to “a collective adventure in generalized joy and freely interdependent exuberance” (Black 1986). These ‘opportunity cost’ arguments can be resisted on the grounds that even if the ludic, leisurely life is better than the working one, work itself is necessary in order to secure greater goods (e.g. supply of food and healthcare for all, money to pay for leisure activities). Or, alternatively, on the grounds that they ignore the opportunity costs of non-work itself. Income is not the only good we derive from work in the modern world. As Gheaus and Herzog (forthcoming) have recently argued, there are at least four nonmonetary goods associated with paid work: (i) excellence in the cultivation of our skills; (ii) contribution to society; (iii) a sense of community and (iv) social status. People want to be good at what they do; they want to make a difference to the world in which they live; they want to engage in collective enterprises; and they want to be recognised and validated in the eyes of their social peers. Paid work is the main forum in which they attain these four goods. Are we going to be cutting people off from these sources of meaning and flourishing in a post-work world? I would argue that both forms of resistance are much less compelling if we are living through an era of technological unemployment. The prospect of near ubiquitous automating technologies seems to break the allegedly necessary link between work and these goods. Gheaus and Herzog themselves acknowledge that paid work is a privileged context for the attainment of the four goods they identify partly because we have to spend so much of our time doing it. It thus becomes the only real outlet we have for achieving excellence, social contribution, community and social status. But there is nothing intrinsic to work as I define it in this paper (performance of a skill for economic reward) that makes it the only forum for achieving those goods. People can, and do, achieve excellence, social contribution, community and status in leisure activities, voluntary charitable activities and hobbies. They tend not to because they are forced to spend their time in economically productive forms of work. If technology can take over 16 the economically productive activities, then the instrumental and intrinsic virtues of these non-work contexts can flourish.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › LINKS › L – Automation

The ludic life entails withdrawals from the world as it is, it creates new conceptions of automation– it enables us to use automation as a means to achieve a life of play rather than a force for economic displacement

Danaher 19 John Danaher is a lecturer in the School of Law at NUI Galway. I am interested in the philosophy of responsibility, ethical issues of all varieties, human enhancement and transhumanism, scientific evidence and the law, and the philosophy of religion. Applied Ethics Normative Ethics Philosophy of Law Social and Political Philosophy. “In Defense of the Post-Work Future: Withdrawal and the Ludic Life” 2019-06-02 ///Mgal

My first argument is that work is bad and its automation is to be welcomed. This is an argument I have defended before (Danaher 2017 & 2018). What I present here is a summary and slight modification of these previous efforts. The argument starts with the premise that work is bad and that anything that hastens its demise is to be welcomed; it then notes that automation is something that can hasten its demise; and thus concludes that the automation of work is desirable. For the purposes of this chapter, I am not going to defend the claim that automation can hasten the demise of work. This is not an uncontroversial premise, but a full defence of it would require an excessive amount of time and space. It is something that has been defended by myself and others, at much greater length, in other work (Brynjoflsson and McAfee 2014; Ford 2015; Avent 2016; Frey and Osborne 2017; Danaher 2017; Danaher 2019). For the purposes of this chapter I am asking the reader to grant, if only for the sake of argument, that automation can hasten the demise of work and to focus on the axiological premise of my argument instead. Is work really bad and should its demise be welcomed? For the purposes of my argument, ‘work’ should be defined narrowly as a type of economic employment, i.e. as the performance of activities and skills for the purpose of receiving (or in the hope of receiving) an economic reward (Danaher 2017). To claim that work, so defined, is a bad thing is not a new idea. There are many well-known anti-work theorists who have argued that work both immiserates and imprisons the ordinary worker (Black 1986; Gorz 1989; Frayne 2016; Anderson 2017; Graeber 2018). The problem with such arguments, as typically presented, is that they contradict the lived experiences of many workers. Although there are, no doubt, lots of people who feel immiserated and imprisoned by the work they do (Graeber 2018), there are also, no doubt, many who see their work as a great source of satisfaction and personal fulfillment. To insist that work is bad in the face of this experience stretches credulity. It usually requires an argument to the effect that these happy workers are victims of a kind of ‘false consciousness’. While they might think their work is meaningful and desirable, they are wrong to think this: 4 they have imbibed and absorbed a pro-work ideology that inures them to the true horrors of what they are doing. While there is something to be said for this idea, I prefer not to deny the actual experiences of happy workers. I prefer to make two connected points (i) that while certain forms of work may be quite good, and certain individual workers quite happy with what they do, their work takes place within an institutional structure that is bad and getting worse (call this the ‘structural badness thesis); and (ii) that non-work is better, i.e. that a life free from the demands of economic employment would allow for a greater form of personal fulfillment and meaning (call this the ‘opportunity cost’ thesis). Let’s briefly consider both of these claims. Let’s start with the claim that work is structurally bad. The basic idea here is that work in the modern world takes place within a set of institutional structures (markets for goods and services, contract and employment law norms, social welfare and entitlement law norms etc.) that is bad and getting worse. On a previous occasion (Danaher 2018), I suggested that the structural badness of work has the character of a collective action problem. While taking up work is often rational and beneficial from an individual’s perspective, the net result of everyone doing this is an equilibrium pattern of employment that is bad (and getting worse) for the majority of workers. The badness of this equilibrium arises from the tendency of modern employment to undermine individual freedom and subject workers to arbitrary practices of domination (Anderson 2017), from the increasingly fragmented and precarious nature of employment (Weil 2014; Standing 2011), from the growing levels of income inequality and distributive injustice in employment-related rewards (Piketty 2014; Atkinson 2015), and from the tendency for modern work to colonise our time and our mental real estate (Frayne 2015). The result is that much of what we now do is geared around ensuring our employability and proving our productivity — so much so that we aren’t even given the opportunity to imagine what a world without work might be like. What’s more, all of these negative structural features of work are being made worse by technology: technology enables greater surveillance and connectivity, thereby exacerbating the tendency for work to colonise our minds and to undermine our freedom; the very same features also facilitate the fragmentation of the workplace and the precariousness of employment; and, finally, advances in automation often benefit the few, highly skilled workers, at the expense of the many. Let’s now consider the opportunity cost thesis. The idea here is that if we could exist in a world without the pressures and demands of work we might be able to flourish in a way that 5 we currently cannot. This claim is essential if you are to embrace the notion that the automation of work might be a good thing. If you don’t believe that non-work would be better, then a natural response to the structural badness thesis might be to try to slow-down the development of automating technologies and try to reform work from within. But if you believe that non-work might be better than work, you can embrace the disruptive potential of automating technologies. So is there any reason to believe this? Bertrand Russell (1935) famously argued that non-work was better than work because it would give people the opportunity to develop higher, intellectual virtues. Indeed, he went so far as to argue that the leisure classes have, historically, been responsible for all the advances of civilisation. The goal should be to make everyone part of the leisure class. This smacks of a certain aristocratic elitism, and suggests that the value of a non-working life should be measured in terms of its social contribution and productivity. That’s not all that different from what we currently have: it just replaces economic contribution and productivity with another metric of success. A simpler argument, and one the pushes us further away from the ‘work ethic’ paradigm, is that without the economic pressures and necessities of work, people will be free to do what they most desire to do — to pursue their own conception of the good life. Of course, this is only true if, having been freed from the pressures of work, they are not left starving and destitute. This is where proposals for the basic income, or similar schemes of welfare distribution, become essential to any case for a post-work future. But assuming they are not left starving and destitute — that they all participate fairly in the benefits of automated abundance — there is reason to hope that they will be free to pursue whatever meaning and purpose they see fit to pursue. This argument quickly runs into a problem. The hope that people who are freed from the yoke of work will be able to pursue whatever conception of the good life they happen to prefer rests on the naive assumption that the effects of automation will be limited. To be precise, it assumes that people will be displaced from forms of work they don’t enjoy and left free to pursue whatever they do enjoy. This is naive because it is unlikely that we can easily control the automation of different modes of work, and quite likely that advances in automating technologies will have far wider effects, particularly if those advances are sufficient to hasten the general demise of work. In a world of significant technological unemployment, not only will automating technologies displace humans from unpleasant forms of work, they will also displace humans from activities that are associated with high levels of meaning and satisfaction, e.g. scientific discovery, or moral/charitable work aimed 6 at alleviating the suffering of others (Danaher 2017). What’s more, even if machines don’t completely replace humans in the pursuit of these goods, they may assist humans in such a way that undermines or lessens the value of human achievements in those domains. They will make things too easy and sever the connection between human activity and the goods toward which that activity is directed. Humans will still be able to derive some meaning and purpose from what they do: but it will be an impoverished or lesser form. We end up with a paradox of sorts: the kind of automation we need to achieve a genuinely post-work world may be the very same kind of automation that undermines the pursuit of happiness beyond the world of work. What can be done about this paradox? In previous work, I argued that we could solve this paradox by pursuing an integrationist approach to technology (Danaher 2017). In other words, instead of racing against the machines we can race with them and become more machine-like ourselves. We can prioritise the development of technologies that enhance and augment human capacities, not technologies that replace or displace such capacities. This would enable us to continue to pursue the kinds of projects that currently bring us much meaning and happiness (e.g. discovery of new truths, benefitting our fellow humans and so on), without completely sacrificing the benefits of technology. There are, however, some significant problems with the integrationist approach. For one thing, it is a largely conservative strategy for dealing with the automation of work and the post-work world. Its appeal lies in its capacity for maintaining the current pathways to meaning and fulfillment. The irony then is that if the integrationist strategy were truly successful, it may just suck us back into the world of work — the very world that I am arguing we should be glad to escape. What’s more, the integrationist strategy is highly uncertain and unpredictable. We may not develop the requisite technologies in time to stop the negative effects of automation beyond the workplace, and we may not be able to develop them at all. To pursue the integrationist strategy is thus to make a bet that is highly uncertain and highly conservative. This leads one to wonder whether there might not be an alternative strategy that would provide a more radical break from the world we current have, while at the same time being more practically feasible. This is where the strategy of ‘withdrawal’ comes in. I now turn to the defence of that strategy. To start off, I need to clarify what I mean by the strategy of withdrawal. I understand it to be the practice of withdrawing from the demands of the world as it is currently constituted, into a world that is largely ludic or game-like in nature. This isn’t a new idea. Bob Black, a famous anarchist anti-work writer, long ago argued that work should be abolished in order to enable us to live a more play-like existence (Black 1986). And Bernard Suits, in his philosophical dialogue The Grasshopper, argued that a perfect technological utopia (in which all productive activities have been automated) would be a world in which we do nothing but play games. My goal is to offer a more persuasive case in favour of this approach. To do that, I have to put some shape on the idea by identifying some minimal conditions on what would count as a game-like existence. One minimal condition is that individuals who pursue a game-like existence must retreat from the world of objective, instrumental goods – such as economic productivity, scientific and intellectual discovery, the alleviation of distributive inequalities and human suffering, and so on. These things will still be important to human flourishing, but the assumption is they can be left, largely, to the machines to bring about (who will do so in a more effective, efficient and tireless manner than their human forebears). Individuals can then dedicate themselves to maintaining relationships with families and friends (always a core part of human life) and, most importantly, to game-like pursuits. What then is a game-like pursuit? Bernard Suits’s (2005) widely-cited definition holds that a game is a set of activities aimed at an arbitrarily defined end (the prelusory goal), where those activities are pursued in an inefficient rule-bound manner (the constitutive rules), and where the people playing the game willingly accept its rule-bound inefficiencies (the lusory attitude). Put more pithily, Suits argues that a game is any voluntary triumph over unnecessary obstacles. As definitions of game-like activities go, this is pretty good. But for present purposes, I think we need to add one more ingredient in order to properly distinguish game-like activities from non-game-like activities. This additional ingredient is ‘triviality’. That is to say, the key defining feature of a game is that it does not (and is known not to) serve a higher purpose or significance. Winning the game (if the game has a clear winning state) does not necessarily make the world a better place, improve one’s economic standing, or contribute to the sum total of human knowledge. Success in the game may exemplify certain aesthetic virtues, it may develop individual or collective character, and it may make the players happy or more satisfied, but that is about it. If it does serve some additional higher purpose, this is entirely accidental or contingent upon its role is a certain social order. In short, games are things that are to be enjoyed for the performances they entail, not for the outcomes they realise. Insisting upon this ‘triviality’ condition helps to avoid two important errors that arise from thinking about games and the post-work future. First, it avoids Yuval Noah Harari’s mistake of presuming that everything we do is a game. Harari is interested in human flourishing and meaning in a post-work economy and he is dismissive of those who worry that in such a world we would do nothing but play sophisticated ‘virtual’ reality games of no ultimate significance (Harari 2017). He is dismissive because he thinks this is what we already do. For example, he argues that religion is a virtual reality game in which we score points in order to progress to the next level (heaven) and that consumerism is a virtual reality game in which we score points in order to gain social status. While this reframing of current social practices as games has a delightful insouciance to it — and may appeal to someone like me who is deeply sceptical of religion and modern capitalism — it clearly does violence to those who actually live those belief systems. They don’t think that what they are doing is trivial or virtual or game-like. They think it is very real and very important. Insisting on the triviality condition avoids conflating or stretching the concept of the game so far as to include these serious pursuits. Similarly, it avoids the error of assuming that much of what the work we currently do is an elaborate (if occasionally torturous) game. Someone who has read David Graeber’s critique of modern employment may be inclined to make this error (Graeber 2018).1 Graeber argues that many of the jobs in modern service and knowledge economies are, as he bluntly puts it, ‘bullshit’: they serve no higher purpose or need, and the people working in them are aware of this but try to ignore it or justify it. I don’t deny Graeber’s claims about the pointlessness of much work. I would just argue that it is a mistake to infer from this that work as currently constituted is an elaborate game. It is not. While the tasks that make up any particular job might be trivial and pointless, having a job is not. It is economically and socially necessary. Without a job you will more than likely be left destitute and unable to 1 I don’t suggest here that Graeber himself makes this mistake. 9 thrive, and viewed as a social pariah. This makes work something that is far from a game. You would have to sever the connection between bullshit work and instrumental economic gain to make it a game. Insisting on the triviality condition avoids trivialising current forms of work. The importance of the triviality condition should not, however, be misunderstood. To say that games and game-like activities are trivial does not mean they are ‘unreal’ or ‘unimportant’. The things that happen within the games might be very real indeed. You can develop real skills and capacities within a game. You can forge real friendships and alliances. You can experience real pain, joy, frustration and satisfaction. None of this need be trivial. It’s just that the game itself that serves no larger purpose. So, to clarify, in arguing for the strategy of withdrawal I am arguing that we should retreat from the demands of the world as currently constituted, with its focus on instrumental activities and economic gains, to a world of largely game-like activities (with plenty of time for sociability, family and friendship). I make no prescriptions about the kinds of game-like activities people will or should pursue in this post-work future. To make such prescriptions would undermine one of the benefits of escaping the world of work: the freedom to pursue that which you desire to pursue. I only make prescriptions about the abstract properties of game-like activities, properly construed. But even if you focus on those abstract properties,

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Reform is impossible – you have an ethical responsibility to negate workism.

Weeks ’11 [Kathi, Associate Professor of Women's Studies at Duke University. “The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries.” Duke University Press. p. 136-138; JFan] [*We don’t endorse ableist language or gendered language]

There are two points I want to make here. The first is that by tapping into the critique of alienation, and offering more work as the solution, management discourses drain the critique of some of its force. The vision of nonalienated labor articulated by critics like Fromm, Mies, and Schleuning, in which work is reintegrated into life, may have been compelling as a critique of modernization’s doctrine and practices of separate spheres, but it loses its critical edge in the context of postmodernity’s subsumption of life into work. The affirmation of unalienated labor is not an adequate strategy by which to contest contemporary modes of capitalist control; it is too readily co-opted in a context in which the metaphysics of labor and the moralization of work carry so much cultural authority in so many realms. This is not to suggest that we should abandon the struggles for better work, for liberation from mindless and repetitive tasks, dangerous environments, numbing isolation, and petty hierarchies. It is important to recognize, however, that the language and to a certain degree the practices of work humanization have been coopted. The ideology of human-resource management—with its various programs for humanizing work to make it a place where employees can be expected to dedicate their hearts as well as their hands and brains, with its techniques for producing more productive models of worker subjectivity—should be recognized as an attempt to address by rendering profitable various expressions of dissatisfaction with work. In this regard, Baudrillard’s critique of a version of the Marxist critique of alienation seems particularly appropriate: “It convinces men [individuals] that they are alienated by the sale of their labor power, thus censoring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be alienated as labor power” (1975, 31).

The problem, therefore, is how to advance demands for better work— how to make good on work’s promises of social utility and individual meaning—in a way that does not simply echo and reaffirm the prescription for a lifetime of work. The question I want to consider is whether the kind of affirmation of work at the heart of the work ethic can be used successfully in the struggle for better work: is it possible to demand both better work and less work without one demand neutralizing the critical force of the other? Muirhead offers one attempt to combine these efforts. To recall the earlier discussion, both Gini and Muirhead call for new ethics of work that can continue to celebrate and encourage commitment to waged work, while insisting that such work should be adequately compensated and personally satisfying. But Muirhead goes further, recognizing that these two commitments, to the affirmation of work’s inherent value and to the improvement of its conditions, can function at cross-purposes. As a way to manage this, he adds a third commitment: to keep work, even good work, in its place so that it does not consume the whole of life, which would moderate the claims about work’s value by simultaneously pursuing a politics directed at work’s reform and reduction (2004, 12). “Tempering the value of work,” Muirhead explains, “also protects against the abuse of that value in the name of practices that are exploitative—an abuse to which the work ethic is particularly prone” (176).

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All attempts to fix work are mere semantics – anything short of a full reorientation away from labor are insufficient

Krisis-Group 99 The Krisis Group was founded in 1986 in Nuremberg, by German left-wing radical intellectuals and activists influenced by the work of Karl Marx and Theodor Adorno. Its leading members included Robert Kurz, Roswitha Scholz, Ernst Lohoff, Norbert Trenkle and Claus-Peter Ortlieb. The group published the theoretical journal Krisis : Contribution to a Critique of Commodity Society, and the review Marxist Critique. The Krisis Group also organized seminars and debates, and published articles in different European and South American reviews , 31st of December, 1999, “Manifesto against Labour” ///Mgal

After centuries of domestication, the modern human being can not even imagine a life without labour. As a social imperative, labour not only dominates the sphere of the economy in the narrow sense, but also pervades social existence as a whole, creeping into everyday life and deep under the skin of everybody. “Free time”, a prison term in its literal meaning, is spent to consume commodities in order to increase (future) sales. Beyond the internalised duty of commodity consumption as an end-in-itself and even outside offices and factories, labour casts its shadow on the modern individual. As soon as our contemporary rises from the TV chair and becomes active, every action is transformed into an act similar to labour. The joggers replace the time clock by the stopwatch, the treadmill celebrates its post-modern rebirth in chrome-plated gyms, and holidaymakers burn up the kilometres as if they had to emulate the year’s work of a long-distance lorry driver. Even sexual intercourse is orientated towards the standards of sexology and talk show boasting. King Midas was quite aware of meeting his doom when anything he touched turned into gold; his modern fellow sufferers, however, are far beyond this stage. The demons for work (labour) even don’t realise any longer that the particular sensual quality of any activity fades away and becomes insignificant when adjusted to the patterns of labour. On the contrary, our contemporaries quite generally only ascribe meaning, validity and social significance to an activity if they can square it with the indifference of the world of commodities. His labour’s subjects don’t know what to make of a feeling like grief; the transformation of grief into grieving-work, however, makes the emotional alien element a known quantity one is able to gossip about with people of one’s own kind. This way dreaming turns into dreaming-work, to concern oneself with a beloved one turns into relationship-work, and care for children into child raising work past caring. Whenever the modern human being insists on the seriousness of his activities, he pays homage to the idol by using the word “work” (labour). The imperialism of labour then is reflected not only in colloquial language. We are not only accustomed to using the term “work/labour” inflationary, but also mix up two essentially different meanings of the word. “Labour” no longer, as it would be correct, stands for the capitalist form of activity carried out in the end-in-itself treadmills, but became a synonym for any goal-directed human effort in general, thereby covering up its historical tracks. This lack of conceptual clarity paves the way for the widespread “common-sense” critique of labour society, which argues just the wrong way around by affirming the imperialism of labour in a positivist way. As if labour would not control life through and through, the labour society is accused of conceptualising “labour” too narrowly by only validating marketable gainful employment as “true” labour in disregard of morally decent do-it-yourself work or unpaid self-help (housework, neighbourly help, etc.). An upgrading and broadening of the concept labour shall eliminate the one-sided fixation along with the hierarchy involved. Such thinking is not at all aimed at emancipation from the prevailing compulsions, but is only semantic patchwork. The apparent crisis of the labour society shall be resolved by manipulation of social awareness in elevating services, which are extrinsic to the capitalist sphere of production and deemed to be inferior so far, to the nobility of “true” labour. Yet the inferiority of these services is not merely the result of a certain ideological view, but inherent in the very fabric of the commodity-producing system and cannot be abolished by means of a nice moral re-definition. What can be regarded as “real” wealth has to be expressed in monetary form in a society ruled by commodity production as an end-in-itself. The concept of labour determined by this structure imperialistically rubs off onto any other sphere, although only in a negative way in making clear that basically everything is subjected to its rule. So the spheres extrinsic to commodity production necessarily remain well within the shadow of the capitalist production sphere because they don’t square with economic administrative time logic even if – and strictly when – their function is vital as it is the case with respect to “female labour” in the spheres of “sweet” home, loving care, etc. A moralising broadening of the labour concept instead of radical criticism not only veils the social imperialism of the commodity producing economy, but fits extremely well with the authoritarian crisis management. The call for the full recognition of “housework” and other menial services carried out in the so-called “3rd sector”, raised since the 1970s of the last century, was focused on social benefits at the beginning. The administration in crisis, however, has turned the table and mobilises the moral impetus of such a claim straight against financial hopes in making use of the infamous “subsidiarity principle”. Singing the praise of “honorary posts” and “honorary citizen activity” does not mean that citizens may poke about in the nearly empty public coffers. Rather, it is meant to cover up the state’s retreat from the field of social services, to conceal the forced labour schemes that are already under way, and to mask the mean attempt to shift the burden of crisis onto women. The public institutions retire from social commitment, appealing kindly and free of charge to “all of us” from now on to take “private” initiative in fighting one’s very own or other’s misery and never demand financial aid. This way the definition juggle with the still “sacred” concept of labour, widely misunderstood as an emancipatory approach, clears the way for the abolition of wages by retention of labour on the scorched earth of the market economy. The steps taken by public institutions bear out that today social emancipation cannot be achieved by means of a re-definition of labour, but only by a conscious devaluation of the very concept.

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Don’t let them justify work – its unreformable, totalizing, and alienating – The alt is essential to open up debate around work and question the dehumanizing activity which occupies every part of our lives

Frayne ’15 (David, lecturer and social researcher based at Cardiff University, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work, 2015, pg. 47-52, )

We hated the place and despised everything it had come to stand for, and yet we were terrified of being ‘set free’ into an economic vacuum where we would struggle to find work and have to present ourselves to other potential employers as similarly enthusiastic, compliant and flexible. I often arrived at the warehouse in the mornings with a mixture of relief that I still had a job and disappointment that the place had not been somehow swept away during the night. Ivor Southwood – Non-Stop Inertia (2011)

Social critics have long been analysing the spiritual costs of work, and this endeavour has, along the way, been enriched by the firsthand accounts of workers themselves. Studs Terkel’s 1972 book Working is worth another mention here as a veritable treasure trove of insights into people’s everyday realities. I quote here just a couple of examples from the book. Phil Stallings, a spot welder for Ford, describes his daily round: The welding gun’s got a square handle, with a button on the top for high-voltage and a button on the bottom for low. The first is to clamp the metal together. The second is to fuse it … I stand in one spot, about two- or three-feet area, all night. The only time a person stops is when the line stops. We do about thirty-two jobs per car, per unit. Forty-eight units an hour, eight hours a day. Thirty-two times forty-eight times eight. Figure it out. That’s how many times I push that button. (Terkel, 2004: 159) Steve Dubi, a steelworker, reflects on his status as an employee: You’re not regarded. You’re just a number out there. Just like a prisoner. When you report off you tell ’em your badge number. A lotta people don’t know your name. They know you by your badge number. My number is 44-065. At the main office they don’t know who 44-065 is … They just know he’s 44-065. (Terkel, 2004: 554)

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Work K – CNDI 23 › FRAMEWORK › FW – Factory DA

Refusal of the social factory wherein work consumes our entire society is key to rights and resistance

Carmichael ’19 (Patrick Carmichael, Managing Director of Camtree: The Cambridge Teacher Research Exchange. Camtree is creating a global platform for educators who wish to reflect on their practice and conduct research to improve learning in their classrooms and institution, “Refusal of Work, Liberation of Time and the Convivial University”, Education and Technological Unemployment, 30 April 2019, ) //OC

Operaismo also explored the idea of the ‘social factory’ whereby society as a whole was organized according to the same principles of domination, production and consumption as the workplace, although its critics have argued that while attention was paid to domestic labour, for example, this was still explored through a theoretical lens that ascribed a central role to the industrial ‘mass worker’. According to this perspective, education can be seen not as a separate domain, but as a particular form of work, and teachers and students are not separated from workers as ‘intellectuals’. Students are workers in formation: already linked to the productive cycles of capitalism, not only by virtue of the marketization of education, and employer input into curriculum and pedagogy, but through the need to work to fund their studies, or by having opportunities to study constrained by their involvement in other forms of labour (often gender-specific) in the social factory. The everyday life of academic workers (students, teachers, researchers and others) blurs the spatial and temporal distinctions between home; school, college or university; and work, making educational settings both social factories in their own right (Selwyn 2014: 71) and part of a broader social factory tied to capitalist production. Alquati’s accounts of work at Fiat and Olivetti presaged developments that have affected not only industrial settings but other sectors of the economy including education. Already, in the 1960s, automation was not simply replacing mundane manual labour, but, as Alquati described, highly trained and supposedly highly invested technicians were already becoming regarded as dispensable, with their roles being reduced to piecework or replaced entirely (Alquati 1975: 37–38). Aspects of traditionally manual labour were becoming ‘intellectualised’ and demanding of new techno-literacies, while at the same time skilled and intellectually demanding work was becoming proletarianized and precarious. Contemporary patterns of automation are continuing this pattern of not simply replacing manual labour but also making inroads into middle-class jobs, compounding the ‘professional precarity’ already enabled by marketization and neoliberalism. So, while the specifics may differ from the situations about which Alquati and Panzieri were writing, there remains the potential for self-elucidating workers’ inquiry and co-research as a basis for radical refusal of work. Alquati’s ‘model’ question regarding FIAT could easily be reframed to ask student workers in formation to consider ‘What different things can I hope for in a society dominated by businesses like Amazon or Uber’ or, alternatively, ‘What different things can I hope for in a society where automation has led to widespread technological unemployment, including my own?’ Summarizing the operaist position on refusal, Thoburn argues that ‘the refusal of work can… be seen as… a propulsive force towards inventive practice within and against the productive regimes of the social factory’ (Thoburn 2003: 111). Rather than the abolition of labour as an aspect of an idealized future communist society, in operaismo, the refusal of work, together with workers’ inquiry and co-research, represent a radical praxis; an active means of exploring alternative ways of being outside capitalist cycles of production and consumption. Before discussing in more detail what this might involve in the context of higher education, it is important to examine the rather different perspectives on work, refusal and education of André Gorz.

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Vote negative to refuse work – our alternative embraces a ‘worthwhile ethic’ and promotes research strategies that resist alienation and work dogma. Debate is a unique site for utopian thinking and your ballot can be a radical act of autonomy.

Frayne ’15 (David, lecturer and social researcher based at Cardiff University, The Refusal of Work: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to Work, 2015, pg. 230-237, )

The vocabulary of my own book has not been a vocabulary of responsibility and duty, but a vocabulary of freedom. My main focus has been on our troubled desire to escape the realities of working life, and my belief is that the most crucial advantage of less work is its promise to allow us to live more varied and convivial lives. For my part, the call for less work is at its most compelling as a celebration of the human capacity for autonomy: ‘the capacity to represent and recreate oneself and one’s relationships, the freedom to design, within obvious bounds, our own lives’ (Weeks, 2011: 168) – a capacity that the work-centred society has blocked through processes of alienation and colonisation. Ultimately, however, if we want to build a strong case against work, we should take a moment to recognise the breadth of today’s critical contributions. Activists would do well to stress that a resistance to the work dogma can simultaneously be a resistance for the environment, for health, for gender equality, for the family, for personal autonomy, and, let us also not forget, for fun

2. Take an active interest in society’s outsiders A research intervention into the work dogma would require researchers to take an active interest in the values and practices of people on the margins of society. The role I imagine for the researcher here is a person who uses her skills and insight to work in solidarity with movements for the refusal of work. Max Haiven and Alex Khasnabish have argued that today’s monopolisation of social research by academic institutions has too often seen researchers working on rather than with social movements. Too often the role of the researcher is to ‘swoop in’ from above, applying a disciplinary perspective and generating grist for the academic mill (Haiven and Khasnabish, 2014: 13). As Michael Billig argues, the publications tied to these research endeavours are often unintelligible and highly self-referential (and, in any case, often fail to see the light of day outside the academy) (Billig, 2013). Like Haiven and Khasnabish, I would like to see a confident defence of the researcher who works in solidarity with social movements for the purposes of transformative social change, as opposed to working on social movements for the purposes of generating academic capital.

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Work K – CNDI 23 › 1NCs › 1nc – One-Off

The impact is institutionalized homicide – the modern system of work is the root cause of social decay and results in psychological and material suffering that outweigh the aff.

Black ‘16 Bob Black is an American anarchist. Bob Black graduated from the University of Michigan and Georgetown Law School. He holds two post graduate degrees–one in jurisprudence and social policy from the University of California, Berkeley and the second in Criminal justice from University Of New York, Albany.; 2016; Instead of Work; pg. 1-20. //[TMS—GK]

Work makes a mockery of freedom. The official line is that we all have rights and live in a democracy. Other unfortunates who aren't free like we are have to live in police states. These victims obey orders or-else, no matter how arbitrary. The authorities keep them under regular surveillance. State bureaucrats control even the smaller details of everyday life. The officials who push them around are answerable only to higher-ups, public or private. Either way, dissent and disobedience are punished. Informers report regularly to the authorities. All this is supposed to be a very bad thing. And so it is, although it is nothing but a description of the modem workplace. The liberals and conservatives and libertarians who lament totalitarianism are phonies and hypocrites. There is more freedom in any moderately Stalinized dictatorship than there is in the ordinary American workplace. You find the same sort of hierarchy and discipline in an office or factory as you do in a prison or monastery. In fact, as Foucault and others have shown, prisons and factories came in at about the same time, and their operators consciously borrowed from each other's control techniques. A worker is a part-time slave. The boss says when to show up, when to leave, and what to do in the meantime. He tells you how much work to do and how fast. He is free to carry his control to humiliating extremes, regulating, if he feels like it, the clothes you wear or how often you go to the bathroom. With a few exceptions he can fire you for any reason, or no reason. He has you spied on by snitches and supervisors, he amasses a dossier on every employee. Talking back is called "insubordination," just as if a worker is a naughty child, and it not only gets you fired, it disqualifies you for unemployment compensation. Without necessarily endorsing it for them either, it is noteworthy that children at home and in school receive much the same treatment, justified in their case by their supposed immaturity. What does this say about their parents and teachers who work? The demeaning system of domination I've described rules over half the waking hours of a majority of women and the vast majority of men for decades, for most of their lifespans. For certain purposes it's not too misleading to call our system democracy or capitalism or-better still-industrialism, but its real names are factory fascism and office oligarchy. Anybody who says these people are "free" is lying or stupid. You are what you do. If you do boring, stupid, monotonous work, chances are you'll end up boring, stupid, and monotonous. Work is a much better explanation for the creeping cretinization all around us than even such significant moronizing mechanisms as television and education. People who are regimented all their lives, handed off to work from school and bracketed by the family in the beginning and the nursing home at the end, are habituated to hierarchy and psychologically enslaved. Their aptitude for autonomy is so atrophied that their fear of freedom is among their few rationally grounded phobias. Their obedience training at work carries over into the families they start, thus reproducing the system in more ways than one, and into politics, culture and everything else. Once you drain the vitality from people at work, they'll likely submit to hierarchy and expertise in everything. They're used to it. We are so close to the world of work that we can't see what it does to us. We have to rely on outside observers from other times or other cultures to appreciate the extremity and the pathology of our present position. There was a time in our own past when the "work ethic" would have been incomprehensible, and perhaps Weber was on to something when he tied its appearance to a religion, Calvinism, which if it emerged today instead of four centuries ago would immediately and appropriately be labeled a cult. Be that as it may, we have only to draw upon the wisdom of antiquity to put work in perspective. The ancients saw work for what it is, and their view prevailed, the Calvinist cranks notwithstanding, until overthrown by industrialism-but not before receiving the endorsement of its prophets. Let's pretend for a moment that work doesn't turn people into stultified submissives. Let's pretend, in defiance of any plausible psychology and the ideology of its boosters, that it has no effect on the formation of character. And let's pretend that work isn't as boring and tiring and humiliating as we all know it really is. Even then, work would still make a mockery of all humanistic and democratic aspirations, just because it usurps so much of our time. Socrates said that manual laborers make bad friends and bad citizens because they have no time to fulfill the responsibilities of friendship and citizenship. He was right. Because of work, no matter what we do we keep looking at our watches. The only thing "free" about so-called free time is that it doesn't cost the boss anything. Free time is mostly devoted to getting ready for work, going to work, returning from work, and recovering from work. Free time is a euphemism for the peculiar way labor as a factor of production not only transports itself at its own expense to and from the workplace but assumes primary responsibility for its own maintenance and repair. Coal and steel don't do that. Lathes and typewriters don't do that. But workers do. No wonder Edward G. Robinson in one of his gangster movies exclaimed, "Work is for saps!" Both Plato and Xenophon attribute to Socrates and obviously share with him an awareness of the destructive effects of work on the worker as a citizen and a human being. Herodotus identified contempt for work as an attribute of the classical Greeks at the zenith of their culture. To take only one Roman example, Cicero said that "whoever gives his labor for money sells himself and puts himself in the rank of slaves." His candor is now rare, but contemporary primitive societies which we are wont to look down upon have provided spokesmen who have enlightened Western anthropologists. The Kapauku of West Irian, according to Leopold Posposil, have a conception of balance in life and accordingly work only every other day, the day of rest designed "to regain the lost power and health." Our ancestors, even as late as the eighteenth century when they were far along the path to our present predicament, at least were aware of what we have forgotten, the underside of industrialization. Their religious devotion to "St. Monday"-thus establishing a de facto five-day week 150-200 years before its legal consecration-was the despair of the earliest factory owners. They took a long time in submitting to the tyranny of the bell, predecessor of the time clock. In fact it was necessary for a generation or two to replace adult males with women accustomed to obedience and children who could be molded to fit industrial needs. Even the exploited peasants of the ancien regime wrested substantial time back from their landlord's work. According to Lafargue, a fourth of the French peasants' calendar was devoted to Sundays and holidays, and Chayanov's figures from villages in Czarist Russia-hardly a progressive society likewise show a fourth or fifth of peasants' days devoted to repose. Controlling for productivity, we are obviously far behind these backward societies. The exploited muzhiks would wonder why any of us are working at all. So should we. To grasp the full enormity of our deterioration, however, consider the earliest condition of humanity, without government or property, when we wandered as hunter-gatherers. Hobbes surmised that life was then nasty, brutish and short. Others assume that life was a desperate unremitting struggle for subsistence, a war waged against a harsh Nature with death and disaster awaiting the unlucky or anyone who was unequal to the challenge of the struggle for existence. Actually, that was all a projection of fears for the collapse of government authority over communities unaccustomed to doing without it, like the England of Hobbes during the Civil War. Hobbes' compatriots had already encountered alternative forms of society which illustrated other ways of life-in North America, particularly-but already these were too remote from their experience to be understandable. (The lower orders, closer to the condition of the Indians, understood it better and often found it attractive. Throughout the seventeenth century, English settlers defected to Indian tribes or, captured in war, refused to return. But the Indians no more defected to white settlements than Germans climb the Berlin Wall from the west.) The "survival of the fittest" version-the Thomas Huxley version---of Darwinism was a better account of economic conditions in Victorian England than it was of natural selection, as the anarchist Kropotkin showed in his book Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution. (Kropotkin was a scientist-a geographer-who'd had ample involuntary opportunity for fieldwork whilst exiled in Siberia: he knew what he was talking about.) Like most social and political theory, the story Hobbes and his successors told was really unacknowledged autobiography. The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins, smveying the data on contemporary huntergatherers, exploded the Hobbesian myth in an article entitled "The Original Affluent Society." They work a lot less than we do, and their work is hard to distinguish from what we regard as play. Sahlins concluded that "hunters and gatherers work less than we do; and rather than a continuous travail, the food quest is intermittent, leisure abundant, and there is a greater amount of sleep in the daytime per capita per year than in any other condition of society." They worked an average of four hours a day, assuming they were "working" at all. Their "labor," as it appears to us, was skilled labor which exercised their physical and intellectual capacities; unskilled labor on any large scale, as Sahlins says, is impossible except under industrialism. Thus it satisfied Friedrich Schiller's definition of play, the only occasion on which man realizes his complete humanity by giving full "play" to both sides of his twofold nature, thinking and feeling. As he put it: "The animal works when deprivation is the mainspring of its activity, and it plays when the fullness of its strength is this mainspring, when superabundant life is its own stimulus to activity." (A modern version---dubiously developmental-is Abraham Maslow's counterposition of "deficiency" and "growth" motivation.) Play and freedom are, as regards production, coextensive. Even Marx, who belongs (for all his good intentions) in the productivist pantheon, observed that "the realm of freedom does not commence until the point is passed where labor under the compulsion of necessity and external utility is required." He never could quite bring himself to identify this happy circumstance as what it is, the abolition of work-it's rather anomalous, after all, to be proworker and anti-work-but we can. The aspiration to go backwards or forwards to a life without work is evident in every serious social or cultural history of pre-industrial Europe, among them M. Dorothy George's England In Transition and Peter Burke's Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe. Also pertinent is Daniel Bell's essay, "Work and its Discontents," the first text, I believe, to refer to the "revolt against work" in so many words and, had it been understood, an important correction to the complacency ordinarily associated with the volume in which it was collected, The End of Ideology. Neither critics nor celebrants have noticed that Bell's endof-ideology thesis signaled not the end of social unrest but the beginning of a new, uncharted phase unconstrained and uninformed by ideology. It was Seymour Lipset (in Political Man), not Bell, who announced at the same time that "the fundamental problems of the Industrial Revolution have been solved," only a few years before the post- or meta-industrial discontents of college students drove Lipset from UC Berkeley to the relative (and temporary) tranquility of Harvard. As Bell notes, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, for all his enthusiasm for the market and the division of labor, was more alert to (and more honest about) the seamy side of work than Ayn Rand or the Chicago economists or any of Smith's modem epigones. As Smith observed: "The understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose life is spent in performing a few simple operations ... has no occasion to exert his understanding ... He generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become." Here, in a few blunt words, is my critique of work. Bell, writing in 1956, the Golden Age of Eisenhower imbecility and American self-satisfaction, identified the unorganized, unorganizable malaise of the 1970s and since, the one no political tendency is able to harness, the one identified in HEW's report Work in America, the one which cannot be exploited and so is ignored. That problem is the revolt against work. It does not figure in any text by any laissez-faire economist-Milton Friedman, Murray Rothbard, Richard Posner-because, in their terms, as they used to say on Star Trek, "it does not compute." If these objections, informed by the love of liberty, fail to persuade humanists of a utilitarian or even paternalist turn, there are others which they cannot disregard. Work is dangerous to your health, to borrow a book title. In fact, work is mass murder or genocide. Directly or indirectly, work will kill most of the people who read these words. Between 14,000 and 25,000 workers are killed annually in this country on the job. Over two million are disabled. Twenty to twenty-five million are injured every year. And these figures are based on a very conservative estimation of what constitutes a work-related injury. Thus they don't count the half million cases of occupational disease every year. I looked at one medical textbook on occupational diseases which was 1,200 pages long. Even this barely scratches the surface. The available statistics count the obvious cases like the 100,000 miners who have black lung disease, of whom 4,000 die every year, a much higher fatality rate than for AIDS, for instance, which gets so much media attention. This reflects the unvoiced assumption that AIDS afflicts perverts who could control their depravity whereas coal-mining is a sacrosanct activity beyond question. What the statistics don't show is that tens of millions of people have their lifespans shortened by work-which is all that homicide means, after all. Consider the doctors who work themselves to death in their 50s. Consider all the other workaholics. Even if you aren't killed or crippled while actually working, you very well might be while going to work, coming from work, looking for work, or trying to forget about work. The vast majority of victims of the automobile are either doing one of these work-obligatory activities or else fall afoul of those who do them. To this augmented body-count must be added the victims of auto-industrial pollution and work-induced alcoholism and drug addiction. Both cancer and heart disease are modern afflictions normally traceable, directly, or indirectly, to work. Work, then, institutionalizes homicide as a way of life. People think the Cambodians were crazy for exterminating themselves, but are we any different? The Pol Pot regime at least had a vision, however blurred, of an egalitarian society. We kill people in the six-figure range (at least) in order to sell Big Macs and Cadillacs to the survivors. Our forty or fifty thousand annual highway fatalities are victims, not martyrs. They died for nothing--or rather, they died for work. But work is nothing to die for.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › 1NCs › 1nc – One-Off

Reform is impossible – you have an ethical responsibility to negate workism.

Weeks ’11 [Kathi, Associate Professor of Women's Studies at Duke University. “The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries.” Duke University Press. p. 136-138; JFan] [*We don’t endorse ableist language or gendered language]

There are two points I want to make here. The first is that by tapping into the critique of alienation, and offering more work as the solution, management discourses drain the critique of some of its force. The vision of nonalienated labor articulated by critics like Fromm, Mies, and Schleuning, in which work is reintegrated into life, may have been compelling as a critique of modernization’s doctrine and practices of separate spheres, but it loses its critical edge in the context of postmodernity’s subsumption of life into work. The affirmation of unalienated labor is not an adequate strategy by which to contest contemporary modes of capitalist control; it is too readily co-opted in a context in which the metaphysics of labor and the moralization of work carry so much cultural authority in so many realms. This is not to suggest that we should abandon the struggles for better work, for liberation from mindless and repetitive tasks, dangerous environments, numbing isolation, and petty hierarchies. It is important to recognize, however, that the language and to a certain degree the practices of work humanization have been coopted. The ideology of human-resource management—with its various programs for humanizing work to make it a place where employees can be expected to dedicate their hearts as well as their hands and brains, with its techniques for producing more productive models of worker subjectivity—should be recognized as an attempt to address by rendering profitable various expressions of dissatisfaction with work. In this regard, Baudrillard’s critique of a version of the Marxist critique of alienation seems particularly appropriate: “It convinces men [individuals] that they are alienated by the sale of their labor power, thus censoring the much more radical hypothesis that they might be alienated as labor power” (1975, 31).

The problem, therefore, is how to advance demands for better work— how to make good on work’s promises of social utility and individual meaning—in a way that does not simply echo and reaffirm the prescription for a lifetime of work. The question I want to consider is whether the kind of affirmation of work at the heart of the work ethic can be used successfully in the struggle for better work: is it possible to demand both better work and less work without one demand neutralizing the critical force of the other? Muirhead offers one attempt to combine these efforts. To recall the earlier discussion, both Gini and Muirhead call for new ethics of work that can continue to celebrate and encourage commitment to waged work, while insisting that such work should be adequately compensated and personally satisfying. But Muirhead goes further, recognizing that these two commitments, to the affirmation of work’s inherent value and to the improvement of its conditions, can function at cross-purposes. As a way to manage this, he adds a third commitment: to keep work, even good work, in its place so that it does not consume the whole of life, which would moderate the claims about work’s value by simultaneously pursuing a politics directed at work’s reform and reduction (2004, 12). “Tempering the value of work,” Muirhead explains, “also protects against the abuse of that value in the name of practices that are exploitative—an abuse to which the work ethic is particularly prone” (176).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Work K – CNDI 23 › 1NCs › 1nc – One-Off

Modern work is unsustainable and irredeemable – it just produces social and economic hierarchies. In this way, “guaranteed jobs” means guaranteed enslavement.

Black ‘16 Bob Black is an American anarchist. Bob Black graduated from the University of Michigan and Georgetown Law School. He holds two post graduate degrees–one in jurisprudence and social policy from the University of California, Berkeley and the second in Criminal justice from University Of New York, Albany.; 2016; Instead of Work; pg. 20-31. //[TMS—GK]

Bad news for liberals: regulatory tinkering is useless in this life-and-death context. The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration was designed to police the core part of the problem, workplace safety. Even before Reagan and the Supreme Court stifled it, OSHA was a farce. At previous and (by current standards) generous Carter-era funding levels, a workplace could expect a random visit from an OSHA inspector once every 46 years. State control of the economy is no solution. Work is, if anything, more dangerous in the state socialist countries than it is here. Thousands of Russian workers were killed or injured building the Moscow subway. Stories reverberate about covered-up Soviet nuclear disasters which make Times Beach and Three-Mile Island look like elementary-school air-raid drills. On the other hand, deregulation, currently fashionable, won't help and will probably hurt. From a health and safety standpoint, among others, work was at its worst in the days when the economy most closely approximated laissez-faire. Historians like Eugene Genovese have argued persuasively that-as antebellum slavery apologists insisted-factory wage-workers in the Northern American states and in Europe were worse off than Southern plantation slaves. No rearrangement of relations among bureaucrats and businessmen seems to make much difference at the point of production. Serious enforcement of even the rather vague standards enforceable in theory by OSHA would probably bring the economy to a standstill. The enforcers apparently appreciate this, since they don't even try to crack down on most malefactors. What I've said so far ought not to be controversial. Many workers are fed up with work. There are high and rising rates of absenteeism, turnover, employee theft and sabotage, wildcat strikes, and overall goldbricking on the job. There may be some movement toward a conscious and not just visceral rejection of work. And yet the prevalent feeling, universal among bosses and their agents and also widespread among workers themselves is that work itself is inevitable and necessary. I disagree. It is now possible to abolish work and replace it, insofar as it serves useful purposes, with a multitude of new kinds of free activities. To abolish work requires going at it from two directions, quantitative and qualitative. On the one hand, on the quantitative side, we have to cut down massively on the amount of work being done. At present most work is useless or worse and we should simply get rid of it. On the other hand-and I think this is the crux of the matter and the revolutionary new departure-­ we have to take what useful work remains and transform it into a pleasing variety of game-like and craft-like pastimes, indistinguishable from other pleasurable pastimes, except that they happen to yield useful end-products. Surely that shouldn't make them less enticing to do. Then all the artificial barriers of power and property could come down. Creation could become recreation. And we could all stop being afraid of each other. I don't suggest that most work is salvageable in this way. But then most work isn't worth trying to save. Only a small and diminishing fraction of work serves any useful purpose independent of the defense and reproduction of the work-system and its political and legal appendages. Twenty years ago, Paul and Percival Goodman estimated that just five percent of the work then being done-­ presumably the figure, if accurate, is lower now would satisfy our minimal needs for food, clothing, and shelter. Theirs was only an educated guess but the main point is quite clear: directly or indirectly, most work serves the unproductive purposes of commerce or social control. Right off the bat we can liberate tens of millions of salesmen, soldiers, managers, cops, stockbrokers, clergymen, bankers, lawyers, teachers, landlords, security guards, admen and everyone who works for them. There is a snowball effect since every time you idle some bigshot you liberate his flunkeys and underlings also. Thus the economy implodes. Forty percent of the workforce are whitecollar workers, most of whom have some of the most tedious and idiotic jobs ever concocted. Entire industries, insurance and banking and real estate for instance, consist of nothing but useless paper-shuffling. It is no accident that the "tertiary sector,'' the service sector, is growing while the "secondary sector" (industry) stagnates and the "primary sector" (agriculture) nearly disappears. Because work is unnecessary except to those whose power it secures, workers are shifted from relatively useful to relatively useless occupations as a measure to assure public order. Anything is better than nothing. That's why you can't go home just because you finish early. They want your time, enough of it to make you theirs, even if they have no use for most of it. Otherwise why hasn't the average work week gone down by more than a few minutes in the past fifty years? Next we can take a meat-cleaver to production work itself. No more war production, nuclear power, junk food, feminine hygiene deodorant-and above all, no more auto industry to speak of. An occasional Stanley Steamer or Model-T might be all right, but the auto-eroticism on which such pestholes as Detroit and Los Angeles depend is out of the question. Already, without even trying, we've virtually solved the energy crisis, the environmental crisis and assorted other insoluble social problems. Finally, we must do away with far and away the largest occupation, the one with the longest hours, the lowest pay and some of the most tedious tasks around. I refer to housewives doing housework and child-rearing. By abolishing wage-labor and achieving full unemployment we undermine the sexual division of labor. The nuclear family as we know it is an inevitable adaptation to the division of labor imposed by modem wage-work. Like it or not, as things have been for the last century or two it is economically rational for the man to bring home the bacon, for the woman to do the shitwork to provide him with a haven in a heartless world, and for the children to be marched off to youth concentration camps called "schools," primarily to keep them out of Mom's hair but still under control, but incidentally to acquire the habits of obedience and punctuality so necessary for workers. If you would be rid of patriarchy, get rid of the nuclear family whose unpaid "shadow work," as Ivan Illich says, makes possible the work-system that makes it necessary. Bound up with this no-nukes strategy is the abolition of childhood and the closing of the schools. There are more full-time students than full-time workers in this country. We need children as teachers, not students. They have a lot to contribute to the ludic revolution because they're better at playing than grownups are. Adults and children are not identical but they will become equal through interdependence. Only play can bridge the generation gap. I haven't as yet even mentioned the possibility of cutting way down on the little work that remains by automating and cybernizing it. All the scientists and engineers and technicians freed from bothering with war research and planned obsolescence would have a good time devising means to eliminate fatigue and tedium and danger from activities like mining. Undoubtedly they'll find other projects to amuse themselves with. Perhaps they'll set up world-wide all-inclusive multi-media communications systems or found space colonies. Perhaps. I myself am no gadget freak. I wouldn't care to live in a pushbutton paradise. I don't want robot slaves to do everything; I want to do things myself. There is, I think, a place for labor-saving technology, but a modest place. The historical and pre-historical record is not encouraging. When productive technology went from hunting-gathering to agriculture and on to industry, work increased while skills and self-determination diminished. The further evolution of industrialism has accentuated what Harry Braverman called the degradation of work. Intelligent observers have always been aware of this. John Stuart Mill wrote that all the laborsaving inventions ever devised haven't saved a moment's labor. Karl Marx wrote that "it would be possible to write a history of the inventions, made since 1830, for the sole purpose of supplying capital with weapons against the revolts of the working class." The enthusiastic technophiles Saint-Simon, Comte, Lenin, B. F. Skinner-have always been unabashed authoritarians also; which is to say, technocrats. We should be more than skeptical about the promises of the computer mystics. They work like dogs; chances are, if they have their way, so will the rest of us. But if they have any particularized contributions more readily subordinated to human purposes than the run of high tech, let's give them a hearing. What I really want to see is work turned into play. A first step is to discard the notions of a "job" and an "occupation." Even activities that already have some ludic content lose most of it by being reduced to jobs which certain people, and only those people are forced to do to the exclusion of all else. Is it not odd that farm workers toil painfully in the fields while their air-conditioned masters go home every weekend and putter about in their gardens? Under a system of permanent revelry, we will witness the Golden Age of the dilettante which will put the Renaissance to shame. There won't be any more jobs, just things to do and people to do them. The secret of turning work into play, as Charles Fourier demonstrated, is to arrange useful activities to take advantage of whatever it is that various people at various times in fact enjoy doing. To make it possible for some people to do the things they could enjoy it will be enough just to eradicate the irrationalities and distortions which afflict these activities when they are reduced to work. I, for instance, would enjoy doing some (not too much) teaching, but I don't want coerced students and I don't care to suck up to pathetic pedants for tenure. Second, there are some things that people like to do from time to time, but not for too long, and certainly not all the time. You might enjoy baby-sitting for a few hours in order to share the company of kids, but not as much as their parents do. The parents meanwhile, profoundly appreciate the time to themselves that you free up for them, although they'd get fretful if parted from their progeny for too long. These differences among individuals are what make a life of free play possible. The same principle applies to many other areas of activity, especially the primal ones. Thus many people enjoy cooking when they can practice it seriously at their leisure, but not when they're just fueling up human bodies for work. Third-other things being equal-some things that are unsatisfying if done by yourself or in unpleasant surroundings or at the orders of an overlord are enjoyable, at least for a while, if these circumstances are changed. This is probably true, to some extent, of all work. People deploy their otherwise wasted ingenuity to make a game of the least inviting drudge-jobs as best they can. Activities that appeal to some people don't always appeal to all others, but everyone at least potentially has a variety of interests and an interest in variety. As the saying goes, "anything once." Fourier was the master at speculating how aberrant and perverse penchants could be put to use in post-civilized society, what he called Harmony. He thought the Emperor Nero would have turned out all right if as a child he could have indulged his taste for bloodshed by working in a slaughterhouse. Small children who notoriously relish wallowing in filth could be organized in "Little Hordes" to clean toilets and empty the garbage, with medals awarded to the outstanding. I am not arguing for these precise examples but for the underlying principle, which I think makes perfect sense as one dimension of an overall revolutionary transformation. Bear in mind that we don't have to take today's work just as we find it and match it up with the proper people, some of whom would have to be perverse indeed. If technology has a role in all this it is less to automate work out of existence than to open up new realms for re/ creation. To some extent we may want to return to handicrafts, which William Morris considered a probable and desirable upshot of communist revolution. Art would be taken back from the snobs and collectors, abolished as a specialized department catering to an elite audience, and its qualities of beauty and creation restored to integral life from which they were stolen by work. It's a sobering thought that the grecian urns we write odes about and showcase in museums were used in their own time to store olive oil. I doubt our everyday artifacts will fare as well in the future, if there is one. The point is that there's no such thing as progress in the world of work; if anything it's just the opposite. We shouldn't hesitate to pilfer the past for what it has to offer, the ancients lose nothing yet we are enriched. The reinvention of daily life means marching off the edge of our maps. There is, it is true, more suggestive speculation than most people suspect. Besides Fourier and Morris-and even a hint, here and there, in Marx-there are the writings of Kropotkin, the syndicalists Pataud and Pouget, anarcho-communists old (Berkman) and new (Bookchin). The Goodman brothers' Communitas is exemplary for illustrating what forms follow from given functions (purposes), and there is something to be gleaned from the often hazy heralds of alternative/appropriate/intermediate/ convivial technology, like Schumacher and especially Illich, once you disconnect their fog machines. The situationists-as represented by Vaneigem's Revolution of Daily Life and in the Situationist International Anthology-are so ruthlessly lucid as to be exhilarating, even if they never did quite square the endorsement of the rule of the worker's councils with the abolition of work. Better their incongruity, though, than any extant version of leftism, whose devotees look to be the last champions of work, for if there were no work there would be no workers, and without workers, who would the left have to organize? So the abolitionists would be largely on their own. No one can say what would result from unleashing the creative power stultified by work. Anything can happen. The tiresome debater's problem of freedom vs. necessity, with its theological overtones, resolves itself practically once the production of use-values is coextensive with the consumption of delightful play-activity. Life will become a game, or rather many games, but not-as it is now-a zero/sum game. An optimal sexual encounter is the paradigm of productive play. The participants potentiate each other's pleasures, nobody keeps score, and everybody wins. The more you give, the more you get. In the ludic life, the best of sex will diffuse into the better part of daily life. Generalized play leads to the libidinization of life. Sex, in turn, can become less urgent and desperate, more playful. If we play our cards right, we can all get more out of life than we put into it, but only if we play for keeps. No one should ever work. Workers of the world ... relax!